CASES - Crim Jurisdiction

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION
PEOPLE VS LAGON
G.R. No. 45815 May 18, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
LIBERTAD LAGON and HON. JUDGE ISIDRO O. BARRIOS, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
CITY COURT OF ROXAS CITY, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 7 July 1976, a criminal information was filed with the City Court of Roxas City and docketed as
Criminal Case No. 7362, charging private respondent Libertad Lagon with the crime of estafa under
paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The information charged that the accused
had allegedly issued a check in the amount of P4,232.80 as payment for goods or merchandise
purchased, knowing that she did not have sufficient funds to cover the check, which check therefore
subsequently bounced.
The case proceeded to trial and the prosecution commenced the presentation of its evidence.
However, in an Order dated 2 December 1976, the City Court dismissed the information upon the
ground that the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged was beyond the court's authority to
impose. The judge held that the jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal action is determined by the law
in force at the time of the institution of the action, and not by the law in force at the time of the
commission of the crime. At the time of the alleged commission of the crime in April 1975, jurisdiction
over the offense was vested by law in the City Court. However, by the time the criminal information
was filed, paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code had already been amended and
the penalty imposable upon a person accused thereunder increased, which penalty was beyond the
City Court's authority to impose. Accordingly, the court dismissed the information without prejudice to
its being refiled in the proper court.
Hence this Petition for Review brought by the People, arguing that the City Court of Roxas City had
jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 7362 and that it had erred in issuing its Order dismissing the
case. Because the Petition for Review was signed by the City Fiscal and Assistant City Fiscal of
Roxas City as counsel for the People, the Court referred the petition to the Office of the Solicitor
General for comment. Responding to the Court's resolution, the then acting Solicitor General Vicente
Mendoza stated that the Office of the Solicitor General, having been previously consulted by the
Assistant City Fiscal of Roxas City, agreed with the position taken by the latter that the City Court
had jurisdiction over the criminal case involved, and asked that the petition be given due course.
After deliberation on the instant Petition for Review, the Court considers that petitioner has failed to
show that the City Court had committed reversible error in dismissing the criminal information in
Criminal Case No. 7362 without prejudice to its refiling in the proper court.
Under the penultimate paragraph of Section 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, the law
governing the subject matter jurisdiction of municipal and city courts in criminal cases in 1975 and
1976, "[municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts
shall have like jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance to try parties charged with an offense within
their respective jurisdictions, in which the penalty provided by lawdoes not exceed prision
correccional or imprisonment for not more than six (6) years or fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or
both . . . ." It appears that at the time of the commission of the offense charged on 5 April 1975, the
penalty imposable for the offense charged under paragraph 2(d) in relation to the third sub-
paragraph of the first paragraph, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, was arresto mayor in its
maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period; at that time therefore, the offense
clearly fell within the jurisdiction of the City Court of Roxas City.
At the time of the institution of the criminal prosecution on 7 July 1976, the penalty imposable for the
offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362 had been increased by P.D. No. 818 (effective 22
October 1975) to prision mayor in its medium period.
It is firmly settled doctrine that the subject matter jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is
properly measured by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of a criminal action, rather
than by the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged. 1 Thus, in accordance
with the above rule, jurisdiction over the instant case pertained to the then Court of First Instance of
Roxas City considering that P.D. No. 818 had increased the imposable penalty for the offense charged in
Criminal Case No. 7362 to a level-in excess of the minimum penalty which a city court could impose.
The real question raised by the petitioner is: would application of the above-settled doctrine to the
instant case not result in also applying Presidential Decree No. 818 to the present case, in disregard
of the rule against retroactivity of penal laws? Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code permits penal
laws to have retroactive effect only "insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, . . . " We do not believe so.
In the first place, subject-matter jurisdiction in criminal cases is determined by the authority of the
court to impose the penalty imposable under the applicable statute given the allegations of a criminal
information. In People v. Purisima, 2the Court stressed that:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The issue here is one of jurisdiction, of a court's legal competence to try a
case ab origine. In criminal prosecutions, it is settled that the jurisdiction of the court
is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender after trial, or even by the
result of the evidence that would be presented at the trial, but by the extent of the
penalty which the law imposes for the misdemeanor, crime or violation charged in
the complaint. If the facts recited in the complaint and the punishment provided for by
law are sufficient to show that the court in which the complaint is presented has
jurisdiction, that court must assume jurisdiction. 3 (Citations omitted; Emphasis
supplied.)
The same rule was set forth and amplified in People v. Buissan, 4 in the following terms:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . in criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction of the court is not determined by what may
be meted out to the offender after trial (People v. Cuello, 1 SCRA 814) or even by the
result of the evidence that would be presented during the trial (People v. Co Hick 62
Phil. 503) but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes, together with other
legal obligations, on the basis of the facts as recited in the complaint or
information (People v. Purisima, 69 SCRA 347) constitutive of the offense
charged, for once jurisdiction is acquired by the court in which the information is filed,
it is retained regardless whether the evidence proves a lesser offense than that
charged in the information (People v. Mision, 48 O.G. 1330) 5 (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, it may be that after trial, a penalty lesser than the maximum imposable under the statute is
proper under the specific facts and circumstances proven at the trial. In such a case, that lesser
penalty may be imposed by the trial court (provided it had subject-matter jurisdiction under the rule
above referred to) even if the reduced penalty otherwise falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of an
inferior court.
In People v. Buissan, 6 the Court also said:
xxx xxx xxx
. . . It is unquestionable that the Court of First Instance, taking cognizance of a
criminal case coming under its jurisdiction, may, after trial, impose a penalty that is
proper for a crime within the exclusive competence of a municipal or city court as the
evidence would warrant. It may not be said, therefore, that the Court of First Instance
would be acting without jurisdiction if in a simple seduction case, it would impose
penalty of not more than six months of imprisonment, if said case, for the reason
already adverted to, be held to fall under the jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance, not a city or municipal court. 7(Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, the increased penalty provided for the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 7362
by P.D. No. 818 (prison mayor in its medium period) is obviously heavier than the penalty provided
for the same offense originally imposed by paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
(up to prision correccional in its minimum period).
Should the criminal information be refiled in the proper court, that is, the proper Regional Trial Court,
that court may not impose that more onerous penalty upon private respondent Libertad Lagon
(assuming the evidence shows that the offense was committed before 22 October 1975). But the
Regional Trial Court would remain vested with subject-matter jurisdiction to try and decide the
(refiled) case even though the penalty properly imposable, given the date of the commission of the
offense charged, should be the lower penalty originally provided for in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code which is otherwise within the exclusive jurisdiction of the City Court of
Roxas City. In other words, the circumstance that P.D. No. 818 would be inapplicable to the refiled
case would not result in the Regional Trial Court losing subject-matter jurisdiction, nor in the case
falling back into the City Court's exclusive jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to DENY the Petition for Review for lack of merit. The Order
dated 2 December 1976 of the public respondent Presiding Judge of the City Court of Roxas City is
hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.

CRUZ VS. CA
LUTGARDA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE

OF THE PHILIPPINES and the HEIRS OF ESTANISLAWA C.
REYES, represented by MIGUEL C. REYES, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to
reverse the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 31, 1995 and its Resolution
dated December 1, 1995. The Court of Appeals dismissed for being insufficient in
substance the Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus, which sought to nullify two orders
of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 53, dated April 18, 1994 and May 6, 1994.
[1]
[2]
The Antecedent Facts

The City Prosecutor of Manila charged petitioner with the crime of Estafa thru
Falsification of Public Document before the Manila Regional Trial Court. Petitioner
executed before a Notary Public in the City of Manila an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of
a parcel of land stating that she was the sole surviving heir of the registered owner
when in fact she knew there were other surviving heirs. Since the offended party did not
reserve the right to file a separate civil action arising from the criminal offense, the civil
action was deemed instituted in the criminal case.
[3]
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered its decision dated January 17, 1994
acquitting petitioner on the ground of reasonable doubt. In the same decision, the trial
court rendered judgment on the civil aspect of the case, ordering the return to the
surviving heirs of the parcel of land located in Bulacan.
[4]
On January 28, 1994, petitioner received a copy of the decision.

On February 10, 1994, petitioner filed by registered mail a motion for
reconsideration dated February 7, 1994, assailing the trial courts ruling on the civil
aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner furnished the City Prosecutor a copy of the
motion by registered mail.
On April 18, 1994, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
stating:
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration dated February 7, 1994, filed by the
accused through counsel and considering that there is nothing to show that the Office
of the City Prosecutor was actually furnished or served with a copy of the said Motion
for Reconsideration within the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days from receipt
by the accused on January 28, 1994 of a copy of the Courts decision dated January
17, 1994, so that the same is already final and executory, let the Motion for
Reconsideration be Denied for lack of merit.
[5]
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the trial courts order of April 18, 1994.
The trial court denied the same in an order dated May 6, 1994, to wit:
Under the Interim Rules, no party shall be allowed a second motion for
reconsideration of a final order or judgment (Sec. 4). The motion of accused dated 22
April 1994 is a violation of this rule.
WHEREFORE, said motion is DENIED.
[6]
Left with no recourse, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the
Court of Appeals to nullify the two assailed orders of the trial court. Petitioner also asked
the Court of Appeals to compel the trial court to resolve her motion for reconsideration
of the decision dated February 7, 1994.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On March 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition and
dismissed the case for being insufficient in substance.
The Court of Appeals sustained the trial courts order of April 18, 1994 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals declared in part:
Section 10, Rule 13, Rules of Court, provides as follows:

SEC. 10. Proof of Service. Proof of personal service shall consist of a written
admission of the party served, or the affidavit of the party serving, containing a full
statement of the date, place and manner of service. If the service is by ordinary mail,
proof thereof shall consist of an affidavit of the person mailing of facts showing
compliance with Section 5 of this rule. If service is made by registered mail, proof
shall be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office.
The registry return card shall be filed immediately upon receipt thereof by the sender,
or in lieu thereof the letter unclaimed together with the certified or sworn copy of the
notice given by the postmaster to the addressee.
Patent from the language of the said section is that in case service is made by
registered mail, proof of service shall be made by (a) affidavit of the person mailing
and (b) the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. Both must concur. In the case
at bench, there was no such affidavit or registry receipt when the motion was
considered. Thus, respondent Judge cannot be said to have acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in ruling in the manner he did.
[7]
The Court of Appeals also affirmed the trial courts order of May 6, 1994 denying the
subsequent motion for reconsideration, as follows:
xxx, while there is merit in petitioners submission that the motion for
reconsideration dated April 22, 1994 was not a second motion for reconsideration of a
final order or judgment, as contemplated in the Interim Rules because the motion
sought to impugn the order dated 18 April 1994 not on the basis of the issues raised in
the motion for reconsideration dated 07 February 1994 but on the erroneous legal
conclusion of the order dated May 6, 1994, this is already academic. The decision
dated January 7, 1994 had long become final when the second motion for
reconsideration was filed on 03 May 1994. Hence, the pairing Judge who issued the
order on 06 May 1994 had no more legal competence to promulgate the same.
[8]
[9]
Finally, the Court of Appeals upheld the assailed decision of the trial court on the
civil aspect of the case, to wit:
x x x, the institution of a criminal action carries with it the civil action for the
recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. There was neither
reservation nor waiver of the right to file the civil action separately nor has one been
instituted to the criminal action. Hence, the civil action for the civil liability has been
impliedly instituted with the filing of the criminal case before respondent Judge. This
is the law on the matter. The proposition submitted by petitioner that the court
presided by respondent Judge had no jurisdiction over the property because it is
located in Bulacan - outside the territorial jurisdiction of said court -does not hold
water. Being a civil liability arising from the offense charged, the governing law is the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the civil procedure rules which pertain to civil action
arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.
[10]
In the dispositive portion of its assailed decision, the Court of Appeals declared:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition not being sufficient in substance is hereby

DENIED DUE COURSE and the case DISMISSED.
[11]
In a resolution dated December 1, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners

motion for reconsideration.
[12]
Hence, this petition.

The Issues
In her Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
1. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION WAS DULY FURNISHED WITH COPY OF THE PETITIONERS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH RESPECT TO THE DECISION ON THE
CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-54773 (SIC) OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 53.
2.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MANILA HAD JURISDICTION TO RENDER
JUDGMENT ON THE CIVIL ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-57743 FOR
FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT, INVOLVING A PROPERTY LOCATED
IN BULACAN.
3. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE

PETITIONER WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS WHEN THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF MANILA, BRANCH 53, RENDERED DECISION ON THE CIVIL
ASPECT OF CRIMINAL CASE NO. 87-57743.[13]
The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.
When the accused is acquitted on reasonable doubt but is adjudged civilly liable, his
motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect must be served not only on the
prosecution, also on the offended party if the latter is not represented by a private
counsel. Moreover, if the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the
accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, it necessarily
exercises jurisdiction over all matters that the law requires the court to resolve. This
includes the power to order the restitution to the offended party of real property located
in another province.
Absence of Proof of Service
The first issue is whether petitioners motion for reconsideration dated February 7,
1994 complied with the mandatory requirements of Section 6, Rule 15 on proof of
service. Petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals erred in sustaining the trial courts
finding that the City Prosecutor was not duly and timely furnished with petitioners
motion for reconsideration of February 7, 1994.
Petitioner asserts that both copies of the motion for reconsideration were sent to the
trial court and the City Prosecutor by registered mail on February 10, 1994. Petitioner
relies on jurisprudence that the date of mailing is the date of filing, arguing that the date
of mailing of both motions was on February 10, 1994. Petitioner maintains that the
motion was properly filed within the 15-day period, citing the registry return card which
shows actual receipt on February 22, 1994 by the City Prosecutor of a copy of the
motion.
The Court of Appeals, noting that petitioner received a copy of the decision on
January 28, 1994, stated that petitioner had until February 12, 1994 to appeal the
decision or file a motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner,
by filing a motion for reconsideration without any proof of service, merely filed a scrap of
paper and not a motion for reconsideration. Hence, the reglementary period of petitioner
to appeal continued to run and lapsed after the 15-day period, making the trial courts
decision final and executory.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that petitioner patently failed to comply with the
mandatory requirements on proof of service insofar as the public prosecutor is
concerned. The Court has stressed time and again that non-compliance with Sections
4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 is a fatal defect. The well-settled rule is that a motion which fails
to comply with Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 is a useless piece of paper. If filed, such
motion is not entitled to judicial cognizance and does not stop the running of the
reglementary period for filing the requisite pleading.
[14]
Section 6 of Rule 15 reads:
SEC. 6. - Proof of service to be filed with motions. No motion shall be acted upon
by the court, without proof of service of the notice thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
[15]
From the language of the rule, proof of service is mandatory. Without such proof of
service to the adverse party, a motion is nothing but an empty formality deserving no
judicial cognizance.
Section 13 of Rule 13 further requires that:
SEC. 13. Proof of Service. x x x. If service is made by registered mail, proof shall
be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing office. The
registry return card shall be filed immediately upon its receipt by the sender, or in lieu
thereof the unclaimed letter together with the certified or sworn copy of the notice
given by the postmaster to the addressee. (Emphasis supplied)
[16]
If service is by registered mail, proof of service consists of the affidavit of the person
mailing and the registry receipt, both of which must be appended to the motion.
Absent one or the other, or worse both, there is no proof of service.
In the instant case, an examination of the record shows that petitioner received a
copy of the trial courts decision of January 17, 1994 on January 28, 1994. Within the
reglementary period to appeal, petitioner filed on February 10, 1994, by registered mail,
a motion for reconsideration. However, petitioner failed to attach both the affidavit and
the registry receipt to the motion for reconsideration as required by the Rules.
The defect of the motion is apparent on its face. Petitioners motion for
reconsideration was a mere scrap of paper as it did not contain the required proof of
service.
However, petitioner is contesting that part of the decision of the trial court finding
him civilly liable even as he is acquitted from the criminal charge on reasonable doubt.
This raises the issue of whether the public prosecutor is the only proper party to be
served with petitioners motion for reconsideration. The present Rules do not require
the accused to serve a copy of his motion for reconsideration on the offended party who
may not be represented by a private counsel. The Rules require service only on the
public prosecutor if the offended party is not represented by a private counsel.
A judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and the prosecution
cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against double
jeopardy. However, either the offended party or the accused may appeal the civil aspect
of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The public prosecutor has
generally no interest in appealing the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused.
The acquittal ends the work of the public prosecutor and the case is terminated as
far as he is concerned.
The real parties in interest in the civil aspect of a decision are the offended party
and the accused. Thus, any appeal or motion for reconsideration of the civil aspect of a
decision in a criminal case must be served on the other real party in interest. If the
offended party appeals or moves for reconsideration, the accused is necessarily served
a copy of the pleading through his counsel.
If the accused appeals or moves for reconsideration, a lacuna arises if the offended
party is not represented by a private counsel. In such a situation, under the present
Rules only the public prosecutor is served the notice of appeal or a copy of the motion
for reconsideration. To fill in this lacuna in the present Rules, we require that henceforth
if the accused appeals or moves for reconsideration, he should serve a copy of his
pleading on the offended party himself if the latter is not represented by a private
counsel. This is in addition to service on the public prosecutor who is the counsel of
record of the State.
In the instant case, the Court notes that petitioner did not serve a copy of her motion
for reconsideration on the offended party who was not represented by a private counsel
in the trial court. In the interest of justice, and considering that the present Rules are
silent on the matter, it is only fair to give petitioner a period of five days from receipt of
this decision within which to serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on the
offended party.
Trial courts jurisdiction over the civil aspect.
Petitioner maintains that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that the trial court had
jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal case. Petitioner
asserts that the Manila trial court had no jurisdiction over the parcel of land in Bulacan
which is outside the trial courts territorial jurisdiction.
In upholding the trial courts jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals held:
Being a civil liability arising from the offense charged, the governing law is the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the civil procedure rules which pertain to civil action
arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.
[17]
We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner asserts that the location of the subject property outside the courts
territorial jurisdiction deprived the trial court of jurisdiction over the civil aspect of the
criminal case. This argument is contrary to the law and the rules.
There are three important requisites which must be present before a court can
acquire criminal jurisdiction. First, the court must have jurisdiction over the subject
matter. Second, the court must have jurisdiction over the territory where the offense was
committed. Third, the court must have jurisdiction over the person of the accused. In
the instant case, the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has
conferred on the court the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa through
falsification of a public document. The trial court also had jurisdiction over the offense
charged since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The trial court
also acquired jurisdiction over the person of accused-petitioner because she voluntarily
submitted to the courts authority.
[18]
Where the court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the
accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court
necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires the court to
resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case is the civil liability of the accused arising
from the crime. Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code provides that [E]very person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. Article 104 of the same Code states
that civil liability x x x includes restitution.
The action for recovery of civil liability is deemed instituted in the criminal action
unless reserved by the offended party. In the instant case, the offended party did not
reserve the civil action and the civil action was deemed instituted in the criminal action.
Although the trial court acquitted petitioner of the crime charged, the acquittal, grounded
on reasonable doubt, did not extinguish the civil liability. Thus, the Manila trial court
had jurisdiction to decide the civil aspect of the instant case - ordering restitution even if
the parcel of land is located in Bulacan.
[19]
[20]
Consequently, while we find no reversible error in the decision of the Court of

Appeals as to proof of service and the trial courts jurisdiction on the civil aspect, we
remand this case for further proceedings in the interest of justice.
WHEREFORE, petitioner is given five (5) days from receipt of this decision within
which to serve a copy of her motion for reconsideration on the offended party. Let this
case be remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., on leave.
Penned by Associate Justice Buenaventura J. Guerrero and concurred in by Associate Justices Asaali
S. Isnani and Antonio P. Solano, Rollo, pp. 8-13.
[1]
[2]
Rollo, p. 14.
[3]
Docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-57743 in Branch 53 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
The trial court declared that petitioner held the parcel of land merely as trustee of the true surviving
heirs of the registered owner. The trial court ordered petitioner not to encumber or dispose of the said
property at the risk of incurring criminal liability. Finally, the trial court ordered the cancellation of the title
in the name of petitioner and the issuance of a new title in the name of the heirs, upon reimbursement to
petitioner of the P2,500.00 she paid to redeem the property.
[4]
[5]
Rollo, p. 46.
[6]
Rollo, p. 50.
[7]
Rollo, p. 11.
[8]
This should read April 18, 1994.
[9]
Rollo, p. 12.
[10]
Ibid.
[11]
Ibid., p. 13.
[12]
Supra, see note 2.
[13]
Rollo, pp. 144-145.
Del Castillo vs. Aguinaldo, 212 SCRA 169 (1992); Cui vs. Madayag, 245 SCRA 1 (1995); Prado vs.
Veridiano II, 204 SCRA 654 (1991).
[14]
[15]
This is taken from Section 6 of the former Rule, which reads:
SEC. 6. - Proof of service to be filed with motions. No motion shall be acted upon by the court,
without proof of service of the notice thereof, except when the court is satisfied that the rights of the
adverse party or parties are not affected.
[16]
This is taken from Section 10 of the old Rule.
[17]
Supra, see note 9.
[18]
Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law, Volume IV, 1992 Edition, p. 3.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was the same rule as the 1985
Rules insofar as civil liability ex-delicto was concerned.
[19]

The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provides as follows:
The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil
action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal
action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. This is substantially
the same rule as in the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[20]

DELA CRUZ VS. MOYA
RODOLFO DELA CRUZ, petitioner,

vs.
Hon. FELIX L. MOYA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Rolando C. Rama for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
Involving as it does a purely legal question, the present petition for certiorari and mandamus was
certified to this Court by the then Intermediate Appellate Court in its resolution dated August 30,
1983.
On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
assigned to the Intelligence and Operations Section of the 432nd PC Company, together with other
PC men, received a mission order to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco, Sto. Tomas, Davao for the
purpose of verifying and apprehending persons who were allegedly engaged in illegal cockfighting.
In compliance with said mission order, Dela Cruz and company proceeded to Maco, Davao del Norte
and caught in flagrante the operators of said illegal cockfighting, but said operators resisted arrest.
The soldiers left the place but they brought with them to the PC Headquarters the evidence of the
crime, such as gaffs and fighting cocks. The operators of the illegal cockfights, including the
deceased Eusebio Cabilto, followed the soldiers on their way back to the PC Headquarters, catching
up with them on the Tagum-Mati National Highway. Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela Cruz
shot Cabilto.
On August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged with homicide in the Court of First Instance of Davao, in
an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 40080.
While the case was pending trial, Presidential Decree Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated by
the President of the Philippines on January 16, 1981, vesting in courts-martial jurisdiction over
crimes committed by members of the Armed Forces or of the Philippine Constabulary in
performance of their duties.
Claiming that the crime for which he was charged was committed in relation to the performance of
his duties, Dela Cruz filed with the Court of First Instance of Davao a motion to transfer the case to
the military authorities so he could be tried by court martial. The motion was denied. Hence, the
present petition.
At issue is whether the civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter of Criminal Case No.
40080.
One of the essential requisites of a valid court proceeding is that the court hearing the case must
have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case. If the court is acting without jurisdiction, then
the entire proceedings are null and void.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined by the statute in force at the time of the
commencement of the action. [Silvestre v. Military Commission, L-48366, March 8, 1978, 82 SCRA
10; People v. Romualdo, 90 Phil. 739 (1952); Rilloraza v. Arciaga, 128 Phil. 799 (1967), 21 SCRA
717.] And once jurisdiction is vested in the court, it is retained up to the end of the litigation.
[Pamintuan v. Tiglao, 53 Phil. 1, (1929); Phil. Land-Air-Sea Labor Union (PLASLU), Inc. v. CIR, 93
Phil. 747 (1953); Tuvera v. De Guzman, 121 Phil. 706 (1965),13 SCRA 729; Rilloraza v.
Arciaga, supra: Rizal Surety and Insurance Co. v. Manila Railroad Co., et al., 123 Phil. 766
(1966),16 SCRA908).
In the instant case, the information was filed on August 2, 1979. On such date, by virtue of General
Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977, published in 73 Official Gazette (Supplement) #28, pages 63731 to 6373-3. (July 11, 1977), military tribunals created under General Order No. 8 exercised
exclusive jurisdiction over "(a)ll offenses committed by military personnel of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines while in the performance of their official duty or which arose out of any act or omission
done in the performance of their official duty; Provided, that for the purpose of determining whether
an offense was committed while in the performance of official duty or whether it arose out of an act
or omission done in the performance of official duty, a certificate issued by the Secretary of National
Defense to that effect shall be conclusive unless modified or revoked by the President. . . " (Section
1.) As no amendatory law was ever published in the Official Gazette between the time G.R. No. 59
was published until the information in Criminal Case No. 40080 was filed on August 2,1979, then
said General Order No. 59 remained in force on said date.
In the case at bar, it is not disputed that at the time of the commission of the alleged offense,
petitioner Dela Cruz was a member of the Philippine Constabulary, and that the shooting of the
deceased Cabilto was committed while petitioner was executing the Mission Order.
But what is the significance of the proviso regarding the certificate to be issued by the Secretary of
National Defense?
The proviso merely states that the certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense
is conclusive for the purpose of determining whether an offense was committed while in the
performance of official duty, or arose out of an act or omission done in the performance of official
duty. It does not in any way preclude the courts from making any finding as to whether an offense is
duty-connected. Nor does it make the certificate a condition precedent for the exercise by either
civilian courts or military tribunals of their jurisdiction over offenses committed by members of the
AFP.
In the instant case, even as no certificate issued by the Secretary of National Defense was
presented in court, the record contains a copy of Mission Order No. 7, signed by a certain Lieutenant
Huerta, directing Dela Cruz, among others, to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco, Sto. Tomas, Davao
to verify and apprehend persons reportedly engaged in illegal cockfighting. The evidence of the
prosecution presented in court likewise shows that Cabilto was shot while petitioner was executing
the mission order. These undisputed facts compel this Court to declare that respondent court was
without jurisdiction to try the case against petitioner Dela Cruz.
The Solicitor General points out that at the time the information was filed, Presidential Decrees Nos.
1822 and 1822-A which vest in the courts-martial jurisdiction over offenses committed by members
of the AFP in the performance of their duties were not yet in effect, the same having been
promulgated only in 1981.
Truly, PD 1822 and 1822-A are inapplicable to the case at bar. However, General Order No. 59 cited
above applies.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The in Criminal Case No. 4008 are declared null and void
but without prejudice to the filing of another action in the proper forum. Let a copy of this decision be
furnished the Judge Advocate of the Philippine Constabulary, Camp Crame, Quezon City, for
appropriate action.
Fernan, Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
FUKUZUME VS. PEOPLE
YUSUKE FUKUZUME,*
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 143647

Present:
PUNO, Chairman,**
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,*** JJ.
- versus -
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
November 11, 2005
x----------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court assailing the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 13, 2000
in CA-G.R. CR No. 21888, which affirmed with modification the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 146 dated October 21, 1996 in
Criminal Case No. 95-083, finding herein accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for twenty (20) years and to pay private complainant the sum
of P424,000.00; and the CA Resolution dated June 16, 2000 denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.[2]
The facts of the case are as follows:
Private complainant Javier Ng Yu (Yu) is a businessman engaged in buying

and selling aluminum scrap wires.[3] Sometime in July 1991, Yu, accompanied by a
friend, Mr. Jovate,[4] who was the vice-president of Manila Electric Company, went
to the house of herein accused-appellant Yusuke Fukuzume (Fukuzume) in
Paraaque.[5] Jovate introduced Fukuzume to Yu telling the latter that Fukuzume is
from Furukawa Electric Corporation (Furukawa) and that he has at his disposal
aluminum scrap wires.[6] Fukuzume confirmed this information and told Yu that
the scrap wires belong to Furukawa but they are under the care of National Power
Corporation (NAPOCOR).[7] Believing Fukuzumes representation to be true, Yu
agreed to buy the aluminum scrap wires from Fukuzume. [8] The initial agreed
purchase price was P200,000.00.[9] Yu gave Fukuzume sums of money on various
dates which eventually totaled P290,000.00, broken down as follows: P50,000.00,
given on July 12, 1991; P20,000.00, given on July 22, 1991; P50,000.00, given on
October 14, 1991; and, P170,000.00, given on October 18, 1991.[10] Fukuzume
admitted that he received the same from Yu and that he still owes him the amount
of P290,000.00.[11] To support his claim that the aluminum scrap wires being sold
are indeed owned by Furukawa, that these scrap wires are with NAPOCOR, and
that Furukawas authorized representatives are allowed to withdraw and dispose of
said scrap wires, Fukuzume gave Yu two certifications dated December 17, 1991
and December 27, 1991 purportedly issued by NAPOCOR and signed by its legal
counsel by the name of R. Y. Rodriguez. [12] At the time that Fukuzume gave Yu the
second certification, he asked money from the latter telling him that it shall be
given as gifts to some of the people in NAPOCOR. Yu gave Fukuzume money and,
in exchange, the latter issued two checks, one for P100,000.00 and the other
for P34,000.00.[13] However, when Yu deposited the checks, they were dishonored
on the ground that the account from which the checks should have been drawn is
already closed.[14] Subsequently, Yu called up Fukuzume to inform him that the
checks bounced.[15] Fukuzume instead told him not to worry because in one or two
weeks he will give Yu the necessary authorization to enable him to retrieve the
aluminum scrap wires from NAPOCOR.[16] On January 17, 1992, Fukuzume gave
Yu a letter of even date, signed by the Director of the Overseas Operation and
Power Transmission Project Divisions of Furukawa, authorizing Fukuzume to
dispose of excess aluminum conductor materials which are stored in their depots in
Tanay and Bulacan.[17] Thereafter, Fukuzume agreed to accompany Yu when the
latter is going to take the aluminum scrap wires from the NAPOCOR compound.
[18]
When Yu arrived at the NAPOCOR compound on the scheduled date,
Fukuzume was nowhere to be found.[19] Hence, Yu proceeded to show the
documents of authorization to NAPOCOR personnel. However, the people from
NAPOCOR did not honor the authorization letter issued by Furukawa dated
January 17, 1992.[20] NAPOCOR also refused to acknowledge the certifications
dated December 17, 1991 and December 27, 1991 claiming that these are spurious
as the person who signed these documents is no longer connected with NAPOCOR
as of December 1991.[21] Unable to get the aluminum scrap wires from the
NAPOCOR compound, Yu talked to Fukuzume and asked from the latter the
refund of the money he paid him.[22] Fukuzume promised to return Yus money.[23]
When Fukuzume failed to comply with his undertaking, Yu sent him a demand
letter asking for the refund of P424,000.00 plus loss of profits.[24] Subsequently, Yu
filed a complaint with the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).[25]
In an Information, dated November 4, 1994, filed with the RTC of Makati,
Fukuzume was charged with estafa committed as follows:
That sometime in the month of July, 1991 up to September 17, 1992, in
the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to
prejudice and defraud Javier Yu y Ng, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make false representation and fraudulent manifestation that he is the
duly authorized representative of Furukawa Electric Co. Ltd., in the Philippines,
and was authorized to sell excess aluminum conductor materials not being used
by Napocor and Furukawa, the accused knowing full well that those
representations were false and were only made to induce and convince said Javier
Yu y Ng to buy said materials, who believing said representations to be true, gave
and delivered the total amount of P424,000.00 but the accused once in possession
of the money, far from complying with his obligation to deliver said aluminum
conductor materials to herein complainant, with intent of gain, unfaithfulness and
abuse of confidence, applied and used for his own personal use and benefit the
said amount and despite repeated demands failed and refused and still fails and
refuses to account for, to the damage and prejudice of Javier Yu y Ng in the
aforementioned amount of P424,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[26]
[27]
Upon being arraigned on February 28, 1995, Fukuzume pleaded not guilty.
Trial ensued.
In its Decision dated October 21, 1996, the trial court found Fukuzume
guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby

finds the accused GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa and
hereby orders him to suffer the maximum penalty of imprisonment for twenty
(20) years. With respect to his civil liability, accused is hereby ordered to pay
complainant the amount of P424,000.00 plus legal interest from the date of
demand until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.[28]
Aggrieved by the trial courts decision, Fukuzume filed an appeal with the
CA.
On March 13, 2000, the CA promulgated its decision affirming the findings
and conclusions of the trial court but modifying the penalty imposed, thus:
although the trial court correctly imposed the maximum penalty of

imprisonment for twenty (20) years, it failed to determine the minimum penalty
for the offense committed (prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period but imposed in the maximum period), hence, the
penalty is modified to six (6) years and one (1) day ofprision mayor in its
minimum period, as the minimum, to not more than twenty (20) years
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period, as maximum.[29]
Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from, except for the

aforementioned modification in the prison term of appellant, is hereby
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[30]
Hence, herein petition filed by Fukuzume based on the following grounds:
THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE

TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI HAS JURISDICTION IS NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME

COURT.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT
CONCLUDED THAT THE ALLEGED FALSE PRETENSE WAS EXECUTED
PRIOR TO OR SIMULTANEOUS WITH THE ALLEGED COMMISSION OF
THE FRAUD.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT BY FAILING TO
CONSIDER THAT THE ORIGINAL TRANSACTION BETWEEN THE
PETITIONER AND PRIVATE COMPLAINANT HAD BEEN NOVATED AND
CONVERTED INTO A MERE DEBTOR-CREDITOR RELATIONSHIP,
THEREBY EXTINGUISHING THE INCIPIENT CRIMINAL LIABILITY
THEREOF, IF ANY.[31]
We agree with Fukuzumes contention that the CA erred in ruling that the
RTC of Makati has jurisdiction over the offense charged. The CA ruled:
The trial court of Makati has jurisdiction. Subject to existing laws, in all
criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the
essential ingredients thereof took place (Rule 110, Sec. 15, Rules of Court).
Although the false representation and verbal contract of sale of the aluminum
scrap wires took place at appellants residence in Paraaque, appellant and private
complainant nevertheless admitted that the initial payment of P50,000.00 for said
transaction was made at the Hotel Intercontinental in Makati City (Record, pp.
15, 68). Hence, an element of the crime that the offended party was induced to
part with his money because of the false pretense occurred within the
jurisdiction of the lower court giving it jurisdiction over the instant case.
The CA ruled on the basis of the sworn statement of Yu filed with the NBI on April
19, 1994[32] and the affidavit of Fukuzume which was subscribed on July 20, 1994.
[33]
With respect to the sworn statement of Yu, which was presented in evidence
by the prosecution, it is clear that he alleged therein that on July 12, 1991, he gave
Fukuzume the amount of P50,000.00 at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati.
However, we agree with Fukuzumes contention that Yu testified during his direct
examination that on July 12, 1991 he gave the amount of P50,000.00 to Fukuzume
in the latters house. It is not disputed that Fukuzumes house is located in
Paraaque. Yu testified thus:
Q
A
Q
A
Q
A
Mr. Witness, you testified the last time that you know the accused
in this case, Mr. Yusuke Fukuzume?
Yes, sir.
Now, would you enlighten us under what circumstance you came
to know the accused?
I know the accused Mr. Yusuke Fukuzume through Mr. Hubati.
And why or how did Mr. Hubati come to know the accused, if you
know?
Mr. Hubati came to my place dealing with the aluminum scrap
wires.
ATTY. N. SERING
Your Honor, may I move to strike out the answer. It is not responsive to
the question.
COURT
Please wait until the answer is completed.
Q
Now, you met this Mr. Hubati. How?
He came to me offering me aluminum scrap wires.
FISCAL E. HIRANG
Q
When was that, Mr. Witness?
That was in 1991, sir.
COURT
When?
FISCAL E. HIRANG
Your Honor please, may the witness be allowed to consult his
memorandum.
A
July 12, 1991, sir.
And what transpired during that time you met Mr. Hubati?
We went to the house of Mr. Fukuzume and game (sic) him some
amount of money.
Now, would you tell the Court the reason why you parted to the
accused in this case the amount of money?
In payment of the aluminum scrap wires and we have documents to

that effect.
Now, please tell us what really was that transaction that took place
at the house of Mr. Fukuzume on that particular date?
Our agreement with Mr. Hubati and with Mr. Fukuzume is that, I
am going to give money in payment of the aluminum scrap wires
coming from Furukawa Eletric Company.
How much is the amount of money which you agreed to give to the
accused?
Our first agreement was for P200,000.
Where is that aluminum scrap located?
The electric aluminum scrap wires was or were under the care of
the National Power Corporation but according to Mr. Fukuzume it
belongs to Furukawa Electric Company.
In short, Mr. Witness, on July 12, 1991, you only gave to the
accused the amount of P50,000?
ATTY. N. SERING
Objection, Your Honor.
FISCAL E. HIRANG
The complainant testified he gave P50,000. I am asking how much the

complainant gave to the accused on that particular date.
A
On July 12, I gave him P50,000 on that date.
Not P200,000?
No, sir.[34]
Settled is the rule that whenever there is inconsistency between the affidavit and
the testimony of a witness in court, the testimony commands greater weight
considering that affidavits taken ex parte are inferior to testimony given in court,
the former being almost invariably incomplete and oftentimes inaccurate.[35]
More importantly, we find nothing in the direct or cross-examination of Yu

to establish that he gave any money to Fukuzume or transacted business with him
with respect to the subject aluminum scrap wires inside or within the premises of
the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati, or anywhere in
Makati for that matter. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of
jurisdiction.[36] Citing Uy vs. Court of Appeals,[37] we held in the fairly recent case
of Macasaet vs. People[38] that:
It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be acquired by courts in

criminal cases the offense should have been committed or any one of its essential
ingredients took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. Territorial
jurisdiction in criminal cases is the territory where the court has jurisdiction to
take cognizance or to try the offense allegedly committed therein by the accused.
Thus, it cannot take jurisdiction over a person charged with an offense allegedly
committed outside of that limited territory. Furthermore, the jurisdiction of a
court over the criminal case is determined by the allegations in the complaint or
information. And once it is so shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the
case. However, if the evidence adduced during the trial show that the offense
was committed somewhere else, the court should dismiss the action for want
of jurisdiction.[39] (Emphasis supplied)
Where life or liberty is affected by its proceedings, the court must keep strictly
within the limits of the law authorizing it to take jurisdiction and to try the case and
to render judgment.[40]
In the present case, the criminal information against Fukuzume was filed
with and tried by the RTC of Makati. He was charged with estafa as defined under
Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of which are
as follows:
1. That there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means.

2. That such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be
made or executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud.
3. That the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means, that is, he was induced to part with his money
or property because of the false pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means.
4. That as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.[41]
The crime was alleged in the Information as having been committed in Makati.
However, aside from the sworn statement executed by Yu on April 19, 1994, the
prosecution presented no other evidence, testimonial or documentary, to
corroborate Yus sworn statement or to prove that any of the above-enumerated
elements of the offense charged was committed in Makati. Indeed, the prosecution
failed to establish that any of the subsequent payments made by Yu in the amounts
of P50,000.00 on July 12, 1991,P20,000.00 on July 22, 1991, P50,000.00 on
October 14, 1991 andP170,000.00 on October 18, 1991 was given in Makati.
Neither was there proof to show that the certifications purporting to prove that
NAPOCOR has in its custody the subject aluminum scrap wires and that
Fukuzume is authorized by Furukawa to sell the same were given by Fukuzume to
Yu in Makati. On the contrary, the testimony of Yu established that all the
elements of the offense charged had been committed in Paraaque, to wit: that on
July 12, 1991, Yu went to the house of Fukuzume in Paraaque; that with the
intention of selling the subject aluminum scrap wires, the latter pretended that he is
a representative of Furukawa who is authorized to sell the said scrap wires; that
based on the false pretense of Fukuzume, Yu agreed to buy the subject aluminum
scrap wires; that Yu paid Fukuzume the initial amount ofP50,000.00; that as a
result, Yu suffered damage. Stated differently, the crime of estafa, as defined and
penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, was
consummated when Yu and Fukuzume met at the latters house in Paraaque and,
by falsely pretending to sell aluminum scrap wires, Fukuzume was able to induce
Yu to part with his money.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that Fukuzume himself alleged in
his affidavit dated July 20, 1994 that in an unspecified date, he
received P50,000.00 from Yu at the Intercontinental Hotel in Makati. However, we
cannot rely on this affidavit for the reason that it forms part of the records of the
preliminary investigation and, therefore, may not be considered evidence. It is
settled that the record of the preliminary investigation, whether conducted by a
judge or a prosecutor, shall not form part of the record of the case in the RTC. [42]
In People vs. Crispin,[43] this Court held that the fact that the affidavit formed part
of the record of the preliminary investigation does not justify its being treated as
evidence because the record of the preliminary investigation does not form part of
the record of the case in the RTC. Such record must be introduced as evidence
during trial, and the trial court is not compelled to take judicial notice of the same.
[44]
Since neither prosecution nor defense presented in evidence Fukuzumes
affidavit, the same may not be considered part of the records, much less evidence.
From the foregoing, it is evident that the prosecution failed to prove that
Fukuzume committed the crime of estafa in Makati or that any of the essential
ingredients of the offense took place in the said city. Hence, the judgment of the
trial court convicting Fukuzume of the crime of estafa
should be set aside for want of jurisdiction, without prejudice, however, to the
filing of appropriate charges with the court of competent jurisdiction.
It is noted that it was only in his petition with the CA that Fukuzume raised
the issue of the trial courts jurisdiction over the offense charged. Nonetheless, the
rule is settled that an objection based on the ground that the court lacks jurisdiction
over the offense charged may be raised or consideredmotu propio by the court at
any stage of the proceedings or on appeal.[45] Moreover, jurisdiction over the
subject matter in a criminal case cannot be conferred upon the court by the
accused, by express waiver or otherwise, since such jurisdiction is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organized the court, and is given only by law in the
manner and form prescribed by law.[46] While an exception to this rule was
recognized by this Court beginning with the landmark case of Tijam vs.
Sibonghanoy,[47] wherein the defense of lack of jurisdiction by the court which
rendered the questioned ruling was considered to be barred by laches, we find that
the factual circumstances involved in said case, a civil case, which justified the
departure from the general rule are not present in the instant criminal case.
Thus, having found that the RTC of Makati did not have jurisdiction to try
the case against Fukuzume, we find it unnecessary to consider the other issues
raised in the present petition.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision

and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 21888
are SET ASIDE on ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati, Branch 146. Criminal Case No. 95-083 isDISMISSED without
prejudice.
SO ORDERED.

BUAYA VS. POLO
SOLEMNIDAD M. BUAYA, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Presiding Judge, Branch XIX, Regional Trial)
Court of Manila and the COUNTRY BANKERS INSURANCE CORPORATION, respondents.
Apolinario M. Buaya for petitioner.
Romeo G. Velasquez for respondent Country Bankers Insurance Corporation.
PARAS, J.:
Petitioner, Solemnidad M. Buaya, in the instant petition for certiorari, seeks to annul and set aside
the orders of denial issued by the respondent Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
XIX on her Motion to Quash/Dismiss and Motion for Reconsideration in Criminal Case No. L-8322252 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Solemnidad M. Buaya." The Motion to Dismiss was
anchored on the following grounds (a) the court has no jurisdiction over the case and (b) the subject
matter is purely civil in nature.
It appears that petitioner was an insurance agent of the private respondent, who was authorized to
transact and underwrite insurance business and collect the corresponding premiums for and in
behalf of the private respondent. Under the terms of the agency agreement, the petitioner is required
to make a periodic report and accounting of her transactions and remit premium collections to the
principal office of private respondent located in the City of Manila. Allegedly, an audit was conducted
on petitioner's account which showed a shortage in the amount of P358,850.72. As a result she was
charged with estafa in Criminal Case No. 83-22252, before the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch XIX with the respondent Hon. Wenceslao Polo as the Presiding Judge. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss. which motion was denied by respondent Judge in his Order dated March 26,
1986. The subsequent motion for reconsideration of this order of denial was also denied.
These two Orders of denial are now the subject of the present petition. It is the contention of
petitioner that the Regional trial Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu
City and necessarily the funds she allegedly misappropriated were collected in Cebu City.
Petitioner further contends that the subject matter of this case is purely civil in nature because the
fact that private respondent separately filed Civil Case No. 83-14931 involving the same alleged
misappropriated amount is an acceptance that the subject transaction complained of is not proper
for a criminal action.
The respondents on the other hand, call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a
motion to dismiss or to quash, being interlocutory in character, cannot be questioned
by certiorari and it cannot be the subject of appeal until final judgment or order rendered (See. 2,
Rule 41, Rules of Court). the ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case is to enter a Plea, go
to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment
(Newsweek Inc. v. IAC, 142 SCRA 171).
The general rule is correctly stated. But this is subject to certain exceptions the reason is that it
would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense or it is not the court of proper venue.
Here, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court of Manila to take cognizance of
this criminal case for estafa.
It is well-settled that the averments in the complaint or information characterize the crime to be
prosecuted and the court before which it must be tried (Balite v. People, L-21475, Sept. 30,1966
cited in People v. Masilang, 142 SCRA 680).
In Villanueva v. Ortiz, et al . (L-15344, May 30, 1960, 108 Phil, 493) this Court ruled that in order to
determine the jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases, the complaint must be examined for the
purpose of ascertaining whether or not the facts set out therein and the punishment provided for by
law fall within the jurisdiction of the court where the complaint is filed. The jurisdiction of courts in
criminal cases is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information, and not by the
findings the court may make after the trial (People v. Mission, 87 Phil. 641).
The information in the case at reads as follows:
The undersigned accuses Solemnidad Buaya of the crime of estafa, committed as follows:
That during the period 1980 to June 15, 1982, inclusive, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously defraud the Country Bankers Insurance
Corporation represented by Elmer Banez duly organized and earth
under the laws of the Philippine with principal address at 9th floor,
G.R. Antonio Bldg., T.M. Kalaw, Ermita, in said City, in the following
manner, to wit. the said having been authorized to act as insurance
agent of said corporation, among whose duties were to remit
collections due from customers thereat and to account for and turn
over the same to the said Country Bankers Insurance Corporation
represented by Elmer Banez, as soon as possible or immediately
upon demand, collected and received the amount of P368,850.00
representing payments of insurance premiums from customers, but
herein accused, once in possession of said amount, far from
complying with her aforesaid obligation, failed and refused to do so
and with intent to defraud, absconded with the whole amount thereby
misappropriated, misapplied and converted the said amount of
P358,850.00 to her own personal used and benefit, to the damage
and prejudice of said Country Bankers Insurance Corporation in the
amount of P358,850.00 Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 44, Rollo)
Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: In all criminal prosecutions the
action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense
was committed or any of the essential elements thereof took place.
The subject information charges petitioner with estafa committed "during the period 1980 to June 15,
1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines . . . ." (p. 44, Rollo)
Clearly then, from the very allegation of the information the Regional Trial Court of Manila has
jurisdiction.
Besides, the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense which may be prosecuted at the
place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place. One of the essential elements of
estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party. The private respondent has its principal place of
business and office at Manila. The failure of the petitioner to remit the insurance premiums she
collected allegedly caused damage and prejudice to private respondent in Manila.
Anent petitioners other contention that the subject matter is purely civil in nature, suffice it to state
that evidentiary facts on this point have still to be proved.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit The case is remanded to the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XIX for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrer

MIRANDA VS TULIAO
JOSE C. MIRANDA, ALBERTO P. DALMACIO, and ROMEO B. OCON, Petitioners,

vs.
VIRGILIO M. TULIAO, Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the 18
December 2002 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 67770 and its 12 June 2003
Resolution denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The dispositive portion of the assailed
decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed Orders, the
instant petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition is hereby GRANTED and GIVEN DUE
COURSE, and it is hereby ordered:
1. The assailed Joint Order dated August 17, 2001, Order dated September 21, 2001, Joint
Order dated October 16, 2001 and Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 dismissing the two
(2) Informations for Murder, all issued by public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad in
Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and another entered UPHOLDING, AFFIRMING[,] and REINSTATING the Order
dated June 25, 2001 and Joint Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by the then acting Presiding
Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan;
2. Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524 are hereby ordered REINSTATED in the
docket of active criminal cases of Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City,
Isabela; and
3. Public respondent Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is DIRECTED to ISSUE forthwith Warrants
of Arrest for the apprehension of private respondents Jose "Pempe" Miranda, SPO3 Alberto
P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon and accused Rodel T. Maderal in said Criminal Cases
Nos. 36-3523 and 36-3524. 2
The factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as follows:
On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which
were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private
respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo Leao, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan,
SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2 Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City.
The venue was later transferred to Manila. On 22 April 1999, the RTC of Manila convicted all of the
accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was
yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic
review where we, on 9 October 2001, acquitted the accused therein on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn
confession and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, and SPO3 Alberto P.
Dalmacio, a certain Boyet dela Cruz and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths of
Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao.
Respondent Tuliao filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners, Boyet dela Cruz, and
Amado Doe, and submitted the sworn confession of SPO2 Maderal. On 25 June 2001, Acting
Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2
Maderal.
On 29 June 2001, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to
reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest.
In the hearing of the urgent motion on 6 July 2001, Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of
petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court
did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In
the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the
Department of Justice.
On 17 August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anastacio D. Anghad took over the case and issued a
Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumaliuan. Consequently, he ordered the cancellation
of the warrant of arrest issued against petitioner Miranda. He likewise applied this Order to
petitioners Ocon and Dalmacio in an Order dated 21 September 2001. State Prosecutor Leo S.
Reyes and respondent Tuliao moved for the reconsideration of the said Joint Order and prayed for
the inhibition of Judge Anghad, but the motion for reconsideration was denied in a Joint Order dated
16 October 2001 and the prayer for inhibition was denied in a Joint Order dated 22 October 2001.
On 25 October 2001, respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with
this Court, with prayer for a Temporary Restraining Order, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from
further proceeding with the case, and seeking to nullify the Orders and Joint Orders of Judge
Anghad dated 17 August 2001, 21 September 2001, 16 October 2001, and 22 October 2001.
On 12 November 2001, this Court issued a Resolution resolving to grant the prayer for a temporary
restraining order against Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases. Shortly after
the aforesaid resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing
the two Informations for murder against petitioners. On 19 November 2001, this Court took note of
respondents cash bond evidenced by O.R. No. 15924532 dated 15 November 2001, and issued the
temporary restraining order while referring the petition to the Court of Appeals for adjudication on the
merits.
Respondent Tuliao filed with this Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging
that Judge Anghad "deliberately and willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15
November 2001 the Order dated 14 November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21
November 2001, we referred said motion to the Court of Appeals in view of the previous referral to it
of respondents petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
On 18 December 2002, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision granting the petition
and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City, as well as the
issuance of warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of this Decision, but the same was denied in a Resolution dated 12 June 2003.
Hence, this petition.
The facts of the case being undisputed, petitioners bring forth to this Court the following assignments
of error:
FIRST ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in reversing and setting aside the
Joint Order of Judge Anastacio D. Anghad dated August 17, 2001, September 21, 2001, October 16,
2001 and November 14, 2001 issued in criminal cases numbered 36-3523 and 36-3524; and, erred
in upholding, affirming and reinstating the Order dated July 6, 2001 issued by then Acting Presiding
Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan, on the alleged rule that an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he
does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court.
SECOND ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
With all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in directing the reinstatement of
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and 36-3524 in the docket of Active Criminal Cases of Branch 36 of the
Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public respondent to re-issue
the warrants of arrest against herein petitioners.
THIRD ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
Wit all due respect, the Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in ordering the
reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 in the docket of active criminal cases
of Branch 36 of the regional trial court of Santiago City, Philippines, and in ordering the public
respondent to issue warrants of arrest against herein petitioners, the order of dismissal issued
therein having become final and executory.
Adjudication of a motion to quash a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of
the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
The first assignment of error brought forth by the petitioner deals with the Court of Appeals ruling
that:
[A]n accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the
court. Jurisdiction over the person of the accused may be acquired either through compulsory
process, such as warrant of arrest, or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he
surrenders to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction
over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court (Pete M. Pico vs. Alfonso V.
Combing, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992). Thus, an accused must first be placed in
the custody of the law before the court may validly act on his petition for judicial reliefs. 3
Proceeding from this premise, the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioners Miranda, Ocon and
Dalmacio cannot seek any judicial relief since they were not yet arrested or otherwise deprived of
their liberty at the time they filed their "Urgent Motion to complete preliminary investigation; to
reinvestigate; to recall and/or quash warrants of arrest."4
Petitioners counter the finding of the Court of Appeals by arguing that jurisdiction over the person of
the accused is required only in applications for bail. Furthermore, petitioners argue, assuming that
such jurisdiction over their person is required before the court can act on their motion to quash the
warrant for their arrest, such jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by the court by their
filing of the above Urgent Motion.
In arguing that jurisdiction over the person is required only in the adjudication of applications for bail,
petitioners quote Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar Herrera:
Except in applications for bail, it is not necessary for the court to first acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the accused to dismiss the case or grant other relief. The outright dismissal of the case
even before the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused is authorized under
Section 6(a), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure (Sec. 12a). In Allado vs. Diokno (232 SCRA 192), the case was dismissed on
motion of the accused for lack of probable cause without the accused having been arrested. In Paul
Roberts vs. Court of Appeals (254 SCRA 307), the Court was ordered to hold the issuance of a
warrant of arrest in abeyance pending review by the Secretary of Justice. And in Lacson vs.
Executive Secretary (301 SCRA 1025), the Court ordered the case transferred from the
Sandiganbayan to the RTC which eventually ordered the dismissal of the case for lack of probable
cause.6
In arguing, on the other hand, that jurisdiction over their person was already acquired by their filing
of the above Urgent Motion, petitioners invoke our pronouncement, through Justice Florenz D.
Regalado, in Santiago v. Vasquez7:
The voluntary appearance of the accused, whereby the court acquires jurisdiction over his person, is
accomplished either by his pleading to the merits (such as by filing a motion to quash or other
pleadings requiring the exercise of the courts jurisdiction thereover, appearing for arraignment,
entering trial) or by filing bail. On the matter of bail, since the same is intended to obtain the
provisional liberty of the accused, as a rule the same cannot be posted before custody of the
accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary surrender.
Our pronouncement in Santiago shows a distinction between custody of the law and jurisdiction over
the person. Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for bail, but
is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere
application therefor constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused.8 Custody of the law is accomplished either by arrest or voluntary surrender,9 while
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary
appearance. 10 One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, such as when a person arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before
arraignment to quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, and yet not be in the custody of the law, such as when an accused escapes
custody after his trial has commenced. 11 Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint on the
person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty, binding him to become obedient to the
will of the law. 12 Custody of the law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but
is not limited to, detention.
The statement in Pico v. Judge Combong, Jr., 13 cited by the Court of Appeals should not have been
separated from the issue in that case, which is the application for admission to bail of someone not
yet in the custody of the law. The entire paragraph of our pronouncement in Pico reads:
A person applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his
liberty. A person who has not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke
the processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently ascertained the whereabouts
of the applicant and that he indeed had jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering
the application for bail. 13
While we stand by our above pronouncement in Pico insofar as it concerns bail, we clarify that, as a
general rule, one who seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of
the court. 15 As we held in the aforecited case of Santiago, seeking an affirmative relief in court,
whether in civil or criminal proceedings, constitutes voluntary appearance.
Pico deals with an application for bail, where there is the special requirement of the applicant being
in the custody of the law. In Feliciano v. Pasicolan, 16 we held that "[t]he purpose of bail is to secure
ones release and it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, bail is the security
required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of law." The rationale behind
this special rule on bail is that it discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice
wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his bail, without recognizing the
jurisdiction of the court by his personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements
therefor. 17
There is, however, an exception to the rule that filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes
voluntary appearance, and the consequent submission of ones person to the jurisdiction of the
court. This is in the case of pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction
of the court, which only leads to a special appearance. These pleadings are: (1) in civil cases,
motions to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, whether or
not other grounds for dismissal are included; 18 (2) in criminal cases, motions to quash a complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and (3) motions to quash a
warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact that failure to file them would constitute
a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact
that it is the very legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused
that is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest.
To recapitulate what we have discussed so far, in criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking an affirmative relief,
except in cases when he invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction
over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving special appearances, an accused can invoke
the processes of the court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor custody of
the law. However, if a person invoking the special jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must
first submit himself to the custody of the law.
In cases not involving the so-called special appearance, the general rule applies, i.e., the accused is
deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court upon seeking affirmative relief.
Notwithstanding this, there is no requirement for him to be in the custody of the law. The following
cases best illustrate this point, where we granted various reliefs to accused who were not in the
custody of the law, but were deemed to have placed their persons under the jurisdiction of the court.
Note that none of these cases involve the application for bail, nor a motion to quash an information
due to lack of jurisdiction over the person, nor a motion to quash a warrant of arrest:
1. In Allado v. Diokno, 19 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the ground of lack
of probable cause, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining PACC from enforcing the
warrant of arrest and the respondent judge therein from further proceeding with the case and,
instead, to elevate the records to us.
2. In Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,20 upon the accuseds Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to
Hold in Abeyance Issuance of Warrants of Arrest on the ground that they filed a Petition for Review
with the Department of Justice, we directed respondent judge therein to cease and desist from
further proceeding with the criminal case and to defer the issuance of warrants of arrests against the
accused.
3. In Lacson v. Executive Secretary,21 on the prayer of the accused in a petition for certiorari on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Sandiganbayan, we directed the Sandiganbayan to
transfer the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court even before the issuance of the warrants of
arrest.
We hold that the circumstances forcing us to require custody of the law in applications for bail are
not present in motions to quash the warrant of arrest. If we allow the granting of bail to persons not
in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at
large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven
guilty. On the other hand, if we allow the quashal of warrants of arrest to persons not in the custody
of the law, it would be very rare that a person not genuinely entitled to liberty would remain scot-free.
This is because it is the same judge who issued the warrant of arrest who will decide whether or not
he followed the Constitution in his determination of probable cause, and he can easily deny the
motion to quash if he really did find probable cause after personally examining the records of the
case.
Moreover, pursuant to the presumption of regularity of official functions, the warrant continues in
force and effect until it is quashed and therefore can still be enforced on any day and at any time of
the day and night.22 Furthermore, the continued absence of the accused can be taken against him in
the determination of probable cause, since flight is indicative of guilt.
In fine, as much as it is incongruous to grant bail to one who is free, it is likewise incongruous to
require one to surrender his freedom before asserting it. Human rights enjoy a higher preference in
the hierarchy of rights than property rights,23 demanding that due process in the deprivation of liberty
must come before its taking and not after.
Quashing a warrant of arrest based on a subsequently filed petition for review with the Secretary of
Justice and based on doubts engendered by the political climate constitutes grave abuse of
discretion.
We nevertheless find grave abuse of discretion in the assailed actions of Judge Anghad. Judge
Anghad seemed a little too eager of dismissing the criminal cases against the petitioners. First, he
quashed the standing warrant of arrest issued by his predecessor because of a subsequently filed
appeal to the Secretary of Justice, and because of his doubts on the existence of probable cause
due to the political climate in the city. Second, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors
resolution, he dismissed the criminal cases on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case
with different accused, doing so two days after this Court resolved to issue a temporary restraining
order against further proceeding with the case.
After Judge Tumaliuan issued warrants for the arrest of petitioners, petitioner Miranda appealed the
assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice. Judge Anghad, shortly after
assuming office, quashed the warrant of arrest on the basis of said appeal. According to Judge
Anghad, "x x x prudence dictates (that) and because of comity, a deferment of the proceedings is but
proper."24
Quashal on this basis is grave abuse of discretion. It is inconceivable to charge Judge Tumaliuan as
lacking in prudence and oblivious to comity when he issued the warrants of arrest against petitioners
just because the petitioners might, in the future, appeal the assistant prosecutors resolution to the
Secretary of Justice. But even if the petition for review was filed before the issuance of the warrants
of arrest, the fact remains that the pendency of a petition for the review of the prosecutors resolution
is not a ground to quash the warrants of arrest.
In Webb v. de Leon,25 we held that the petitioners therein cannot assail as premature the filing of the
information in court against them on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse
resolution of the DOJ Panel to the Secretary of Justice. Similarly, the issuance of warrants of arrest
against petitioners herein should not have been quashed as premature on the same ground.
The other ground invoked by Judge Anghad for the quashal of the warrant of arrest is in order if true:
violation of the Constitution. Hence, Judge Anghad asked and resolved the question:
In these double murder cases, did this Court comply or adhere to the above-quoted constitutional
proscription, which is Sec. 2, Article III Bill of Rights; to Sec. 6(a), Rule 112, Rules of Criminal
Procedure and to the above-cited decisional cases? To this query or issue, after a deep perusal of
the arguments raised, this Court, through [its] regular Presiding Judge, finds merit in the contention
of herein accused-movant, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.26
Judge Anghad is referring to the following provision of the Constitution as having been violated by
Judge Tumaliuan:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.27
However, after a careful scrutiny of the records of the case, including the supporting evidence to the
resolution of the prosecutor in his determination of probable cause, we find that Judge Anghad
gravely abused his discretion.
According to petitioners:
In this case, the nullity of the order of Judge Tumaliuan, for the arrest of the petitioners is apparent
from the face of the order itself, which clearly stated that the determination of probable cause was
based on the certification, under oath, of the fiscal and not on a separate determination personally
made by the Judge. No presumption of regularity could be drawn from the order since it expressly
and clearly showed that it was based only on the fiscals certification. 28
Petitioners claim is untrue. Judge Tumaliuans Joint Order contains no such indication that he relied
solely on the prosecutors certification. The Joint Order even indicated the contrary:
Upon receipt of the information and resolution of the prosecutor, the Court proceeded to determine
the existence of a probable cause by personally evaluating the records x x x.[29]
The records of the case show that the prosecutors certification was accompanied by supporting
documents, following the requirement under Lim, Sr. v. Felix30 and People v. Inting.31 The supporting
documents are the following:
1. Resolution dated 21 June 2001 of State Prosecutor Leo S. Reyes;
2. Affidavit dated 22 May 2001 of Modesto Gutierrez;
3. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Romeo B. Ocon;
4. Joint Counter Affidavit dated 23 May 2001 of Mayor Jose C. Miranda and Reynaldo de la
Cruz;
5. Affidavit dated 19 May 2001 of Alberto Dalmacio;
6. Decision dated 22 April 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 41 in Criminal
Case No. 97-160355;
7. Sworn statement dated 27 April 2001 of Rodel Maderal;
8. Information dated 22 June 2001;
9. Affidavit-complaint of Virgilio Tuliao; and
10. Medico-legal Reports of the cadavers of Elezer Tuliao and Vicente Buazon.
Hence, procedurally, we can conclude that there was no violation on the part of Judge Tumaliuan of
Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. Judge Anghad, however, focused on the substantive part of
said section, i.e., the existence of probable cause. In failing to find probable cause, Judge Anghad
ruled that the confession of SPO2 Maderal is incredible for the following reasons: (1) it was given
after almost two years in the custody of the National Bureau of Investigation; (2) it was given by
someone who rendered himself untrustworthy for being a fugitive for five years; (3) it was given in
exchange for an obvious reward of discharge from the information; and (4) it was given during the
election period amidst a "politically charged scenario where "Santiago City voters were pitted against
each other along the lines of the Miranda camp on one side and former City Mayor Amelita S.
Navarro, and allegedly that of DENR Secretary Heherson Alvarez on the other." 32
We painstakingly went through the records of the case and found no reason to disturb the findings of
probable cause of Judge Tumaliuan.
It is important to note that an exhaustive debate on the credibility of a witness is not within the
province of the determination of probable cause. As we held in Webb 33:
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime
has been committed and was committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on
clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v.
United States, while probable cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than
evidence which would justify x x x conviction." A finding of probable cause merely binds over the
suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.
x x x Probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary
manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial x x x.
Dismissing a criminal case on the basis of a decision of this Court in another case with different
accused constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Judge Anghad had quashed the warrant of arrest on the ground, among other things, that there was
a petition for review of the assistant prosecutors resolution before the Secretary of Justice.
However, after the Secretary of Justice affirmed the prosecutors resolution, Judge Anghad
summarily dismissed the two criminal cases against the petitioners on the basis of the following
explanation:
Rodel Maderal was one of the accused in People vs. Wilfredo Leano, et al., RTC, Branch 41, Manila,
and based from his sworn statements, he pinpointed to Mr. Miranda the mastermind and with him
and the other police officers as the direct perpetrators, the October 9, 2001 Decision of the Supreme
Court absolving the five cops of murder, certainly makes his sworn Statements a "narration of
falsehood and lies" and that because of the decision acquitting said officers "who were likewise
falsely linked by said Rodel Maderal in his April 27, 2001 statements, it is now beyond doubt that
Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore the same is
without probable value." This Court agrees with the defenses views. Indeed, of what use is
Maderals statements when the Supreme Court rejected the prosecutions evidence presented and
adduced in Criminal Case No. 97-160355. Rodel Maderal is supposed to turn state witness in these
two (2) cases but with the Supreme Court decision adverted to, the probative value of his statements
is practically nil.
xxxx
This Court finds merit to the manifestation of the accused Miranda dated October 18, 2001, praying
for the summary dismissal of the two (2) murder charges in view of the latest decision of the
Supreme Court in People of the Philippines vs. Wilfredo Leao, et al., G.R. No. 13886, acquitting the
accused therein and in effect disregarding all the evidence presented by the prosecution in that
case. Accordingly, the two (2) informations [for] murder filed against Jose Miranda are ordered
dismissed.34
This is a clear case of abuse of discretion. Judge Anghad had no right to twist our decision and
interpret it to the discredit of SPO2 Maderal, who was still at large when the evidence of the
prosecution in the Leao case was presented. A decision, even of this Court, acquitting the accused
therein of a crime cannot be the basis of the dismissal of criminal case against different accused for
the same crime. The blunder of Judge Anghad is even more pronounced by the fact that our
decision in Leao was based on reasonable doubt. We never ruled in Leao that the crime did not
happen; we just found that there was reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused therein, since
the prosecution in that case relied on circumstantial evidence, which interestingly is not even the
situation in the criminal cases of the petitioners in the case at bar as there is here an eyewitness:
Rodel Maderal. The accused in Leao furthermore had no motive to kill respondent Tuliaos son,
whereas petitioners herein had been implicated in the testimony of respondent Tuliao before the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee.
It is preposterous to conclude that because of our finding of reasonable doubt in Leao, "it is now
beyond doubt that Rodel Maderal made untruthful, fabricated and perjured statements and therefore
the same is without probable value."35 On the contrary, if we are to permit the use of our decision in
Leao, an acquittal on the ground of reasonable doubt actually points to the probability of the
prosecutions version of the facts therein. Such probability of guilt certainly meets the criteria of
probable cause.
We cannot let unnoticed, too, Judge Anghads dismissal of the informations two days after we
resolved to issue, upon the filing of a bond, a temporary restraining order prohibiting him from further
proceeding with the case. The bond was filed the day after the informations were dismissed. While
the dismissal of the case was able to beat the effectivity date of the temporary restraining order,
such abrupt dismissal of the informations (days after this Courts resolve to issue a TRO against
Judge Anghad) creates wild suspicions about the motives of Judge Anghad.
Nullification of a proceeding necessarily carries with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by
the nullified proceeding.
In their second assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals did not recall or
reinstate the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan, but instead directed Judge Anghad to
issue apparently new warrants of arrest.36According to the petitioners, it was an error for the Court of
Appeals to have done so, without a personal determination of probable cause.
We disagree. Whether the Court of Appeals ordered the issuance of new warrants of arrest or
merely ordered the reinstatement of the warrants of arrest issued by Judge Tumaliuan is merely a
matter of scrupulous semantics, the slight inaccuracy whereof should not be allowed to affect the
dispositions on the merits, especially in this case where the other dispositions of the Court of
Appeals point to the other direction. Firstly, the Court of Appeals had reinstated the 25 June 2001
Order of Judge Tumaliuan,37 which issued the warrants of arrest. Secondly, the Court of Appeals
likewise declared the proceedings conducted by Judge Anghad void. Certainly, the declaration of
nullity of proceedings should be deemed to carry with it the reinstatement of the orders set aside by
the nullified proceedings. Judge Anghads order quashing the warrants of arrest had been nullified;
therefore those warrants of arrest are henceforth deemed unquashed.
Even if, however, the Court of Appeals had directed the issuance of new warrants of arrest based on
a determination of probable cause, it would have been legally permissible for them to do so. The
records of the preliminary investigation had been available to the Court of Appeals, and are also
available to this Court, allowing both the Court of Appeals and this Court to personally examine the
records of the case and not merely rely on the certification of the prosecutor. As we have ruled in
Allado v. Diokno and Roberts v. Court of Appeals, the determination of probable cause does not rest
on a subjective criteria. As we had resolved in those cases to overrule the finding of probable cause
of the judges therein on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, in the same vein, we can also
overrule the decision of a judge reversing a finding of probable cause, also on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion.
There is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment
In their third assignment of error, petitioners claim that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible
error in ordering the reinstatement of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524, alleging that the
order of dismissal issued therein had become final and executory. According to petitioners:
It is also worthy to point out at this juncture that the Joint Order of Judge Anghad dated November
14, 2001 is NOT ONE of those Orders which were assailed in the private respondent Tuliaos
Petition for Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition filed by the private respondent before the Court of
Appeals. As carefully enumerated in the first page of the assailed Decision, only the following Orders
issued by Judge Anghad were questioned by private respondent, to wit:
1.) Joint Order dated August 17, 2001;

2.) Order dated September 21, 2001;
3.) Joint Order dated October 16, 2001; and
4.) Joint Order dated October 22, 2001.
Obviously, the Joint Order dated November 14, 2001 of Judge Anghad, which ultimately dismissed
Criminal Cases Nos. 36-3523 AND 36-3524 is NOT included in the list of the assailed Order/Joint
Orders. Hence, the Court of Appeals should not have passed upon the validity or nullity of the Joint
Order of November 14, 2001.38
Petitioners must have forgotten that respondent Tuliaos Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus was filed not with the Court of Appeals, but with this Court. The Court of Appeals decided
the case because we referred the same to them in our 19 November 2001 Resolution. Such petition
was filed on 25 October 2001, around three weeks before the 14 November 2001 Order. Upon
receipt of the 14 November 2001 Order, however, respondent Tuliao lost no time in filing with this
Court a Motion to Cite Public Respondent in Contempt, alleging that Judge Anghad "deliberately and
willfully committed contempt of court when he issued on 15 November 2001 the Order dated 14
November 2001 dismissing the informations for murder." On 21 November 2001, we referred said
motion to the Court of Appeals, in view of the previous referral of respondent Tuliaos petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
Our referral to the Court of Appeals of the Motion to Cite Public Repondent in Contempt places the
14 November 2001 Order within the issues of the case decided by the Court of Appeals. In claiming
that Judge Anghad committed contempt of this Court in issuing the 14 November 2001 Order,
respondent Tuliao had ascribed to Judge Anghad an act much more serious than grave abuse of
discretion.
Respondent Tuliao claims that Judge Anghad issued the 14 November 2001 Order on 15 November
2001, antedating it so as to avoid the effects of our 12 November 2001 Resolution. In said 12
November 2001 Resolution, we resolved to issue a temporary restraining order enjoining Judge
Anghad from further proceeding with the criminal cases upon the respondent Tuliaos filing of a bond
in the amount of P20,000.00. Respondent Tuliao had filed the bond on 15 November 2005.
While we cannot immediately pronounce Judge Anghad in contempt, seeing as disobedience to
lawful orders of a court and abuse of court processes are cases of indirect contempt which require
the granting of opportunity to be heard on the part of respondent,39 the prayer to cite public
respondent in contempt and for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises should be
construed to include a prayer for the nullification of said 14 November 2001 Order.
In any case, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute
double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and
it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed. 40
As to respondent Tuliaos prayer (in both the original petition for certiorari as well as in his motion to
cite for contempt) to disqualify Judge Anghad from further proceeding with the case, we hold that the
number of instances of abuse of discretion in this case are enough to convince us of an apparent
bias on the part of Judge Anghad. We further resolve to follow the case of People v. SPO1
Leao,41 by transferring the venue of Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 to the City of
Manila, pursuant to Article VIII, Section 4, of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 18 December 2002 and the Resolution
dated 12 June 2003 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that
Criminal Cases No. 36-3523 and No. 36-3524 be transferred to and raffled in the Regional Trial
Court of the City of Manila. In this connection,
1) Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of
Santiago, Isabela, who is directed to effect the transfer of the cases within ten (10) days after
receipt hereof;
2) The Executive Judge of the RTC of the City of Santiago, Isabela, is likewise directed to
report to this Court compliance hereto within ten (10) days from transfer of these cases;
3) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila shall proceed to raffle the criminal cases within
ten (10) days from the transfer;
4) The Executive Judge of the City of Manila is likewise directed to report to this Court
compliance with the order to raffle within ten (10) days from said compliance; and
5) The RTC Judge to whom the criminal cases are raffled is directed to act on said cases
with reasonable dispatch.
6) Finally, Judge Anastacio D. Anghad is directed to issue forthwith warrants of arrest for the
apprehension of petitioners Jose C. Miranda, Alberto P. Dalmacio, Romeo B. Ocon, and
accused Rodel T. Maderal, conformably with the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 18
December 2002.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 4 August 2003 is hereby LIFTED. Costs
against Petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

CASES - Crim Jurisdiction

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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

G.R. No. 45815 May 18, 1990

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

LUTGARDA CRUZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE

The Antecedent Facts

On January 28, 1994, petitioner received a copy of the decision.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

Section 10, Rule 13, Rules of Court, provides as follows:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

WHEREFORE, the instant petition not being sufficient in substance is hereby

In a resolution dated December 1, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied petitioners

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

Hence, this petition.

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

3. WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE

The Ruling of the Court

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

Section 6 of Rule 15 reads:

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

We agree with the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

Consequently, while we find no reversible error in the decision of the Court of

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

This should read April 18, 1994.

Supra, see note 2.

Rollo, pp. 144-145.

This is taken from Section 6 of the former Rule, which reads:

This is taken from Section 10 of the old Rule.

Supra, see note 9.

Oscar M. Herrera, Remedial Law, Volume IV, 1992 Edition, p. 3.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

RODOLFO DELA CRUZ, petitioner,

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

FUKUZUME VS. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 143647

November 11, 2005

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

Private complainant Javier Ng Yu (Yu) is a businessman engaged in buying

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby

although the trial court correctly imposed the maximum penalty of

Accordingly, the dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from, except for the

Hence, herein petition filed by Fukuzume based on the following grounds:

THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

Now, you met this Mr. Hubati. How?

He came to me offering me aluminum scrap wires.

When was that, Mr. Witness?

That was in 1991, sir.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - JURISDICTION

July 12, 1991, sir.

In payment of the aluminum scrap wires and we have documents to

Our first agreement was for P200,000.

Where is that aluminum scrap located?