G.R. No.

145804

February 6, 2003

LIGHT RAIL TRANSIT AUTHORITY & RODOLFO ROMAN, petitioners,

vs.
MARJORIE NAVIDAD, Heirs of the Late NICANOR NAVIDAD & PRUDENT
SECURITY AGENCY, respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:

3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00;

"b) Moral damages of P50,000.00;
"c) Attorneys fees of P20,000;
"d) Costs of suit.
"The complaint against defendants LRTA and Rodolfo Roman are dismissed for lack of
merit.

The case before the Court is an appeal from the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals, promulgated on 27 April 2000 and 10 October 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 60720, entitled "Marjorie Navidad and Heirs of the Late Nicanor Navidad vs.
Rodolfo Roman, et. al.," which has modified the decision of 11 August 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 266, Pasig City, exonerating Prudent Security Agency
(Prudent) from liability and finding Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) and Rodolfo
Roman liable for damages on account of the death of Nicanor Navidad.

"The compulsory counterclaim of LRTA and Roman are likewise dismissed."1

On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past seven oclock in the evening, Nicanor
Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a "token"
(representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near
the LRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached
Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the two apparently ensued that
led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started
or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT
tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by petitioner
Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was
killed instantaneously.

"WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment is hereby MODIFIED, by exonerating the

appellants from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad, Jr. Instead, appellees
Rodolfo Roman and the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) are held liable for his death
and are hereby directed to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs-appellees, the
following amounts:

On 08 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, herein respondent Marjorie Navidad,

along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo
Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for
the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counterclaim against Navidad and a
cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and
averred that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its
security guards.
The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of
presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that
Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered
its decision; it adjudged:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the
defendants Prudent Security and Junelito Escartin ordering the latter to pay jointly and
severally the plaintiffs the following:
"a) 1) Actual damages of P44,830.00;
2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00;

Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court
promulgated its now assailed decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the
death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and
severally liable thusly:

a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;

b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages;
c) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
d) P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and
e) P20,000.00 as and for attorneys fees."2
The appellate court ratiocinated that while the deceased might not have then as yet
boarded the train, a contract of carriage theretofore had already existed when the victim
entered the place where passengers were supposed to be after paying the fare and
getting the corresponding token therefor. In exempting Prudent from liability, the court
stressed that there was nothing to link the security agency to the death of Navidad. It
said that Navidad failed to show that Escartin inflicted fist blows upon the victim and the
evidence merely established the fact of death of Navidad by reason of his having been
hit by the train owned and managed by the LRTA and operated at the time by Roman.
The appellate court faulted petitioners for their failure to present expert evidence to
establish the fact that the application of emergency brakes could not have stopped the
train.
The appellate court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10
October 2000.

In their present recourse, petitioners recite alleged errors on the part of the appellate
court; viz:

employees may have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the
orders of the common carriers.

"I.

"This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their
employees."

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED BY DISREGARDING

THE FINDINGS OF FACTS BY THE TRIAL COURT
"II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE FOR THE DEATH OF NICANOR NAVIDAD, JR.
"III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT
RODOLFO ROMAN IS AN EMPLOYEE OF LRTA."3
Petitioners would contend that the appellate court ignored the evidence and the factual
findings of the trial court by holding them liable on the basis of a sweeping conclusion
that the presumption of negligence on the part of a common carrier was not overcome.
Petitioners would insist that Escartins assault upon Navidad, which caused the latter to
fall on the tracks, was an act of a stranger that could not have been foreseen or
prevented. The LRTA would add that the appellate courts conclusion on the existence
of an employer-employee relationship between Roman and LRTA lacked basis because
Roman himself had testified being an employee of Metro Transit and not of the LRTA.
Respondents, supporting the decision of the appellate court, contended that a contract
of carriage was deemed created from the moment Navidad paid the fare at the LRT
station and entered the premises of the latter, entitling Navidad to all the rights and
protection under a contractual relation, and that the appellate court had correctly held
LRTA and Roman liable for the death of Navidad in failing to exercise extraordinary
diligence imposed upon a common carrier.
Law and jurisprudence dictate that a common carrier, both from the nature of its
business and for reasons of public policy, is burdened with the duty of exercising utmost
diligence in ensuring the safety of passengers.4 The Civil Code, governing the liability of
a common carrier for death of or injury to its passengers, provides:
"Article 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with a due regard for all the circumstances.
"Article 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755."
"Article 1759. Common carriers are liable for the death of or injuries to passengers
through the negligence or willful acts of the formers employees, although such

"Article 1763. A common carrier is responsible for injuries suffered by a passenger on

account of the willful acts or negligence of other passengers or of strangers, if the
common carriers employees through the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a
family could have prevented or stopped the act or omission."
The law requires common carriers to carry passengers safely using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all circumstances. 5 Such duty of
a common carrier to provide safety to its passengers so obligates it not only during the
course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises and where
they ought to be in pursuance to the contract of carriage. 6 The statutory provisions
render a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through the
negligence or wilful acts of its employees or b) on account of wilful acts or negligence of
other passengers or of strangers if the common carriers employees through the
exercise of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. 7 In case
of such death or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent,
and8 by simple proof of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the
fault or negligence of the carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the
carrier to prove that the injury is due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.9 In the
absence of satisfactory explanation by the carrier on how the accident occurred, which
petitioners, according to the appellate court, have failed to show, the presumption
would be that it has been at fault,10 an exception from the general rule that negligence
must be proved.11
The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to
exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its
commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own
employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to
undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its
responsibilities under the contract of carriage.
Should Prudent be made likewise liable? If at all, that liability could only be for tort
under the provisions of Article 217612 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article
2180,13 of the Civil Code. The premise, however, for the employers liability is
negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the
employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juris tantum that the
employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection and supervision
of its employees. The liability is primary and can only be negated by showing due
diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee, a factual matter that has not
been shown. Absent such a showing, one might ask further, how then must the liability
of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the other
hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by
tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa
contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 14 of the Civil Code can well

apply.15 In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that
which breaches the contract.16 Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a
breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability
had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been
breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.17
Regrettably for LRT, as well as perhaps the surviving spouse and heirs of the late
Nicanor Navidad, this Court is concluded by the factual finding of the Court of Appeals
that "there is nothing to link (Prudent) to the death of Nicanor (Navidad), for the reason
that the negligence of its employee, Escartin, has not been duly proven x x x." This
finding of the appellate court is not without substantial justification in our own review of
the records of the case.
There being, similarly, no showing that petitioner Rodolfo Roman himself is guilty of any
culpable act or omission, he must also be absolved from liability. Needless to say, the
contractual tie between the LRT and Navidad is not itself a juridical relation between the
latter and Roman; thus, Roman can be made liable only for his own fault or negligence.
The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages is untenable. Nominal
damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. 18 It is an established rule that
nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.19
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the appellate court is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION but only in that (a) the award of nominal damages is DELETED and (b)
petitioner Rodolfo Roman is absolved from liability. No costs.

vs.
PEDRO A. ARRIESGADO, BENJAMIN CONDOR, SERGIO PEDRANO and
PHILIPPINE PHOENIX SURETY AND INSURANCE, INC., respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 54354 affirming with modification
the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court, 7th Judicial Region, Cebu City, Branch 20, in
Civil Case No. CEB-5963 for breach of contract of carriage, damages and attorneys
fees, and the Resolution dated February 26, 1999 denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
The following facts are undisputed:
At about 10:00 p.m. of March 15, 1987, the cargo truck marked "Condor
Hollow Blocks and General Merchandise" bearing plate number GBP-675 was
loaded with firewood in Bogo, Cebu and left for Cebu City. Upon reaching Sitio
Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu, just as the truck passed over a bridge,
one of its rear tires exploded. The driver, Sergio Pedrano, then parked along
the right side of the national highway and removed the damaged tire to have it
vulcanized at a nearby shop, about 700 meters away.3Pedrano left his helper,
Jose Mitante, Jr. to keep watch over the stalled vehicle, and instructed the
latter to place a spare tire six fathoms away 4 behind the stalled truck to serve
as a warning for oncoming vehicles. The trucks tail lights were also left on. It
was about 12:00 a.m., March 16, 1987.

SO ORDERED.
At about 4:45 a.m., D Rough Riders passenger bus with plate number PBP-724 driven
by Virgilio Te Laspias was cruising along the national highway of Sitio Aggies,
Poblacion, Compostela, Cebu. The passenger bus was also bound for Cebu City, and
had come from Maya, Daanbantayan, Cebu. Among its passengers were the Spouses
Pedro A. Arriesgado and Felisa Pepito Arriesgado, who were seated at the right side of
the bus, about three (3) or four (4) places from the front seat.
As the bus was approaching the bridge, Laspias saw the stalled truck, which was then
about 25 meters away.5He applied the breaks and tried to swerve to the left to avoid
hitting the truck. But it was too late; the bus rammed into the trucks left rear. The
impact damaged the right side of the bus and left several passengers injured. Pedro
Arriesgado lost consciousness and suffered a fracture in his right colles.6 His wife,
Felisa, was brought to the Danao City Hospital. She was later transferred to the
Southern Island Medical Center where she died shortly thereafter.7

WILLIAM TIU, doing business under the name and style of "D Rough Riders,"
and VIRGILIO TE LAS PIAS petitioners,

Respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado then filed a complaint for breach of contract of

carriage, damages and attorneys fees before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City,
Branch 20, against the petitioners, D Rough Riders bus operator William Tiu and his
driver, Virgilio Te Laspias on May 27, 1987. The respondent alleged that the
passenger bus in question was cruising at a fast and high speed along the national

road, and that petitioner Laspias did not take precautionary measures to avoid the
accident.8 Thus:
6. That the accident resulted to the death of the plaintiffs wife, Felisa Pepito
Arriesgado, as evidenced by a Certificate of Death, a xerox copy of which is
hereto attached as integral part hereof and marked as ANNEX "A", and
physical injuries to several of its passengers, including plaintiff himself who
suffered a "COLLES FRACTURE RIGHT," per Medical Certificate, a xerox
copy of which is hereto attached as integral part hereof and marked as
ANNEX "B" hereof.
7. That due to the reckless and imprudent driving by defendant Virgilio Te
Laspias of the said Rough Riders passenger bus, plaintiff and his wife, Felisa
Pepito Arriesgado, failed to safely reach their destination which was Cebu City,
the proximate cause of which was defendant-drivers failure to observe utmost
diligence required of a very cautious person under all circumstances.
8. That defendant William Tiu, being the owner and operator of the said Rough
Riders passenger bus which figured in the said accident, wherein plaintiff and
his wife were riding at the time of the accident, is therefore directly liable for
the breach of contract of carriage for his failure to transport plaintiff and his
wife safely to their place of destination which was Cebu City, and which failure
in his obligation to transport safely his passengers was due to and in
consequence of his failure to exercise the diligence of a good father of the
family in the selection and supervision of his employees, particularly
defendant-driver Virgilio Te Laspias.9
The respondent prayed that judgment be rendered in his favor and that the petitioners
be condemned to pay the following damages:
1). To pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P30,000.00 for the
death and untimely demise of plaintiffs wife, Felisa Pepito Arriesgado;
2). To pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P38,441.50,
representing actual expenses incurred by the plaintiff in connection with the
death/burial of plaintiffs wife;
3). To pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P1,113.80,
representing medical/hospitalization expenses incurred by plaintiff for the
injuries sustained by him;
4). To pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P50,000.00 for moral
damages;
5). To pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P50,000.00 by way of
exemplary damages;
6). To pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P20,000.00 for
attorneys fees;

7). To pay to plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P5,000.00 for
litigation expenses.
PLAINTIFF FURTHER PRAYS FOR
REMEDIES IN LAW AND EQUITY.10

SUCH OTHER

RELIEFS AND

The petitioners, for their part, filed a Third-Party Complaint11 on August 21, 1987 against
the following: respondent Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. (PPSII),
petitioner Tius insurer; respondent Benjamin Condor, the registered owner of the cargo
truck; and respondent Sergio Pedrano, the driver of the truck. They alleged that
petitioner Laspias was negotiating the uphill climb along the national highway of Sitio
Aggies, Poblacion, Compostela, in a moderate and normal speed. It was further alleged
that the truck was parked in a slanted manner, its rear portion almost in the middle of
the highway, and that no early warning device was displayed. Petitioner Laspias
promptly applied the brakes and swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck head-on,
but despite his efforts to avoid damage to property and physical injuries on the
passengers, the right side portion of the bus hit the cargo trucks left rear. The
petitioners further alleged, thus:
5. That the cargo truck mentioned in the aforequoted paragraph is owned and
registered in the name of the third-party defendant Benjamin Condor and was
left unattended by its driver Sergio Pedrano, one of the third-party defendants,
at the time of the incident;
6. That third-party defendant Sergio Pedrano, as driver of the cargo truck with
marked (sic) "Condor Hollow Blocks & General Merchandise," with Plate No.
GBP-675 which was recklessly and imprudently parked along the national
highway of Compostela, Cebu during the vehicular accident in question, and
third-party defendant Benjamin Condor, as the registered owner of the cargo
truck who failed to exercise due diligence in the selection and supervision of
third-party defendant Sergio Pedrano, are jointly and severally liable to the
third-party plaintiffs for whatever liability that may be adjudged against said
third-party plaintiffs or are directly liable of (sic) the alleged death of plaintiffs
wife;
7. That in addition to all that are stated above and in the answer which are
intended to show reckless imprudence on the part of the third-party
defendants, the third-party plaintiffs hereby declare that during the vehicular
accident in question, third-party defendant was clearly violating Section 34,
par. (g) of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code

10. That the aforesaid passenger bus, owned and operated by third-party
plaintiff William Tiu, is covered by a common carrier liability insurance with
Certificate of Cover No. 054940 issued by Philippine Phoenix Surety and
Insurance, Inc., Cebu City Branch, in favor of third-party plaintiff William Tiu
which covers the period from July 22, 1986 to July 22, 1987 and that the said
insurance coverage was valid, binding and subsisting during the time of the
aforementioned incident (Annex "A" as part hereof);

11. That after the aforesaid alleged incident, third-party plaintiff notified thirdparty defendant Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc., of the alleged
incident hereto mentioned, but to no avail;
12. That granting, et arguendo et arguendi, if herein third-party plaintiffs will be
adversely adjudged, they stand to pay damages sought by the plaintiff and
therefore could also look up to the Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance,
Inc., for contribution, indemnification and/or reimbursement of any liability or
obligation that they might [be] adjudged per insurance coverage duly entered
into by and between third-party plaintiff William Tiu and third-party defendant
Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc.;12
The respondent PPSII, for its part, admitted that it had an existing contract with
petitioner Tiu, but averred that it had already attended to and settled the claims of those
who were injured during the incident.13 It could not accede to the claim of respondent
Arriesgado, as such claim was way beyond the scheduled indemnity as contained in
the contract of insurance.14
After the parties presented their respective evidence, the trial court ruled in favor of
respondent Arriesgado. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered in favor
of plaintiff as against defendant William Tiu ordering the latter to pay the
plaintiff the following amounts:
1 - The sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as moral
damages;
2 - The sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
exemplary damages;
3 - The sum of THIRTY-EIGHT THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
FORTY-ONE PESOS (P38,441.00) as actual damages;
4 - The sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) as
attorneys fees;
5 - The sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as costs of
suit;
SO ORDERED.15
According to the trial court, there was no dispute that petitioner William Tiu was
engaged in business as a common carrier, in view of his admission that D Rough Rider
passenger bus which figured in the accident was owned by him; that he had been
engaged in the transportation business for 25 years with a sole proprietorship; and that
he owned 34 buses. The trial court ruled that if petitioner Laspias had not been driving
at a fast pace, he could have easily swerved to the left to avoid hitting the truck, thus,

averting the unfortunate incident. It then concluded that petitioner Laspias was
negligent.
The trial court also ruled that the absence of an early warning device near the place
where the truck was parked was not sufficient to impute negligence on the part of
respondent Pedrano, since the tail lights of the truck were fully on, and the vicinity was
well lighted by street lamps. 16 It also found that the testimony of petitioner Tiu, that he
based the selection of his driver Laspias on efficiency and in-service training, and that
the latter had been so far an efficient and good driver for the past six years of his
employment, was insufficient to prove that he observed the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of his employees.
After the petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said decision was denied, the
petitioners elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the following issues:
I WHETHER THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT SERGIO PEDRANO WAS
RECKLESS AND IMPRUDENT WHEN HE PARKED THE CARGO TRUCK IN
AN OBLIQUE MANNER;
II WHETHER THE THIRD PARTY DEFENDANTS ARE JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY LIABLE DIRECTLY TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE OR TO
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS FOR WHATEVER LIABILITY THAT MAY BE
ADJUDGED TO THE SAID DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS;
III WHETHER DEFENDANT-APPELLANT VIRGILIO TE LASPIAS WAS
GUILTY OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE;
IV WHETHER DEFENDANT-APPELLANT WILLIAM TIU HAD EXERCISED
THE DUE DILIGENCE OF A GOOD FATHER OF A FAMILY IN THE
SELECTION AND SUPERVISION OF HIS DRIVERS;
V GRANTING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT DEFENDANTAPPELLANT WILLIAM TIU IS LIABLE TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
WHETHER THERE IS LEGAL AND FACTUAL BASIS IN AWARDING
EXCESSIVE MORAL DAMAGES, EX[E]MPLARY DAMAGES, ATTORNEYS
FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES TO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE;
VI WHETHER THIRD PARTY DEFENDANT PHILIPPINE PHOENIX SURETY
AND INSURANCE, INC. IS LIABLE TO DEFENDANT- APPELLANT WILLIAM
TIU.17
The appellate court rendered judgment affirming the trial courts decision with the
modification that the awards for moral and exemplary damages were reduced
to P25,000. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated November 6, 1995 is hereby
MODIFIED such that the awards for moral and exemplary damages are each
reduced to P25,000.00 or a total of P50,000.00 for both. The judgment is
AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.18
According to the appellate court, the action of respondent Arriesgado was based not on
quasi-delict but on breach of contract of carriage. As a common carrier, it was
incumbent upon petitioner Tiu to prove that extraordinary diligence was observed in
ensuring the safety of passengers during transportation. Since the latter failed to do so,
he should be held liable for respondent Arriesgados claim. The CA also ruled that no
evidence was presented against the respondent PPSII, and as such, it could not be
held liable for respondent Arriesgados claim, nor for contribution, indemnification
and/or reimbursement in case the petitioners were adjudged liable.
The petitioners now come to this Court and ascribe the following errors committed by
the appellate court:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT DECLARING
RESPONDENTS BENJAMIN CONDOR AND SERGIO PEDRANO GUILTY
OF NEGLIGENCE AND HENCE, LIABLE TO RESPONDENT PEDRO A.
ARRIESGADO OR TO PETITIONERS FOR WHATEVER LIABILITY THAT
MAY BE ADJUDGED AGAINST THEM.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
PETITIONERS GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE AND HENCE, LIABLE TO
RESPONDENT PEDRO A. ARRIESGADO.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING
PETITIONER WILLIAM TIU LIABLE FOR EXEMPLARY DAMAGES,
ATTORNEYS FEES AND LITIGATION EXPENSES.
IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
RESPONDENT PHILIPPINE PHOENIX SURETY AND INSURANCE, INC.
LIABLE TO RESPONDENT PEDRO A. ARRIESGADO OR TO PETITIONER
WILLIAM TIU.19
According to the petitioners, the appellate court erred in failing to appreciate the
absence of an early warning device and/or built-in reflectors at the front and back of the
cargo truck, in clear violation of Section 34, par. (g) of the Land Transportation and
Traffic Code. They aver that such violation is only a proof of respondent Pedranos
negligence, as provided under Article 2185 of the New Civil Code. They also question
the appellate courts failure to take into account that the truck was parked in an oblique
manner, its rear portion almost at the center of the road. As such, the proximate cause
of the incident was the gross recklessness and imprudence of respondent Pedrano,
creating the presumption of negligence on the part of respondent Condor in supervising
his employees, which presumption was not rebutted. The petitioners then contend that
respondents Condor and Pedrano should be held jointly and severally liable to
respondent Arriesgado for the payment of the latters claim.
The petitioners, likewise, aver that expert evidence should have been presented to
prove that petitioner Laspias was driving at a very fast speed, and that the CA could
not reach such conclusion by merely considering the damages on the cargo truck. It

was also pointed out that petitioner Tiu presented evidence that he had exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his drivers.
The petitioners further allege that there is no legal and factual basis to require petitioner
Tiu to pay exemplary damages as no evidence was presented to show that the latter
acted in a fraudulent, reckless and oppressive manner, or that he had an active
participation in the negligent act of petitioner Laspias.
Finally, the petitioners contend that respondent PPSII admitted in its answer that while it
had attended to and settled the claims of the other injured passengers, respondent
Arriesgados claim remained unsettled as it was beyond the scheduled indemnity under
the insurance contract. The petitioners argue that said respondent PPSII should have
settled the said claim in accordance with the scheduled indemnity instead of just
denying the same.
On the other hand, respondent Arriesgado argues that two of the issues raised by the
petitioners involved questions of fact, not reviewable by the Supreme Court: the finding
of negligence on the part of the petitioners and their liability to him; and the award of
exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses in his favor. Invoking the
principle of equity and justice, respondent Arriesgado pointed out that if there was an
error to be reviewed in the CA decision, it should be geared towards the restoration of
the moral and exemplary damages toP50,000 each, or a total of P100,000 which was
reduced by the Court of Appeals to P25,000 each, or a total of only P50,000.
Respondent Arriesgado also alleged that respondents Condor and Pedrano, and
respondent Phoenix Surety, are parties with whom he had no contract of carriage, and
had no cause of action against. It was pointed out that only the petitioners needed to be
sued, as driver and operator of the ill-fated bus, on account of their failure to bring the
Arriesgado Spouses to their place of destination as agreed upon in the contract of
carriage, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due regard for all
circumstances.
Respondents Condor and Pedrano point out that, as correctly ruled by the Court of
Appeals, the proximate cause of the unfortunate incident was the fast speed at which
petitioner Laspias was driving the bus owned by petitioner Tiu. According to the
respondents, the allegation that the truck was not equipped with an early warning
device could not in any way have prevented the incident from happening. It was also
pointed out that respondent Condor had always exercised the due diligence required in
the selection and supervision of his employees, and that he was not a party to the
contract of carriage between the petitioners and respondent Arriesgado.
Respondent PPSII, for its part, alleges that contrary to the allegation of petitioner Tiu, it
settled all the claims of those injured in accordance with the insurance contract. It
further avers that it did not deny respondent Arriesgados claim, and emphasizes that its
liability should be within the scheduled limits of indemnity under the said contract. The
respondent concludes that while it is true that insurance contracts are contracts of
indemnity, the measure of the insurers liability is determined by the insureds
compliance with the terms thereof.
The Courts Ruling

At the outset, it must be stressed that this Court is not a trier of facts. 20 Factual findings
of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed on appeal by this Court,
except when the lower court and the CA arrived at diverse factual findings. 21 The
petitioners in this case assail the finding of both the trial and the appellate courts that
petitioner Laspias was driving at a very fast speed before the bus owned by petitioner
Tiu collided with respondent Condors stalled truck. This is clearly one of fact, not
reviewable by the Court in a petition for review under Rule 45.22
On this ground alone, the petition is destined to fail.
However, considering that novel questions of law are likewise involved, the Court
resolves to examine and rule on the merits of the case.
Petitioner Laspias
Was negligent in driving
The Ill-fated bus
In his testimony before the trial court, petitioner Laspias claimed that he was
traversing the two-lane road at Compostela, Cebu at a speed of only forty (40) to fifty
(50) kilometers per hour before the incident occurred.23 He also admitted that he saw
the truck which was parked in an "oblique position" at about 25 meters before
impact,24and tried to avoid hitting it by swerving to the left. However, even in the
absence of expert evidence, the damage sustained by the truck25 itself supports the
finding of both the trial court and the appellate court, that the D Rough Rider bus driven
by petitioner Laspias was traveling at a fast pace. Since he saw the stalled truck at a
distance of 25 meters, petitioner Laspias had more than enough time to swerve to his
left to avoid hitting it; that is, if the speed of the bus was only 40 to 50 kilometers per
hour as he claimed. As found by the Court of Appeals, it is easier to believe that
petitioner Laspias was driving at a very fast speed, since at 4:45 a.m., the hour of the
accident, there were no oncoming vehicles at the opposite direction. Petitioner
Laspias could have swerved to the left lane with proper clearance, and, thus, could
have avoided the truck.26 Instinct, at the very least, would have prompted him to apply
the breaks to avert the impending disaster which he must have foreseen when he
caught sight of the stalled truck. As we had occasion to reiterate:
A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it
is his duty to be cautious, careful and prudent, if not from instinct, then through
fear of recurring punishment. He is responsible for such results as anyone
might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except
through culpable abandon. Otherwise, his own person, rights and property,
and those of his fellow beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger
and injury.27
We agree with the following findings of the trial court, which were affirmed by the CA on
appeal:
A close study and evaluation of the testimonies and the documentary proofs
submitted by the parties which have direct bearing on the issue of negligence,
this Court as shown by preponderance of evidence that defendant Virgilio Te
Laspias failed to observe extraordinary diligence as a driver of the common
carrier in this case. It is quite hard to accept his version of the incident that he

did not see at a reasonable distance ahead the cargo truck that was parked
when the Rough Rider [Bus] just came out of the bridge which is on an (sic)
[more] elevated position than the place where the cargo truck was parked.
With its headlights fully on, defendant driver of the Rough Rider was in a
vantage position to see the cargo truck ahead which was parked and he could
just easily have avoided hitting and bumping the same by maneuvering to the
left without hitting the said cargo truck. Besides, it is (sic) shown that there was
still much room or space for the Rough Rider to pass at the left lane of the
said national highway even if the cargo truck had occupied the entire right lane
thereof. It is not true that if the Rough Rider would proceed to pass through
the left lane it would fall into a canal considering that there was much space
for it to pass without hitting and bumping the cargo truck at the left lane of said
national highway. The records, further, showed that there was no incoming
vehicle at the opposite lane of the national highway which would have
prevented the Rough Rider from not swerving to its left in order to avoid hitting
and bumping the parked cargo truck. But the evidence showed that the Rough
Rider instead of swerving to the still spacious left lane of the national highway
plowed directly into the parked cargo truck hitting the latter at its rear portion;
and thus, the (sic) causing damages not only to herein plaintiff but to the cargo
truck as well.28
Indeed, petitioner Laspias negligence in driving the bus is apparent in the records. By
his own admission, he had just passed a bridge and was traversing the highway of
Compostela, Cebu at a speed of 40 to 50 kilometers per hour before the collision
occurred. The maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge is only 30 kilometers per
hour.29 And, as correctly pointed out by the trial court, petitioner Laspias also violated
Section 35 of the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, Republic Act No. 4136, as
amended:1avvphil.net
Sec. 35. Restriction as to speed. (a) Any person driving a motor vehicle on a
highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor
less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width
of the highway, and or any other condition then and there existing; and no
person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such speed as to
endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than
will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance
ahead.30
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving a vehicle is presumed negligent if
at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.31
Petitioner Tiu failed to
Overcome the presumption
Of negligence against him as
One engaged in the business
Of common carriage
The rules which common carriers should observe as to the safety of their passengers
are set forth in the Civil Code, Articles 1733, 32 175533 and 1756.34 In this case,
respondent Arriesgado and his deceased wife contracted with petitioner Tiu, as owner
and operator of D Rough Riders bus service, for transportation from Maya,

Daanbantayan, Cebu, to Cebu City for the price of P18.00.35 It is undisputed that the
respondent and his wife were not safely transported to the destination agreed upon. In
actions for breach of contract, only the existence of such contract, and the fact that the
obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his
destination are the matters that need to be proved. 36 This is because under the said
contract of carriage, the petitioners assumed the express obligation to transport the
respondent and his wife to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary
diligence with due regard for all circumstances.37 Any injury suffered by the passengers
in the course thereof is immediately attributable to the negligence of the carrier. 38Upon
the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arises, and it
becomes the duty of a common carrier to prove that he observed extraordinary
diligence in the care of his passengers. 39 It must be stressed that in requiring the
highest possible degree of diligence from common carriers and in creating a
presumption of negligence against them, the law compels them to curb the
recklessness of their drivers.40
While evidence may be submitted to overcome such presumption of negligence, it must
be shown that the carrier observed the required extraordinary diligence, which means
that the carrier must show the utmost diligence of very cautious persons as far as
human care and foresight can provide, or that the accident was caused by fortuitous
event.41 As correctly found by the trial court, petitioner Tiu failed to conclusively rebut
such presumption. The negligence of petitioner Laspias as driver of the passenger bus
is, thus, binding against petitioner Tiu, as the owner of the passenger bus engaged as a
common carrier.42
The Doctrine of
Last Clear Chance
Is Inapplicable in the
Case at Bar
Contrary to the petitioners contention, the principle of last clear chance is inapplicable
in the instant case, as it only applies in a suit between the owners and drivers of two
colliding vehicles. It does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the
carrier to enforce its contractual obligations, for it would be inequitable to exempt the
negligent driver and its owner on the ground that the other driver was likewise guilty of
negligence.43 The common law notion of last clear chance permitted courts to grant
recovery to a plaintiff who has also been negligent provided that the defendant had the
last clear chance to avoid the casualty and failed to do so. Accordingly, it is difficult to
see what role, if any, the common law of last clear chance doctrine has to play in a
jurisdiction where the common law concept of contributory negligence as an absolute
bar to recovery by the plaintiff, has itself been rejected, as it has been in Article 2179 of
the Civil Code.44
Thus, petitioner Tiu cannot escape liability for the death of respondent Arriesgados wife
due to the negligence of petitioner Laspias, his employee, on this score.
Respondents Pedrano and
Condor were likewise
Negligent

In Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,45 where therein

respondent Dionisio sustained injuries when his vehicle rammed against a dump truck
parked askew, the Court ruled that the improper parking of a dump truck without any
warning lights or reflector devices created an unreasonable risk for anyone driving
within the vicinity, and for having created such risk, the truck driver must be held
responsible. In ruling against the petitioner therein, the Court elucidated, thus:
In our view, Dionisios negligence, although later in point of time than the
truck drivers negligence, and therefore closer to the accident, was not an
efficient intervening or independent cause. What the petitioners describe as an
"intervening cause" was no more than a foreseeable consequence of the risk
created by the negligent manner in which the truck driver had parked the
dump truck. In other words, the petitioner truck driver owed a duty to private
respondent Dionisio and others similarly situated not to impose upon them the
very risk the truck driver had created. Dionisios negligence was not that of an
independent and overpowering nature as to cut, as it were, the chain of
causation in fact between the improper parking of the dump truck and the
accident, nor to sever the juris vinculum of liability.

We hold that private respondent Dionisios negligence was "only contributory,"

that the "immediate and proximate cause" of the injury remained the truck
drivers "lack of due care."46
In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts failed to consider that respondent
Pedrano was also negligent in leaving the truck parked askew without any warning
lights or reflector devices to alert oncoming vehicles, and that such failure created the
presumption of negligence on the part of his employer, respondent Condor, in
supervising his employees properly and adequately. As we ruled in Poblete v. Fabros:47
It is such a firmly established principle, as to have virtually formed part of the
law itself, that the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of
negligence on the part of the employer. This is the presumed negligence in the
selection and supervision of employee. The theory of presumed negligence, in
contrast with the American doctrine of respondeat superior, where the
negligence of the employee is conclusively presumed to be the negligence of
the employer, is clearly deducible from the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the
Civil Code which provides that the responsibility therein mentioned shall cease
if the employers prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damages. 48
The petitioners were correct in invoking respondent Pedranos failure to observe Article
IV, Section 34(g) of the Rep. Act No. 4136, which provides:1avvphil.net
(g) Lights when parked or disabled. Appropriate parking lights or flares
visible one hundred meters away shall be displayed at a corner of the vehicle
whenever such vehicle is parked on highways or in places that are not welllighted or is placed in such manner as to endanger passing traffic.

The manner in which the truck was parked clearly endangered oncoming traffic on both
sides, considering that the tire blowout which stalled the truck in the first place occurred
in the wee hours of the morning. The Court can only now surmise that the unfortunate
incident could have been averted had respondent Condor, the owner of the truck,
equipped the said vehicle with lights, flares, or, at the very least, an early warning
device.49 Hence, we cannot subscribe to respondents Condor and Pedranos claim that
they should be absolved from liability because, as found by the trial and appellate
courts, the proximate cause of the collision was the fast speed at which petitioner
Laspias drove the bus. To accept this proposition would be to come too close to wiping
out the fundamental principle of law that a man must respond for the foreseeable
consequences of his own negligent act or omission. Indeed, our law on quasi-delicts
seeks to reduce the risks and burdens of living in society and to allocate them among
its members. To accept this proposition would be to weaken the very bonds of society.50
The Liability of
Respondent PPSII
as Insurer

A perusal of the records will show that when the petitioners filed the Third-Party
Complaint against respondent PPSII, they failed to attach a copy of the terms of the
insurance contract itself. Only Certificate of Cover No. 05494051 issued in favor of "Mr.
William Tiu, Lahug, Cebu City" signed by Cosme H. Boniel was appended to the thirdparty complaint. The date of issuance, July 22, 1986, the period of insurance, from July
22, 1986 to July 22, 1987, as well as the following items, were also indicated therein:
SCHEDULED VEHICLE
MODEL

MAKE
Isuzu Forward

PLATE
NO.
PBP-724

SERIAL/CHASSIS MOTOR
NO.
NO.
SER450-1584124 677836

A. THIRD PARTY LIABILITY

B. PASSENGER LIABILITY

In fact, respondent PPSII did not dispute the existence of such contract, and admitted
that it was liable thereon. It claimed, however, that it had attended to and settled the
claims of those injured during the incident, and set up the following as special
affirmative defenses:
Third party defendant Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. hereby
reiterates and incorporates by way of reference the preceding paragraphs and
further states THAT:-

The trial court in this case did not rule on the liability of respondent PPSII, while the
appellate court ruled that, as no evidence was presented against it, the insurance
company is not liable.

SECTION 1/11

Sec. 8. How to contest genuineness of such documents. When an action or

defense is founded upon a written instrument copied in or attached to the
corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness
and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the
adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he
claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the
adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when
compliance with an order for inspection of the original instrument is refused.

TYPE
BODY
Bus

OF COLOR
blue mixed
AUTHORIZED
CAPACITY
50

*LIMITS
OF
P50,000.00

BLT FILE NO.

UNLADEN
WEIGHT
6 Cyls. Kgs.

LIABILITY PREMIUMS
PAID
P540.0052

Per Person Per

Accident
P12,000.00 P50,000

In its Answer53 to the Third-Party Complaint, the respondent PPSII admitted the
existence of the contract of insurance, in view of its failure to specifically deny the same
as required under then Section 8(a), Rule 8 of the Rules of Court,54 which reads:

8. It has attended to the claims of Vincent Canales, Asuncion

Batiancila and Neptali Palces who sustained injuries during the
incident in question. In fact, it settled financially their claims per
vouchers duly signed by them and they duly executed Affidavit[s] of
Desistance to that effect, xerox copies of which are hereto attached
as Annexes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 respectively;
9. With respect to the claim of plaintiff, herein answering third party
defendant through its authorized insurance adjuster attended to said
claim. In fact, there were negotiations to that effect. Only that it
cannot accede to the demand of said claimant considering that the
claim was way beyond the scheduled indemnity as per contract
entered into with third party plaintiff William Tiu and third party
defendant (Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc.). Third
party Plaintiff William Tiu knew all along the limitation as earlier
stated, he being an old hand in the transportation business;55
Considering the admissions made by respondent PPSII, the existence of the insurance
contract and the salient terms thereof cannot be dispatched. It must be noted that after
filing its answer, respondent PPSII no longer objected to the presentation of evidence
by respondent Arriesgado and the insured petitioner Tiu. Even in its
Memorandum56 before the Court, respondent PPSII admitted the existence of the
contract, but averred as follows:
Petitioner Tiu is insisting that PPSII is liable to him for contribution,
indemnification and/or reimbursement. This has no basis under the contract.
Under the contract, PPSII will pay all sums necessary to discharge liability of
the insured subject to the limits of liability but not to exceed the limits of liability
as so stated in the contract. Also, it is stated in the contract that in the event of
accident involving indemnity to more than one person, the limits of liability
shall not exceed the aggregate amount so specified by law to all persons to be
indemnified.57

As can be gleaned from the Certificate of Cover, such insurance contract was issued
pursuant to the Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance Law. It was expressly
provided therein that the limit of the insurers liability for each person was P12,000,
while the limit per accident was pegged at P50,000. An insurer in an indemnity contract
for third party liability is directly liable to the injured party up to the extent specified in
the agreement but it cannot be held solidarily liable beyond that amount.58 The
respondent PPSII could not then just deny petitioner Tius claim; it should have
paid P12,000 for the death of Felisa Arriesgado, 59 and respondent Arriesgados
hospitalization expenses of P1,113.80, which the trial court found to have been duly
supported by receipts. The total amount of the claims, even when added to that of the
other injured passengers which the respondent PPSII claimed to have settled, 60 would
not exceed the P50,000 limit under the insurance agreement.
Indeed, the nature of Compulsory Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance is such that it is
primarily intended to provide compensation for the death or bodily injuries suffered by
innocent third parties or passengers as a result of the negligent operation and use of
motor vehicles. The victims and/or their dependents are assured of immediate financial
assistance, regardless of the financial capacity of motor vehicle owners. 61 As the Court,
speaking through Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, explained in Government
Service Insurance System v. Court of Appeals:62
However, although the victim may proceed directly against the insurer for
indemnity, the third party liability is only up to the extent of the insurance policy
and those required by law. While it is true that where the insurance contract
provides for indemnity against liability to third persons, and such persons can
directly sue the insurer, the direct liability of the insurer under indemnity
contracts against third party liability does not mean that the insurer can be
held liable in solidum with the insured and/or the other parties found at fault.
For the liability of the insurer is based on contract; that of the insured carrier or
vehicle owner is based on tort.
Obviously, the insurer could be held liable only up to the extent of what was
provided for by the contract of insurance, in accordance with the CMVLI law.
At the time of the incident, the schedule of indemnities for death and bodily
injuries, professional fees and other charges payable under a CMVLI
coverage was provided for under the Insurance Memorandum Circular (IMC)
No. 5-78 which was approved on November 10, 1978. As therein provided, the
maximum indemnity for death was twelve thousand (P12,000.00) pesos per
victim. The schedules for medical expenses were also provided by said IMC,
specifically in paragraphs (C) to (G).63
Damages to be
Awarded
The trial court correctly awarded moral damages in the amount of P50,000 in favor of
respondent Arriesgado. The award of exemplary damages by way of example or
correction of the public good,64 is likewise in order. As the Court ratiocinated in
Kapalaran Bus Line v. Coronado:65
While the immediate beneficiaries of the standard of extraordinary diligence
are, of course, the passengers and owners of cargo carried by a common

carrier, they are not the only persons that the law seeks to benefit. For if
common carriers carefully observed the statutory standard of extraordinary
diligence in respect of their own passengers, they cannot help but
simultaneously benefit pedestrians and the passengers of other vehicles who
are equally entitled to the safe and convenient use of our roads and highways.
The law seeks to stop and prevent the slaughter and maiming of people
(whether passengers or not) on our highways and buses, the very size and
power of which seem to inflame the minds of their drivers. Article 2231 of the
Civil Code explicitly authorizes the imposition of exemplary damages in cases
of quasi-delicts "if the defendant acted with gross negligence."66
The respondent Pedro A. Arriesgado, as the surviving spouse and heir of Felisa
Arriesgado, is entitled to indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00.67
The petitioners, as well as the respondents Benjamin Condor and Sergio Pedrano are
jointly and severally liable for said amount, conformably with the following
pronouncement of the Court in Fabre, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals:68
The same rule of liability was applied in situations where the negligence of the
driver of the bus on which plaintiff was riding concurred with the negligence of
a third party who was the driver of another vehicle, thus causing an accident.
In Anuran v. Buo, Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, and Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the
bus company, its driver, the operator of the other vehicle and the driver of the
vehicle were jointly and severally held liable to the injured passenger or the
latters heirs. The basis of this allocation of liability was explained in Viluan v.
Court of Appeals, thus:
"Nor should it make difference that the liability of petitioner [bus
owner] springs from contract while that of respondents [owner and
driver of other vehicle] arises from quasi-delict. As early as 1913, we
already ruled in Gutierrez vs. Gutierrez, 56 Phil. 177, that in case of
injury to a passenger due to the negligence of the driver of the bus on
which he was riding and of the driver of another vehicle, the drivers
as well as the owners of the two vehicles are jointly and severally
liable for damages. Some members of the Court, though, are of the
view that under the circumstances they are liable on quasi-delict."69
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:
(1) Respondent Philippine Phoenix Surety and Insurance, Inc. and petitioner
William Tiu are ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally, respondent Pedro A.
Arriesgado the total amount of P13,113.80;
(2) The petitioners and the respondents Benjamin Condor and Sergio Pedrano
are ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally, respondent Pedro A.
Arriesgado P50,000.00
as
indemnity; P26,441.50
as
actual
damages; P50,000.00 as moral damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages; and P20,000.00 as attorneys fees.

G.R. No. L-30309 November 25, 1983

CLEMENTE BRIAS, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Mariano R. Abad for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of respondent Court of Appeals, now
Intermediate Appellate Court, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, Ninth Judicial District, Branch 1, which found the accused Clemente Brias
guilty of the crime of DOUBLE HOMICIDE THRU RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE prior the
deaths of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo.
The information charged the accused-appellant. and others as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of January, 1957, in the Municipality of Tiaong, Province of
Quezon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Hon. Court, the said accused
Victor Milan, Clemente Brias and Hermogenes Buencamino, being then persons in
charge of passenger Train No. 522-6 of the Manila Railroad Company, then running
from Tagkawayan to San Pablo City, as engine driver, conductor and assistant
conductor, respectively, wilfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same in a
negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without due regard to existing laws,
regulations and ordinances, that although there were passengers on board the
passenger coach, they failed to provide lamps or lights therein, and failed to take the
necessary precautions for the safety of passengers and to prevent accident to persons
and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence,
that when said passenger Train No. 522-6 was passing the railroad tracks in the
Municipality of Tiaong, Quezon, two of its passengers, Martina Bool, an old woman,
and Emelita Gesmundo, a child about three years of age, fell from the passenger coach
of the said train, as a result of which, they were over run, causing their instantaneous
death. "

'Lusacan', 'Lusacan'. Thereupon, the old woman walked towards the left front door
facing the direction of Tiaong, carrying the child with one hand and holding her baggage
with the other. When Martina and Emelita were near the door, the train suddenly picked
up speed. As a result the old woman and the child stumbled and they were seen no
more. It took three minutes more before the train stopped at the next barrio, Lusacan,
and the victims were not among the passengers who disembarked thereat .
Next morning, the Tiaong police received a report that two corpses
were found along the railroad tracks at Barrio Lagalag. Repairing to
the scene to investigate, they found the lifeless body of a female
child, about 2 feet from the railroad tracks, sprawled to the ground
with her belly down, the hand resting on the forehead, and with the
back portion of the head crushed. The investigators also found the
corpse of an old woman about 2 feet away from the railroad tracks
with the head and both legs severed and the left hand missing. The
head was located farther west between the rails. An arm was found
midway from the body of the child to the body of the old woman.
Blood, pieces of scattered brain and pieces of clothes were at the
scene. Later, the bodies were Identified as those of Martina Bool and
Emelita Gesmundo. Among the personal effects found on Martina
was a train ticket (Exhibits "B").
On January 7, 1957, the bodies of the deceased were autopsied by Dr. Pastor Huertas,
the Municipal Health Officer of Tiaong. Dr. Huertas testified on the cause of death of the
victims as follows: t.hqw
FISCAL YNGENTE:
Q What could have caused the death of those
women?
A Shock.
Q What could have caused that shock?
A Traumatic injury.
Q What could have caused traumatic injury?

The facts established by the prosecution and accepted by the respondent court as
basis for the decision are summarized as follows:
The evidence of the prosecution tends to show that in the afternoon of January 6, 1957,
Juanito Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the railroad station in Tagkawayan, Quezon
for his 55-year old mother Martina Bool and his 3-year old daughter Emelita
Gesmundo, who were bound for Barrio Lusacan, Tiaong, same province. At about 2:00
p.m., Train No. 522 left Tagkawayan with the old woman and her granddaughter among
the passengers. At Hondagua the train's complement were relieved, with Victor Millan
taking over as engineman, Clemente Brias as conductor, and Hermogenes
Buencamino as assistant conductor. Upon approaching Barrio Lagalag in Tiaong at
about 8:00 p.m. of that same night, the train slowed down and the conductor shouted

A The running over by the wheel of the train.

Q With those injuries, has a person a chance to
survive?
A No chance to survive.
Q What would you say death would come?

A Instantaneous.
Q How about the girl, the young girl about four
years old, what could have caused the death?

The accused-appellant alleges that the Court of Appeals made the following errors in its
decision:
I t.hqw

A Shock too.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONVICTING

PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNDER THE FACTS AS FOUND BY
SAID COURT; and

Q What could have caused the shock?

A Compound fracture of the skull and going out of
the brain.
Q What could have caused the fracture of the skull
and the going out of the brain?
A That is the impact against a steel object. (TSN.,
pp. 81-82, July 1, 1959)
The Court of First Instance of Quezon convicted defendant-appellant Clemente Brias
for double homicide thru reckless imprudence but acquitted Hermogenes Buencamino
and Victor Millan The dispositive portion of the decision reads: t.hqw
WHEREFORE, the court finds the defendant Clemente Brias guilty
beyond doubt of the crime of double homicide thru reckless
imprudence, defined and punished under Article 305 in connection
with Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences him to
suffer six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Martina Bool and Emelita
Gesmundo in the amounts of P6,000 and P3,000, respectively, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency not to exceed onethird of the principal penalty, and to pay the costs.
For lack of sufficient evidence against the defendant Hermogenes
Buencamino and on the ground of reasonable doubt in the case of
defendant Victor Millan the court hereby acquits them of the crime
charged in the information and their bail bonds declared cancelled.
As to the responsibility of the Manila Railroad Company in this case,
this will be the subject of court determination in another proceeding.
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
During the pendency of the criminal prosecution in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon, the heirs of the deceased victims filed with the same court, a separate civil
action for damages against the Manila Railroad Company entitled "Civil Case No. 5978,
Manaleyo Gesmundo, et al., v. Manila Railroad Company". The separate civil action
was filed for the recovery of P30,350.00 from the Manila Railroad Company as
damages resulting from the accident.

II t.hqw
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN INCLUDING
THE PAYMENT OF DEATH INDEMNITY BY THE PETITIONERAPPELLANT, WITH SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT IN CASE OF
INSOLVENCY, AFTER THE HEIRS OF THE DECEASED HAVE
ALREADY COMMENCED A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION FOR
DAMAGES AGAINST THE RAILROAD COMPANY ARISING FROM
THE SAME MISHAP.
We see no error in the factual findings of the respondent court and in the conclusion
drawn from those findings.
It is undisputed that the victims were on board the second coach where the petitionerappellant was assigned as conductor and that when the train slackened its speed and
the conductor shouted "Lusacan, Lusacan", they stood up and proceeded to the
nearest exit. It is also undisputed that the train unexpectedly resumed its regular speed
and as a result "the old woman and the child stumbled and they were seen no more.
In finding petitioner-appellant negligent, respondent Court t.hqw
xxx xxx xxx
The appellant's announcement was premature and erroneous, for it
took a full three minutes more before the next barrio of Lusacan was
reached. In making the erroneous and premature announcement,
appellant was negligent. He ought to have known that train
passengers invariably prepare to alight upon notice from the
conductor that the destination was reached and that the train was
about to stop. Upon the facts, it was the appellant's negligent act
which led the victims to the door. Said acts virtually exposed the
victims to peril, for had not the appellant mistakenly made the
announcement, the victims would be safely ensconced in their seats
when the train jerked while picking up speed, Although it might be
argued that the negligent act of the appellant was not the immediate
cause of, or the cause nearest in time to, the injury, for the train
jerked before the victims stumbled, yet in legal contemplation
appellant's negligent act was the proximate cause of the injury. As
this Court held in Tucker v. Milan, CA G.R. No. 7059-R, June 3, 1953:
'The proximate cause of the injury is not necessarily the immediate
cause of, or the cause nearest in time to, the injury. It is only when

the causes are independent of each other that the nearest is to be

charged with the disaster. So long as there is a natural, direct and
continuous sequence between the negligent act the injury (sic) that it
can reasonably be said that but for the act the injury could not have
occurred, such negligent act is the proximate cause of the injury, and
whoever is responsible therefore is liable for damages resulting
therefrom. One who negligently creates a dangerous condition
cannot escape liability for the natural and probable consequences
thereof, although the act of a third person, or an act of God for which
he is not responsible intervenes to precipitate the loss.
xxx xxx xxx
It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common carriers like trains
and buses that before reaching a station or flagstop they slow down and the conductor
announces the name of the place. It is also a matter of common experience that as the
train or bus slackens its speed, some passengers usually stand and proceed to the
nearest exit, ready to disembark as the train or bus comes to a full stop. This is
especially true of a train because passengers feel that if the train resumes its run
before they are able to disembark, there is no way to stop it as a bus may be stopped.
It was negligence on the conductor's part to announce the next flag stop when said stop
was still a full three minutes ahead. As the respondent Court of Appeals correctly
observed, "the appellant's announcement was premature and erroneous.
That the announcement was premature and erroneous is shown by the fact that
immediately after the train slowed down, it unexpectedly accelerated to full speed.
Petitioner-appellant failed to show any reason why the train suddenly resumed its
regular speed. The announcement was made while the train was still in Barrio Lagalag.
The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and erroneous
announcement of petitioner' appelant Brias. This announcement prompted the victims
to stand and proceed to the nearest exit. Without said announcement, the victims would
have been safely seated in their respective seats when the train jerked as it picked up
speed. The connection between the premature and erroneous announcement of
petitioner-appellant and the deaths of the victims is direct and natural, unbroken by any
intervening efficient causes.
Petitioner-appellant also argues that it was negligence per se for Martina Bool to go to
the door of the coach while the train was still in motion and that it was this negligence
that was the proximate cause of their deaths.
We have carefully examined the records and we agree with the respondent court that
the negligence of petitioner-appellant in prematurely and erroneously announcing the
next flag stop was the proximate cause of the deaths of Martina Bool and Emelita
Gesmundo. Any negligence of the victims was at most contributory and does not
exculpate the accused from criminal liability.
With respect to the second assignment of error, the petitioner argues that after the heirs
of Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo had actually commenced the separate civil

action for damages in the same trial court during the pendency of the criminal action,
the said court had no more power to include any civil liability in its judgment of
conviction.
The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in Civil Case No. 5978 is culpa
contractual, not an act or omission punishable by law. We also note from the appellant's
arguments and from the title of the civil case that the party defendant is the Manila
Railroad Company and not petitioner-appellant Brias Culpa contractual and an act or
omission punishable by law are two distinct sources of obligation.
The petitioner-appellant argues that since the information did not allege the existence
of any kind of damages whatsoever coupled by the fact that no private prosecutors
appeared and the prosecution witnesses were not interrogated on the issue of
damages, the trial court erred in awarding death indemnity in its judgment of conviction.
A perusal of the records clearly shows that the complainants in the criminal action for
double homicide thru reckless imprudence did not only reserve their right to file an
independent civil action but in fact filed a separate civil action against the Manila
Railroad Company.
The trial court acted within its jurisdiction when, despite the filing with it of the separate
civil action against the Manila Railroad Company, it still awarded death indemnity in the
judgment of conviction against the petitioner-appellant.
It is well-settled that when death occurs as a result of the commission of a crime, the
following items of damages may be recovered: (1) an indemnity for the death of the
victim; (2) an indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the deceased; (3) moral
damages; (4) exemplary damages; (5) attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, and
(6) interest in proper cases.
The indemnity for loss of earning capacity, moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney's fees, and interests are recoverable separately from and in addition to the
fixed slim of P12,000.00 corresponding to the indemnity for the sole fact of death. This
indemnity arising from the fact of death due to a crime is fixed whereas the others are
still subject to the determination of the court based on the evidence presented. The fact
that the witnesses were not interrogated on the issue of damages is of no moment
because the death indemnity fixed for death is separate and distinct from the other
forms of indemnity for damages.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in that the award for death
indemnity is increased to P12,000.00 for the death of Martina Bool instead of P6,000.00
and P12,000.00 for the death of Emelita Gesmundo instead of P3,000.00, but deleting
the subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency imposed by the lower court. The
judgment is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-22985

January 24, 1968

back wall to the left was ripped open. (Exhibits 1 and 2). The BTCO bus
suffered damages for the repair of its damaged portion.

BATANGAS TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, petitioner,

vs.
GREGORIO CAGUIMBAL, PANCRACIO CAGUIMBAL, MARIA MARANAN DE
CAGUIMBAL, BIAN TRANSPORTATION COMPANY and MARCIANO
ILAGAN, respondents.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta and
Victoriano H. Endaya for respondents.

Domingo

E.

de

Lara

for

petitioner.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The main facts are set forth in said decision from which we quote:
There is no dispute at all that the deceased Pedro Caguimbal, Barrio
Lieutenant of Barrio Calansayan, San Jose, Batangas, was a paying
passenger of BTCO bus, with plate TPU-507, going south on its regular route
from Calamba, Laguna, to Batangas, Batangas, driven by Tomas Perez, its
regular driver, at about 5:30 o'clock on the early morning of April 25, 1954. The
deceased's destination was his residence at Calansayan, San Jose,
Batangas. The bus of the Bian Transportation Company, bearing plate TPU820, driven by Marciano Ilagan, was coming from the opposite direction
(north-bound). Along the national highway at Barrio Daraza, Tanauan,
Batangas, on the date and hour above indicated, a horse-driven rig (calesa)
managed by Benito Makahiya, which was then ahead of the Bian bus, was
also coming from the opposite direction, meaning proceeding towards the
north. As to what transpired thereafter, the lower court chose to give more
credence to defendant Batangas Transportation Company's version which, in
the words of the Court a quo, is as follows: "As the BTCO bus was nearing a
house, a passenger requested the conductor to stop as he was going to alight,
and when he heard the signal of the conductor, the driver Tomas Perez slowed
down his bus swerving it farther to the right in order to stop; at this juncture,
a calesa, then driven by Benito Makahiya was at a distance of several meters
facing the BTCO bus coming from the opposite direction; that at the same time
the Bian bus was about 100 meters away likewise going northward and
following the direction of the calesa; that upon seeing the Bian bus the driver
of the BTCO bus dimmed his light as established by Magno Ilaw, the very
conductor of the Bian bus at the time of the accident; that as the calesa and
the BTCO bus were passing each other from the opposite directions, the
Bian bus following the calesa swerved to its left in an attempt to pass
between the BTCO bus and thecalesa; that without diminishing its speed of
about seventy (70) kilometers an hour, the Bian bus passed through the
space between the BTCO bus and the calesa hitting first the left side of the
BTCO bus with the left front corner of its body and then bumped and struck
the calesa which was completely wrecked; that the driver was seriously injured
and the horse was killed; that the second and all other posts supporting the
top of the left side of the BTCO bus were completely smashed and half of the

As a consequence of this occurrence, two (2) passengers of BTCO died, namely, Pedro
Caguimbal and Guillermo Tolentino, apart from others who were injured. The widow
and children of Caguimbal instituted the present action, which was tried jointly with a
similar action of the Tolentinos, to recover damages from the Batangas Transportation
Company, hereinafter referred to as BTCO. The latter, in turn, filed a third-party
complaint against the Bian Transportation Company hereinafter referred to as
Bian and its driver, Marciano Ilagan. Subsequently, the Caguimbals amended their
complaint, to include therein, as defendants, said Bian and Ilagan.
After appropriate proceedings, the Court of First Instance of Batangas rendered a
decision dismissing the complaint insofar as the BTCO is concerned, without prejudice
to plaintiff's right to sue Bian which had stopped participating in the proceedings
herein, owing apparently, to a case in the Court of First Instance of Laguna for the
insolvency of said enterprise and Ilagan, and without pronouncement as to costs.
On appeal taken by the Caguimbals, the Court of Appeals reversed said decision and
rendered judgment for them, sentencing the BTCO, Bian and Ilagan to, jointly and
severally, pay to the plaintiffs the aggregate sum of P10,500.00 1 and the costs in both
instances. Hence, this appeal by BTCO, upon the ground that the Court of Appeals
erred: 1) in finding said appellant liable for damages; and 2) in awarding attorney's fees.
In connection with the first assignment of error, we note that the recklessness of
defendant was, manifestly, a major factor in the occurrence of the accident which
resulted, inter alia, in the death of Pedro Caguimbal. Indeed, as driver of the Bian bus,
he overtook Benito Makahiya's horse-driven rig or calesa and passed between the
same and the BTCO bus despite the fact that the space available was not big enough
therefor, in view of which the Bian bus hit the left side of the BTCO bus and then
the calesa. This notwithstanding, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment against the
BTCO upon the ground that its driver, Tomas Perez, had failed to exercise the
"extraordinary diligence," required in Article 1733 of the new Civil Code, "in the
vigilance for the safety" of his passengers. 2
The record shows that, in order to permit one of them to disembark, Perez drove his
BTCO bus partly to the right shoulder of the road and partly on the asphalted portion
thereof. Yet, he could have and should have seen to it had he exercised
"extraordinary diligence" that his bus was completely outside the asphalted portion of
the road, and fully within the shoulder thereof, the width of which being more than
sufficient to accommodate the bus. He could have and should have done this, because,
when the aforementioned passenger expressed his wish to alight from the bus, Ilagan
had seen the aforementioned "calesa", driven by Makahiya, a few meters away, coming
from the opposite direction, with the Bian bus about 100 meters behind the rig cruising
at a good speed.3 When Perez slowed down his BTCO bus to permit said passenger to
disembark, he must have known, therefore, that the Bian bus would overtake the
calesa at about the time when the latter and BTCO bus would probably be on the same
line, on opposite sides of the asphalted portions of the road, and that the space
between the BTCO bus and the "calesa" would not be enough to allow the Bian bus to
go through. It is true that the driver of the Bian bus should have slowed down or
stopped, and, hence, was reckless in not doing so; but, he had no especial obligations

toward the passengers of the BTCO unlike Perez whose duty was to exercise "utmost"
or "extraordinary" diligence for their safety. Perez was thus under obligation to avoid a
situation which would be hazardous for his passengers, and, make their safety
dependent upon the diligence of the Bian driver. Such obligation becomes more
patent when we considered the fact of which the Court may take judicial cognizance
that our motor vehicle drivers, particularly those of public service utilities, have not
distinguished themselves for their concern over the safety, the comfort or the
convenience of others. Besides, as correctly stated in the syllabus to Brito Sy vs.
Malate Taxicab & Garage, Inc., 4
In an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an
express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold
it responsible to pay the damages sought for by the passenger. By the
contract of carriage, the carrier assumes the express obligation to transport
the passenger to his destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence
with a due regard for all the circumstances, and any injury that might be
suffered by the passenger is right away attributable to the fault or negligence
of the carrier (Article 1756, new Civil Code). This is an exception to the
general rule that negligence must be proved, and it is therefore incumbent
upon the carrier to prove that it has exercised extraordinary diligence as
prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755 of the new Civil Code.
In the case at bar, BTCO has not proven the exercise of extraordinary diligence on its
part. For this reason, the case of Isaac vs. A. L. Ammen Trans. Co., Inc. 5 relied upon by
BTCO, is not in point, for, in said case, the public utility driver had done everything he
could to avoid the accident, and could not have possibly avoided it, for he "swerved the
bus to the very extreme right of the road," which the driver, in the present case, had
failed to do.
As regards the second assignment of error, appellant argues that the award of
attorney's fees is not authorized by law, because, of the eleven (11) cases specified in
Article 1208 of the new Civil Code, only the fifth and the last are relevant to the one
under consideration; but the fifth case requires bad faith, which does not exist in the
case at bar. As regards the last case, which permits the award, "where the court deems
it just and equitable that attorney's fees . . . should be recovered," it is urged that the
evidence on record does not show the existence of such just and equitable grounds.
We, however, believe otherwise, for: (1) the accident in question took place on April 25,
1954, and the Caguimbals have been constrained to litigate for over thirteen (13) years
to vindicate their rights; and (2) it is high time to impress effectively upon public utility
operators the nature and extent of their responsibility in respect of the safety of their
passengers and their duty to exercise greater care in the selection of drivers and
conductor and in supervising the performance of their duties, in accordance, not only
with Article 1733 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, but, also, with Articles 1755 and
1756 thereof 6 and the spirit of these provisions, as disclosed by the letter thereof, and
elucidated by the Commission that drafted the same. 7
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from, should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with the
costs of this instance against appellant Batangas Transportation Company.

At around 6:30 p.m. on November 12, 1991, along Aguinaldo Highway, San Agustin,
Dasmarias, Cavite, the Celyrosa Express bus, carrying Dr. Mariano as its passenger,
collided with an Isuzu truck with trailer bearing plate numbers PJH 906 and TRH 531.
The passenger bus was bound for Tagaytay while the trailer truck came from the
opposite direction, bound for Manila. The trailer truck bumped the passenger bus on its
left middle portion. Due to the impact, the passenger bus fell on its right side on the
right shoulder of the highway and caused the death of Dr. Mariano and physical injuries
to four other passengers. Dr. Mariano was 36 years old at the time of her death. She
left behind three minor children, aged four, three and two years.
Petitioner filed a complaint for breach of contract of carriage and damages against
respondents for their failure to transport his wife and mother of his three minor children
safely to her destination. Respondents denied liability for the death of Dr. Mariano. They
claimed that the proximate cause of the accident was the recklessness of the driver of
the trailer truck which bumped their bus while allegedly at a halt on the shoulder of the
road in its rightful lane. Thus, respondent Callejas filed a third-party complaint against
Liong Chio Chang, doing business under the name and style of La Perla Sugar Supply,
the owner of the trailer truck, for indemnity in the event that he would be held liable for
damages to petitioner.lavvph!l

G.R. No. 166640

Other cases were filed. Callejas filed a complaint,4 docketed as Civil Case No. NC-397
before the RTC of Naic, Cavite, against La Perla Sugar Supply and Arcadio Arcilla, the
truck driver, for damages he incurred due to the vehicular accident. On September 24,
1992, the said court dismissed the complaint against La Perla Sugar Supply for lack of
evidence. It, however, found Arcilla liable to pay Callejas the cost of the repairs of his
passenger bus, his lost earnings, exemplary damages and attorneys fees.5

July 31, 2009

HERMINIO
MARIANO,
vs.
ILDEFONSO C. CALLEJAS and EDGAR DE BORJA, Respondents.

JR., Petitioner,

DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
On appeal are the Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
66891, dated May 21, 2004 and January 7, 2005 respectively, which reversed the
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, dated September 13, 1999,
which found respondents jointly and severally liable to pay petitioner damages for the
death of his wife.

A criminal case, Criminal Case No. 2223-92, was also filed against truck driver Arcilla in
the RTC of Imus, Cavite. On May 3, 1994, the said court convicted truck driver Arcadio
Arcilla of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, multiple slight physical
injuries and damage to property.6
In the case at bar, the trial court, in its Decision dated September 13, 1999, found
respondents Ildefonso Callejas and Edgar de Borja, together with Liong Chio Chang,
jointly and severally liable to pay petitioner damages and costs of suit. The dispositive
portion of the Decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the defendants are ordered to pay as follows:
1. The sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the loss of life;

First, the facts:

2. The sum of P40,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;

Petitioner Herminio Mariano, Jr. is the surviving spouse of Dr. Frelinda Mariano who
was a passenger of a Celyrosa Express bus bound for Tagaytay when she met her
death. Respondent Ildefonso C. Callejas is the registered owner of Celyrosa Express,
while respondent Edgar de Borja was the driver of the bus on which the deceased was
a passenger.

3. The sum of P1,829,200.00 as foregone income;

4. The sum of P30,000.00 as moral damages;
5. The sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages;

6. The costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.7
Respondents Callejas and De Borja appealed to the Court of Appeals, contending that
the trial court erred in holding them guilty of breach of contract of carriage.
On May 21, 2004, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court. It
reasoned:
. . . the presumption of fault or negligence against the carrier is only a disputable
presumption. It gives in where contrary facts are established proving either that the
carrier had exercised the degree of diligence required by law or the injury suffered by
the passenger was due to a fortuitous event. Where, as in the instant case, the injury
sustained by the petitioner was in no way due to any defect in the means of transport or
in the method of transporting or to the negligent or wilful acts of private respondent's
employees, and therefore involving no issue of negligence in its duty to provide safe
and suitable cars as well as competent employees, with the injury arising wholly from
causes created by strangers over which the carrier had no control or even knowledge
or could not have prevented, the presumption is rebutted and the carrier is not and
ought not to be held liable. To rule otherwise would make the common carrier the
insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers which is not the intention of the
lawmakers.8
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from, insofar as it found defendants-appellants
Ildefonso Callejas and Edgar de Borja liable for damages to plaintiff-appellee Herminio
E. Mariano, Jr., is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one entered absolving
them from any liability for the death of Dr. Frelinda Cargo Mariano.9
The appellate court also denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner.

ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are

presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they
observed extraordinary diligence as prescribed in articles 1733 and 1755.
In accord with the above provisions, Celyrosa Express, a common carrier, through its
driver, respondent De Borja, and its registered owner, respondent Callejas, has the
express obligation "to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with a due regard for
all the circumstances,"11 and to observe extraordinary diligence in the discharge of its
duty. The death of the wife of the petitioner in the course of transporting her to her
destination gave rise to the presumption of negligence of the carrier. To overcome the
presumption, respondents have to show that they observed extraordinary diligence in
the discharge of their duty, or that the accident was caused by a fortuitous event.
This Court interpreted the above quoted provisions in Pilapil v. Court of Appeals. 12 We
elucidated:
While the law requires the highest degree of diligence from common carriers in the safe
transport of their passengers and creates a presumption of negligence against them, it
does not, however, make the carrier an insurer of the absolute safety of its passengers.
Article 1755 of the Civil Code qualifies the duty of extraordinary care, vigilance and
precaution in the carriage of passengers by common carriers to only such as human
care and foresight can provide. What constitutes compliance with said duty is adjudged
with due regard to all the circumstances.
Article 1756 of the Civil Code, in creating a presumption of fault or negligence on the
part of the common carrier when its passenger is injured, merely relieves the latter, for
the time being, from introducing evidence to fasten the negligence on the former,
because the presumption stands in the place of evidence. Being a mere presumption,
however, the same is rebuttable by proof that the common carrier had exercised
extraordinary diligence as required by law in the performance of its contractual
obligation, or that the injury suffered by the passenger was solely due to a fortuitous
event.

Hence, this appeal, relying on the following ground:

THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, SPECIAL
FOURTEENTH DIVISION IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE FACTUAL BASIS OF THE
CASE.10
The following are the provisions of the Civil Code pertinent to the case at bar:
ART. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of
public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the
goods and for the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the
circumstances of each case.
ART. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human
care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons,
with a due regard for all the circumstances.

In fine, we can only infer from the law the intention of the Code Commission and
Congress to curb the recklessness of drivers and operators of common carriers in the
conduct of their business.
Thus, it is clear that neither the law nor the nature of the business of a transportation
company makes it an insurer of the passenger's safety, but that its liability for personal
injuries sustained by its passenger rests upon its negligence, its failure to exercise the
degree of diligence that the law requires.
In the case at bar, petitioner cannot succeed in his contention that respondents failed to
overcome the presumption of negligence against them. The totality of evidence shows
that the death of petitioners spouse was caused by the reckless negligence of the
driver of the Isuzu trailer truck which lost its brakes and bumped the Celyrosa Express
bus, owned and operated by respondents.

First, we advert to the sketch prepared by PO3 Magno S. de Villa, who investigated the
accident. The sketch13shows the passenger bus facing the direction of Tagaytay City
and lying on its right side on the shoulder of the road, about five meters away from the
point of impact. On the other hand, the trailer truck was on the opposite direction, about
500 meters away from the point of impact. PO3 De Villa stated that he interviewed De
Borja, respondent driver of the passenger bus, who said that he was about to unload
some passengers when his bus was bumped by the driver of the trailer truck that lost
its brakes. PO3 De Villa checked out the trailer truck and found that its brakes really
failed. He testified before the trial court, as follows:
ATTY. ESTELYDIZ:
q You pointed to the Isuzu truck beyond the point of impact. Did you
investigate why did (sic) the Isuzu truck is beyond the point of impact?
a Because the truck has no brakes.
COURT:
q What is the distance between that circle which is marked as Exh. 1-c to the
place where you found the same?
a More or less 500 meters.
q Why did you say that the truck has no brakes?
a I tested it.
q And you found no brakes?

q On what part of the road was it lying?

a On the shoulder of the road.
COURT:
q How many meters from the point of impact?
a Near, about 5 meters.14
His police report bolsters his testimony and states:
Said vehicle 1 [passenger bus] was running from Manila toward south direction when,
in the course of its travel, it was hit and bumped by vehicle 2 [truck with trailer] then
running fast from opposite direction, causing said vehicle 1 to fall on its side on the road
shoulder, causing the death of one and injuries of some passengers thereof, and its
damage, after collission (sic), vehicle 2 continiously (sic) ran and stopped at
approximately 500 meters away from the piont (sic) of impact.15
In fine, the evidence shows that before the collision, the passenger bus was cruising on
its rightful lane along the Aguinaldo Highway when the trailer truck coming from the
opposite direction, on full speed, suddenly swerved and encroached on its lane, and
bumped the passenger bus on its left middle portion. Respondent driver De Borja had
every right to expect that the trailer truck coming from the opposite direction would stay
on its proper lane. He was not expected to know that the trailer truck had lost its
brakes. The swerving of the trailer truck was abrupt and it was running on a fast speed
as it was found 500 meters away from the point of collision. Secondly, any doubt as to
the culpability of the driver of the trailer truck ought to vanish when he pleaded guilty to
the charge of reckless imprudence resulting to multiple slight physical injuries and
damage to property in Criminal Case No. 2223-92, involving the same incident.1avvph!
1

a Yes, sir.
xxx
q When you went to the scene of accident, what was the position of Celyrosa
bus?
a It was lying on its side.
COURT:
q Right side or left side?
a Right side.
ATTY. ESTELYDIZ:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated May 21, 2004 and the
Resolution dated January 7, 2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66891
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000

VICENTE
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS,
SALVA, respondents.

CALALAS, petitioner,
ELIZA

JUJEURCHE

SUNGA

and

FRANCISCO

MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated
March 31, 1991, reversing the contrary decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36,
Dumaguete City, and awarding damages instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche
Sunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of contract of carriage.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G.
Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman
University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by petitioner Vicente
Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was
given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at
the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a
passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the
outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck driven by Iglecerio

Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As a
result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left tibiafibula with severe necrosis of the underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long
leg circular casting, and case wedging were done under sedation. Her confinement in
the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her attending physician, Dr.
Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a
period of three months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging
violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence
required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the other hand, filed a third-party
complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck.
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and
absolved Calalas of liability, holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was
responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490),
filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the
same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to
his jeepney.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the
ground that Sunga's cause of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasidelict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise the diligence required under the
Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against Salva and
adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The dispositive portion of its decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and another one is entered ordering defendantappellee Vicente Calalas to pay plaintiff-appellant:
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P10,000.00 as attorney's fees; and
(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
(5) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the
negligence of Verena was the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and
that to rule otherwise would be to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of
its passengers. He contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the truck owned by
Salva was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to
Sunga on the ground that it is not supported by evidence.

The petition has no merit.

The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the
driver and the owner of the truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was
never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle ofres judicata does not apply.
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue
in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasidelict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in
this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The first, quasi-delict,
also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the
negligence of the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is
premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established
because it is the basis of the action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be
prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract and the fact that the obligor,
in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to his
destination.2 In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code
provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary diligence as defined in
Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the common
carrier the burden of proof.
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding
Salva and his driver Verena liable for the damage to petitioner's jeepney, should be
binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the proximate cause of the collision between the
jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The doctrine of proximate
cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of
contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no
relation between him and another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law
itself. But, where there is a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, it is the
parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function of the law is merely to
regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some
aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of
common carriers with regard to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of
negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. It provides:
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for
reasons of public policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence
in the vigilance over the goods and for the safety of the passengers
transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further
expressed in articles 1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5, 6, and 7, while
the extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers is further
set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.
Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely
as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost

diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence
at once arose, and it became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe
extraordinary diligence in the care of his passengers.
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight
could provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for
all the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755? We do not think so. Several factors
militate against petitioner's contention.
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear
portion being exposed about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and
facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No.
4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. No person shall drive his motor
vehicle in such a manner as to obstruct or impede the passage of
any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on passengers or
loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of other
vehicles on the highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioner's driver took in more passengers than the
allowed seating capacity of the jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law. It
provides:
Exceeding registered capacity. No person operating any motor
vehicle shall allow more passengers or more freight or cargo in his
vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than
that to which the other passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner
unable to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on him for the injury
sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually negligent in
transporting passengers.
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioner's contention that Sunga's taking an
"extension seat" amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the
injuries to the many victims of the tragedies in our seas should not be compensated
merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of drowning by boarding an
overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioner's contention that the jeepney being
bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an
event which could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. 3 This
requires that the following requirements be present: (a) the cause of the breach is

independent of the debtor's will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or unavoidable; (c) the
event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the
creditor.4 Petitioner should have foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its
body protruding two meters into the highway.
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it is excessive
and without basis in law. We find this contention well taken.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated:
Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year college
student in that school year 1989-1990 at the Silliman University,
majoring in Physical Education. Because of the injury, she was not
able to enroll in the second semester of that school year. She
testified that she had no more intention of continuing with her
schooling, because she could not walk and decided not to pursue her
degree, major in Physical Education "because of my leg which has a
defect already."
Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was under
confinement, she cried in pain because of her injured left foot. As a
result of her injury, the Orthopedic Surgeon also certified that she has
"residual bowing of the fracture side." She likewise decided not to
further pursue Physical Education as her major subject, because "my
left leg . . . has a defect already."
Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the inevitable
bedfellows of the injuries that she suffered. Under Article 2219 of the
Civil Code, she is entitled to recover moral damages in the sum of
P50,000.00, which is fair, just and reasonable.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages
predicated on a breach of contract for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art.
2219 of the Civil Code.5 As an exception, such damages are recoverable: (1) in cases
in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764, in
relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is
guilty of fraud or bad faith, as provided in Art. 2220.6
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no
factual finding by the appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the
performance of the contract of carriage. Sunga's contention that petitioner's admission
in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to a nearby
hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the
driver of the Isuzu truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner was
utterly indifferent to the plight of his injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied
recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the accident.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and its
resolution, dated September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
the award of moral damages is DELETED.
SO ORDERED.