G.R. No.

L-7188

August 9, 1954

In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.

SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula for
appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu,
executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now
marked Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14,
1943, in the municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He
left properties estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres
Enriquez, one of the legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in
the Court of First Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would
inherit the estate of the deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead,
testified without contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his
co-witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish
which the testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on he left
hand margin of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the
document is composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and
finally signed his name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the
presence of the three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will
and that the said three witnesses signed their names on the last page after
the attestation clause in his presence and in the presence of each other. The
oppositors did not submit any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will;
that it was in the handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it
was executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were
not permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the
case was to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code

permitted the execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry
out the intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the
controlling factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court by order
dated January 24, 1952, admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and
Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealing from that
decision; and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the
case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides
that a person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written,
dated and signed by the testator himself and need not be witnessed. It is a
fact, however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the
time that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted,
and the law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of
wills, such as numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters
and signing on the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting
witnesses, requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because
the back pages of the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one,
not even by the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front
pages, they were signed only by the testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate
of Saguinsin, 41 Phil., 875, 879, referring to the failure of the testator and his
witnesses to sign on the left hand margin of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not
enough that the signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear
upon two folios or leaves; three pages having been written on, the
authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed by the signature
of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same
requirement, this Court declared:
From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the
left margins of the six pages of the document are signed only by
Ventura Prieto. The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by
the attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator at the left
margin of each of the five pages of the document alleged to be the will

of Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect that constitutes an obstacle to its

probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the
provisions of the new Civil Code which not allows holographic wills, like
Exhibit "A" which provisions were invoked by the appellee-petitioner and
applied by the lower court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code
expressly provides: "The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the
observance of the law in force at the time it is made." The above provision is
but an expression or statement of the weight of authority to the affect that the
validity of a will is to be judged not by the law enforce at the time of the
testator's death or at the time the supposed will is presented in court for
probate or when the petition is decided by the court but at the time the
instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that although
the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of the
testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the
legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in
reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has
been laid down by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is
a wholesome doctrine and should be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the
ruling and controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations
should be resorted to in order to carry out said intention, and that when
statutes passed after the execution of the will and after the death of the
testator lessen the formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said
subsequent statutes should be applied so as to validate wills defectively
executed according to the law in force at the time of execution. However, we
should not forget that from the day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a
will, the title of the legatees and devisees under it becomes a vested right,
protected under the due process clause of the constitution against a
subsequent change in the statute adding new legal requirements of execution
of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity of reasoning, when one
executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and follow the legal
requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he should be
regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then inherit
by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal
requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution
should be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of
their vested rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is

that the Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231,
pp. 192-193).
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A"
is denied probate. With costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo,
Labrador, Concepcion and Reyes J.B.L., JJ., concur

5th. That on May 24, 1947, the spouses Maria Canoy and Roberto
Canoy sold the same parcel of land to the plaintiff in this case named
Bienvenido A. Ebarle;
G.R. No. L-5064

February 27, 1953

BIENVENIDO A. IBARLE, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ESPERANZA M. PO, defendant-appellant.
Quirico del Mar for appellant.
Daniel P. Tumulak and Conchita F. Miel appellee.
TUASON, J.:
This action commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to annul a deed
of sale conveying to the defendant, in consideration of P1,700, one undivided
half of a parcel of land which previously had been sold, along with the other
half, by the same vendor to the plaintiff's grantors. judgment was against the
plaintiff.
The case was submitted for decision upon an agreed statement of facts, the
pertinent parts of which are thus summarized in the appealed decision:
1st. That Leonard j. Winstanley and Catalina Navarro were
husband and wife, the former having died on June 6, 1946 leaving
heir the surviving spouse and some minor children;
2nd. hat upon the death of L.J. Winstanley, he left a parcel of land
described under Transfer Certificate of title No. 2391 of the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Cebu;
3rd. That the above mentioned property was a conjugal property;
4th. That on April 15, 1946, the surviving spouse Catalina Navarro
Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel of land to the spouses Maria
Canoy, alleging among other things, that she needed money for the
support of her children;

6th. That the two deeds of sale referred to above were not
registered and have never been registered up to the date;
7th. That on January 17, 1948 surviving spouse Catalina Navarro
Vda. de Winstanley, after her appointment as guardian of her children
by this court (Special proceeding no. 212-R) sold one-half of the land
mentioned above to Esperanza M. Po, defendant in the instant case,
which portion belongs to the children of the above named spouses.
As stated by the trial Judge, the sole question for determination is the validity
of the sale to Esperanza M. Po, the last purchaser. This question in turn
depends upon the validity of the prior ale to Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy.
Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a
person are transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly different
language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.
Manresa, commending on article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain, says:
The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire
a definite right to the inheritance, whether such right be pure or
contingent. It is immaterial whether a short or long period of time
lapses between the death of the predecessor and the entry into
possession of the property of the inheritance because the right is
always deemed to be retroactive from the moment of death. (5
Manresa, 317.)
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro
Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it
already belonged to the seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration
being needed to confirm the children's title, it follows that the first sale was null
and void in so far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority
of the competent court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has
not been recorded is of no consequence. If registration were necessary, still

the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to no other
cause than his own opposition.
The decision will be affirmed subject to the reservation, made in said decision,
of the right of the plaintitff and/or the Canoy spouses to bring such action
against Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley as may be appropriate for such
damages as they may have incurred by reason of the voiding of the sale in
their favor.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo,
Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-55076 September 21, 1987

MATILDE S. PALICTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE O. RAMOLETE as Presiding Judge of Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch III, and MARCELO SOTTO,
Administrator, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of the then
Court of First Instance of Cebu declaring the deed of redemption
executed for the petitioner null and void and denying the
petitioner's motion that the Registrar of Deeds of the City of Cebu be
directed to transfer the Owner's Duplicate Certificates of Title to Lot
Nos. 1049, 1051, and 1052 from Filemon Sotto to her and to issue a
new Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title to Lot 2179-C in her name.
On July 5, 1979, a sale at public auction was held pursuant to a writ
of execution issued on February 5, 1979 by the respondent judge
and to a court order dated June 4, 1979 in the case of Pilar Teves, et
al. vs Marcelo Sotto, Administrator, Civil Case No. R-10027, for the
satisfaction of judgment in the amount of P725,270.00.
The following properties belonging to the late Don Filemon Sotto and
administered by respondent Marcelo Sotto were levied upon:
1. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1049, covered by TCT No.
27640 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City;
2. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1052, covered by TCT No.
27642 of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City;

3. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1051,covered by TCT No.

27641 of the Banilad Friad Lands Estate, Cebu City;
4. Parcel of land on Lot No. 5253 of the Cebu
Cadastre, Cebu City, covered by TCT No. 27639;
5. Parcel of land situated at Mantalongon, Dalaguete,
Cebu, covered by TD No. 010661, with an area of 76708; (sic)
6. Parcel of land on Lot No. 4839 of the Upon
Cadastre, at Barrio Sa-ac Mactan Island, with an area
of Forty Four Thousand Six Hundred Forty Four
(44,644) square meters more or less;
7. Residential House of strong materials, situated on a
Government lot at Lahug, Cebu City;
8. Residential House of strong materials, situated at
Central, Cebu City. " (Rollo, p. 40)
Seven of the above-described properties were awarded to Pilar
Teves, who alone bid for them for the amount of P217,300.00.
The residential house situated on a government lot at Lahug, Cebu
City, was awarded to lone bidder Asuncion Villarante for the amount
of P10,000.00.
Within the period for redemption, petitioner Matilde S. Palicte, as
one of the heirs of the late Don Filemon Sotto, redeemed from
purchaser Pilar Teves, four (4) lots for the sum of P60,000.00.
A deed of redemption dated July 29, 1980, executed by Deputy
Provincial Sheriff Felipe V. Belandres and approved by the Clerk of
Court, Esperanza Garcia as Ex-Officio Sheriff, was issued for these
lots:
1. A parcel of land or Lot No. 2179-C-PDI-25027 Cebu
Cadastre, Cebu City, bid at P20,000.00;

2. A parcel of land or Lot No. 1052, covered by TCT

No. 27642, of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu
City, bid at P15,000.00;
3. A parcel of land or Lot No.1051,covered by TCT No.
27641, of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City, at
P5,000.00;
4. A parcel of land or Lot No. 1049, covered by TCT
No. 27640, of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu
City, at P20,000.00. (Rollo, p. 42)
On July 24, 1980, petitioner Palicte filed a motion with respondent
Judge Ramolete for the transfer to her name of the titles to the four
(4) parcels of land covered by the deed of redemption.
This motion was opposed by the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. R-10027,
entitled "Pilar Teves, et al. vs Marcelo Sotto, administrator" on
several grounds, principal among which, is that movant, Palicte, is
not one of those authorized to redeem under the provisions of the
Rules of Court.
A hearing on the said motion, with both parties adducing evidence
was held.
The lower court held that although Palicte is one of the declared
heirs in Spl. Proc. No. 2706-R, she does not qualify as a successor-ininterest who may redeem the real properties sold. It ruled that the
deed of redemption is null and void. The motion of Palicte was
denied.
Hence, the present petition.
The petitioner raises the following assignment of errors:
A
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT THE
JUDGMENT DEBTOR ENTITLED TO REDEEM UNDER

SECTION 29(a), RULE 39 OF THE REVISED RULES OF

COURT REAL PROPERTY SOLD ON EXECUTION
AGAINST THE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT IS ONLY THE
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE, OR HIS SUCCESSORIN-INTEREST.

SEC. 29. Who may redeem real property so sold.

Real property sold as provided in the last preceding
section, or any part thereof sold separately, may be
redeemed in the manner hereinafter provided, by the
following persons:

(a) The judgment debtor, or his successor in interest

in the whole or any part of the property;

RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT

PETITIONER, WHO IS A DECLARED HEIR OF THE
DECEDENT, IS NOT THE JUDGMENT DEBTOR NOR
DOES SHE QUALIFY AS A SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF
THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE ENTITLED TO
RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER SECTION 29(a), RULE
39 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
C
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT
ALTHOUGH PETITIONER IS A DECLARED HEIR OF THE
DECEDENT, HER RIGHT TO THE ESTATE, LIKE THAT OF
REDEMPTION OF CERTAIN ESTATE PROPERTY, COULD
ONLY ARISE AFTER DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE AS
THERE IS STILL JUDGMENT DEBT CHARGEABLE
AGAINST THE ESTATE.
D
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONER'S REDEMPTION OF FOUR (4) PARCELS OF
LAND OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT SOLD ON
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT AGAINST THE ESTATE IS
NULL AND VOID AND INEFFECTIVE. (Rollo, pp. 17-18)
These assigned errors center on whether or not petitioner Palicte
may validly exercise the right of redemption under Sec. 29, Rule 39
of the Rules of Court.
We answer in the affirmative. Sec. 29 of Rule 39 provides:

(b) A creditor having a lien by attachment, judgment

or mortgage on the property sold, or on some part
thereof, subsequent to the judgment under which the
property was sold. Such redeeming creditor is termed
a redemptioner.
Under Subsection (a), property sold subject to redemption may be
redeemed by the judgment debtor or his successor-in-interest in the
whole or any part of the property. Does Matilde Palicte fall within the
term "successor-in-interest"?
Magno vs Viola and Sotto (61 Phil. 80, 84-85) states that:
The rule is that the term "successor-in-interest"
includes one to whom the debtor has transferred his
statutory right of redemption (Big Sespe Oil Co. vs
Cochran, 276 Fed., 216, 223); one to whom the debtor
has conveyed his interest in the property for the
purpose of redemption (Southern California Lumber
Co. vs. McDowell, 105 Cal, 99; 38 Pac., 627; Simpson
vs. Castle, 52 Cal., 644; Schumacher vs. Langford, 20
Cal. App., 61; 127 Pac., 1057); one who succeeds to
the interest of the debtor by operation of law (XI
McKinney's California Jurisprudence, 99); one or more
joint debtors who were joint owners of the property
sold (Emerson vs. Yosemite Gold Min. etc. Co., 149
Cal., 50; 85 Pac., 122); the wife as regards her
husband's homestead by reason of the fact that some
portion of her husband' title passes to her (Hefner vs.
Urton, 71 Cal., 479; 12 Pac., 486). This court has held
that a surety can not redeem the property of the

principal sold on execution because the surety, by

paying the debt of the principal, stands in the place of
the creditor, not of the debtor, and consequently is
not a successor in interest in the property. (G. Urruitia
& Co. vs. Moreno and Reyes, 28 Phil., 260, 268).
(Emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, petitioner Palicte is the daughter of the late Don
Filemon Sotto whose estate was levied upon on execution to satisfy
the money judgment against it. She is one of the declared heirs in
Special Proceeding No. 2706-R. As a legitimate heir, she qualifies as
a successor-in- interest.
Art. 777 of the Civil Code states that:
The rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of the death of the decedent.
At the moment of the decedent's death, the heirs start to own the
property, subject to the decedent's liabilities. In fact, they may
dispose of the same even while the property is under administration.
(Barretto vs. Tuason, 59 Phil. 845; Jakosalem vs. Rafols, 73 Phil.
628). If the heirs may dispose of their shares in the decedent's
property even while it is under administration. With more reason
should the heirs be allowed to redeem redeemable properties
despite the presence of an administrator.
The respondents contend that the petitioner must positively prove
that the three other co-heirs, the administrator, and the intestate
court had expressly agreed to the redemption of the disputed
parcels of land. We see no need for such prior approval. While it may
have been desirable, it is not indispensable under the circumstances
of this case. What is important is that all of them acquiesced in the
act of redeeming property for the estate. The petitioner contends
that the administrator and the three other heirs agreed to the
redemption. There is, however. no clear proof of such approval.
What is beyond dispute from the records is that they did not
disapprove nor reprobate the acts of the petitioner. There is likewise
nothing in the records to indicate that the redemption was not
beneficial to the estate of Don Filemon Sotto.

It may be true that the interest of a specific heir is not yet fixed and
determinate pending the order of distribution but, nonetheless, the
heir's interest in the preservation of the estate and the recovery of
its properties is greater than anybody else's, definitely more than
the administrator's who merely holds it for the creditors, the heirs,
and the legatees.
The petitioner cites precedents where persons with inchoate or
contingent interest were allowed to exercise the right of redemption
as "successors-in-interest," e.g. Director of Lands vs. Lagniton (103
Phil. 889, 892) where a son redeemed the property of his parents
sold on execution and Rosete vs. Provincial Sheriff of Zambales (95
Phil. 560, 564), where a wife by virtue of what the Court called
"inchoate right of dower or contingent interest" redeemed a
homestead as successor-in-interest of her husband.
In fact, the Court was explicit in Lagniton that:
... The right of a son, with respect to the property of a
father or mother, is also an inchoate or contingent
interest, because upon the death of the father or the
mother or both, he will have a right to inherit said
conjugal property. If any holder of an inchoate interest
is a successor in interest with right to redeem a
property sold on execution, then the son is such a
successor in interest, as he has an inchoate right to
the property of his father.
The lower court, therefore, erred in considering the person of the
administrator as the judgment debtor and as the only "successor-ininterest." The estate of the deceased is the judgment debtor and the
heirs who will eventually acquire that estate should not be
prohibited from doing their share in its preservation.
Although petitioner Palicte validly redeemed the properties, her
motion to transfer the titles of the four (4) parcels of land covered
by the Deed of Redemption from registration in the name of Filemon
Sotto to her name cannot prosper at this time.

Otherwise, to allow such transfer of title would amount to a

distribution of the estate.

decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will or

by law, but (2) such order shall not be issued until
after it is shown that the "debts, funeral expenses,
expenses of administration, allowances, taxes, etc.,
chargeable to the estate" have been paid, which is
but logical and proper, (3) besides, such an order is
usually issued upon proper and specific application for
the purpose of the interested party or parties, and not
of the court."

As held in the case of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs.

Escolin (56 SCRA 267, 345- 346):
Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical
and unequivocal. Section 1 of Rule 90 provides:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue
made. When the debts, funeral charges, and
expenses of administration, the allowance to the
widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the
estate in accordance with law, have been paid, the
court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate,
and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue
of the estate to the persons entitled to the same,
naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which
each is entitled, and such persons may demand and
recover their respective shares from the executor or
administrator, or any other person having the same in
his possession. If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased
person or as to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall
be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of
the obligations above mentioned has been made or
provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them,
give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs.
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that
in order that a proceeding for the settlement of the
estate of a deceased may be deemed ready for final
closure, (1) there should have been issued already an
order of distribution or assignment of the estate of the

The other heirs are, therefore, given a six months period to join as
co-redemptioners in the redemption made by the petitioner before
the motion to transfer titles to the latter's name may be granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent
court's orders declaring the deed of redemption null and void and
denying the motion to transfer title over the redeemed properties to
Matilda Palicte are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, subject to the right of
the other heirs to join in the redemption as stated above.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 126950 July 2, 1999

NELSON NUFABLE, SILMOR NUFABLE and AQUILINA NUFABLE,
petitioners, vs. GENEROSA NUFABLE, VILFOR NUFABLE,
MARCELO
NUFABLE,
and
the
COURT
OF
APPEALS,
respondents.

GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside
the Decision dated November 25, 1995 of the Fifth Division 1 of the
Court of Appeals for allegedly being contrary to law.

HEREBY DECLARE AND MAKE MANIFEST

The following facts as found by the Court of Appeals are undisputed:

1. That on August 9, 1965, Rev. Fr. Esdras Nufable died leaving (a)
Last Will and Testament (marked Exh. G) disposing (of) his
properties or estate in favor of his four legitimate children, namely:
Angel Custodio Nufable, Generosa Nufable, Vilfor Nufable and
Marcelo Nufable;

Edras Nufable owned at Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental,

consisting of 948 square meters, more or less. He died on August 9,
1965 and was survived by his children, namely: Angel Custodio,
Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo, all surnamed Nufable. Upon petition
for probate filed by said heirs and after due publication and hearing,
the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch II) issued
an Order dated March 30, 1966 admitting to probate the last will
and testament executed by the deceased Edras Nufable (Exhs. B, C
and C-1).

2. That on March 30, 1966 the said Last Will and Testament was
probated by the Honorable Court, Court of First Instance of Negros
Oriental, and is embodied in the same order appointing an
Administratrix, Generosa Nufable, but to qualify only if she put up a
necessary bond of P1,000.00;

On June 6, 1966 the same court issued an Order approving the

Settlement of Estate submitted by the heirs of the late ESdras
Nufable, portions of which read:

3. That herein legitimate children prefer not to appoint an

Administratrix, as agreed upon (by) all the heirs, because they have
no objection as to the manner of disposition of their share made by
the testator, the expenses of the proceedings and that they have
already taken possession of their respective shares in accordance
with the will;

KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

We, ANGEL CUSTODIO NUFABLE, GENEROSA NUFABLE, VILFOR

NUFABLE and MARCELO NUFABLE, all of legal ages (sic), Filipinos,
and with residence and postal address at Manjuyod, Negros Oriental,
Philippines,

4. That the herein heirs agreed, as they hereby agree to settle the
estate in accordance with the terms and condition of the will in the
following manner, to wit:

a) That the parcel of land situated in Poblacion Manjuyod, Negros

Oriental remains undivided for community ownership but respecting
conditions imposed therein (sic) in the will;

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray this Honorable Court that after trial

judgment be rendered ordering:

(a) That the said Deed of Sale (Annex "C") executed by the
Development Bank of the Philippines in favor of the defendants be
declared null and void as far as the three fourths (3/4) rights which
belongs (sic) to the plaintiffs are concerned;

(Exhs. "E" and "E-1")

Two months earlier, or on March 15, 1966, spouses Angel Custodio

and Aquilina Nufable mortgaged the entire property located at
Manjuyod to the Development Bank of the Philippines [DBP] (Pretrial Order, dated January 7, 1992, p. 103, Original Records). Said
mortgagors became delinquent for which reason the mortgaged
property was foreclosed by DBP on February 26, 1973 (id.).

On January 11, 1980, Nelson Nufable, the son of Angel Custodio

Nufable (who died on August 29, 1978 [TSN, Testimony of Nelson
Nufable, Hearing of August 18, 1992, p. 17]), purchased said
property from DBP (Exh. "1").

Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo, all surnamed Nufable filed with the
lower court a complaint dated July 25, 1985 "To Annul Fraudulent
Transactions, to Quiet Title and To Recover Damages' against Nelson
Nufable, and wife, Silmor Nufable and his mother Aquilina Nufable.
Plaintiffs pray:

(b) That the said three fourths (3/4) rights over the above parcel in
question be declared as belonging to the plaintiffs at one fourth
right to each of them;

(c) To order the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the

plaintiffs by way of actual and moral damages the amount of
P10,000.00 and another P5,000.00 as Attorney's fees, and to pay
the costs.

(d) Plus any other amount which this Court may deem just and
equitable. (p. 6, Original Records)

In their Answer, defendants contend:

4. Paragraph 4 is denied, the truth being that the late Angel Nufable
was the exclusive owner of said property, that as such owner he
mortgaged the same to the Development Bank of the Philippines on
March 15, 1966, that said mortgage was foreclosed and the DBP
became the successful bidder at the auction sale, that ownership

was consolidated in the name of the DBP, and that defendant Nelson
Nufable bought said property from the DBP thereafter. During this
period, the plaintiffs never questioned the transactions which were
public, never filed any third party claim nor attempted to redeem
said property as redemptioners, and that said Deed of Sale, Annex
"B" to the complaint, is fictitious, not being supported by any
consideration; (pp. 20-21, id.)

The Deed of Sale (Annex "B"), referred to by the parties is a

notarized Deed of Sale, dated July 12, 1966 (marked as Exhibit "H")
by virtue of which, spouses Angel and Aquilina Nufable, as vendors,
sold 3/4 portion of the subject property to herein plaintiffs for and in
consideration of P1,000.00 (Exh. "5"). 2

On November 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment,

the dispositive portion 3 of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is REVERSED

and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered declaring
plaintiffs-appellants as the rightful co-owners of the subject property
and entitled to possession of 3/4 southern portion thereof; and
defendant-appellee Nelson Nufable to 1/4 portion.

No award on damages.

No costs.

Defendants-appellees' Motion for Reconsideration was denied for

lack of merit in the Resolution of the Court of Appeals 4 dated
October 2, 1996.

Hence, the present petition. Petitioners raise the following grounds

for the petition:

1. Honorable Court of Appeals erred in considering as controlling the

probate of the Last Will and Testament of Esdras Nufable, the
probate thereof not being an issue in this case;

2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not considering the fact

that the Development Bank of the Philippines became absolute,
exclusive, legal and rightful owner of the land in question, from
whom petitioner Nelson Nufable acquired the same by purchase and
that, therefore, no award can be made in favor of private respondent
unless and until the Development Bank of the Philippines' title
thereto is first declared null and void by the court.

The Court of Appeals, in its decision, stated that the trial court failed
to take into consideration the probated will of the late Esdras
Nufable bequeathing the subject property to all his four children. 5
In the present petition, petitioner present the issue of whether or not
the Last Will and Testament of Esdras Nufable and its subsequent
probate are pertinent and material to the question of the right of
ownership of petitioner Nelson Nufable who purchased the land in
question from, and as acquired property of, the Development Bank
of the Philippines (DBP, for short). They contend that the probate of
the Last Will Testament and of Esdras Nufable did not determine the

ownership
of
the
parties.1wphi1.nt

land

in

question

as

against

third

As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited only to

passing upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated,
the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and
the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribes by law.
Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not called to rule on
the rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the will. 6 The question
of the intrinsic validity of a will normally comes only after the court
has declared that the will has been duly authenticated.

The records show that upon petition for probate filed by the heirs of
the late Esdras Nufable, an Order dated March 30, 1966 was issued
by then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, Branch II,
admitting to probate the last will and testament executed by the
decedent. 7 Thereafter, on June 6, 1966, the same court approved
the Settlement of Estate submitted by the heirs of the late Esdras
Nufable wherein they agreed "(T)hat the parcel land situated in
Poblacion Manjuyod, Negros Oriental remains undivided for
community ownership but respecting conditions imposed therein
(sic) in the will." 8 In paragraph 3 thereof, they stated that "they
have no objection as to the manner of disposition of their share
made by the testator, the expenses of the proceeding and that they
have already taken possession of their respective shares in
accordance with the will." Verily, it was the heirs of the late Esdras
Nufable who agreed among themselves on the disposition of their
shares. The probate court simply approved the agreement among
the heirs which approval was necessary for the validity of any
disposition of the decedent's estate. 9

It should likewise be noted that the late Esdras Nufable died on

August 9, 1965. When the entire property located at Manjuyod was
mortgaged on March 15, 1966 by his son Angel Custodio with DBP,
the other heirs of Esdras namely: Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo
had already acquired successional rights over the said property. This
is so because of the principle contained in Article 777 of the Civil
Code to the effect that the rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, for the
purpose of transmission of rights, it does not matter whether the
Last Will and Testament of the late Esdras Nufable was admitted on
March 30, 1966 or thereafter or that the Settlement of Estate was
approved on June 6, 1966 or months later. It is to be noted that the
probated will of the late Esdras Nufable specifically referred to the
subject property in stating that "the land situated in the Poblacion,
Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, should not be divided because this must
remain in common for them, but it is necessary to allow anyone of
them brothers and sisters to construct a house therein." 10 It was
therefor the will of the decedent that the subject property should
undivided, although the restriction should not exceed twenty (20)
years pursuant to Article 870 11 of the Civil Code.

Thus, when Angel Nufable and his spouses mortgaged the subject
property to DBP on March 15, 1966, they had no right to mortgage
the entire property. Angel's right over the subject property was
limited only to 1/4 pro indiviso share. As co-owner of the subject
property, Angel's right to sell, assign or mortgage is limited to that
portion that may be allotted to him upon termination of the coownership. Well-entrenched is the rule that a co-owner can only
alienate his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property. 12

The Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Angel Custodio
Nufable "had no right to mortgage the subject property in its
entirety. His right to encumber said property was limited only to 1/4

pro indiviso share of the property in question." 13 Article 493 of the

Civil Code spells out the rights or co-owners over a co-owned
property. Pursuant to said Article, a co-owner shall have full
ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto. He has the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment. As a mere part
owner, he cannot alienate the shares of the other co-owners. The
prohibition is premised on the elementary rule that "no one can give
what he does not have." 14

Moreover, respondents stipulated that they were not aware of the

mortgage by petitioners of the subject property. 15 This being the
case, a co-owner does not lose his part ownership of a co-owned
property when his share is mortgaged by another co-owner without
the former's knowledge and consent 16 as in the case at bar. It has
likewise been ruled that the mortgage of the inherited property is
not binding against co-heirs who never benefitted. 17

Furthermore, the Deed of Sale dated June 17, 1966 marked as

Exhibit "H" executed by spouses Angel and Aquilina Nufable in favor
of respondents Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo wherein the former
sold, ceded and transferred back to the latter the 3/4 portion of the
subject property bolsters respondents' claim that there was coownership. Petitioner Nelson himself claimed that he was aware of
the aforesaid Deed of Sale. 18

Anent the second ground of the petition, petitioners allege that the
Development Bank of the Philippines acquired ownership of the land
in question through foreclosure, purchase and consolidation of
ownership. Petitioners argue that if petitioner Nelson Nufable had
not bought said land from the DBP, private respondents, in order to

acquire said property, must sue said bank for the recovery thereof,
and in so doing, must allege grounds for the annulment of
documents evidencing the bank's ownership thereof. Petitioners
contend that since petitioner Nelson Nufable simply bought the
whole land from the bank, they cannot be deprived of the ownership
of 3/4 without making any pronouncement as to the legality or
illegality of the bank's ownership of said land. It is argued that there
was no evidence to warrant declaration of nullity of the bank's
acquisition of said land; and that neither was there a finding by the
court that the bank illegally acquired the said property.

As adverted to above, when the subject property was mortgaged by

Angel Custodio, he had no right to mortgage the entire property but
only with respect to his 1/4 pro indiviso share as the property was
subject to the successional rights of the other heirs of the late
Esdras. Moreover, in case of foreclosure; a sale would result in the
transmission of title to the buyer which is feasible only if the seller
can be in a position to convey ownership of the things sold. 19 And
in one case, 20 it was held that a foreclosure would be ineffective
unless the mortgagor has title to the property to be foreclosed.
Therefore, as regards the remaining 3/4 pro indiviso share, the same
was held in trust for the party rightfully entitled thereto, 21 who are
the private respondents herein.

Pursuant to Article 1451 of the Civil Code, when land passes by

succession to any person and he causes the legal title to be put in
the name of another, a trust is established by implication of law for
the benefit of the true owner. Likewise, under Article 1456 of the
same Code, if property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes. In the case of Noel vs. Court of Appeals, 22 this Court held
that "a buyer of a parcel of land at a public auction to satisfy a

judgment against a widow acquired only one-half interest on the

land corresponding to the share of the widow and the other half
belonging to the heirs of her husband became impressed with a
constructive trust in behalf of said heirs."

At the outset, it should be stated petitioners never raised this issue

in their Answers and pursuant to Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of
Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer are deemed waived.

Neither does the fact that DBP succeeded in consolidating

ownership over the subject property in its name terminate the
existing co-ownership. Registration of property is not a means of
acquiring ownership. 23 When the subject property was sold to and
consolidated in the name of DBP, it being the winning bidder in the
public auction, DBP merely held the 3/4 portion in trust for the
private respondents. When petitioner Nelson purchased the said
property, he merely stepped into the shoes of DBP and acquired
whatever rights and obligations appertain thereto.

Nonetheless, the rule is that indispensable parties, i.e., parties in

interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action, shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants; the inclusion
as a party, i.e., persons who are not indispensable but ought to be
parties if complete relief is to be accorded as between those already
parties, the court may, in its discretion, proceed in the action
without making such persons parties, and the judgment rendered
therein shall be without prejudice to the rights of such persons. 25
Proper parties, therefore, have been described as parties whose
presence in necessary in order to adjudicate the whole controversy,
but whose interests are so far separable that a final decree can be
made in their absence without affecting them. 26 Any claim against
a party may be severed and proceeded with separately. 27

This brings us to the issue of whether or not the DBP should have
been impleaded as party-defendant in the case at bar. Petitioners
contend that DBP was never impleaded and that due process
requires that DBP be impleaded so that it can defend its sale to
petitioner Nelson Nufable; and that it was the duty of private
respondents, and not of petitioner Nelson, to implead the bank and
ask for the annulment of documents evidencing the bank's
ownership of the disputed land.

In the Rejoinder to the Reply, private respondents that the noninclusion of DBP as a "necessary party" was not questioned by
petitioners from the time the Complaint was filed until the case was
"finished." It was only after the adverse decision by the respondent
Court of Appeals that petitioners raised the issue.

The pivotal issue to be determined is whether DBP is an

indispensable party in this case.

Private respondents do not question the legality of the foreclosure of

the mortgaged property and the subsequent sale of the same to
DBP. The subject property was already purchased by petitioner
Nelson from DBP and latter, by such sale, transferred its rights and
obligations to the former. Clearly, petitioners' interest in the
controversy is distinct and separable from the interest of DBP and a
final determination can be had of the action despite the noninclusion of DBP as party-defendant. Hence, DBP, not being an
indispensable party, did not have to be impleaded in this case.

MENDOZA, J.:
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the decision
appealed from, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby
DENIED.1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.

RESOLUTION

This is a motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated

November 29, 1995, of the Court, denying the petition for review of
the decision, dated May 28, 1993, and the resolution, dated August
30, 1993, of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 08410,
affirming the conviction of petitioner Zenaida P. Reyes of falsification
of public document. Petitioner's motion is based on her contention
that because of her counsel's unexplained absences at the trial she
was prevented from presenting evidence in her defense and
therefore denied the due process of law.

Romero, J., abroad, on official business leave.

The facts are as follows:

In an information filed on April 7, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court

of Bulacan and later assigned to Branch 22 thereof as Criminal Case
No. 9252-M, petitioner Zenaida Reyes was accused of falsifying a
deed of sale of four (4) parcels of land "by feigning and signing the
name of Pablo Floro, who could not affix his signature anymore due
to age infirmity, on the said document as seller and causing it to
appear that said Pablo Floro [had] participated in the execution of
the said document when in truth and in fact, as said accused well
knew, said deed of sale was not executed and signed by the said
Pablo Floro, nor did he ever appear before any notary public for the
purpose of acknowledging the deed above mentioned." 2
G.R. No. 111682 February 6, 1997
ZENAIDA REYES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Upon being arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the

merits then followed. After the prosecution had rested its case, the

presentation of the defense evidence was scheduled on February 6,

1989, which, however, was reset "for the last time" to March 10,
1989 due to petitioner's illness. 3 The hearing on March 10, 1989
was, however, cancelled also because of the absence of both the
private prosecutor and defense counsel, Atty. Analuz Cristal-Tenorio.
The new schedule was April 12, 1989. 4 However, Atty. Tenorio was
again absent on April 12, 1989. Petitioner was also absent, but her
husband appeared and submitted to the court a medical certificate
that she was sick. The hearing on that date was therefore postponed
to May 17, 1989 "[f]or the last time. " 5

On May 11, 1989, Atty. Tenorio moved for the postponement of the
hearing from May 17, 1989 to June 5, 1989, allegedly because she
had to leave for Malaybalay, Bukidnon to assist in the prosecution of
her brother-in-law's killers. The trial court, while noting that the
hearing on May 17, 1989 was "intransferrable in character,"
nonetheless granted Atty. Tenorio's motion and postponed the
hearing to June 5, 1989 over the objection of the private prosecutor.
Petitioner was warned that if she did not present her evidence on
that date, she would be considered to have waived her right to do
so. 6 But the hearing on June 5, 1989 had to be rescheduled again
because petitioner's counsel, Atty. Tenorio, was absent. 7

On July 10, 1989, the new date of hearing, both petitioner and Atty.
Tenorio were absent, so that on motion of private prosecutor, the
court declared petitioner to have waived the right to present her
evidence. 8 Four days later (on July 14, 1989), petitioner gave a
medical certificate 9 stating that she was suffering from
hypertension and rheumatism which required bed rest for at least 57 days. The court merely noted the medical certificate but
maintained its previous order, on the ground that "the same is not a
motion and [as] counsel was also not in Court during the last
hearing, the Order of the Court dated July 10, 1989 to the effect that

the presentation of defense evidence is considered waived, stands. "

10

Petitioner by herself moved for reconsideration, alleging that she

failed to appear in court on July 10, 1989 because she was
indisposed and had been unable to contact Atty. Tenorio. She asked
for permission to present her evidence. Her motion, however, was
denied by the court in its order of August 29, 1989 11 in which it
also scheduled the promulgation of judgment on September 29,
1989.

On September 29, 1989, the court rendered its decision 12 finding

petitioner guilty of falsification and sentencing her to 4 months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prision
correccional, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00.

Petitioner through a new counsel, Atty. Ronolfo S. Pasamba, filed a

notice of appeal. 13 On May 9, 1990, petitioner by herself filed a
motion in the Court of Appeals for extension of 30 days to file her
brief as appellant. 14 About the same time Atty. Pasamba also filed a
motion for an extension of 45 days for the same purpose, but later
asked to be relieved as petitioner's counsel on the ground that
despite his request, petitioner did not give him the records of the
case and confer with him but instead acted as her own counsel by
filing her own motion for time to file brief.

The Court of Appeals granted Atty. Pasamba's motion and required

petitioner to submit the name and address of her new counsel within
ten (10) days from notice. Petitioner instead filed a motion for new
trial in lieu of appellant's brief, claiming that because of the

negligence of her counsel, she had been deprived of her right to

present evidence on her behalf in the trial court.

produced at the trial, and which if introduced and admitted, would

probably change the judgment. (Rule 121, Section 2)

After the Solicitor General filed his comment, the Court of Appeals in
its resolution dated January 15, 1992 denied petitioner's motion for
new trial and gave her 30 days within which to file her appellant's
brief. 15 The appellate court held:

There is not even a wee bit of a hint about the second ground.

All that appellant is invoking as ground for new trial is the policy of
liberality in the application of the rules and the alleged negligence of
her counsel.

Appellant, who has, in fact, prepared the motion herself, without the
assistance of counsel, is probably a member of the Bar. If she is not,
she must have gone through law school as her handiwork is written
in forensic style and is even better than the pleadings of some
licensed advocates who are handling appealed cases or original
special civil actions before this Court.

Under the Rules the grounds for new trial are

(a) That errors of law or irregularities have been committed during

the trial prejudicial to the substantial nights of the accused; and

(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the
accused could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and

So, in effect, what the accused would want of Us is to bend over

backwards and in a gesture of liberality consider as an error of law
or as an irregularity the trial court's conclusion that she was deemed
to have waived her right to present evidence in her defense. In
connection with this course of action she already filed before the
trial court a motion for reconsideration: this was denied, whereupon
the trial court proceeded to rendition of the judgment appealed from
by the accused to this court.

We have meticulously gone over the entire record, and We find that
accused appellant was not at all deprived of her day in court or
denied due process. She was afforded ample opportunity to present
evidence in her defense.

Regardless of the nature of the offense charged, a criminal case,

even if it involves only a light offense, the penalty for which might
be mere censure, is a serious matter that deserves equally serious
attention by the one accused. The appellant, it seems never gave to
this case while it was still at the lower court the serious attention
that it deserves. For good reason repeated absences of the
accused and her counsel the trial court was eventually
constrained to consider the accused to have waived the
presentation of evidence in her defense. As pointed out by the
Solicitor General, it is settled in our jurisprudence that dilatory
moves by the accused that tend to defeat the expeditious

termination of a criminal case is tantamount to trifling with the

administration of justice that certainly can not and should not be
condoned. (PP vs. Angco, 103 Phil. 33; PP vs. Dichoso, 96 SCRA 957)

Petitioner filed a "very urgent motion" for 90 days from February 22,
1992 to secure services of counsel to file her appellant's brief. The
Court of Appeals gave petitioner 15 days from February 22, 1992,
the last day of the extension previously granted her. The Court of
Appeals stated that it had given petitioner notice to file brief as
early as March 27, 1990, but "petitioner has been trifling with our
judicial processes long enough."

On March 6, 1992, without the assistance of counsel, accusedappellant filed an appellant's brief. Thereafter the Solicitor General
filed the appellee's brief to which petitioner filed a reply brief. On
May 28, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, affirming
the trial court's ruling. On August 30, 1993 it denied reconsideration.

Petitioner filed this case for review on certiorari, claiming that her
conviction by the trial court was void because she was denied due
process, since she was denied the opportunity to present evidence
in her behalf. The Solicitor General filed his comment to which
petitioner filed a reply. On November 29, 1995 this Court denied the
petition for lack of merit. Hence this motion for reconsideration.

After due consideration of the motion and its supplement and the
separate comments thereto by the respondents as well as
petitioner's replies and private respondent's consolidated rejoinder,
the Court now resolves to grant petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.

First. The issue in this case is whether the trial court properly held
petitioner to have waived the right to present evidence because of
her failure to proceed despite several postponements granted to
her. To be sure, the postponement of the trial of a case to allow the
presentation of evidence of a party is a matter which lies in the
discretion of the trial court, but it is a discretion which must be
exercised wisely, considering the peculiar circumstances obtaining
in each case and with a view to doing substantial justice. 16 In the
case at bar, hearings were scheduled for die presentation of
petitioner's evidence on six different dates, to wit: (1) February 6,
1989; (2) March 10, 1989; (3) April 12, 1989; (4) May 17, 1989; (5)
June 5, 1989; and (6) July 10, 1989. Petitioner was absent thrice, i.e.,
on February 6, 1989, April 12, 1989, and July 10, 1989. On the first
date, petitioner could not come because she was sick and her
counsel so informed the court. She was absent also on June 5, 1989
and July 10, 1989 because of illness (hypertension and rheumatism).
Thus, while petitioner's absences were explained, those of her
counsel were not. Atty. Tenorio simply disappeared without a trace,
despite warning to counsel that her failure to present evidence for
her client on June 5, 1989 would be considered a waiver of the
latter's right to present her evidence. But counsel failed to heed the
warning. Petitioner had to soldier on and, by herself, had to plead
with the court for a chance to present her evidence. Contrary to
what the appellate court thought in affirming petitioner's conviction,
this was not the case of a woman who treated the criminal
proceedings against her with cavalier disdain. Indeed, we do not
think that petitioner's absences were so many, capricious, or
egregious as to indubitably indicate an attempt to stall the
proceedings of the criminal case as was the case in People v. Angco
17 and People v. Dichoso. 18 Petitioner might have tried to delay the
filing of her appellant's brief, but her effort can be attributed to an
understandable desire to be allowed to present her evidence.
Hence, the filing of a motion for new trial. Even in her present
petition before this Court petitioner's prayer is not that she be

exonerated but only that she be given the chance to prove her
innocence by being allowed to present her evidence.

Respondent People and the counsel for the private respondent

oppose petitioner's motion. They point out that, unlike the cases 19
which petitioner cites in support of her motion, petitioner herself
was negligent. They contend that she could not have been unaware
of the absences of her lawyer but despite that she did nothing to
protect her interests. Private respondent argues that "if granted a
second chance to present her side, nothing will stop the petitioner
from once again engaging the services of her erstwhile absentee
counsel. Anyway, after another 10 years of litigation, she can easily
sound her reliable refrain: 'I was denied due process! I was ready to
present my evidence, but my lawyer was absent for five consecutive
times'. . . ."

Private respondent's contention is exaggerated. Of course there is a

limit to petitioner's credibility should she repeat what had happened
here just for delay, not to mention that she would be taking a big
risk of losing her defense. As for the private respondent's argument
that petitioner should have gotten another lawyer, only with the
benefit of hindsight does this course appear to be the only tenable
one to take. Petitioner might have thought that her counsel would
be more sedulous in her behalf. Or perhaps petitioner tried to get
another counsel, but failed and, left with no choice, stuck it out with
Atty. Tenorio and simply hoped for the best rather than be left
without a counsel. In any case, the fact that on May 17, 1989 and
June 5, 1989 petitioner was present even when counsel was absent
tends to negate an intention to delay the criminal proceedings.

It was Atty. Tenorio's absences, then, rather than petitioner's, which

appear to be the cause for the defense's failure to present its
evidence. Atty. Tenorio's negligence did not consist in error of
procedure or even a lapse in strategy but something as basic as
failing to appear in court despite clear warning that such failure
would amount to waiver of her client's right to present evidence in
her defense.

Keeping in mind that this case involves personal liberty, the

negligence of counsel was certainly so gross that it should not be
allowed to prejudice petitioner's constitutional right to be heard. The
judicial conscience certainly cannot rest easy on a conviction based
solely on the evidence of the prosecution just because the
presentation of the defense evidence had been barred by
technicality. Rigid application of rules must yield to the duty of
courts to render justice where justice is due to secure to every
individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime
with which he or she might be
charged. 20

Only last year, this Court set aside its decision after finding that the
right of the accused to due process had been violated. In De
Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 21 this Court set aside its decision
affirming petitioner's conviction by the Sandiganbayan and its
resolution denying reconsideration, after being shown that
petitioner's conviction had been brought about by his counsel's
gross ignorance of law and procedure. The Court held:

Petitioner's present dilemma is certainly not something reducible to

pesos and centavos. No less than his liberty is at stake here. And he

is just about to lose it simply because his former lawyers pursued a

carelessly contrived procedural strategy of insisting on what has
already become an imprudent remedy, which thus forbade
petitioner from offering his evidence all the while available for
presentation before the Sandiganbayan. Under the circumstances,
higher interests of justice and equity demand that petitioner be not
penalized for the costly importunings of his previous lawyers based
on the same principles why this Court had, on many occasions
where it granted new trial, excused parties from the negligence or
mistakes of counsel. To cling to the general rule in this case is only
to condone rather than rectify a serious injustice to petitioners
whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his innocence to
his previous lawyers. . . .

The Court remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for reception

and appreciation of petitioner's evidence.

In another case, People v. Del Mundo, 22 in which the accused was

convicted of rape in six cases and sentenced to reclusion perpetua
on five of them and to death on the sixth, this Court ordered a new
trial after it was shown that complainant had executed prior to
accused's conviction an affidavit of desistance, while an NBI medicolegal report given after such conviction found that complainant's
"physical virginity preserved." The report belied the contrary finding
of the city health officer on which the trial court relied in convicting
the accused. Although the NBI report did not constitute newlydiscovered evidence, a new trial was nonetheless ordered "on the
broader ground of substantial justice [as] the rule for granting a
motion for new trial, among others, should be liberally construed to
assist the parties in obtaining a just and speedy determination of
their rights. . . . Court litigations are primarily for the search for
truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties

are given the fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to
ferret out such truth."

Reconsideration of the resolution in this case is compelled by these

precedents. Indeed, to deny petitioner the opportunity to present
her evidence on the merest chance that she might be innocent
would be to disregard the wisdom that it is better to acquit ten
guilty individuals than to convict one innocent person. The Court is
as aware as anyone of the need for the speedy disposition of cases.
At the same time, however, it has ever been mindful of its
responsibility as the highest tribunal of justice to see to it that the
paramount interests of justice are not sacrificed for the sake of
speed and efficiency. As Justice Teehankee wrote: 23

The Court has consistently maintained that although a speedy

determination of an action implies a speedy trial, speed is not the
chief objective of a trial. Careful and deliberate consideration for the
administration of justice, a genuine respect for the rights of all
parties and the requirements of procedural due process and an
adherence to the Court's standing admonition that the discretion
granted judges in the granting or denial of motions for
postponement and the setting aside of denial orders previously
issued "should always be predicated on the consideration that more
than the mere convenience of the courts or of the parties in the
case, the ends of justice and fairness would be served thereby" are
more important than a race to end the trial.

Second. In denying petitioner's plea for a chance to present her

evidence, the Court of Appeals observed that petitioner has more
than a layman's acquaintance with the law, having been able to
prepare and file her own motion for new trial and appellant's brief,

to be given the benefit of the doubt. But even lawyers, who are
parties in a case, need the guiding hand of counsel. Skill in drafting
pleadings (which is practically the only "lawyerly" thing petitioner
did) is vastly different from skill needed in the courtroom. Preparing
pleadings can be done at leisure with the luxury of consultation,
either of books or of people. Trial work, however, demands more. It
requires the ability to think fast on one's feet and the psychologist's
feel for the witness' mood and motive. As then Chief Justice Moran
said for the Court in People v. Holgado: 24

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of

November 29, 1995 is GRANTED and the decision dated May 28,
1993 of the Court of Appeals and that of the Regional Trial Court of
Bulacan, Branch 22 dated September 29, 1989 in Criminal Case No.
9252-M are SET ASIDE and this case is REMANDED to the Regional
Trial Court of Bulacan for a new trial for the purpose of allowing
petitioner to present evidence in her defense with directive to the
court thereafter to decide the case with all deliberate speed.

SO ORDERED.
Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the
science of the law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and,
without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence.

It is entirely probable that, forced to be her own lawyer, petitioner

nonetheless felt some inadequacy and experienced some moments
of doubt whether she could go through the ordeal of presenting her
evidence by her lonesome, and that could be the reason why she
hesitated from doing so when she found herself without the
assistance of counsel and not because petitioner tried to delay the
proceedings and obstruct the course of justice.

In sum, it is better to allow petitioner another chance to present her

evidence than to let her conviction stand based solely on the
evidence of the prosecution. In accordance with Rule 121, 6, 25 the
evidence of the prosecution shall be understood preserved, subject
to the right of the prosecution to supplement it and/or to rebut the
evidence which petitioner may present.

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

POSTIGO VS. BORJAL

13 Phil 240

G.R. No. L-15737

February 28, 1962

LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of
the testate estate of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO, defendantappellee.
Amado G. Salazar for plaintiff-appellant.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Subject to this direct appeal to us on points of law is the decision of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, in its Civil Case No. Q-2809,
dismissing plaintiff-appellant's complaint for the recovery of certain
properties that were originally owned by the plaintiff's granduncle,
Nicolas Villaflor, and which he granted to his widow, Doa Fausta
Nepomuceno, bequeathing to her "su uso y posesion mientras viva y
no se case en segundas nupcias".
The following facts appear of record: On October 9, 1908, Don
Nicolas Villaflor, a wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a
will in Spanish in his own handwriting, devising and bequeathing in
favor of his wife, Dona Fausta Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real
and personal properties, giving the other half to his brother Don
Fausto Villaflor.
Clause 6th, containing the institution of heirs, reads as follows: .
SEXTO En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las
leyes, instituyo per mis unicos y universales herederos de
todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto
Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que
partan todos mis bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales
partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las
donaciones y legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea
voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente: .

SEPTIMO: Lego para dispues de mi muerte a mi esposa Da.

Fausta Nepomuceno, en prueba de mi amor y carino, los
bienes, alhajas y muebles que a continuacion se expresan; .
OCTAVO: Que estos legades disfrutaria mi referida esposa
Da. Fausta Nepomuceno su uso y posesion mientras viva y no
se case en segundas nupcias, de la contrario, pasara a ser
propiedad estos dichos legados de mi sobrina nieta Leonor
Villaflor.
The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and
7th thereof would be deemed annulled from the moment he bore
any child with Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. Said Clause 12th reads as
follows: .
DUODECIMO: Quedan anulados las parrafos 6.0 y 7.0 de
este testamento que tratan de institucion de herederos y los
legados que se haran despues de mi muerte a favor de mi
esposa, en el momento que podre tener la dicha de contrar
con hijo y hijos legitimos o legitimados, pues estos, conforme
a ley seran mis herederos.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any
child with his wife Doa Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter, already a
widow, thereupon instituted Special Proceeding No. 203 of the Court
of First Instance of Zambales, for the settlement of her husband's
estate and in that proceeding, she was appointed judicial
administratrix. In due course of administration, she submitted a
project of partition, now Exhibit "E". In the order of November 24,
1924, now exhibit "C", the probate court approved the project of
partition and declared the proceeding closed. As the project of
partition, Exhibit "E", now shows Doa Fausta Nepomuceno received
by virtue thereof the ownership and possession of a considerable
amount of real and personal estate. By virtue also of the said project
of partition, she received the use and possession of all the real and
personal properties mentioned and referred to in Clause 7th of the
will. The order approving the project of partition (Exh. "C"), however,
expressly provided that approval thereof was "sin perjuicio de lo
dispuesto en la clausula 8.o del testamento de Nicolas Villaflor." .

On May 1, 1956, Doa Fausta Nepomuceno died without having

contracted a second marriage, and without having begotten any
child with the deceased Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now being
settled in Special Proceeding No. Q-1563 in the lower court, with the
defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly appointed and qualified judicial
administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the
same Leonor Villaflor mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as
his "sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor".
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the
administrator of the estate of the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on
February 8, 1958, contending that upon the widow's death, said
plaintiff became vested with the ownership of the real and personal
properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor to clause 7 of his
will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position, adopted
by the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became
absolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on account of the
fact that she never remarried.
We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the
testator, as manifested in clause 8 of his testament, was to invest
his widow with only a usufruct or life tenure in the properties
described in the seventh clause, subject to the further condition
(admitted by the appellee) that if the widow remarried, her rights
would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the
widow was meant to have no more than a life interest in those
properties, even if she did not remarry at all, is evident from the
expressions used by the deceased "uso y posesion mientras viva"
(use and possession while alive) in which the first half of the phrase
"uso y posesion" instead of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the
second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly did not give his widow
the full ownership of these particular properties, but only the right to
their possession and use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is
in contrast with the remainder of the estate in which she was
instituted universal heir together with the testator's brother (clause
6). 1wph1.t

SEXTO: En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las

leyes, instituyo por mis unicos y universales herederos de
todos mis derechos y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto
Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta Nepomuceno para que
parten todos mis bienes que me pertenescan, en iguales
partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las
donaciones y legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea
voluntad, lo hago en la forma siguiente.
The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as
reversionary legatee, could succeed to the properties bequeathed
by clause 7 of the testament only in the event that the widow
remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the expression "mientras
viva," and considered the words "uso y posesion" as equivalent to
"dominio" (ownership). In so doing, the trial court violated Article
791 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule
123 of the Rules of Court.
ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation
which will give to every expression some effect, rather than
one which will render any of the expressions inoperative; and
of two modes of interpreting a will, that one is to be preferred
which will prevent intestacy." .
SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all
provisions. In the construction of an instrument where
there are several provisions or particulars, such a
construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to
all." .
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the
conditions contained in clause 7 of his testament should not be
allowed to obscure the clear and unambiguous meaning of his plain
words, which are over the primary source in ascertaining his intent.
It is well to note that if the testator had intended to impose as sole
condition the non-remarriage of his widow, the words "uso y
posesion mientras viva" would have been unnecessary, since the
widow could only remarry during her own lifetime.

The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889),
expressly enjoins the following: .
ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary
and grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them
in another sense can be gathered, and that other can be
ascertained." .
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical
sense, unless the context clearly indicates a contrary
intention, or unless it satisfactorily appears that the will was
drawn solely by the testator, and that he was unacquainted
with such technical sense. (675a)
In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the
doctrine in In re Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil., 233, that the intention
and wishes of the testator, when clearly expressed in his will,
constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and all questions raised at
the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be settled in
accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the
testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was
otherwise. The same rule is adopted by the Supreme Court of Spain
(TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28 Mayo 1918; 30 Abril 1913; 16 Enero
1915; 23 Oct. 1925).
La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y constantemente
expresada al ordenar su ultimo voluntad, es ley unica,
imperativa y obligatoria que han de obedecer y cumplir
fieldmente albaceas, legatarios y heredera, hoy sus
sucesores, sin que esa voluntad patente, que no ha menester
de interpretaciones, pues no ofrece la menor duda, pueda
sustituirse, pues no ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse
por ningun otro criterio de alguna de los interesados, ni
tampoco por el judicial. (Tribunal Supremo of Spain, Sent. 20
March 1918) .
The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief inapplicable,
because they involve cases where the only condition imposed on the
legatee was that she should remain a widow. As already shown, the
testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor clearly and unmistakably provided

that his widow should have the possession and use of the legacies
while alive and did not remarry. It necessarily follows that by the
express provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies should
pass to the testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the
widow's death, even if the widow never remarried in her lifetime.
Consequently, the widow had no right to retain or dispose of the
aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to the
reversionary legatee for their return, unless they had been lost due
to fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent third
parties have intervened.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and
the appellant Leonor Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is declared
entitled to the ownership and fruits of the properties described in
clause 7 of the will or testament, from the date of the death of Doa
Fausta Nepomuceno. The records are ordered remanded to the court
of origin for liquidation, accounting and further proceedings
conformably to this decision. Costs against the Administratorappellee.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon and De Leon, JJ., concur.
Labrador, J., took no part.

Aznar v Garcia 7 scra 95

Facts:
Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated
to California where he resided and consequently was considered a
California Citizen for a period of nine years to 1913. He came to the
Philippines where he became a domiciliary until the time of his
death. However, during the entire period of his residence in this
country, he had always considered himself as a citizen of California.

In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an

The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in

acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only

heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen Christensen
Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the Supreme Court had been
declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of his. Counsel of
Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law
should be applied, the matter is returned back to the law of
domicile, that Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share
of Helen must be increased in view of successional rights of
illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On the other hand,
counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16
(2) of the Mew Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply,
our courts must apply internal law of California on the matter. Under
California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently a
testator should dispose any property possessed by him in absolute
dominion.

Issue:
Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.

Held:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional
rights to Helen Christensen Garcia said in effect that there be two
rules in California on the matter.
The conflict rule which should apply to Californians outside
the California, and

califronia.
The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California
Civil code States that if there is no law to the contrary in the place
where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the
decree of its owner and is governed by the law of the domicile.
Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of his
domicile, the Philippines is ought to be followed.
Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is
remanded to the lower court with instructions that partition
be made as that of the Philippine law provides.
G.R. Nos. L-11483-11484

February 14, 1958

In the matter of the Testate Estate of the deceased Edward

E. Christensen, ADOLFO CRUZ AZNAR, petitioner.
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY and ADOLFO CRUZ
AZNAR, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA and BERNARDA
CAMPOREDONDO, oppositors-appellees.
BERNARDA CAMPOREDONDO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ADOLFO CRUZ AZNAR, as Executor of the Deceased EDWARD
E. CHRISTENSEN, defendant-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for appellants.
Leopoldo M. abellera and Amado A. Munda for appellee Maria
Heliuen Christensen Garcia.
Pedro P. Suarez and Oscar Breva for appellee Bernarda
Camporedondo.
FELIX, J.:

From the records of the above-entitled cases, it appears that as of

1913,Edward E. Christensen, an American citizen, was already
residing in Davao and on the following year became the manager of
Mindanao Estates located in the municipality of Padada of the same
province. At a certain time, which the lower court placed at 1917, a
group of laborers recruited from Argao, Cebu, arrived to work in the
said plantation. Among the group was a young girl,Bernarda
Camporendondo, who became an assistant to the cook. Thereafter,
thegirl and Edward E. Christensen, who was also unmarried staring
living together as husband and wife and although the records failed
to establishthe exact date when such relationship commenced, the
lower court found the same to have been continous for over 30
years until the death of Christensen occurecd on April 30, 1953. Out
of said relations, 2 children, Lucy and Helen Christensen, were
allegedly born.
G. R. NO. L-11484.
Upon the demise of the American, who had left a considerable
amount of properties his will naming Adolfo Cruz Aznar as executor
was duly presented for probate in court and became the subject of
Special Proceedings No. 622 of the Court of First Instance of Davao.
Said will contains, among others, the following provisions:
xxx

xxx

xxx.

3. I declare . . . that I have but one (1) child, named MARIA

LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born
in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is
now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I have no living ascendants, andno
descendantsexcept my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx

xxx

xxx.

7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA LUCY

CHRISTENSEN, now married toEduardo Garcia, about
eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the factthat
she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related to
me, nor hasshe been at any time adopted to me, and who,
from all information I have now resides in Egipt, Digos,
Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREEE THOUSAND
SIXHUNDRED PESOS (P3,600) Philippine Currency, the same
to be deposited in trustfor said Maria Lucy Christensen with
the Davao Branch of the PhilippineNational Bank, and paid to
her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100), Philippine
Currency per month until the the principal thereof as well as
any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted.
8. I give devise and bequeath unto BERNARDA
CAMPORENDONDO, now residing inPadada, Davao,
Philippines, the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000),
Philippine Currency.
xxx

xxx

xxx.

12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved

daughter, the said MARIA Lucy CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs.
Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger
Young Village Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., all the income
from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and
estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or
character, andwheresover situated; of which I may be
possessed at any death and which mayhave come to me
from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime,Provided,
honvever, that should the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY at any time prior to her decease having living issue,
then, and in that event, the life interest herein given shall
terminate, and if so terminated, then I give, devise, and
bequeath to my said daughter, the said MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY, the rest remainder and residue of my
property, with the same force and effectas if I had originally
so given, devised and bequeathedit to her; and provided,
further, that should be said Maria Lucy ChristensenDaney die
without living issue then, and in that event, I give, devise and

bequeath all the rest, remainder and residue of my property,

one-half (1/2) to my well-beloved sister, Mrs. CARRIE LOIUSE
C. BORTON, now residing at No. 2124 Twentieth Street,
Bakersfield, California, U.S.A. and one-half (1/2) to the
children of my deceased brother, JOSEPH C. CRISTENSEN, . . .

ruling of the Court and in order to attain the purpose sought by her
overruled opposition Bernarda Camporedondo had to institute, as
she did institute Civil Case No. 1076 of the Court of First Instance of
Davao (G.R. No. L-11483) which we will consider and discuss
hereinafter.

13. I hereby nominate and appoint Mr Adolfo Cruz Aznar, of

Davao City, Philippines, my executor, and the executor of
this, my last will and testament.

In the meantime, Adolfo Cruz Aznar was appointed special

adminsitrator of the estate after filing a bond for P5,000 pending the
appointment of a regular one, and letters of special administrition
were correspondingly issued to him on May 21, 1953.

. . . (Exh. A).
Oppositions to the probate of this will were separately filed by Maria
Helen Christensen Garcia and Bernarda Camporendondo, the first
contending that thewill lacked the formalities required by law; that
granting that he had, thedispositions made therein were illegal
because although she and Lucy Christensen were both children had
by the deceased with Bernarda Camporendondo, yet she was given
only a meager sum of P3,600 out of an estate valued at $485,000
while Lucy would get the rest of the properties;and that the
petitioner Adolfo Cruz Aznar was not qualified to be appointed as
administrator of the estate because he had an interest adverse to
thatof the estate. It was therefore prayed by his oppositor that the
application for probate be denied and the will disallowed; that the
proceeding be declared intestate and that another disinterested
person be appointed as administrator.
Bernarda Camporedondo, on the other hand, claimed ownership
over one-halfof the entire estate in virtue of her relationship with the
deceased, it being alleged that she and the testator having lived
together as husband andwife continuously for a period of over 30
years, the properties acquired during such cohabitation should be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. This opposition was
dismissed by the probate court on the ground that shehad no right
to intervene in said proceeding, for as such common-law wife she
had no successional right that might be affected by the probate of
thewill, and likewise, she could not be allowed to establish her title
and co-ownership over the properties therein for such questions
must be ventilated in a court of general jurisdiction. In view of this

The records further show that subsequent to her original opposition.

Helen Christensen Garcia filed a supplemental opposition and
motion to declare her an acknowledged natural child of Edward E.
Christensen, alleging that shewas conceived during the time when
her mother Bernarda Camporendondo was living with the deceased
as his common-law wife; that she had been in continous possession
of the status of a natural child of the deceased; thatahe had in her
favor evidence and/or proof that Edward Christensen was her father;
and that she and Lucy had the same civil status as children of the
decedent and Bernarda Camporedondo. This motion was opposed
jointly by the executor and Maria Lucy Christensen Daney asserting
that before, during and after the conception and birth of Helen
Christensen Garcia, her mother was generally known to be carrying
relations with 3 different men; that during the lifetime of the
decedent and even years before his death, Edward Christensen
verbally as well as in writing disavowed relationship with said
oppositor; that oppositor appropriated and used the surname
Christensen illegally and without permission from the deceased.
Thus they prayed the Court that the will be allowed; that Maria
Helen Christensen Garcia be declared not in any way related to the
deceased; and that the motion of said oppositor be denied.
After due hearing, the lower court in a decision dated February 28,
1953, found that oppositor Maria Helen Cristensen had been in
continous possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased
Edward Christensen notwithstanding the fact that she was disowned
by him in his will, for such action must have been brought about by
the latter's disaproval of said oppositor's marriage to a man he did
not like. But taking into considerationthat such possession of the

status of a natural child did not itself constitute acknowledgment

but may only be availed of to compel acknowledgment, the lower
Court directed Maria Lucy Christensen Daney toacknowledge the
oppositor as a natural child of Edward E. Christensen. Thewill was,
however, allowed the letters testamentary consequently issued
toAdolfo Cruz Aznar, the executor named therein. From the portion
of the decision requiring Lucy Christensen to acknowledge Helen as
a natural child of the testator, the former and the executor
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA-G. R. No. 13421-R),
but the appellate tribunal elevatedthe same to Us on the ground
that the case involves an estate the value of which far exceeds
P50,000.00 and thus falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction
of this Court pursuant to Section 17 (5), Republic Act No. 296.
The principal issue in this litigation is whether the lower court erred
in finding that the oppositor Maria Helen Christensen Garcia had
been in continous possession of the status of a natural child of the
deceased EdwardE. Christensen and in directing Maria Lucy
Christensen Daney, recognizeddaughter and instituted heirs of the
decedent, to acknowledge the former assuch natural child.
Maria Lucy Christensen was born on April 25, 1922, and Maria Helen
Christensen on July 2, 1934, of the same mother, Bernarda
Camporedondo, during the period when the latter was publicly
known to have been living as common-law wife of Edward E.
Chrisiensen. From the facts of the case there can be no question as
to Lucy's parentage, but controversy arose when Edward
Christensen, in making his last will and testament, disavowed such
paternity to Helen and gave her only a legacy of P3,600. ln the
course of the proceeding for the probate of the will (Exh, A), Helen
introduced documentary and testimonial evidence to support her
claim that she, Lucy,was a natural child of the deceased and,
therefore, entitled to the hereditaryshare corresponding to such
descendant. Several witness testified in herfavor, including the
mother Bernarda Camporendondo, her former teachers andother
residents of the community, tending to prove that she was known in
the locality as a child of the testator and was introduced by the
latter to the circle of his friends and acquaintances as his daughter.
Family portraits, greeting cards and letters were likewise presented

to bolster herassertion that she had always been treated by the

deceased and by Lucy herself as a member of the family.
Lucy Christensen and Adolfo Cruz Aznar, as executor, tried to
repudiate herclaim by introducing evidence to prove that on or
about the period when shewas conceived and born, her mother was
carrying an affair with another man,Zosimo Silva, a former laborer in
her Paligue plantation. Silva executed an affidavit and even took the
witness stand to testify to this effect. Appellants also strived to show
that the defendant's solicitations for Helen's welfare and the help
extended to her merely sprang out generosity and hammered on the
fact that on several occasions, the deceased disclaimed any
relationship with her (Exh. O-Daney, Exh. Q-Daney, Exh. Z-Daney,
Exh. 8-Helen).
Going over the evidence adduced during the trial, it appears
indubitable that on or about the period when Helen was born,
Bernarda Camporendondo had established residence at her
plantation at Paligue, Davao, and that although Edward Christensen
stayed in Davao City to manage his merchandising business, he
spent the weekends with the former and their child Lucy in the
Christensenplantation. Even granting that Zosimo Silva at his stage
fitted himself intothe picture, it cannot be denied that Helen's
mother and the deceased weregenerally and publicly known to be
living together as husband and wife. Thismust have been the reason
why Christensen from Helen's birth in 1934 providedfor her
maintenance; shouldered the expenses for her education to the
extentthat she was even enrolled as an intern in an exclusive
college for girls inManila; tolerated or allowed her carrying the
surname "Christensen", and ineffect gaver her the attention and
care that a father would only do to this offspring. We should take
note that nothing appears on record to show thatChristensen ever
entertained any doubt or disputed Helen's paternity. Hisrepudations
of her relationship with him came about only after he andBernarda
Comperodondo parted ways in March, 1950, and apparently after
Helentook sides with her mother. Furthermore, it seems that despite
that decedent's desire that she continue her studies, Helen ignored
the same andgot married to a man for Christensen held no high
esteem. We may state at hisjuncture that while it is true that herein
appellants introduced witnesses todisprove oppositor'r claim, the

lower Court that had the opportunity to observe the conduct of the
witnesses while testifying and could better gaugetheir credibility
and impartiality in the case, arrived at the conclusion that Maria
Helen Christensen had established that she had been in
continouspossessions of the status of a natural child of the
deceased. Considering the preponderant evidence on record, We see
no reason to reverse said ruling.The testator' lastacts cannot be
made the criterion in determining whether oppositor was his child or
not, for human frailty and parental arrogance maydraw a person to
adopt unnatural or harsh measures against an erring child orone
who displeases just so the weight of his authority could be felt. In
theconsideration of a claim that one is a natural child, the attitude
or directacts of the person against whom such action is directed or
that of his family before the controversy arose or during his lifetime
if he predeceases the claimant, and not a single opportunity or an
isolated occasions but as a whole, must be taken into account. The
possession of such status is one of the cases that gives rise to the
right, in favor of the child, of coumpulsaryrecognition. (Art. 283, Civil
Code).
The lower Court, however, after making its finding directed Maria
Lucy Christensen Daney, an heir of the decedent, to recognize
oppositor as a natural child of the deceased. This seems improper.
The Civil Code for 2 kinds of acknowledgement of a natural child:
voluntary and compulsory. In the first instance, which may be
effected in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record or in an authentic writing (Art. 278,Civil Code), court
intervention is very nil and not altogether wanting, whereas in the
second, judicial pronouncement is essential, and while it is true that
the effect of a voluntary and a compulsory acknowledgment onthe
right of the child so recognized is the same, to maintain the view of
thelower Court would eliminate the distinction between voluntary
acts and those brought about by judicial dicta. And if We consider
that in the case, where, the presumed parent dies ahead of the child
and action for compulsory recogniton is brought against the heirs of
the deceased, as in the instant case, the situation would take absurd
turn, for the heirs would be compelled to recognize such child as a
natural child of the deceased without a properprovision of the law,
for as it now stands, the Civil Code only requires a declaration by the
court of the child's status as a natural child of the parent who, if
living, would be compelled to recognize his offspring as

such.Therefore, We hold that in cases of compulsory recognition, as

in the case at bar, it would be sufficient that a competent court,
after taking into account all the evidence on record, would declare
that under any of the circumstances specified by Article 283 of the
Civil Code, a child has acquired the status of a natural child of the
presumptive parent and as such is entitled to all rights granted it by
law, for such declaration is by itself already a judicial recognition of
the paternity of the parent concerned which is her against whom the
action is directed, are bound to respect.
G.R. No. L-11483
Coming now to Civil Case No. 1076 of the Court of First Instance of
Davao, Bernarda Camporendondo claimed in her complaint 1/2 of
the properties of thedeceased as co-owner thereof in virtue of her
relations with the deceased. She alleged as basis for action that she
and the deceased Edward E. Christensen had lived and cohabitated
as husband and wife, continously and openly for a period for more
than 30 years; that within said period, plaintiff and the deceased
acquired real and personal properties through their common effort
and industry; and that in virtue of such relationship, she was a coowner of said properties. As the executor refused to account forand
deliver the share allegedly belonging to her despite her repeated
demands, she prayed the court that said executor be ordered to
submit an inventory and render an accounting of the entire estate of
the deceased;to divide the same into 2 equal parts and declare that
one of them lawfully belonged to plaintiff; and for such other reliefs
as may be deemed just and equitable in the premises. In his answer,
the executor denied the avermentsof the complaint, contending that
the decedent was the sole owner of the properties left by him as
they were acquired through his own efforts; thatplaintiff had never
been a co-owner of any property acquired or possessed by the late
Edward christensen during his lifetime; that the personal
relationship between plaintiff and the deceased was purely
clandestinebecause the former habitually lived in her plantation at
Paligue, Davao, from the time she acquired the same in 1928; that
she also maintained relations with 2 other men; and that the claim
of plaintiff would violate the provisions of Article 2253 of the Civil
Code as the vested rights of the compulsory heirs of the deceased
would be impaired. Defendant thus prayed for the dismissal of the

complaint and as counterclaim demanded the sum ofP70.000.00

representing actual, moral and exemplary damages.
Due hearing was conducted thereon and after the parties ad
submitted theirrespective memoranda, the lower Court on August
25, 1954, rendered judgmentfinding that the deceased Edward
Christensen and Bernarda Camporendondo,not otherwise suffering
from any impediment to contract marriage, lived together as
husband and wife without marital ties continously for over 30years
until the former's death in 1953; that out of such relations 2
childrenwere born; and that the properties in controversy were
acquired by either orboth of them through their work or industry.
Relying on Section 144 of theCivil Code which said court considered
to have created another mode ofacquiring ownership, plaintiff was
held to be entitled to one-half of saidproperties as co-owner thereof
in view of her relationship with the deceasedand ordered the
executor to account for and deliver the same by her. Fromthis
decision, defendant Aznar, as Executor of the will, perfected an
appealto the Court of Appeals, but as the property involved in the
litigation exceeds P50,000.00 said tribunal elevated the case to Us
for consideration.
It is not controverted that at the time of his death, Edward
Christensen was the owner of certain properties, including shares of
stock in the plantation bearing his name and a general
merchandising store in Davao City. It is also undeniable that the
deceased and appellee, both capacitated to enter into the married
state, maintained relations as husband and wife, continuously and
publicly for a considerable number of years which the lower Court
declared to be until the death of Christensen in 1953. While as a
general rule appellate courts do not usually disturb the lower court's
findings of fact, unless said finding is not supported by or totally
devoid of or inconsistent with the evidence on record, such finding
must ofnecessity be modified to confrom with the evidence if the
reviewing tribunalwere to arrive at the proper and just solution of
the controversy. In theinstant case, the court a quo overlooked or
failed to consider the testimonies of both Lucy and Helen
Christensen to the effect that the deceased and their mother
Bernarda Camporendondo had some sort of quarrel or
misunderstanding and parted ways as of March, 1950, a fact which

appelleewas not able to overcome. Taking into account the

circumstances of this caseas found by the trial court, with the
modification that the cohabitation should appear as continuous from
the early 20's until March, 1950, the question left for our
determination is whether Bernarda Camporedondo, byreason of
such relationship, may be considered as a co-owner of the
properties acquired by the deceased during said period and thus
entitledto one-half thereof after the latter's death.
Presumably taking judicial notice of the existence in our society of a
certain kind of relationship brought about by couples living together
as husbands and wives without the benefit of marriage, acquiring
and bringingproperties unto said union, and probably realizing that
while same may not beacceptable from the moral point of view they
are as much entitled to theprotection of the laws as any other
property owners, the lawmakersincorporated Article 144 in Republic
Act No. 386 (Civil Code of the Philippines) to govern their property
relations. Said article read as follows:
ART. 114. When a man and a woman live together as
husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage
is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or
both of them through their work or industry or their wages
and salaries shall be governed by the rules of co-ownership.
It must be noted that such form of co-ownership requires that the
man and the woman thus living together must not in any way be
incapacitated to contract marriage and that the properties realized
during their cohabitation be acquired through the work, industry,
employment or occupation of both or either of them. And the same
thing may be said of whose marriages are by provision of law
declared void ab intio. While it is true that these requisites are fully
met and satisfied in the case at bar, We must remember that the
deceased and herein appellee were already estranged as of March,
1950. There being no provision of law governing the cessation of
such informal civil partnership, if ever existed, same may be
considered terminated upon their separation or desistance to
continue said relations.The Spanish Civil Code which was then
enforce contains to counterpart of Article 144 and as the records in
the instant case failed to show show thata subsequent reconciliation

ever took place and considering that Republic ActNo. 386 which
recognizeed such form of co-ownership went into operation onlyon
August 30, 1950, evidently, this later enactment cannot be invoked
as basis for appellee's claim.
In determining the question poised by this action We may look upon
the jurisprudence then obtaining on the matter. As early as 1925,
this Court already declared that where a man and a woman, not
suffering from any impediment to contract marriage, live together
as husband and wife, an informal civil partnership exists and made
the pronouncement that each of them has an intereat in the
properties acquired during said union and is entitled to participate
therein if said properties were the product oftheir JOINT efforts
(Marata vs. Dionio G.R. No. 24449, Dec. 31, 1925). In another case,
this Court similarly held that although there is no technical marital
partnership between person living maritally without being lawfully
married, nevertheless there is between them an informalcivil
partnership, and the parties would be entitled to an equal interest
where the property is acquired through their JOINT efforts (Lesaca
vs. FelixVda. de Lesaca, 91 Phil., 135).
Appellee, claiming that the properties in controversy were the
product of their joint industry apparently in her desire to tread on
the doctrine laiddown in the aforementioned cases, would lead Us to
believe that her help wassolicited or she took a hand in the
management of and/or acquisition of thesame. But such assertion
appears incredible if We consider that she wasobserved by the trial
Court as an illiterate woman who cannot even remembersimple
things as the date when she arrived at the Mindanao Estate, when
shecommenced relationship with the deceased, not even her
approximate age orthat of her children. And considering that aside
from her own declaration, which We find to be highly improbable,
there appears no evidence to proveher alleged contribution or
participation in the acquisition of the properties involved therein,
and that in view of the holding of this Courtthat for a claim to onehalf of such property to be allowed it must be provedthat the same
was acquired through their joint efforts and labor (Flores
vs.Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, * 50 Off. Gaz. 1029), We have
no recoursebut reverse the holding of the lower Court and deny the
claim of BernardaCampredondo. We may further state that even

granting, for the sake ofargument, that this case falls under the
provisions of Article 144 of theCivil Code, same would be applicable
only as far as properties acquiredafter the effectivity of Republic Act
386 are concerned and to no other, forsuch law cannot be given
retroactive effect to govern those already possessedbefore August
30, 1950. It may be argued, however, that being a newly created
right, the provisions of Section 144 should be made to retroact if
only toenforce such right. Article 2252 of the same Code is explicit in
thisrespect when it states:
SEC. 2252. Changes made and new provisions and rules laid
down by this Code which may prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the old legislation, shall
have ro retroactive effect.
xxx

xxx

xxx.

As it cannot be denied that the rights and legitimes of the

compulsory heirsof the deceased Edward Christensen would be
impaired or diminished if the claim of herein appellee would
succeed, the answer to such argument wouldbe simply obvious.
With regard to appellant Aznar's contention that the lower Court
erred in admitting the testimony of appellee Bernarda
Camporedondo dealing with facts that transpired before the death of
Edward Christensen on the ground that it is prohibited by Section
26-(c), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court. We deem it unnecessary to
delve on the same because even admitting that the court a quo
committed the error assigned, yet it will not affect anymore the
outcome of the case in view of the conclusion We have already
arrived at on the main issue.
On the strength of the foregoing considerations, We affirm the
decision of the lower Court in case G.R. No. L-11484, with the
modification that MariaLucy Christensen Daney need not be
compelled to acknowledge her sister Maria Helen Christensen Garcia
as a natural child of her father Edward E. Christensen, the
declaration of the Court in this respect being sufficient to enable her
to all the rights inherent to such status.

The decision appealed from in case G.R. No. L-11483 is hereby

reversed and another one rendered, dismissing plaintiff's complaint.
Costs are taxed against appellants in G.R. No. L-11484 and against
appellee Bernarda Camporedondo in G.R. No. L-11483. It is so
ordered.
Bengzon, Paras, C.J., Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo,
Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., and Endencia, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-23678

June 6, 1967

TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.

PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS,
oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A.
Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:

This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an

order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated April 30, 1964,
approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case
No. 37089 therein.1wph1.t
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas
and of the United States." By his first wife, Mary E. Mallen, whom he
divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George
Bellis (who pre-deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander
Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet Kennedy,
who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis,
Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis; and finally, he had three
illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines,
in which he directed that after all taxes, obligations, and expenses of
administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be
divided, in trust, in the following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00
to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam
Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after the foregoing two
items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven
surviving children by his first and second wives, namely: Edward A.
Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman,
Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal
shares.1wph1.t
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of
San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was admitted to probate in the
Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid
all the bequests therein including the amount of $240,000.00 in the
form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3)
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam
Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in
satisfaction of their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00,

which it released from time to time according as the lower court

approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the
latter three requesting partial advances on account of their
respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the
executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final Account, Report of
Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter
alia, the satisfaction of the legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery
to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the
legacies of Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma
Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of P120,000.00. In
the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth"
clause of the testator's Last Will and Testament divided the
residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the
testator's seven legitimate children by his first and second
marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis
filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the
ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate
children and, therefore, compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof
of service of which is evidenced by the registry receipt submitted on
April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other
pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964, issued an
order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final
account, report and administration and project of partition. Relying
upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the
decedent, which in this case is Texas law, which did not provide for
legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by
the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-appellants appealed to
this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply Texas law or
Philippine law.

In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even
discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court in Aznar v.
Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is
usually pertinent where the decedent is a national of one country,
and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that
the decedent was both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at
the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict of
law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile)
should govern, the same would not result in a reference back
(renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law.
Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts rule adopting the situs theory
(lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where
the properties are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties
here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence, however,
of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be
presumed different from ours.3 Appellants' position is therefore not
rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor
even mentioned it in their arguments. Rather, they argue that their
case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
of Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable
the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession;
(b) the amount of successional rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide
that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject
to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration,
whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless
of the country wherein said property may be found.

ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the

nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of
the Civil Code, stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property,
and those which have for their object public order, public
policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code aforequoted. This is not correct. Precisely, Congress deleted the phrase,
"notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding
article" when they incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art.
17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art.
16 in the new. It must have been their purpose to make the second
paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be
applied in testate and intestate succession. As further indication of
this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art.
1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by
the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs
may be involved in our System of legitimes, Congress has not
intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals.
For it has specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of
successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific
provisions must prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills
one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate
arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his
Philippine estate. Assuming that such was the decedent's intention
in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law, for
as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision
in a foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be
distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his

national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot be
ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16
of the Civil Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of
the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there
are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic
validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional
rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on
legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto,
with costs against appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar,
Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur

G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]

PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.

DECISION

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States

citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued
in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of
New York.vi[6]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in
1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to
visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. vii[7] He discovered that his
wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and having an
adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. viii[8]
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in
the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo Llorente, with the
certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for
the fathers name was left blank.ix[9]

PARDO, J.:

The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of
Appealsi[1] modifying that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur,
Branch 35, Iriga City ii[2] declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente
(herinafter referred to as Alicia), as co-owners of whatever
property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter
referred to as Lorenzo) may have acquired during the twenty-five
(25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.

The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman
of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30,
1957.iii[3]
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente
(hereinafter referred to as Paula) were married before a parish
priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur. iv[4]
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the
United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio
Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.v[5]

Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on

February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written agreement to the effect
that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy
as part of Lorenzos salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily
maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would
dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings;
(3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal
property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not
prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted
her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The
agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was
witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. The agreement was
notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.x[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16,
1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego.
Paula was
represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the
proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the
State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factual
allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of
divorce.xi[11]
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. xii[12]
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in

Manila.xiii[13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage

even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose
the marriage or cohabitation.xiv[14]

executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in her default or

incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age,
if of age;

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as

husband and wife.xv[15] Their twenty-five (25) year union produced
three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente. xvi[16]

(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful
substitute should served (sic) without bond;

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and

Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public Salvador M.
Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco
Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo
bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO
exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San Francisco,
Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal
properties and other movables or belongings that may be found or
existing therein;
(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno
and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F.
Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and
wheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at
Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon,
Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua,
Camarines Sur;
(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia
R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and
Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in
Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the
Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
(4) That their respective shares
properties, whether real or personal
disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed
could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and
themselves;

in the above-mentioned
properties, shall not be
to any other persons, but
disposed of by and among

(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole

(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or

testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or published,
by me;
(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of
mine in any degree in the Llorentes Side should ever bother and
disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and
my children with respect to any real or personal properties I gave
and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this
Last Will and Testament.xvii[17]
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance
of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be
appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.xviii[18]
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the
reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.xix[19]
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed,
the trial court admitted the will to probate. xx[20]
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated,
Lorenzo died.xxi[21]
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a
petitionxxii[22] for letters of administration over Lorenzos estate in her
favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse,
(2) that the various property were acquired during their marriage,
(3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia
and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the
conjugal property.xxiii[23]
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding
(Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of letters
testamentary.xxiv[24]
On

October

14,

1985,

without

terminating

the

testate

proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paulas petition in

Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.xxv[25]
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in
the newspaper Bicol Star.xxvi[26]
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint
decision, thus:
Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the
divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and
inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted
with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void.
This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of
letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to
receive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so
her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour
which is under Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular
Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the
will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares
her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their
conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T.
Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third
should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all
surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also
entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of
the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the
corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her
filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her
to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and
complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and
estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the
possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to
pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or
such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court;
to render a true and just account of her administration to the court
within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the
court and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.

On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for

want of evidence could not be granted.
SO ORDERED.xxvii[27]
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court
reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.xxviii[28]

motion

for

On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion

for reconsideration but modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul
and Luz Llorente are not children legitimate or otherwise of
Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him. xxix[29] Amending
its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly
Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to
one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of
the estate.xxx[30]
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of
Appeals.xxxi[31]
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision,
affirming with modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of
whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired
during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.xxxii[32]
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a
motion for reconsideration of the decision.xxxiii[33]
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals, xxxiv[34] denied the
motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.xxxv[35]

The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the
various arguments raised,xxxvi[36] the issue is simple.
Who are

entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?

We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We
remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity
of the will of the deceased.

The Applicable Law

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American
citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2)
marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly
established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are
necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to
the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with
respect to the order of succession and to the amount of successional
rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall
be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature
of the property and regardless of the country wherein said property
may be found. (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction
and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them.
Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved. xxxvii[37]
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court
of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and
the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case
was referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, in this
case, Philippine law.

We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New
York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it made the
categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that American law
follows the domiciliary theory hence, Philippine law applies when
determining the validity of Lorenzos will.xxxviii[38]
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national
law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to
general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of
testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the
union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only
within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of
the State of which the decedent was a resident. xxxix[39] Second, there
is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for
or required by New York State law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it
contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the trial courts
opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out,
leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice
entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo
acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete
disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in
accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially
in light of the factual and legal circumstances here
obtaining.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.xl[40] we held that owing to the
nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute
divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid

according to their national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of
Appeals,xli[41] that once proven that respondent was no longer a
Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the
ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could
very well lose her right to inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,xlii[42] we recognized the divorce
obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in
view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of
persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of
Appeals must be reversed.xliii[43] We hold that the divorce obtained by
Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the
effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the
decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial
court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and
other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the
country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic
or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign
country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be
observed in their execution. (underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his
second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in the will he
executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a
foreigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties,
status, condition and legal capacity.xliv[44]

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from
Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law which must be
pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance
with the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine
law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever
public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of
legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the
succession of foreign nationals.
Congress specifically left the
amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.xlv[45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the
other issues raised.

The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31,
1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional
Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted
in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of
the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final
on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for
determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will
and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof
of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with
all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within
the framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and YnaresSantiago, JJ., concur.

In the matter of the estate of Tomas Rodriguez, deceased.

MANUEL TORRES, special administrator, and LUZ LOPEZ DE
BUENO, heir, appellee,
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellant.
Marcaida, Capili and Ocampo and Camus, Delgado and Recto for
appellant.
Araneta and Zaragoza for appellee.

STREET, J.:
This appeal involves a controversy over one-half of the estate
of Tomas Rodriguez, decedent. The appellant, Margarita Lopez,
claims said half by the intestate succession as next of kin and
nearest heir; while the appellee, Luz Lopez de Bueno, claims the
same by accredition and in the character of universal heir the will of
the decedent. The trial court decided the point of controversy in
favor of Luz Lopez de Bueno, and Margariat Lopez appealed.
The facts necessary to an understanding of the case are
these: On January 3, 1924, Tomas Rodriguez executed his last will
and testament, in the second clause of which he declared:
I institute as the only and universal heirs to all my
property, my cousin Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter Luz
Lopez de Bueno.

G.R. No. L-25966

November 1, 1926

Prior to the time of the execution of this will the testator,

Tomas Rodriguez, had been judicially declared incapable of taking
care of himself and had been placed under the care of his cousin
Vicente F. Lopez, as guardian. On January 7, 1924, or only four days
after the will above-mentioned was made, Vicente F. Lopez died; and
the testator, Tomas Rodriguez, died on February 25, 1924,
thereafter. At the time the will was made Vicente F. Lopez had not
presented his final accounts as guardian, and no such accounts had
been presented by him at the time of his death. Margariat Lopez

was a cousin and nearest relative of the decedent. The will referred
to, and after having been contested, has been admitted to probate
by judicial determination (Torres and Lopez de Bueno vs. Lopez, 48
Phil., 772).
Our discussion of the legal problem presented should begin
with article 753 of the Civil Code which in effect declares that, with
certain exceptions in favor of near relatives, no testamentary
provision shall be valid when made by a ward in favor of his
guardian before the final accounts of the latter have been approved.
This provision is of undoubted application to the situation before us;
and the provision made in the will of Tomas Rodriguez in favor of
Vicente F. Lopez was not any general incapacity on his part, but a
special incapacity due to the accidental relation of guardian and
ward existing between the parties.

heir at law of the decedent. In this connection attention is directed

to article 764 of the Civil Code wherein it is declared, among other
things, that a will may be valid even though the person instituted as
heir is disqualified to inherit. Our attention is next invited to article
912 wherein it is declared, among other things, that legal succession
takes place if the heir dies before the testator and also when the
heir instituted is disqualified to succeed. Upon these provisions an
argument is planted conducting to the conclusion that the will of
Tomas Rodriguez was valid, notwithstanding the fact that one of the
individuals named as heirs in the will was disqualified to take, and
that as a consequence Margarita Lopez s entitled to inherit the share
of said disqualified heir.

We now pass to article 982 of the Civil Code, defining the right
of accretion. It is there declared, in effect, that accretion take place
in a testamentary succession, first when the two or more persons
are called to the same inheritance or the same portion thereof
without special designation of shares; and secondly, when one of
the persons so called dies before the testator or renounces the
inheritance or is disqualifying to receive it. In the case before us we
have a will calling Vicente F. Lopez and his daughter, Luz Lopez de
Bueno, to the same inheritance without special designation of
shares. In addition to this, one of the persons named as heir has
predeceased the testator, this person being also disqualified to
receive the estate even if he had been alive at the time of the
testator's death. This article (982) is therefore also of exact
application to the case in hand; and its effect is to give to the
survivor, Luz Lopez de Bueno, not only the undivided half which she
would have received in conjunction with her father if he had been
alive and qualified to take, but also the half which pertained to him.
There was no error whatever, therefore, in the order of the trial court
declaring Luz Lopez de Bueno entitled to the whole estate.

We are the opinion that this contention is untenable and that

the appellee clearly has the better right. In playing the provisions of
the Code it is the duty of the court to harmonize its provisions as far
as possible, giving due effect to all; and in case of conflict between
two provisions the more general is to be considered as being limited
by the more specific. As between articles 912 and 983, it is obvious
that the former is the more general of the two, dealing, as it does,
with the general topic of intestate succession while the latter is
more specific, defining the particular conditions under which
accretion takes place. In case of conflict, therefore, the provisions of
the former article must be considered limited by the latter. Indeed,
in subsection 3 of article 912 the provision with respect to intestate
succession is expressly subordinated to article 983 by the
expression "and (if) there is no right of accretion." It is true that the
same express qualification is not found in subsection 4 of article
912, yet it must be so understood, in view of the rule of
interpretation above referred to, by which the more specific is held
to control the general. Besides, this interpretation supplies the only
possible means of harmonizing the two provisions. In addition to
this, article 986 of the Civil Code affords independent proof that
intestate succession to a vacant portion can only occur when
accretion is impossible.

The argument in favor of the appellant supposes that there

has supervened a partial intestacy with respect to the half of the
estate which was intended for Vicente F. Lopez and that this half has
descended to the appellant, Margarita Lopez, as next of kin and sole

The attorneys for the appellant direct attention to the fact

that, under paragraph 4 of article 912, intestate succession occurs
when the heir instituted is disqualified to succeed (incapaz de
suceder), while, under the last provision in paragraph 2 of article

982, accretion occurs when one of the persons called to inherit

under the will is disqualified to receive the inheritance (incapaz de
recibirla). A distinction is then drawn between incapacity to succeed
and incapacity to take, and it is contended that the disability of
Vicente F. Lopez was such as to bring the case under article 912
rather than 982. We are of the opinion that the case cannot be made
to turn upon so refined an interpretation of the language of the
Code, and at any rate the disability to which Vicente F. Lopez was
subject was not a general disability to succeed but an accidental
incapacity to receive the legacy, a consideration which makes a
case for accretion rather than for intestate succession.
The opinions of the commentators, so far as they have
expressed themselves on the subject, tend to the conclusion that
the right of accretion with regard to portions of an inheritance left
vacant by the death or disqualification of one of the heirs or his
renunciation of the inheritance is governed by article 912, without
being limited, to the extent supposed in appellant's brief, by
provisions of the Code relative to intestate succession (Manresa,
Comentarios al Codigo Civil Espaol, 4th ed., vol. VII, pp. 310, 311;
id., 34; 13 Mucius Scaevola, pp. 372, 373, 285-287; 16 Mucius
Scaevola, 186). Says Escriche: "It is to be understood that one of the
coheirs or colegatees fails if nonexistent at the time of the making of
the will, or he renounces the inheritance or legacy, if he dies before
the testator, if the condition be not fulfilled, or if he becomes
otherwise incapacitated. . . . (Diccionario de Legislacion y
Jurisprudencia, vol. I, p. 225.)lawphil.net
In conclusion it may be worth observing that there has always
existed both in the civil and in the common law a certain legal
intendment, amounting to a mild presumption, against partial
intestacy. In Roman law, as is well known, partial testacy systems a
presumption against it, a presumption which has its basis in the
supposed intention of the testator.
The judgment appealed from will be affirmed, and it is so
ordered, with costs against the appellant.
Avancea, C, J., Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, Romualdez and Villa-Real,
JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 4445

September 18, 1909

CATALINA BUGNAO, proponent-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO UBAG, ET AL., contestants-appellants.
Rodriguez and Del Rosario for appellants.
Fernando Salas for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Oriental
Negros, admitting to probate a document purporting to be the last will and
testament of Domingo Ubag, deceased. The instrument was propounded by
his widow, Catalina Bugnao, the sole beneficiary thereunder, and probate was
contested by the appellants, who are brothers and sisters of the deceased,
and who would be entitled to share in the distribution of his estate, if probate

were denied, as it appears that the deceased left no heirs in the direct
ascending or descending line.
Appellants contend that the evidence of record is not sufficient to establish the
execution of the alleged will in the manner and form prescribed in section 618
of the Code of Civil Procedure; and that at the time when it is alleged that the
will was executed, Ubag was not of sound mind and memory, and was
physically and mentally incapable of making a will.
The instrument propounded for probate purports to be the last will and
testament of Domingo Ubag, signed by him in the presence of three
subscribing and attesting witnesses, and appears upon its face to have been
duly executed in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Civil
Procedure touching the making of wills.
Two of the subscribing witnesses, Victor J. Bingtoy and Catalino Mario,
testified in support of the will, the latter being the justice of the peace of the
municipality wherein it was executed; and their testimony was corroborated in
all important details by the testimony of the proponent herself, who was
present when the will was made. It does not appear from the record why the
third subscribing witness was not called; but since counsel for the contestants
makes no comment upon his absence, we think it may safely be inferred that
there was some good and sufficient reason therefore. In passing, however, it
may be well to observe that, when because of death, sickness, absence, or
for any other reason, it is not practicable to call to the witness stand all the
subscribing witnesses to a will offered for probate, the reason for the absence
of any of these witnesses should be made to appear of record, and this
especially in cases such as the one at bar, wherein there is a contests.
The subscribing witnesses gave full and detailed accounts of the execution of
the will and swore that the testator, at the time of its execution, was of sound
mind and memory, and in their presence attached his signature thereto as his
last will and testament, and that in his presence and in the presence of each
other, they as well as the third subscribing witness. Despite the searching and
exhaustive cross-examination to which they were subjected, counsel for
appellants could point to no flaw in their testimony save an alleged
contradiction as to a single incident which occurred at or about the time when
the will was executed a contradiction, however, which we think is more
apparent than real. One of the witnesses stated that the deceased sat up in
bed and signed his name to the will, and that after its execution food was
given him by his wife; while the other testified that he was assisted into a

sitting position, and was given something to eat before he signed his name.
We think the evidence discloses that his wife aided the sick man to sit up in
bed at the time when he signed his name to the instrument, and that he was
given nourishment while he was in that position, but it is not quite clear
whether this was immediately before or after, or both before and after he
attached his signature to the will. To say that the sick man sat up or raised
himself up in bed is not necessarily in conflict with the fact that he received
assistance in doing so; and it is not at all improbable or impossible that
nourishment might have been given to him both before and after signing the
will, and that one witness might remember the former occasion and the other
witness might recall the latter, although neither witness could recall both. But,
however this may have been, we do not think that a slight lapse of memory on
the part of one or the other witness, as to the precise details of an unimportant
incident, to which his attention may not have been particularly directed, is
sufficient to raise a doubt as to the veracity of these witnesses, or as to the
truth and accuracy of their recollection of the fact of the execution of the
instrument. Of course, a number of contradictions in the testimony of alleged
subscribing witnesses to a will as to the circumstances under which it was
executed, or even a single contradiction as to a particular incident, where the
incident was of such a nature that the intention of any person who was
present must have been directed to it, and where the contradictory statements
in regard to it are so clear and explicit as to negative the possibility or
probability of mistake, might well be sufficient to justify the conclusion that the
witnesses could not possibly have been present, together, at the time when it
is alleged the will was executed; but the apparent contradictions in the
testimony of the witnesses in the case at bar fall far short of raising a doubt a
to their veracity, and on the other hand their testimony as a whole gives such
clear, explicit, and detailed account of all that occurred, and is so convincing
and altogether satisfactory that we have no doubt that the trial judge who
heard them testify properly accepted their testimony as worthy of entire
confidence and belief.
The contestants put upon the stand four witnesses for the purpose of proving
that at the time and on the occasion when the subscribing witnesses testified
that the will was executed, these witnesses were not in the house with the
testator, and that the alleged testator was at that time in such physical and
mental condition that it was impossible for him to have made a will. Two of
these witnesses, upon cross-examination, admitted that they were not in the
house at or between the hours of four and six in the afternoon of the day on
which the will is alleged to have been made, this being the time at which the
witnesses in support of the will testified that it was executed. Of the other

witnesses, one is a contestant of the will, Macario Ubag, a brother of the

testator, and the other, Canuto Sinoy, his close relative. These witnesses
swore that they were in the house of the deceased, where he was lying ill, at
or about the time when it is alleged that the will was executed, and that at that
time the alleged subscribing witnesses were not in the house, and the alleged
testator was so sick that he was unable to speak, to understand, or to make
himself understood, and that he was wholly incapacitated to make a will. But
the testimony of Macario Ubag is in our opinion wholly unworthy of credence.
In addition to his manifest interest in the result of the investigation, it clearly
discloses a fixed and settled purpose to overthrow the will at all costs, and to
that end an utter disregard of the truth, and readiness to swear to any fact
which he imagined would aid in securing his object. An admittedly genuine
and authentic signature of the deceased was introduced in evidence for
comparison with the signature attached to the will, but this witness in his
anxiety to deny the genuineness of the signature of his brother to the will,
promptly and positively swore that the admittedly genuine signature was not
his brother's signature, and only corrected his erroneous statement in
response to a somewhat suggestive question by his attorney which evidently
gave him to understand that his former answer was likely to prejudice his own
cause. On cross-examination, he was forced to admit that because his brother
and his brother's wife (in those favor the will was made) were Aglipayanos, he
and his other brothers and sisters had not visited them for many months prior
to the one particular occasion as to which testified; and he admitted further,
that, although he lived near at hand, at no time thereafter did he or any of the
other members of his family visit their dying brother, and that they did not even
attend the funeral. If the testimony of this witness could be accepted as true, it
would be a remarkable coincidence indeed, that the subscribing witnesses to
the alleged will should have falsely pretended to have joined in its execution
on the very day, and at the precise hour, when this interested witness
happened to pay his only visit to his brother during his last illness, so that the
testimony of this witness would furnish conclusive evidence in support of the
allegations of the contestants that the alleged will was not executed at the
time and place or in the manner and form alleged by the subscribing
witnesses. We do not think that the testimony of this witness nor any of the
other witnesses for the contestants is sufficient to raise even a doubt as to the
truth of the testimony of the subscribing witnesses as to the fact of the
execution of the will, or as to the manner and from in which it was executed.

signature with the signature attached to the instrument in question, we are

wholly of the opinion of the trial judge, who held in this connection as follows:

In the course of the proceedings, an admittedly genuine signature of the

deceased was introduced in evidence, and upon a comparison of this

Counsel for appellant suggests that the fact that the alleged will leaves all the
property of the testator to his widow, and wholly fails to make any provision for
his brothers or sisters, indicates a lack of testamentary capacity and undue
influence; and because of the inherent improbability that a man would make

No expert evidence has been adduced with regard to these two

signatures, and the presiding judge of this court does not claim to
possess any special expert knowledge in the matter of signatures;
nevertheless, the court has compared these two signatures, and does
not find that any material differences exists between the same. It is
true that the signature which appears in the document offered for
authentication discloses that at the time of writing the subscriber was
more deliberate in his movements, but two facts must be
acknowledge: First, that the testator was seriously ill, and the other
fact, that for some reason which is not stated the testator was unable
to see, and was a person who was not in the habit of signing his
name every day.
These facts should sufficiently explain whatever difference may exist
between the two signatures, but the court finds that the principal
strokes in the two signatures are identical.
That the testator was mentally capable of making the will is in our opinion fully
established by the testimony of the subscribing witnesses who swore
positively that, at the time of its execution, he was of sound mind and memory.
It is true that their testimony discloses the fact that he was at that time
extremely ill, in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with severe
intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was too sick to rise unaided from his
bed; that he needed assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position; and
that during the paroxysms of asthma to which he was subject he could not
speak; but all this evidence of physical weakness in no wise establishes his
mental incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and indeed the evidence
of the subscribing witnesses as to the aid furnished them by the testator in
preparing the will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and physical
description of the various parcels of land set out therein, taken together with
the fact that he was able to give to the person who wrote the will clear and
explicit instructions as to his desires touching the disposition of his property, is
strong evidence of his testamentary capacity.

so unnatural and unreasonable a will, they contend that this fact indirectly
corroborates their contention that the deceased never did in fact execute the
will. But when it is considered that the deceased at the time of his death had
no heirs in the ascending or descending line; that a bitter family quarrel had
long separated him from his brothers and sisters, who declined to have any
relations with the testator because he and his wife were adherents of the
Aglipayano Church; and that this quarrel was so bitter that none of his
brothers or sisters, although some of them lived in the vicinity, were present at
the time of his death or attended his funeral; we think the fact that the
deceased desired to leave and did leave all of his property to his widow and
made no provision for his brothers and sisters, who themselves were grown
men and women, by no means tends to disclose either an unsound mind or
the presence of undue influence on the part of his wife, or in any wise
corroborates contestants' allegation that the will never was executed.
It has been said that "the difficulty of stating standards or tests by which to
determine the degree of mental capacity of a particular person has been
everywhere recognized, and grows out of the inherent impossibility of
measuring mental capacity, or its impairment by disease or other causes"
(Greene vs. Greene, 145 III., 264, 276); and that "it is probable that no court
has ever attempted to lay down any definite rule in respect to the exact
amount of mental capacity requisite for the making of a valid will, without
appreciating the difficulty of the undertaking" (Trish vs. Newell, 62 III., 196,
203).
Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory which
unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and that degree of
mental aberration generally known as insanity or idiocy, there are numberless
degrees of mental capacity or incapacity, and while on one hand it has been
held that "mere weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from the disease of
body, or from age, will not render a person incapable of making a will, a weak
or feeble minded person may make a valid will, provided he has
understanding memory sufficient to enable him to know what he is about, and
how or to whom he is disposing of his property" (Lodge vs. Lodge, 2 Houst.
(Del.), 418); that, "To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not
necessary that the mind should be unbroken or unimpaired, unshattered by
disease or otherwise" (Sloan vs. Maxwell, 3 N. J. Eq., 563); that "it has not
been understood that a testator must possess these qualities (of sound and
disposing mind and memory) in the highest degree. . . . Few indeed would be
the wills confirmed, if this is correct. Pain, sickness, debility of body, from age
or infirmity, would, according to its violence or duration, in a greater or less

degree, break in upon, weaken, or derange the mind, but the derangement
must be such as deprives him of the rational faculties common to man" (Den.
vs. Vancleve, 5 N. J. L.,680); and, that "Sound mind does not mean a perfectly
balanced mind. The question of soundness is one of degree" (Boughton vs.
Knight, L. R.,3 P. & D., 64; 42 L. J. P., 25); on the other hand, it has been held
that "testamentary incapacity does not necessarily require that a person shall
actually be insane or of an unsound mind. Weakness of intellect, whether it
arises from extreme old age from disease, or great bodily infirmities or
suffering, or from all these combined, may render the testator incapable of
making a valid will, providing such weakness really disqualifies her from
knowing or appreciating the nature, effects, or consequences of the act she is
engaged in" (Manatt vs. Scott, 106 Iowa, 203; 68 Am. St. Rep., 293, 302).
But for the purposes of this decision it is not necessary for us to attempt to lay
down a definition of testamentary capacity which will cover all possible cases
which may present themselves, because, as will be seen from what has
already been said, the testator was, at the time of making the instrument
under consideration, endowed with all the elements of mental capacity set out
in the following definition of testamentary capacity which has been frequently
announced in courts of last resort in England and the United States; and while
is some cases testamentary capacity has been held to exist in the absence of
proof of some of these elements, there can be no question that, in the
absence of proof of very exceptional circumstances, proof of the existence of
all these elements in sufficient to establish the existence of testamentary
capacity.
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of
the transaction which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect
the property to be disposed of and the person who would naturally be
supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the
manner in which the instrument will distribute his property among the
objects of his bounty.
(Cf. large array of cases cited in support of this definition in the Encyclopedia
of Law, vol. 23, p. 71, second edition.)
In our opinion, the evidence of record establishes in a strikingly conclusive
manner the execution of the instrument propounded as the last will and
testament of the deceased; that it was made in strict conformity with the
requisites prescribed by law; and that, at the time of its execution, the

deceased was of sound mind and memory, and executed the instrument of his
own free will and accord.
The order probating the will should be land is hereby affirmed, with the cost of
this instance against the appellants.
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Moreland, JJ., concur.

CAGUIOA VS. CALDERON

20 Phil 400

4. Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes

to his wife and to other members of his family.
5. The testator wrote out on several pieces of paper the disposition
of his property.
6. The same was in turn delivered to one Seor Marco who
transcribed and put them in form.
7. The pieces of paper were then delivered to a lawyer who read
them to the testator asking if they were his dispositions.
8. The testator assented each time with an affirmative movement of
his head.
9. The widow of the decedent Juliana Bagtas then sought the
probate of the purported last will and testament of Pioquinto.
10. The CFI of Bataan admitted the same for probate.
11. Isidoro Paguio, a son of the decedent by a former marriage,
opposed the probation on the ground that the testator was not n full
enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and was without mental
capacity necessary to execute a valid will.
ISSUE:
Was the will was validly executed?
HELD:
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is
well-established, and the testator in the case at bar never having
been adjudged insane by the court of competent jurisdiction , this
presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the
opponents to overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence.
The opponents failed to do this.

BAGTAS VS. PAGUIO

22 Phil 227

FACTS:
1. Pioquinto Paguio died on September 28, 1909.
2. For some 14 or 15 years prior to the time of his death, he suffered
from a paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few years prior to
his death his hearing became impaired and that he lost the power of
speech.
3. He retained the use of his right hand and was able to write fairly
well.

The courts have repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and
body , induced by age and disease does not render a person
incapable of making a will. The law does not require that a person
shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine physical
and mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If such were the
legal standard , few indeed would be the number of wills that could
meet such exacting requirements. The authorities, both medical and
legal, are universal in the statement that the question of mental
capacity is one of degree, and that there are many gradations from
the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest conditions of
diseased mentality which are denominated insanity or idiocy.

G.R. No. L-6801

March 14, 1912

JULIANA BAGTAS, plaintiffs-appellee,

vs.
ISIDRO PAGUIO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
Salas and Kalaw for appellants.
Jose Santiago for appellee.
TRENT, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of the
Province of Bataan, admitting to probate a document which was
offered as the last will and testament of Pioquinto Paguio y Pizarro.
The will purports to have been executed in the pueblo of Pilar,
Province of Bataan, on the 19th day of April, 1908. The testator died
on the 28th of September, 1909, a year and five months following
the date of the execution of the will. The will was propounded by the
executrix, Juliana Bagtas, widow of the decedent, and the opponents
are a son and several grandchildren by a former marriage, the latter
being the children of a deceased daughter.
The basis of the opposition to the probation of the will is that the
same was not executed according to the formalities and
requirements of the law touching wills, and further that the testator
was not in the full of enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and
was without the mental capacity necessary to execute a valid will.
The record shows that the testator, Pioquinto Paguio, for some
fourteen of fifteen years prior to the time of his death suffered from
a paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few years prior to his
death his hearing became impaired and that he lost the power of
speech. Owing to the paralysis of certain muscles his head fell to
one side, and saliva ran from his mouth. He retained the use of his
right hand, however, and was able to write fairly well. Through the
medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to
other members of his family.

At the time of the execution of the will there were present the four
testamentary witnesses, Agustin Paguio, Anacleto Paguio, and Pedro
Paguio, and attorney, Seor Marco, and one Florentino Ramos.
Anacleto Paguio and the attorney have since died, and consequently
their testimony was not available upon the trial of the case in the
lower court. The other three testamentary witnesses and the
witness Florentino Ramos testified as to the manner in which the will
was executed. According to the uncontroverted testimony of these
witnesses the will was executed in the following manner:
Pioquinto Paguio, the testator, wrote out on pieces of paper notes
and items relating to the disposition of his property, and these notes
were in turn delivered to Seor Marco, who transcribed them and
put them in form. The witnesses testify that the pieces of paper
upon which the notes were written are delivered to attorney by the
testator; that the attorney read them to the testator asking if they
were his testamentary dispositions; that the testator assented each
time with an affirmative movement of his head; that after the will as
a whole had been thus written by the attorney, it was read in a loud
voice in the presence of the testator and the witnesses; that Seor
Marco gave the document to the testator; that the latter, after
looking over it, signed it in the presence of the four subscribing
witnesses; and that they in turn signed it in the presence of the
testator and each other.
These are the facts of record with reference to the execution of the
will and we are in perfect accord with the judgment of the lower
court that the formalities of the Code of Civil Procedure have been
fully complied with.
This brings us now to a consideration of appellants' second
assignment of error, viz, the testator's alleged mental incapacity at
the time of the execution of the will. Upon this point considerable
evidence was adduced at the trial. One of the attesting witnesses
testified that at the time of the execution of the will the testator was
in his right mind, and that although he was seriously ill, he indicated
by movements of his head what his wishes were. Another of the
attesting witnesses stated that he was not able to say whether
decedent had the full use of his mental faculties or not, because he
had been ill for some years, and that he (the witnesses) was not a

physician. The other subscribing witness, Pedro Paguio, testified in

the lower court as a witness for the opponents. He was unable to
state whether or not the will was the wish of the testator. The only
reasons he gave for his statement were the infirmity and advanced
age of the testator and the fact that he was unable to speak. The
witness stated that the testator signed the will, and he verified his
own signature as a subscribing witness.
Florentino Ramos, although not an attesting witness, stated that he
was present when the will was executed and his testimony was
cumulative in corroboration of the manner in which the will was
executed and as to the fact that the testator signed the will. This
witness also stated that he had frequently transacted matters of
business for the decedent and had written letters and made
inventories of his property at his request, and that immediately
before and after the execution of the will he had performed offices of
his character. He stated that the decedent was able to communicate
his thoughts by writing. The testimony of this witness clearly
indicates the presence of mental capacity on the part of the testator.
Among other witnesses for the opponents were two physician,
Doctor Basa and Doctor Viado. Doctor Basa testified that he had
attended the testator some four or five years prior to his death and
that the latter had suffered from a cerebral congestion from which
the paralysis resulted. The following question was propounded to
Doctor Basa:
Q.
Referring to mental condition in which you found him
the last time you attended him, do you think he was in his
right mind?
A.
I can not say exactly whether he was in his right mind,
but I noted some mental disorder, because when I spoke to
him he did not answer me.
Doctor Basa testified at more length, but the substance of his
testimony is that the testator had suffered a paralysis and that he
had noticed some mental disorder. He does not say that the testator
was not in his right mind at the time of the execution of the will, nor
does he give it at his opinion that he was without the necessary
mental capacity to make a valid will. He did not state in what way

this mental disorder had manifested itself other than that he had
noticed that the testator did not reply to him on one occasion when
he visited him.
Doctor Viado, the other physician, have never seen the testator, but
his answer was in reply to a hypothetical question as to what be the
mental condition of a person who was 79 years old and who had
suffered from a malady such as the testator was supposed to have
had according to the testimony of Doctor Basa, whose testimony
Doctor Viado had heard. He replied and discussed at some length
the symptoms and consequences of the decease from which the
testator had suffered; he read in support of his statements from a
work by a German Physician, Dr. Herman Eichost. In answer,
however, to a direct question, he stated that he would be unable to
certify to the mental condition of a person who was suffering from
such a disease.
We do not think that the testimony of these two physicians in any
way strengthens the contention of the appellants. Their testimony
only confirms the fact that the testator had been for a number of
years prior to his death afflicted with paralysis, in consequence of
which his physician and mental strength was greatly impaired.
Neither of them attempted to state what was the mental condition
of the testator at the time he executed the will in question. There
can be no doubt that the testator's infirmities were of a very serious
character, and it is quite evident that his mind was not as active as
it had been in the earlier years of his life. However, we can not
include from this that he wanting in the necessary mental capacity
to dispose of his property by will.
The courts have been called upon frequently to nullify wills executed
under such circumstances, but the weight of the authority is in
support if the principle that it is only when those seeking to
overthrow the will have clearly established the charge of mental
incapacity that the courts will intervene to set aside a testamentary
document of this character. In the case of Bugnao vs. Ubag (14 Phil.
Rep., 163), the question of testamentary capacity was discussed by
this court. The numerous citations there given from the decisions of
the United States courts are especially applicable to the case at bar
and have our approval. In this jurisdiction the presumption of law is

in favor of the mental capacity of the testator and the burden is

upon the contestants of the will to prove the lack of testamentary
capacity. (In the matter of the will of Cabigting, 14 Phil. Rep., 463; in
the matter of the will of Butalid, 10 Phil. Rep., 27; Hernaez vs.
Hernaez, 1 Phil. Rep., 689.)
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is
well established, and the testator in the case at bar never having
been adjudged insane by a court of competent jurisdiction, this
presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent upon the
opponents to overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence.
This we think they have failed to do. There are many cases and
authorities which we might cite to show that the courts have
repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body, induced by
age and disease do not render a person incapable of making a will.
The law does not require that a person shall continue in the full
enjoyment and use of his pristine physical and mental powers in
order to execute a valid will. If such were the legal standard, few
indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such exacting
requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are universal
in statement that the question of mental capacity is one of degree,
and that there are many gradations from the highest degree of
mental soundness to the lowest conditions of diseased mentality
which are denominated as insanity and idiocy.
The right to dispose of property by testamentary disposition is as
sacred as any other right which a person may exercise and this right
should not be nullified unless mental incapacity is established in a
positive and conclusive manner. In discussing the question of
testamentary capacity, it is stated in volume 28, 70, of the American
and English Encyclopedia of Law, that
Contrary to the very prevalent lay impression, perfect
soundness of mind is not essential to testamentary capacity.
A testator may be afflicted with a variety of mental
weaknesses, disorders, or peculiarities and still be capable in
law of executing a valid will. (See the numerous cases there
cited in support of this statement.)

The rule relating to testamentary capacity is stated in Buswell on

Insanity, section 365, and quoted with approval in Campbell vs.
Campbell (130 Ill., 466), as follows:
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary
that the mind shall be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or
unshattered by disease or otherwise, or that the testator
should be in the full possession of his reasoning faculties.
In note, 1 Jarman on Wills, 38, the rule is thus stated:
The question is not so much, that was the degree of memory
possessed by the testator, as, had he a disposing memory?
Was he able to remember the property he was about to
bequeath, the manner of disturbing it, and the objects of his
bounty? In a word, were his mind and memory sufficiently
sound to enable him to know and understand the business in
which he was engaged at the time when he executed his will.
(See authorities there cited.)
In Wilson vs. Mitchell (101 Penn., 495), the following facts appeared
upon the trial of the case: The testator died at the age of nearly 102
years. In his early years he was an intelligent and well informed
man. About seven years prior to his death he suffered a paralytic
stroke and from that time his mind and memory were mush
enfeebled. He became very dull of hearing and in consequence of
the shrinking of his brain he was affected with senile cataract
causing total blindness. He became filthy and obscene in his habits,
although formerly he was observant of the properties of life. The
court, in commenting upon the case, said:
Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor debility
of body will affect the capacity to make a will, if sufficient
intelligence remains. The failure of memory is not sufficient
to create the incapacity, unless it be total, or extend to his
immediate family or property. . . .
xxx

xxx

xxx

Dougal (the testator) had lived over one hundred years

before he made the will, and his physical and mental
weakness and defective memory were in striking contrast
with their strength in the meridian of his life. He was blind;
not deaf, but hearing impaired; his mind acted slowly, he was
forgetful or recent events, especially of names, and repeated
questions in conversation; and sometimes, when aroused for
sleep or slumber, would seem bewildered. It is not singular
that some of those who had known him when he was
remarkable for vigor and intelligence, are of the opinion that
his reason was so far gone that he was incapable of making a
will, although they never heard him utter an irrational
expression.
In the above case the will was sustained. In the case at bar we
might draw the same contrast as was pictured by the court in the
case just quoted. The striking change in the physical and mental
vigor of the testator during the last years of his life may have led
some of those who knew him in his earlier days to entertain doubts
as to his mental capacity to make a will, yet we think that the
statements of the witnesses to the execution of the will and
statements of the conduct of the testator at that time all indicate
that he unquestionably had mental capacity and that he exercised it
on this occasion. At the time of the execution of the will it does not
appear that his conduct was irrational in any particular. He seems to
have comprehended clearly what the nature of the business was in
which he was engaged. The evidence show that the writing and
execution of the will occupied a period several hours and that the
testator was present during all this time, taking an active part in all
the proceedings. Again, the will in the case at bar is perfectly
reasonable and its dispositions are those of a rational person.
For the reasons above stated, the order probating the will should be
and the same is hereby affirmed, with costs of this instance against
the appellants.
Arellano, C.J., Torres, Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Moreland, JJ.,
concur.

G.R. No. L-19142

March 5, 1923

In the matter of the estate of Mariano Corrales Tan, deceased.

FLAVIANA SAMSON, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
VICENTE CORRALES TAN QUINTIN, oppositor-appellant.

Marcaida, Capili and Ocampo for appellant.

Epimaco Molina for appellee.
OSTRAND, J.:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila
admitting to probate a document alleged to be the last will and testament of
the deceased Mariano Corrales Tan. There is no direct evidence as to the
interest of the oppositor-appellant in the estate in question, though it may,
perhaps, be inferred from the testimony of his wife Maximina Ong that he is
the son of the deceased.
In his answer to the petition for probate he alleges, in substance, that the will
is incomplete and fraudulent and does not express the true intent of the
testator; that the testator acted under duress and under undue influence, and
that at the time of the execution of the will he was not of sound and disposing
mind.
We do not think the opponent has succeeded in proving any of his allegations.
There is no evidence whatever showing that the testator acted under duress
or undue influence and the only question of fact which we need consider is
whether the testator was of sound and disposing mind when the document in
question was executed.
Upon this point the testimony of Dr. Tee Han Kee, the attending physician, as
a witness for the opposition, is to the effect that the deceased was suffering
from diabetes and had been in a comatose condition for several days prior to
his death. He died about eight or nine o'clock in the evening of December 26,
1921, and the will is alleged to have been executed in the forenoon of the
same day. Counsel for the appellant, in his well-prepared brief, argues ably
and vigorously that coma implies complete unconsciousness, and that the
testator, therefore, could not at that time have been in possession of his
mental faculties and have executed a will. There are, however, varying
degrees of coma and in its lighter forms the patient may be aroused and have
lucid intervals. Such seems to have been the case here. Doctor Tee Han Kee,
the opponent's principal witness, who visited the deceased in the evening of
December 25th, says he then seemed to be in a state of coma and that in the
forenoon of December 26th, when the doctor again visited him, he was in "the
same state of coma." Maximina Ong, the wife of the opponent, the only other
witness for the opposition, states that on December 26th the deceased could

not talk and did not recognize anyone. But all the witnesses presented by the
petitioner, five in number, testify that the deceased was conscious, could hear
and understand what was said to him and was able to indicate his desires.
Four of these witnesses state that he could speak distinctly; the fifth,
Velhagen, says that the deceased only moved his head in answer to
questions.
That the deceased was in an exceedingly feeble condition at the time the will
was executed is evident, but if the witnesses presented in support of the
petition told the truth there can be no doubt that he was of sound mind and
capable of making his will. And we see no reason to discredit any of these
witnesses; the discrepancies found between their respective versions of what
took place at the execution of the document are comparatively unimportant
and so far from weakening their testimony rather lend strength to it by
indicating the absence of any conspiracy among them.
As against their testimony we have only the testimony of Maximina Ong and
Dr. Tee Han Kee. The former is not a disinterested witness. As to the
testimony of the latter it is sufficient to say that mere professional speculation
cannot prevail over the positive statements of five apparently credible
witnesses whose testimony does not in itself seem unreasonable.
There is no direct evidence in the record showing that the publication of the
time and place of the hearing of the petition for probate has been made as
provided for in section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure and the appellant
argues that the court below erred in admitting the will to probate without proof
of such publication. This question not having been raised in the court below
will not be considered here.
Section 630 of the Code of Civil Procedure, speaking of hearings for the
probate of wills, also provides that "At the hearing all testimony shall be taken
under oath, reduced to writing and signed by the witnesses" and the appellant
maintains that the transcript of the testimony of the witness Dr. N. M. Saleeby,
not having been signed by the witness, the testimony should have been
excluded.
There is no merit in this contention. When, as in this case, the testimony is
taken by the stenographer of the court and certified to by him, the provision
quoted can only be regarded as directory and a failure to observe the

provision will not render the testimony inadmissible. (Reese vs. Nolan, 99 Ala.,
203.)
The order appealed from is affirmed, with the costs against the appellant. So
ordered.
Araullo, C. J., Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor, Johns, and Romualdez,
JJ., concur.

TRINIDAD NEYRA, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.
ENCARNACION NEYRA, defendant-appellee.
Alejandro M. Panis for appellant.
Lucio Javillonar for appellee.
DE JOYA, J.:
On October 25, 1939, Trinidad Neyra filed a complaint against her sister,
Encarnacion Neyra, in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, for the
recovery of one-half () of the property mentioned and described therein,
which had been left by their deceased father, Severo Neyra, and which had
been previously divided equally between the two extrajudicially, demanding at
the same time one-half () of the rents collected on the said property by the
defendant Encarnacion Neyra. The defendant filed an answer admitting that
the property mentioned and described therein was community property, and at
the same time set up counterclaims amounting to over P1,000, for money
spent, during the last illness of their father, and for money loaned to the
plaintiff.
After the trial of the case, the court found that the plaintiff was really entitled to
one-half () of the said property, adjudicating the same to her, but at the same
time ordered said plaintiff to pay to the defendant the sum of P727.77, plus
interests, by virtue of said counterclaims.
Plaintiff Trinidad Neyra appealed from the said decision, to the Court of
Appeals for Manila, alleging several errors, attacking the execution and
validity of said agreement; and on November 10, 1942, said appeal was
dismissed, pursuant to the to an agreement or compromise entered into by
the parties, as shown by the corresponding document, dated November 3,
1942, which was filed in the case the following day, November 4, 1942.
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra, who had been sickly for about two
years, unexpectedly died, on November 4, 1942 at the age of 48, allegedly
from heart attack, as a consequence of Addison's disease from which, it was
claimed, she had been suffering for sometime.

C.A. No. 8075

March 25, 1946

In view of the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated November 10, 1942,
dismissing the appeal, by virtue of said agreement or compromise, Atty. Lucio

Javillonar, claiming to represent Encarnacion Neyra, who had died since

November 4, 1942, and other relatives of hers, filed a petition, dated
November 23, 1942, asking for the reconsideration of said decision of the
Court of Appeals, dismissing the appeal, claiming that the alleged compromise
or agreement, dated November 3, 1942, could not have been understood by
Encarnacion Neyra, as she was already then at the threshold of death, and
that as a matter of fact she died the following day; and that if it had been
signed at all by said Encarnacion Neyra, her thumbmark appearing on said
document must have been affixed thereto by Trinidad Neyra's attorney,
against Encarnacion's will; and that the court had no more jurisdiction over the
case, when the alleged agreement was filed on November 4, 1942, at the
instance of Trinidad Neyra, as Encarnacion was already dead at the time.
The principal question to be decided, in connection with said petition for
reconsideration, is whether or not said compromise or agreement had been
legally executed and signed by Encarnacion Neyra, on November 3, 1942.
Trinidad Neyra maintains the affirmative.
The voluminous evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced by the
parties, in this case, has fully established the following facts:
That Severo Nayra died intestate in the City of Manila, on May 6, 1938,
leaving certain properties and two children, by his first marriage, named
Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, and other children by his second
marriage; That after the death of Severo Neyra, the two sisters, Encarnacion
Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, had serious misunderstandings, in connection with
the properties left by their deceased father, and so serious were their
dissensions that, after March 31, 1939, they had two litigations in the Court of
First Instance of Manila, concerning said properties. In the first case, filed in
March 31, 1939, Trinidad Neyra and others demanded by Encarnacion Neyra
and others the annulment of the sale of the property located at No. 366 Raon
Street, Manila which was finally decided in favor of the defendants, in the
court of first instance, and in the Court of Appeals, on December 21, 1943
(G.R. No. 8162); and the second is the instance case.
That Encarnacion Neyra, who had remained single, and who had no longer
any ascendants, executed a will on September 14, 1939, marked Exhibit 16,
disposing of her properties in favor of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la
Virgen Maria" and her other relatives, named Teodora Neyra, Pilar de
Guzman and Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, making no provision whatsoever
in said will, in favor of her only sister of the whole blood, Trinidad Neyra, who

had become her bitter enemy; that when the said will was brought to the
attention of the authorities of said Congregation, after due deliberation and
consideration, said religious organization declined the bounty offered by
Encarnacion Neyra, and said decision of the Congregation was duly
communicated to her; that in order to overcome the difficulties encountered by
said religious organization in not accepting the generosity of Encarnacion
Neyra, the latter decided to make a new will, and for that purpose, about one
week before her death, sent for Atty. Ricardo Sikat, and gave him instructions
for the preparation of a new will; that Atty. Sikat, instead of preparing a new
will, merely prepared a draft of a codicil, amending said will, dated September
14, 1939, again naming said religious organization, among others as
beneficiary, and said draft of a codicil was also forwarded to the authorities of
religious organization, for their consideration and acceptance; but it was also
rejected.
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill, suffering from
Addison's disease, and on October 31, 1942, she sent for her religious adviser
and confessor, Mons. Vicente Fernandez of the Quiapo Church to make
confession, after which she requested that holy mass be celebrated in her
house at No. 366 Raon Street, City of Manila, so that she might take holy
communion; that Mons. Fernandez caused the necessary arrangements to be
made, and, as a matter of fact, on November 1, 1942, holy mass was
solemnized in her house by Father Teodoro Garcia, also of the Quiapo
Church, on which occasion, Encarnacion Neyra, who remained in bed, took
holy communion; that after the mass, Father Garcia talked to Encarnacion
Neyra and advised reconciliation between the two sisters, Encarnacion and
Trinidad Neyra. Encarnacion accepted said advise and, at about noon of the
same day (November 1, 1942), sent Eustaquio Mendoza to fetch her sister
Trinidad, who came at about 2:30 that same afternoon; that the two sisters
greeted each other in most affectionate manner, and became reconciled and
two had a long and cordial conversation, in the course of which they also
talked about the properties left by their father and their litigations which had
reached the Court of Appeals for the City of Manila, the instant case being the
second, and they agreed to have the latter dismissed, on the condition that
the property involved therein should be given exclusively to Trinidad Neyra,
that the latter should waive her share in the rents of said property collected by
Encarnacion, and the Trinidad had no more indebtedness to Encarnacion.
They also agreed to send for Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, to prepare the
necessary document embodying the said agreement, but Attorney Panis could
come only in the afternoon of the following day, November 2, 1942, when
Encarnacion gave him instructions for the preparation of the document

embodying their agreement, and other instructions for the preparation of her
last will and testament; that Attorney Panis prepared said document of
compromise as well as the new will and testament, naming Trinidad Neyra
and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant to Encarnacion's
express instructions, and the two documents were prepared, in duplicate, and
were ready for signature, since the morning of November 3, 1942; that in the
afternoon of that day, of compromise and last will and testament to
Encarnacion Neyra, slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of Father
Teodoro Garcia, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, Trinidad Neyra, and
others, after which he asked her if their terms were in accordance with her
wishes, or if she wanted any change made in said documents; that
Encarnacion Neyra did not suggest any change, and asked for the pad and
the two documents, and, with the help of a son of Trinidad, placed her
thumbmark at the foot of each one of the two documents, in duplicate, on her
bed in the sala, in the presence of attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr.
Eladio R. Aldecoa and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, after which said witnesses
signed at the foot of the will, in the presence of Encarnacion Neyra, and of
each other. The agreement was also signed by Trinidad Neyra, as party, and
by Dr. M. B. Abad and Eustaquio Mendoza, a protege, as witnesses.
Father Teodoro Garcia was also present at the signing of the two documents,
at the request of Encarnacion Neyra.
The foregoing facts have been established by the witnesses presented by
Trinidad Neyra, who are all trustworthy men, and who had absolutely no
interest in the final outcome of this case. Two of them are ministers of the
Gospel, while three of the attesting witnesses are professional men of
irreproachable character, who had known and seen and actually talked to the
testatrix.
Petitioner Teodora Neyra, half sister of Encarnacion, and her young daughter
Ceferina de la Cruz, and Presentacion Blanco, daughter of petitioner Maria
Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, substantially corroborated the testimony of the
witnesses presented by Trinidad Neyra, with reference to the signing of
documents, in the bedroom of Encarnacion Neyra, in the afternoon of
November 3, 1942.
Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz testified,
however, that when the thumbmark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the
agreement in question, dated November 3, 1942, she was sleeping on her

bed in the sala; and that the attesting witnesses were not present, as they
were in the caida.
But Ceferina de la Cruz also stated that the attesting witnesses signed the
documents thumbmarked by Encarnacion Neyra, in the sala near her bed,
thus contradicting herself and Teodora Neyra and Presentacion Blanco.
Strange to say, Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz
also testified that Encarnacion Neyra's, thumbmark was affixed to the will, only
in the morning of November 4, 1942, by Trinidad Neyra and one Ildefonso del
Barrio, when Encarnacion was already dead.
The testimony of Dr. Dionisio Parulan, alleged medical expert, as to the nature
of effects of Addison's disease, is absolutely unreliable. He had never seen or
talked to the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra.
According to medical authorities, persons suffering from Addison's disease
often live as long as ten (10) years, while others die after a few weeks only,
and that as the disease progresses, asthenia sets in, and from 80 per cent to
90 per cent of the patients develop tuberculosis, and complications of the
heart also appear. (Cecil, Textbook of Medicine, 3d ed., 1935, pp. 1250-1253;
McCrae, Osler's Modern Medicine, 3d ed., Vol. V, pp. 272-279.)
And it has been conclusively shown that Encarnacion Neyra died on
November 4, 1942, due to a heart attack, at the age of 48, after an illness of
about two (2) years.
In connection with mental capacity, in several cases, this court has considered
the testimony of witnesses, who had known and talked to the testators, more
trustworthy than the testimony of the alleged medical experts.
Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two doctors, who testified for the
opponents to the probate of a will, to the effect that it tended to destroy mental
capacity, was held not to effect the full possession of mental faculties deemed
necessary and sufficient for its execution. (Caguioa vs. Calderon, 20 Phil.,
400.) The testatrix was held to have been compos mentis, in spite of the
physician's testimony to the contrary, to the effect that she was very weak,
being in the third or last stage of tuberculosis. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and
Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.) The testimony of the attending physician that the
deceased was suffering from diabetes and had been in a comatose condition

for several days, prior to his death, was held not sufficient to establish
testamentary incapacity, in view of the positive statement of several credible
witnesses that he was conscious and able to understand what was said to him
and to communicate his desires. (Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin, 44 Phil.,
573.) Where the mind of the testator is in perfectly sound condition, neither old
age, nor ill health, nor the fact that somebody had to guide his hand in order
that he might sign, is sufficient to invalidate his will (Amata and Almojuela vs.
Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)
Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after the execution of
the will, the testator intelligently and intelligibly conversed with other persons,
although lying down and unable to move or stand up unassisted, but could still
effect the sale of property belonging to him, these circumstances show that
the testator was in a perfectly sound mental condition at the time of the
execution of the will. (Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)
Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-examination, frankly admitted
that, in the morning and also at about 6 o'clock in he afternoon of November
3, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra talked to her that they understood each other
clearly, thus showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at the time of
signing and execution of the agreement and will in question.
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons
suffering from Addison's disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain
unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy, they
necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. And that like
patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their
mental faculties until the moments of their death.
Judging by the authorities above cited, the logical conclusion is that
Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and possessed the necessary
testamentary and mental capacity, at the time of the execution of the
agreement and will, dated November 3, 1942.
The contention that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the time
Encarnacion Neyra thumbmarked the agreement and will in question, on her
bed, in the sala of the house, as they were allegedly in the caida, is untenable.
It has been fully shown that said witnesses were present, at the time of the
signing and execution of the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where
the testatrix was lying on her bed. The true test is not whether they actually

saw each other at the time of the signing of the documents, but whether they
might have seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so; and the attesting
witnesses actually saw it all in this case. (Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.)
And the thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the agreement and will in
question is equivalent to her signature. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca
Llu, 27 Phil., 579.)
Teodora Neyra and her principal witnesses are all interested parties, as they
are children of legatees named in the will, dated September 14, 1939, but
eliminated from the will, dated November 3, 1942.
Furthermore, the testimony of Teodora Neyra and her witnesses, to the effect
that there could have been no reconciliation between the two sisters, and that
the thumbmark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the documents
embodying the agreement, while she was sleeping, on November 3, 1942, in
their presence; and that her thumbmark was affixed to the will in question,
when she was already dead, in the morning of November 4, 1942, within their
view, is absolutely devoid of any semblance of truth. Said testimony is
contrary to common sense. It violates all sense of proportion. Teodora Neyra
and her witnesses could not have told the truth; they have testified to
deliberate falsefoods; and they are, therefore, absolutely unworthy of belief.
And to the evidence of the petitioners is completely applicable the legal
aphorism falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus. (Gonzales vs. Mauricio, 53 Phil.,
728, 735.)
To show the alleged improbability of reconciliation, and the execution of the
two documents, dated November 3, 1942, petitioners have erroneously placed
great emphasis on the fact that, up to October 31, 1942, the two sisters
Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra were bitter enemies. They were banking
evidently on the common belief that the hatred of relatives is the most violent.
Terrible indeed are the feuds of relatives and difficult the reconciliation; and
yet not impossible. They had forgotten that Encarnacion Neyra was a religious
woman instructed in the ancient virtues of the Christian faith, and hope and
charity, and that to forgive is a divine attribute. They had also forgotten that
there could be no more sublime love than that embalmed in tears, as in the
case of a reconciliation.
It was most natural that there should have been reconciliation between the
two sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra, as the latter is the nearest
relative of the former, her only sister of the whole blood. The approach of
imminent death must have evoked in her the tenderest recollections of family

life. And believing perhaps that her little triumphs had not always brought her
happiness, and that she had always been just to her sister, who had been
demanding insistently what was her due, Encarnacion finally decided upon
reconciliation, as she did not want to go to her eternal rest, with hatred in her
heart or wrath upon her head. It was, therefore, most logical that Encarnacion
should make Trinidad the benificiary of her generosity, under her last will and
testament, and end all her troubles with her, by executing said agreement,
and thus depart in perfect peace from the scenes of her earthly labors.
It having been shown that the said compromise or agreement had been
legally signed and executed by Encarnacion Neyra on November 3, 1942, in
the presence of credible and trustworthy witnesses, and that she was compos
mentis and possessed the necessary testamentary and mental capacity of the
time; the petition for the reconsideration filed by Atty. Lucio Javillonar, on
November 23, 1942, on behalf of a client, Encarnacion Neyra, who had been
dead since November 4, 1942, and some of her relatives, who have
appeared, in accordance with the provisions of section 17 of Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court, is hereby denied; and the decision of the Court of Appeals for
Manila, dated November 10, 1942, dismissing the appeal, is hereby reaffirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Ozaeta, Perfecto, Hilado, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

In the matter of the testate estate of the late Encarnacion Neyra.

TRINIDAD NEYRA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
TEODORA NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and MARIA JACOBO VDA. DE
BLANCO, oppositors-appellants.
TEODORA NEYRA, PILAR DE GUZMAN and MARIA JACOBO VDA.
BLANCO, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
TRINIDAD NEYRA and EUSTAQUIO MENDOZA, oppositors-appellees.
Lucio Javillonar for oppositors and appellants.
Alejandro M. Panis for applicants and appellees.
DE JOYA, J.:
This is an appeal from a decree rendered by the Hon. Gervasio Diaz, Judge of
the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, on December 3, 1943,
admitting to probate a will dated November 3, 1942, executed by the
deceased Encarnacion Neyra; at the same time denying the probate of a
previous will dated September 14, 1939, alleged to have been executed by
the said testatrix.
Trinidad Neyra, beneficiary in the will executed on November 3, 1942, filed, on
November 10, 1942, a petition in the Court of First Instance of Manila, for the
probate of said will.

C.A. No. 4

March 21, 1946

On December 19, 1942, Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman, and Maria Jacobo
Vda. de Blanco, who had not been named as beneficiaries in said will, filed on
opposition to the probate of the said will dated November 3, 1942, alleging (1)
that at the time of the alleged execution of the said will, the testatrix
Encarnacion Neyra no longer possessed testamentary capacity; (2) that her
thumb marks on said instrument had been procured by means of fraud by
petitioner Trinidad Neyra, and that Encarnacion Neyra never intended to
consider said document as will; (3) that the alleged will, dated November 3,
1942, had not been executed in the manner and form prescribed by law;
and(4) that Encarnacion Neyra, since September 14, 1939, had executed a
will, naming as beneficiaries said oppositors and others, and that said will had
never been revoked or amended in any manner whatsoever.

On December 26, 1942, petitioner Trinidad Neyra filed a reply denying the
allegations in the opposition.
Subsequently, said oppositors filed a counter petition, asking for the probate of
the first will executed by Encarnacion Neyra, on September 14, 1939, marked
as Exhibit 16. On March 16, 1943, the legatees Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio
Mendoza filed their opposition to the probate on said will marked as Exhibit
16, and amended said opposition, on September 15, 1943, to which Teodora
Neyra and the others filed a reply, on September 20, 1943.
On the dates set for the hearing on the petition filed by Trinidad Neyra, and
the counter petition mentioned above, said petitioner as well as the
oppositors, presented evidence, testimonial and documentary. The witnesses
presented by the petitioner Trinidad Neyra were Mons. Vicente Fernandez,
Rev. Fr. Teodoro Garcia, Sor. Andrea Montejo, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio
A. Aldecoa, Atty. Ricardo Sikat, petitioner Trinidad Neyra herself, and Atty.
Alejandro M. Panis, who had acted as scrivener in the preparation of said will
dated November 3, 1942.
Teodora Neyra and the other oppositors also presented several witnesses, the
principal among whom were Presentacion Blanco, Caferina de la Cruz, Acislo
Manuel, Dr. Dionisio Parulan, an alleged medical expert, and the oppositors
Teodora Neyra and Pilar de Guzman themselves.
After considering the evidence, the lower court rendered a decree admitting to
probate the will dated November 3, 1942; at the same time denying the
probate of the will dated September 14, 1939.
From said decision Teodora Neyra and the other oppositors appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the City of Manila, assigning several errors, which may
be reduced to the following, to wit, that the trial court erred (1) in finding that
Encarnacion Neyra wanted to make a new will; (2) in declaring that there was
reconciliation between Encarnacion Neyra and her sister Trinidad; (3) in
accepting as satisfactory the evidence submitted by the petitioner; (4) in
ignoring the evidence submitted by the oppositors; and (5) in not admitting to
probate the will dated September 14, 1939.
The evidence, testimonial and documentary, adduced during the trial of the
case in the court below, has satisfactorily and sufficiently established the
following facts:

That Severo Neyra died intestate in the City of Manila, on May 6, 1938,
leaving certain properties and two children, by his first marriage, named
Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra, and several other relatives; that after
the death of Severo Neyra, the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad
Neyra, had serious quarrels, in connection with the properties left by their
deceased father, and so serious were their dissensions that, after March 31,
1939, they had two litigations in the Court of First Instance of Manila,
concerning said properties (Exhibits 8 and 9): In the first case, filed on March
31, 1939, Trinidad Neyra and others demanded from Encarnacion Neyra et al.
the annulment of the sale of the property located at No. 366 Raon Street,
Manila, and it was finally decided in favor of the defendants in the Court of
First Instance and in the Court of Appeals, on December 21, 1943 (G.R. No.
8162, Exhibit 9).
In the second case, filed on October 25, 1939, Trinidad Neyra demanded from
Encarnacion Neyra, one-half () of the property described therein, and onehalf () of the rents, and the Court of First Instance decided in favor of the
plaintiff, but at the same time awarded in favor of the defendant P727.77,
under her counterclaim; and Trinidad Neyra again elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals for Manila (G.R. No. 8075) Exhibit 8, which was decided,
pursuant to the document of compromise marked as Exhibit D; and the
petition for reconsideration filed therein still remains undecided.
That Encarnacion Neyra, who had remained single, and who had no longer
any ascendants, executed a will on September 14, 1939, marked Exhibit 16,
disposing of her properties in favor of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la
Virgen Maria" and her other relatives named Teodora Neyra, Pilar de Guzman
and Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco, making no provision whatsoever in said
will in favor of her only sister Trinidad Neyra, who had become her bitter
enemy; that when the said will was brought to the attention of the authorities
of said Congregation, after due deliberation and consideration, said religious
organization declined the bounty offered by Encarnacion Neyra, and said
decision of the Congregation was duly communicated to her; that in order to
overcome the difficulties encountered by said religious organization in not
accepting the generosity of Encarnacion Neyra, the latter decided to make a
new will, and for that purpose, about one week before her death, sent for one
Ricardo Sikat, an attorney working in the Law Offices of Messrs. Feria and
LaO, and gave him instructions for the preparation of a new will; that Attorney
Sikat, instead of preparing a new will, in accordance with the express
instructions given by Encarnacion Neyra, merely prepared a draft in the form
of a codicil, marked as Exhibit M, amending said will, dated September 14,

1939, again naming said religious organization, among others, as beneficiary,

and said draft of a codicil was also forwarded to the authorities of the said
religious organization, for their consideration and acceptance.
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion Neyra had become seriously ill, suffering from
Addison's disease, and on October 31, 1942, she sent for her religious adviser
and confessor, Mons. Vicente Fernandez of the Quiapo Church to make
confession, after which she expressed her desire to have a mass celebrated
in her house at No. 366 Raon Street, City of Manila, so that she might take
holy communion, in view of her condition; that following the request of
Encarnacion Neyra, Mons. Fernandez caused the necessary arrangements to
be made for the celebration of holy mass in the house of Encarnacion Neyra,
and, as a matter of fact, on November 1, 1942, holy mass was solemnized in
her house, Fr. Teodoro Garcia, also of the Quiapo Church, officiating in said
ceremony, on which occasion, Encarnacion Neyra, who remained in bed, took
holy communion; that after said religious ceremony had been terminated,
Father Garcia talked to Encarnacion Neyra and advised reconciliation
between the two sisters, Encarnacion Neyra and Trinidad Neyra. Encarnacion
Neyra accepted said advice and at about noon of the same day (November 1,
1942), sent Eustaquio Mendoza to fetch her sister Trinidad Neyra, who came
at about 2:30 that same afternoon; that on seeing one another, the two
greeted each other in a most affectionate manner, and became reconciled;
that the two had a long and cordial conversation, in the course of which the
two sisters also talked about the properties left by their deceased father and
their litigations which had reached the Court of Appeals for the City of Manila,
and they agreed to have the said appeal dismissed, on the condition that the
property involved therein, consisting of a small house and lot, should be given
exclusively to Trinidad Neyra, on the condition that the latter should waive her
claim for her share in the rents of said property, while under the administration
of Encarnacion Neyra, and that the two should renounce their mutual claims
against one another. It was also agreed between the two sisters to send for
Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, to prepare the necessary document embodying the
said agreement, but Attorney Panis could come only in the afternoon of the
following day, November 2, 1942, when Encarnacion gave him instructions for
the preparation of the document embodying their agreement, and other
instructions relative to the disposition she wanted to make of her properties in
her last will and testament; that Attorney Panis prepared said document of
compromise or agreement marked as Exhibit D, as well as the new will and
testament marked as Exhibit C, naming Trinidad Neyra and Eustaquio
Mendoza beneficiaries therein, pursuant to the express instructions given by
Encarnacion Neyra, and said instruments were ready for signature on

November 3, 1942; that in the afternoon of that day, November 3, 1942;

Attorney Panis read said will and testament marked as Exhibit D to
Encarnacion Neyra slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of Fr. Teodoro
Garcia, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio Aldecoa, herein petitioner Trinidad
Neyra, and others, after which he asked her if its terms were in accordance
with her wishes, if she had anything else to add, or anything to be changed in
said will; and as Encarnacion Neyra stated that the terms of said will were in
accordance with her wishes and express instructions, she asked for the pad
and the will Exhibit C and, with the help of a son of herein petitioner, placed
her thumb mark at the foot of said will, in the presence of the three attesting
witnesses, Dr. Moises B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa, and Atty. Alejandro M.
Panis, after which the attesting witnesses signed at the foot of the document,
in the presence of the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra, and of each and everyone
of the other attesting witnesses. Fr. Teodoro Garcia and petitioner Trinidad
Neyra and several others were also present.
On November 4, 1942, the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra, due to a heart attack,
unexpectedly died.
Although the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen Maria" had again
decided not to accept the provision made in its favor by the testatrix
Encarnacion Neyra in the proposed codicil prepared by Atty. Ricardo Sikat,
said decision could not be communicated to the testatrix, before her death.
Mons. Vicente Fernandez and Fr. Teodoro Garcia testified as to the request
made on October 31, 1942, by Encarnacion Neyra for the celebration of holy
mass in her house, on November 1, 1942; that said mass was in fact
solemnized in her house, on that date, in the course of which the testatrix
Encarnacion Neyra took holy communion; that on the same day, after the
mass, Encarnacion held a long conversation with Father Garcia, in the course
of which, said priest advised her to have reconciliation with her sister Trinidad;
and that said advise was accepted by Encarnacion.
But the testimony of Trinidad Neyra, it has been shown that Encarnacion sent
Eustaquio Mendoza to fetch her, and that in fact she came to the house of
Encarnacion, at about 2:30 o'clock in the afternoon that same day, November
1, 1942, with said Eustaquio Mendoza; that on seeing one another,
Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra greeted each other most affectionately,
forgiving one another, after which they talked about the property left by their
deceased father and the litigation pending between them; and the two sisters
agreed to settle their case, which had been elevated to the Court of Appeals

for the City of Manila, concerning a certain house and lot, on the
understanding that said property should be given exclusively to Trinidad, and
that the latter should renounce her claim against Encarnacion, for her share in
the rents collected on said property, and, at the same time, Encarnacion
renounced her claim for P727.77 against Trinidad; and that it was also agreed
between the two sisters that Atty. Alejandro M. Panis should be called to
prepare the necessary papers for the settlement of said case. Presentacion
Blanco, a witness for the oppositors, also testified substantially to the
foregoing facts.
By the testimony of Trinidad Neyra and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, and the other
attesting witnesses, it has also been shown that Atty. Alejandro M. Panis came
in the afternoon of the following day, November 2, 1942, and received
instructions from Encarnacion Neyra, not only for the preparation of said
agreement, but also for the preparation of a new will, and consequently
Attorney Panis prepared said document of compromise and the will, dated
November 3, 1942, which were both thumb marked, in duplicate, in the
afternoon of that day, by Encarnacion Neyra, who was then of sound mind, as
shown by her appearance and conversation, aided by a son of Trinidad Neyra,
on her bed in the sala, in the presence of the attesting witnesses, Dr. Moises
B. Abad, Dr. Eladio R. Aldecoa, and Atty. Alejandro M. Panis, who signed in
the presence of the testatrix and of each other.

question, dated November 3, 1942, she was sleeping on her bed in the sala;
and that the attesting witnesses were not present, as they were in the caida.
But Ceferina de la Cruz, witness for the oppositors, also stated that the
attesting witnesses signed the documents thumb marked by Encarnacion
Neyra, in the sala near her bed, thus contradicting herself and Teodora Neyra
and Presentacion Blanco.
Strange to say, Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz
also testified that Encarnacion Neyra's thumb mark was affixed to the will, only
in the morning of November 4, 1942, by Trinidad Neyra and Ildefonso del
Barrio, when Encarnacion was already dead.
The testimony of Dr. Dionisio Parulan, alleged medical expert, as to the nature
and effects of Addison's disease, is absolutely unreliable. He had never seen
or talked to the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra.

Father Teodoro Garcia was also present at the signing of the will, at the
request of Encarnacion Neyra, and so was Trinidad Neyra.

According to the medical authorities, the cause or causes of the sleeping

sickness, known as Addison's disease, are not yet fully known: that persons
attacked by said decease often live as long as ten (10) years after the first
attack, while others die after a few weeks only, and that as the disease,
progresses, asthenia sets in, and from 80 per cent to 90 per cent of the
patients develop tuberculosis, and complications of the heart also appear.
(Cecil, Textbook of Medicine, 3d ed., 1935, pp. 1250, 1252, 1253; MaCrae,
Osler's Modern Medicine, 3d ed., Vol. V. pp. 272-279).

On November 4, 1942, due to a heart attack as a consequence of Addison's

disease, perhaps, Encarnacion Neyra expired, at about 3 o'clock in the
morning.

And it has been conclusively shown in this case that the testatrix Encarnacion
Neyra, at the age of 48, died on November 4, 1942, due to a heart attack,
after an illness of about two (2) years.

Oppositor Teodora Neyra, her young daughter Ceferina de la Cruz, and

Presentacion Blanco, daughter of oppositor Maria Jacobo Vda. de Blanco,
practically corroborated the testimony of the witnesses of the petitioner, with
reference to the signing of documents, in the bedroom of Encarnacion Neyra,
on November 3, 1942.

In connection with testamentary capacity, in several cases, this court has

considered the testimony of witnesses, who had known and talked to the
testators, more trustworthy than the testimony of alleged medical experts.

Teodora Neyra, Presentacion Blanco and Ceferina de la Cruz, witnesses for

the oppositors, testified, however, that when the thumb mark of Encarnacion
Neyra was affixed, as stated above, to the document of compromise in

Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend the nature of the

transaction in which the testator is engaged at the time, to recollect the
property to be disposed of, and the persons who would naturally be supposed
to have claims upon the testator, and to comprehend the manner in which the
instrument will distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.
(Bugnao vs. Ubag. 14 Phil., 163.)

Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two doctors who testified for the
opponents to the probate of a will, who stated that it tended to destroy mental
capacity, was held not to affect the full possession of the mental faculties
deemed necessary and sufficient for its execution. (Caguioa vs. Calderon, 20
Phil., 400.) The testatrix was held to have been compos mentis, in spite of the
physician's testimony to the contrary, to the effect that she was very weak,
being in the third or last stage of tuberculosis. (Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and
Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.) The testimony testimony of the attending physician
that the deceased was suffering from diabetes and had been in a comatose
for several days, prior to his death, was held not sufficient to establish
testamentary incapacity, in view of the positive statement of several credible
witnesses that he was conscious and able to understand what said to him and
to communicate his desires. (Samson vs. Corrales Tan Quintin, 44 Phil., 573.)
Where the mind of the testator is in perfectly sound condition, neither old age,
nor ill health, nor the fact that somebody had to guide his hand in order that he
might sign, is sufficient to invalidate his will. (Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo,
48 Phil., 485.)
Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days after the execution of
the will, the testator intelligently and intelligibly conversed with other persons,
although lying down and unable to move or stand up unassisted, but could still
effect the sale of property belonging to him, these circumstances show that
the testator was in a perfectly sound mental condition at the time of executing
the will. (Amata and Almojuela vs. Tablizo, 48 Phil., 485.)
Presentacion Blanco, in the course of her cross-examination, frankly admitted
that, in the morning and also at about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November
3, 1942, Encarnacion Neyra talked to her and that they understood each other
clearly, thus showing that the testatrix was really of sound mind, at the time of
the signing and execution of the agreement and will in question.

testamentary capacity, at the time of the execution of the will, cannot be

properly disturbed.
The oppositors also claim that the attesting witnesses were not present, at the
time that the testatrix thumbed marked the will in question, on her bed, in the
sala of the house, as they were allegedly in the caida. But it has been fully
shown that the attesting witnesses were present at the time of the signing and
execution of the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where the
testatrix was lying on her bed. The true test is not whether they actually saw
each other, at the time of the signing of the will, but whether they might have
seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so; and the attesting witnesses
actually saw it in this case. (Jaboneta vs. Gustilo, 5 Phil., 541.) And the
thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the will is equivalent to her signature.
(Yap Tua vs. Yap Ca Kuan and Yap Ca Llu, 27 Phil., 579.)
The oppositors as well as their principal witnesses are all interested parties,
as said oppositors had been named legatees in the will dated September 14,
1939, but eliminated from the will dated November 3, 1942.
On the other hand, the witnesses for the petitioner are all trustworthy men,
who had absolutely no interest in the final outcome of this case. Two of them
are ministers of the Gospel, while the three attesting witnesses are
professional men of irreproachable character, who had known and seen and
talked to the testatrix.

It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the mental faculties of persons

suffering from Addison's disease, like the testatrix in this case, remain
unimpaired, partly due to the fact that, on account of the sleep they enjoy, they
necessarily receive the benefit of physical and mental rest. And that like
patients suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they preserve their
mental faculties until the moments of their death.

Furthermore, the testimony of the oppositors and their witnesses, to the effect
that there could have been no reconciliation between the two sisters, and that
the thumb mark of Encarnacion Neyra was affixed to the document
embodying the agreement, while she was sleeping, on November 3, 1942, in
their presence; and that her thumb mark was affixed to the will in question,
when she was already dead, in the morning of November 4, 1942, within their
view is preposterous, to say the least. Said testimony is contrary to common
sense. It violates all sense of proportion. The oppositors and their witnesses
could not have told the truth; they have testified to brazen falsehoods; and
they are, therefore, absolutely unworthy of belief. And to the evidence of the
oppositors is completely applicable the rule falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus.
(Gonzales vs. Mauricio, 53 Phil., 728, 735.)

Judging by the authorities above cited, the conclusion made the trial court that
the testatrix Encarnacion Neyra was of sound mind and possessed

In the brief presented by counsel for the oppositors and the appellants, to
show the alleged improbability of the reconciliation of the two sisters and the

execution of the will, dated November 3, 1942, they have erroneously placed
great reliance on the facts that, up to October 31, 1942, the two sisters
Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra were bitter enemies. They were banking
evidently on the common belief that the hatred of relatives is the most violent.
Dreadful indeed are the feuds of relatives, and difficult the reconciliation. But
they had forgotten the fact that Encarnacion Neyra was a religious and pious
woman instructed in the ancient virtues of Christian faith and hope and charity,
and that it was godly to forgive and better still to forget.
It was most natural that there should have been reconciliation between the
two sisters, Encarnacion and Trinidad Neyra, as the latter is the nearest
relative of the former, her only sister of the whole blood. The approach of
imminent death must have evoked in her the tenderest recollections of
childhood. And believing perhaps that her little triumphs had not always been
fair to her sister who in fact, had had successively instituted two suits against
her, to recover what was her due, and for which Encarnacion believed she
must atone, she finally decided upon reconciliation, so that she might depart
in peace.
The record shows that, of the two, Encarnacion lived in greater opulence, and
that Trinidad had been demanding tenaciously her share; and as a Christian
woman, Encarnacion must have known that no one has any right to enrich
himself unjustly, at the expense of another. And it was, therefore, natural that
Encarnacion should desire reconciliation with her sister Trinidad, and provide
for her in her last will and testament.
As for Eustaquio Mendoza, who, according to the evidence, had served
Encarnacion Neyra for so many years and so well, it was also natural that she
should make some provision for him, as gratitude is the noblest sentiment that
springs from the human heart.
The conduct of Encarnacion Neyra, in making altogether a new will, with new
beneficiaries named therein, including principally her bitterest enemy of late,
which is completely incompatible with the will, dated September 14, 1939,
may really seem strange and unusual; but, as it has been truly said, above the
logic of the head is the feeling in the heart, and the heart has reasons of its
own which the head cannot always understand, as in the case of intuitive
knowledge of eternal verity.

As Encarnacion Neyra felt the advent of immortality, she naturally wanted to

follow "the path of the just, which is as the shining light that shineth more and
more unto the perfect day," so that her memory may be blessed. As a
Christian woman, she must have loved justice, mercy and truth and to follow
the law, for this is the whole duty of man.
In the present case, the court cannot find any reason or justification to alter
the conclusions set forth in the decree appealed from. This court will not
reverse any findings of fact by the trial court made upon conflicting testimony
and depending largely upon the credibility of witnesses, who testified in the
presence of the trial judge, unless the court below failed to take into
consideration some material facts or circumstances, or to weigh accurately all
of the material facts and circumstances presented to it for consideration.
(Baltazar vs. Alberto, 33 Phil., 336; Melliza vs. Towle, 34 Phil., 345; Caragay
vs. Urquiza, 53 Phil., 72, 79; Garcia vs. Garcia de Bartolome, 63 Phil., 419.)
After a careful consideration of the evidence and the law of this case, we find
it legally impossible to sustain any of the errors assigned by the appellants.
The judgment appealed from is, therefore, affirmed, with costs against the
appellants. So ordered.
Ozaeta, Perfecto, Hilado, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

G.R. Nos. L-46430-31 July 30, 1979

FRANCISCA
ALSUA-BETTS,
JOSEPH
O.
BETTS,
JOSE
MADARETA, ESTEBAN P. RAMIREZ, and THE REGISTER OF
DEEDS FOR ALBAY PROVINCE, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO ALSUA BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO
BUENVIAJE, FERNANDO ALSUA, represented by his guardian,
CLOTILDE S. ALSUA and PABLO ALSUA, respondents.
Rafael Triumfante for petitioners.
Sabido-Sabido & Associates and Madrid Law Office for private
respondents.

The antecedent events leading to

consolidated actions are the following.

the

filing

of

these

two

On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus Alsua and his wife, Do;a
Florentina Rella, both of Ligao, Albay, together with all their living
children, Francisca Alsua-Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua thru this
judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, and Amparo Alsua de Buenviaje,
entered into a duly notarized agreement, Escritura de Particion
Extrajudicial (Exhibit 8), over the then present and existing
properties of the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Florentina
enumerated in a prepared inventory, Exhibit 8-A, the essential
features of which are stated in private respondents' Brief, pp. 26-29,
to wit: t.hqw

GUERRERO, J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 54492-R and 54493-R which reversed the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Albay allowing the probate
of the win of Don Jesus Alsua in Special Proceedings No. 699 and
dismissing the complaint in Civil Case 3068 after declaring the two
deeds of sale executed by Don Jesus Alsua legal and valid. The
respondent court 1 denied the probate of the will, declared null and
void the two sales subject of the complaint and ordered the
defendants, petitioners herein, to pay damages to the plaintiffs, now
the private respondents, the sum of Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00), to render an accounting of the properties in their
possession and to reimburse the latter the net gain in the proportion
that appertains to them in the properties from the date of the firing
of the complaint up to complete restoration plus Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees and costs.

(1) Basis of the partition: Inventory (Annex A) of all the properties of

the Alsua spouses, which inventory consists of 97 pages, all of them
signed by the spouses and all the above named heirs in the left
margin of every page (parafo primers).

(2) An acknowledgment of the spouses that all the properties

described in the inventory (Annex A) are conjugal properties with
the exception of five parcels of land Identified with the figures of 1
to 5 and 30 shares of San Miguel Brewery stock which are
paraphernal properties of the late Do;a Tinay (segundo parafo).

(3) An acknowledgment that during their marriage, they had nine

children but five of them died minors, unmarried (parafo tercero y
cuatro).

(4) An acknowledgment that on the basis of Article 1056 of the Civil

Code (old) to avoid Possible misunderstanding among their children
concerning the inheritance they are entitled to in the event of death
of one of them they have decided to effectuate an extrajudicial
partition of all the properties described in Annex "A" thereto under
the following terms and conditions: (Parafo quinto):

To Francisca Alsua, married to Joseph O. Betts were allotted or

assigned all the real properties with the improvements thereon
specifically described from pages 1-12 of said inventory or, 34
parcels of land with a total land area of 5,720,364 sq. meters, with a
book or appraised value of P69,740.00.

To Pablo Alsua, married to Teresa Locsin were allotted or assigned all

the real properties with the improvements thereon specifically
described from pages 12-20 of said inventory or, 26 parcels of land
with a total land area of 5,679,262 sq. meters, with a book or
appraised value of P55,940.00.

To Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde Samson were allotted or

assigned all the real properties with the improvements thereon
specifically described from pages 20-33 of said inventory or, 47
parcels of land with a total land area of 6,639,810 sq. meters, with a
book or appraised value of P89,300.00.

To Amparo Alsua, married to Fernando Buenviaje were allotted or

assigned all the real properties with the improvements thereon
specifically described from pages 33-47 of said inventory or, 47

parcels of land with a total land area of 5,630,715 sq. meters, with a
book or appraised value of P58,830.00. t.hqw

(a) Each and every one of the heirs named above acknowledge and
admit that the totality of the properties allotted and adjudicated to
the heirs as described in the preceding paragraph, constitute one
half of the properties described in Annex "A", including any amount
of cash deposited.

(b) That all the heirs acknowledge and admit that all the properties
assigned to them as their hereditary portion represent one-half not
only of the conjugal properties but includes the paraphernal
properties waiving now and forever any complaint or claim they
have or they may have concerning the amount, value, extension
and location of the properties that are allotted to each and
everyone. They also waive any claim they have or they may have
over the remaining portion of the properties, which spouses
reserved for themselves.

(c) That in case of death of one of the spouses, each and everyone
of the heirs acknowledge that the properties which are left in the
possession of the surviving spouse, including any amount in cash,
are even less than the one- half that should correspond in absolute
ownership as his legitimate participation in the conjugal properties.
In consequence they waive any claim that they have or may have
over said portion of said properties or any amount in cash during the
lifetime of the surviving spouse, including any right or claim they
have or they may have over the paraphernal properties of Do;a
Tinay in the event the surviving spouse is Don Jesus.

(d) The spouses on their part in case of death of any one of them,
the surviving spouse waives any claim he or she may have over the
properties assigned or adjudicated to the heirs under and by virtue
of this deed. The properties which were reserved for them (the
spouses) should be considered as his or her legitimate participation
in the conjugal properties and the fair compensation of his or her
usufruct on the properties that the surviving spouse reserved for
himself or herself which shag be distributed in equal shares among
the heirs upon his or her death unless said properties of some of
them have been disposed of during the lifetime of the surviving
spouse.

1949. Their holographic wills similarly provided for the institution of

the other to his or her share in the conjugal properties, the other
half of the conjugal assets having been partitioned to constitute
their legitime among their four living children in the Extrajudicial
Partition of 1949. The wigs also declared that in the event of future
acquisitions of other properties by either of them, one-half thereof
would belong to the other spouse, and the other half shall be
divided equally among the four children. The holographic will of
Do;a Tinay written in Spanish reads, as translated: t.hqw

TESTAMENT
(e) Any heir who may dare question the validity and legitimacy of
the provision contained herein shall be under obligation to pay to
the other heirs, in the concept of damages and prejudice, the sum of
P5,000.00 plus attorney's fees.

(f) The provisions of this deed shall bind the successors of the herein
heirs.

(g) In the event of death of one of the spouses, the properties

assigned or adjudicated to each and everyone of the heirs shall be
considered as his share or participation in the estate or as his
inheritance left by the deceased and each heir shall become the
absolute owner of the properties adjudicated to him under this deed.

On January 5, 1955, Don Jesus and Do;a Florentina, also known as

Do;a Tinay separately executed their respective holographic wills
(Exhs. 6-B and 7-B), the provisions of which were in conformity and
in implementation of the extrajudicial partition of November 25,

I, FLORENTINA R. DE ALSUA, 67 years old, Filipina, married to Don

Jesus Alsua, resident of and with postal address in the Municipality
of Ligao, Province of Albay, Philippines, being in the full possession
of my mental and physical faculties freely and spontaneously
execute this my last will and testament in my handwriting and
signed by me and expressed in the Spanish language which I speak,
write and understand, this 5th day of January, 1955 in the
Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, and in which I ordain and
provide:

First: That in or about the year 1906 I was married to my husband

Don Jesus Alsua and begot nine (9) children with him, four (4) of
whom are still living and they are Francisco Alsua, Pablo Alsua,
Fernando Alsua and Amparo Alsua. The other five (5) died during
their minority, single and without children.

Second: That after my marriage to my husband Don Jesus Alsua and

during our conjugal union, and as a result of our efforts and industry,

we were able to acquire conjugal properties consisting of abaca

(abales) and cacao lands and urban lands registered in the office of
the Registry of Property of the Province of Albay and in the City of
Manila.

(SGD.) FLORENTINA R. DE ALSUA

(Joint Record on appeal pp. 420-423, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)

Third: That I institute as my heirs with right to inherit the followingmy spouse Don Jesus Alsua, one-half (1/2) of my properties, real and
personal, and the other half, to my children Francisco Alsua, married
to Joseph O. Betts, Pablo Alsua, Fernando Alsua, married to Clotilde
Samson, and Amparo Alsua, married to Fernando Buenviaje, in equal
parts. It is to be understood, however, that the other half that
corresponds as legitime to my above named children have already
been given to them, pursuant to a document dated November 25,
1949 and ratified on the same day, month and year before Notary
Public Segundo G. Flores (Reg. No. 525; Pag. 15; Lib. 11; Series of
1949) enjoining each and everyone of them to respect and faithfully
comply with each and every clause contained in the said document.

Fourth: That should I acquire new properties after the execution of

this testament, the same shall be partitioned among my spouse and
above named children or the children mentioned in above par. 3 in
the same proportion that is, one-half (1 1/2) to my spouse; and the
other half to my children in equal parts.

Fifth: That I name as my executor my husband Don Jesus Alsua

without having to post any bond.

IN VIRTUE WHEREOF, I hereby sign in my own handwriting this

testament on this 5th day of January, 1955 in the Municipality of
Ligao, Province of Albay, Philippines. t.hqw

As previously stated, Don Jesus Alsua executed a separate but

similar holographic will on the same day, Jan. 5, 1955 in exactly the
same terms and conditions as the above will of his wife.

On May 21, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay filed
before the Court of First Instance of Albay their respective petitions
for the probate of their respective holographic wins which were
docketed as Special Proceedings No. 484 (Jesus Alsua, Petitioner)
and Special Proceedings No. 485 (Do;a Florentina Ralla de Alsua,
Petitioner).

On August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay
executed their mutual and reciprocal codicils amending and
supplementing their respective holographic wins. Again, the codicils
similarly acknowledged and provided that one-half of all the
properties of the spouses, conjugal and paraphernal, had been
disposed of, conveyed to and partitioned among their legitimate
heirs in the "Escritura de Particion" of November 25, 1949, but that
they reserved for themselves (the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a
Tinay) the other half or those not disposed of to the said legitimate
heirs under the above agreement of partition, and that they
mutually and reciprocally bequeathed unto each other their
participation therein as well as in all properties which might be
acquired subsequently. Each spouse also declared that should she or

he be the surviving spouse, whatever belongs to him or her or would

pertain to him or her, would be divided equally among the four
children. It was also declared in both codicils that upon the death of
either of the spouses, the surviving spouse was designated mutually
and reciprocally as the executor or administrator of all the properties
reserved for themselves.

The codicil executed by Do;a Tinay, written in Spanish reads, as

translated: t.hqw

CODICIL

This codicil supplements and amends the preceding testament. That

my spouse and I have agreed to divide the properties which we have
acquired into 2 parts. The 1/2 that would correspond to me covers
all the properties that I have partitioned among my children in the
Document of Partition dated November 25, 1949 before Notary
Public Segundo G. Flores, Jr. (Doc. No. 525; Pag. No. 15; Lib. No. 11;
Series of 1949) (and) even as the properties which by reason of this
testament I leave to my husband as his share and the other half that
corresponds to my husband constitutes an the properties that up to
now have not been disposed of, particularly the urban lands situated
in Legaspi, Albay, Ligao of the Province of Albay and in the City of
Manila, with the exception of that portion that I bequeath to my
husband as his inheritance and his legitimate.

dated November 25, 1949 which correspond to each one of them

and in the profits (fruits) expressed in the same, and in the event
that the properties granted to one or any of my children should
exceed in quantity or value those corresponding to another or
others, I hereby declare that it is my will that the same be divided
among my children as their inheritance from the free portion of my
property.

I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as Ws

inheritance the part of the free portion of my property which have
not been allocated in favor of my children in the Document of
Partition aforecited and that which should exceed 1/2 of the conjugal
property of gains that pertains to him as above stated, including all
those properties which we shall acquire after the execution of this
document.

In case it should be God's will that I survive my spouse, I hereby

declare that it is my will that any and all kinds of property that
pertain to me or would pertain to me, which have not been disposed
of pursuant to the partition, should be divided equally among my
above-mentioned heirs after my death. Ligao, Albay, Philippines,
August 14,1956. t.hqw

(SGD.) FLORENTINA RALLA DE ALSUA

(joint Record on Appeal pp. 423-425, CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)

That I institute as my heirs with the right to inherit my husband Don
Jesus Alsua and my children Francisco Alsua, Pablo Alsua, Fernando
Alsua and Amparo Alsua. I leave to my aforecited children all the
properties described in the above mentioned Document of Partition

And as stated previously, on the same day, August 14, 1956, Don
Jesus executed also a separate but similar codicil in exactly the
same terms and conditions as the above codicil of his wife. Also on
the same day of August 14, 1956, the spouses Don Jesus and Do;a
Tinay both filed their respective supplemental petitions for the
probate of their respective codicils in the probate proceedings
earlier filed. On February 19, 1957, their respective holographic wins
and the codicils thereto were duly admitted to probate.

Upon the death of Do;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, Don Jesus was
named executor to serve without bond in an order issued by the
probate court on October 13, 1959. Letters testamentary having
been issued in favor of Don Jesus, he took his oath of office and
performed his duties as such until July 1, 1960.

Thereafter in the early part of November, 1959, Don Jesus cancelled

his holographic will in the presence of his bookkeeper and secretary,
Esteban P. Ramirez, whom he instructed to make a list of all his
remaining properties with their corresponding descriptions. His
lawyer, Atty. Gregorio imperial Sr. was then instructed to draft a new
will which was duly signed by Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses
on November 14, 1959 at Ms home in Ligao, Albay. This notarial will
and testament (Exh. A) of Don Jesus executed on November 14,
1959 had three essential features: (a) it expressly cancelled,
revoked and annulled all the provisions of Don Jesus' holographic will
of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956; (b) it provided
for the collation of all his properties donated to his four living
children by virtue of the "Escritura de Particion Extra. judicial" of
1949, and that such properties be taken into account in the partition
of his estate among the children; and (c) it instituted his children as
legatees/devisees of certain specific properties, and as to the rest of
the properties and whatever may be subsequently acquired in the

future, before his death, were to be given to Francisca and Pablo,

naming Francesca as executrix to serve without a bond.

After all debts, funeral charges and other expenses of the estate of
Do;a Tinay had been paid, all her heirs including Don Jesus,
submitted to the probate court for approval a deed of partition
executed on December 19, 1959 (Exh. 7-Q) and which essentially
confirmed the provisions of the partition of 1949, the holographic
will and codicil of Do;a Tinay. On July 6, 1960, the court approved
the partition of 1959 and on January 6, 1961 declared the
termination of the proceedings on the estate of Do;a Tinay.

On May 6,1964, Don Jesus Alsua died.

On May 20, 1964, petitioner herein Francisca Alsua Betts, as the

executrix named in the will of November 14, 1959, filed a petition
for the probate of said new will of Don Jesus Alsua before the Court
of First Instance of Albay and was docketed as Special Proceedings
No. 699. Oppositions thereto were filed by Pablo, Amparo and
Fernando, thru his judicial guardian Clotilde Samson, on the
following grounds: (a) that Don Jesus was not of sound and disposing
mind at the time of the execution of the alleged will; (b) that the will
was executed under duress or influence of fear or threats; or it was
procured by undue and improper pressure and influence on the part
of the main beneficiaries and of person or persons in collusion with
them, or the signature of the testator was secured by or thru fraud;
(c) that the will was not executed according to the formal
requirements of the law; and (d) that the alleged will subject of
probate contravened the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949 agreed upon
by him, his deceased spouse, Do;a Tinay, and all his children,
Francisco, Pablo, Amparo and Fernando thru his judicial guardian

Clotilde Samson, and also contravened Don Jesus' own probated

holographic will and codicil of 1955 and 1956, respectively,
essentially confirming and implementing the said partition of 1949
which had already been partially executed by all the signatories
thereto in the partition of the estate of Do;a Tinay in December,
1959.

On the basis of Francisca's designation as executrix in the new will

dated November 14, 1959, the Probate Court appointed her
Administratrix of the estate of her late father, Don Jesus Alsua. She
then filed with the Probate Court an inventory of the properties of
the estate which, according to the oppositors therein (the private
respondents now) did not include some properties appearing in the
agreement of November 25. 1949 or in the inventory attached
thereto as Annex "A" and in the "Escritura de Particion" of December
19, 1959 as belonging to or should pertain to Don Jesus. According
to the oppositors, these properties consist of thirty- three (33)
premium agricultural lots with a total land area of 1,187,970 square
meters, or approximately 119 hectares and with a total assessed
value of P48,410.00 or a probable total market value of P238,000.00
at only P2,000.00 per hectare, and four (4) commercial urban lots
Ideally located in the business section of Legazpi City including the
lot and the building presently occupied by the well-known "Mayon
Hotel" with an assessed value of approximately P117,260.00 or a
probable market value at the time of P469,040.00. It appearing from
the new will that these properties were bequeathed to Pablo Alsua
and Francisco Alsua-Betts, specifically, 3 parcels of the 33
agricultural lands to Pablo and the rest to Francisco, the oppositors
also raised in issue the non-inclusion of said properties in the
inventory of the estate of their late father. In answer, Francisco
claimed ownership over the same, alleging that she bought the
properties from their father and presenting the two Deeds of Sale
now being assailed, one dated August 26, 1961 purporting to show
the sale of the 33 parcels of agricultural land to Francisco by their

father for the price of P70,000.00 and the other dated November 26,
1962 evidencing the sale of the four urban lots for the sum of
P80,000.00. Claiming fraud in the sales, the oppositors filed Civil
Case No. 3068, seeking the annulment of the aforesaid two deeds of
sale, with damages, which upon agreement of the parties was then
jointly heard and tried with Special Proceedings No. 699 for probate
of the Last Will and Testament of Don Jesus executed on November
14, 1959.

After a joint hearing of the merits of these two cases, the Court of
First Instance of Albay promulgated a decision on January 15, 1973,
the dispositive portion of which states: t.hqw

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby

rendered, to wit:

1. In Special Proceedings 699, the Court hereby APPROVES and

ALLOWS the Will executed by Don Jesus Alsua at Ligao, Albay, on
November 14, 1959, which had been marked as Exhibit A, consisting
of nine (9) pages, and orders that the same be made the basis for
division and distribution of the estate of said testator;

2. In Civil Case 3068, the Court hereby dismisses the complaint and
holds that the sale on August 26, 1961 (Exh. U) and the sale on
November 26, 1962 (Exh. W), are lawful and valid sales and
accordingly conveyed title to the VENDEE thereof. The Plaintiffs in
Civil Case 3068. are ordered jointly and severally to pay to the
defendant, Francisco Alsua Betts Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00)
as damages and Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) Pesos for attorney's

fees or a total of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and to

pay the costs.

respondents, oppositors to the probate of the will, are in estoppel to

question the competence of testator Don Jesus Alsua.

On appeal by herein respondents to the Court of Appeals, the court

reversed the appealed decision in a judgment rendered on April 4,
1977, the dispositive portion of which states, as translated, thus
t.hqw

II. The respondent Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that

testator Don Jesus Alsua cannot revoke his previous will.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Tribunal finds itself constrained to

set aside as it hereby sets aside the decision appealed from in the
following manner: (1) in Special Proceedings 699, the probate of the
will, Exh. A, is hereby denied; (2) in Civil Case No. 3068, Exhs. U and
W and the titles issued on the basis thereof are hereby declared null
and void, ordering the appellees Francisco Alsua and Joseph Betts to
pay to the plaintiffs in the concept of fixed damages, the sum of
P5,000.00 and to render an accounting of properties in their
possession and to reimburse the plaintiffs the net gain, in the
proportion that appertains to them in the properties subject of
litigation in Civil Case No. 3068 from the date of the filing of this
complaint, up to the complete restoration of the properties
pertaining to (plaintiffs) pursuant to Article 2208 of the New Civil
Code, paragraph 11, ordering them in addition to pay to the
plaintiffs and oppositors the sum of P50,000.00 as attorney's fees,
and the costs.

Hence, the petition at bar assailing the respondent court's decision

on four assigned errors, to wit: t.hqw

I. The respondent Court of Appeals erred in not affirming the findings

of the probate court (Special Proceedings No. 699) that private

III. The respondent court's finding is grounded entirely on

speculation, surmises or conjectures resulting in a gross
misapprehension of facts.

IV. The respondent court grossly erred in annulling the sales of

August 26, 1961 (Exh. U), and of November 26, 1962 (Exh. W).

On the first issue of estoppel raised in the assignment of errors, We

hold that the same is of no moment. The controversy as to the
competency or incompetency of Don Jesus Alsua to execute his will
cannot be determined by acts of the herein private respondents as
oppositors to the will in formally agreeing in writing jointly with the
petitioner Francisca Alsua de Betts that their father, Don Jesus Alsua,
be appointed by the court executor of the will of their mother in
Special Proceedings No. 485, Testate Estate of Do;a Florentina Ralla
de Alsua and in subsequently petitioning the court not to require
Don Jesus Alsua to file any accounting as executor in the
proceedings, which petitioners claim and was upheld by the trial
court as constituting estoppel on the part of the private respondents
from questioning the competence of Don Jesus Alsua.

The principle of estoppel is not applicable in probate proceedings, a

ruling laid down in the case of Testate Estate of the Late Procopia
Apostol Benedicta Obispo, et al vs. Remedios Obispo, 50 O.G. 614,
penned by Justice J.B.L. Reyes, an eminent and recognized authority
on Civil Law when he was still in the Court of Appeals, and We
quote: t.hqw

Finally, probate proceedings involve public interest, and the

application therein of the rile of estoppel, when it win block the
ascertainment of the truth as to the circumstances surrounding the
execution of a testament, would seem inimical to public policy. Over
and above the interest of private parties is that of the state to see
that testamentary dispositions be carried out if, and only if,
executed conformably to law.

with the public interest, the devolutionary wishes of a deceased

person (Matter of Watson's Wilt 262 N.Y., 284, 294, 186, N.E., 787;
Matter of Marriman's Estate, 124 Misc. 320, 325, 208, N.Y.S., 672;
Foley, S., affirmed 217 app. Div., 733, 216 N.Y.S., 126, Henderson, S.,
Matter of Draske's Estate, 160 Misc. 587, 593, 290, N.Y.S., 581). To
that end, the court is, in effect, an additional party to every litigation
affecting the disposal of the assets of the deceased. Matter of Van
Valkenburgh's Estate, 164 Misc. 295, 298, N.Y.S., 219.'

The next issue that commands Our attention is whether the

respondent court erred in not allowing the probate of the last will
and testament of Don Jesus Alsua. Petitioners claim that the
disallowance was based on speculations, surmises or conjectures,
disregarding the facts as found by the trial court. The Civil Court is
very clear and explicit in providing the cases where a will may be
disallowed under Article 839 which provides as follows: t.hqw

The Supreme Court of New York aptly said in Re Canfield's Will, 300
N.Y.S., 502: t.hqw
Art. 839. The will shall be disallowed in any of the following cases:
'The primary purpose of the proceeding is not to establish the
existence of the right of any living person, but to determine whether
or not the decedent has performed the acts specified by the
pertinent statutes, which are the essential prerequisites to personal
direction of the mode of devolution of his property on death. There
is no legal but merely a moral duty resting upon a proponent to
attempt to validate the wishes of the departed, and he may and
frequently does receive no personal benefit from the performance of
the act.

(1) If the formalities required by law have not been complied with;

(2) If the testator was insane, or otherwise mentally incapable of

making a wilt at the time of its execution;

(3) If it was executed through force or under duress, or the influence

of fear, or threats;
One of the most fundamental conceptions of probate law, is that it is
the duty of the court to effectuate, in so far as may be compatible

(4) If it was procured by undue and improper pressure and influence,

on the part of the beneficiary or of some other person;

including Exh. V-14). He then instructed Ramirez to make a list of all

s properties with their corresponding descriptions.

(5) If the signature of the testator was procured by fraud,

Meanwhile, Don Jesus Alsua sent for his lawyer, Don Gregorio
Imperial, Sr. and the latter came accompanied by his son, Atty. Jorge
S, Imperial, who, incidentally, is now a judge of the Court of First
Instance of Naga City, Camarines Sur. Don Jesus informed his
lawyers that he wanted to make a new will, and accordingly gave
more detailed instructions as to how he wanted to divide his
properties among his four children. He handed to them a list and on
the left he indicated the name of the child to whom the listed
properties shall pertain. Atty. Jorge Imperial took notes of the
instructions of Don Jesus Alsua. To Don Jesus, Spanish is his major
language, as in fact his conversations with Don Gregorio are always
in Spanish. A few days before November 14, 1959, Atty. Jorge S.
Imperial showed to Don Jesus the semi-final draft of the will and
after reading it Don Jesus said that it was as directed by him, and
after making a few minor corrections, he instructed Atty. Jorge S.
Imperial to put the win in final form. He further told Atty, Jorge
Imperial that the signing of the will should be at his home in Ligao,
in the morning of November 14, 1959, and that the witnesses should
be Mr. Ramon Balana, the then Register of Deeds of Albay; Mr. Jose
Madarieta who is a friend of the family; and Mr. Jose Gaya who is a
sort of employee of Don Jesus.

(6) If the testator acted by mistake or did not intend that the
instrument he signed should be his will at the time of affixing his
signature thereto.

The issue under consideration appears to Us to have been answered

by the respondent court itself when it accepted the findings of the
trial court on the due execution of the questioned will and testament
of Don Jesus, declaring: t.hqw

... and going back to the previous question, whether the questioned
will and testament of November 14, 1959, Exh. A, was executed in
accordance with Arts. 805-809 of the New Civil Code, this Tribunal
from the very beginning accepts the findings of the inferior court
concerning the question, t.hqw

On October 2, 1959, Do;a Florentina died at Ligao, Albay. About 2

weeks after said death of his wife, Don Jesus Alsua decided to make
a new will, thereby revoking and cancelling his previous holographic
will which he made on January 5, 1955 and also its codicil dated
August 14, 1956. In the presence of his bookkeeper and secretary,
Esteban P. Ramirez, he crossed out in ink each and every page of
said page he wrote on each page the word "cancelado", and affixed
his signature thereon (Exh V-5, V-6, consecutively up to and

Thus in the morning of November 14, 1959, Don Gregorio and Atty.
Jorge S. Imperial, riding in a sedan, stopped at the Legaspi residence
of Mr. Ramon Balana, and informed the latter that Don Jesus was
requesting him to be one of the attesting witnesses to his will. Mr.
Balana, having a very high regard for Don Jesus, considered it an
honor to be so asked, and gladly went with the Imperials. They
arrived at the residence of Don Jesus at Ligao; Albay, almost ten
o'clock of that morning, and they were ushered in by Mr. Jose Gaya,

and the latter requested them to be seated at the usual receiving

room on the ground floor while he announced their arrival to Don
Jesus who was on the second floor. Soon Don Jesus came down,
carrying with him the will to be signed placed inside a cartolina
folder. He greeted Don Gregorio, Mr. Balan, and Atty. Imperial and
immediately joined them in conversation. Mr. Gaya called for Mr.
Jose Madarieta, whose residence is just across the road from the
house of Don Jesus. Mr. Madarieta was already informed by Don
Jesus himself about the fact of signing the will that morning, and so,
on being advised by Mr. Gaya that the Imperials had already arrived,
Madarieta proceeded to the residence of Don Jesus, without much
delay. With the coming of Madarieta and the coming back of Gaya,
there were now six people gathered in the living room, namely: Don
Jesus Alsua, Don Gregorio Imperial Atty. Jorge S. Imperial Mr. Ramon
Balana, Mr. Jose Madarieta, and Mr. Jose Gaya. All the witnesses who
testified for the petitioner declared that Don Jesus was in bright and
lively conversation which ran from problems of farming and the
merits of French-made wines. At 1 1:00 o'clock, Don Gregorio made
a remark that it is about time to do what they were there for, and
this was followed by a more or less statement from Jesus, who said:
t.hqw

'Preisamente es por lo que he Hamado a ustedes que esten

presentes para ser testigos de rni ultimo voluntad y testamento que
ha sido preparado por el abogado Sr. Gregorio Imperial segun mis
instrucciones cuyo documento tengo aqui conmigo y encuentro que,
despues de lo he leido, esta satisfactoriamente hecho segun mis
instrucciones, Como saben ustedes tengo cuatro (4) hijos todos
egos.' (pp. 43-44, t.s.n., hearing of December 7, 1967, Sarte.

On request of Don Jesus, all of them moved to the big round table on
another part of the same sala for convenience in signing because
there were chairs all around this table. The will which consisted of

nine pages, with a duplicate, and triplicate was laid on the round
table and the signing began, with Atty. Jorge S. Imperial assisting
each person signing by indicating the proper place where the
signature shall be written. Don Jesus, as testator, signed first. After
signing the original and the two other sets, the three sets were then
passed to Mr. Ramon Balana who signed as attesting witness. After
Mr. Balana, Mr. Jose Madarieta signed next as another attesting
witness, and when Mr. Madarieta finished signing all the three sets,
the same were passed to Mr. Jose Gaya who also signed as the third
attesting witness. On each of the three sets, Don Jesus signed ten
times, one on the margin of each of the nine pages, and at the
end of the instrument proper. Each of the three attesting witnesses
(Balana, Madarieta and Gaya) signed eleven times on each set,
one on the margin of each of the nine pages, one at the end of the
instrument proper and one below the attestation clause. The original
will was marked as Exh. A (or set A); the duplicate as Exh. K (or set
K) and the triplicate of Don Jesus, Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta, and Mr.
Gaya were Identified by Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta and Atty. (now
Judge) imperial. It was also clearly established that when Don Jesus
signed the will Mr. Balana, Mr. Madarieta, and Mr. Gaya were present
and witnessed said signing, and that when each of these three
witnesses was signing, Don Jesus and the two other attesting
witnesses were present and Witnessing said Signing. The signing by
the testator and the attesting witnesses having been completed,
Atty. Jorge S. Imperial as Notary Public with commission for the
entire province of Albay, notarized the wilt and sealed it with his
notarial seat which seal he brought along that morning. After all the
three sets were notarized, they were all given back to Don Jesus who
placed them inside the same folder. At that moment, it was already
about 12:30 P.M. and Don Jesus invited all of them to lunch, which
invitation was gladly accepted by all of then-L (pp. 474-480, Joint
Record on Appeal in CA-G.R. No. 54492-R)

which findings are supported by the evidence, - it is quite difficult to

conclude that the same had not complied with the requirements of
Arts. 804- 806 of the New Civil Code. ... (CA Decision, pp. 13-16, as
translated).

This cited portion of the appealed decision accepts as a fact that the
findings of the lower court declaring the contested will as having
been executed with all the formal requirements of a valid will, are
supported by the evidence. This finding is conclusive upon this
Tribunal and We cannot alter, review or revise the same. Hence,
there is no further need for Us to dwell on the matter as both the
lower court and the respondent appellate court have declared that
these are the facts and such facts are fully borne and supported by
the records. We find no error in the conclusion arrived at that the
contested will was duly executed in accordance with law. We rule
that the questioned last will and testament of Don Jesus Alsua fully
complied with the formal requirements of the law.

Respondent court, however, denied probate of the will after ,'noting

certain details which were a little bit difficult to reconcile with the
ordinary course of things and of life." First was the fact that the
spouses Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay together with their four children
Francisco, Pablo, Amparo and Fernando had executed the
Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949 (Exh. A) which divided
the conjugal properties of the spouses between the spouses
themselves and the children under the terms and conditions and
dispositions herein before stated and to implement its provisions,
Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay subsequently executed separately their
respective holographic wigs both dated January 5, 1955 and codicils
dated August 14, 1956 with the same terms and conditions as
reproduced herein earlier. Both holographic wills and codicils having
been probated thereafter and upon the death of Do;a Tinay, Don
Jesus was appointed executor of the will and in due time the

partition of the properties or estate of Do;a Tinay was approved by

the probate court on July 6, 1960.

The respondent court ruled that the Extrajudicial Partition of

November 25, 1949 was an enforceable contract which was binding
on Don Jesus Alsua as the surviving spouse, barring him from
violating said partition agreement, barring him from revoking his
holographic will of January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14,
1956, and further barring him from executing his new will and
testament of November 14, 1959, now the subject of the probate
proceedings elevated to this Court.

We do not agree with this ruling of the Court of Appeals. We hold

that the Extrajudicial Partition of November 25, 1949 is null and void
under Article 1056 in relation to Article 1271 of the old Civil Code
which are applicable hereto. These Articles provide as follows: t.
hqw

Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by

an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it
does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs. ...

Art. 1271. All things, even future ones, which are not excluded from
the commerce of man, may be the subject-matter of contracts.

Nevertheless, no contract may be entered into with respect to future

inheritances, except those the object of which is to make a division
inter vivos of an estate, in accordance with Article 1056.

All services not contrary to law or to good morals may also be the
subject- matter of contract.

Article 1056 specifically uses the word "testator" from which the
clear intent of the law may be deduced that the privilege of
partitioning one's estate by acts inter vivos is restricted only to one
who has made a prior will or testament. In other words, Article 1056
being an exception cannot be given a wider scope as to include in
the exception any person whether he has made a will or not.

Respondent court citing the same Article concluded that under both
the old and new Civil Code, a person who executes a will is
permitted at the same time or a little thereafter or even before as
long as he mentions this fact in the will, to partition his properties
pursuant to the provisions of Article 1056 of the old Civil Code. The
court further added that jurisprudence is to the effect that the
partition presupposes the execution of the will that it ratifies or
effectuates, citing the case of Legasto vs. Verzosa, 54 Phil. 776.
Finally, respondent court held the opinion that the extrajudicial
partition of November 14, 1949 was ratified in the holographic will
executed by Don Jesus on Jan. 5, 1955 and in the codicil of August
14, 1956.

Again, We do not agree with this ruling of the respondent court. In

Legasto vs. Verzosa, supra, the Supreme Court categorically
declared the necessity of a prior will before the testator can partition
his properties among his heirs, and We quote the pertinent portions
of the decision: t.hqw

The first question to decide in the instant appeal is whether the

partition made by Sabina Almadin of her property among her nieces,
the defendants and appellants herein, was valid and enforceable.

Article 1056 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 1056. If the testator should make a partition of his property by

an act inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall stand in so far as it
does not prejudice the legitime of the forced heirs.

The Supreme Court of Spain, in a decision rendered on June 13,

1903, laid down the following doctrine:

Considering that the language of article 1056 cannot be interpreted

to mean that a person may, by acts inter vivos, partition his
property referred to in the section wherein said article is found,
without the authority of a testament containing an expression of his
last will, or the authority of law, for, otherwise, a partition thus made
would be tantamount to making a will in a manner not provided for,
authorized, nor included in the chapter referring to testaments, and
especially, to the forms thereof, which is entirely different from the
legal consequences of a free disposition made by parents during
their lifetime, whereby they give to their children the whole or a part
of their property;

Considering that, inasmuch as the second paragraph of article 1271

makes reference to the aforesaid article, in providing that no
contracts may be entered into with respect to future inheritances

except those the object of which is to make a division inter vivos of

the estate in accordance with article 1056, it is evident that said
difference likewise leads to the conclusion that a partition thus made
should be on the basis of a testamentary or legal succession and
should be made in conformity with the fundamental rules thereof
and the order of the heirs entitled to the estate, because neither of
the two provisions could be given a wider meaning or scope than
that they simply provide for the division of the estate during the
lifetime of the owner, which, otherwise, would have to be done upon
the death of the testator in order to carry into effect the partition of
the estate among the persons interested.

Manresa comments on the same article as follows:

A distinction must be made between the disposition of property and

its division; and the provision of article 1056 authorizing the testator
to dispose of his property by acts inter vivos or by last will, must be
understood in accordance with this distinction. The Idea is to divide
the estate among the heirs designated by the testator. This
designation constitutes the disposition of the properties to take
effect after his death, and said act must necessarily appear in the
testament because it is the expression of the testator's last will and
must be surrounded by appropriate formalities. Then comes the
second part, to wit, the division in conformity with that disposition,
and the testator may make this division in the same will or in
another will, or by an act inter vivos. With these words, the law, in
article 1056 as well as in article 1057, which we shall hereafter
examine, makes allusion to the forms or manner of making the
partition and not to the effects thereof, which means that, for
purposes of partition the formal solemnities which must accompany
every testament or last will are not necessary. Neither is it
necessary to observe the special for. realities required in case of
donations, because it is not a matter of disposing gratuitously of

properties, but of dividing those which already have been legally

disposed of.

It is thus seen that both the Spanish Supreme Court and the learned
and authoritative commentator, Manresa, are of opinion that a
testator may, by an act inter vivos, partition his property, but he
must first make a will with all the formalities provided for by law.
And it could not be otherwise, for without a will there can be no
testator; when the law, therefore, speaks of the partition inter vivos
made by a testator of his property, it necessarily refers to that
property which he has devised to his heirs. A person who disposes of
his property gratis inter vivos is not called a testator, but a donor. In
employing the word "testator," the law evidently desired to
distinguish between one who freely donates his property in life and
one who disposes of it by will to take effect after his death.

We are not in conformity with the holding of the respondent court

that the extrajudicial partition of November 25, 1949 which under
the old Civil Code was expressly prohibited as against public policy
had been validly ratified by the holographic will of Don Jesus
executed on January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956.
Such a holding of the appellate court that a person who executes a
will is permitted to partition his properties pursuant to the provisions
of Article 1056 of the old Civil Code even before executing his will as
long as he mentions this fact in the will, is not warranted under the
ruling of Legasto vs. Verzosa, supra and the commentary of Manresa
as quoted above. We rule, therefore, that the respondent court erred
in denying probate to the will of Don Jesus dated November 14,
1959; it erred in holding that Don Jesus being a party to the
extrajudicial partition of 1949 was contractually bound by the
provisions thereof and hence could not revoke his participation
therein by the simple expedience of making a new will with contrary
provisions or dispositions. It is an error because the so-called

extrajudicial partition of 1949 is void and inoperative as a partition;

neither is it a valid or enforceable contract because it involved
future inheritance; it may only be given effect as a donation inter
vivos of specific properties to the heirs made by the parents.

Considering that the document, the extrajudicial partition of

November 25, 1949, contained specific designation of properties
allotted to each child, We rule that there was substantial compliance
with the rules on donations inter vivos under the old Civil Code
(Article 633). On the other hand, there could have been no valid
donation to the children of the other half reserved as the free
portion of Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay which, as stated in the deed,
was to be divided equally among the children for the simple reason
that the property or properties were not specifically described in the
public instrument, an essential requirement under Article 633 which
provides as follows: t.hqw

Art. 633. In order that a donation or real property be valid it must be

made by public instrument in which the property donated must be
specifically described and in the amount of the encumbrances to be
assumed by the donee expressed.

The acceptance must be made in the deed of gift or in a separate

public writing; but it shall produce no effect if not made during the
lifetime of the donor.

If the acceptance is made by separate public instrument, authentic

notice thereof shall be given the donor, and this proceeding shall be
noted in both instruments.

This other half, therefore, remained as the disposable free portion of

the spouses which may be disposed of in such manner that either of
the spouses would like in regards to his or her share in such portion,
unencumbered by the provision enjoining the last surviving spouse
to give equally to the children what belongs or-would pertain to him
or her. The end result, therefore, is that Don Jesus and Do;a Tinay,
in the Deed of 1949, made to their children valid donations of only
one-half of their combined properties which must be charged
against their legitime and cannot anymore be revoked unless
inofficious; the other half remained entirely at the free disposal of
the spouses with regards to their respective shares.

Upon the death of Do;a Tinay on October 2, 1959, her share in the
free portion was distributed in accordance with her holographic will
dated January 25, 1955 and her codicil dated August 14, 1956. It
must be stressed here that the distribution of her properties was
subject to her holographic win and codicil, independently of the
holographic will and codicil of Don Jesus executed by him on the
same date. This is fundamental because otherwise, to consider both
wills and codicils jointly would be to circumvent the prohibition of
the Civil Code on joint wills (Art. 818) and secondly because upon
the death of Do;a Tinay, only her estate was being settled, and not
that of Don Jesus.

We have carefully examined the provisions of the holographic will

and codicil of Do;a Tinay and We find no indication whatsoever that
Do;a Tinay expressly or impliedly instituted both the husband and
her children as heirs to her free portion of her share in the conjugal
assets. In her holographic will, mention of her children as heirs was
made in the fourth clause but it only provided that, to wit: t.
hqw

Cuatro. Que si yo adquieriese nuevase propiedades despues de

otorgado este mi testamento seran las mismas repartados entre mi
esposo o hijos arriba mencionada en el parrafo tercero su la misma
proporcion o sea: la mitad (1/2) para is esposa; y la otra mitad (1/2)
para mis hijos en partes iguales.

For purposes of clarity and convenience, this fourth clause provided

that "Should I acquire new properties after the execution of this
testament, the same shall be partitioned among my spouse and
above named children or the children mentioned in above par. 3 in
the same proportion, that is, one- half (1/2) to my spouse; and the
other half to my children in equal parts." From the above-quoted
provision, the children would only inherit together with Don Jesus
whatever new properties Do;a Tinay would acquire after the
execution of her will.

Likewise, the codicil of Do;a Tinay instituted her husband as sole

heir to her share in the free portion of the conjugal assets, and We
quote that part of the codicil: t.hqw

Dejo a mi esposo Jesus Alsua como su legitima y como herencia que

se sacara de ni cuenta de libre disposicion todos aquellos bienes de
los que no he dispuesto aun en favor de mis hijos en la escritura de
reparticion precitada y que excedieran de la mitad de gananciales
que le corresponds tal como arriba declare, incluyendo todos
aquenos bienes que se adquiriesen por nosotros despues de
otorgado por mi este testamento.

Para el caso de que Dios dispusiera que yo sobreviviera a mi esposo

declaro que es mi voluntad que todas las propiedades de todo
genero que me pertenecen y me pudieran pertenecer, no dispuestas
aun en la reparticion, se dividan por igual entre mis herederos
mencionados despues de mi muerte.

Again for purposes of clarity and convenience, the above portion

states: t.hqw

I leave to my spouse Don Jesus Alsua as his legitime and as his

inheritance the part of the free portion of my property which have
not been allocated in favor of my children in the Document of
Partition aforecited and that which should exceed 1/2 of the conjugal
property of gains that pertains to him as above stated, including all
those properties which we shall acquire after the execution of this
document.

In case it should be God's will that I survive my spouse, I hereby

declare that it is my will that any and all kinds of property that
pertains to me or would pertain to me, which have not been
disposed of pursuant to the partition, should be divided equally
among my above-mentioned heirs after my death.

The children, therefore, would only receive equal shares in the

remaining estate of Do;a Tinay in the event that she should be the
surviving spouse. To stress the point, Do;a Tinay did not oblige her
husband to give equally to the children, upon his death, all such
properties she was bequeathing him.

Considering now the efficacy of Don Jesus' last will and testament
executed on November 14, 1959 in view of Our holding that Do;a
Tinay's wig and codicil did not stipulate that Don Jesus will bestow
the properties equally to the children, it follows that all the
properties of Do;a Tinay bequeathed to Don Jesus under her
holographic win and codicil became part of Don Jesus' estate
unburdened by any condition obligation or proviso.

Respondents insist that Don Jesus was bound by the extrajudicial

partition of November 25, 1949 and had in fact conformed to said
Partition by making a holographic will and codicil with exactly the
same provisions as those of Do;a Tinay, which respondent court
sustained. We rule, however, that Don Jesus was not forever bound
thereby for his previous holographic will and codicil as such, would
remain revokable at his discretion. Art. 828 of the new Civil Code is
clear: "A win may be revoked by the testator at any time before his
death. Any waiver or restriction of this right is void." There can be no
restriction that may be made on his absolute freedom to revoke his
holographic will and codicil previously made. This would still hold
true even if such previous will had as in the case at bar already been
probated (Palacios v. Palacios, 106 Phil. 739). For in the first place,
probate only authenticates the will and does not pass upon the
efficacy of the dispositions therein. And secondly, the rights to the
succession are transmitted only from the moment of the death of
the decedent (Article 777, New Civil Code). In fine, Don Jesus
retained the liberty of disposing of his property before his death to
whomsoever he chose, provided the legitime of the forced heirs are
not prejudiced, which is not herein claimed for it is undisputed that
only the free portion of the whole Alsua estate is being contested.

After clearly establishing that only Don Jesus was named as sole heir
instituted to the remaining estate of Do;a Tinay in her holographic
will and codicil resulting in all such properties becoming the

properties of Don Jesus alone, and after clearly pointing out that Don
Jesus can, in law, revoke his previous holographic will and codicil, by
making another win expressly cancelling and revoking the former,
the next issue for the Court's resolution is the validity of the
provisions of the contested will. Though the law and jurisprudence
are clear that only questions about the extrinsic validity of the will
may be entertained by the probate court, the Court had, on more
than one occasion, passed upon the intrinsic validity of a will even
before it had been authenticated. Thus We declared in Nuguid v.
Nuguid, 17 SCRA 499: t.hqw

The parties shunted aside the question of whether or not the will
should be allowed to probate. For them, the meat of the case is the
intrinsic validity of the wilt Normally this comes only after the court
has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. ...

... If the case were to be remanded for probate of the wilt nothing
will be gained. On the contrary, this litigation win be protracted and
for ought that appears in the record, in the event of probate or if the
court rejects the will probability exists that the case win come up
once again before us on the issue of the intrinsic validity or nullity of
the wilt Result: waste of time, effort, expense, plus added anxiety.
These are the practical considerations that induce us to a behalf
that we might as well meet head-on the time of the validity of the
provisions of the will in question. ...

The last Will and Testament of Don Jesus executed on November 14,
1959 contained an express revocation of his holographic wig of
January 5, 1955 and the codicil of August 14, 1956; a statement
requiring that all of his properties donated to his children in the
Deed of 1949 be collated and taken into account in the partition of

his estate; the institution of all his children as devisees and legatees
to certain specific properties; a statement bequeathing the rest of
his properties and all that may be acquired in the future, before his
death, to Pablo and Francesca; and a statement naming Francesca
as executrix without bond.

Considering these testamentary provisions, a close scrutiny of the

properties distributed to the children under the Deed of 1949 and
those distributed under the contested will of Don Jesus does not
show that the former had in fact been included in the latter. This
being so, it must be presumed that the intention of Don Jesus in his
last win was not to revoke the donations already made in the Deed
of 1949 but only to redistribute his remaining estate, or that portion
of the conjugal assets totally left to his free disposal and that which
he received as his inheritance from Do;a Tinay. The legitimes of the
forced heirs were left unimpaired, as in fact, not one of said forced
heirs claimed or intimated otherwise. The properties that were
disposed of in the contested will belonged wholly to Don Jesus
Alsua's free portion and may be diamond of by him to whomsoever
he may choose.

If he now favored Francesca more, as claimed by private

respondents, or Pablo as in fact he was, We cannot and may not sit
in judgment upon the motives and sentiments of Don Jesus in doing
so. We have clearly laid down this rule in Bustamante v. Arevalo, 73
Phil. 635, to wit: t.hqw

... nevertheless it would be venturesome for the court to advance its

own Idea of a just distribution of the property in the face of a
different mode of disposition so clearly expressed by the testatrix in
the latter will. ...

It would be a dangerous precedent to strain the interpretation of a

will in order to effect what the court believes to be an equitable
division of the estate of a deceased person. The only functions of
the courts in these cases is to carry out the intention of the
deceased as manifested in the wig. Once that intention has been
determined through a careful reading of the will or wills, and
provided the law on legitimes has not been violated, it is beyond the
place of judicial cognizance to inquire into the fairness or unfairness
of any devise or bequeast. The court should not sit in judgment
upon the motives and sentiments of the testatrix, first, because as
already stated, nothing in the law restrained her from disposing of
her property in any manner she desired, and secondly, because
there are no adequate means of ascertaining the inward process of
her conscience. She was the sole judge of her own attitude toward
those who expected her bounty. ...

Respondent court, in trying to rationalize the will of Don Jesus which

allegedly benefited and favored the petitioner to the prejudice of the
other heirs who would have been entitled to an equal share under
the extrajudicial partition of 1949, faced two alternatives-one, to
consider Don Jesus as a man of culture and honor and would not
snow himself to violate the previous agreement, and the other as
one whose mental faculties or his possession of the same had been
diminished considering that when the will was executed, he was
already 84 years of age and in view of his weakness and advanced
age, the actual administration of his properties had been left to his
assistant Madarieta who, for his part received instructions from
Francisco and her husband, Joseph Betts. According to the court, the
better explanation is the latter, which is not legally tenable. Under
Article 799 of the New Civil Code which provides as follows: t.
hqw

Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator

be in full possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be
wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by disease, injury or
other cause.

It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making

the will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the
proper objects of his bounty, and the character of the testamentary
act,

The test of testamentary capacity is at the time of the making of the

win. Mere weakness of mind or partial imbecility from disease of
body or from age-does not render a person incapable of making a
will. t.hqw

Between the highest degree of soundness of mind and memory

which unquestionably carries with it full testamentary capacity, and
that degrees of mental aberration generally known as insanity or
Idiocy, there are numberless degrees of mental capacity or
incapacity and while on one hand it has been held that mere
weakness of mind, or partial imbecility from disease of body, or from
age, will not render a person incapable of making a will; a weak or
feebleminded person may make a valid will, provided he has
understanding and memory sufficient to enable him to know what
he is about to do and how or to whom he is disposing of his property.
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not necessary that
the mind be unbroken or unimpaired or unshattered by disease or
otherwise. It has been held that testamentary incapacity does not
necessarily require that a person shall actually be insane or of
unsound mind. (Bugnao vs. Ubag, 14 Phil. 163).

The Civil Code itself provides under Article 798 that in order to make
a will, it is essential that the testator be of sound mind at the time of
its execution, and under Article 800, the law presumes that every
person is of sound mind in the absence of proof to the contrary. In
the case at bar, the acceptance by the respondent court of the
findings of fact of the trial court on the due execution of the last win
and testament of Don Jesus has foreclosed any and all claim to the
contrary that the will was not executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law. But more than that, gleaned from the
quoted portions of the appealed decision, the described behavior of
Don Jesus is not that of a mentally incapacitated person nor one
suffering from "senile dementia" as claimed by private respondents.
From these accepted facts, We find that: (a) it was Don Jesus himself
who gave detailed instructions to his lawyer as to how he wanted to
divide his properties among his children by means of a list of his
properties should pertain; (b) the semi-final draft of the contested
will prepared by his lawyer w-as even corrected by Don Jesus; (c) on
the day of the signing of the will at his house in Ligao, "Don Jesus
was in bright and lively spirits ..., leading in the conversation which
ran from problems of farming and the merits of French-made wines";
(d) the signing of the will by Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses
was made after a statement from Don Jesus of the purpose of their
meeting or gathering, to wit: t.hqw

Precisamente es por lo que he Ilamado a ustedes que eaten

presentes para ser testigos de mi ultima voluntad y testamento que
ha sido preparado por el abogado Sr. Gregorio Imperial segun mis
instrucciones cuyo documents tengo aqui con migo y encuentro que,
despues de lo he leido, esta satisfactoriamente hecho segun mis
ingtrucciones, Como saben ustedes tengo cuatro (4) hijos todos
ellos.

Clearly then, Don Jesus knew exactly what his actions were and the
fun implications thereof.

In rejecting probate of the wilt respondent court further pointed out

other details which, in the words of the decision "are a little bit
difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course of things and of fife"
such as the fact that Don Jesus had sought the probate of his will of
January 5, 1955 and his codicil of August 14, 1956 during his lifetime
but insofar as the will of November 14, 1959 is concerned, he had
no intention of seeking the probate thereof during his lifetime, the
alleged redundant and unnecessary proceedings undertaken by Don
Jesus in the properties under question to petitioner Franciso AlsuaBetts when the same properties had already been bequeathed to
her in the will of November 14, 1959 and that "nothing, absolutely
nothing, could be made the basis for finding that Don Jesus Alsua
had regarded his other children with less favor, and that he was
more sympathetic to Francisca so as to or forget the former
depriving them of benefits already given to them and rewarding the
latter with disproportionate advantages or benefits, to such an
extreme as to violate his previous disposition consecrated in the
previous extrajudicial partition, Exh. 8."

We agree with the petitioner that these details which respondent

court found difficult to reconcile with the ordinary course of things
and of life are mere conjectures, surmises or speculations which,
however, do not warrant or justify disallowance of the probate of the
win of Don Jesus. The fact that Don Jesus did not cause his will to be
probated during his lifetime while his previous holographic win and
codicil were duly probated when he was still alive is a mere
speculation which depends entirely on the discretion of Don Jesus as
the testator. The law does not require that a will be probated during
the lifetime of the testator and for not doing so there cannot arise
any favorable or unfavorable consequence therefrom. The parties

cannot correctly guess or surmise the motives of the testator and

neither can the courts. Such surmise, speculation or conjecture is no
valid and legal ground to reject allowance or disallowance of the
wig. The same thing can be said as to whatever reason Don Jesus
had for selling the properties to his daughter Francisca when he had
already assigned the same properties to her in his will. While We can
speculate that Don Jesus desired to have possession of the
properties transferred to Francisca after the sale instead of waiting
for his death may be a reasonable explanation or speculation for the
act of the testator and yet there is no certainty that such was
actually the reason. This is as good a conjecture as the respondents
may offer or as difficult to accept which respondent court believes. A
conjecture is always a conjecture; it can never be admitted as
evidence.

Now, the annulment case. The only issue raised anent the civil case
for annulment of the two Deeds of Sale executed by and between
Don Jesus and petitioner Francisco is their validity or nullity. Private
respondents mainly contend that the sales were fictitious or
simulated, there having been no actual consideration paid. They
further insist that the issue raised is a question of fact and,
therefore, not reviewable in a certiorari proceeding before the
Supreme Court. On the other hand, petitioners herein maintain that
it was error for the respondent court to set aside on appeal the
factual findings of the trial court that the two sales were valid.

It is true that the jurisprudence of this Court in cases brought to Us

from the Court of Appeals is limited to reviewing and revising the
errors of law imputed to it, its findings of fact being conclusive; and
this same principle applies even if the Court of Appeals was in
disagreement with the lower court as to the weight of evidence with
a consequent reversal of its findings of fact. But what should not be
ignored by lawyers and litigants alike is the more basic principle that

the "findings of fact" described as "final" or "conclusive" are those

borne out by the record or those which are based upon substantial
evidence. The general rule laid down by the Supreme Court does not
declare the absolute correctness of all the findings of fact made by
the Court of Appeals. These are exceptions to the general rule,
where We have reviewed and revised the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals. Among the exceptions to the rule that findings of
fact by the Court of Appeals cannot be reviewed on appeals by
certiorari are:

1. When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on

speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin vs. Navarro, 93 Phil.
257);

2. When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or

impossible (Luna vs. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15);

3. Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco vs. People, 51

O.G. 2927);

4. When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz

vs. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953);

5. When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica vs. Villaseca, L9590, April 30, 1957); and

6. When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond

the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee (Evangelists vs. Alto Surety & Ins. Co.,
L-11139, April 23, 1958; Ramos vs. Pepsi Cola, L-22533, Feb. 9,
1967, 19 SCRA 289).

In the case at bar, We find and so declare that the respondent

court's conclusion as to the nullity of the contested sales was not
supported by the evidence on record and adduced during the trial.

Evident from the records are the following documentary evidence:

(1) Exhibit U, a deed of sale over agricultural lands executed on
August 26, 1961 by Don Jesus in favor of Francisca for the
consideration of Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00), which
document bears the signature of Don Jesus, not assailed as a
forgery, and the signature of Pablo Alsua as an instrumental witness,
again not assailed as a forgery nor alleged as done thru fraud, force
or threat. (2) Exhibit "W", a deed of sale over urban lots executed on
November 16, 1962 for the consideration of Eighty Thousand Pesos
(P80,000.00), which document also bears the signature of Don Jesus,
also admittedly not a forgery. (3) Exhibit "F", a document dated
August 26, 1961 and signed by Don Jesus and Pablo Alsua as
witness, acknowledging receipt of a Bank of Philippine Island Check
No. 0252 in the amount of Seventy Thousand Pesos (P70,000.00) for
the sale of 33 parcels of agricultural land to Francisco under the
same date; again, Pablo did not deny the genuineness of his
signature. (4) Exhibit "X", a Bank of the Philippine Islands Check No.
D-6979 dated November 26, 1962, in the amount of P32,644.71,
drawn and signed by Francesca, payable to Don Jesus. (5) Exhibit "X1", a second Bank of Philippine Islands Check (No. D-6980) also
dated November 26, 1962 in the amount of ?47,355.29, drawn by
Francisco and payable to Don Jesus. (6) Exhibit "X-3 " and "X-5 ",
endorsements on the back of the last two checks by Don Jesus,

again, his signatures thereon were not assailed. (7) Exhibit "A" (in
the annulment case), a Bureau of Internal Revenue Receipt (No.
2347260) dated November 29, 1962 with a notation acknowledging
the receipt of BPI Check No. D-6980 in the amount of P47,355.29
from Don Jesus Alsua in payment of Balance of Transfer of Tax Ass.
No. EA-35415-19 plus interest. We are convinced and satisfied from
this array of documentary evidence that in fact, Don Jesus sold the
subject properties to his daughter, Francisca for the total
consideration of P150,000.00.

The claim of the private respondents that the sales were fictitious
and void for being without cause or consideration is as weak and
flimsy as the ground upon which the respondent court upheld said
claim on the basis that there was no need for funds in Don Jesus' old
age aside from the speculation that there was nothing in the
evidence that showed what motivated Don Jesus to change his mind
as to favor Francesca and discriminate against the other children.
The two contracts of same executed by Don Jesus in favor of
Francesca are evidenced by Exhibits "U" and "W", the genuineness
of which were not at all assailed at any time during this long drawnout litigation of 15 years standing. That the consideration stated in
the contracts were paid is also sufficiently proved as the receipts
thereof by Don Jesus were even signed by one of the private
respondents, Pablo Alsua, as a witness. The latter cannot now deny
the payment of the consideration And even of he now allege that in
fact no transfer of money was involved, We find his allegation belied
by Exhibits "X-3 " and "X-5 ", which show that the checks of
Francisco made payable to Don Jesus. were in fact given to Don
Jesus as he endorsed them on the back thereof, and most
specifically Exhibit "A" in the annulment case, which proved that
Don Jesus actually used Exhibit "XI " to complete payment on the
estate and inheritance tax on the estate of his wife to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue.

Private respondents further insist that the sales were fraudulent

because of the inadequacy of the given price. Inadequacy of
consideration does not vitiate a contract unless it is proven which in
the case at bar was not, that there was fraud, mistake or undue
influence. (Article 1355, New Civil Code). We do not find the
stipulated price as so inadequate to shock the court's conscience,
considering that the price paid was much higher than the assessed
value of the subject properties and considering that the sales were
effected by a father to her daughter in which case filial love must be
taken into account.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed

from is hereby set aside. The decision of the Court of First Instance
Of Albay in Special Proceedings No. 699 and Civil Case No. 3068 is
hereby reinstated, with costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee
(Chairman),
concur.1wph1.t

Makasiar

De Castro, J., took no part.

Melencio Herrera, J., concur in the result.

and

Fernandez,

JJ.,

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