Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration4 but the RTC denied it in its
Order5 dated October 15, 2004.
Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA
assailing the July 9, 2004 and October 15, 2004 Orders of the RTC. 6
In its Resolution promulgated on April 6, 2006, the CA dismissed
petitioners petition for certiorariholding that it has no jurisdiction over the
said petition. The CA ruled that since appellate jurisdiction over private
respondents complaint for tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is
vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA), pursuant to its expanded
jurisdiction under Republic Act No. 9282 (RA 9282), it follows that a
petition for certiorari seeking nullification of an interlocutory order issued
in the said case should, likewise, be filed with the CTA.
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,7 but the CA denied it in its
Resolution dated November 29, 2006.
Hence, the present petition raising the following
issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
II Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely
abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in enjoining by issuing a Writ of Injunction the petitioners[,] their
agents and/or authorized representatives from implementing
Section 21 of the Revised Revenue Code of Manila, as amended,
against private respondents.
III Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely
abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing the Writ of Injunction despite failure of private
respondents to make a written claim for tax credit or refund with
the City Treasurer of Manila.
IV Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely
abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
considering that under Section 21 of the Manila Revenue Code, as
amended, they are mere collecting agents of the City Government.
V Whether or not the Honorable Regional Trial Court gravely
abuse[d] its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
in issuing the Writ of Injunction because petitioner City of Manila
and its constituents would result to greater damage and prejudice
thereof. (sic)8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Without first resolving the above issues, this Court finds that the instant
petition should be denied for being moot and academic.
U pon perusal of the original records of the instant case, this Court
discovered that a Decision9 in the main case had already been rendered by
the RTC on August 13, 2007, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court hereby renders
JUDGMENT in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant to grant a tax
refund or credit for taxes paid pursuant to Section 21 of the Revenue Code
of the City of Manila as amended for the year 2002 in the following
amounts:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
P
To plaintiff SM Mart, Inc.
11,462,525.02
To plaintiff SM Prime
3,118,104.63
Holdings, Inc.
To plaintiff Star Appliances
2,152,316.54
Center
To plaintiff Supervalue, Inc. 1,362,750.34
To plaintiff Ace Hardware
419,689.04
Phils., Inc.
To plaintiff Watsons
Personal Care Health Stores 231,453.62
Phils., Inc.
To plaintiff Jollimart Phils.,
140,908.54
Corp.
To plaintiff Surplus
220,204.70
Marketing Corp.
To plaintiff Signature Mktg.
94,906.34
Corp.
P
19,316,458.77
Defendants are further enjoined from collecting taxes under Section 21,
Revenue Code of Manila from herein plaintiff.
TOTAL:
SO ORDERED.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The parties did not inform the Court but based on the records, the above
Decision had already become final and executory per the Certificate of
Finality11 issued by the same trial court on October 20, 2008. In fact, a
Writ of Execution12 was issued by the RTC on November 25, 2009.
In view of the foregoing, it clearly appears that the issues raised in the
present petition, which merely involve the incident on the preliminary
injunction issued by the RTC, have already become moot and academic
considering that the trial court, in its decision on the merits in the main
case, has already ruled in favor of respondents and that the same decision
is now final and executory. Well entrenched is the rule that where the
issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable
controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical
use or value.13
Having disposed of the procedural aspect, we now turn to the central issue
in this case. The basic question posed before this Court is whether or not
the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an
interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.
This Court rules in the affirmative.
On June 16, 1954, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 1125 (RA 1125)
creating the CTA and giving to the said court jurisdiction over the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) Decisions of the Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving
disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties imposed in relation thereto, or other matters arising
under the National Internal Revenue Code or other law or part of law
administered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
(2) Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability
for customs duties, fees or other money charges; seizure, detention or
release of property affected fines, forfeitures or other penalties imposed in
relation thereto; or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other
law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Customs; and
(3) Decisions of provincial or City Boards of Assessment Appeals in cases
involving the assessment and taxation of real property or other matters
arising under the Assessment Law, including rules and regulations relative
thereto.
On March 30, 2004, the Legislature passed into law Republic Act No. 9282
(RA 9282) amending RA 1125 by expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA,
enlarging its membership and elevating its rank to the level of a collegiate
court with special jurisdiction. Pertinent portions of the amendatory act
provides thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. The CTA shall exercise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
a. Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein
provided:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. Decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving
disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties in relation thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue or other laws administered by the Bureau of
Internal Revenue;
2. Inaction by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue in cases involving
disputed assessments, refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other
charges, penalties in relations thereto, or other matters arising under the
National Internal Revenue Code or other laws administered by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue, where the National Internal Revenue Code provides a
specific period of action, in which case the inaction shall be deemed a
denial;
3. Decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in
local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the
exercise of their original or appellate jurisdiction;
4. Decisions of the Commissioner of Customs in cases involving liability for
customs duties, fees or other money charges, seizure, detention or release
of property affected, fines, forfeitures or other penalties in relation thereto,
or other matters arising under the Customs Law or other laws
administered by the Bureau of Customs;
regarded as powers which are inherent in its jurisdiction and the court
must possess them in order to enforce its rules of practice and to suppress
any abuses of its process and to defeat any attempted thwarting of such
process.
In this regard, Section 1 of RA 9282 states that the CTA shall be of the
same level as the CA and shall possess all the inherent powers of a court
of justice.
Indeed, courts possess certain inherent powers which may be said to be
implied from a general grant of jurisdiction, in addition to those expressly
conferred on them. These inherent powers are such powers as are
necessary for the ordinary and efficient exercise of jurisdiction; or are
essential to the existence, dignity and functions of the courts, as well as to
the due administration of justice; or are directly appropriate, convenient
and suitable to the execution of their granted powers; and include the
power to maintain the courts jurisdiction and render it effective in behalf
of the litigants.38
Thus, this Court has held that while a court may be expressly granted the
incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a grant of
jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary
and usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to
existing laws and constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted
court has power to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the
administration of justice within the scope of its jurisdiction and for the
enforcement of its judgments and mandates.39 Hence, demands, matters
or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action,
and coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the
court and determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over
the principal matter, even though the court may thus be called on to
consider and decide matters which, as original causes of action, would not
be within its cognizance.40
Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that
the authority of the CTA to take cognizance of petitions
for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local
tax case is included in the powers granted by the Constitution as well as
inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Finally, it would bear to point out that this Court is not abandoning the rule
that, insofar as quasijudicial tribunals are concerned, the authority to
issue writs of certiorari must still be expressly conferred by the
Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence of
their appellate jurisdiction. This doctrine remains as it applies only to
quasijudicial bodies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193986
January 15, 2014
EASTERN SHIPPING LINES INC., Petitioner,
vs.
BPI/MS INSURANCE CORP. and MITSUI SUM TOMO INSURANCE CO.
LTD., Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition1 for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88361, which
affirmed with modification the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
of Makati City, Branch 138 in Civil Case No. 04-1005.
The facts follow:
On August 29, 2003, Sumitomo Corporation (Sumitomo) shipped through
MV Eastern Challenger V-9-S, a vessel owned by petitioner Eastern
Shipping Lines, Inc. (petitioner), 31 various steel sheets in coil weighing
271,828 kilograms from Yokohama, Japan for delivery in favor of the
consignee Calamba Steel Center Inc. (Calamba Steel). 4 The cargo had a
declared value of US$125,417.26 and was insured against all risk by
Sumitomo with respondent Mitsui Sumitomo Insurance Co., Ltd. (Mitsui).
On or about September 6 2003, the shipment arrived at the port of Manila.
Upon unloading from the vessel, nine coils were observed to be in bad
condition as evidenced by the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order Cargo No.
67327. The cargo was then turned over to Asian Terminals, Inc. (ATI) for
stevedoring, storage and safekeeping pending Calamba Steels withdrawal
of the goods. When ATI delivered the cargo to Calamba Steel, the latter
rejected its damaged portion, valued at US$7,751.15, for being unfit for its
intended purpose.5
Subsequently, on September 13, 2003, a second shipment of 28 steel
sheets in coil, weighing 215,817 kilograms, was made by Sumitomo
through petitioners MV Eastern Challenger V-10-S for transport and
delivery again to Calamba Steel.6 Insured by Sumitomo against all risk
with Mitsui,7 the shipment had a declared value of US$121,362.59. This
second shipment arrived at the port of Manila on or about September 23,
2003. However, upon unloading of the cargo from the said vessel, 11 coils
were found damaged as evidenced by the Turn Over Survey of Bad Order
Cargo No. 67393. The possession of the said cargo was then transferred to
ATI for stevedoring, storage and safekeeping pending withdrawal thereof
by Calamba Steel. When ATI delivered the goods, Calamba Steel rejected
the damaged portion thereof, valued at US$7,677.12, the same being unfit
for its intended purpose.8
Lastly, on September 29, 2003, Sumitomo again shipped 117 various steel
sheets in coil weighing 930,718 kilograms through petitioners vessel, MV
Eastern Venus V-17-S, again in favor of Calamba Steel.9 This third
shipment had a declared value of US$476,416.90 and was also insured by
Sumitomo with Mitsui. The same arrived at the port of Manila on or about
October 11, 2003. Upon its discharge, six coils were observed to be in bad
condition. Thereafter, the possession of the cargo was turned over to ATI
for stevedoring, storage and safekeeping pending withdrawal thereof by
Calamba Steel. The damaged portion of the goods being unfit for its
intended purpose, Calamba Steel rejected the damaged portion, valued at
US$14,782.05, upon ATIs delivery of the third shipment. 10
Calamba Steel filed an insurance claim with Mitsui through the latters
settling agent, respondent BPI/MS Insurance Corporation (BPI/MS), and
the former was paid the sums of US$7,677.12, US$14,782.05 and
US$7,751.15 for the damage suffered by all three shipments or for the
total amount of US$30,210.32. Correlatively, on August 31, 2004, as
insurer and subrogee of Calamba Steel, Mitsui and BPI/MS filed a
Complaint for Damages against petitioner and ATI.11
As synthesized by the RTC in its decision, during the pre-trial conference of
the case, the following facts were established, viz:
1. The fact that there were shipments made on or about August 29, 2003,
September 13, 2003 and September 29, 2003 by Sumitomo to Calamba
Steel through petitioners vessels;
2. The declared value of the said shipments and the fact that the
shipments were insured by respondents;
3. The shipments arrived at the port of Manila on or about September 6,
2003, September 23, 2003 and October 11, 2003 respectively;
4. Respondents paid Calamba Steels total claim in the amount of
US$30,210.32.12
Trial on the merits ensued.
On September 17, 2006, the RTC rendered its Decision, 13 the dispositive
portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against defendants Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. and Asian Terminals, Inc.,
jointly and severally, ordering the latter to pay plaintiffs the following:
1. Actual damages amounting to US$30,210.32 plus 6% legal interest
thereon commencing from the filing of this complaint, until the same is
fully paid;
2. Attorneys fees in a sum equivalent to 25% of the amount claimed;
3. Costs of suit. The defendants counterclaims and ATIs crossclaim are
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.14
Aggrieved, petitioner and ATI appealed to the CA. On July 9, 2010, the CA
in its assailed Decision affirmed with modification the RTCs findings and
ruling, holding, among others, that both petitioner and ATI were very
negligent in the handling of the subject cargoes. Pointing to the affidavit of
Mario Manuel, Cargo Surveyor, the CA found that "during the unloading
operations, the steel coils were lifted from the vessel but were not
carefully laid on the ground. Some were even dropped while still several
inches from the ground while other coils bumped or hit one another at the
pier while being arranged by the stevedores and forklift operators of ATI
and [petitioner]." The CA added that such finding coincides with the factual
findings of the RTC that both petitioner and ATI were both negligent in
handling the goods. However, for failure of the RTC to state the
justification for the award of attorneys fees in the body of its decision, the
CA accordingly deleted the same.15 Petitioner filed its Motion for
Reconsideration16 which the CA, however, denied in its Resolution 17 dated
October 6, 2010.
Both petitioner and ATI filed their respective separate petitions for review
on certiorari before this Court.1wphi1 However, ATIs petition, docketed
as G.R. No. 192905, was denied by this Court in our Resolution 18 dated
October 6, 2010 for failure of ATI to show any reversible error in the
assailed CA decision and for failure of ATI to submit proper verification.
Said resolution had become final and executory on March 22,
2011.19 Nevertheless, this Court in its Resolution20 dated September 3,
2012, gave due course to this petition and directed the parties to file their
respective memoranda.
In its Memorandum,21 petitioner essentially avers that the CA erred in
affirming the decision of the RTC because the survey reports submitted by
respondents themselves as their own evidence and the pieces of evidence
submitted by petitioner clearly show that the cause of the damage was the
rough handling of the goods by ATI during the discharging operations.
Petitioner attests that it had no participation whatsoever in the discharging
operations and that petitioner did not have a choice in selecting the
stevedore since ATI is the only arrastre operator mandated to conduct
discharging operations in the South Harbor. Thus, petitioner prays that it
be absolved from any liability relative to the damage incurred by the
goods.
On the other hand, respondents counter, among others, that as found by
both the RTC and the CA, the goods suffered damage while still in the
possession of petitioner as evidenced by various Turn Over Surveys of Bad
Order Cargoes which were unqualifiedly executed by petitioners own
surveyor, Rodrigo Victoria, together with the representative of ATI.
Respondents assert that petitioner would not have executed such
documents if the goods, as it claims, did not suffer any damage prior to
their turn-over to ATI. Lastly, respondents aver that petitioner, being a
common carrier is required by law to observe extraordinary diligence in
the vigilance over the goods it carries.22
Simply put, the core issue in this case is whether the CA committed any
reversible error in finding that petitioner is solidarily liable with ATI on
account of the damage incurred by the goods.
The Court resolves the issue in the negative.
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that factual questions may
not be raised before this Court in a petition for review on certiorari as this
Court is not a trier of facts. This is clearly stated in Section 1, Rule 45 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which provides:
SECTION 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to
appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final order or resolution of the
Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other
courts whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a
verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.
on the riprap and the elevation of the road embankment. Since First Sta.
Clara ran out of funds after only two (2) months of construction, Rivelisa
Realty was forced to shoulder part of the payment due to the
subcontractor.7 First Sta. Clara manifested its intention to back out from
the JVA and to discontinue operations when Rivelisa Realty refused to
advance any more funds until 60% of the project had been accomplished.
In a letter dated August 24, 1995, Rivelisa Realty readily agreed to release
First Sta. Clara from the JVA and estimated its actual accomplishment
at P4,000,000.00, which included the payment to the subcontractor in the
amount of P1,258,892.72 and the cash advances amounting
to P319,259.68.8 First Sta. Clara, however, insisted on a valuation of its
accomplished works at P 4,578,142.10, which, less the cash advances and
subcontractors fees, should leave a net reimbursable amount
of P3,000,000.00 in its favor. After several exchanges, Rivelisa Realty
agreed to reimburse First Sta. Clara the amount of P3,000,000.00,
emphasizing in its letter dated October 9, 1995 that the amount is actually
over and beyond its obligation under the JVA.9 However, the reimbursable
amount of P 3,000,000.00 remained unpaid despite several demands.
Hence, First Sta. Clara filed a complaint10 for rescission of the JVA against
Rivelisa Realty before the RTC, claiming the payment of damages for
breach of contract and delay in the performance of an obligation.
For its part, Rivelisa Realty asserted that it was not obligated to pay First
Sta. Clara any amount at all since the latter had even failed to comply with
its obligation to initially spend the equivalent amount of P10,000,000.00
on the project before being entitled to cash payments. 11
The RTC Ruling
In a Decision12 dated March 30, 2000, the RTC dismissed the complaint
and ordered First Sta. Clara to instead pay Rivelisa Realty on its
counterclaims for actual expenses and damages amounting
to P300,000.00, and for attorneys fees of P50,000.00, including costs of
suit.13 It found that First Sta. Clara had agreed to first accomplish several
conditions before it could demand from Rivelisa Realty the performance of
the latters obligations under the JVA, namely: (a) to finish the
development and construction of the remaining 69% of horizontal work in
the project within a period of twelve (12) months from signing; (b) to
spend an initial amount of P10,000,000.00 of its own resources for the
project; and (c) to accomplish at least 60% of the horizontal work in the
remaining undeveloped area.14 As First Sta. Clara stopped working on the
project halfway into the construction period due to its own lack of funds,
the RTC concluded that it was actually the party that first violated the
JVA.15 Dissatisfied, First Sta. Clara elevated the matter on appeal.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision16 dated February 27, 2009 (CA Decision), the CA found
Rivelisa Realty still liable for First Sta. Claras actual accomplishments in
the project amounting to P3,000,000.00, after deducting certain costs it
advanced during the construction period. It held that First Sta. Clara was
no longer obligated to comply with the terms and conditions of the JVA
after Rivelisa Realty agreed that it be dissolved. First Sta. Clara was,
xxxx
Section 3. Period of Ordinary Appeal. The appeal shall be taken within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the
judgment or final order. (Sec. 3, Rule 41, RCP)
(Emphases supplied)
xxxx
While a motion for additional time is expressly permitted in the filing of a
petition for review before the Court under Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court,24 a similar motion seeking to extend the period for filing a motion
for reconsideration is prohibited in all other courts.1wphi1 This rule was
first laid down in the case of Habaluyas Enterprises v. Japzon 25 wherein it
was held that:26
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule
shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a
motion for new trial or reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan
or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate
Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the
Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound
discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Restating the rule in Rolloque v. CA27 (Rolloque), the Court emphasized
that the 15-day period for filing a motion for new trial or reconsideration is
non-extendible. Hence, the filing of a motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration did not toll the 15-day period before a
judgment becomes final and executory.28
In this case, Rivelisa Realty only had until March 18, 2009 29 within which to
file either a motion for reconsideration before the CA or a petition for
review of the CA Decision to the Court. But it committed the fatal error of
filing instead a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Motion for
Reconsideration before the CA which as expressed in Rolloque did not
toll the running of the period for the finality of the latters decision. Verily,
a party who fails to question an adverse decision by not filing the proper
remedy within the period prescribed by law loses the right to do so as the
decision, as to him, becomes final and binding.30 Since the CA Decision had
already become final and executory due to the lapse of the reglementary
period, not only did the CA properly deny Rivelisa Realtys belatedly-filed
motion for reconsideration but also the remedy of review before the Court
had already been lost. The Court has repeatedly held that the failure to
perfect an appeal in the manner and within the period fixed by law renders
the decision sought to be appealed final, with the result that no court can
exercise appellate jurisdiction to review the decision. 31 Considering that the
CA Decision had long become final and unalterable by the time Rivelisa
Realty elevated the same,32 the Court must hereby deny the instant
petition.
Even discounting the above-discussed procedural aspects, the Court is still
wont to deny the instant petition on substantive grounds.
The Court concurs with the CA that First Sta. Clara is entitled to be
compensated for the development works it had accomplished on the
project based on the principle of quantum meruit. Case law instructs that
under this principle, a contractor is allowed to recover the reasonable
value of the thing or services rendered despite the lack of a written
contract, in order to avoid unjust enrichment. 33 Quantum meruit means
that, in an action for work and labor, payment shall be made in such
amount as the plaintiff reasonably deserves. 34 The measure of recovery
should relate to the reasonable value of the services performed 35 because
the principle aims to prevent undue enrichment based on the equitable
postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain any benefit without paying
for it.36 In this case, it is undisputed that
First Sta. Clara already performed certain works on the project with an
estimated value of P4,578, 152.10. Clearly, to completely deny it payment
for the same would result in Rivelisa Realty's unjust enrichment at the
former' s expense. Besides, as may be gleaned from the parties'
correspondence, Rivelisa Realty obligated itself to unconditionally
reimburse First Sta. Clara the amount of P3,000,000.00 (representing First
Sta. Clara's valuation of its accomplished works at P4,578,152.10, less the
cash advances and subcontractor's fees) after the JV A had already been
terminated by them through mutual assent. As such, Rivelisa Realty
cannot unilaterally renege on its promise by citing First Sta. Clara's nonfulfillment of the terms and conditions of the terminated JVA. For all these
reasons, the CA' s ruling must be upheld.
WHERFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated February 27,
2009, and Resolutions dated May 22, 2009 and September 8, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67198 are hereby AFFIRMED.
G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014
RALPH P. TUA, Petitioner, v. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, PRESIDING
JUDGE, BRANCH 22, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, IMUS, CAVITE; AND
ROSSANA HONRADO-TUA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to annul the
Decision1 dated October 28, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) issued in
CA-G.R. SP No. 89939.
On May 20, 2005, respondent Rossana Honrado-Tua (respondent) filed
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite a Verified Petition 2 for
herself and in behalf of her minor children, Joshua Raphael, Jesse Ruth
Lois, and Jezreel Abigail, for the issuance of a protection order, pursuant to
Republic Act (RA) 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and their
Children Act of 2004, against her husband, petitioner Ralph Tua. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 0464-05 and raffled-off to Branch 22.
Respondent claimed that she and her children had suffered from
petitioners abusive conduct; that petitioner had threatened to cause her
and the children physical harm for the purpose of controlling her actions or
decisions; that she was actually deprived of custody and access to her
minor children; and, that she was threatened to be deprived of her and
her childrens financial support.
On May 23, 2005, the RTC issued a Temporary Protection Order (TPO), 4
which we quote in full:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Pursuant to the provisions of R.A. 9262, otherwise known as the AntiViolence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004, a Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) effective for thirty (30) days from date of receipt is
hereby issued against respondent Ralph P. Tua.
For the purpose of the implementation of the Temporary Protection Order,
the respondent (herein petitioner Ralph) is hereby ordered
to:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
1. Enjoin from committing and threatening to commit personally or
through another, physical, verbal and emotional harm or abuse against the
herein petitioner (respondent) and other family and household members;
2. Restrain from harassing, annoying, texting, telephoning, contacting or
otherwise communicating with the petitioner (respondent) whether directly
or indirectly or engaged in any psychological form of harassment;
3. Stay away from the petitioner (respondent) and other family and
household members at a distance of 100 meters radius from the place of
residence of the plaintiff and likewise to stay away from the residence,
school, place of employment and other places frequented by the herein
petitioner (respondent), and other family and household members.
4. Give and deliver the three (3) minor children of the petitioner
(respondent) to the [latter] who shall have their temporary custody
The Sheriff of this Court, the PNP Imus, Cavite, or any Officers of the Law
are hereby commanded to effect this Order immediately and to use
necessary force and measures under the law to implement this Order.
Let the hearing for Permanent Protection Order be set on June 9, 2005 at
2:00 oclock in the afternoon.
SO ORDERED.5crallawlibrary
In his Comment6 to respondents Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO,
petitioner denied respondents allegations and alleged, among others, that
he had been maintaining a separate abode from petitioner since November
2004; that it was respondent who verbally abused and threatened him
whenever their childrens stay with him was extended; that respondent
had been staying with a certain Rebendor Zuiga despite the impropriety
and moral implications of such set-up; that despite their written
agreement that their minor children should stay in their conjugal home,
the latter violated the same when she surreptitiously moved out of their
conjugal dwelling with their minor children and stayed with said Zuiga;
and, that respondent is mentally, psychologically, spiritually and morally
unfit to keep the children in her custody. Petitioner contended that the
issuance of the TPO on May 23, 2005 is unconstitutional for being violative
of the due process clause of the Constitution.
Without awaiting for the resolution of his Comment on the petition and
motion to lift TPO, petitioner filed with the CA a petition for certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and hold departure
order assailing the May 23, 2005 TPO issued by the RTC.
On June 9, 2005, the CA, in order not to render the petition moot and to
avoid grave and irreparable injury, issued a temporary restraining order to
temporarily enjoin the parties and their agents from enforcing the assailed
May 23, 2005 TPO issued in Civil Case No. 0464-05.7crallawlibrary
Petitioner later filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction with Manifestation,8 praying that the enforcement of all orders,
decision to be issued by the RTC and all the proceedings therein be
restrained. A hearing9 was, subsequently, conducted on the motion.
On October 28, 2005, the CA issued its assailed decision, the decretal
portion of which reads:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is
hereby DENIEDfor lack of merit. Accordingly, the assailed Temporary
Protection Order dated May 23, 2002 (sic) issued by the Regional Trial
Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch 22 in Civil Case No. 0464-05 is UPHELD.10
In so ruling, the CA found that the petition filed by respondent under RA
9262 is still pending before the RTC; thus, the factual matters raised
therein could not be passed upon in the petition for certiorarifiled with it.
The CA noted that during the pendency of the herein proceedings,
petitioner filed an urgent motion to quash warrant issued by the RTC and
which matter could not also be a subject of this petition which assails the
TPO dated May 23, 2005 and that the motion to quash should have been
filed with the RTC.
The CA found that the TPO dated May 23, 2005 was validly issued by the
RTC and found no grave abuse of discretion in the issuance thereof as the
same were in complete accord with the provision of RA 9262.
As to petitioners argument that there was no basis for the issuance of the
TPO, considering that the provision authorizing such issuance is
unconstitutional, the CA ruled that since the matter raised herein was the
RTCs alleged grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO, such matter
could be resolved without having to rule on the constitutionality of RA
9262 and its provisions. And that the requisites that the constitutionality
of the law in question be the very lis mota of the case was absent.
Dissatisfied, petitioner files the instant petition raising the following
issues:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS WITH DUE RESPECT SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN HOLDING AND FINDING IN A MANNER CONTRARY TO
ESTABLISHED RULES AND JURISPRUDENCE THAT PUBLIC RESPONDENT
COMMITTED NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN THE LATTER
ISSUED THE TEMPORARY PROTECTIVE ORDER (TPO) DATED 23 MAY 2005
WITHOUT OBSERVING DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND CONSIDERATIONS OF
JUSTICE AND BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN REFUSING TO RULE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROVISIONS OF RA 9262 HAS DECIDED
THE CASE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH ESTABLISHED LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE CONSIDERING THAT CONTRARY TO ITS FINDINGS THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SAID LAW IS THE LIS MOTA OF THE CASE.11
Petitioner claims that contrary to the stance of the CA in not deciding the
issue of the constitutionality of RA 9262, the issue presented is the very
lis mota in the instant case.
The issue of constitutionality of RA 9262 was raised by petitioner in his
Comment to respondents Petition with Urgent Motion to Lift TPO dated
May 23, 2005 filed with the RTC. However, without awaiting for the
resolution of the same, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
assailing the TPO issued for violating the due process clause of the
Constitution. Contrary to the CAs finding that the matter raised in the
petition filed with it was the RTCs alleged grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the TPO which could be resolved without having to rule on the
constitutionality of RA 9262 and its provisions, we find that since petitioner
is assailing the validity of RA 9262 wherein respondents right to a
protection order is based upon, the constitutionality of the said law must
first be decided upon. After all, the alleged unconstitutionality of RA 9262
is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a
protection order.12 Notwithstanding, however, we still find no merit to
declare RA 9262 unconstitutional.
Petitioner particularly directs his constitutional attack on Section 15 of RA
9262 contending that had there been no ex parte issuance of the TPO, he
would have been afforded due process of law and had properly presented
his side on the matter; that the questioned provision simply encourages
arbitrary enforcement repulsive to basic constitutional rights which affects
his life, liberty and property.
We are not impressed.
Section 15 of RA 9262 provides:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. - Temporary Protection Orders
(TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the court on the date of
filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order should
be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs
mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court
shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a [Permanent Protection Order]
PPO prior to or on the date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall
order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the
court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for
the service. The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing on the
merits of the issuance of a PPO.
In Garcia v. Drilon,13 wherein petitioner therein argued that Section 15
of RA 9262 is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, we
struck down the challenge and held:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence
against women and their children, their family or household members, and
to grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended
parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and
facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.
The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the
victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail
access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim
from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for
protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and
afforded an opportunity to present his side. x x x. The essence of due
process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and
submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense. To be
heard does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard
also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due
process.14
Petitioner also assails that there is an invalid delegation of legislative
power to the court and tobarangay officials to issue protection orders.
Section 2 of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides that the
Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of the various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court
of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in Section 5 hereof. Hence, the
primary judge of the necessity, adequacy, wisdom, reasonableness and
expediency of any law is primarily the function of the legislature. 15 The act
of Congress entrusting us with the issuance of protection orders is in
pursuance of our authority to settle justiciable controversies or disputes
involving rights that are enforceable and demandable before the courts of
justice or the redress of wrongs for violations of such rights. 16crallawlibrary
As to the issuance of protection order by the Punong Barangay, Section 14
pertinently provides:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by
the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing
acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act. A Punong Barangay who
receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the
applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of
the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the
application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available
Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order
must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the
Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO.
BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the
issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad
shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any
barangay official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any
proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Hence, the issuance of a BPO by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any availableBarangay Kagawad, merely orders the
perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her
child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm.
Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature,
in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to enforce all
laws and ordinances, and to maintain public order in the
barangay.17crallawlibrary
Petitioner assails that the CA erred in finding that the RTC did not commit
grave abuse of discretion in issuing the TPO dated May 23, 2005 as the
petition was bereft of any indication of grounds for the issuance of the
same. Petitioner claims that while the issuance of the TPO is ex parte,
there must be a judicial determination of the basis thereof. He contends
that the allegations in respondents affidavit attached to the petition, and
without admitting the same to be true, are nothing more than normal or
usual quarrels between a husband and wife which are not grave or
imminent enough to merit the issuance of a TPO.
We are not persuaded.
We quote again Section 15 of RA 9262 for ready reference,
thus:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders. - Temporary Protection Orders
(TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the court on the date of
filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order should
be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any, some or all of the reliefs
mentioned in this Act and shall be effective for thirty (30) days. The court
shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of
the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order the immediate personal
service of the TPO on the respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain
the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service. The TPO shall
include notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the issuance of a
PPO.
Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of
the application after ex partedetermination that there is basis for the
issuance thereof. Ex parte means that the respondent need not be notified
or be present in the hearing for the issuance of the TPO. Thus, it is within
the courts discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached
thereto, to determine that the violent acts against women and their
children for the issuance of a TPO have been committed.
And Section 5 of the same law provides:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The
crime of violence against women and their children is committed through
any of the following acts:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage
in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or
desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage
in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the womans or her childs
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or
other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed
against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the
following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the womans or her childs movement or
conduct:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of
custody to her/his family;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of
financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the
womans children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal
right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity or controlling the victims own money or
properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or
properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the
purpose of controlling her actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in
any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of
force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman
or her child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or
through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not
be limited to, the following acts:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman
or her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman
or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to
animals or pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to
the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor
children of access to the womans child/children.
In this case, the alleged acts of petitioner among others, i.e., he cocked
the gun and pointed the same to his head in order to convince respondent
not to proceed with the legal separation case; feeding his other children
with the food which another child spat out; and threatening the crying
child with a belt to stop him from crying which was repeatedly done; and
holding respondent by her nape when he got furious that she was asking
him not to come often to their conjugal home and hold office thereat after
their agreed separation and threatening her of withholding half of the
financial support for the kids, while not conclusive, are enough bases for
the issuance of a TPO. Petitioners actions would fall under the
enumeration of Section 5, more particularly, paragraphs a, d, e (2), f, h,
and i.
It is settled doctrine that there is grave abuse of discretion when there is a
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction, such as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be
so patent and gross so as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.18 We find that the CA did not err when it found no
grave abuse of discretion committed by the RTC in the issuance of the
TPO.
The factual matters herein raised by petitioner should be presented during
the hearing on the merits on the issuance of the Permanent Protection
Order.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated October 28,
2005 of the Court of Appeals issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 89939, upholding
the Regional Trial Courts issuance of the Temporary Protection Order dated
May 23, 2005, is AFFIRMED. The Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite is
hereby ORDERED to resolve with dispatch respondents Petition for a
Permanent Protection Order.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199146, March 19, 2014
HEIRS OF PACIFICO POCDO, NAMELY, RITA POCDO GASIC, GOLIC POCDO,
MARCELA POCDO ALFELOR, KENNETH POCDO, NIXON CADOS,
JACQUELINE CADOS LEE, EFLYN CADOS, AND GIRLIE CADOS DAPLIN,
HEREIN REPRESENTED BY THEIR ATTORNEYINFACT JOHN
POCDO,Petitioners, v. ARSENIA AVILA AND EMELINDA
CHUA, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review1 assails the 12 October 2011 Decision2 of the Court
of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 91039. The Court of Appeals affirmed the 14
January 2008 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch
61, in Civil Case No. 4710R, dismissing the complaint for lack of
jurisdiction.
The Facts
In June 2000, Pacifico Pocdo, who was later substituted by his heirs upon
his death, filed a complaint to quiet title over a 1,728square meter
property (disputed property) located in Camp 7, Baguio City, and covered
by Tax Declaration 9606008106641. Pacifico claimed that the disputed
property is part of Lot 43, TS39, which originally belonged to Pacificos
father, Pocdo Pool. The disputed property is allegedly different from the
onehectare portion alloted to Polon Pocdo, the predecessorininterest of
the defendants Arsenia Avila and Emelinda Chua, in a partition made by
the heirs of Pocdo Pool. Pacifico alleged that the defendants unlawfully
claimed the disputed property, which belonged to Pacifico.
The facts of the case were summarized by the Court of Appeals as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As it appears, in 1894, Pocdo Pool, who died in 1942, began his occupation
and claim on three lots that were eventually surveyed in his name as Lot
43, TS 39SWO36431, Lot 44, TS 39SWO36420 and Lot 45 TS 39
SWO36429 with an area of 144,623 [sq.m.], 64,112 [sq.m.], and 9,427
square meters, respectively, and situated at Residence Section 4, Baguio
City. These lots were the subject of a petition to reopen judicial
proceedings filed by the Heirs of Pocdo Pool with the CFI of Baguio City in
Civil Reservation Case No. 1, LRC Case 211. The registration of the lots in
the names of the petitioners were [sic] granted in October 1964, but since
the decision was not implemented within the 10 years [sic] prescribed
period, the Heirs filed their ancestral land claims with the DENR. In August
1991, Certificates of Ancestral Lands Claims (CALS) were issued by the
DENR for Lots 44 and 45, but Lot 43 was not approved due to
Memorandum Order 9815 issued by the DENR Secretary in September
1998.
In the meantime, on September 14, 1960, Polon Pocdo, an heir of Pocdo
Pool, ceded his rights over the three lots to Pacifico Pocdo in exchange for
a one hectare lot to be taken from Lot 43. However, Pacifico entered into a
contract with Florencio Pax and Braulio Yaranon on November 21, 1968
revoking the agreement with Polon. In the contract, the 4,875 square
meters where Polons house was located became part of the 1hectare
given to Pax and Yaranon in exchange for their services in the titling of
Pacificos lands.
Polon filed a complaint in August 1980 [with] the Office of the Barangay
Captain at Camp 7, Baguio City, which was settled by an amicable
settlement dated September 3, 1980 between Pacifico and Polon. They
agreed that Polon would again retain the 4,875 square meters and Pacifico
would give the 5,125 square meter area, the remaining portion of the 1
hectare share of Polon, to be taken from Lot 43 after a segregation.
On April 18, 1981, Polon entered into a Catulagan with Arsenia Avila
authorizing the latter to undertake the segregation of his onehectare land
The instant case, Civil Case 4710R, before the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City, Branch 61 was filed by Pacifico Pocdo against Arsenia Avila
and Emelinda Chua in June 2000, just after the RED set aside Suakings
revocation on April 28, 2000 and ordered the restoration of Avilas
Certificate of Exclusion. Since then, the judicial proceedings have run
parallel to the administrative case.3
In a Resolution4 dated 14 January 2008, the Regional Trial Court dismissed
the case for lack of jurisdiction. The trial court held that the DENR had
already declared the disputed property as public land, which the State,
through the DENR, has the sole power to dispose. Thus, the claim of
petitioners to quiet title is not proper since they do not have title over the
disputed property. The trial court agreed with the DENR Secretarys ruling
that petitioner may participate in the public bidding of the disputed
property if qualified under applicable rules.
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, asserting that the case is not
limited to quieting of title since there are other issues not affected by the
DENR ruling, particularly the validity of the Waiver of Rights and the
Catulagan. Petitioners maintained that the DENRs ruling that the disputed
property is public land did not preclude the court from taking cognizance of
the issues on who is entitled possession to the disputed property and
whether the questioned documents are valid and enforceable against
Pacifico and his heirs.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners, in raising the issue of quieting
of title, failed to allege any legal or equitable title to quiet. Under Article
477 of the Civil Code, in an action to quiet title, the plaintiff must have
legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the
subject matter of the action. Instead of an action to quiet title or accion
reivindicatoria, the Court of Appeals stated that petitioners should have
filed an accion publiciana based merely on the recovery ofpossession de
jure.
On the validity of the Catulagan and the Waiver of Rights, the Court of
Appeals held that petitioners have no right to question these since they
were not parties to said documents had not participated in any manner in
their execution. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the contracting
parties are bound by the stipulations of the said documents. Those not
parties to the said documents, and for whose benefit they were not
expressly made, cannot maintain an action based on the said documents.
Thus, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts resolution, subject to
the right of petitioners to file the appropriate action.
The Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There is no more need to discuss the other issues raised since these are
intrinsically linked to petitioners action to quiet title.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 12 October 2011
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 91039.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 203947
February 26, 2014
RUFA A. RUBIO, BARTOLOME BANTOTO, LEON ALAGADMO, RODRIGO
DELICTA, and ADRIANO ALABATA,Petitioners,
vs.
LOURDES ALABATA, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeks to annul and set
aside the November 16, 2011 Decision1and the September 26, 2012
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 02497, which
affirmed the February 28, 2008 Resolution of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 42, Dumaguete City (RTC-42). in an action for revival of judgment.
The Facts:
Petitioners Rufa A. Rubio, Bartolome Bantoto, Leon Alagadmo, Rodrigo
Delicta, and Adriano Alabata (petitioners) and respondent Lourdes Alabata
(respondent) were protagonists in an earlier case for annulment of
declaration of heirship and sale, reconveyance and damages before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dumaguete City (RTC-43). Docketed as
Civil Case No. 10153, the case was decided in favor of petitioner. In its
October 31, 1995 Decision, the RTC-43 (1) voided the "Declaration of
Heirship and Sale;" (2) ordered respondent to reconvey the entire subject
property to petitioners; (3) dismissed respondents counterclaim; and (4)
ordered her to pay moral and exemplary damages plus the cost of suit. 3
Not in conformity, respondent elevated the RTC-43 case to the CA. She,
however, later withdrew her appeal which paved the way for the RTC-43
Decision to lapse into finality. The CA resolution granting respondents
motion to withdraw became final and executory on June 20, 1997. On
August 20, 1997, the Entry of Judgment4 was issued and recorded in the
CA Book of Entries of Judgments.
Unfortunately, the judgment was not executed. Petitioners claim that their
counsel at the Public Attorneys Office, Dumaguete City (PAO-Dumaguete),
was never informed that the entry of judgment had already been
issued.5They pointed out that, initially, their case was handled by the PAODumaguete, but when the RTC-43 decision was appealed to the CA by
respondent, their case was handed over to the Special Appealed Cases
Division (SAC-PAO) at the PAO Central Office in Manila. They explained
that although a copy of the Entry of Judgment was sent to Atty. Ma.
Lourdes Naz, the SAC-PAO lawyer in charge of their case, she failed to
inform petitioners of the issued entry of judgment before she resigned
from PAO sometime in November 1997. She also failed to inform PAODumaguete of the said development. When petitioners followed up with
It appears from the records that a copy of the Entry of Judgment was sent
to Atty. Ma. Lourdes Naz, the SAC-PAO lawyer in charge of their case, who
had resigned. Unfortunately, she failed to inform petitioners of the said
entry of judgment before her resignation in November 1997. She also
failed to inform PAO-Dumaguete of such development.
It was only in November 2007, when petitioners actually discovered that
their victory was already final after their nephew secured a copy of the
entry of judgment from RTC-43.
Indeed, both the RTC-42 and the CA were acting in accordance with the
rules and jurisprudence when they dismissed the action for revival of
judgment. Section 6 is clear. Once a judgment becomes final and
executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right by
mere motion within five (5) years from the date of entry of judgment. If
the prevailing party fails to have the decision enforced by a motion after
the lapse of five (5) years, the said judgment is reduced to a right of
action which must be enforced by the institution of a complaint in a regular
court within ten (10) years from the time the judgment becomes final. 11
An action for revival of judgment is governed by Article 1144 (3), Article
1152 of the Civil Code and Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Thus,
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action accrues:
xxxx
(3) Upon a judgment
Article 1152 of the Civil Code states:
Art. 1152. The period for prescription of actions to demand the fulfillment
of obligations declared by a judgment commences from the time the
judgment became final.
To allow a strict application of the rules, however, would result in an
injustice to petitioners considering (1) that respondent decided not to
contest the RTC-43 decision and withdrew her appeal and (2) that no fault
could be attributed to petitioners.
Petitioners could not afford to engage the services of a private counsel and
so were represented by the PAO. As has been repeatedly stated all over
the records, PAO, SAC-PAO in particular, failed them. SAC-PAO never
informed them of the abandonment by respondent of her appeal or of the
entry of judgment. Under the circumstances, they could not be faulted for
their subsequent actions. They went to PAO-Dumaguete and they were
told that the case was still pending on appeal. Due to their penury and
unfamiliarity or downright ignorance of the rules, they could not be
expected to bypass PAO-Dumaguete and directly verify the status of the
case with the SAC-PAO. They had to trust their lawyer and wait.
No prejudice is caused to respondent because she withdrew her
appeal.1wphi1 Withdrawing her appeal means that she respected the
RTC-43 Decision, which voided the "Declaration of Heirship and Sale,"
dismissed respondents counterclaim, and ordered her to reconvey the
entire subject property to petitioners and to pay moral and exemplary
damages plus the cost of suit. Since the decision became final and
executory, she has been in possession of the property which rightfully
"A parcel of rice land designated as Lot 2473, situated at Brgy. Capoocan,
Calbayog City, bounded on the North by 03-005(1472)04-001(2474); on
the East by 04-031(2774); on the South by 05-009(2462), 008(2461),
004-2458, 003(2457), and on the West by 03-005(2472), 001(2463),
containing an area of 6,433 square meters more or less, declared in
Declaration of Real Property ARP No. 96-01015-00398 in the name of the
late Paciano Yabao, with an assessed value of P2,760.00"
4. That sometime in 1996, defendant herein asserted claim of ownership
and allowed a person to possess the above-described property,
notwithstanding vehement opposition thereto by plaintiffs herein;
5. That notwithstanding demands for the defendant to vacate the premises
usurped and occupied by her, she refused and still continue to refuse, to
leave the said premises;
6. That, aside from taking possession of the premises in question,
defendant also applied for free patent for the property in question with the
DENR Office of Samar, to which plaintiffs herein have filed a timely
opposition; x x x4
The Heirs of Yabao prayed that they be declared the co-owners and
possessors of a parcel of land designated as Lot 2473 located in Brgy.
Capoocan, Calbayog City (subject lot);that possession thereof be restored
to them; and that Van der Kolk be ordered to pay them attorneys fees,
litigation expenses as well as reasonable rental ofP2,000.00 per month.
Copies of the summons and the complaint were served upon the attorneyin-fact of Van der Kolk, Ma. Narcisa Fabregaras-Ventures (Ventures),whom
she authorized, among others, to institute and defend all actions for the
protection of her rights and interests over her properties, including the
subject lot, by virtue of a special power of attorney5 executed on August
22, 1999. It was noted in the Sheriffs Return of Service 6 that Van der Kolk
was in the Netherlands at the time of the service.
On April 2, 2001, Van der Kolk filed a Motion to Dismiss7 the complaint
anchored on the following grounds: 1] lack of jurisdiction by the MTCC
over her person due to defective service of summons; and 2] lack of cause
of action. Van der Kolk alleged that the service of summons should have
been made in accordance with Section 15, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court
because she was not actually residing in the Philippines. She contended
that the predecessors-in-interest of the Heirs of Yabao had executed a
joint affidavit on July 16, 1980, wherein they renounced their hereditary
rights over the subject lot and declared that Faustina Yabao, mother of Van
der Kolk, as its true owner.
The Heirs of Yabao filed their opposition to the said motion and moved to
declare Van der Kolk in default contending that the motion to dismiss was
filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period and no answer had been
filed.8
On July 27, 2004, the MTCC issued a Resolution9 denying the motion to
dismiss and holding that there was proper service of summons. It also
denied the motion to declare defendant in default, stating that the motion
to dismiss was seasonably filed. The MTCC further directed Van der Kolk to
file an answer within 10 days from receipt of the aforesaid resolution.
On September 6, 2004, Van Der Kolks counsel, Atty. Felidito Dacut, filed a
Manifestation with Motion10 praying that he be relieved as her counsel
because she never contacted him about the case after he was informed
that she had revoked the authority of Ventures and, thereafter, asked for
the documents in his possession.
The Heirs of Yabao still reiterated their motion to declare Van der Kolk in
default during the December 20, 2004 hearing because no answer had yet
been filed.
On March 7, 2005, Van der Kolk, through her new counsel, Atty. Eduardo
Tibo (Atty. Tibo),filed her Answer11 to the complaint which was appended
to the Motion for Allowance12 To Belatedly File Defendants Answer.
On December 4, 2006, the MTCC rendered its Decision, 13 declaring Van der
Kolk in default giving the reason that her non-filing of an answer within the
fresh 10-day period was deliberately calculated to delay the early
termination of the case and resolving the case on the merits taking into
account only the allegations of the complaint. The pertinent portions of the
decision, including the dispositive portion, read:
Finding the Motion to Declare Defendant in Default for her failure to file
her answer or any responsive pleading within the fresh period of ten (10)
days given her in the Resolution of July 27, 2004, tenable, the Court
hereby declares the said defendant in default, and considering the
allegations of the complaint to contain clear allegations warranting the
relief and claims prayed for therein, renders its judgment, declaring and
ordering as follows:
1. That the plaintiffs are the lawful co-owners and possessors of the parcel
of land designate das Lot 2473, situated at Brgy. Capoocan, Calbayog City,
more particularly described in paragraph
3 of the complaint; and
2. The defendant and all persons claiming and/or acting under her and her
command shall immediately vacate the premises in question mentioned in
No. 1 hereof and restore the same to the plaintiffs;
3. To pay plaintiffs the amount of Php30,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
4. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.14
Aggrieved, Van der Kolk appealed the MTCC decision before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 32, Calbayog City (RTC). On October 22, 2007, counsel
for Van der Kolk received the notice of the RTC Clerk of Court requiring her
to file a memorandum on appeal within 15 days from such receipt or until
November 6, 2007. On November 5, 2007, Atty. Tibo moved for additional
time of 30 days from November 6, 2007 alleging that he could not
seasonably file the saidpleading due to heavy pressures of work. The
appeal memorandum was filed only on November 21, 2007.15 On October
27, 2008, the Heirs of Yabao filed a Motion to Dismiss the appeal, 16 citing
the failure of Van der Kolk to file the appeal memorandum within the 15day reglementary period fixed under Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the Rules of
Court.
On May 6, 2009, the RTC issued the Order17 dismissing the appeal for
failure of Van de Kolk to file the memorandum on appeal within the period
mandated by the Rules of Court. The RTC considered the reasons
which to file their memorandum and [the Acbangs] are also given similar
period to file their reply on the memorandum of [the spouses Lopez].
Afterwhich (sic) the case shall be submitted for decision with or without
the memorandum from the parties.
SO ORDERED.5
The petitioner moved for reconsideration,6 stressing that the filing of the
supersedeas bond was for the purpose of staying the execution; and that
she as a defendant would not be placed in a position to stay the execution
by filing a supersedeas bond unless she was first notified of the filing of
the motion for immediate execution.
The RTC denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration on April 26,
2004,7 viz:
The Motion for Reconsideration filed by defendant Herminia Acbang is
denied, for the reason that the Court finds no cause or reason to recall the
order granting appellees motion for execution. There was no supersedeas
bond filed by [the Acbangs], so the execution of the decision is proper.
As the office of the supersedeas bond is to stay the execution of the
decision, the same should be filed before the Motion For Writ of Execution
is filed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
The petitioner then brought the petition for prohibition directly in this
Court on July 2, 2004, submitting that Judge Luczon thereby committed
grave error in granting the motion for immediate execution of the Spouses
Lopez without first fixing the supersedeas bond as prayed for by the
Acbangs.
It appears that the RTC rendered its decision in Civil Case No. 6302 on July
30, 2004,9 finding that the petitioner had not received the summons, and
that the sheriffs return did not show the steps taken by the server to
insure the petitioners receipt of the summons, like the tender of the
summons to her; that the non-service of the summons on her resulted in
the MTC not acquiring jurisdiction over her; and that the MTCs decision in
Civil Case No. 64 dated January 14, 2004 was void as far as she was
concerned. Thus, the RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Court declares that the
decision rendered by the Municipal Trial Court of Alcala, Cagayan dated
January 14, 2004 is null and void, as far as defendant Herminia Acbang is
concerned.
The MTC of Alcala is Ordered to reopen the case and served [sic] the
summons to Herminia Acbang and conduct the proceedings without any
delay.
It is so adjudged.10
In the petition, the petitioner insists that the Spouses Lopezs motion for
execution pending appeal should be filed before she posted a supersedeas
bond. She argues that even if the MTCs decision was immediately
executory, it did not mean that a motion for execution was dispensable;
and that the Spouses Lopez waived their right to the immediate execution
when they did not file a motion for execution in the MTC.
On the other hand, the Spouses Lopez claim that the issuance of a writ of
execution was ministerial because of the defendants failure to file a