Debating the borders of Europe

International Herald Tribune; 5/21/2004; Thierry de Montbrial

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International Herald Tribune
05-21-2004
With elections to the European Parliament fast approaching, the public debate, particularly in France, has
tended to focus on Turkey's candidacy to join the European Union. There may be more pressing issues, but
this concentration on Turkey reflects anxiety about the very process of European integration, and the
definition of Europe. From a geological viewpoint, Europe is not a continent. The way we have arranged
the division of Europe and Asia does not follow physical geography, but geopolitics. If the Ural mountains
are seen as a ''natural'' division, it is because the bulk of the Russian population is Christian, and lies west
of these mountains. Assigning Istanbul to Europe and western Anatolia to Asia is a way of reminding us
that Byzantium, renamed Constantinople, used to be a capital city of Christianity. In that sense, the fall of
Constantinople in 1453 can still be felt some 450 years after the event. Many of the intellectuals arguing
against the Turkish candidacy still draw a map of Europe which essentially coincides with the Middle Age
concept of the Christian world. The essence of geopolitics is that ideology, which includes the way one
looks at history, also shapes the map. The real question for the European Union, therefore, is what is its
underlying ideology? The answer is not simple, since the ideology has changed tremendously since the
collapse of the Soviet Union and, enven before, with the first enlargements pf the "European Community"
to include such countries as Britain and Greece. Nevertheless, it seems to me that the following key words
encapsulate the current ideology of the EU: reconciliation, democracy, rule of law, human rights and the
protection of minorities, secularism, market economy, security and solidarity. What we want to achieve in
Europe is a new kind of political unit, whose identity is based on these concepts. French-German
reconciliation, for example by no means obvious after World War II is now taken for granted. To look
positively at the Turkish candidacy, therefore, is to share the grand vision of a reconciliation between the
three monotheistic religions through secularism. Many in the Muslim world, particularly in Arab countries,
look at Euro-Turkish relations with this in mind. Yet strangely enough, French intellectuals who invented
the French concept of secularism, ''laicite'' have never resorted to the idea of Christendom more than
today.In concrete, political terms, the relationship between the European Union and Turkey has been
shaped by a sequence of mutual commitments including the 1963 association treaty, the 1999 Helsinki
European Council decision to recognize Turkey as a candidate and the EU decision in 2002 that made the
opening of negotiations conditional on Turkey's fulfillment of the 1993 Copenhagen political criteria,
which are related to some of the concepts above.These commitments set the following timetable: In late
September or early October, the European Commission will issue a report assessing Turkey's fulfillment of
these criteria. Based on this report, the European Council will decide if and when negotiations are to
commence. If the Turks perceive the report to be unfair, failing in particular to recognize Ankara's efforts
regarding Cyprus, there could be a major political crisis in Turkey. It is important to remember that
according to public opinion polls, three quarters of the Turkish population accept the reforms demanded by
the commission, but a majority of these believe that whatever they accomplish, European leaders will find a
pretext to say no. If, on the contrary, a date is set to start the negotiations, it should be clear to everybody,
both in the European Union and in Turkey, that the negotiations will take a lot of time and will have to be
extremely detailed. At the end of the day, were an adhesion treaty to be signed it would stand no chance of
being unanimously ratified unless all shadows have been swept away. Moreover, the difficulty of getting
unanimity for the admission of a new member increases with the number of existing ones. At some point,
further enlargement could become practically impossible. Rather than some abstract geographical or
cultural notions, the ratification process would then become the de facto mechanism for setting the
boundaries of Europe. European integration is a long-term process, whose ''soft power'' has already
demonstrated a remarkable vitality. The collapse of the Soviet Union forced us to move ahead at excessive
speed, putting the whole construction at risk. Hence the vertigo over Turkey, a country more populous than

Germany, and one which most Europeans are not yet culturally prepared to regard as ''one of them.'' We
need time to adjust. But surrendering to emotions next fall, when the time comes to fulfill our
commitments, and refusing to start negotiations even if the conditions we set ourselves are met, would be a
fatal mistake.**Thierry de Montbrial is the founder and president of the Paris-based French Institute of
International Relations (Ifri).[Not to be reproduced without the permission of the author.]
2004 Copyright International Herald Tribune. http://www.iht.com

2.The philosophy of "Europe."

The National Interest; 3/22/1995; Laughland, John

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European governments will only lead the region to destruction if they support the destabilization of
European nationalism and its control by supranational organizations. Political representatives have been
publicly voicing their contempt for the rule of law and the philosophical foundations of democracy.
Balance of power remains the best option for ensuring that peace and respect for the law are maintained
throughout Europe.
"The rational organization, at the global level, of human existence...is clearly an absolute necessity."
- Eduard Shevardnadze, 1992
There are moments when the swirling mists in which modern European political speech seems deliberately
to envelop itself are dissipated by sudden, perhaps unintended, flashes of linguistic clarity. Two remarks
made in 1994 have illuminated, if only in silhouette, the broad outlines of current European geopolitics and
political culture.
The first came in May, when Boris Yeltsin paid a state visit to Germany. The theme of his visit was the
entry of Russia into all European organizations, ultimately including NATO and the European Union. As a
priority, though, Yeltsin concentrated on a theme dear to the Russian heart, the strengthening of the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to which Moscow would like NATO to be subordinate.
The Russian president declared to an eager audience - using words that would have been music to the ears
of the former Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, as well as to many contemporary politicians - that
he wanted a "politically, economically and spiritually unified architecture for our continent, which must not
isolate countries or groups of countries or separate them according to the criteria of friend or enemy..."
[emphasis added].
The second came in November. A few months previously, the ruling Christian Democratic parliamentary
group in Germany had published a policy document entitled "Reflections on European Policy," which
contained striking proposals for the future political architecture of the European Union. It called for the
federal political union of a hard core of five countries in the European Union (France, Germany, Benelux).
The document, which Chancellor Kohl has welcomed and defended, and perhaps even surreptitiously
encouraged, threatens that if political union does not occur on its own terms, Germany might go it alone in
Europe, overturning the whole apple cart of postwar European cooperation. According to this scheme,
otherwise known as the "concentric circles plan," all European Union policy would be made by the hard
core - or more precisely, by the hard core of the hard core, France and Germany - and followed in variable
participatory arrangements by other member states. On a tour of European capitals to peddle the plan, the
CDU's foreign policy spokesman, Karl Lamers, expressed the regret that many people in Europe were
reluctant to take such a bold leap toward political union, because they experienced "the emotional difficulty
of abandoning revered and cherished institutions and notions even if, like the concept of national
sovereignty, they have long since become an illusion" [emphasis added].

What do these remarks tell us about the likely evolution of Europe's political architecture after the end of
the Cold War? One thing is immediately clear: Germany and Russia are the two largest and most powerful
countries in Europe. If there is to be a truly united Europe, and not just a united Western Europe, then one
of the most important axes along which it will develop will be Berlin-Moscow. The Germans, more than
any other Western Europeans, are aware of this. Indeed, the CDU document emphasizes that the European
Union's primary foreign policy objective must be to ensure stability in Eastern Europe by constructing an
"all-encompassing partnership with Russia." Similarly, Mr. Kozyrev, the Russian foreign minister, has often
spoken of the "special relationship" between Germany and Russia.
It is preoccupying, therefore, to observe in these remarks by political representatives of both countries a
clutch of ideas which displays a striking contempt for the philosophical bases of democracy and the rule of
law. It is even more preoccupying to realize that these remarks are utterly typical of contemporary
European political discourse. Indeed, they have become its common currency. Slogans such as "United
Europe," "failing borders," "convergence" and "integration" trip lightly off the lips of all post-Cold War
European leaders. They are the foreign policy counterparts of similar slogans about "protection" and "social
security" which have become the staple diet fed to voters at home. These cliches are disturbing because
they are manifestations of the extent to which European politicians have lost a sense of the true meaning of
politics itself.
Friends and Enemies
Politics is the necessary prerequisite for democracy because it is only within a certain polity, a state, where
the rules of the game and the common reference points are understood, that democratic debate and
democratic accountability can be assured. Democracy inevitably presupposes constitutional independence
or national statehood because, before the democratic mechanisms of control over political power - a
legislature, an independent judiciary, a free press - can be put in place, the basic right of the state to rule its authority - must first be recognized. It is only from this fundamental recognition of legitimacy that the
rule of law can flow. If a people agrees that the state has the right to rule, then that people is constituted as a
political entity. Without politics, therefore, there can be no statehood, and if politics and statehood
disintegrate, as they are doing in Europe, then democracy will disintegrate too. Politics is the realm of
human freedom.
Yeltsin's proclaimed desire not to separate countries according to the criterion of friend and enemy recalls
the famous definition of politics made by the right-wing German jurist, Carl Schmitt. According to Schmitt,
writing in 1932, areas of human activity like morality, aesthetics, and economics each have their own
criteria: good and evil, beautiful and ugly, profitable and damaging. Politics, he insists, is an area of human
activity distinct from the others, and its criterion is the distinction between friend and enemy. Anyone who
tries to overcome that distinction, as Yeltsin is, is trying to overcome politics itself. Yeltsin is not saying, "I
was your enemy, now I am your friend," he is saying that the distinction itself should no longer apply.
What does Schmitt mean? First, he does not mean that a state always has enemies, although this may be so,
but that politics only exists where there is conflict, and that both foreign and domestic politics consist in
making the distinction between friend and enemy. An enemy need not be evil or ugly or economically
damaging: he does not have to be hated or despised. The distinction between friend and enemy in this sense
is merely intended to indicate the difference between association (with a friend) or dissociation (from an
enemy). This is not a bellicose or aggressive way of defining politics, it is a factual one: where there is no
conflict there is no politics, only management. The term enemy is by no means limited to the military
sense, nor is the definition intended to assimilate politics to war. On the contrary, war is not the
continuation of politics by other means, but something different from politics, with its own separate set of
rules.(1)
Nor does this definition rule out peace between peoples or states, or even neutrality. The decisive issue is
that political life is the domain in which the possibility of making the distinction obtains. Indeed, far from
peace being the absence of an enemy, one can make peace only with an enemy. Just as there is no peace
without an enemy, there is no politics without the possibility of knowing who one's (political) enemies are.

Indeed, peace is not the absence of antagonism or conflict, but the absence of war. This fact underlines the
essential difference between politics and war: it would clearly be contrary to the essence of politics as such
to want to suppress one's enemies, or to dissipate the distinction between friend and enemy into obscurity.
This is precisely because politics lives off enmity, the opposition between parties and interests and
ideologies, the antagonism between different opinions, values and goals, as well as the divergence between
different solutions which are proposed in order to attain the common good. In a European continent where
"consensus," "cooperation," "stability," and "negotiation" are widely proclaimed as the cardinal virtues
(most notably by the British foreign secretary, Douglas Hurd, who often seems to believe that diplomatic
negotiation is a good thing even if it does not produce any results, as in Yugoslavia) this fact is almost
universally misunderstood.
As Publius wrote in the Tenth Federalist Paper, "the principal task of modern legislation...involves the spirit
of party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the government." It is the purpose of good
government to contain and to channel this inevitable facet of human behavior. But the negation of the
enemy in domestic politics, in the name of universal tolerance for instance, is nonsense precisely because
tolerance is a matter of behavior between men - one tolerates one's political enemy - and not a relationship
of ideas. The irenic notion of universal tolerance is therefore not evidence of bad judgment, it is the absence
of judgment. It is irrelevant whether we approve or disapprove of the distinction between friend and enemy,
for it is an incontrovertible fact of human (i.e. political) existence. It is only in Utopia - i.e. nowhere - that
the distinction between friend and enemy does not apply.
The same is true of foreign policy, where peace denotes a certain relationship between states. No law
enjoining peace can maintain itself in mere virtue of its status as law, without the political will of two or
more distinct parties - enemies - expressed in a peace treaty. The notion of peace without a treaty
representing the expression of genuine convictions of those parties and the rules by which they agree to
abide is nonsense. Similarly, in domestic politics no constitution within a state can maintain itself if not
supported by citizens who recognize its political authority. If peace is not the absence of conflict, the
difference between peace and war is simply that in peace, a state or a person does not seek to destroy the
enemy, but rather recognizes him as an equal in all his difference. Accordingly, any so-called proclamation
of peace which implies the suppression or the negation of the enemy is in reality a camouflaged declaration
of war. This is the danger in Yeltsin's remark. To put it bluntly, if the price of peace with Russia after the
Cold War is the disappearance of the states of Western Europe as genuine political entities in any
meaningful sense, then that price is too high.
The Primacy of Stability
The Soviet Union long sought to remove the American presence in Europe, and to instigate instead a panEuropean political and military organization. The CSCE, which arose out of a proposal made by Ceausescu
to de Gaulle on Brezhnev's behalf in 1968, comes closest to what Russia wants. This is because the CSCE which in January became the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe - is not a military
alliance like NATO. Instead, as the chairman of the recent Budapest conference of the CSCE made clear,
"The CSCE is a unique organization, because it deals not only with relations between states but also within
states, with the relationship between the state and the citizen." In other words, the CSCE blurs the very
distinction between friend and enemy by obscuring that between internal and external affairs.
This is because the so-called "Moscow Document" signed in 1991, introduced a series of commitments
governing the relationship between states and their citizens, including such things as the rights of women,
migrant workers and disabled persons, as well as more general commitments to democracy and the rule of
law. It also included an important provision relating to the rights of minorities by making reference to a
report on national minorities which thereby achieves normative status within the CSCE. That report
declares that, "Issues concerning national minorities...are matters of legitimate international concern and
consequently do not constitute exclusively an internal affair of the respective State." States which are
deemed to have minorities problems might be required by the CSCE to do anything from providing
education in minority languages to establishing local autonomy.

First, this interest in minorities is germane to Russia. The collapse of the Soviet Union has been followed
by the creation, not only of the Commonwealth of Independent States and a forum for economic
"cooperation" between its "member states," but also by the rallying to the CIS of initially recalcitrant states
like Moldova, on the pretext that the Russian minorities there need protecting. Similar influence has been
exerted over the Baltic states, especially Estonia. Americans who are preoccupied with the rising problem
of "group rights," which seems to be undermining their own constitution, will recognize the de jure
classification of individuals into ethnic groups as an instrument of state control and social management,
because groups are more easy to control and to speak for than individuals.
Second, it is a consequence of the CSCE's unique combination of internal and external competencies that,
whatever the outcome of the legal debate on the precise status of the Helsinki Final Act and the associated
documents, the CSCE in total is "the source of an overarching European constitutional order which sets the
standards to which all national legal and political institutions in Europe must conform."(2)
Therefore, far from being a defense alliance like NATO, which is directed against a potential outside
aggressor and intended to preserve the internal integrity and peace of the signatory states, the CSCE's
pretense that it can pacify the whole gamut of political antagonism from workers' rights to national
minority questions - itself a mistaken aim, as anyone who has digested the above argument about the nature
of politics will see - risks making it more like a transcontinental military police force. The use of CSCE
"peacekeeping forces" is one way in which it proposes to do this, and a precedent was set in December
when such a force was dispatched to Azerbaijan. A moment's thought should suffice to realize the enormity
of this: imagine NATO troops being called in to impose a military solution to a disturbance - or even to
preempt a potential one - within a NATO member state. Indeed, such principles, which attribute the highest
value to stability, might even legitimate the use of a national army against its own citizens, as in Chechnya.
In case any of these fears seem exaggerated, it should not be forgotten that three of the key architects of the
Maastricht Treaty on European Union, Francois Mitterrand, Jacques Delors and John Major, have all made
extraordinary remarks about the primacy of stability over democracy. The two Frenchmen initially
welcomed the Moscow putsch in 1991, Delors saying that it could have "positive aspects." Indeed, he even
declared to the European parliament just after it occurred that, "We cannot unite the states of Western
Europe and at the same time encourage the breakaway of Soviet Republics," by which he presumably
meant that the European Union and the Soviet Union were similar institutions. The pro-Serb policy of
London and Paris is similarly predicated on a preference for large political entities over the bothersome
multiplicity of small nations. No politician has given clearer expression to this than John Major, who
declared in 1993 that, "The biggest single element behind what has happened in Bosnia is the collapse of
the Soviet Union and of the discipline that exerted over the ancient hatreds in the old Yugoslavia" - a
grotesque contortion of the truth, not only because Yugoslavia ceased to be under Soviet "discipline" in
1948, but also because communist leaders like Slobodan Milosevic, Thodor Zhivkov, and Nicolae
Ceausescu, to name but the worst and not to mention their contemporary epigones, were themselves rabid
nationalists, whose regimes - by virtue of their very collapse! - were not stable.
It is in exactly the same vein that the Russian foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev, has already said - and many
have echoed his thought that the main threat to security in Europe is from "nationalist extremists." He has
realized, by observing his Western counterparts, that if a politician can claim that "populism" is likely to
erupt at any minute, then he can justify almost endless amounts of governmental control over society.
Kozyrev's idea is that the CSCE will quell any such threat. But, as we have seen above, peace denotes an
equilibrium of forces between parties. A legal order cannot be maintained without authority, that is, without
the meta-legal force accorded to it by citizens or states. An organization which pretends that such force
does not exist is perhaps merely trying to camouflage the inevitable fact that it does. In any case, one man's
nationalist extremist is another man's freedom fighter, as the violent overthrows of democratically elected
Presidents Gamsakhurdia in Georgia and Elchibey in Azerbaijan have shown.
To protest against all this is not to claim that sovereign states have the right to abuse individuals or groups
within their borders. Rather, it is to insist, against the current drift towards the internationalization of
government, that international law or policy is not necessarily any wiser than that made by national
governments. Very often it is far more stupid, as the debacle over Yugoslavia shows. Indeed, the CSCE's

conference in Budapest in December failed even to mention the Yugoslav war in its communique, an
illustration of how surreal international bureaucratic government quickly becomes. Nor is international
policy any less political. Moreover, at least national politics might be democratic, and controllable by a
national parliament, while international politics, by definition, never is. It is the task of all states to maintain
peace within their borders by policing their citizens, and to defend that internal peace from external
aggression. The CSCE's confusion of these two roles means that it wants to assume state-like power, but
without explaining in whose name it acts.
The CSCE is also the focal point of a series of bilateral treaties signed between the Western powers and
Russia, many of which require that the relationship between the signatory states be governed by the
commitments laid out in the CSCE documents. This is a curious manner of submitting free foreign policy
decision-making to the say-so of an international committee. But it explains why Kozyrev has called the
CSCE and the lattice-work of treaties a "net" in which the states of Europe are to be "entangled," arguing
that it is only through such an entanglement that stability can be achieved. In other words, foreign policy,
which for many philosophers is a paradigm at the international level of the kind of free political action that
existed in the Greek polls, where democracy was founded, is to disappear as a forum for free action and
instead be smothered under a bureaucratic and pseudo-legal "mechanism."
Like other utopias, this one spells the end of politics and law, for it assumes that foreign policy can
disappear. It is absurd to think that either domestic or foreign politics can be managed by a committee, and
that disputes can be resolved by international-bureaucratic mechanisms. Such absurdities are in reality little
but the institutionalization of political cowardice, for they all derive from a desire to shield politicians from
ever having to take a decision for whose unwelcome consequences they might be held responsible.
Courage, as Churchill said, is the greatest of all political virtues because it presupposes all the rest. Political
existence requires a constant, courageous struggle. If a people loses the will to maintain itself in the sphere
of politics, this does not mean that politics disappears from the world. It merely means that a weak people
disappears from the world, and that its constitution is subsumed into someone else's.
It is precisely because politics is the realm of freedom that politics cannot be governed by prescriptive
rules. It is depressing to realize that the lesson learned by Britain and America in the economic domain in
the 1980s - that economies cannot be planned - has been spectacularly unlearned in the political domain by
continental Europe since the Cold War. It is a modernist, constructivist conceit to believe that political life
can be planned in advance. (The CSCE's aims to engage in "conflict-prevention" is a perfect example of
this mentality.) This is not just because political life, like economics, is very complex. It is above all
because statesmanship, like law, contains as its fundamental principle the possibility of genuine decisionmaking, i.e. the possibility that political decisions might leave the normal framework of rules to create
something exceptional. It is hardly surprising, given that Europe's share of world trade has declined by 25
percent in the last ten years, that Europe's economic backwardness should spill over and influence its
political reasoning too.
For, as that other great German jurist and philosopher Leo Strauss realized:
What cannot be decided in advance by universal rules, what can only be decided in the critical moment by
the most competent and conscientious statesman on the spot, can be made visible as just, in retrospect, to
all; the objective discrimination between extreme actions which were just and extreme actions which were
unjust is one of the noblest duties of the historian.
Indeed, it is precisely the genius of the Anglo-Saxon common law tradition to have preserved, unlike
continental Europe, the Aristotelian notion that justice inheres in individual decisions and actions, and not
in general principles. It is only in such sovereign decisions that true statesmanship is revealed, just as it is
only in sovereign individual decisions that the virtue of the citizen is revealed.
Sovereignty, Properly Misunderstood
Why so much attention to the CSCE, an organism which is at best in an embryonic stage of development?
The reason is that another organization, the European Union, which is in a very mature stage of

development and apparent growth, draws on many of the same unwelcome principles. Like the CSCE, for
instance, the Maastricht Treaty is full of "mechanisms" to enable governments to decide this or that,
especially in the domains of foreign and defense policy, as if decision-making were a procedural matter.
But, more profoundly, the German plans for federal political union within the European Union fit inside the
CSCE's overall plans for the entire continent like a Russian doll. This is for the same philosophical reasons
as have been outlined above.
Karl Lamers' conviction that national sovereignty has long since become an illusion counts as one of the
great accepted truths among the Europhile cognoscenti. Indeed, the comments made about sovereignty in
the European Community are generally of an almost unimaginable crassness and infantility. It is almost
impossible to find any modern European politician who can correctly define - or even betray an instinctive
understanding of - national sovereignty, and there are plenty of European intellectuals who will tell you that
it is an outdated concept. Those in favor of European integration, for instance, will tell you, in the same
breath, that sovereignty is a meaningless concept and that the nation-states have already lost it anyway.
The argument usually goes like this: the nation-states of Europe are economically interdependent and must
react to events outside their individual control. Therefore they are no longer sovereign. The only way to
regain their lost power (or "sovereignty") is to join forces and act together. The former British foreign
secretary, Lord (then Sir Geoffrey) Howe, has expressed this thought by writing that "sovereignty is a
nation's practical ability to make its influence felt in the world."
All this is deeply misguided. Far from being meaningless, sovereignty is the definitive quality of a
constitutionally independent state. If a country is constitutionally independent, it is sovereign. A country
does not become less sovereign if it becomes less powerful. To say that "sovereignty" is meaningless is to
say that "constitution," "independence," and "state" are meaningless concepts as well. It is rather like
wanting to overcome the distinction between friend and enemy.
Far from being a call for all-powerful national government, defense of the concept of national sovereignty
is the most important defense of democracy in modern Europe. De Gaulle used to say that he considered
national sovereignty and democracy to be the same thing. The point about national sovereignty is not that
the state is either internally or externally all-powerful (although there can, by definition, not be a higher
constitutional authority than that of a sovereign entity), it is rather to clarify the source of the authority
which the state exercises. If the state is democratic, that source is the people or the nation. At bottom, this
inability to understand sovereignty, and the concomitant view that it is "an illusion," is based on a simple
and worrying confusion between authority and power, a distinction which is the cornerstone of all legal
reasoning. It is extremely worrying that all modern European politicians, almost without exception, make
this error.
This is why the CSCE's pretense to be the source of a new constitutional order for the whole of Europe
dovetails with the proclaimed aim of some very powerful players in European politics, most notably the
German governing party, to subsume national constitutions in a European one. Let us be clear: the weasel
words about "uniting Europe while protecting national differences," and the widespread refusal (such as
that of the French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur) even to address the question of sovereignty, means
that what is an offer is not a clearly proclaimed intention to replace the states of Western Europe by one
super-state, but instead a legal and political order predicated on the blurring of those fundamental concepts
which are the building blocks of law, democracy, and freedom.
The rhetoric about borders reinforces this dovetailing. It is fashionable to say that borders are coming down
all over Europe, and unfashionable and seemingly narrow-minded to want to maintain them. In the
moments when Russia expresses hostility to the eastward extension of NATO, for instance, it protests
against "the creation of new lines of division in Europe." But, like the others, this political slogan ignores
the legal importance of borders, whether national or regional, as de-limiting domains of jurisdiction. In
ancient Greek, the word for "law," nomos, is derived from nemein, to distribute, to possess (what was
distributed), or to dwell - to the extent that Heraclitus could pun on "law" and "hedge," as in, "The people
should fight for the law as for a wall." The law, indeed, was originally identified with the boundary line
between properties (later, between cities), and even if the concept of law has evolved since, it is clear that a

domain of jurisdiction must be spatially defined for it truly to exist. It is only in the communist mind that a
border need be a barrier.
To abolish borders (rather than to open them) or to make them so vast and vague as to be non-existent
("from Vancouver to Vladivostock") is ultimately to undermine the rule of law, for it risks abolishing even
the possibility of statehood. In the EU, outright federalists and crypto-federalists are united by their failure
to understand the legal and political significance of borders. In the CSCE, there is no proposal to abolish
national borders (indeed their inviolability is one of its central commitments) but rather the aim is to make
them irrelevant. But states, as the subjects of international law, must exist as such if international law is to
exist, and they must also exist if domestic law is to exist.
The advantage of national sovereignty over supranational sovereignty is that it is based on a reality, namely
that pre-existing political entity which is the nation. Nations are not rounded, they grow. Even if a state has
a formal foundation date, the nation on which it is based will already have contained a whole tapestry of
habits, conventions, rules, and historical and cultural reference points which will enable it to exist as a
political entity. It is only when the cultural basis for political discourse exists that democracy can obtain. A
good constitution, like good law, is one which reflects reality and does not seek to destroy it. This is why
the notion that the European parliament can ever replace national parliaments as the holder of political
legitimacy, or even as a forum for political accountability and democracy, is naive.
The widespread misunderstanding of the inherently conservative nature of democracy is reflected in the
strikingly undemocratic nature of the German proposals to construct a federal union of a "hard core" of
states. First, the proposals ride a coach and horses through the principle of national self-determination, by
insisting that all European policy henceforth be made by majority vote between the member states. Indeed,
they even promise to provide the "hard core" with its own autochthonous constitution, and to abolish the
national veto on any further constitutional and institutional developments.
This would be bad enough, were all the European Union's present institutions not already undemocratic.
The Commission, the most powerful organ in the Union, is composed of unelected officials, and is the sole
initiator, and in some cases, executor of policy. It is constitutionally independent, i.e. accountable to no one.
The Council of Ministers is also unaccountable, and it represents as thorough a confusion between
executive and legislature as it is possible to imagine. Composed of ministers from each member state, it is
the supreme legislative body of the Union. No doubt part of the reason why European national governments
are all so keen on the EU is that it enables them, as governments, to sit in the Council of Ministers in a
legislative capacity, for the Council is subject to no parliamentary control whatever. It is unelected as a
body (although most of its members are elected in their home countries), and it answers neither to the
European parliament nor to national parliaments. Its meetings take place in secret and decisions are taken
by majority vote, which extinguishes all national parliamentary control over its activities, because, if ever
called to account for a vote by his national parliament, a minister can always plead that he was in a
minority. Indeed, in general terms, it is always convenient for national politicians to have "Europe" either
as a vehicle with which to propagate their more unrealistic promises or as a whipping-boy for their own
failures.
Meanwhile, the judges of the European Court of Justice, the approximate equivalent of the Supreme Court
of the United States, are very often not even judges by training at all. Perhaps this is why the Court has a
thirty year history of bending Community law (which takes immediate and total precedence over national
law) in order to force a greater and greater degree of legal and political centralization.
The final window on national democracy will be shut if, as proposed, Europe adopts a single currency. This
will be managed by an independent Central Bank, which is supposed to be sealed off from national
governments, parliaments, and electorates. As the Maastricht treaty and the German government make
absolutely clear, monetary policy is extremely political, for it presupposes that the whole gamut of other
policies - fiscal, budgetary, social, foreign and even defense - be subordinated to its commitment to the
undefined goal of "price stability." As Lamers himself has said, "monetary union is the highest and purest
form of integration." In other words, the Maastricht treaty, which obliges member states to join a monetary
union, proposes to transfer the power currently exercised by national governments accountable to national

parliaments to two unaccountable institutions, the Council of Ministers and the Central Bank. This means
that power currently exercised democratically and within the framework of national constitutions will be
transformed into totally discretionary power. But government is not about administering society - an
impossible task - it is about upholding the law. Unfortunately, most Western European states have such a
moribund political and civic culture that most voters seem actually to want the state to control their lives at
the price of personal liberty, all in the name of security.
When Germany ratified the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993, it awarded itself two rights which no other
country has within the present European legal order. The Federal Constitutional Court at Karlsruhe
proclaimed itself the final arbiter in any disputes in interpretation of European Community law between
itself and the Court of Justice of the European Communities in Luxembourg. This flies in the face of thirty
years of Community jurisprudence, which insists that Community law always takes immediate and direct
priority over national law, even over national constitutional law.
Secondly, Germany awarded itself the right, through an extremely imaginative reading of the treaty, to
withdraw from its commitment to engage in the process of monetary union. Its supreme judges argued that
the treaty committed it only to maintaining price stability, and that if that as yet undefined goal were to be
unfulfilled, then Germany could withdraw from the monetary union. The court even evoked the possibility
that new, stronger political institutions might be necessary in order to make the monetary union work,
noting that in the past, such as in the transition of Germany from North German Federation to German
Empire in 1871, political union had been the prerequisite for monetary union. In other words, the CDU is
saying that monetary union must occur on Germany's terms, and those terms are the adoption of a federal
political union of five countries, in which Germany alone will represent 50 percent in terms of population.
This is why the CDU document hovers between threats - "Without such a continued development of (West)
European integration Germany could be required, or as a result of its own security needs, tempted, to
ensure the stability of Eastern Europe alone and by traditional means" - and professions of European faith.
It is also striking that the document calls explicitly for France and Germany to exercise a hegemony over
the peripheral states: "No substantial action in foreign or European policy may be taken without prior
Franco-German agreement." Mr. Lamers, who, in a rather Kozyrevian phrase, calls the British Euroskeptics
"national ideologues," glosses the same thought by saying that the "hard core" would exercise "an
irresistible force" on the peripheral states, and that any attempt to resist that force would be "self-centered
and ultimately irrational."
Perhaps the most striking remark in Lamers' writings is the claim that Germany had understood the lessons
of European history better than other states because of "the catastrophe of 1945." This is a surprisingly
common remark in modern Germany. One would expect Germans to say that they have learned their
lessons from what happened in 1933 or 1939, not 1945. Most Europeans, like most Americans, see May
1945 not as the date of the victory of the Allies over Germany, but of the victory of democracy over
dictatorship, and thus no catastrophe. But if modern German policymakers say that it is from 1945 that they
have learned the lessons of history, then the lesson in question can only be that Germany can never succeed
in dominating Europe on its own, and conversely, that hegemony can only be exercised together with
others, because it is at its weakest when surrounded by enemies. Germany's need for allies is due to its
vulnerable position in the center of Europe: its power is augmented when a clutch of allies is gathered on its
frontiers, especially if for economic or political reasons they are obliged to toe the German line. This is
what is happening both in the proposed creation of a hard core for Western Europe and with the eastward
extension of the European Union to include all Germany's former client states in Eastern Europe.
It is striking that no French politician seems to understand how badly Germany needs France in order to
clothe its hegemony in Western Europe in respectability. France is the decent apparel with which German
power can gird its loins, for if France were not in the hard core, then the European Union would clearly be
a German empire. It is noteworthy, therefore, that Germany proposes to exercise its power behind a French
(or European) fig-leaf, a convenient way of not assuming its responsibilities.
It is in this vein that most German politicians call for the old doctrine of the "balance of power" in Europe
to be overthrown. It is odd that this view should be politically correct these days, for German leaders from

Kaiser Wilhelm II to Hitler have sung the same song, arguing that the balance of power in Europe is
nothing but a perfidious British (or sometimes American) policy to ensure that the continental European
powers remain weak. Proposals to reinforce political union in Europe - whether in France or in Germany are nearly always accompanied by an expression of desire for Europe to affirm its power against America
and Japan. But what such explicit or implicit attacks on the balance of power conveniently obscure is the
fact that those countries which have supported the doctrine of the balance of power have never had any
hegemonial ambitions on the continent, unlike those which reject it. What could be a better principle for the
government of the European continent than that a certain equity or balance be maintained between the
major powers? We have already seen that peace and the maintenance of law depends upon such an equity.
Indeed, the doctrine of the balance of power is one of the wisest and most profound insights into the way
the European continent should operate, and it is sad to see it being scorned yet again. If the myth of
destabilizing European nationalism - and the concomitant view$that it can be contained only within
supranational organizations - continues to cast its spell over the decisions of Europe's political architects,
then it will prove to be a self-fulfilling fantasy.
1 Clausewitz in fact did not write what everyone knows he wrote. What he asserted was, "War is nothing
but the continuation of political intercourse mixed with other means." Vom Kriege, III. Teil, Berlin, 1834, p.
140.
2 Thomas Buergenthal, "The CSCE Rights System," The George Washington Journal of International Law
and Economics, vol. 25, no. 2, 1991, p. 380.
John Laughland is lecturer in philosophy and politics at the Institute of Political Science in Paris. He is a
regular commentator on European affairs for the Spectator and the Wall Street Journal (Europe). His book,
The Death of Politics: France under Mitterrand is reviewed in this issue.

COPYRIGHT 1995 The National Affairs, Inc.

3."Old" vs. "New" Europe--and America: France's geopolitical intentions enjoy a history going back to de
Gaulle in the early 1960s. Here's how America should respond. (Institutions).
The International Economy; 3/22/2003; Connolly, Bernard

Search for more information on HighBeam Research for russian geopolitics.

The celebrated Letter of the Eight expressing support for the U.S. stance on Iraq has been seen as giving
substance to U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's evocation of "New Europe" as a counterweight to
the "Old Europe" of France, Germany, and their satellites. There is an obvious historical resonance in
Rumsfeld's remarks: one of the Eight was Portugal, and it was in discussing Portugal's affairs in the
Commons in December 1825 that British Foreign Secretary George Canning made his famous claim, "I
have called the New World into existence, to redress the balance of the Old." After the end of the Cold War
unfroze the rivers of geopolitics and marked the Rebirth of History, it took some time for the old concepts
of the Balance of Power and alliance-building to re-emerge as driving forces in the world. But now they are
definitely back. What's more, the numbers game has its own historical antecedents--in the strategic
maneuvering within western Europe, pitting Britain's Seven (the European Free Trade Association, or
EFTA) against France and Germany's Six (formerly the EEC, or European Economic Community, now the
EU, once the Empire of Charlemagne), in the late 1950s and the 1960s. In the background stood the
western superpower, the United States. Now we have the Eight, not to mention the Vilnius Ten. Can one
speak of America's Eighteen?
France seems to have no doubts. We recently watched a Gaullist deputy saying on BBC television that the
appropriate division was not between "old Europe" and "new Europe" but between "free Europe" and

"American Europe." And "free Europe" has been seen, since Charles de Gaulle, as including Russia: de
Gaulle sought a "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" that would compete with the United States for
world hegemony. But it had to be achieved in stages. The first had to involve forging an alliance between
France and Germany. "Europe," proclaimed de Gaulle, "is France and Germany: the rest are just
trimmings." De Gaulle's government put forward in the early 1960s a plan, the Fouchet plan, that uncannily
prefigured the Chirac-Schroeder plan for an intergovernmental political union in effect an anti-democratic
superstate run by France and Germany with small countries squashed. It is hardly a mystery, then, that
accession countries, most of them former provinces of the Soviet empire, are beginning to feel
uncomfortable about the imperialism of France. Chirac's Brezhnev-like instruction to them to shut up and
not attempt to meddle in the affairs of grown-ups rightly infuriated them, and the joint Franco-GermanRussian approach to the Iraq question just as rightly worries them. The prospect of vassal status in a
Franco-German condominium as staging-post to a Franco-German-Russian condominium is never going to
be an attractive one.
To make things worse, the threatened "Constitution" will ensure that the Franco-German empire will have
the characteristics of a New Soviet Union. It will incorporate the so-called Charter of Fundamental Rights,
whose terrifying article 52 ordains, in polar opposition to the U.S. Bill of Rights, that all freedoms--of
speech, of the press, of assembly, of political association, from arbitrary arrest, from punishment without
legal sanction, from unfair trial, even from torture--shall be taken away if "made necessary by the pursuit of
the objectives of the Union."
So joining the New Soviet Union will, for the accession countries, mean condemnation to vassal status in
an anti-American, repressive empire. They may regard the United States as potentially their protector
against the worst aspects of the NSU. But the United States is not going to join the NSU. And Chirac is as
anxious to ensure that the accession countries do not import pro-American attitudes into the NSU as de
Gaulle was forty years ago to keep Britain, suspected of being a Trojan Horse for the United States, out. So
why might the governments of the accession countries choose to shut up rather than stay out?
The NSU will provide subsidies to the accession countries; Chirac presumably calculates that the accession
treaties will thus replicate the Treaty of Dover (the secret treaty in which Charles II pledged England's
political and naval support to Louis XIV's foreign policy in return for subventions). In addition, as the
illusions of the Rubin world--the belief that global free-market capitalism not only is good in itself (which
is true) but also makes geopolitics redundant (which is patently untrue)--slip away, the accession countries
will fear a return to the interaction between trade and politics that plagued the 1950s and 1960s. Britain
formed the Seven in 1959 because it feared that the Six would be protectionist and exclude
Britain from some of its major markets. Then-Prime Minister Harold Macmillan wrote confidentially that,
"For the first time since the Napoleonic era the major continental powers are united in a positive economic
grouping, with considerable political aspects, which, though not specifically directed against the United
Kingdom, may have the effect of excluding us both from European markets and from consultation in
European policy." As a Foreign Office official wrote, again confidentially, in 1959, "EFTA was formed
primarily as an economic defense organization and the simile of a bridge-head would in fact have been
more apt than that of the bridge."
Britain never really believed EFTA could last: its real purpose was as a bargaining-chip that could lead to a
wider European free trade area encompassing both the Six and the Seven. But a free trade area was
absolutely the last thing France wanted: its aims were indeed geopolitical, Napoleonic. And Britain
received no support from the United States, whose policy was unequivocally (and extremely naively and
short-sightedly) aimed at creating a political union in Europe--and initially wanted Britain out because it,
just like de Gaulle, believed British entry would make full political union more difficult. Now the wheel is
turning full circle. As distrust between the United States and "old Europe" grows ever more marked, the
risk that the NSU seeks to use trade restrictions as a geopolitical weapon is rising. For Britain, as for the
accession countries, the choice may yet be between accepting the extinction of national independence,
democracy, and freedom in an anti-American NSU or having to face the equivalent of Napoleon's
Continental System of trade exclusion.

Could the United States help now by offering an Atlantic Free Trade Area, for which Britain campaigned
vigorously but unsuccessfully in the 1950s? Any such offer would now face strong opposition from British
Prime Minister Tony Blair, truly a would-be Napoleonic figure, who knows that in an AFTA the job
opportunities for Messiahs would be limited. And if it were nonetheless made, the United States would risk
widening the split between "old Europe" and "new Europe" and might find itself faced with FrancoGermania and its Low Country satellites, occupying approximately the territory of the empire of
Charlemagne, as enemy. But the more likely effect of such an offer would be to isolate France and Belgium
from Germany, the Netherlands, and "new Europe." It could prevent the creation of a hostile and internally
riven NSU that would, under French leadership, seek to join hands with Russia against the United States. It
would help preserve the open and capitalist world trade and financial system, which will otherwise be in
serious danger. It would definitely be the better alternative.
Sadly, it may already be too late for some "new Europe" countries--Portugal, Spain, and Italy. Why?
Because they are in the European monetary union. These three non-Carolingian countries were allowed into
the euro at the insistence of France, who saw them as likely monetary allies against Germany. Now, their
economies are in varying stages of disarray as the result of the euro. Portugal, at least, is facing a looming
economic, financial, political, and social crisis even worse than that which convertibility forced on
Argentina. Portugal can be bailed out only by large, permanently maintained transfers from "Europe." In
return, Portugal will be expected to fall in line with "old Europe" and to embrace the NSU, a deal indeed
mimicking the Treaty of Dover. When in 1971 then-Prime Minister Sir Edward Heath re-submitted Britain
for and to EC entry, French President Georges Pompidou said to his confidantes that, "Je la veux nue"--and
Heath accepted the principle of the monetary and political union that would strip his country of sovereignty
and independence. If the accession countries repeat Portugal's mistake and join not only the EU but also the
euro, then France will have them not only naked but touching their toes. It should certainly be a priority of
U.S. diplomacy to seek to dissuade them.
Bernard Connolly is chief economist, AIG, and author of The Rotten Heart of Europe: The Dirty War for
Europe's Money.

COPYRIGHT 2003 International Economy Publications, Inc.

4.Dilemmas for renewal of futures methodology *.(Central and Eastern Europe)
Futures; 6/1/2002; Novaky, Erzsebet

Search for more information on HighBeam Research for european geopolitics.

Abstract
Using the so-called Transition Paradox for methodological renewal in futures studies, this article derives
one paradox plus six dilemmas. The analysis concludes that methodological renewal should be embedded
in the renewal of science. The power of new paradigms depends on how much they serve the long run
welfare, stability and existence of the whole world population. Methods -- and the breakthrough strategies
of the East-Central European countries -- are intended not only for outlining visions, but also for creating
their technological, institutional and other foundations so that they do not remain merely utopias. Science
Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The small, semi-peripheral countries of East-Central Europe have been facing a serious political challenge.
The collapse of the bipolar, communist-capitalist world system has put an end to the homogeneous Eastern
and Western social structures and the visions that were reliant on block security. At the same time the

transition has made it possible to search for and express alternative visions of these countries as well as for
voluntary integration, as compared with involuntary and incompatible co-operation.
However, in the European Union the analytical, linear way of thinking, and the dominance of the
Enlightenment and the natural sciences still determine the EU's integration model. The extension of Europe
risks continuing a violent relationship of dominance and inferiority.
This political problem is not only a diplomatic question, but a theoretical one as well. The debate on the
renewal of methodology is a strategic question in forecasting the futures of the East-Central European
semi-periphery and creating alternative futures. This paper addresses those issues, which are of vital
importance as far the catch-up is concerned.
The dilemmas of futures studies below are not real and new controversies. Many researchers have
investigated them and given answers in evolutionary, critical paradigms, poststructuralism and
postmodernism, which are widely publicized and known. However, we summarize them here from the
viewpoint of methodology because the future of the East-Central European semi-periphery, including
Hungary, mostly remains a European problem and because the problem is more complex than expected.
First, the European tradition is not homogeneous. When we criticize elements of European culture, we
question individualism, a natural-science orientation and its extension to society, an aspiration for
exclusiveness, an analytical way of thinking to the smallest detail, cultural imperialism, etc. However, these
are not the only inheritances of European tradition and the Enlightenment. Human alternatives have always
been atriculated but have been distorted or eliminated: Greek philosophy was transformed to the Roman
Empire; the Jewish--Christian tradition became dogmatism; the aims of the labour movement were
distorted into Stalinism, for example. One should see, however, that the realization and the ideology of
these aims have not always coincided. The Renaissance discovered the Greek tradition; the Reformation
brought the inheritance of the Bible into new circumstances; the aims of 19th Century revolutions were
taken up by the central powers in the 20th century.
All in all, one of the most difficult tasks now is the separation of foresight from the retrograde inheritance
of Western civilization. Thinking of these dilemmas begins a revival of Europeanism.
Second, the technological criteria of the catch-up and the democratization of the future were created by
classical Euro-Atlantic development; however, this more and more contradicts the leading mindset of
neoliberal ideology.
Third, global pluralism should include the European alternative too. Multiculturalism is as much a problem
and possibility within Europe as it is globally.
Fourth, the aim is not to find a new, dominant ideology against the Euro-Atlantic alliance but to investigate
the culture of co-existence among different cultures. Thus, the dilemmas have not yet been resolved, not
even in a postmodern context.
2. The Transition Paradox
Thinking about the futures of futures studies methodology soon encounters the following problem. The
renewal of the methodology of futures studies needs a better understanding of the coming era; however the
investigation of the global world calls for new methodologies. This is what we call the Transition Paradox.
It is not the more sophisticated usage of general forecasting methods that the renewal of methodologies
refers to. The term is tightly connected to the transition of the present world system. Transition means more
than the transition economies, that is, the social, economic and institutional changes in the former socialist
countries. With the collapse of the bipolar world system not only the Eastern block is under transformation,
but so too the other parts of the former order. Transition is meant as world-wide social-economic change,
including re-evaluating the main values, the relationship to each other, as well as the relationship to science.

Transition refers not to the reshaping or a new stage of capitalism but to the erosion of its bases. We think
that the transition from capitalism to a new, human system is a process over a century and a half, having
started gradually after the 1848 revolutions. This process has reached qualitatively new changes through
globalization, and technological, intellectual revolution. At the same time the contradiction between
capitalism and the new needs is reaching its peak.
Technological development has created the technical background to new social-economic formations,
rather than just modernized the infrastructural basis of the ex bipolar-welfare world. The Transition
Paradox draws attention to the fact that methodological debates and the futures of futures studies are
embedded in the debate over the coming world system which gives the possibility of, and recognizes the
need for, the mass population to actively participate in its creation. One who considers the futures of futures
studies has to integrate the aspect of methodology, just as whoever thinks of the future of methods has to
consider research on the new world order. From a scientific point of view this means that the time is ripe
for integrating epistemology and ontology again, which were separated in the European Enlightenment. As
for technological foundations, it is information and space technology -- which paradoxically were created
by the dominant mindset -- that make possible a return to ancient traditions, such as Indian, Islamic,
Chinese, Greek, Christian, etc. In addition, these technologies allow adaptation of traditions to the global
society of six billion people.
Transition has been taken seriously by both evolutionary futurists [1] and macrohistorian futurists [2]. The
questions they address are how social transformation can be investigated other than by linear methods; and
what forces play the dominant role. As economists, too, we would emphasize that the present transition is
embedded in an economic--technological environment that basically differs from the industrial era.
The economic--technical foundations of the global world call for a new mindset. We need to be conscious
of these changes in order to break the Transition Paradox and to find new ways to break out of the EastCentral European semi-periphery. The key issues, which highlight the core, can be structured as Fig. 1
shows. We interpret them as dilemmas, though in all cases they are not real dilemmas. The topics, certainly,
are highly interrelated since they are the different sides of the same coin.
[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]
3. Methods versus methodology
Dilemma one: Do the futures of futures studies mean renewal? If yes, which of the following: the renewal
of methods or of methodology?
The Transition Paradox is the consequence of questioning methodological renewal. However, experts take
different places in this issue, which makes a distinction between methods and methodology. Some
concentrate only on the techniques -- say methods -- owing to the reasoning that viewpoints always change
automatically and can be left out of sight. The renewal in this case refers only to the methods and appears
as a question of didactics reduced to tools. Others put the renewal of the way of thinking -- say
methodology -- to the forefront on the basis that the change in paradigms means a new sense of reason and
a change of methods automatically follows the changed perspectives. In this sense methodology reflects
subjective factors and the methods related to them.
We are of the opinion that methods, as techniques, are a part of methodology and both aspects of
methodology suffer change in transitive periods.
The methodological renewal [3] has been integrating:
* renewal of the way of thinking and the approach to the topic under forecasting (i.e. the renewal of the
methodological grounds);
* renewal of methods and techniques used in futures studies (i.e. the renewal of the methodological
storehouse of futures studies).

The methodological storehouse of futures studies is under two kinds of renewal. Futures studies itself
strives to elaborate new methods and further develops the tried and tested ones that are suited to provide
guidance, even amid the circumstances of instability arising from the transition, as regards the possible
future alternatives expected to eventuate. At the same time futures studies also examines the range of
methods used in other fields, such as sociology, the natural sciences (mainly biology and physics) and
political economy to see whether the results achieved in these specific areas can be put to use in
forecasting.
The methodological storehouse renewal includes:
(a) "New" methods -- for example, storytelling method, futures workshop techniques, quest techniques,
casual layered analysis or anticipatory action learning -- that rely on individual creativity and on group
thinking. These methods help to carry out environmental scanning and provide ammunition for the
elaboration of strategies. The methods themselves are in most cases certainly not new. Some date back
thousands of years; others have been used for decades. The point is that these methods are becoming
dominant in the new mindset. Nevertheless, in European geopolitics and in the breakthrough of the post
socialist, East-Central European countries, they are new.
(b) Old methods -- for example, time series analysis and the system dynamics method -- in a new light
concentrate on the analysis of stability, namely what characterizes these series: stability in the professional,
mathematical sense, its modification or a total lack of it, that is, instability. In unstable periods stability is
not evident. Trend analysis gives place to examining the statistical balance and chaos calculations. In its
new form, the system dynamics method does not only concentrate on seeking a stable course but also
investigates unstable ones due to positive feedback.
(c) Old methods in new attire -- Delphi method and scenario method -- where new circumstances force
futurists to take into account, also, the judgement of non-experts when outlining the future. It is not only the
average opinions that may express the most probable or most desirable future, but also the "outlier" ones.
Furthermore, the scenario method is able to systematize the results of different methods as well as a variety
of futures, values and actions.
(d) New combinations of methods serve more than meeting the challenges of instability; they take into
account the visioning power of individuals as well. For example, combining the Delphi method, the
scenario method and the futures workshop technique is particularly advantageous when non-experts, as
well as experts, are involved in exploring possible alternatives of the future. Combining chaos calculations
with the analysis of future orientation rests on the notion that (positive or negative) attitudes to
systematically-generated future possibilities are easier to explore if we have information concerning the
future orientation of the groups under scrutiny.
However, innovation included in the methodological storehouse cannot be understood and applied without
changing the mindset. The methodological grounds express which theoretical paradigm our research and
forecasting are embedded in, and assist in the selection of methods that should be used amid different
methodological approaches. This kind of renewal can be characterized in six ways:
* the possibility of cognition and determination of the future;
* the space and time dimension of the future;
* the alternatives of future;
* the complexity of the future;
* the problem of commensurability; and
* the reliability of forecasts.

These aspects reflect the main dilemmas of the futures of futures studies.
4. Cultural versus technical issue
Dilemma two: Is the renewal of methodology a question of culture or of techniques?
Our main statement is that the future of future studies as well as its methodological renewal is dominated
by culture. The distinction between methodological grounds and methodological storehouse has highlighted
that, although both sides are under change, it is the methodological grounds that play the determinant role.
In our case the extension of the EU appears as a legal problem in the propaganda. However, the acquis
communitaire is not only a question of organizational technique but it also reflects the ideology of the
European centre towards the semi-periphery.
It is first of all cultural and moral values that determine the tasks and the directions of futures studies in the
future. The techniques are only means that can serve opposite aims as well. The recognition of morality and
culture in science, as well as its undertaking, are the elements that can make futures studies an integrative
discipline and mainstream. The new paradigms of futures studies have already changed their aims to
investigate possible futures that are different in fundamental values and to ask which kind of future we wish
to create. It is only on this basis that the EU can consciously ensure that the extension of the integration
should not be mechanistic and that the vision of the potential members does count and will improve the
renewal of integration.
However, techniques and methods, as well as the economic, institutional foundations of the qualitatively
different visions, are similarly important. Futures studies should not stop at the investigation of different
and wishful values, but should take an active part in the creation of their technological background -otherwise culture, ethics and values remain only a sermon. The idea of a united Europe (with equal
partners) is very old but cannot be fulfilled until the technological infrastructure creates the possibility to
overcome real-politics, classical diplomacy and exploitation.
This is where the futures of futures studies definitely call for transdisciplinarity and multiculturalism.
Futures studies should make a comparison of the renewal efforts of other disciplines, mainly in the field of
social sciences.
Knowledge about reality is a crucial issue in the renewal of futures studies. If the future unfolds as the
continuity of the past and the present, then the possibility of a cognition of the future is based on classic,
positivist philosophical and methodological principles: the profound study of phenomena (tendencies and
events) of the past and the present may lead to an altogether more thorough knowledge of future
phenomena. If the future is not rooted in the past and the present, if it manifests itself in a new form,
however, this classic course of knowing it will not lead to the exploration of a qualitatively new future.
Cognition requires a new approach that can rely on the crutches of a future-oriented view and a way of
thinking that revises and reassesses the past and the present. These options appear as two extreme
alternatives of the EU extension: either continuing the reflexes of the colonization mindset to get to new
resources, or giving place to the integration of alternative visions and viewpoints of the semi-periphery that
may put European development on a new course.
The cultural approach makes changes in the interpretation of knowledge as well. One viewpoint denies
knowledge and accepts only interpretation, while others do not give up the possibility of cognition, but
redefine it and put it into new circumstances.
The new approach places the emphasis on exploring a series of turning points and qualitatively new, often
incalculable, situations. The sense and aim of possibility of cognition is striving to know not the repetitions
inherent in continuity but the changes and renewal instead.
Though individual or cultural-social (local) cognition and just interpretation are emphasized by the
postmodern, diversity should give place to common knowledge as well. This means that the role of futures

studies should preserve the investigation of global culture; however, not in an isolated and excluding way.
The role of common knowledge in the future either as a way of social management or for linking visioning
and decision-making is already analyzed and emphasized [4].
This kind of change in cognition results in the past, present and future being thrown off balance in
statistical terms, and in a consequent relegation of traditional mathematical and statistical methods. By the
same token, it entails a newly gained prominence for expert methods (which create the connection between
the past and the present and the changed, new future) that apply intuitive ways of cognition.
The cultural determination of methodology underlines the importance of the subjective observer, of
responsibility, of alternatives, of qualitative analysis, etc. These are the topics we continue with.
5. Scientific versus non-scientific area
Dilemma three: Is futures studies a discipline of science or should it deny science?
The methodological renewal of futures studies is part and consequence of a process of general
modernization and change of paradigm that is under way in a number of fields of science, among them
futures studies, during the late 20th century. The need for this renewal is generated not only by common
demands on science but also by the fact that people's faith in science is flagging. The uncertainty that has
increased as a result of instability and transformation has given rise to a new situation in the daily routine of
society and in scientific life alike, providing a brand new challenge for futures studies and futures
researchers.
Classical futures research considered itself to be scientific. Its main target, that is the exploration of the
most probable future, was based on the assumption that, provided it perceives the laws of reality in the right
way, it can make correct predictions of the coming future. This is the reason why futures research put the
emphasis on an investigation of the development tendencies of the objective, perceivable reality. Its
methodology adapted the characteristics of positivist science and preferred the hard, quantitative methods
as well as techniques refined from subjective elements of experts' judgements. Thus it followed that only
one type of future could be outlined, because of monocultural patterns, and this was critically debated by
the researchers of so-called futures studies. The classical approach has weakened owing to the changing
reality as well, resulting in the fact that the predicted futures did not come about in more and more cases.
The recognition of development tendencies has become ever dissolvable. Further, this is the case because of
emerging, alternative approaches, such as those of Foucault and postcolonial theory as well as postnormal
science, Islamic science and feminist science, etc. [5].
The debate over futures studies being scientific or non-scientific has been renewed in the years of
Transition. The new paradigms turn away from classical science and in the methodological renewal they try
to find new approaches and new methods that give more space to subjective techniques -- such as futures
workshops, visionary management, technology foresight-- as well as to complexity or models that embrace
empirical, interpretative, critical theory, casual layered analysis and action learning. This eclectic approach
permits learning from each one [6].
By recognizing its own barriers, futures studies no longer strives to be scientific. However this must not
mean that futures studies should give up being science. Rather, it should enrich science with the viewpoint,
aim, culture, etc., of the individual and of the researcher.
Concentrating on the openness of the future, either from evolutionary uncertainty or existing uncertainty,
the new paradigms made huge steps towards the renewal of science, though sometimes they did not
undertake it. Derived from the analysis of emergent complex systems like the global world, post-normal
science puts the emphasis on the role and responsibility of the observer. The new approach denies the
separation of the objective world and the outside observer.
When we understand the problem of separating humankind from nature we come to the conclusion that a
methodology does not lack values; there is no such objective world, and being a scientist is always

normative. Such an approach to science will make it clear to people in the semi-periphery that there are
macrohistoric transformations in process in which our development is embedded in the global context,
although much dominated by the European centre. These processes are objective in a different way and do
not follow the "laws" of international integration.
Since futures studies is concerned that the use of methods should be conscious, the main question is not
only what method to use but also whether one is aware of using a clearly specified attitude or not. To put it
in the extreme, no matter which technique is used; the main point is to know consciously what it is used for
[7].
Another point is that the futurist should make clear not only which technique is suitable for what, but also
whether or not s/he is using any method. Thus the futures of futures studies methods cannot be examined
and taught in itself, without methodology.
6. Alternatives versus the future coming into existence
Dilemma three: What do different methods have to investigate: the alternative futures or the future coming
into existence?
Classical futures research aims to reduce the risk and unexpectedness of the future and to outline the
possibilities of change and development. The output is `if-then' types of statements referring to the future
with certain probabilities, although in a preliminary and provisional way; but the future can be revealed and
recognizable.
The alternative nature of the future has grown stronger because the chance of unstable states arising has
also increased. Events and phenomena have become more complex, and because the difference between a
possible and a desired future has increased in many fields. Increasing social participation in shaping
objectives and the means for accomplishing them further enhances this alternative nature. Individuals and
social groups wish to mould not only their own future but the general shape of the future, too. Unlike the
past, people now feel a stronger need to compare and weigh the different options ahead of them, take
various points of view into consideration and make a responsible decision about accepting one or more of
them. These elements are emphasized by two new conceptual--methodological frameworks, that is,
evolutionary and critical futures studies [8].
A comparative analysis of the alternatives completes the forecasting activity and forecasting itself, and
helps users to gain a better understanding of the differences among alternatives. At the same time it can
mean a basis for formulating ways and conditions of changing from one alternative to another. This was
typically the case in post-socialist countries where people took alternatives seriously as well as their own
role in creating them. However, the "disappointment" in the reaction of the centre (reluctance in supporting
the real accession to the European integration) as well as the alternative of immorality (the suppressed time
period of accumulation of capital) soon proved that the possibility of alternatives should not be treated as a
toy. Another feature of the early transition was that many people thought of alternatives as possible choices
among the optional directives of the government, no matter which one.
Alternatives permeate the whole process of futures studies from the objectives to the possible options
among means and ways of accomplishing them. There is more scope for using alternatives for possible
ways and means than for objectives. This is so because the means present themselves or can be created
increasingly from the results of earlier and/or accomplishable activities. Yet alternatives among objectives
is on the increase in the process of social development too.
Alternatives can be assigned to tendencies as well as to turning points. Alternatives that can be assigned to
lasting tendencies may mean not only a changed continuity of past development but also an outlining of
qualitatively different ways and means. However, a greater number of alternatives can be assigned to the
turning points of development than to lasting tendencies. These alternatives are mostly embodied in future
shapes and social models, which shows that the turning points of development hold the promise of
qualitative renewal of the complex system of society. Within Europe there was widespread critique of the

dominant mindset and institutions. However, within the frameworks of the bipolar world system they could
not surface. The European Union first encountered the possibility of demolishing its post-war structure in
Maastricht, but the neoliberal ideology of transition overwhelmed it. The "transition-energy", that is, the
willingness of people to be involved in, and continue, change, did not last long. Thus the turning points of
development became important indeed.
However, optional future visions and individual choices must not substitute for long-term viability. Thus
the concept of alternatives is forward-looking only within the social-economic-technical frameworks that
serve the long-run stability of the global world. In our case, Hungary's catch-up strategy should make clear
that it depends not only on whether society's alternative visions are acknowledged, but also on whether
these visions serve a new type of European regional co-existence. Furthermore, the study of the
neoconservative global regime of the previous twenty years shows that the demolition of the bipolar
welfare-state system and the transition were more deliberate than expected. Uncertainty and chaos have
served not only as a new mindset of scientific methodology, but also as a type of global order. People have
been forced to think in terms of alternatives in their choices, however, the necessary future orientation was
created in a negative way, as future shock [9].
Postmodernism has correctly realized the importance of individual (local) visions and responsibilities, the
differentiation of viewpoints, the quantitative inconsumability of qualitative discrepancy, etc. However, it is
unable and unwilling to integrate the divergent, alternative visions to the extent where they serve the same
future aim, that is, to create through communication the ideology and the infrastructural-institutional basis
of the global system that has no alternative -- the long-run existence of humankind. Thus, owing to certain
opinions, the futures of futures studies will not remain in the framework of either neoliberal individualism
and diversity, or postmodern differentiation. Or, if so, futures studies cannot become mainstream [10].
7. Leadership versus participation
Dilemma four: Whose vision is the task of futures studies methodology and who creates these visions?
Classical futures research is based on the universal--modernist world conception connected to modern
industrial structures and science. The vision of improving the future for the whole world, which can be
revealed, has been fed by an optimistic future, hence a belief in the technological revolution. The futurist
has become the "engineer of the future", one who can outline tendencies and can construct a better world.
Among others, there are three serious problems with the above concept. Futures studies, based on classical
science and rationality, projects a knowledge and a reasoning of past and present on to the future. Secondly,
the global world is dominated now by the knowledge and reasoning of Western civilization, with the above
restrictions. Finally, the futurist as an engineer is separated from the mass population and monopolizes the
creation of the future as an "expert"; the engineer considers the world as a machine from an outsider's point
of view [11].
The new paradigms of futures studies, mainly critical futures studies, have challenged the positivist
approach. All postmodern paradigms underline the active role and responsibility of individuals and the
cultural divergence of visions. In this sense, the role of futures studies and the futurist is to show the
divergences and make conscious these differences without determining the social direction. The competing
visions will get different social support. Thus all visions can take part in the "competition".
The future is the democratization of futures studies. However, this aim or culture needs a technological,
institutional basis. The possibility to democratize the future and the science of futures has been created by
the microelectronic revolution of the neoconservative era. But its creation has not been at all democratic, its
fulfilment is full of controversies and its neoliberal ideology is in contrast with the new international
networks. So the extension of the participation process has needed leadership; however, it does not mean
that the Euro-Atlantic mindset will or should direct the new world order. This era of Transition is already
over, even if the new paradigms are still part of the Transition itself.

Does methodology monopolize and colonize the future? Even if we accept that it expresses a certain
mindset, the answer is still no. Though the aim of methodological renewal is to reveal different values and
make them conscious, the renewal incorporates a definite value as well, thus representing leadership within
participation. Such leadership is neither monopolization nor colonization because the methodological
renewal is a fluent process that gives place to different integrating values (such as positivism,
postmodernism and so on) depending on certain historic periods.
8. Qualitative versus quantitative methods
Dilemma five: Is it qualitative or quantitative methods that will be at the core of methodological renewal;
and what is the role of information technology in the renewal?
In stable periods mathematical-statistical methods (even simpler trend analyses) were suitable for
forecasting. Methods based on gathering experts' opinions provided adequate guidance in the maze of the
future. Even modelling methods, today considered as classical, were successfully applicable, as they were
reliable in judging the interaction of events and trends in which linear relations prevailed. Today these
methods must be superseded. Unfolding new trends are no longer an organic continuity of the past, nor are
they the consequences of obvious turning points, since the factors are connected in a complicated, nonlinear determinism.
The new, evolving paradigms develop different groups of methods, owing to conceptual differences in their
methodology. Evolutionary futures studies concentrates on model-creating methods, while the critical
approach is much more involved in the renewal of subjective methods [12]. Both paradigms emphasize
future orientation, though evolutionary futures studies combines the different methods in evolutionary
models and scenarios. Critical futures studies, however, arrives at subjective visions of rational future
options [13].
Evolutionary studies is also a good example for integrating the two types of method. The general theory of
evolution may indicate verbally the transition from stability to instability, the setting in motion of the
bifurcation mechanisms and the domain of possible futures. Chaos theory, by outlining the emergence of
different new situations amid circumstances of instability, not only guides us through the jungle of possible
future courses/paths but also systematically generates them with its methods aiming at quantitativeness
[14].
Qualitative and quantitative approaches cannot be separated mechanically. The development of information
technology shows that they are tightly interrelated. Microelectronics is not simply the technological basis of
more effective usage of old quantitative methods, but the basis of a new methodology in itself. Global
modelling was closer to the increasing efficiency of calculation; however, chaos theory has meant a
qualitative change. In other words information technology serves a continuation of the previous social and
world structures if it is no more than a modernization of state and corporate administration for making them
more effective. The aim of East-Central European countries is not a more effective Brussels centre but the
possibility to express, to spread and to execute their visions.
The quantitative revolution as a qualitative change makes clear a future usage for multimedia, computer
packages. The above "dilemmas" have explained that the issue of a CD-ROM containing a collection of
methods cannot be used as an "anthology". Methods are not receipts and not automatism. They are just
means, and the futurist should have knowledge of and responsibility for the means and purpose of their use.
9. Empirical versus theoretical experience
Dilemma six: What determines the utility of a given method: the empirical experience or the theoretical
framework?
Reliability is the yardstick for the quality and adequacy of all futures research and studies. The concept of
reliability is interpreted in different ways in futures studies. On the one hand reliability refers to the
problem that forecasts can be checked only post hoc. On the other hand it refers to the responsibility of

methodological analysis and the assessment of the database used in making the forecast or in expressing
visions.
Assessing the reliability of scientific statements is indeed an essentially more complex task in futures
studies than in other fields of science in general. This stems from the very core of futures studies, namely
from the fact that we make assumptions about something that does not yet exist; or something that exists
but has not yet surfaced and it is not conscious. The reliability of a forecast is affected not only by the
subject of the research but also by the uncertainty contained in the pertaining knowledge. The notion of
reliability in futures studies, therefore, is both objective and subjective. Like the process of cognition,
reliability too can be interpreted only as a process, in the light of changes taking place in the object of the
forecast and the related knowledge, and on the basis of the growing field of knowledge.
Reliability in futures studies is a complex notion to be interpreted in its dynamics, which synthesizes the
quantitative and qualitative assessment of changes in the forecast object, the knowledge needed to make the
forecast and consequently, and the results. It answers to what extent forecasts can serve as bases for
decision-making and to what extent they explore factors promoting progress. A forecast is reliable if it has
such quality inner content that makes for the best possible basis for decision-making and, with its
assumptions and effects, serves progress or averts dangers as best it can in the prevailing system of
environmental conditions. And it needs a high probability of materializing. This interpretation of the notion
reflects that we link the reliability of forecasts, like the interpretation of forecasts, to the basing of decisions
[15]. However, it is not minimum risk and maximum probability that decision making refers to, but the inbuilt ability to create alternative futures. Hence the problem of reliability exceeds forecasting and remains
as a core in all futures studies.
Empiricism, in this sense, is not the verification of futures studies research, but rather the adaptation of the
methodology in given circumstances. Methodology determines the values and the way of thinking, which
become more or less stable in the long run, while empirical experience results from the use of different
methods according to changes in cultures, time periods etc. All in all it is the theoretical framework which
determines the utility of the method; however it is the empirical evidence which evaluates the correct, upto-date realization of future visions. At this point we have returned to the first "dilemma", thus closing the
circle.
10. Conclusion
Futures studies as well as its methodologies can face the challenges of the new era. To break the Transition
Paradox the renewal of methodology should be embedded in the renewal of science. Although its elements
are not yet coherent, futures studies has a good chance of integrating the methodological renewal of other
disciplines, thus becoming mainstream. Methods are not for outlining visions, but also for creating their
technological, institutional and other foundations so that they do not remain utopias.
Methodological renewal can be understood only in relation to the so-called Transition Paradox. This draws
attention to the fact that the investigation of the future of futures studies and the study of global socialeconomic-technological institutions are two sides of the same coin.
Methodological renewal contains two main elements. We have to make a difference between
methodological grounds and the methodological storehouse. Both need to be reviewed in order to make any
survey on the futures of futures studies; however it is the cultural aspect, that is, values and paradigms
expressed by methodological grounds, that dominates the relationship of the two.
The main aspects of changing methodological grounds bring some core "dilemmas" to the surface. We have
tried to summarize the essence of the ongoing changes as well as the main ideas of difference. The
discussion of methodological renewal is as much a political as a cultural question. Hence the breakthrough
of the post-socialist countries needs deep theoretical clarification too. The derivation of the main issues is
just one of many steps, and is what we offer for further discussion. See (Fig. 1).

* The article has been prepared in the framework of OTKA research, entitled Futures Studies in Economics.
Project coordinator: Tamas, Gaspar, PhD.
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Tamas Gaspar, Erzsebet Novaky
Futures Studies Centre, Budapest University of Economics Sciences
and Public Administration, 1093
Budapest, Fovam ter 8, Hungary
Erzsebet Novaky, Tel./fax: +36-1-216-2016. E-mail addresses: tamas.gaspar@jkut.bke.hu (T. Gaspar);
erzsebet.novaky@jkut.bke.hu (E. Novaky).

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