Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 161921
that she was delinquent for three (3) months corresponding to the months of December 1998,
January 1999, and February 1999. Ma. Theresa argued that the due date of her payment was
March 18, 1999 yet (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, pp. 11-12). Mrs. Madjos later told her that it was
at the instance of Joyce Ardiente that the water line was cut off (T.S.N., February 5, 2001, p. 31).
On March 15, 1999, Ma. Theresa paid the delinquent bills (T.S.N., October 31, 2000, p. 12). On
the same date, through her lawyer, Ma. Theresa wrote a letter to the COWD to explain who
authorized the cutting of the water line (Records, p. 160).
On March 18, 1999, COWD, through the general manager, [respondent] Gaspar Gonzalez, Jr.,
answered the letter dated March 15, 1999 and reiterated that it was at the instance of Joyce
Ardiente that the water line was cut off (Records, p. 161).
Aggrieved, on April 14, 1999, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide [and her husband] filed [a] complaint for
damages [against petitioner, COWD and its manager Gaspar Gonzalez] (Records, pp. 2-6).
In the meantime, Ma. Theresa Pastorfide's water line was only restored and reconnected when
the [trial] court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on December 14, 1999
(Records, p. 237).4
After trial, the RTC rendered judgment holding as follows:
xxxx
In the exercise of their rights and performance of their duties, defendants did not act with justice,
gave plaintiffs their due and observe honesty and good faith. Before disconnecting the water
supply, defendants COWD and Engr. Gaspar Gonzales did not even send a disconnection notice
to plaintiffs as testified to by Engr. Bienvenido Batar, in-charge of the Commercial Department
of defendant COWD. There was one though, but only three (3) days after the actual
disconnection on March 12, 1999. The due date for payment was yet on March 15. Clearly, they
did not act with justice. Neither did they observe honesty.
They should not have been swayed by the prodding of Joyce V. Ardiente. They should have
investigated first as to the present ownership of the house. For doing the act because Ardiente
told them, they were negligent. Defendant Joyce Ardiente should have requested before the
cutting off of the water supply, plaintiffs to pay. While she attempted to tell plaintiffs but she did
not have the patience of seeing them. She knew that it was plaintiffs who had been using the
water four (4) years ago and not hers. She should have been very careful. x x x5
The dispositive portion of the trial court's Decision reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendants
[Ardiente, COWD and Gonzalez] to pay jointly and severally plaintiffs, the following sums:
(a) P200,000.00 for moral damages;
resurrect their lost cause by filing pleadings this time as respondents but, nonetheless, reiterating
the same prayer in their previous pleadings filed with the RTC and the CA.
As to the merits of the instant petition, the Court likewise noticed that the main issues raised by
petitioner are factual and it is settled that the resolution of factual issues is the function of lower
courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and considered binding by the
Supreme Court subject only to certain exceptions, none of which is present in this instant
petition.13 This is especially true when the findings of the RTC have been affirmed by the CA as
in this case.14
In any case, a perusal of the records at hand would readily show that the instant petition lacks
merit.
Petitioner insists that she should not be held liable for the disconnection of respondent spouses'
water supply, because she had no participation in the actual disconnection. However, she
admitted in the present petition that it was she who requested COWD to disconnect the Spouses
Pastorfide's water supply. This was confirmed by COWD and Gonzalez in their cross-claim
against petitioner. While it was COWD which actually discontinued respondent spouses' water
supply, it cannot be denied that it was through the instance of petitioner that the Spouses
Pastorfide's water supply was disconnected in the first place.
It is true that it is within petitioner's right to ask and even require the Spouses Pastorfide to cause
the transfer of the former's account with COWD to the latter's name pursuant to their
Memorandum of Agreement. However, the remedy to enforce such right is not to cause the
disconnection of the respondent spouses' water supply. The exercise of a right must be in
accordance with the purpose for which it was established and must not be excessive or unduly
harsh; there must be no intention to harm another.15 Otherwise, liability for damages to the
injured party will attach.16 In the present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of
petitioner when she requested for the disconnection of respondent spouses water supply without
warning or informing the latter of such request. Petitioner claims that her request for
disconnection was based on the advise of COWD personnel and that her intention was just to
compel the Spouses Pastorfide to comply with their agreement that petitioner's account with
COWD be transferred in respondent spouses' name. If such was petitioner's only intention, then
she should have advised respondent spouses before or immediately after submitting her request
for disconnection, telling them that her request was simply to force them to comply with their
obligation under their Memorandum of Agreement. But she did not. What made matters worse is
the fact that COWD undertook the disconnection also without prior notice and even failed to
reconnect the Spouses Pastorfides water supply despite payment of their arrears. There was
clearly an abuse of right on the part of petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez. They are guilty of bad
faith.
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
In this regard, the Court's ruling in Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation17
is instructive, to wit:
xxxx
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of ones rights as
well as in the performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give everyone his due; and
observe honesty and good faith.
In Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, it was elucidated that while
Article 19 "lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the
maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an action
for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper." The Court said:
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic
principles that are to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order." [REPORT ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED
CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers of the Code, seeking to remedy the
defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to draw out its spirit,
incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that
spring from the fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for
human conduct [that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may
approach its supreme ideal, which is the sway and dominance of justice." (Id.) Foremost among
these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 x x x.
xxxx
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,
sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights, but also in
the performance of one's duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give
everyone his due; and to observe honesty and good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a
primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of human conduct set forth in
Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law
as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
But while Article 19 lays down a rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for
the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a remedy for its violation. Generally, an
action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently
causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks of the general
sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the
said provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which
the wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for its
violation, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be
proper.
The question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in
damages under Article 20 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of
each case. x x x18
To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the abovementioned provisions of law is her
unjustifiable act of having the respondent spouses' water supply disconnected, coupled with her
failure to warn or at least notify respondent spouses of such intention. On the part of COWD and
Gonzalez, it is their failure to give prior notice of the impending disconnection and their
subsequent neglect to reconnect respondent spouses' water supply despite the latter's settlement
of their delinquent account.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the ruling of both
the RTC and the CA that petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez are solidarily liable.
The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral damages based on the provisions of Article 2219,19
in connection with Articles 2020 and 2121 of the Civil Code.
As for exemplary damages, Article 2229 provides that exemplary damages may be imposed by
way of example or correction for the public good. Nonetheless, exemplary damages are imposed
not to enrich one party or impoverish another, but to serve as a deterrent against or as a negative
incentive to curb socially deleterious actions.22 In the instant case, the Court agrees with the CA
in sustaining the award of exemplary damages, although it reduced the amount granted,
considering that respondent spouses were deprived of their water supply for more than nine (9)
months, and such deprivation would have continued were it not for the relief granted by the RTC.
With respect to the award of attorney's fees, Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides, among
others, that such fees may be recovered when exemplary damages are awarded, when the
defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest, and where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in
refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just and demandable claim.
WHEREFORE, instant petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated August 28, 2003 and December 17, 2003, respectively,
in CA-G.R. CV No. 73000 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Abad, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
July 24, 2013
N O T I C E OF J U D G M E N T
Sirs/Mesdames:
Please take notice that on ___July 17, 2013___ a Decision, copy attached herewith, was rendered
by the Supreme Court in the above-entitled case, the original of which was received by this
Office on July 19, 2013 at 2:25 p.m.
Very truly yours,
(SGD)
LUCITA ABJELINA SORIANO
Division Clerk of Court
Footnotes
* Spelled as Gonzales in other parts of the rollo and records.
1
Penned by Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Edgardo
P. Cruz and Noel G. Tijam, concurring; rollo, pp. 60-67.
2
Id. at 68.
Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 65.
Id. at 64.
10
Id. at 219.
11
Id. at 220.
12
Id. at 14.
13
Philippine National Bank v. DKS International, Inc., G.R. No. 179161, January 22,
2010, 610 SCRA 603, 621.
14
Id.
15
Uypitching v. Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 172, 179.
16
Id.
17
18
19
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
xxxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28. 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
xxxx
20
Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another,
shall indemnify the latter for the same.
21
Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
22
Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corporation, supra note 17, at 405.