Carroll v.

United States

Held:

1. The legislative history of 6 of the act supplemental to the National Prohibition Act,
November 23, 1921, c. 134, 42 Stat. 223, which makes it a misdemeanor for any
officer of the United States to search a private dwelling without a search warrant or to
search any other building or property without a search warrant, maliciously and
without reasonable cause, shows clearly the intent of Congress to make a distinction
as to the necessity for a search warrant in the searching of private dwellings and in
the searching of automobiles or other road vehicles, in the enforcement of the
Prohibition Act.

(a) That the primary purpose is the seizure and destruction of the contraband liquor,
and the provisions for forfeiture of the vehicle and arrest of the transporter are merely
incidental.

2. The Fourth Amendment denounces only such searches or seizures as are

unreasonable, and it is to be construed in the light of what was deemed an
unreasonable search and seizure when it was adopted, and in a manner which will
conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual citizens. P.
3. Search without a warrant of an automobile, and seizure therein of liquor subject to
seizure and destruction under the Prohibition Act, do not violate the Amendment, if
made upon probable cause, i.e., upon a belief, reasonably arising out of
circumstances known to the officer, that the vehicle contains such contraband liquor. P
4. Various acts of Congress are cited to show that, practically since the beginning of
the Government, the Fourth Amendment has been construed as recognizing a
necessary difference between a search for contraband in a store, dwelling-house, or
other structure
Page 267 U. S. 133
for the search of which a warrant may readily be obtained, and a search of a ship,
wagon, automobile, or other vehicle which may be quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
5. Section 26, Title II, of the National Prohibition Act, provides that, when an officer
"shall discover any person in the act" of transporting intoxicating liquor in any
automobile, or other vehicle, in violation of law, it shall be his duty to seize the liquor
and thereupon to take possession of the vehicle and arrest the person in charge of it,
and that, upon conviction of such person, the court shall order the liquor destroyed,
and, except for good cause shown, shall order a public sale, etc. of the other property
seized.

(b) Hence, the right to search an automobile for illicit liquor and to seize the liquor, if
found, and thereupon to seize the vehicle also and to arrest the offender, does not
depend upon the right to arrest the offender in the first instance, and therefore it is not
determined by the degree of his offence -- whether a misdemeanor under 29, Title II
of the Act, because of being his first or second offence, or a felony because it is his
third, and the rule allowing arrest without warrant for misdemeanor only when the
offence is committed in the officer's presence, but for a felony when the officer has
reasonable cause to believe that the person arrested has committed a felony, is not
the test of the validity of such search and seizure.
(c) The seizure is legal if the officer, in stopping and searching the vehicle, has
reasonable or probable cause for believing that contraband liquor is being illegally
transported in it.
(d) The language of 26 -- when an officer shall "discover " any person in the act of
transporting, etc. -- does not limit him to what he learns of the contents of a passing
automobile by the use of his senses at the time.
(e) The section thus construed is consistent with the Fourth Amendment..
6. Probable cause held to exist where prohibition officers, while patrolling a highway
much used in illegal transportation of liquor, stopped and searched an automobile
upon the faith of information previously obtained by them that the car and its
occupants, identified by the officers, were engaged in the illegal business of
"bootlegging."
7. When contraband liquor, seized from an automobile and used in the conviction of
those in charge of the transportation, was shown at the trial to have been taken in a
search justified by probable cause, held that the Court's refusal to return he liquor on
defendants' motion before trial, even if erroneous because probable cause was not
then proven, was not a substantial reason for . reversing the conviction.
8. The Court notices judicially that Grand Rapids is about 152 miles from Detroit, and
that Detroit, and its neighborhood along the Detroit River, which is the international

boundary, is one of the most active centers for introducing illegally into this country
spirituous liquors for distribution into the interior. Affirmed.
This is a writ of error to the District Court under Section 238 of the Judicial Code. The
plaintiffs in error, hereafter to be called the defendants, George Carroll and John Kiro,
were indicted and convicted for transporting in an automobile intoxicating spirituous
liquor, to-wit: 68 quarts of so-called bonded whiskey and gin, in violation of the
National Prohibition Act. The ground on which they assail the conviction is that the trial
court admitted in evidence two of the 68 bottles, one of whiskey and one of gin, found
by searching the automobile. It is contended that the search and seizure were in
violation of the Fourth Amendment, and therefore that use of the liquor as evidence
was not proper. Before the trial, a motion was made by the defendants that all the
liquor seized be returned to the defendant Carroll, who owned the automobile. This
motion was denied.
The search and seizure were made by Cronenwett, Scully and Thayer, federal
prohibition agents, and one Peterson, a state officer, in December, 1921, as the car
was going westward on the highway between Detroit and Grand Rapids at a point 16
miles outside of Grand Rapids. The facts leading to the search and seizure were as
follows: on September 29th, Cronenwett and Scully were in an apartment in Grand
Rapids. Three men came to that apartment, a man named Kruska and the two
defendants,
Carroll and Kiro. Cronenwett was introduced to them as one Stafford, working in the
Michigan Chair Company in Grand Rapids, who wished to buy three cases of whiskey.
The price was fixed at $13 a case. The three men said they had to go to the east end
of Grand Rapids to get the liquor and that they would be back in half or three-quarters
of an hour. They went away, and in a short time Kruska came back and said they
could not get it that night, that the man who had it was not in, but that they would
deliver it the next day. They had come to the apartment in an automobile known as an
Oldsmobile Roadster, the number of which Cronenwett then identified, a did Scully.
The proposed vendors did not return the next day, and the evidence disclosed no
explanation of their failure to do so. One may surmise that it was suspicion of the real
character of the proposed purchaser, whom Carroll subsequently called by his first
name when arrested in December following. Cronenwett and his subordinates were
engaged in patrolling the road leading from Detroit to Grand Rapids, looking for
violations of the Prohibition Act. This seems to have been their regular tour of duty. On
the 6th of October, Carroll and Kiro, going eastward from Grand Rapids in the same
Oldsmobile Roadster, passed Cronenwett and Scully some distance out from Grand
Rapids. Cronenwett called to Scully, who was taking lunch, that the Carroll boys had
passed them going toward Detroit, and sought with Scully to catch up with them to see
where they were going. The officers followed as far as East Lansing, half way to
Detroit, but there lost trace of them. On the 15th of December, some two months later,

Scully and Cronenwett, on their regular tour of duty, with Peterson, the State officer,
were going from Grand Rapids to Ionia, on the road to Detroit, when Kiro and Carroll
met and passed them in the same automobile, coming from the direction of Detroit to
Grand Rapids. The government agents turned their car and followed the defendants to
a point some sixteen miles east of Grand Rapids, where they stopped them and
searched the car. They found behind the upholstering of the seats, the filling of which
had been removed, 68 bottles. These had labels on them, part purporting to be
certificates of English chemists that the contents were blended Scotch whiskeys, and
the rest that the contents were Gordon gin made in London. When an expert witness
was called to prove the contents, defendants admitted the nature of them to be
whiskey and gin. When the defendants were arrested, Carroll said to Cronenwett,
"Take the liquor and give us one more chance and I will make it right with you," and he
pulled out a roll of bills, of which one was for $10. Peterson and another took the two
defendants and the liquor and the car to Grand Rapids, while Cronenwett, Thayer and
Scully remained on the road looking for other cars of whose coming they had
information. The officers were not anticipating that the defendants would be coming
through on the highway at that particular time, but when they met them there, they
believed they were carrying liquor, and hence the search, seizure and arrest.
PAPA v. MAGO
Original action in the SC for prohibition and certiorari, praying for the annulment of the
order issued by respondent judge
Parties:
Petitioners:
Ricardo G. Papa (Chief of Police of Manila), Juan Ponce Enrile (Commissioner of
Customs), Pedro Pacis (Collector of Customs of the Port of Manila), Martin Alagao
(Patrolman, head of counter-intelligence of the Manila Police Department)
Respondents:
Remedios Mago
Hilarion Jarencio (Presiding Judge of Br. 23, CFI of Manila)
J. Zaldivar
November 4, 1966 having received information the day before that a certain
shipment of misdeclared and undervalued personal effects would be released from the
customs zone of the port of Manila, Alagao and a duly deputized agent of the Bureau
of Customs conducted surveillance of two trucks allegedly carrying the goods. When
the trucks left the customs zone, elements of the counter-intelligence unit intercepted
them in Ermita. The trucks and the nine bales of goods they carried were seized on

instructions of the Chief of Police. Upon investigation those claiming ownership

showed the policemen a Statement of Receipts of Duties Collected in Informal Entry
No. 147-5501 issued by the Bureau of Customs in the name of one Bienvenido
Naguit.
Mago filed with the CFI of Manila a Petition for Mandamus with restraining order or
preliminary injunction, alleging that she was the owner of the goods seized, which
were purchased from Sta. Monica Grocery in San Fernando, Pampanga. She hired
the trucks owned by Lanopa (who filed with her) to bring the goods to her residence in
Sampaloc, Manila. She complained that the goods were seized without a warrant, and
that they were not subject to seizure under Section 2531 of the Tariff and Customs
Code even if they were misdeclared and undervalued because she had bought them
without knowing they had been imported illegally. They asked that the police not open
the bales, the goods be returned, and for moral and exemplary damages.
November 10, 1966 Judge issued an order restraining the police from opening the
nine bales in question, but by then some had already been opened. Five days later
Mago filed an amended petition including as party defendants Pedro Pacis and Martin
Alagao.
December 23, 1966 Mago filed a motion to release the goods, alleging that since the
inventory ordered by the court of the goods seized did not show any article of
prohibited importation, the same should be released upon her posting of the
appropriate bond. The petitioners in the instant case filed their opposition, alleging that
the court had no jurisdiction over the case and thus no jurisdiction to order the release
(case under jurisdiction of CTA), and as the goods were not declared they were
subject to forfeiture.
March 7, 1967 assailed Order issued by Jarencio, authorized release under bond of
goods seized and held by petitioners in connection with the enforcement of the Tariff
and Customs Code. The bond of P40,000.00 was filed five days later. On the same
day, Papa filed on his own behalf a motion for reconsideration on the ground that the
Manila Police Department had been directed by the Collector of Customs to hold the
goods pending termination of the seizure proceedings.
Without waiting for the courts action on the MR, petitioners filed the present action.
Arguments of Petitioners (that seem important)
(1) CFI had no jurisdiction over the case
(2) Mago had no cause of action in the civil case filed with the CFI due to her failure to
exhaust all administrative remedies before invoking judicial intervention
Arguments of Respondents
(1) It was within the jurisdiction of the lower court presided by respondent Judge to
hear and decide Civil Case No. 67496 and to issue the questioned order of March 7,
1967, because said Civil Case No. 67496 was instituted long before seizure, and

identification proceedings against the nine bales of goods in question were instituted
by the Collector of Customs
(2) Petitioners could no longer go after the goods in question after the corresponding
duties and taxes had been paid and said goods had left the customs premises and
were no longer within the control of the Bureau of Customs
IMPORANT ISSUE (theres another involving illegal search and seizure): WON the
judge acted with jurisdiction in issuing the Order releasing the goods in question
HELD: NO. Petition granted, case filed by Mago dismissed.
The Bureau of Customs has the duties, powers and jurisdiction, among others, to
(1) assess and collect all lawful revenues from imported articles, and all other dues,
fees, charges, fines and penalties, accruing under the tariff and customs laws
(2) prevent and suppress smuggling and other frauds upon the customs; and
(3) to enforce tariff and customs laws.
The goods in question were imported from Hongkong, as shown in the "Statement and
Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry". As long as the importation has not
been terminated the imported goods remain under the jurisdiction of the Bureau
of customs. Importation is deemed terminated only upon the payment of the
duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid, at the
port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. The
payment of the duties, taxes, fees and other charges must be in full.
The record shows, by comparing the articles and duties stated in the aforesaid
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" with the
manifestation of the Office of the Solicitor General wherein it is stated that the
estimated duties, taxes and other charges on the goods subject of this case
amounted to P95,772.00 as evidenced by the report of the appraiser of the Bureau of
Customs, that the duties, taxes and other charges had not been paid in full.
Furthermore, a comparison of the goods on which duties had been assessed, as
shown in the "Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry" and the
"compliance" itemizing the articles found in the bales upon examination and inventory,
shows that the quantity of the goods was underdeclared, presumably to avoid
the payment of duties thereon. (e.g. 40 pieces of ladies sweaters assessed in the
Statement when there actually 42 dozen; 100 watch bands were assessed but 2,209
dozen, etc.)
The articles contained in the nine bales in question, were, therefore, subject to
forfeiture under Section 2530, pars. e and m, (1), (3), (4), and (5) of the Tariff and
Customs Code. The Court had held before (and did again in this case) that
merchandise, the importation of which is effected contrary to law, is subject to
forfeiture, and that goods released contrary to law are subject to seizure and
forfeiture.

Even if it be granted, arguendo, that after the goods in question had been brought out
of the customs area the Bureau of Customs had lost jurisdiction over the same,
nevertheless, when said goods were intercepted at the Agrifina Circle on November 4,
1966 by members of the Manila Police Department, acting under directions and orders
of their Chief, Ricardo C. Papa, who had been formally deputized by the
Commissioner of Customs, the Bureau of Customs had regained jurisdiction and
custody of the goods. Section 1206 of the Tariff and Customs Code imposes upon
the Collector of Customs the duty to hold possession of all imported articles
upon which duties, taxes, and other charges have not been paid or secured to
be paid, and to dispose of the same according to law. The goods in question,
therefore, were under the custody and at the disposal of the Bureau of Customs
at the time the petition for mandamus was filed in the Court of First Instance of
Manila on November 9, 1966. The Court of First Instance of Manila, therefore,
could not exercise jurisdiction over said goods even if the warrant of seizure
and detention of the goods for the purposes of the seizure and forfeiture
proceedings had not yet been issued by the Collector of Customs.
The Court reiterated its ruling in De Joya v. Lantin: The owner of seized goods may
set up defenses before the Commissioner of Customs during the proceedings
following seizure. From his decision appeal may be made to the Court of Tax Appeals.
To permit recourse to the Court of First Instance in cases of seizure of imported goods
would in effect render ineffective the power of the Customs authorities under the Tariff
and Customs Code and deprive the Court of Tax Appeals of one of its exclusive
appellate jurisdictions. Republic Acts 1937 and 1125 vest jurisdiction over seizure
and forfeiture proceedings exclusively upon the Bureau of Customs and the
Court of Tax Appeals. Such law being special in nature, while the Judiciary Act
defining the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance is a general legislation, not
to mention that the former are later enactments, the Court of First Instance
should yield to the jurisdiction of the Customs authorities.
The Bureau of Customs acquires exclusive jurisdiction over imported goods, for
the purposes of enforcement of the customs laws, from the moment the goods
are actually in its possession or control, even if no warrant of seizure or
detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with seizure and forfeiture proceedings. In the present case, the
Bureau of Customs actually seized the goods in question on November 4, 1966,
and so from that date the Bureau of Customs acquired jurisdiction over the
goods for the purposes of the enforcement of the tariff and customs laws, to the
exclusion of the regular courts. Much less then would the Court of First
Instance of Manila have jurisdiction over the goods in question after the
Collector of Customs had issued the warrant of seizure and detention on
January 12, 1967. Not having acquired jurisdiction over the goods, it follows that
the Court of First Instance of Manila had no jurisdiction to issue the questioned
order of March 7, 1967 releasing said goods.

consent, uncovered marihuana, which was used to convict petitioner of a federal

crime. The Government seeks to justify the search on the basis of 287(a)(3) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, which provides for warrantless searches of
automobiles and other conveyances "within a reasonable distance from any external
boundary of the United States," as authorized by regulations to be promulgated by the
Attorney General. The Attorney General's regulation defines "reasonable distance" as
"within 100 air miles from any external boundary of the United States." The Court of
Appeals upheld the search on the basis of the Act and regulation.
Held: The warrantless search of petitioner's automobile, made without probable cause
or consent, violated the Fourth Amendment.
(a) The search cannot be justified on the basis of any special rules applicable to
automobile searches, as probable cause was lacking; nor can it be justified by
analogy with administrative inspections, as the officers had no warrant or reason to
believe that petitioner had crossed the border or committed an offense, and there was
no consent by petitioner.
(b) The search was not a border search or the functional equivalent thereof.
Reversed.
Caballes vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
While on a routine patrol in Brgy Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, Sgt.
Victorino Nocejo and Pat. Alex de Castro spotted a passenger jeep unusually covered
with kakawati leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggled goods, the
two officers flagged down the vehicle. Being the driver of the jeep, Caballes was
asked by the officers as to what was loaded in the jeep, to which he did not respond,
appearing pale and nervous. The officers checked the cargo and discovered bundles
of galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by National Power Corporation.
Caballes and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan
Police Station, where he was imprisoned for 7 days.
The trial court found Caballes guilty of the crime of Theft of property. Upon
appeal, the Court fo Aooeaksm affirmed the trial courts judgment of conviction.
Issue: WON the evidence taken from the warrantless search is admissible against
Caballes

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States

Held: No; the evidence are not admissible in evidence.
Petitioner, a Mexican citizen and holder of a valid work permit, challenges the
constitutionality of the Border Patrol's warrantless search of his automobile 25 air
miles north of the Mexican border. The search, made without probable cause or

Ratio: The constitutional proscription against warrantless searches and seizures is not
absolute, but admits of certain exceptions. The situation in the case at bar does not
fall under any of the accepted exceptions.
1

Search of a moving vehicle (ito yung sense ng case talaga)

The rules governing searches and seizures of moving vehicles have been liberalized
for the purposes of practicality. Obtaining a warrant for a moving vehicle is particularly
difficult for want of a specific description of the place, things, and persons to be
searches. Also, it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought. Still,
however, there must be probable cause to conduct such warrantless search.
One form of search of moving vehicles is the stop-and-search without warrant at
checkpoints, which has been declared as not illegal per se, for as long as it is
warranted by the exigencies of public order and conducted in a way least intrusive to
motorists. A checkpoint may either be a mere routine inspection or it may involve an
extensive search.
Routine inspections are not regarded as violative of an individuals right against
unreasonable search. The circumstances in this case, however, do not constitute a
routine inspection. They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the leaves and look inside
the sacks before they were able to see the cable wires.
When a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a search would
be constitutionally permissible only if the officers have probable cause to believe that
either the motorist is a law-offender or they will find the instrumentality or evidence
pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched. In this case, the officers flagged
down the jeep because they became suspicious when they saw that the back of the
vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves, which, to them, was unusual and
uncommon. The Court believes that the fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply
because it is not common for such to be covered in kakawati leaves does not
constitute probable cause to justify a search without a warrant. In addition, there was
no tip or confidential information that could have backed up their search, as
jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become sufficient to
constitute probable cause.
2

Plain view doctrine

It is clear from the records that the cable wires were not exposed to sight because
they were placed in sacks and covered with leaves. They had no clue as to what was
underneath the leaves. Object was not in plain view which could have justified mere
seizure without further search.

Consented search

At most, there was only implied acquiescence, a mere passive conformity, which is no
consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. Evidence is lacking
that Caballes intentionally surrendered his right against unreasonable searches.
Asuncion vs. CA
Following reports from a confidential informer, the Chief of the Malabon Police AntiNarcotics Unit ordered his men to conduct patrol at Barangay Taong with specific
instruction to look for a certain vehicle with a certain plate number and watch out for a
certain drug pusher named Vic Vargas. While patrolling at midnight of December 6,
1993, along Leoo Street, the informant pointed a gray Nissan car and told the
policemen that the occupant thereof had shabu in his possession. They immediately
flagged down the car and the driver turned out to be herein petitioner known as Vic
Vargas in the movies. A consented search in his vehicle was conducted which yielded
a plastic packet containing white substance suspected to be shabu. Another plastic
packet containing the same type of substances suspected to be shabu was taken from
his underwear when he was frisked at the police headquarters. When charged, the
trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for possession of regulated drugs
punishable under the Dangerous Drugs Act , R.A. 642. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial courts ruling. On petition for review before the Supreme Court, petitioner
questions the constitutionality of his arrest and the admissibility of the evidence
against him.
The Supreme Court held that the rule that search and seizure must be supported by a
valid warrant is not absolute. The search of a moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally
accepted exceptions to the constitutional mandate that no search or seizure shall be
made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the
existence of probable cause. The prevalent circumstances of the case undoubtedly
bear out the fact that the search in question was made as regards a moving vehicle
-petitioners vehicle was flagged down by the apprehending officers upon
identification. Therefore, the police authorities were justified in searching the
petitioners automobile without a warrant since the situation demanded immediate
action. The apprehending officers even sought the permission of petitioner to search
the car, to which the latter agreed. As such, since the shabu was discovered by virtue
of a valid warrantless search and the petitioner himself freely gave his consent to said
search, the prohibited drugs found as a result were admissible in evidence.
HON. ARSENIO N. ROLDAN, JR., and THE PHIL. NAVY, vs. HON. FRANCISCO
ARCA, and MORABE, DE GUZMAN & COMPANY,
FACTS:

- Respondent company filed a case against Roldan, Jr. for the recovery of fishing
vessel Tony Lex VI which had been seized and impounded by petitioner Fisheries
Commissioner through the Philippine Navy. The CFI Manila granted it, thus
respondent company took Possession of the vessel Tony Lex VI.
- Petitioner requested the Philippine Navy to apprehend vessels Tony Lex VI and Tony
Lex III, also respectively called Srta. Winnie and Srta. Agnes, for alleged violations of
some provisions of the Fisheries Act. On August 5 or 6, 1965, the two fishing boats
were actually seized for illegal fishing with dynamite.
The Fiscal filed an ex parte motion to hold the boats in custody as instruments and
therefore evidence of the crime, and cabled the Fisheries Commissioner to detain the
vessels. On October 2 and 4, likewise, the CFI of Palawan ordered the Philippine
Navy to take the boats in custody. Judge Francisco Arca issued an order granting the
issuance of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction and issued the preliminary writ
upon the filing by the company of a bond of P5,000.00 for the release of the two
vessels. On 19 October 1965, the Commission and the Navy filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order issuing the preliminary writ
Judge Arca denied the said motion for reconsideration. The Commission and the Navy
filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain Judge
Arca from enforcing his order dated 18 October 1965, and the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction there under issued.
ISSUE: WON a police officer can search without warrant
HELD: YES. Search and seizure without search warrant of vessels and air crafts for
violations of the customs laws have been the traditional exception to the constitutional
requirement of a search warrant, because the vessel can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the search warrant must be sought before such warrant
could be secured; hence it is not practicable to require a search warrant before such
search or seizure can be constitutionally effected. The same exception should apply to
seizures of fishing vessels breaching our fishery laws. They are usually equipped with
powerful motors that enable them to elude pursuing ships of the Philippine Navy or
Coast Guard.
Under our Rules of Court, a police officer or a private individual may, without
a warrant, arrest a person (a) who has committed, is actually committing or is about to
commit an offense in his presence; (b) who is reasonably believed to have committed
an offense which has been actually committed; or (c) who is a prisoner who has
escaped from confinement while serving a final judgment or from temporary detention
during the pendency of his case or while being transferred from one confinement to
another. In the case at bar, the members of the crew of the two vessels were caught in
flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and without the requisite license. Thus their

apprehension without a warrant of arrest while committing a crime is lawful.

Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipment and dynamites therein was
equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest. In the case at bar, the members of the
crew of the two vessels were caught in flagrante illegally fishing with dynamite and
without the requisite license. Thus their apprehension without a warrant of arrest while
committing a crime is lawful. Consequently, the seizure of the vessel, its equipment
and dynamites therein was equally valid as an incident to a lawful arrest.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. LO HO WING alias PETER LO, LIM
CHENG HUAT alias ANTONIO LIM and REYNALDO TIA y SANTIAGO,
defendants. LO HO WING alias PETER LO
FACTS:
- Peter Lo, together with Lim Cheng Huat alias Antonio Lim and Reynaldo Tia, were
charged with a violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Only Peter Lo and Lim
Cheng Huat were convicted.
- In July 1987, the Special Operations Group, a unit of the Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS) of the Philippine Constabulary (PC), received a tip from one of its
informers about an organized group engaged in the importation of illegal drugs,
smuggling of contraband goods, and gunrunning. After an evaluation of the
information received, a project codenamed "OPLAN SHARON 887" was created to
bust the suspected syndicate. As part of the operations, the recruitment of confidential
men and "deep penetration agents' was carried out. One of those recruited was
Reynaldo Tia. The latter offered his services to Lim as his ompanion for his business
nips abroad. In the course of their meetings in China, Tia was introduced to Peter Lo
whom Tia found out to be the person he was to accompany to China in lieu of Lim. As
a "deep penetration agent," Tia regularly submitted reports of his undercover activities
on the suspected criminal syndicate.
- Tia and Peter went to Guangzhou. They went to a local store where Peter purchased
6 tin cans of tea. Tia saw the paper tea bags when the cans were opened for
examination during the purchase. Afterwards, they returned to the hotel. Peter kept
the cans of tea in his hotel room. That evening, Tia went to Peter's room to talk to him.
Upon entering, he saw two other men with Peter. One was fixing the tea bags, while
the other was burning substance on a piece of aluminum foil using a cigarette lighter.
Peter joined the second man and sniffed the smoke emitted by the burning substance.
Tia asked the latter what they would be bringing back to the Philippines. He was
informed that their cargo consisted of Chinese drugs.
- When the 2 arrived in the Phil., the car of the operatives overtook the taxicab ridden
by Peter and Tia and cut into its path forcing the taxi driver to stop his vehicle,
approached the taxicab, and asked the driver to open the baggage compartment. 3

pcs. of luggage were retrieved. They requested from the suspects permission to
search their luggage. A tin can of tea was taken out of the red traveling bag of Peter.
During the investigation, a total of 56 paper tea bags with white crystalline powder
were found and tested and was found out that it was metamphetamine.

She also reported the make and plate number of the taxicab which Balingan boarded.
Upon receiving the report, Lt. Obrera ordered Cpl. Garcia to proceed to the Philippine
Rabbit Terminal in case Balingan would go there. Pat. Kimay, who must have
intercepted Cpl. Garcia's message, also reported that the taxicab described

ISSUE: WON the warrantless search and seizure made against is illegal

by the latter passed along Bonifacio Rotunda. Lt. Obrera instructed him to move out
and proceed to the Police Checkpoint at Kennon Road going to the Philippine Military
Academy. From his post at the Dangwa Bus Station, Pat. Bueno informed Lt. Obrera
that Balingan boarded a Dangwa Bus with plate number NTU-153 bound for Manila.
Lt. Obrera promptly proceeded to the bus station to verify the report. There, he went
up the bus described by Pat. Bueno, and he saw Balingan on the third or fourth seat
behind the driver's seat. In the luggage carrier above her head was the gray luggage
earlier described by Cpl. Garcia. He then left and positioned himself with Ong at the
Lakandula burned area to wait for the bus to depart. At about 11:00 a.m., the bus
moved out (on its way) to Manila via Kennon Road. Lt. Obrera instructed Pat. Kimay,
who was at the Kennon Road Checkpoint, to stop the bus when it reaches the place.
Meanwhile, Lt. Obrera and Lt. Ong

HELD: The search and seizure must be supported by a valid warrant, is not an
absolute rule. There are at least 3 well-recognized exceptions: [1] a search incidental
to an arrest, [2] a search of a moving vehicle, and [3] seizure of evidence in plain view.
The circumstances of the case clearly show that the search in question was made as
regards a moving vehicle. Therefore, a valid warrant was not necessary to effect the
search on appellant and his co-accused. A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is
justified on the ground that "it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought."
In the instant case, it was firmly established from the factual findings of the
trial court that the authorities had reasonable ground to believe that appellant would
attempt to bring in contraband and transport it within the country. The belief was based
on intelligence reports gathered from surveillance activities on the suspected
syndicate, of which appellant was touted to be a member. . The discharge of accused
Tia was based on Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which reads in part: Sec.
9. Discharge of the accused to be state witness. When two or more persons are
jointly charged with the commission of any offense, upon motion of the prosecution
before resting its case,the court may direct one or more of the accused to be
discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state.
People vs. Balingan [GR 105834, 13 February 1995]
Facts:
On 31 August 1988, the Narcotics Intelligence Division of the Baguio City Police
Station received a telephone call from an unnamed male informant. He passed the
information that Jean Balingan y Bobbonan was going to Manila with a bag filled with
marijuana. Acting on the information, then P/Lt. Manuel Obrera
formed a surveillance team to monitor Balingan's movements. The team as deployed
at different places in Baguio City, including Balingan's house on Brookside and bus
stations. Cpl. Garcia soon reported seeing Balingan move out from her residence at
Brookside and board a taxicab which proceeded to the direction of Bonifacio Street.
Balingan was wearing a pink dress and carrying a gray luggage with orange or yellow
belts.

tailed the bus at about 15 to 20 meters behind. As instructed, Pat. Kimay stopped the
bus at the Kennon Road Checkpoint. That was already at 11:30 a.m. Lt. Obrera and
Pat. Ong arrived at the Checkpoint less than a minute after the bus did and
immediately boarded it. Lt. Obrera announced a routinary check-up. Pat. Ong
identified himself as a policeman to Balingan and asked her permission to check her
luggage, she did not respond and just looked outside the window. He opened the
luggage in the luggage carrier overhead and above Balingan and found suspected
marijuana in it. He pulled out the luggage and turned it over to Lt. Obrera. Thereupon,
Lt. Obrera tried to arrest Balingan but the latter resisted and tried to bite his hand and
furthermore held tightly onto the window pane. Lt. Obrera asked Pat. Ong to
fetch Cpl. Garcia from the Philippine Rabbit Terminal in the City proper, so that she
would be the one to bring out Balingan from the bus. In the meantime, he remained
inside the bus holding the confiscated luggage while the other passengers
alighted from the bus. After some 30 minutes, Garcia arrived and pulled Balingan out
of the bus and brought her to the Baguio City Police Station and there locked her up in
jail. On 24 October 1988, Balingan was charged with Violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of
Republic Act 6425, otherwise known as "The Dangerous Drugs Act. On 4 April 1989,
Balingan was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. After trial, Balingan was convicted by
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 4, and was sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment; to pay a fine of P20,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. Balingan appealed.

Issue: Whether the search conducted in the Dangwa bus, subsequent to police
surveillance pursuant to an informants tip, is valid.

the area except on mercy missions to transport sick soldiers and workers to the
hospital and when used to buy food supplies for the men inside the camp.[3]

Held: The search and seizure herein happened in a moving, public vehicle. The rules
governing search and seizure have over the years been steadily liberalized whenever
a moving vehicle is the object of the search on the basis of practicality. This is so
considering that before a warrant could be obtained, the place, things and

Private respondents then filed a complaint [4] for injuction and damages, with an
application for temporary restraining order, with the Regional Trial court, Branch 8, of
Baguio and Benguet. They alleged that the truck had been seized without prior
investigation to determine the existence of probable cause .

persons to be searched must be described to the satisfaction of the issuing judge a

requirement which borders on the impossible in the case of smuggling effected by the
use of a moving vehicle that can transport contraband from one place to another with
impunity. A warrantless search of a moving vehicle is justified on the ground that "it is
not practicable to secure a warrant because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought." Unquestionably, the
warrantless search herein is not bereft of a probable cause. The Baguio INP Narcotics
Intelligence Division received an information that
Balingan was going to transport marijuana in a bag to Manila. Their surveillance
operations revealed that Balingan, whose movements had been previously monitored
by the Narcotics Division, boarded a Dangwa bus bound for Manila carrying a
suspicious-looking gray luggage bag. When the moving, public bus was stopped, her
bag, upon inspection, yielded marijuana. Under those circumstances, the warrantless
search of Balingan's bag was not illegal.
BENJAMIN D. OBRA and BRIG. GEN. TOMAS DUMPIT, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, SPOUSES JAMES BRETT and JUNE PRILL BRETT, respondents.
FACTS:
Petitioner Benjamin D. Obra was, the Regional Director of the Bureau of Mines and
Geo-Sciences (BMGS) in Baguio City. Jeannette M. Grybos wrote him a letter on
behalf of the Gillies heirs of Palasa-an, Mankayan, complaining that private
respondents, spouses James Brett and June Prill Brett, had been conducting illegal
mining activities. Petitioner Obra wrote Brig. Gen. Tomas Dumpit, requesting
assistance in apprehending a truck allegedly used by private respondents in illegal
mining in the area. Petitioner Obra request to Col. Bernardo Estepa, Provincial
Commander of Benguet, that the latter stop momentarily any mining operation or
activity, if there be any, of James and June Prill until the controversy or case has been
resolved by [the BMGS].
Accordingly, elements of RUC-1 under Major Guillermo Densen and led by SGT.
Josefino A. Morales seized, an Isuzu ELF truck (ABX-587) belonging to private
respondents. The truck was impounded by the military and prevented from leaving

ISSUE: WON the warrantless search has a probable cause.

HELD:
The truck was seized while it was entering the mining area; it was not transporting
minerals outside of the area. With regard to the search of moving vehicles, this had
been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it possible for
the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the
warrant must be sought.
This is in no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause. When a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search
has been held to be valid as long as the officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime in the vehicle to be searched.
There could not have been, therefore, any finding of probable cause that the truck was
being used for any illegal mining activities.
Harris v. United States
1. Upon warrants charging violations of the Mail Fraud Statute and the National Stolen
Property Act, five federal agents arrested an accused in the living room of an
apartment which was in his exclusive possession. Without a search warrant, they
searched the apartment (living room, bedroom, kitchen and bath) intensively for five
hours, for two canceled checks and any other means by which the crimes charged
might have been committed. Beneath some clothes in a bedroom bureau drawer, they
discovered a sealed envelope marked "personal papers" of the accused. This was
torn open and found to contain several draft cards which were property of the United
States and the possession of which was a federal offense. Upon the evidence thus
obtained, the accused was convicted of violations of the Selective Training & Service
Act of 1940 and 48 of the Criminal Code.

Held: The evidence was not obtained in violation of the provision of the Fourth
Amendment against unreasonable searches and seizures, nor did its use violate the
privilege of the accused against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment.

CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

2. A search incidental to an arrest may, under appropriate circumstances, extend

beyond the person of the one arrested to the premises under his immediate control.

Police went to petitioner's home on January 28, 1964, to question him about a murder.
In the course of their inquiry, he showed them three guns, and he agreed to take a lie
detector test on February 2. The test was inconclusive on the murder, but, during its
course, petitioner admitted a theft. In petitioner's absence, two other policemen came
to the house and questioned petitioner's wife to check petitioner's story and
corroborate his admission of the theft. Unaware of the visit of the other officers who
had been shown the guns and knowing little about the murder weapon, the police
asked about any guns there might be in the house, and were shown four by
petitioner's wife which she offered to let them take. After one policeman first declined
the offer, they took the guns, along with various articles of petitioner's clothing his wife
made available to them. On February 19, petitioner was arrested in his house for the
murder, and, on that date, a warrant to search petitioner's automobile was applied for
by the police chief and issued by the Attorney General (who had assumed charge of
the investigation and was later the chief prosecutor at the trial), acting as a justice of
the peace. The car, which, at the time of the arrest, was parked in petitioner's
driveway, was subsequently towed to the police station, where, on February 21 and on
two occasions the next year, it was searched. Vacuum sweepings from the car as well
as from the clothing were used as evidence at the trial, along with one of the guns
made available by petitioner's wife. Following the overruling of pretrial motions to
suppress that evidence, petitioner was convicted, and the State Supreme Court
affirmed.

3. A search incidental to an arrest, which is otherwise reasonable, is not rendered

invalid by the fact that the place searched is a dwelling, rather than a place of
business.
4. The search in this case was not rendered invalid by the fact that it extended beyond
the room in which the accused was arrested.
5. The search in this case was not more intensive than was reasonably demanded by
the circumstances.
6. The objects sought and those actually seized in this case were properly subject to
seizure.
7. It is of no significance in this case that the draft cards which were seized were
unrelated to the crimes for which the accused was arrested.
8. Since possession of the draft cards by the accused was a serious and continuing
offense against federal laws, upon discovery of the cards, a crime was being
committed in the very presence of the agents conducting the search.
9. If entry upon the premises be authorized and the search which follows be valid,
there is nothing in the Fourth Amendment which inhibits the seizure by law
enforcement agents of government property the possession of which is a crime, even
though the officers are not aware that such property is on the premises when the
search is initiated.
10. That abuses sometimes occur is no basis for giving sinister coloration to
procedures which are basically reasonable. Affirmed.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire
No. 323
Argued January 12, 1971
Decided June 21, 1971
403 U.S. 443

Syllabus

Held:
1. The warrant for the search and seizure of petitioner's automobile did not satisfy the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment, as made applicable to the States by the
Fourteenth, because it was not issued by a "neutral and detached magistrate."
2. The basic constitutional rule is that "searches conducted outside the judicial
process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under
the Fourth Amendment -- subject only to a few specifically established and well
defined exceptions," and, on the facts of this case, a warrantless search and seizure
of the car cannot be justified under those exceptions.
(a) The seizure of the car in the driveway cannot be justified as incidental to the arrest,
which took place inside the house. Even assuming, arguendo, that the police could
properly have made a warrantless search of the car in the driveway when they
arrested petitioner, they could not have done so at their leisure after its removal.

(b) Under the circumstances present here -- where the police for some time had
known of the probable role of the car in the crime, petitioner had had ample
opportunity to destroy incriminating evidence, the house was guarded at the time of
arrest and petitioner had no access to the car -- there were no exigent circumstances
justifying the warrantless search even had it been made before the car was taken to
the police station, and the special exceptions for automobile searches in Carroll v.
United States and Chambers v. Maroney are clearly inapplicable.
(c) Under certain circumstances, the police may, without a warrant seize, evidence in
"plain view," though not for that reason alone, and only when the discovery of the
evidence is inadvertent. That exception is inapplicable to the facts of the instant case,
where the police had ample opportunity to obtain a valid warrant, knew in advance the
car's description and location, intended to seize it when they entered on petitioner's
property, and no contraband or dangerous objects were involved.
3. No search and seizure were implicated in the February 2 visit when the police
obtained the guns and clothing from petitioner's wife, and hence they needed no
warrant. The police, who exerted no effort to coerce or dominate her, were not
obligated to refuse her offer for them to take the guns, and, in making these and the
other items available to the police, she was not acting as the instrument or agent of
the police. Reversed and remanded.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARI MUSA y HANTATALU
FACTS: Mari Musa was found guilty of selling marijuana in violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972.

On December 13, 1989, T/Sgt. Belagra, the leader of a NARCOM

team based at Calarian, Zamboanga City, instructed Sgt. Amado Ani to conduct
surveillance and test buy on Mari Musa of Suterville, Zamboanga City. Information
received from civilian informer was that Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in said
place. So Sgt. Amado Ani proceeded to Suterville, in company with a NARCOM
civilian informer, to the house of Mari Musa. The same civilian informer had also
described to him the appearance of Mari Musa. Arriving at the target site, Sgt. Ani
proceeded to the house of Musa, while the rest of the NARCOM group positioned
themselves at strategic places about 90 to 100 meters from Mari Musa's house. T/Sgt.
Belarga could see what went on between Ani and suspect Musa from where he was.
Ani approached Musa, who came out of his house, and asked Ani what he wanted.
Ani said he wanted some more stuff. Ani gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. After
receiving the money, Musa went back to his house and came back and gave Amado
Ani two newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. Ani opened the two
wrappers and inspected the contents. Convinced that the contents were marijuana,
Ani walked back towards his companions and raised his right hand. The two
NARCOM teams, riding the two civilian vehicles, sped towards Sgt. Ani. Ani joined
Belarga's team and returned to the house.
ISSUE: WON the search is valid.
HELD: While a valid search warrant is generally necessary before a search and
seizure may be effected, exceptions to this rule are recognized. Thus, in Alvero v.
Dizon, 36 the Court stated that. "[t]he most important exception to the necessity for a
search warrant is the right of search and seizure as an incident to a lawful arrest." 37
Rule 126, Section 12 of the Rules of Court expressly authorizes a warrantless search
and seizure incident to a lawful arrest, thus: Sec. 12. Search incident to lawful arrest.
A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything
which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search
warrant. There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest
authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon the person of the person
arrested. As early as 1909, the Court has ruled that "[a]n officer making an arrest may
take from the person arrested any money or property found upon his person which
was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might
furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which
may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause . . . " 38 Hence, in a buy-bust
operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize
the
marked
money
found
on
the
person
of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. 39
In the case at bar, the NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after
arresting him in his house but found nothing. They then searched the entire house
and, in the kitchen, found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a corner.

The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may
extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings
under his immediate control. 40 Objects in the "plain view" of an officer who has the
right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
presented as evidence. 41
PEOPLE vs. FLORENCIO DORIA and VIOLETA GADDAO
Facts:

On December 1995 in Mandaluyong City, the accused mutually helped one

another and sold 11 plastic bags of suspected marijuana fruiting tops.
Previously on November, members of the North Metropolitan District,
Philippine National Police Narcotics Command, received information that
one Jun was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The
Narcom agents decided to entrap him in a buy-bust operation.
On December 5, 1995, SPO3 Manlangit arrested Jun and the latter led
them to his associate, Neneth. They took "Neneth and "Jun," together
with the box, its contents and the marked bills and turned them over to the
investigator at headquarters. It was only then that the police learned that
"Jun" is Florencio Doria while "Neneth" is Violeta Gaddao. The one brick of
dried marijuana leaves recovered from "Jun" plus the ten bricks recovered
from "Neneth's" house were examined at the PNP Crime Laboratory and
were found to be dried marijuana fruiting tops.
They were subsequently charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to
Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.

Issue: WoN the warrantless arrest was valid. (Valid, as regards Dorias arrest.)
Decision: Florencio Doria was convicted and Violeta Gaddao was aquitted.
RD:
The warrantless arrest of Doria is lawful since he was caught in the act of
committing an offense. A person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense."
The warrantless search and arrest of Gaddao is unlawful. Search and seizure may be
made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in
the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving
motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches
and seizures.

Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for
her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime; in fact,
she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her.
Neither could her arrest be justified under "Personal knowledge" of facts because it
must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable
grounds of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence
of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of
the person to be arrested.
Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her coaccused. Doria did not point to Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as
the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily
lead to the conclusion that Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs.
Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug
pushing. Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search
of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana
cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest.
People of the Philippines v. Zenaida Bolasa
Facts:
An informer told the police that an illegal transaction of prohibited drugs
were being conducted at a certain house in Sta. Brigida St. Karuhatan Valenzuela
Metro Manila. PO3 Salonga and Carizon together with SPO1 Fernando Arenas
immediately proceed to the said house. Upon reaching the house, they peeped
through a small window and saw a man and woman repacking suspected marijuana.
They enter the house and introduce themselves as police officers and confiscated the
tea bag and other drug paraphernalia.Afterwhich, the police officers arrested the
two,Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto de los Reyes. Upon examination by the NBI, the tea
bags were confirmed as marijuana. Zenaida Bolasa and Roberto de los Reyes were
charged with violation of Sec.8 of Article II of Republic Act 6425 otherwise known as
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The RTC convicted them of the crime charged.
Accused Bolasa asserts that the search and her arrest was illegal. She
insists that the trial court should not regard the testimony of PO3 cCarizon credible
because he does not have personal knowledge regarding the conduct of the arrest
and search making his testimony a hearsay.
Issue:

Whether or not the arrest and seizure were valid

Ruling:
No. The Supreme Court held that the arrest was invalid because the
arresting officers had no personal knowledge that at the time of their arrest, accusedapellants had just committed, were committing or about to commit a crime. The
arresting officers also have no personal knowledge that a crime was committed nor
have a reasonable ground to believe that the accused committed the crime. And
accused appellants were
not prisoners who have escaped from a penal
establishment.
With respect to the seizure of the tea bags,the court held that it is also
invalid because the objects were not seized in plain view. There was no valid intrusion
and the evidence was not inadvertently discovered. The police officers intentionally
peeped through the window to ascertain the activities of appellants inside the room. In
like manner, the search cannot be categorized as a search of a moving vehicle, a
consented warrantless arrest, a customs search, or a stop and frisk situations.
The court stated that the arresting officers should have first conducted a
surveillance considering that the identities and addressed of the suspected culprits
were already ascertained. After conducting the surveillance and determining the
existence of probable cause, they should have secured a warrant prior to effecting a
valid arrest and seizure. The arrest being illegal ab initio, the accompanying search
was also illegal. Every evidence thus obtained during the illegal search cannot be
used against the accused-appellants.
People vs. Andre Marti [GR 81561, 18 January 1991]
Facts: On 14 August 1987, Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes,
went to the booth of the Manila Packing and Export Forwarders in the Pistang Pilipino
Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes
(the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. Marti informed
Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti
filled up the contract necessary for the transaction, writing therein his name, passport
number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee, namely,
WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland. Anita Reyes did not inspect
the packages as Marti refused, who assured the former that the packages simply
contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of
Martis representation, the 4 packages were then placed inside a brown corrugated
box, with styro-foam placed at the bottom and on top of the packages, and sealed with
masking tape. Before delivery of Martis box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau
of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard
operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar odor

emitted therefrom. Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of
one of the gloves, and took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith
prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory
examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At the
Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the box containing
Martis packages was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks)
dried marijuana leaves. The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box
and of the contents thereof, after signing a Receipt acknowledging custody of the
said effects. Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no avail, inasmuch
as the latters stated address was the Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter, an
Information was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act. After trial, the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial
Court, Branch XLIX) rendered the decision, convicting Marti of violation of Section 21
(b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e)(i), Article 1 of
Republic Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act. Marti
appealed.
Issue: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accuseds
constitutional rights, be invoked against the State.
Held: In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. The contraband herein, having
come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing the
accuseds rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent
reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the
offense charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable
search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search.
Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid
thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles are identified without a trespass
on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the
constitution. The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures
therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the
State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must
generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the
search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment
for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum,
the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to
acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.

Waterous Drug Corporation v. NLRC

Facts: Antonia Melodia Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by Waterous Drug
Corporation on 15 August 1988. On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum
from Waterous Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co warning her not to
dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latters accounts because the
same was a prohibited practice. On the same date, Co issued another memorandum
to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine without consulting
the Purchasing Department, as this would impair the companys control of purchases
and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers. As regards the
first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act
was due to negligence, since fellow employee Irene Soliven obtained the medicines
in bad faith and through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given a
charge slip by the Admitting Department, Catolico then asked the company to look into
the fraudulent activities of Soliven. In a memorandum 9 dated 21 November 1989,
Waterous Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico against the rush delivery
of medicines without the proper documents. On 29 January 1990, Waterous Control
Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving Catolico
and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Valdez talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the
check but she denied having received it and that she is unaware of the overprice.
However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, she
confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms. Catolico.
As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the envelope
containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her talagang ganyan, bukas. It
appears that the amount in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms. Catolico.
Forthwith, in her memorandum dated 31 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain,
within 24 hours, her side of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time
to give her explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3
February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that effective 6
February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she would be placed on preventive suspension to
protect the interests of the company. In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico
requested access to the file containing Sales Invoice 266 for her to be able to make a
satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested Saldaas invasion of her privacy
when Saldaa opened an envelope addressed to Catolico. In a letter 15 to Co dated
10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she
received from YSP was a Christmas gift and not a refund of overprice. She also
averred that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as it sprang from an earlier
incident between her and Cos secretary, Irene Soliven. On 5 March 1990, Waterous
Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum notifying Catolico of her
termination. On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a
complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and illegal suspension. In his
decision of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair
labor practice against Waterous. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico
because Waterous failed to prove what [they] alleged as complainants dishonesty,

and to show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without
just cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but
disallowed reinstatement, as it would not be to the best interest of the parties.
Accordingly, he awarded separation pay to Catolico computed at one-half months pay
for every year of service; back wages for one year; and the additional sum of
P2,000.00 for illegal suspension representing 30 days work; for a total of
P35,401.86. Waterous seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to
set it aside. In its decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of
the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for
Catolicos dismissal from her employment. and thus dismissed the appeal for lack of
merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by deleting the
award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the computation of
the aggregate of the awards in the amount of P35,401.86. Their motion for
reconsideration having been denied, Waterous filed the special civil action for
certiorari with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Waterous act of opening an envelope from one of its regular suppliers
is contrary to the injunction against unreasonable search and seizure and a persons
right to privacy of communication.
Held: In light of the decision in the People v. Marti, the constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of ones person
from interference by government and cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government. The Court finds no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs.
Marti that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true that the citizens have no
recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, such an invasion gives rise to both
criminal and civil liabilities. Herein, there was no violation of the right of privacy of
communication, and Waterous was justified in opening an envelope from one of its
regular suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a business communication in
which it had an interest. However, Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due
process requires that an employee be apprised of the charge against him, given
reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed amply opportunity to be heard and
defend himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so desires. Ample
opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the
employee to enable him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal
representation. Although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she
was dismissed from the service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her
Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing was ever
conducted after the issues were joined through said letters. The Supervisors
memorandum spoke of evidence in [Waterous] possession, which were not,
however, submitted. What the evidence other than the sales invoice and the check
were, only the Supervisor knew. Catolicos dismissal then was grounded on mere

suspicion, which in no case can justify an employees dismissal. Suspicion is not

among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of
employment; and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence
must rest on substantial grounds and not on the employers arbitrariness, whims,
caprices, or suspicion. Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a managerial
employee, to which class of employees the term trust and confidence is restricted.
Thus, the decision and resolution of the NLRC are affirmed except as to its reason for
upholding the Labor Arbiters decision, viz., that the evidence against Catolico was
inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy
of communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures, which was set
aside.
People vs. de Gracia
Facts:
The incidents took place at the height of the coup d'etat staged in December, 1989 by
ultra-rightist elements headed by the Reform the Armed Forces Movement-Soldiers of
the Filipino People (RAM-SFP) against the Government. At that time, various
government establishments and military camps in Metro Manila were being
bombarded by the rightist group with their "tora-tora" planes. At around midnight of 30
November 1989, the 4th Marine Battalion of the Philippine Marines occupied Villamor
Air Base, while the Scout Rangers took over the Headquarters of the Philippine Army,
the Army Operations Center, and Channel 4, the government television station. Also,
some elements of the Philippine Army coming from Fort Magsaysay occupied the
Greenhills Shopping Center in San Juan, Metro Manila. On 1 December 1989, Maj.
Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division, National Capital Region Defense Command,
was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar Sales
Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) in Quezon City, together with
his team composed of Sgt. Crispin Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry
Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos. The surveillance, which actually started
on the night of 30 November 1989 at around 10:00 p.m., was conducted pursuant to
an intelligence report received by the division that said establishment was being
occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a communication command post. Sgt.
Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around 10 to 15 meters away
from the Eurocar building near P. Tuazon Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier
alighted from the car to conduct his surveillance on foot. A crowd was then gathered
near the Eurocar office watching the on-going bombardment near Camp Aguinaldo.
After a while a group of 5 men disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked
towards the car of the surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then
seated in front, saw the approaching group and immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to
start the car and leave the area. As they passed by the group, then only 6 meters
away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the team, which attack
resulted in the wounding of Sgt. Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance

team was able to retaliate because they sought cover inside the car and they were
afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire. As a consequence,
at around 6:30 a.m. of 5 December 1989, searching them composed of F/Lt. Virgilio
Babao as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and
elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion under one Col. delos Santos raided the
Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate 6 cartons of M-16
ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and
"molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is
located at the right portion of the building. St. Oscar Obenia, the first one to enter the
Eurocar building, saw Rolando De Gracia inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a
C-4 and suspiciously peeping through a door. De Gracia was the only person then
present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of Col. Matillano was also found.
As a result of the raid, the team arrested de Gracia, as well as Soprieso Verbo and
Roberto Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building. They were then made to
sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the explosives and ammunition confiscated by
the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team because,
according to them, at that time there was so much disorder considering that the
nearby Camp Aguinaldo was being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was
simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside from the fact that the
courts were consequently closed. The group was able to confirm later that the owner
of Eurocar office is a certain Mr. Gutierrez and that de Gracia is supposedly a "boy"
therein. de Gracia was charged in two separate informations for illegal possession of
ammunition and explosives in furtherance of rebellion, and for attempted homicide
(Criminal Cases Q-90-11755 and Q-90-11756, respectively), which were tried jointly
by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 103. During the arraignment, de
Gracia pleaded not guilty to both charges. However, he admitted that he is not
authorized to posses any firearms, ammunition and/or explosive. The parties likewise
stipulated that there was a rebellion during the period from November 30 up to 9
December 1989. On 22 February 1991, the trial court rendered judgment acquitting de
Gracia of attempted homicide, but found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offense of illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of rebellion and sentenced him
to serve the penalty of reclusion perpetua. De Gracia appealed.
Issue:
Whether the military operatives made a valid search and seizure during the height of
the December 1989 coup detat.
Held:
It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not
armed with a search warrant at that time. The raid was actually precipitated by
intelligence reports that said office was being used as headquarters by the RAM. Prior
to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the

surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building.
When the military operatives raided the place, the occupants thereof refused to open
the door despite the requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the former to
break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is
definitely not an armory or arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and
ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of automobiles. The
presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be
justifiably or even colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and
disorder at that time because of simultaneous and intense firing within the vicinity of
the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces.
The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the
building and houses therein were deserted. Under the foregoing circumstances, the
case falls under one of the exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search.
In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account the facts obtaining in this
case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was
consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore,
under the situation then prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for

and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge himself manifested that
on 5 December 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such
urgency and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed
with.