Included in this months diary is a copy of 15 Panzer Grenadiers War Diary.

The Battalion
is mentioned once or twice (The attack on ELSDORF - attack on WISTEDT).
WAR DIARY
15 PANZER GRENADIER DIVISION
9 April 1945 - 7 May 1945
9 April
Enemys pressure increases constantly.
4 CANADIAN ARMOURED DIVISION advance from LATHEN (about 27 km South of
PAPENBURG) North and North East.
43 DIVISION supported by one Armd Bde attacks North and North East from area South
West of CLOPPENBURG.
51 (H) DIVISION advance from area LOHNE - VECHTA.
3 INFANTRY DIVISION captures BASSUM and continues advance North.
A small battle group seems to be already South of WILDEHAUSEN.
15 Pz Gr Div (without one reinforced bn (I/115 which was sent in advance on 8 Apr)) moves
from area CLOPPENBURG into the area South West of BREMEN to counter-attack and stop
the enemys advance South West of BREMEN. Axis of this movement is ANKUM OVACKENBURG - WILDESHAUSEN - HARPSTEDT into area HARPSTEDT NORDWOHLDE - FARHRENHORST - IPPENER. During the evening all units reach the
area as ordered, except Gr Regt 857 which follows on foot, and secures the area South and
East. I Bn 115 is in contact with the enemy on the line BASSUM - SYKE.

10 April
After having been in reserve in the wood North of NORDWOHLDE 115 PGR prepares to
attack the enemys flank which is advancing Norht from SYKE. The HOHE BERG is taken
and we advance up to a point 1 km West of SYKE. During the attack we hear from wireless
intercept that the enemy is constantly getting reinforcements, mainly tanks and scout cars.
The enemys artillery activity is not very heavy. The object of our attack is to control road
BASSUM - SYKE and to stop the enemys advance. The attack succeeds.
During the afternoon an order comes through from Para Army to build up a new line of
defence on the general line WILDESHAUSEN - HORSTEDT - IPPENER HEILIGENRODE - BRINKUM. The Division withdraws to this line after dark. Gr Regt 857,
following on foot, has orders to occupy and hold WILDESHAUSEN, but finds this place
already occupied by the enemy and therefore takes up defensive positions North and North
East of the town, with strong points on both sides of road junction 1 km North of
WILDESHAUSEN.

11 April
The day passes with only light infantry activity. The enemy does not probe the new line of
defence, and contact is made with bridgehead at BREMEN (SS Trg Bn). The picture of the
enemys positions is gained by (a) own recce and patrols, and (b) wireless intercept. The
results are as follows:(a) Enemy strong points are in the area WILDESHAUSEN - HARPSTEDT - SYKE. A
counter-attack of Gr Regt 857 to regain WILDESHAUSEN does not succeed.
(b) Strong enemy armour and infantry forces advancing during the afternoon from
BURCHHAUSEN towards NIENBURG.
4 ARMOURED BRIGADE is reported in BRUCHHAUSEN with Brigade H.Q. probably in
the town.

12 April
The enemys dispositions in front of our line of defence are presumed to be as follows:43 DIVISION, with one Armoured Brigade under command, are in area CLOPPENBURG SOUTH of AHLHORN - SOUTH of WILDESHAUSEN, and then
3 BRITISH DIVISION
The enemy reinforces in area WILDESHAUSEN.
There is heavy traffic on all roads leading from BASSUM towards the front line. Small
enemy attacks Northwards from WILDESHAUSEN - HARPSTEDT do not succeed.
During one of our own attacks towards the road WILDESHAUSEN - HARPSTEDT several
tanks and vehicles are knocked out and we succeed in interrupting the flow of enemy traffic
for a short period.
Advance Posts from FAHRENHORST are recalled to the main line of defence. By wireless
intercept it is learnt that 51 (H) DIVISION is approaching and that they have been ordered to
take over the front line South of DELMENHORST. All the enemys artillery is concentrated
in the area WILDESHAUSEN (according to civilian reports, probably two regiments).
Interrogation reports from scattered and returned German soldiers say mainly that strong
armoured units supported by artillery and Anti-Aircraft are on the move via
NEUBRUCHAUSEN towards NIENBURG. Reliefs and withdrawal of units for other
purposes?

13 April

According to Prisoner of War reports 52 DIVISION is supposed to relieve parts of 7

ARMOURED DIVISION in the area RIEDE between 13 and 14 April. It is said that parts of
the armoured troops have already moved South East from RIEDE. We presum 52 DIVISION
is in the area between RIEDE - BRUCHHAUSEN - VILSEN.
Enemy recce patrols increase on our own front from the area WILDESHAUSEN to the North
and North East, and also against left flank of 104 PGR. From wireless intercept we learn of
the enemys intentions in time, and place our troops accordingly.
As 51 (H) DIVISION has been brought into the area WILDESHAUSEN - HARPSTEDT we
expect the main thrust of the enemys attack from this area. 115 PGR is being withdraw from
the Division left flank and is being put in reserve on the right flank for a counter-attack
against WILDESHAUSEN.

14 April
115 PGRs counter-attack against WILDESHAUSEN penetrates to the railway line on the
West edge of the town and to the road junction North of it, but cannot penetrate farther owing
to strong concentrated artillery and Anti-Tank fire. 51 (H) DIVISION is identified in this area
by Prisoners of War, with one battalion in the woods east of WILDESHAUSEN and another
battalion to the South East. Prisoner of War reports that one company position is at the East
entrance to WILDESHAUSEN, with a third company in the town itself, and a fourth
company on the Southern edge.
On the rest of the Division front, only strong recce patrols without success.

15 April
Strong recce patrols in company strength, supported by a few tanks, are pushing North East
from WILDESHAUSEN and North from HARPSTEDT. These have been repulsed. Our own
wireless intercept works very well again today. We know enemy intentions, times of coming
attacks and artillery targets.
During the afternoon, the enemy succeeds in capturing a road junction North of
WILDESHAUSEN by outflanking it and using well planned and intense artillery fire. Enemy
pressure in this area is extremely heavy.
During the night, 15 Pz Gr Div withdraw according to orders leaving behind small rearguards
on the line DOTLINGEN - UHLHORN - HENGSTERHOLZ - AMNEN - GROSSMACKENSTEDT.

16 April
The withdrawal of the Division is going according to plan. The enemy is following

reluctantly with light recce elements. We know by wireless intercept and Prisoner of War
reports that two brigades of 51 (H) DIVISION are in the line, and presume that the third
brigade is in reserve. We succeed, by well carried out rearguards manoeuvres, in making the
enemy believe the whole line of defence is occupied, and we repulse light infantry recce
patrols. Although these rearguards are completely on their own, their fighting morale still
proves to be excellent.

17 April
New enemy reinforcements arrive in area WILDESHAUSEN. We shell enemy reserves in
area IPPENER - HEILIGENRODE.
Today again, all enemy attacks on the whole of the Division front area made in battalion
strength with armoured support, but are known beforehand form wireless intercept which
enables us to counter-measure them by manoeuvring with our reserves. The enemy succeeds
therefore only in penetrating locally.
During the day we get numerous reports from our wireless intercept about the enemy order of
battle, mainly recce units but also about the results of aerial recce on our own and
neighbouring fronts.
We succeed in holding the front line by manoeuvring constantly with our reserves, Anti-Tank
weapons and units.
From documents belonging to a dead Prisoner of War we learn that B Company of 52
DIVISION Recce is in WERDER.

18 April
Today we expect very early attacks as enemy wireless activity increases. Pressure in the area
of WILDESHAUSEN continues during the morning, and the enemy succeeds, after a heavy
battle, in penetrating into DOTLINGEN and THRAHE and to occupy the crossroads near the
railway stations at DOTLINGEN.
The enemy attack from the area of IPPENER towards ADELHEIDE starts at 1030 and they
succeed, after heavy artillery preparation, in penetrating into GROSS-MACKENSTEDT. We
presume the enemy strength to be one Battalion supported by tanks (flamethrowing tanks?).
Our own troops are exhausted as they have been fighting continuously for several weeks and
they lack weapons, mainly light and heavy MGs, and reinforcements are badly trained. Due
to these reasons, and to the fact that our front line is over 30 kms long, stubborn defence is
not possible to give the impression of greater strength, and to stop the enemys advance by
continuous manoeuvring, extremely efficient wireless interception, rushing about of the few
available tanks and anti-tank weapons, but mainly due to the supreme fighting quality of all

ranks.
At 1330 hours our own recce finds STUHR North East of BRINKUM free of enemy.
According to wireless intercept TOSTEDT East of the River WESER has been occupied by
the enemy since 1320 hours. VISSELHOVEDE is still in our hands.
Only light infantry actions South West of BREMEN. The enemy penetrated into
OBERHEIDE and there is fighting in MORDEICH North West of BRINKUM (25 tanks
seen).
The enemys main thrust has been switched during the last few days towards the area of
VERDEN and to the East. One can recognise the enemys intention of advancing via
ROTENBURG towards HAMBURG and to continue their advance North West and East of
the WESER in force. The main objective is BREMEN.
Civilians report more than 100 enemy tanks in area VERDEN - ROTENBURG.

19 April
On our Division front it is clear the enemys intention is to attack DELMENHORST from
both flanks. Their main thrust will be along the roads WILDESHAUSEN - DELMENHORST
and GROSS-MACKENSTEDT - DELMENHORST. The Division regroups during the night
18/19th according to the expected attack and patrols and rearguards only occupy the former
main defence line. Our new defence line runs OSTRITTRUM - NEERSTEDT KRATTENHOFF - IMMER - HOLZKAMP - DAHLHOF - AMNENRIEDE - HUCHTING.
During the day the enemy succeeds only in pushing back our forward patrols and rearguards
and our main defence line is held firmly.
The enemys armoured thrusts from GROSS-MACKENSTEDT towards road junction South
East of STICKGRAS and against HOLZKAMP South West of DELMENHORST are
repulsed.
The enemys main thrust today is again East of the WESER. Strong enemy attacks on
BREMEN via ROTENBURG and on WESERMUNDE via ZEVEN show clearly enemys
plan of encircling the whole of Corps EMS.
At 1700 hours wireless intercept shows strong enemy movement East of the WESER. There
can be no doubt that the massed enemy formations East of the River WESER are prepared to
deliver a deadly blow at Corps EMS. The enemys main supply route is the road NIENBURG
- RETHEM - WALSRODE - SOLTAU.
During the night 15 Pz Gr Div is withdrawn into the ZEVEN area, without being properly
relieved in the old sector. This is done as part of the counter measures planned by higher

Command. The only units remaining in the old sector are Gr Regt 857, which is under our
command, and a Heavy Anti-Tank Battery. As no new units can be brought up to the sector it
can only be held weakly (one battalion).
The Division succeeds in disengaging and arrives in the new area according to plan without
losses or without being shelled heavily on the way.
We learn, by wireless intercept, that 51 HIGHLAND DIVISION is preparing, in area South
of DELMENHORST, to attack and advance via DELMENHORST to the WESER.

20 April
New Division H.Q. - DIPSHORN (South West of ZEVEN).
52 Division Engineers identified by Prisoner of War near DANELSEN.
Captured enemy map taken from medical Prisoner of War from GUARDS ARMOURED
DIVISION shows the following enemy Order of Battle and intentions:51 HIGHLAND DIVISION in area South of DELMENHORST - axis of advance is
DELMENHORST towards WESER.
3 BRITISH DIVISION in area BRINKUM.
53 DIVISION in area North and North West of VERDEN
GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION in area East of ZEVEN
7 ARMOURED DIVISION Axis of advance towards BUXTEHUDE.

GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION intentions:32 ARMOURED BRIGADE to take ROTENBURG from North East and South East.
5 ARMOURED BRIGADE to advance in strength from TOSTEDT via ZEVEN to North
West and make contact near BREMERVORDE with the rest of Brigade (only recce units?),
which advance from TOSTEDT via AHLERSTEDT.
According to the captured documents, SECOND ARMY H.Q., 8 CORPS H.Q. and 11
ARMOURED DIVISION H.Q., are all, on the same day in HOLDENSTEDT (8 km South of
UELZEN) and South West of LUNEBURG.
Parts of one Brigade of 52 DIVISION are in area DANELSEN. Other units of 52 DIVISION
are in position in area ETELSEN (Recce Regiment)

According to wireless intercept GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION have formed Battle

Groups each consisting of one armoured and one infantry battalion. One of these Battalion
Groups is to advance from East of ZEVEN to the South East.
All units of our Division are by now in new concentration area South West of ZEVEN. 115
PGR and one battery of 22 Artillery Regiment were sent in advance one day earlier.
The intention of Corps EMS is to get 15 Pz Gr Div ready to attack in South-Easterly direction
(ROTENBURG - SOLTAU) to relieve a surrounded Battle Group in SOLTAU - MUNSTER
area, and to cut the supply routes of rear formations fighting in the area North East of
ROTENBURG.

21 April
A Troop Leader of our Recce Regiment who escaped out of enemys Prisoner of War Camp
reports heavy traffic on the road SCHEESEL - SITTENSEN towards the North. This
confirms our assumption that part of GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION were switched
North. The quick advance of GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION up to the line TOSTEDT SITTENSEN and the encircling movement by strong armoured formations near ZEVEN
show that Corps EMS will be encircled East of BREMEN. If the enemy succeeds in his
attack from the East via ZEVEN and reaches OSTRHOLZ - SCHARMBEK he will over-run
Corps H.Q. (HEPSTEDT) and the fate of the rest of Corps EMS South of the HAMME OSTE line would be sealed.
Corps Commander therefore orders, at our Div Commanders suggestion, preparations for
our intended attack to stop, and to prepare instead the defence of the line ROTENBURG ZEVEN as 115 PGR is anyway in contact with the enemy South and South East of ZEVEN,
but as higher Command still persists in the plan that 15 Pz Gr Div should attack, we prepare
small local and limited attacks.
A Battalion of 104 PGR receives orders to occupy ELSDORF and hold it at all costs but
when it arrives there they find the village held by the enemy. An attempt to capture
ELSDORF does not succeed.
52 DIVISION Recce Regiment is identified by a KOd Armoured Recce Car near
GRASCORF (8 km East North East of ACHIM). According to wireless intercept the enemy
is reinforcing his artillery in the ELSDORF area.

22 April
The enemy penetrates into ROTENBURG with a concentrated attack from the North East.
Our Division received orders to prepare defences on the line Road Junction North West
ROTENBURG - ALBENDORF - GYHUM - ZEVEN and to prepare Battle Groups for

attacks in the area South West of GYHUM and West of BRUTTENDORF. Ordered objectives
of these attacks are:The line ELSDORF - FRANKENBOSTEL
River OSTE WEST of SITTENSEN.
Road Triangle SITTENSEN.
Two pincer attacks from GYHUM - BRUTTENDORF succeed and we recapture WISTEDT.
ELSDORF is stubbornly defended and remains in enemy hands. 2nd Battalion GRENADIER
GUARDS, 5 ARMOURED BRIGADE, is identified by Prisoners of War near WIERSDORF
(3 kms East of ZEVEN).

23 April
The enemy continues attacking with armour from HETZWEGE towards APPENDORF. Our
own troops are pushed back and we have to give up the road HETZWEGE - ELSDORF. The
enemy attack against WIERSDORF results also in the withdrawal of our advanced posts from
there. HEESLINGEN is taken by the enemy but an attack against OFFENSEN is repulsed.
From known enemy dispositions (the relief of Advance units of GUARDS ARMOURED
DIVISION near HEESLINGEN) we have to count on more strong attacks from
MEINSTEDT in direction of SASSENHOLZ.
As enemys recce activities in the area ZEVEN - BREMERVORDE - STADE BUXTEHUDE increase tremendously we have to presum that the GUARDS ARMOURED
DIVISIONs main axis of advance will be between ZEVEN and the River ELBE to the North
West. Constant enemy movement from TOSTEDT to the North and North West confirm this.
Pz Gr Training and Reinforcement Brigade GROSSDEUTSCHLAND are put under
command of the Division and arrive by battalions. The first arriving battalion relieves 115
PGR near ZEVEN during the night 23rd/24th.

24 April
The enemy has brought 9 ARMOURED DIVISION and 43 DIVISION from the area West of
the WESER. 9 ARMOURED DIVISION will probably advance in an Easterly or NorthEasterly direction. No. 4 Battalion DORSETSHIRE REGIMENT, 130 BRIGADE, is
identified by Prisoner of War. 53 DIVISION are near HELLWEGE (13 kms South West of
ROTENBURG). C Company of 43 DIVISION Recce Regiment is near EGYPTEN.
We know that there are strong enemy infantry reserves in area South West of ROTENBURG.
It is also known that there are strong enemy armoured reserves in WIERSDORF (4 kms East
of ZEVEN) and in HEESLINGEN (5 kms Eas of ZEVEN). Enemy pressure in the area of
ZEVEN increases hourly.
After strong artillery fire and typhooning of the town, ZEVEN is attacked and entered by the

enemy. Tough fighting continues till nightfall. We have to give up the town and withdraw to a
line of defence on the edge of the wood 2 kms West of ZEVEN. WISTEDT is also given up.
We succeed in stopping the enemy advance on the general line BRITTENDORF OLDENDORF - BRAUEL with I Bn 115 PGR which was put in during the night.

25 April
The main attack on BREMEN is expected after strong artillery preparation. The enemy
penetrate into the outskirts of the town.
On our own front the enemy attacks from ABBENDORF towards HESELDORF and
penetrates into the village after heavy fighting, supported by strong artillery fire and ground
staffing. Our own troops make a fighting withdrawal to the railway line West of the village
and prepare their new line of defence.
Wireless intercept tells us that GYHUM and BOCKEL will be attacked during the afternoon
with heavy artillery concentrations and Typhoons. This attack starts at 1400 hours.
GYHUM is attacked with infantry supported by six tanks and is captured by the enemy. They
also occupy WINDMHULEN HILL. We repulse an attack from GYHUM to the North
towards WEHLDORF.
The Division takes up a new defence line BOTERSEN - MULMSHORN - BOCKEL WEHLSDORF - BRUTTENDORF - OLDENDORF - Wood ZEVEN - GODENSTEDT. This
is the beginning of a general withdrawal of the whole of Corps EMS to HAMME - OSTE line
which has been proposed to Corps EMS by our Division for the last two days. It was stressed
by the Division that this was the only possibility we had of closing the gap to the ELBE and
to hold the ever-increasing enemy pressure.
33 Engr Bn and 115 Recce Bn are switched into the area between ZEVEN and the ELBE to
secure contact with the AUE sector. These two Battle Groups occupy these areas to stop
enemy recce patrols to the North and in the case of any enemy advance in this direction to
delay him by making a fighting withdrawal to the River OSTE. For this task they are
supported by two special tank hunting detachments.
The Division proposes to Corps EMS to build immediately a strong bridgehead at
BREMERVORDE as the enemys main thrust is expected either in this direction or on the
road BUXTEHUDE - STADE.

26 April
After strong preparation the enemy attacks from ZEVEN with the main thrust to the South
West. As our fighting strength has decreased considerably we have to give up wood near
ZEVEN after only a few days fighting. A new defence line is built between BADENSTEDT

and BADENMUHLEN, but BADENSTEDT falls into enemy hands after little resistance.
Some of our tanks succeed in holding out East of OSTERTIMKE.
We learn constantly from wireless intercept about position of enemys spearheads, successes
of our own artillery, and planning and preparations for coming attacks. (for instance that one
lorry was hit on the bridge across BADE the enemy will have new bridge ready at 1730
hours).
Today brings a crisis for the Division.
It is only due to superb work of our own wireless intercept that we are able to prevent a
breakthrough at several points, and to build up again and again new centres of resistance
wherever the enemy tries to break through our lines.
The Division sends envoys to arrange for the hand-over of the WESTERTIMKE Prisoner of
War Camp. We follow, by wireless intercept, their way, as all enemy units report on the
arrival of these officers. We get to know by this means that the G.O.C. of GUARDS
ARMOURED DIVISION decided to retain these two officers as Prisoners of War and that he
ordered an attack by all available tanks for 1800 hours to break through to WESTERTIMKE.
As the Bailey bridge North of BADENSTEDT was finished by 1700 hours the order to attack
was already given at 1730 hours. Immediately after we knew about this attack all available
units, especially Anti-Tank units, were regrouped accordingly.
The Division considers it a matter of honour that this attack on WESTERTIMKE should not
be allowed to succeed and the Camp should not be reached today by the enemy, as we wanted
to hand over the Camp through our envoys.
The GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION could have considered the sending of the two
officers to parley the handing over of the camp as a sign of our weakness.
Divisional H.Q. moves into the area West of KIRCHTIMKE to be able to prepare everything
necessary for the defence on the spot.
After concentrated artillery fire the enemy attacks with tanks and armoured cars and infantry
towards OSTERTIMKE but this attack is broken up by our well-directed artillery fire and the
enemy suffers heavy losses. The enemy withdraws to BADENSTEDT. This was a decisive
success of the day. Our Tank troops and artillery deserve the highest praise. They knew what
was at stake.
Enemy Order of Battle Canadian Divisions West of DELMENHORST
51 HIGHLAND DIVISION South East of DELMENHORST
3 BRITISH DIVISION South of BREMEN

9 ARMOURED DIVISION East of River WESTER, South East of BREMEN

52 DIVISION ACHIM area
43 DIVISION South of HELLWEGE
GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION North and North East of ZEVEN
7 ARMOURED DIVISION South of BUXTEHUDE
58 DIVISION East of BUCHHOLZ.

27 April
Enemy enters BREMEN and penetrates into the Northern outskirts of the town. 15 Pz Gr Div
regroups during the night and forms new line of defence in depth FORWERK - BULSTEDT
- KIRCHTIMKE - OSTEREISTEDT - ROCKSTEDT.
We leave only rearguards behind in OSTERTIMKE. Divisional H.Q. is in BREILLIT. The
Division task is to slow down the enemys advance and to make a slow fighting withdrawal to
the HAMME - OSTE sector and also to preserve our own strength. The enemy starts a new
attack and penetrates through OSTERTIMKE into KIRCHTIMKE which he reaches at 1100
hours. From KIRCHTIMKE he advances to he North and North West. WENTELL has to be
given up by us. At 1800 hours a new enemy concentration is reported at KIRCHTIMKE and
we direct all our artillery onto it. At 1830 hours the enemy attacks from KIRCHTIMKE to the
West. In the evening he succeeds in penetrating into the Northern part of WESTERTIMKE
after a stubborn battle.
All enemys attempts to attack in the direction of OSTEREISTEDT from East and South East
fail.
Escaped Prisoner of War reports 4 ARMOURED BRIGADE in LEHESTER - DIECH (11 km
North East of BREMEN) recognised by Brigade Sign.

28 April
No enemy action in the ZEVEN area, only local recce patrols. Enemy probably regrouping.
15 Pz Gr Div withdraws according to plan to the line TARMSTEDT - HEPSTEDT BREDDORF - HAMSTEDT - RHADE - OSTE.
We only occupy strongpoints on this Line. Part of the Division is taken over the Canal into
positions there. Advanced Posts are set up on the line WISTE - RHADEREISTEDT ROCKSTEDT.
We repulse recce patrol sent in strength against SANDBOSTEL.
We can see from strong concentration of armour in SANDBOSTEL area that the enemy
intends to attack over the OSTE. It might also mean flank protection of units attacking in the

direction of BREMERVORDE.
Wireless intercept reports strong amoured and motorised traffic on roads VERDEN ROTENBURG and North East.
We must presume that 9 ARMOURED DIVISION, 79 ARMOURED BRIGADE (zbV), 8
INFANTRY DIVISION, 43 DIVISION and 8 ARMOURED DIVISION are advancing to the
North East.
According to wireless intercept 51 HIGHLAND DIVISION is now in area BASSUM ROTENBURG. Parts of this Division were already intercepted two days ago.

29 April
15 Pz Gr Div regroups during the night. 104 PGR is taken out of the line on the right flank of
the Division to strengthen our left flank although this means our right flank between
TARMSTEDT and HAMSTEDT is therefore dangerously weakened.
Parts of this Regiment are kept as Divisional reserve.
No enemy activity except few small recce patrols. We presum enemy is regrouping for attack
over the HAMME - OSTE Canal.
Enemys main thrust for the next few days is thought to be in area of BREMERVORDE. He
can concentrate all his artillery there for decisive attack and breakthrough towards
WESERMUNDE or CUXHAVEN.
The marshes on enemy side of HAMME - OSTE Canal makes bigger attacks impossible. The
Division, therefore, proposed to Corps that the BREMERVORDE area is handed over
immediately to the Division so that we can prepare our own Anti-Tank defence. As Corps
considers the danger not immediate and as they they that the Marine Troops which are in
BREMERVORDER sector are high-quality fighters, they reject this suggestion. We therefore
send one battalion into the GLINDE area to protect our own flank. We contact Commander of
the BREMERVORDE Garrison and our Pz Eng Bn 33 prepare demolitions on both sides of
the town. One Eng. Platoon is sent into the town itself to erect tank obstacles.

30 April
We want to hand over Prisoner of War Camp in SANDBOSTEL to the enemy, but again
Officers sent as envoys are retained as Prisoners of War. Enemy is sending escaped Prisoners
of War back into our lines with orders to recce our strengths and positions and to come back
to report these.
After renewed artillery preparation the enemy succeeds in forcing a crossing over the OSTE

near SANDBOSTEL and to advance to the Camp. We succeed in sealing off this penetration.
Our Division issues orders to the effect that nobody must fire in the direction of the Prisoner
of War Camp as each shot into the overcrowded camp would mean murder. Only if there is
no doubt that the enemy intends to advance from the Prisoner of War Camp will the Division
lift that order.
The enemy succeeds in penetrating into TARMSTEDT from the South using tanks. We have
to give up this place.
15 Pz Gr Div makes a fighting withdrawal during dusk to the HAMME - OSTE Canal and
leaves small rearguards behind. A new defence line is established behind the Canal.
The enemy tries to hinder us in this manoeuvre by attacking North from the River
WUMMER and by cutting the road TARMSTEDT - RHADE. 51 HIGHLAND DIVISION
appears again on our front and it seems that GUARDS ARMOURED DIVISION has been
switched to the East.
51 HIGHLAND DIVISION, since AFRICA, is known to be one of the best British Divisions.
Heavy fighting lies ahead of us.

1 May
The Division is prepared for the defence. Advanced posts are on the line HUTTENBUSCH GLUNSTEDT - AUGUSTENDORF - OBERKLENKENDORF with centres of resistance on
the road GNARRENBURG - RHADE. Gr Regt NEUMUNSTER which had come under our
command is put into the line on our right flank. 115 PGR supported by a Company of 33
AntI-Tank Bn is kept as Divisional reserve in KICHURSTEDT area. 33 Eng Bn mines all
roads and passes on the whole Division front leading to this defensive line. Each of the three
forward battaliosn had one Pnr Company in support. None of the enemys intentions East of
BREMERVORDER are known, but he sends strong recce elements towards STADE. The
enemys intentions are still not clear. The only thing recognised is that the enemys main
thrust will be on the Divisions left flank and further to the North.
Identifications by Prisoner of War 157 BRIGADE of 52 DIVISION near RITTERHUDE (6 km South South West of
OSTERHOLZ - SCHARMBECK)
111 AMB Coln and 113 Provost Company of 30 BRITISH CORPS near BORKFELD (15
kms South South West of OSTERHOLZ - SCHARMBECK).

2 May
A little infantry and artillery activity. Our defensive positions are being improved. The
Division receives order to take over the BREMERVORDE sector at 1000 hours on 3 May
1945.

3 May
51 HIGHLAND DIVISION (identified by wireless intercept) attacks BREMERVORDE in
the early morning after heavy artillery programme. The units which were supposed to hold
BREMERVORDE offer only slight or in some cases, no resistance at all. 115 PGR is
therefore sent immediately into the area of EPPERDORF - LINDORF to stop further
penetration to the North. The enemy occupies BREMERVORDE. 115 PGR succeeds in
stopping the enemy on the above line by fighting regardless of losses. 115 Recce Bn with one
Anti-Tank Troop under command seals off the enemys advance to the West and South West
on the line OEREL - BARCHEL. The left flank of 104 PGR is bent back and the
BREMERVORDE penetration stopped on the line FAHRENDAHL - BARCHEL EBERSDORF. After quick regrouping the enemy attacks again and succeeds in entering
BARCHEL, OEREL and EBERSDORF. Another armoured battle group advances to the West
and attacks HIPSTEDT without opposition. To prevent the enemy from breaking through our
line to the North 115 PGR is withdrawn during the night 3rd/4th via GROSSENHEIM RINGSTEDT into the area of FRELSDORF. KOHBEN and Regt LUBECK is to be under
our command. 153 BRIGADE of 51 HIGHLAND DIVISION with 5 and 7 GORDONS
identified area BARCHEL (8 kms West South West of BREMERVORDE). To stop the
enemys breakthrough from HIPSTEDT alarm units are quickly formed and thrown into the
line.
All British Divisions are not East of the WESER. Only Canadian Divisions remain West of
the WESER. Army boundary between SECOND BRITISH ARMY and CANADIAN ARMY
presumably River WESER.

4 May
The Division withdraws according to order during the night of 3rd/4th to the line WELLEN KIRCHWISTEDT - APPELN - FRELSDORF - FRELSDORFERMUHLEN. One battalion of
each four regiments are in the front line. Each regiment has also one battalion in reserve (two
battalions in BEVERSTEDT, one battalion in WOLLINGST, one battalion in
GEESTENSETH). 115 Recce Battalion is in Divisional reserve in area LOHE HEERSTEDT. During the night we receive II Mortar Training Regiment with three batteries
and 10,000 rounds of ammunition, in support. Our tanks are concentrated as centres of
resistance at KIRCHWISTEDT, BEVERSTEDT and GEESTENSETH. Our artillery and
mortars are positioned so that the fire of each two artillery and mortars are positioned so that
the fire of each two artillery batteries can be concentrated in front of the right and left flanks
of the Division. 969 LAA Battery are under command. It has three troops of each fifteen 2cm
Anti-Aircraft guns which are in ground role positions. 60 Heavy Anti-Aircraft Battery which
is also under our tactical command is in the are BEVERSTEDT - Crossroads GESTENSETH
in an anti-tank and artillery role.
Our own Engr Battalion mined all roads and passes leading to this line of the defence and is
now in Divisional reserve in an infantry role. During the day only light patrolling. 51

HIGHLAND DIVISION again identified by Prisoner of War.

The higher Command considers the withdrawal of Corps EMS to the outlying defences of
WESERMUNDE Fortress or to the BEESTE - EDD Canal in case our last defence line
should be broken.
The defensive positions we are holding now are the strongest we have ever had since crossing
the RHINE. Five battalions in reserve, one Mortar Regiment with 10,000 rounds of
ammunition, four artillery and three Anti-Aircraft Batteries with enough ammunition, and last
but not least the well-seasoned 33 Eng Battalion with plenty of mines and with very high
fighting spirit. All this support and the superb fighting spirit and qualities of the troops under
our command guarantees that the enemy attack could only succeed after extremely heavy
casualties on both sides.
But there can be no doubt that the enemy would nevertheless succeed also in this attack after
bringing up all his heavy artillery and Typhoons as we have no such weapons. It must be
remarked that all the enemy attacks in the last weeks and months have succeeded for the
following main reasons:(a) Every single detail of the attack was thoroughly prepared and well-planned especially
Army and Air Force co-operation.
(b) Overwhelming amount of material.
(c ) Better trained men, especially as individual fighters.
The German High Command could not counter these facts with improvisation.
Improvisations could only delay the final decision but not avert it. They carry the core of
decline and fall especially if they are not the exception but the rule.

5 May
Our Division, which has frequently been mentioned in British Bulletins as the last German
Division which can still offer organised resistance, receives an envoy from 51 HIGHLAND
DIVISION. From that moment on there exists an armistice between 51 HIGHLAND
DIVISION and 15 Pz Gr Division which stood up against each other in honourable fighting
for nearly two years.
This is a memorable hour in the history of these two Divisions.

The War Record of 15 PGR ends on the 7 May 1945 with the unconditional surrender, and
we have to hand over our weapons in a few days to 51 HIGHLAND DIVISION without
incident. The Division is to be concentrated in the area TARMSTEDT (Lower ELBE) and to
prepare for demobilisation.

Concluded and Signed

RODT, Lieutenant General
15 Pz Gr Division