Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Number:P1007
File Reference
1007-DISQ-0-P-PH-48071
Page
1 of 12
RWE Dea
Shutdown Philosophy
Document number
1007-DISQ-0-P-PH-48071-Rev.0
12.12.11
Rev
Date
Description
S.Morsi
A.Fawzi
A.Hamdan
RWE
Client
Approval
Changes List
Rev.
Date
prepared
Prepared by
Description
(dd.MM.yyyy)
Page: 2 of 12
Introduction ...................................................................................................................... 4
1.1
1.2
Abbreviations ............................................................................................................... 6
2.1.
Application ................................................................................................................... 7
2.2.
Principles ..................................................................................................................... 7
2.3.
2.4.
3
3.1.
5.1
5.2
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1 Introduction
RWE Dea Egypt has discovered seven natural gas reserves in the Disouq Concession within
the onshore Nile Delta, starting in 2008, as shown on the concession map below. Further
exploration in the concession is ongoing. RWE Dea Egypt is the operator of the Concession
with EGAS as a partner.
The objective of this project is to carry out front end engineering design (FEED) services and
prepare a scope of work for Engineering, Installation and Construction tenders (procurement will
be undertaken by RWE Dea) to finally install a natural gas trunk line system to be gathered, led
to a central gas treatment plant where the gas shall be treated to achieve sales gas quality and
send to the gas pipeline infrastructure at the boundaries of the Disouq Concession.
The selected development comprises a central gas treatment site near NSG-1x, where the gas
is collected, treated by means of Low Temperature Separation utilizing the Joule Thomson
effect, and compressed for export. Treated gas is exported via a 16 export pipeline directly into
the GASCO NTS pipeline.
The well fluids from the directly routed wells and the trunk line are fed to a common inlet
separator at the central plant. All gases and liquids will be separated and processed on the
central treatment site into sales gas, stabilized condensate, and free production water.
Treatment of gas is carried out in two trains, while treatment of condensate is in a single train.
Three trains of sales gas compression are installed. During FEED investigation shall clarify, if
the installation of front end booster compressors is more advantageous compared to this
concept.
Fuel gas for the gas engine drives is taken from the suction of the sales gas compressors.
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1.1
This document defines the safety shutdown philosophy and the basis of design for the Safety
System for Disouq Gas Plant Facility.
The principal objectives of the safety system are:
Ensure personal protection
Minimization of hazards to the environment
Plant and equipment protection
The safety system will provide the safe isolation and depressurization of the total facility or
critical sections of the process and utilities in the event of an emergency condition when the
safety of personnel or equipment is threatened. The safety system is divided into two subsystems; Fire and Gas detection and protection system (F&G) and Emergency Shutdown
System (ESD).
This document primarily defines the Process Shutdown philosophy.
Protective systems will provide the protection of personnel, environment, and equipment by
providing the safe shutdown of plant and/or process equipment during an event that may
include hazards such as loss of containment or fire, a process upset, or when the primary
control system fails to keep the process within specified operating limits.
Shutdown, isolation of process inventories into manageable volumes and depressurizing are
used to manage and limit escalation of any event.
Protective systems will include dedicated process sensors and final elements and will not rely
upon functions controlled by the process control system. Except where required by the project
design specifications, protective system outputs will be designed as Fail-Action, that is, loss of
output signal will cause the associated field device to move to its shutdown state.
The Shutdown Philosophy includes systems that respond to different types of events. These
systems are the Emergency Shutdown System (ESD) that includes fire and gas detection, fire
suppression, and emergency depressurizing, Total Plant Shutdown, Process Shutdown, and
Equipment Shutdown.
Electrical protection, including manual emergency switchgear trip, manual emergency generator
trips, and electrical protective relay functions is separate to and independent of the Safety
Instrumented System.
The Shutdown System for each facility will be a self-contained stand-alone system that is not
dependent upon inter-location communications.
The Shutdown System will operate
independently of the Plant Control System, but communicate with the Plant Control System for
data to be available at the operator interface.
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Abbreviations
Blowdown valve
: BDV
: CTP
Emergency Shutdown
: ESD
: ESDV
: F&G
: GPSD
: SIS
: SIF
Process Shutdown
: PSD
: SIL
Safety System
: SS
Unit Shutdown
: USD
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Application
A common safety shutdown system is provided for the entire facility. The shutdown hierarchy
applies across all plant areas.
2.2.
Principles
The overall safety shutdown philosophy is based on the principle of maintaining the facility at an
acceptable level of safety for personnel; equipment and the environment whilst initiating the
lowest shutdown level possible to allow for efficient re-start.
The following principles shall apply to the achievement of an acceptable level of safety:
Personnel safety.
Minimize the requirement for manual operations during and after a hazardous event.
Where appropriate, limit cascaded process trips to allow easier identification of the trip
cause and make use of operator intervention.
Provide a system that is simple to implement, test / verify and operate thereby achieving
high availability.
2.3.
Applicable Code
API RP 500
API RP 520
API RP 521
2.4.
Safety Instrumented Functions (SIF) within the Protective System will be analyzed to ensure
compliance with the required Safety Integrity Level (SIL) and will be designed to meet the target
SILs of the project.
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3 Logic Hierarchy
The shutdown system logic is structured in a hierarchical form ensuring that an orderly
shutdown of systems can be accomplished. The structure includes:
An Emergency Shutdown System (Level 4) that includes fire or gas detection that initiates
the site emergency alarm isolates the electrical systems and following either confirmed fire
or confirmed gas detection in the processing area initiates a Total Plant Shutdown with
depressurization.
A General Process Shutdown (Level 3) that isolates the site from external sources of
hydrocarbons by closing the facility import and export pipeline valves and inter-facility tie
line valves, isolates large volume inventory, and initiates a process shutdown for train, unit
or process station shutdown.
A Process Shutdown (Level 2) stops a whole process train, closes inventory isolation
valves and initiates Process Equipment Shutdown for the train.
An Equipment (Unit) Shutdown (Level 1) that stops a single equipment item (process
component) and closes its inventory isolating valves.
Total Plant Shutdown, Process Shutdown, and Equipment Shutdown respond to both manually
initiated shutdowns from shutdown hand switches, and automatically initiated shutdown from
process sensors.
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3.1.
Shutdown Levels
The safety shutdown system for the facility is arranged in a hierarchical manner, with each
shutdown level automatically initiating the level below.
The shutdown levels are divided into four (4) main groups, ESD, GPSD, PSD and USD as
follows:
3.1.1 Emergency Shutdown (ESD)
ESD is a high emergency shutdown which will be initiated under extreme circumstances when
normal operations cannot be resumed in the foreseeable future.
ESD shutdown will be initiated by the following conditions:
I.
II.
III.
Major plant fire, confirmed fire (by at least two detectors) in more than one fire
zone at CTP
The ESD is aimed at isolating hydrocarbon feeds and outlets, reducing hydrocarbon inventory
and limiting ignition sources and will be automatically activate in the following;
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Isolate a site from external hydrocarbon sources by closing the site or facility import and
export pipeline (S) valves that are located at or near the plant area boundary
Isolate a site or facility from external hydrocarbon sources by closing valves on interfacility.
Isolate all trains or units by closing the train or unit isolation valves
Isolate large inventory within trains or units by closing inventory isolation valves
Inventory blow down is initiated manually except for incidents for which blow down is
automatic.
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Abnormal flow
Low flow shutdown inputs should be used for centrifugal pumps to prevent cavitation and
subsequent pump damage from operating at flow rates less than the required minimum
flow. These are not required where pump minimum flow protection is provided.
4.2.
Abnormal level
Low low level shutdown inputs are recommended for any vessel where loss of level would
result in damage to process pumps or significant gas blow-by and overpressure of
downstream equipment.
4.3.
Abnormal Pressure
Process equipment that is susceptible to damage in the event of low inlet pressure and no
other adequate protection exists, e.g. compressors.
High pressure shutdown inputs and alarms should be considered for compressor
discharge and seal leakage detection systems for pumps.
4.4.
Abnormal Temperature
4.5.
Abnormal Vibration
Utilities Shutdown
All utilities shall be shut down only in case of ESD (level 4) except fire fighting system.
All essential utilities listed below will normally remain in operation.
Instrument Air
Flare System
ESD valves
Please refer to Valves Specifications 1007-DISQ-0-J-SS-33033
5.2
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