CARMELITA I. ZAGUIRRE vs. ATTY.

ALFREDO
CASTILLO
FACTS:
Complainant and respondent had their illicit relationship while the latter was preparing
to take the bar examinations. After the admission of the respondent to the Philippine Bar,
complainant learned that he was already married. Respondent, who by now is a lawyer,
executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the complainant and recognizing the
unborn child she was carrying as his. After the birth of the baby, however, respondent had
started to refuse recognizing the child and giving her any form of support. After due hearing,
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Castillo guilty of gross immoral conduct
and recommends that he be meted the penalty of indefinite suspension from the practice of
law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the penalty imposed is proper.

HELD:
YES. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the same Code.
The conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so
corrupt as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree
or committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense
of decency.
Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards
of morality required of every lawyer. Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his
notarized statement recognizing and undertaking to support his child by Carmelita
demonstrates a certain unscrupulousness on his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a
member of a noble profession, tantamount to self-stultification.
The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct,
even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.

gross discourtesy to superior officers as manifested by his uncalled for and unjustified use of
strong and contemptuous language in addressing the City Judges.
Issue:
Whether or not respondents acts constitute grounds for dismissal from the service.

Held:
In his affidavit subscribed and sworn to before then City Judge Oscar A. Inocentes on June 10,
1969, the respondent stated that I am a person of good moral character and integrity and have
no administrative, criminal or police record. This claim is not true because the respondent had
been convicted of libel in Criminal Case No. Q-7171, of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Branch IV, in a sentence dated April 28, 1967. This prevarication in a sworn statement is a
ground for serious disciplinary action.
That in his accomplished Civil Service Form No. 212 which was subscribed and sworn to, the
respondent admits having acted as counsel for three companies; and that the giving of legal
advice by notaries and others who are not admitted to the practice of law is dangerous to the
welfare of the community, because such persons have not demonstrated their capacity by
submitting to examinations lawfully established in the practice of law.
The respondent's conviction for libel shows his propensity to speak ill of others as reflected in
his letter to Judge Minerva C. Genovea, then Executive Judge of the City Court of Quezon
City which contains defamatory and uncalled for language.es virtual law library
The handwritten notes of the respondent regarding different cases pending in Branch VI of the
City Court of Quezon City, presided by the complainant, show that the respondent had exerted
undue influence in the disposition of the cases mentioned therein.
Respondent, Diosdado S. Flores, is dismissed as Deputy Clerk of Court of Branch VI of the
City Court of Quezon City, with forfeiture of all retirement privileges and with prejudice to
reinstatement in the national and local governments, as well as, in any government
instrumentality or agency including government owned or controlled corporations.

Guevarra vs. Eala, A.C. No. 7136 , August 1, 2007

HON. REMIGIO E. ZARI, Complainant, vs. DIOSDADO
S. FLORES, Respondent
Facts:
Hon. Remigio E. Zari, Presiding Judge of Branch VI City Court of Quezon City,
recommended the dismissal from the service of Mr. Diosdado S. Flores, Deputy Clerk of Court
of Branch VI, City Court, on grounds of moral turpitude and persistent attempts to unduly
influence the complainant amounting to undue interest in cases pending before Branch VI and

Facts: Joselano Guevarra filed a Complaint for Disbarment before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose
Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent) for "grossly immoral conduct and
unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."
The complainant first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) thenfiancee Irene Moje (Irene) introduced respondent Atty. Eala, a lawyer and a
sportscaster, to him as her friend who was married to Mary Ann Tantoco with whom
he had three children.
After his marriage to Irene, complainant noticed that Irene had been receiving from
respondent cellphone calls, as well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I

miss you," or "Meet you at Megamall." He also noticed that Irene habitually went
home very late at night or early in the morning of the following day, and sometimes
did not go home from work. When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that
she slept at her parents' house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
More so, complainant has seen Irene and respondent together on two occasions. On
the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene abandoned the
conjugal house.
Moreover, Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card
bearing the words "I Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a
handwritten letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene. Also, it was
revealed that Irene gave birth to a girl in 2002 and Irene named respondent in the
Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's father.
In his answer, Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous
relationship with Irene, the truth of the matter being that their relationship was low
profile and known only to the immediate members of their respective families. He also
said that his special relationship with Irene is neither under scandalous circumstances
nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct as would be a ground for disbarment.
Issue: Whether the respondent be disbarred from the practice of Law.
Held: YES. The case at bar involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a
married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial whether the affair was carried out
discreetly.
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations
between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for
such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of fidelity.
Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law, sexual
relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests
deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the
Constitution and affirmed by our laws.
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to
practice law. Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code
which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on
his fitness to practice law."
As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven otherwise, to have
entered into a lawful contract of marriage. In carrying on an extra-marital affair with
Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with complainant was null and
void, and despite respondent himself being married, he showed disrespect for an
institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his unfitness to be a lawyer.

Ui vs. Bonifacio
Facts: Lesli Ui filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris

Bonifacio on the ground of immorality, for allegedly carrying an immoral relationship

with Carlos Ui, her (Lesli) husband.
In the proceeding before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Iris attached a
photocopy of a marriage certificate that said that she and Carlos got married in 1985
but according to the certificate of marriage obtained from the Hawaii State
Department of Health, they were married in 1987.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Iris Bonifacio conducted herself in an immoral manner for
which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law.
Held: NO. The practice of law is a privilege. The bar candidate does not have the
right to enjoy the practice of the legal profession simply by passing the bar, he must
also have a continued possession of good moral character. A lawyer may be
disbarred for grossly immoral conduct , which has been defined as the conduct which
is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral indifference to the good
and respectable members of the community. Lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are
burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle their
personal affairs with great caution.
Iris Bonifacio was imprudent in managing her personal affairs. However the fact
remains that her relationship with Carlos, clothed as it was with what she believed as
a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. Immorality connotes conduct that
shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and
respectable members of the community. For such conduct to warrant disciplinary
action, it must be grossly immoral, it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a
criminal act or unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree.
A lawyer is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships but must also
behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards. Her act of distancing herself on her discovery that
Carlos was married proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high
moral standard of the legal profession.
On the matter of the falsified marriage certificate, it is contrary to human experience
and highly improbable that she did not know the year of her marriage or she failed to
check that the information on the document she attached to her Answer were correct.
Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and
acts of malpractice.

Toledo vs. Abalos

FACTS:
Atty. Erlinda Abalos obtained a loan of P20,000.00 from Priscila Toledo, payable
within six months from date, plus interest of 5% per month. To guarantee the
payment of said obligation, respondent executed a Promissory Note. After the lapse
of six months, and despite repeated demands, respondent failed to pay her
obligation. Afraid that she will not recover her money, Ms. Toledo sought the help of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which referred the matter to the

Commission on Bar Discipline.

[T]he Commission issued an order directing Atty. Abalos to file her Answer to the
letter-complaint of Ms. Toledo. Despite receipt of said order, respondent did not
answer the complaint. Investigating Commissioner issued an order setting the case
for hearing Despite due notices, respondent failed to appear. Accordingly,
complainant was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte after which, the case was
considered submitted for resolution. Respondent received this order as shown by the
registry return. However, she again did not do anything about it.

when served personally. Complainant was required anew to submit the correct,
present address of respondents under pain of dismissal of her administrative
complaint. She disclosed respondents address at 12403 Develop Drive Houston,
Texas in a handwritten letter.
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) recommended that both respondents be
disbarred. The Supreme Court ordered Atty. Alejandro to be disbarred while the
complaint against his co-respondent Atty. Villarin was returned to the IBP for further
proceedings or it appears that a copy of the resolution requiring comment was never
deemed served upon her as it was upon Atty. Alejandro.
Issue: Whether or not abandonment of lawful wife and maintaining an illicit
relationship with another woman are grounds for disbarment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Abalos may be disciplined by the IB
HELD:
YES. Respondent suspended for one (1) month.

Held: Sufficient evidence showed that respondent Atty. Alejandro, lawfully married to
complainant, carried on an illicit relationship with co-respondent Atty. Villarin.
Although the evidence was not sufficient to prove that he co0ntracted a subsequent
bigamous marriage, that fact remains of his deplorable lack of that degree of morality
required of him as member of the bar. A disbarment proceeding is warranted against
a lawyer who abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with
another woman who had borne him a child. We can do no less in this case where Atty.
Alejandro even fled to another country to escape the consequences of his misconduct.
Therefore, Atty. Alejandro disbarred from the practice of law while the complaint
against Atty. Villarin was referred back to the IBP.

RATIO:
According to the Supreme Court, the general rule is that a lawyer may not be
suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to
discipline him, for misconduct in his non-professional or private capacity. It was,
however, still necessary for respondent to acknowledge the orders of the Commission
in deference to its authority over her as a member of the IBP. Her wanton disregard of
its lawful orders subjects her to disciplinary sanction. Thus, her suspension from the
practice of law is warranted.

ABANDONMENT OF LAWFUL WIFE AND MAINTAINING ILLICIT

RELATIONSHIP AS GROUND FOR DISBARMENT

JOVITA BUSTAMANTE-ALEJANDRO VS.

ATTY. WARFREDO TOMAS ALEJANDRO and
MARICRIS VILLARIN
Facts: Complainant submitted a photocopy of the marriage contract between her and
respondent Atty. Alejandro in support of her charge of bigamy and concubinage
against the latter and Villarin. She also submitted a photocopy of the birth certificate
of a child of the respondent and also stated that they were married in May 1, 1990 in
Isabela, Province.
The Supreme Court directed respondents to file their comment on the complaint
within 10 days but they failed to comply. Copies of the resolution, complaint and its
annexes were returned to both respondents unserved with notation moved, same as

Chuavs.Mesina;Grossmisconduct
Facts:
ComplainantsAnaAlvaranChuaandMarcelinaHsiaadministrativelychargedrespondent
Atty.SimeonM.Mesina,Jr.,forbreachofprofessionalethics,grossprofessionalmisconduct,
andculpablemalpractice.
Complainantswerelesseesofthepropertyofrespondent'smother.Respondent'smother
defaultedinpayingaloanthatsheobtainedinabank,thusrespondentconvinced
complainantstohelphermotherifpayingthesaidobligation,towhichthecomplainants
acceded.Itwasagreedamongthatthatinconsiderationfortheactofcomplainants,the
propertywhichtheyareleasingwillbetransferredtotheirname.Thecomplainantscomplied
withthetermsoftheagreement.Adeedofsaleconcerningsuchpropertywasexecuted.
However,toevadeliabilityforpayingcapitalgainstax,respondentinstructedcomplainantsto
executeanotherdeedofsalewhichwillbeantedated1979,whereinthecapitalgainstaxwas
notyetineffective.
Subsequently,aftertheexecutionofthedeedofsale,respondentsinstructedhisclients
[complainants]toexecuteasimulateddeedofsalewhichwillreflectthatthepropertywasre
conveyedtohismother.
Thecunningactsofrespondentdidnotendthere.Respondentwenttothehouseof
complainantsandgottheownerscertificateoftitleofthesaidpropertywhichisstillunderthe

nameofhermother.hepromisedtothecomplainantsthathewillprocessthetransferofthe
propertytotheirname.Yearspassed,butrespondentneverreturnedthesaidtitletothe
complainants.
Meanwhile,anotherlesseefileacriminalcaseagainstthecomplainantsandrespondentsfor
falsification.Heclaimsthatwasalsogiventhepromisethatthepropertywillbeofferedtohim
beforeitwillbesoldtoanother,butrespondentssoldittocomplainantswithoutofferingto
him.Becauseoftheforegoingcircumstances,complainantsfiledanadministrativecase
againstrespondent.
Issue:
Whetherornotrespondentisguiltyofgrossmisconduct.
Held:
Yes,saidtheCourt"ThisCourtfindsthatindeed,respondentisguiltyofgrossmisconduct.
First,byadvisingcomplainantstoexecuteanotherDeedofAbsoluteSaleantedatedto1979to
evadepaymentofcapitalgainstaxes,heviolatedhisdutytopromoterespectforlawandlegal
processes,andnottoabetactivitiesaimedatdefianceofthelaw;Thatrespondentintendedto,
ashediddefraudnotaprivatepartybutthegovernmentisaggravating.
Second,whenrespondentconvincedcomplainantstoexecuteanotherdocument,asimulated
DeedofAbsoluteSalewhereintheymadeitappearthatcomplainantsreconveyedthe
Melenciopropertytohismother,hecommitteddishonesty.
Third,whenonMay2,1990respondentinveigledhisownclients,theChuaspouses,into
turningovertohimtheownerscopyofhismotherstitleuponthemisrepresentationthathe
would,infourmonths,haveadeedofsaleexecutedbyhismotherinfavorofcomplainants,
helikewisecommitteddishonesty.
ThatthesignatureofFelicisimaM.Melenciointhe1985documentandthatinthe1979
documentaremarkedlydifferentisinfactisabadgeoffalsificationofeitherthe1979orthe
1985documentorevenboth.
AproposisthisCourtsfollowingpronouncementinNakpilv.Valdez
Asarule,alawyerisnotbarredfromdealingwithhisclientbutthebusinesstransactionmust
becharacterizedwithutmosthonestyandgoodfaith.Themeasureofgoodfaithwhichan
attorneyisrequiredtoexerciseinhisdealingswithhisclientisamuchhigherstandardthatis
requiredinbusinessdealingswherethepartiestradeatarmslength.Businesstransactions
betweenanattorneyandhisclientaredisfavoredanddiscouragedbythepolicyofthelaw.
Hence,courtscarefullywatchthesetransactionstoassurethatnoadvantageistakenbya
lawyeroverhisclient.Thisruleisfoundedonpublicpolicyfor,byvirtueofhisoffice,an
attorneyisinaneasypositiontotakeadvantageofthecredulityandignoranceofhisclient.
Thus,nopresumptionofinnocenceorimprobabilityofwrongdoingisconsideredinan
attorneysfavor.
RespondenthavingwelchedonhispromisetocausethereconveyanceoftheMelencio
propertytocomplainants,considerationofwhetherheshouldbeorderedtohonorsuch

promiseshouldbetakenupinthecivilcasefiledforthepurpose,theissuetherebeingoneof
ownershipwhilethatinthecaseatbarismoralfitness.
RespondentATTY.SIMEONM.MESINA,JR.is,forgrossmisconduct,hereby
DISBARRED.

In the Matter of Petition for Authority to Continue

the Use of the Firm name Sycip, Salazar,
Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo (July 30, 1979)
Facts: The case involves two petitions. The first was filed by the surviving partners of
Atty. Alexander Sycip who died on May 5, 1975 and the other by the surviving
partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta who died on February 14, 1976 praying that they be
allowed to continue using in the name of their firms the names of their deceased
partners who had passed away. The petitioner anchored their petitions on the
following: 1)that under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its
business under a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner; 2) that
in regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the legislature
has authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to the use, in
such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 3)that the Canons of
Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of the name of a
deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because Canon 33 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar Association declares that
the continued use of the name of a deceased or former partner when permissible by
local custom, is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or deception
is practiced through this use; 4) that there is no possibility of imposition or deception
because the deaths of their respective deceased partners were well-publicized in all
newspapers of general circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used
by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased
partners were connected with the firm and; 5) that no local custom prohibits the
continued use of a deceased partner's name in a professional firm's name.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners should be allowed to use in their firm names the
names of their deceased partners
Held: The court ruled in the negative. The court cited the following reasons. First is
that Article. 1815 of the Civil Code provides that Every partnership shall operate
under a firm name, which may or may not include the name of one or more of the
partners. Those who, not being members of the partnership, include their names in
the firm name, shall be subject to the liability, of a partner thus it is clearly tacit in the
above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership must either be those of
living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be living persons who can be
subjected to liability. Second, the courts said that a partnership for the practice of law
cannot be likened to partnerships formed by other professionals or for business. For
one thing, the law on accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in
connection with the practice of accountancy. A partnership for the practice of law is
not a legal entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a particular purpose. It is
not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or of holding

property. Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade
name in law practice is improper. And lastly while the court admits that it is true that
Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the name of a
deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when such a
practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should be
taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use. It must be
conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the continued use
of a deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law partnerships.

ULEP VS. THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC

In1984,TheLegalClinicwasformedbyAtty.RogelioNogales.Itsaim,accordingtoNogales
wastomovetowardspecializationandtocatertoclientswhocannotaffordtheservicesofbig
lawfirms.Now,Atty.MauricioUlepfiledacomplaintagainstTheLegalClinicbecauseofthe
lattersadvertisementswhichcontainthefollowing:

SECRET MARRIAGE?
P560.00 for a valid marriage.
Info on DIVORCE. ABSENCE. ANNULMENT. VISA.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
Please call: 521-0767; 521-7232; 522-2041
8:30am 6:00pm
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila
GUAM DIVORCE
DON PARKINSON
An attorney in Guam is giving FREE BOOKS on Guam Divorce through The
Legal Clinic beginning Monday to Friday during office hours.
Guam divorce. Annulment of Marriage. Immigration Problems, Visa Ext.
Quota/Non-quota Res. & Special Retirees Visa. Declaration of Absence.
Remarriage to Filipina Fiancees. Adoption. Investment in the Phil.
US/Foreign Visa for Filipina Spouse/Children.
Call Marivic.
THE LEGAL CLINIC, INC.
7th Flr. Victoria Bldg., UN Ave., Manila nr. US Embassy
Tel. 521-7232, 521-7251, 522-2041, 521-0767
ItisalsoallegedthatTheLegalClinicpublishedanarticleentitledRxforLegalProblemsin
StarWeekofPhilippineStarwhereinNogalesstatedthattheyTheLegalCliniciscomposed
ofspecialiststhatcantakecareofaclientsproblemnomatterhowcomplicateditisevenifit
isascomplicatedastheSharonCunetaGabbyConcepcionsituation.Hesaidthatheandhis
staffoflawyers,who,likedoctors,arespecialistsinvariousfields,cantakecareofit.The
LegalClinic,Inc.hasspecialistsintaxationandcriminallaw,medicolegalproblems,labor,
litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of paralegals,
counselorsandattorneys.
Asforitsadvertisement,Nogalessaiditshouldbeallowedinviewofthejurisprudenceinthe
USwhichnowallowsit(JohnBatesvsTheStateBarofArizona).Andthatbesides,the
advertisementismerelymakingknowntothepublictheservicesthatTheLegalClinicoffers.
ISSUE:WhetherornotTheLegalClinicisengagedinthepracticeoflaw;whethersuchis
allowed;whetherornotitsadvertisementmaybeallowed.

HELD:Yes,TheLegalClinicisengagedinthepracticeoflawhowever,suchpracticeisnot
allowed.TheLegalCliniciscomposedmainlyofparalegals.Theservicesitofferedinclude
variouslegalproblemswhereinaclientmayavailoflegalservicesfromsimpledocumentation
to complex litigation and corporate undertakings. Most of these services are undoubtedly
beyondthedomainofparalegals,butrather,areexclusivefunctionsoflawyersengagedinthe
practiceoflaw. UnderPhilippinejurisdictionhowever,theservicesbeingofferedbyLegal
Clinicwhichconstitutepracticeoflawcannotbeperformedbyparalegals.Onlyapersonduly
admittedasamemberofthebarand whoisingoodandregularstanding,isentitledto
practicelaw.
Anenttheissueonthevalidityofthequestionedadvertisements,theCodeofProfessional
Responsibilityprovidesthatalawyerinmakingknownhislegalservicesshalluseonlytrue,
honest,fair,dignifiedandobjectiveinformationorstatementoffacts.Thestandardsofthe
legalprofessioncondemnthelawyersadvertisementofhistalents.Alawyercannot,without
violatingtheethicsofhisprofession,advertisehistalentsorskillsasinamannersimilartoa
merchantadvertisinghisgoods.Further,theadvertisementsofLegalClinicseemtopromote
divorce,secretmarriage,bigamousmarriage,andothercircumventionsoflawwhichtheir
expertscanfacilitate.Suchishighlyreprehensible.
TheSupremeCourtalsonotedwhichformsofadvertisementareallowed.Thebestadvertising
possibleforalawyerisawellmeritedreputationforprofessionalcapacityandfidelitytotrust,
whichmustbeearnedastheoutcomeofcharacterandconduct.Goodandefficientservicetoa
clientaswellastothecommunityhasawayofpublicizingitselfandcatchingpublicattention.
Thatpublicityisanormalbyproductofeffectiveservicewhichisrightandproper.Agood
andreputablelawyerneedsnoartificialstimulustogenerateitandtomagnifyhissuccess.He
easilyseesthedifferencebetweenanormalbyproductofableserviceandtheunwholesome
resultofpropaganda.TheSupremeCourtalsoenumeratedthefollowingasallowedformsof
advertisement:
Advertisementinareputablelawlist
Useofordinarysimpleprofessionalcard
Listinginaphonedirectorybutwithoutdesignationastohisspecialization.

PCGG v SANDIGANBAYAN
Facts:
1976: General Bank & Trust Company (Genbank) encountered financial difficulties.
Central Bank extended loans to Genbank in the hope of rehabilitating it (P310M).
Nonetheless, Genbank failed to recover.
1977: Genbank was declared insolvent. A public bidding of Genbanks assets was held with
the Lucio Tan Group winning the bid. Solicitor General Mendoza, representing the
government, intervened with the liquidation of Genbank.
1986: after EDSA I, Cory established the PCGG to recover the ill-gotten wealth of Marcos,
his family and cronies.
1987: PCGG filed a case against Lucio Tan and certain other people (basta marami sila). In
relation to this case, PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly
acquired by the respondents by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with
Marcos. Sandiganbayan heard the case.
Estelito Mendoza (Solicitor General during the time of Marcos) represented the
respondents.

 1991: PCGG filed a motion to disqualify Mendoza, because of his participation in the
liquidation of Genbank. Genbank (now Allied Bank) is one of the properties that PCGG is
seeking to be sequestered from the Lucion Tan group. PCGG invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Sandiganbayan denied PCGGs motion. According to the Sandiganbayan, Mendoza did not
take an adverse position to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank. And Mendozas
appearance as counsel was beyond the 1 year prohibitory period since he retired in 1986.
Issue:
W/N Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility apllies to Estelito Mendoza
Held:
No, it does not apply to Mendoza. Sandiganbayan decision is affirmed.
The matter (see 3rd note), or the act of Mendoza as Solicitor General is advising the Central
Bank on how to proceed with the liquidation of Genbank. This is not the matter
contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The matter involved in the liquidation of Genbank is entirely different from the matter
involved in the PCGG case against the Lucio Tan group.
The intervention contemplated in Rule 6.03 should be substantial and important. The role
of Mendoza in the liquidation of Genbank is considered insubstantial.
SC is even questioning why PCGG took such a long time to revive the motion to disqualify
Mendoza. Apparently, PCGG already lost a lot of cases against Mendoza. Kyles
interpretation: PCGG getting desperate
Something to think about: SC is somehow of the opinion that Rule 6.03 will make it harder
for the government to get good lawyers in the future to work for them because of the

prohibition of accepting cases in the future that were related to ones work as a government
counsel.
Concurring Opinions:
Panganiban & Carpio: the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 should have a prescriptive
period
Tinga: Rule 6.03 cannot apply retroactively to Mendoza (when he was Solicitor General, no
Rule 6.03 yet)
Bottom line, they are all questioning the unfairness of the rule if applied without any
prescriptive period and if applied retroactively
Notes:
Adverse-interest conflicts where the matter in which the former government lawyer
represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt
with while employed with the government and the interests of the current and former are
adverse
Congruent-interest conflicts the use of the word conflict is a misnomer, it does not
involve conflicts at all, as it prohibits lawyers from representing a private person even if the
interests of the former government client and the new client are entirely parallel
Matter any discrete, isolatable act as well as indentifiable transaction or conduct
involving a particular situation and specific party
Intervention interference that may affect the interests of others