BONDS OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS - RULE 81

OCAMPO ET. AL. VS OCAMPO ET. AL.

FACTS: Vicente and Maxima died intestate and left several properties and no debts. The heirs include
Leonardo. Leonardo was married to Dalisay, herein petitioner. Leonardo had siblings, herein respondents.
Both parties want to become administrators.
5 months after the death of Leonardo, petitioners initiated a petition for intestate proceedings, entitled "In
Re: Intestate Proceedings of the Estate of Sps. Vicente Ocampo and Maxima Mercado Ocampo, and
Leonardo M. Ocampo".
RTC first appointed Dalisay and Renato as joint administrators but later revoked that of Dalisay and
assigned Erlinda instead. Erlinda and Renato filed a Motion for Exemption to File Administrators Bond that
they be allowed to enter their duties as special administrators without the need to file an administrators
bond due to their difficulty in raising the necessary amount.
Petitioners filed a motion to revoke respondents assignment as administrators. RTC granted the petition
and revoked respondents as administrators on the account of failing to post the administrators bond. CA
reversed the decision based on the finding that the RTC gravely abused its discretion in revoking
respondents appointment as joint special administrators without first ruling on their motion for exemption
from bond. CA held that the posting of the bond is a prerequisite before respondents could enter their duties
and responsibilities as joint special administrators.
ISSUE: WON the revocation of respondents assignment as administrator on the ground of failing to post
bond is proper.
HELD: YES. Pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 81, the bond secures the performance of the duties and
obligations of an administrator namely: (1) to administer the estate and pay the debts; (2) to perform all
judicial orders; (3) to account within one (1) year and at any other time when required by the probate court;
and (4) to make an inventory within three (3) months.
More specifically, per Section 4 of the same Rule, the bond is conditioned on the faithful execution of
the administration of the decedents estate requiring the special administrator to (1) make and return a
true inventory of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which come to his
possession or knowledge; (2) truly account for such as received by him when required by the court; and (3)
deliver the same to the person appointed as executor or regular administrator, or to such other person as
may be authorized.
Verily, the administration bond is for the benefit of the creditors and the heirs, as it compels the
administrator, whether regular or special, to perform the trust reposed in, and discharge the
obligations incumbent upon him. Its object and purpose is to safeguard the properties of the decedent,
and, therefore, the bond should not be considered as part of the necessary expenses chargeable
against the estate, not being included among the acts constituting the care, management, and settlement
of the estate. Moreover, the ability to post the bond is in the nature of a qualification for the office of
administration.
LUZON SURETY VS QUEBRAR AND KILAYKO
FACTS: Luzon Surety issued 2 administrator's bond (P15,000.00 each), in behalf of Pastor T. Quebrar, as
administrator of the estates of A. B. Chinsuy and Cresenciana Lipa. For the first year, premiums and
documentary stamps were paid. CFI of Negros Occidental approved the amended Project of Partition and
Accounts of Quebrar. On May 8, 1962, Luzon Surety demanded the payment of the premiums and
documentary stamps but Quebrar moved for the cancellation and/or reduction of executor's bonds on the
ground that "the heirs of these testate estates have already received their respective shares". The CFI of
Negros Occidental ordered the bonds cancelled. In 1963, Luzon Surety filed the case with the CFI of Manila.
The defendants-appellants offered P1,800.00 by way of amicable settlement which the Luzon Surety
refused. The lower court allowed the plaintiff to recover from thedefendants-appellants. Defendantsappellants appealed tothe CA. CA certified the herein case to the SC after finding that this case involves
only errors or questions of law.
ISSUE: WON the administrator's bonds were in force and effect from and after the year that they were
filed and approved by the court up to 1962, when they were cancelled.
HELD: YES. Section 1 of Rule 81 the administrator/executor to put up a bond for the purpose of
indemnifying the creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It is conditioned upon the faithful performance of
the administrator's trust. The surety is then liable under the administrator's bond, for as long as the
administrator has duties to do as suchadministrator/executor. Quebrar still had something to do as an
administrator/executor even after the approval of the amended project of partition and accounts. It appears

that there were still debts and expenses to be paid after June 6, 1957. The sureties of an administration
bond are liable only as a rule, for matters occurring during the term covered by the bond. And the
term of a bond does not usually expire until the administration has been closed and terminated in
the manner directed by law.
Thus, as long as the probate court retains jurisdiction of the estate, the bond contemplates a
continuing liability not withstanding the non-renewal of the bond by the defendants-appellants.
The payment of the annual premium is to be enforced as part of the consideration, and not as a condition
for the payment was not made a condition to the attaching or continuing of the contract. The premium is
the consideration for furnishing the bonds and the obligation to pay the same subsists for as long as the
liability of the surety shall exist.
REVOCATION OF ADMINISTRATION, DEATH, RESIGNATION AND REMOVAL OF EXECUTORS
AND ADMINISTRATORS RULE 82
VICTORIO AND JUAN REYNOSO VS VICENTE SANTIAGO (CFI QUEZON JUDGE), PIA REYNOSO,
AGUSTINA REYNOSO, MELITON PALABRICA, LEONICIO CADIZ, ET. AL.
FACTS: Leoncilo Cadiz and other heirs of Salvadora Obispo presented an application in CFI of Quezon for
the administration of the property of the deceased. (Intestate proceeding No. 2914)
Victorio Reynoso and Juan Reynoso, surviving spouse and eldest son, opposed the application and filed a
document, which purported to be the last will and testament of Salvadora, with a counter for its probate. TC
rejected the instrument as a forgery but CA found the will authentic.
Thereafter, Victorio and Juan filed two petitions:
a) In Special Proceeding No. 2914: Prayed that the appointed special administrator Meliton
Palabrica turn over the properties of deceased and its proceeds to Victorio and that the intestate
proceeding be closed.
b) Under Special Proceeding No. 3107, titled Testate Estate of the deceased Salvadora Obispo:
Prayed that the estate be administered and settled and that Victorino be appointed as executor of
the deceased last will and testament. It also prayed for accounting and delivery of the proceeds
and possession of the properties.
Respondent Judge Santiago decided on the the cases separately and held that the substitution was not
necessary, inconvenient and expensive and that Special Proceeding No. 2914 must simply be converted
into a testate proceeding in the same original expediente without the necessity of changing its number,
name or title.
Petitioners thus instituted this present case on Mandamus to compel Judge Santiago to order the opening
of the testate estate.
ISSUES:
a) WON Judge Santiago may be compelled to open the testate estate case.
b) WON substitution of executor is necessary.
c) WON Victorio Reynoso should be appointed as administrator.
HELD:
a)
NO. Whether the intestate proceeding already commenced should be discontinued and a new
proceeding under a separate number and title should be constituted is entirely a matter of form and lies
within the sound discretion of the court.
b)
YES. The appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in granting
letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a
will or some other cause.
There is no valid reason for the further retention of a special administrator in the case at bar. The
appointment of a regular administrator is necessary for the prompt settlement and distribution of
the estate for there are important duties devolving on a regular administrator which a special administrator
can not perform, and there are many actions to be taken by the court which could not be accomplished
before a regular administrator is appointed.
c)
NO. This matter cannot be decided in a petition for mandamus. While the surviving spouse is
entitled to preference in the appointment (Sec 6, Rule 79), circumstances might warrant his rejection and
the appointment of someone else. Mandamus does not lie where judgment or discretion is exercised in the
performance of the act. The court below must thus decide whom to appoint.
Petition for constitution of a separate proceeding for the administration of the estate under the will is
DENIED. Petition for the appointment of a regular administrator is GRANTED.
EMILIO ADVINCULA VS HON. JUDGE JOSE TEODORO, SR. & ENRIQUE LACSON

FACTS: Petitioner was appointed as special administrator of the estate of his deceased wife, Josefa Lacson
Advincula in Special Proceeding No. 3245. In due course, he was appointed regular administrator.
Thereafter, the brothers of the deceased submitted to the court for allowance, a document purporting to be
her last will and testament. Respondent Enrique Lacson, one of the brothers, filed a motion praying that he
be appointed as administrator of said estate in lieu of petitioner Emilio, as he was named as executor in the
will. Petitioner opposed the probate thereof upon the ground that the signature was secured through fraud
and duress.
During the hearing, the brothers alleged that Emilio was incompetent, incapable and unsuitable to act as
administrator because he was foreign to the estate. Respondent Judge Teodoro revoked Emilios
appointment as administrator and appointed Enrique in his place upon payment of P5,000 bond.
Petitioner thus instituted this present petition for certiorari praying that the lower courts order be annulled.
ISSUE: WON Emilios appointment may be revoked on the ground of Enrique being appointed as executor
in the deceased alleged last will and testament.
HELD: NO. The appointment of Lacson as administrator in lieu of Advincula is predicated on the fact that
Lacson was named executor of the deceased will. This provision however cannot be enforced until the said
will is admitted to probate.
The discovery of a will of the deceased does not ipso facto nullify letters of administration already
issued or even authorize the revocation thereof until the alleged will is proved and allowed by the
court.
Furthermore, the lower court appears to have followed the argument of the respondents that Emilio, being
foreign to the deceased estate is incapable of being an administrator. This argument is untenable because
from the viewpoint of logic and experience, a stranger may be competent, capable and fit to be administrator
of the estate in the same way that a family member can be incompetent, incapable and unfit to do so.
Besides, Emilio as the surviving spouse if a forced heir of the deceased. He is entitled to of all
property apart from his share of the other half thereof as heir of the deceased since all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership. Judge Teodoros orders are thus hereby
REVERSED.
COTIA, ET AL. VS. JIMENEZ, ET AL.
Intestate Estate of the deceased Mariano Cotia. Elena Cotia, et al., petitioners and appellants, vs. Maria
Jimenez, et al., oppositors and appellees.
FACTS: This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Manila relieving the petitionerappellant, Elena Cotia, as administratrix of the estate of the deceased Mariano Cotia and appointing in her
stead the Philippine Trust Company.
Petitioner Elena Cotia was appointed administratrix of the Intestate Estate of the deceased Mariano Cotia.
When she failed to submit an accounting of her administration, respondents moved for the submission of
the same which was granted by the lower court. She subsequently submitted said accounting. During the
hearing of the statement of accounts, it was found that petitioner spent P64,650 for family expenses and
attorneys fees without prior judicial authority. Thus, respondents moved for her removal as administratrix
due to her failure to submit accounting, settle the estate and unauthorized disbursements as required by
the Rules. The lower court granted the respondents motion thus this appeal.
ISSUE: WON the lower court gravely abused its discretion in granting the motion for removal as
administratrix.
HELD: NO. The appealed order finds express sanction in Section 2, Rule 83, of the Rules of Court, which
provides that the court may remove an administrator who neglects to render his account and settle
the estate according to law. What is more, the family expenses and attorneys fees in the aggregate
amount of P64,650 paid by the administratrix out of the estate without previous authority of the court,
is seemingly in disregard of Section 3, Rule 84, of the Rules of Court, to the effect that the widow and
minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person shall receive, under the direction of the court, such
allowances as are provided by law. Appealed orders AFFIRMED.

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF DECEASED ISMAEL REYES, THE HEIRS OF
OSCAR R. REYES VS CESAR R. REYES
FACTS: Spouses Ismael Reyes and Felisa Revita Reyes are the registered owners of parcels of land
situated in Arayat Street, Cubao, Quezon City. The spouses have seven children, namely: Oscar, Araceli,
Herminia, Aurora, Emmanuel, Cesar and Rodrigo, all surnamed Reyes. On April 18, 1973, Ismael Reyes
died intestate. Prior to his death, Ismael Reyes was notified by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) of his
income tax deficiency which arose out of his sale of a parcel land located in Tandang Sora, Quezon
City. For failure to settle his tax liability, the amount increased to about P172,724.40 and since no payment
was made by the heirs of deceased Ismael Reyes, the property was levied sold and eventually forfeited by
the Bureau of Internal Revenue in favor of the government. Sometime in 1976, petitioners predecessor
Oscar Reyes availed of the BIRs tax amnesty and he was able to redeem the property upon payment of
the reduced tax liability in the amount of about P18,000. On May 18, 1982, the Office of the City Treasurer
of Quezon City sent a notice to Felisa Revita Reyes informing her that the Arayat properties will be sold at
public auction on August 25, 1982 for her failure to settle the real estate tax delinquency from 1974-1981.
Thereafter, petitioners predecessor Oscar Reyes entered into an amnesty compromise agreement settled
the accounts of Felisa R. Reyes. On May 10, 1989, Cesar Reyes, brother of Oscar Reyes, filed a petition
for issuance of letters of administration with the RTC praying for his appointment as administrator of the
estate of the deceased Ismael Reyes which estate included 50% of the Arayat. Oscar Reyes filed his
conditional opposition thereto on the ground that the Arayat properties do not form part of the estate of
the deceased as he (Oscar) had acquired the properties by redemption and or purchase. The probate court
subsequently issued letters of administration in favor of Cesar Reyes .On the other hand, Oscar Reyes filed
his objection to the inventory reiterating that the Arayat properties had been forfeited in favor of the
government and he was the one who subsequently redeemed the same from the BIR using his own funds.
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the probate court is proper.
HELD: YES. The jurisdiction of the probate court merely relates to matters having to do with the settlement
of the estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, and the appointment and removal of
administrators, executors, guardians and trustees. The question of ownership is as a rule extraneous matter
which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain
property should or should not be included in the inventory estate proceeding, the probate court may pass
upon the title thereto, but such determination provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision
in a separate action to resolve.
The foregoing rule however provides for an exception, that is: if the claimant and all other parties having
legal interest in the property consent, expressly or impliedly, to the submission of question to the probate
court for adjudgment, or the interests of third persons are not ones prejudiced. In this case, not all parties,
not all heirs, gave their consent to the probate court.
EDGARDO AGTARAP VS SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, TERESA AGTARAP,
WALTER DE SANTOS AND ABELARDO DAGORO
FACTS: Eduardo filed with the RTC a verified petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his
deceased father Joaquin Agtarap. Joaquin left two parcels of land with improvements.
During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two marriages:
1)
Lucia Garcia (Lucia) 3 children : Jesus, Milagros and Jose(survived by three children, namely,
Gloria, Joseph, and Teresa - respondents)
2)
Caridad Garcia (Caridad) 3 Children: Eduardo (Petitioner), Sebastian, and Mercedes
RTC: Appointed Eduardo as special administrator and issued an order of partition. It also declared that the
real estate properties belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia.
CA: Affirmed RTCs decision but provided for a different partition.

ISSUE: WON RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited jurisdiction, can determine questions of
ownership, which properly belongs to another court with general jurisdiction.
HELD: YES. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court, either as a probate or an intestate
court, relates only to matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of
deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the
proceedings. The patent rationale for this rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one in charge of estate proceedings, whether
testate or intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate and which are claimed to belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance
from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate. All that the said court
could do as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they should be included in the
inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no
problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final determination of the conflicting claims
of title.
Exceptions to the general rule:
1)
the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question
of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final
determination of ownership in a separate action.
2)
If the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or advancement,
or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties
are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.
The parties are all heirs of Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by the resolution of
the ownership issue. More importantly, the determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal is
but collateral to the probate courts jurisdiction to settle the estate of Joaquin.
SEBIAL VS SEBIAL
FACTS: Gelacio Sebial died in 1943, he had 3 children with this 1st wife Reoncia (Roberta's mother) and
6 other children with his 2nd wife Dolores, (Benjamina's mother). In 1960, Benjamina filed for the settlement
of her father's estate and her appointment as administrator. Thisd petition was oppsed by Roberta on the
ground that said estate had already been apportioned and that she should be the one appointed as
administrator and not Benjamina. The Court appointed Benjamina and found that alleged partition was
invalid and ineffective. So the letters of administration were issued and a notice to the creditors was issue
don the same date. The oppositors motion for reconsideration was denied. For the possibility of an amicable
settlement, the court ordered both sides to give a complete list of the properties of the decedent with
segregation for each marriage.
On Nov. 1961, the lower court approved the administrator's inventory (second one) or six months from the
appointment. Roberta them moved for the motion reconsideration alleging as ground that the court has no
jurisdiction to approve the inventory as it was files beyond the 3-month period. The Court of Appeals certified
the case to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: WON the court lost jurisdiction to approve the inventory which was made 6 months after the
appointment.
HELD: NO. Under section 1 of Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, the prescribed three-month period is not
mandatory. Once a petition for the issuance of letters of administration is filed with the proper court and the
publication of the notice of hearing is complied with, said court acquires jurisdiction over the estate and

retains such until the probate proceedings is closed. Hence, even if the inventory was filed only after the
three-month period, this delay will not deprive the probate court of its jurisdiction to approve it. However,
under section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, such unexplained delay can be a ground for an
administrator's removal.
BENITO BOLISAY AND GENEROSA BOLISAY VS HON. LEONARDO ALCD AND ANGELA
PASCUAL
FACTS: Petitioner Generosa Buted Bolisay and private respondent-administratrix Angela Buted Pascual
are sisters, the daughters of the deceased Luciana Abadilla whose intestate estate is being settled.
The subject property was in the name of petitioners. With the TCT lost by way of mortgage, petitioners
obtained a loan from GSIS. On the other hand, private respondent filed an action for the annulment of the
Deed of Slae executed by their deceased mother in favor of petitioners for alleged lack of consideration. A
compromise agreement was reached between the parties from the list of partitionable properties.
That notwithstanding, respondent administratrix filed an inventory of the properties comprising the estate
of Luciana and included therein the property here in controversy. Said inventory was approved without
opposition.
ISSUE: WON the subject property was properly included in the inventory as part of the estate of the
deceased.
HELD: NO. It is the duty of every administrator, whether special or regular, imposed by section 668 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, to return to the court within three months after his appointment a true inventory
of the real estate and an the goods, chattels, rights, and credits of the deceased which come into
his possession or knowledge, unless he is residuary legatee and has given the prescribed bond. The
court which acquires jurisdiction over the properties of a deceased person through the filing of the
corresponding proceedings, has supervision and control over the said properties, and under the said power,
it is its inherent duty to see that the inventory submitted by the administrator appointed by it contains all the
properties, rights and credits which the law requires the administrator to set out in his inventory.
In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, the SC held that if a property covered by Torrens
title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in
the absence of strong compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered
as the owner of the property in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary
action, particularly, when as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in
the title.
The property in issue should be excluded from the inventory of the subject estate, said order has no more
legal basis. The probate court's authority extends only over properties listed in the inventory, without
prejudice to any party adversely affected asserting or protecting his rights or interests in a separate
appropriate remedy.

FRANCISCO CUIZON, ROSITA CUIZON, PURIFICATION C. GUIDO married to TEODORO GUIDO, and JUAN ARCHE,
petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE R. RAMOLETE, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch III,
DOMINGO L. ANTIGUA and SEGUNDO ZAMBO, respondents.
Facts:
Marciano Cuizon applied for the registration of several parcels of land located at Opao, Mandaue City [A1] he
distributed his property between his two children, Rufina and Irene.[A2] On December 29, 1971, Irene Cuizon
executed a Deed of Sale with Reservation of Usufruct involving the said salt beds in favor of the petitioners Francisco,
Rosita and Purificacion, all surnamed Cuizon[A3] .Original Certificate of Title No. 0171 was issued only in 1976 in the
name of Marciano Cuizon[A4] .In that same year, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 10477 covering the property in
question was issued by the Register of Deeds to Irene Cuizon.[A5] The latter died in 1978. In the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate, her alleged half sister and sole heir Rufina adjudicated to herself all the property of the
decedent including the property in question. [A6] In the instant case, the property involved is not only claimed by
outside parties but it, was sold seven years before the death of the decedent and is duly titled in the name of the
vendees who are not party to the proceedings.[A7]

The petitioners therein sought to annul the order of the respondent court in a special proceeding which in effect
ruled that notwithstanding that the subject property was duly titled in the name of petitioners, the administratrix of
the intestate estate involved in said proceeding had the right to collect the rentals of said property over the objection
of the titled owners just because it was included in the inventory of said estate and there was an ordinary action in
the regular court over the ownership thereof and the estate was one of the parties therein. [A8] This Court viewed
the petition as one seeking for a prima facie determination and not a final resolution of the claim of ownership.
Issue: The sole issue in this petition for certiorari is whether or not a probate court has jurisdiction over
parcels[A9] of land already covered by a Transfer Certificate of Title issued in favor of owners who are not parties
to the intestate proceedings[A10] if the said parcels have been included in the inventory of properties of the estate
prepared by the administrator.
Held:
It does not matter that respondent - administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership, for,
on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with
incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not
include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the estate of deceased
persons. [A12] In other words, in Our considered view, the mere inclusion in the inventory submitted by the
administrator of the estate of a deceased person of a given property does not of itself deprive the probate court of
authority to inquire into the property of such inclusion in case an heir or a third party claims adverse title
thereto.[A13]
To hold otherwise would render inutile the power of that court to make a prima facie determination of the issue of
ownership recognized in the above quoted precedents. [A14] The correct rule is that the probate court should
resolve the issue before it provisionally, as basis for its inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory.[A15] It does not
even matter that the issue is raised after approval of the inventory because "apparently, it is not necessary that the
inventory and appraisal be approved by the Court." (Francisco on the Rules of Court Vol. V-B, p. 99, citing Siy Chong
Keng vs. Collector of Internal Revenue, 60 Phil. 494)
In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved,
the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong compelling
evidence to the contrary,[A16] the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property in controversy
until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when as in the case at bar,
possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title.
Having been apprised of the fact that the property in question was in the possession of third parties and more
important, covered by a transfer certificate of title issued in the name of such third parties, the respondent court
should have denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the
inventory of the property of the estate.[A17] It had no authority to deprive such third persons of their possession
and ownership of the property. [A18] Respondent court was clearly without jurisdiction to issue the order of June
27, 1979[A19] . Thus, it was unnecessary for the petitioners to first apply for relief with the intestate court.

UY vs CAPULONG
FACTS: JUDGE TERESITA DIZON-CAPULONG, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, is charged with gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct in a
complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator by the spouses Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy,
relative to Special Proceedings for settlement of the estate of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco.

Herminia R. Alvos, claiming to be a niece of Paz Ramirez, surviving spouse of the late Ambrocio
C. Pingco, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela a petition for settlement of the estate of Ambrocio
C. Pingco. 2 days after, respondent Judge appointed said Herminia R. Alvos special administratrix under
Rule 80 of the Rules of Court.
Sometime later 2 parcels of land belonging to the late Ambrocio C. Pingco and his wife had been
sold to complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy who registered the sale with the Register of Deeds of
Manila. Consequently, counsel requested the court to direct the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela to "freeze
any transaction without the signature of Herminia Alvos" involving the properties, respondent Judge granted
the motion.
Counsel for the special administratrix filed with the court an urgent motion to cancel the titles issued
in the name of Jose P. Uy stating that the latter was able to register the titles in his name through fraud,
and the signatures of the vendors on the deed of sale were forged.
Respondent Judge ordered the cancellation of the titles in the name of complainant Jose P. Uy and the
reinstatement of the names of the spouses Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez or the issuance of new
titles in their name.
Complainant Jose P. Uy filed with the Court of Appeals a petition to annul the Order of respondent
Judge, with prayer for a temporary restraining order enjoining the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela from
implementing the Order, and that respondent Judge be restrained from further proceeding against him.
The Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition of complainants and set aside the
Order of respondent Judge, and enjoined her from proceeding against complainant Jose P. Uy in the
intestate proceedings.
ISSUE: WON the Court of Appeals was right in invalidating the Judges order?
HELD: YES. ". . . a probate court has no authority to decide questions of the ownership of property, real
or personal. The only purpose of the examination . . . is to elicit information or to secure evidence from the
persons suspected of having possession or knowledge of the property of the deceased, or of having
concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the property of the deceased. If after such examination
there is good reason for believing that the person so examined has property in possession belonging to the
estate, it is the duty of the administrator, by ordinary action, to recover the same.
Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court simply provides that a person who is suspected of having
in his possession property belonging to an estate, may be cited and the court may examine him under oath
on the matter. Said section nowhere gives the court the power to determine the question of ownership of
such property. Furthermore, the declaration of nullity of the sale of a parcel of land under administration
and the consequent cancellation of the certificate of title issued in favor of the vendee, cannot be obtained
through a mere motion in the probate proceedings over the objection of said vendee over whom the probate
court has no jurisdiction. To recover the property, an independent action against the vendee must be
instituted in the proper court.

ESTATE OF HILARIO RUIZ VS. CA

FACTS: Hilario M. Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only son, Edmond Ruiz, his
adopted daughter, respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three granddaughters, private respondents
Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz. He bequeathed cash,
personal and real properties, Edmond was named executor.

After Hilario died, the cash was distributed according to the will but Edmond did not take any action for the
probate of his fathers holographic will. It was Maria who filed for the probate of Hilarios will 4 years after
his death. Edmond opposed the petition. Subsequently, Edmond withdrew his opposition and the probate
court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned
upon the filing of a bond. Maria filed a Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs and Motion for
Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will. Maria prayed for the release of the rent payments to
the three grandchildren and for the distribution of the testators properties, specifically the Valle Verde
property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will. This was
granted by the probate court.
The court ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only such amount as may be necessary to cover
the expenses of administration and allowances for support of the testators three granddaughters subject
to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance.
ISSUE: WON the court erred in ordering the release of allowance to the grandchildren.
HELD: YES. It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to
the minor or incapacitated children of the deceased. Article 188 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the
substantive law in force at the time of the testators death, provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the deceaseds legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful
employment, are entitled to provisional support from the funds of the estate. The law is rooted on the fact
that the right and duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedents
estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to widow and children and does not extend it to the deceaseds
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to
sustain the probate courts order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending
settlement of his estate.
ESTATE OF GURREA VS. MANUELA GURREA
FACTS: Carlos Gurrea and Manuela Ruiz Gurrea were married in Spain in 1932 they had a son named
Teodoro. In 1945, Carlos abandoned Manuela and lived in the Philippines with Rizalina Perez by whom he
had 2 children. In 1960, Manuela instituted a case against Carlos for support and the annulment of some
alleged donations of conjugal property, in favor of his common-law wife, Rizalina. In due course, said court
issued an order granting Mrs. Gurrea a monthly alimony, pendente lite, of P2,000.00 which was reduced
by the Court of Appeals to P1,000.00.
Carlos Gurrea died, leaving a document purporting to be his last will and testament, in which he named
Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof and disinherited Manuela and their son, Teodoro. Manuela filed a
motion alleging that the aforementioned alimony, pendente lite, of P1,000 a month, had been suspended
upon the death of Carlos Gurrea, and praying that the Special Administrator, Pijuan, be ordered to continue
paying it pending the final determination of the case. This motion was denied.
Mrs. Gurrea assails as erroneous the order of the lower court denying her petition for support, as well as
that denying its reconsideration. Both were predicated upon the theory that, pursuant to Article 188 of our
Civil Code the support of a surviving spouse constitutes, not an encumbrance upon the estate of the
decedent, but merely an advance from her share of said estate, and that Mrs. Gurrea is not entitled to such
advance, there being neither allegation nor proof that she had contributed any paraphernal property to said
estate or that the same includes properties forming part of the conjugal partnership between her and the
deceased.
ISSUE: W/N the court erred in not granting the motion for continuance of support.

HELD: YES. The lower court denied support to Mrs. Gurrea because of absence of proof as regards the
status, nature or character of the property now under the custody of the Special Administrator. Precisely,
however, on account of such lack of proof thereon, the court is bound by law to assume that the estate of
the deceased consists of property belonging to the conjugal partnership, one-half of which belongs
presumptively to Mrs. Gurrea, aside from such part of the share of the deceased in said partnership as may
belong to her as one of the compulsory heirs, if his alleged will were not allowed to probate, or, even if
probated, if the provision therein disinheriting her were nullified. Inasmuch as the aforementioned estate is
worth P205,397.64, according to the inventory submitted by the special administrator, it is clear to us that
the continuation of the monthly alimony, pendente lite, of P1,000, authorized in said Civil Case No. 5820,
is fairly justified.
RULE 84 IN RELATION TO RULE 81
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ VS CA, MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA
CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ & THE PRESIDING JUDGE
OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG
FACTS: Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will where he named the following as his heirs: a) Edmond
Ruiz his only son; b) Maria Pilar Ruiz his adopted daughter; and c) Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and
Maria Angeline his 3 granddaughters, all daughters of Ruiz.
Testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz
executor of his estate. Hilario Ruiz died and the cash component of his estate was immediately distributed
among Ruiz and respondents. Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his
father's holographic will. 4 years after, Pilar filed before the RTC a petition for the probate and approval of
the deceaseds will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. Edmond opposed the
petition on the ground that the will was executed under undue influence.
The house and lot in Valle Verde, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to the 3 granddaughters was leased
out by Edmond to third persons. Probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court
the rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde
property. Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real properties
of the estate. The probate court approved the release of P7,722.00. Edmond then withdrew his opposition
to the probate of the will. But the probate court admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of
letters testamentary to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00.
Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz, with Edmond Ruiz as executor, filed an "Ex-Parte Motion for Release of
Funds. Prayed for release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court. Montes opposed
and praying that the release of rent payments be given to the 3 granddaughters. The probate court denied
the release of funds and granted the motion of Montes due to Edmonds lack of opposition.
Probate Court ordered the release of the funds to Edmond but only "such amount as may be necessary to
cover the expenses of administration and allowances for support" of the testator's three granddaughters
subject to collation and deductible from their share in the inheritance. CA sustained probate courts order.
ISSUE: WON the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate's debts
and obligations, has the authority to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the
will.
HELD: The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and
personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised "so long as it is necessary
for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not willed.
An executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real
as well as the personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the
debts and expenses for administration.
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he had been
previously granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the
properties of the estate, and payment of the real estate taxes thereon, but he moved again for the release
of additional funds for the same reasons he previously cited. Thus, it was correct for the probate court
to require him to submit an accounting of the necessary expenses for administration before
releasing any further money in his favour. As executor, he is a mere trustee of his father's estate. The
funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a trustee
of the highest order.

SINFOROSO BUENAVENTURA AS ADMINISTRATOR AND TIMOTEO DEL ROSARIO VS TOMAS

RAMOS, ET. AL.
FACTS: Sinoforoso, administrator, asked permission from CFI Bulacan to sell a certain fishery belonging
to the estate of Juan Buenaventura (deceased) as it was allegedly already in a bad condition, the estate
was unable to make necessary repairs and the heir was poor and without adequate and necessary funds.
The estate of Juan opposed.
CFI denied the motion by the administrator due to: a) Commisioners appointed to make an inventory had
not rendered a report; b) Pending an action favor of the estate against tenant and said fishery; c) Cannot
fix value of fishery; d) Admin might fight sufficient funds.
Administrator later renewed this petition to which the heirs again opposed. Judge Revilla this time granted
the petition and authorized the sale of the fishery. It was later sold to co-petitioner Timoteo del Rosario.
ISSUE: WON petitioner-administrator has power to sell the fishery.
HELD: NO. Section 714 to 722 of Act No. 190 provide when an executor or administrator of the estate of a
deceased person may sell the property of the estate, both real and personal. There are but two cases,
speaking generally, under which an administrator may sell real and personal estate of a deceased person.
The conditions are: a) when it is necessary to pay the debts and charges against the estate, and b) when
it is made to appear to the court that it will be beneficial to the heirs and those interested in the estate.
There was no allegation or showing, nor any attempt to make it appear, that there were any debts or
charges against the estate of Juan Buenaventura, which make it necessary to sell the real estate of
that estate. While there was an attempt made to show that the sale of the real estate would be beneficial
to the heirs, the petition was not made "with the consent and approbation, in writing, of the heirs," etc. Not
only did the administrator fail to show "the consent and approbation, in writing of the heir," etc.,
but the record clearly shows that the heirs opposed, in writing, to the sale of the fishery in question.
Further, the only ground upon which an administrator can demand of the heirs at law the possession
of real property of which his intestate was seized at the time of his death, is, that such property will
be required to be sold to pay the debts of the deceased.
The heirs having become the absolute owners of the property of the ancestor, and there being no debts or
obligations against the same which existed at the time of the death of the ancestor, it is a matter of no
importance to the administrator or to any other person, that the property is in a state of bad repair. In
absence of debts or obligations against the estate at the time of the death of the ancestor, the heirs, as
absolute owners, may manage and control the same without interference on the part of the administrator.
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR. VS CA (5 Division) and NELIA S.SILVERIO-DEE
FACTS: Beatriz Silverio died. Her surviving spouse, Ricardo Silverio, Sr., filed an intestate proceeding for
the settlement of her estate. In Nov 2004, during the pendency of the case in RTC of Makati City, Ricardo
Silverio, Jr. filed a petition to remove Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as the administrator of the estate. Edmundo
S. Silverio also filed an opposition for the removal of Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the estate
and for the appointment of a new administrator. RTC granted the petition and removed Silverio Sr. as
administrator of the estate, while appointing Silverio Jr. as the new administrator. The Motion for
Reconsideration was denied. In 2005, Ricardo Silverio Jr. filed an Urgent Motion for an Order Prohibiting
Any Person to Occupy/Stay/Use Real Estate Properties Involved in the Intestate Estate of the Late Beatriz
Silverio, without Authority from this Honorable Court.
On May 31, 2005, the RTC issued an Omnibus Order affirming its Order dated January 3, 2005 and denying
private respondents motion for reconsideration. In the Omnibus Order, the RTC also authorized Ricardo
Silverio, Jr. to, upon receipt of the order, immediately exercise his duties as administrator of the subject
estate. The Omnibus Order also directed Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to vacate the property at No. 3, Intsia, Forbes
Park, Makati City within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the order.
Silverio-Dee received a copy of the said Order on June 8, 2005. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and
Record on Appeal, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order which was denied by
RTC in an Order dated December 12, 2005. This Order was received by private respondent on December
22, 2005. On January 6, 2006, private respondent filed her Notice of Appeal while she filed her Record on
Appeal on January 23, 2006.
RTC denied the appeal on two grounds: (1) that Nelia Silverio-Dees appeal was against an order denying
a motion for reconsideration which is disallowed under Sec. 1(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court; and (2) that
Nelia Silverio-Dees Record on Appeal was filed beyond the reglementary period to file an appeal provided
under Sec. 3 of Rule 41. Hence, private respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, with the
CA which issued a TRO and ruled that Notice of Appeal was filed within the reglementary period provided
th

by the Rules of Court applying the "fresh rule period" enunciated by this Court in Neypes v. Court of
Appeals.
ISSUES: WON the Omnibus Order dated May 31, 2005 and the Order dated December 12, 2005 are
Interlocutory Orders which are not subject to appeal? [Yes, they are interlocutory orders.]
RATIO: CA correctly held that the alleged authority given by SILVERIO, SR. for Nelia S. Silverio-Dee to
occupy the property is null and void since the possession of estate property can only be given to a purported
heir by virtue of an Order from this Court (see Sec. 1 Rule 90, supra; and Sec. 2 Rule 84, Revised Rules
of Court).
In fact, the Executor or Administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the
real as well as the personal estate of the deceased only when it is necessary for the payment of the
debts and expenses of administration (Sec. 3 Rule 84, Revised Rules of Court). CA also reiterated that
a final order is one that disposes of the subject matter in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding
or action, leaving nothing else to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined by the
court, while an interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves
something to be decided upon.
The SC added that it is only after a judgment has been rendered in the case that the ground for the appeal
of the interlocutory order may be included in the appeal of the judgment itself. The interlocutory order
generally cannot be appealed separately from the judgment. It is only when such interlocutory order was
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65
may be resorted to.
In the instant case, Nelia Silverio-Dee appealed the May 31, 2005 Order of the RTC on the ground that it
ordered her to vacate the premises of the property located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City.
On that aspect the order is not a final determination of the case or of the issue of distribution of the shares
of the heirs in the estate or their rights therein. It must be borne in mind that until the estate is partitioned,
each heir only has an inchoate right to the properties of the estate, such that no heir may lay claim on a
particular property. The underlying rationale is that until a division is made, the respective share of each
cannot be determined and every co-owner exercises, together with his co-participants, joint ownership over
the pro indiviso property, in addition to his use and enjoyment of the same. The Court in Alejandrino v.
Court of Appeals said that although the right of an heir over the property of the decedent is inchoate as long
as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned, the law allows a co-owner to exercise rights of
ownership over such inchoate right as provided in Art 493 of the Civil Code.
J.J. WILSON VS M.T. REAR
FACTS: Charles C. Rear was murdered by some Moros on his plantation situate in the interior of the
Province of Cotabato at an isolated place, without communication except by river, about 17 kilometers from
the nearest settlement of Pikit, and about 70 kilometers from the town of Cotabato. The whole plantation
consisted of public lands. J.J. Wilson qualified as special administrator of the estate on November 17,1925.
Later, the property of the estate was appraised at P20,800, of which the commissioners filed an inventory
and report, which was also signed by Wilson. January 4,1927, the commisioners made and filed a report
of claims against the estate, but by reasons of the fact that it was claimed and alleged that the administrator
did not have any funds to pay, on March 30, 1927, the court ordered the administrator to sell a portion of
the property. April 26, 1927, and with the consent of the heirs, a petition was made for authority to sell,
under sealed proposal, all the property of the estate, with a view of closing the administration. October
10,1927, the court granted this petition, and after due notice, the public sale took place, and the property
was sold to Wm. Mannion for P7,600. April 26,1927, Wilson submitted a report covering his administration
to that date, which was approved and later set aside on motion of the heirs of the deceased. March 23,
1928, Wilson filed his final account which later was amended on June 20,1928, to which the heirs made
numerous and specific objections, and after a hearing, the court approved the account as filed.
ISSUES:
1) WON that the alleged disbursements made by the special administrator and the administrator were far
in excess of the amount required to preserve the estate;
2) WON that no authority being asked for or granted by the court, all loans or advances, made to the estate,
were made contrary to law and are not legal charges against the estate (Trs., p. 37).
3) WON the court erred in admitting, over objection, Exhibits D, E and F.
4) WON that Wilson, as special administrator and as administrator, was neglectful and imprudent and he
committed waste. He is, therefore, liable.

RATIO: It appears from the first inventory of December 27, 1925, that the assets of the estate, including
real property, coconut trees, and houses were P15,300, and that the personal property was valued at
P5,250, which included 80 head of cattle, carabao and horses of the value of P4,000. Although he was
appointed special administrator on November 17, 1925, he never made any report or filed any account of
any kind until 1927. Neither did he apply to or obtain an order from the court of any nature during that
period, and it appears that the attention of the court was for the first time called to the administration of the
estate when the commissioners on claims asked to have their fees paid; otherwise, the court never made
any order of any kind from December 27, 1925, to April, 1927. It also appears that at the time of his death,
the only debts against the deceased were one in favor of Sewal Fleming which then amounted to P800,
and one in favor of J. S. Alano for P500.
From which it appears that on November 30,1925, the administrator sold hogs for P108.50; in July, 1927,
he sold one carabao for P100 and two steers for P160; in August he sold hogs for P79.50; and in September
he sold two steers for P180.
Strange as it may seem, the above is the only account which was ever rendered of the livestock which was
appraised at P4,000, and yet no specific objection was ever made or filed to the final account of the
administrator for his failure to render any other or different account of the livestock. Even so, it appears that
the sale to Mannion was made by and with the consent of the heirs, and that the deed was intended to
convey all of the property to him described in the inventory, except that of a perishable nature and some
personal effects. It further appears from the amended account that the total amount of cash received by the
administrator, including the sale to Mannion was P9,519.25, and that the total amount of cash disbursed by
the administrator was P11,328.94, leaving a deficit or balance due and owing from the estate of P1,809.69.
It also appears that the amount of Fleming's note at the time it was paid was P1,003.40, and that the taxes
for the years 1925,1926, and 1927 amounted to P152.14, and the claim of J. S. Alano amounted to P500.
That is to say, at the time they were paid, the actual claims against the deceased was P 1,655.54. Here, it
will be noted that the value of the personal property of the estate at the time of Wilson's appointment,
appearing over his own signature was P5,800 which included 80 head of cattle, carabao and horses of the
value of P4,000. That is to say, at the time Wilson was appointed, his estate had personal property of the
value of P5,800, and when the amended final account was filed the actual debts of the deceased, including
interest and accumulated taxes, was P1,655.54.
In this situation, it was the legal duty of the administrator to at once apply to the court for an order to sell
the personal property to pay the debts of the deceased and the expenses of administration. It also appears
from the amended final account that the expenses charged by the administrator was P750.94; that the court
expenses, including attorney's fees was P693.20; and that the claims of the commisioners was P322.90,
the total of which is P1,767.04. That is to say, that the total of all claims against the deceased, including
interest and taxes was P1,655.54, and that the whole amount of the court costs and expenses of
administration was P1,767.04, the total of which is P3,422.58. That is to say, at the time of his appointment,
it appears over the administrator's own signature that the value of the personal property of the deceased
which came into his possession was P5,800, and the whole amount of claims against Rear at the time of
his death and the court costs and expenses of administration was P3,422.58. That is to say, if the personal
property of the estate had been promptly sold, when it should have been, and sold for its appraised value,
all the debts of the deceased and the court costs and expenses of administration would have been paid,
and the estate would have a balance left of P2,377.42. Instead of doing that, and without any order, process
or authority of the court the administrator, as appears from his amended final account, continued the
operation of the plantation and the employment of Fleming as manager at a salary of P200 per month, and
a large number of men, so that at the time of the filing of the amended final account, the total expense for
labor was P2,863.62, and the amount of the manager's salary was P4,533.33, the net result of which was
that all of the property of the estate was consumed, lost, or destroyed, leaving a deficit against the estate
of P1,809.69. Whereas, if the administrator had followed the law and promptly sold the personal property,
all of the debts of the estate would have been paid, and it would have a cash balance in its favor of
P2,377.42, and all of its real property left, which was appraised at P15,000.
It is but fair to say that Wilson's place of business, which was in Zamboanga, is at least 300 kilometers from
the plantation, and that he declined to serve as administrator and only accepted it under pressure. That in
legal effect he operated and left the management of the plantation largely in the discretion of Fleming, and
that he personally had but little, if anything, to do with the administration, and it does not appear that he
was a party to any fraud. But even so, he was appointed and qualified as administrator, and the law imposed
upon him legal duties and obligations, among which was to handle the estate in a business-like manner,

marshal its assets, and close the estate without any unreasonable or unnecessary delay. He was not
appointed to act for or on behalf of the creditors, or to represent the interests of the heirs only. He should
have administered the affairs of the estate for the use and benefit alike of all interested persons, as any
prudent business man would handle his own personal business. When appointed, it is the legal duty of the
administrator to administer, settle, and close the administration in the ordinary course of business, without
any unnecessary delay. Neither does an administrator, in particular, without a specific showing or an order
of the court, have any legal right to continue the operation of the business in which the deceased was
engaged, or to eat up and absorb the assets of the estate in the payment of operating expenses. Yet, in
the instant case, the administrator on his own volition and without any authority or process of court
continued the operation of the plantation, and in the end, as shown by his own report, the estate, which
was appraised at P20,800, with actual debts of the deceased of only P1,655,54 was all wiped out and lost,
and left with a deficit of P1,809.69.
The law does not impose upon an administrator a high degree of care in the administration of an estate,
but it does impose upon him ordinary and usual care, for want of which he is personally liable. In the instant
case there were no complications of any kind and in the usual and ordinary course of business, the
administrator should have wound up and settled the estate within eight months from the date of his
appointment.
As stated, it is the duty of the administrator of an estate to represent and protect the interests of all interested
persons, including the heirs of the deceased. It is very apparent upon their face that the entries in Exhibits
D and E were not made in the ordinary course of business, and even if they were, they would not be
evidence of the payments without the corresponding receipts or vouchers. That is to say, to entitle the
administrator to credit for money paid out in the course of administration, he should submit and file with the
court a corresponding receipt or voucher. Even so, it appears from the record that during his lifetime, the
deceased employed a number of laborers on the plantation, and that after Wilson was appointed as
administrator, Fleming personally took charge of and operated the plantation, and that the expenses of
which for the first eight months was P2,257.45.
CONCEPCION JOCSON DE HIDALGO VS JESUS NAVA
FACTS: On February 8, 1935, the administatrix Estefania Fenix of the intestate of the Rafael Jocson,
executed in favor of appellant Jesus R. Nava a contract of lease period of five crop years, over certain
properties of the estate, at a stipulated rental of P1,000 a year. The contract was entered into without the
intervention of the court acting in the intestate proceedings.
On July 23, 1936, Conception Jocson de Hillado, filed a motion in said proceedings, praying that the
administratrix be required to explain certain details in the matter of said lease. In reply to the answer of the
administratrix, Hillado and Fenix agreed to lease the lands compromised in the contract to the highest
bidder at public auction. Jesus R. Nava, the lessee, filed a motion asking that the order be set aside, it
having been issued without jurisdiction. The motion was denied, and he appealed.
ISSUE: WON the lower court has the power to annul, in the intestate proceedings, a contract of lease
executed by the administratrix without its intervention.
HELD: YES. The contract here in question being a mere act of administration, could validly be entered into
by the administratrix within her powers of administration, even without the court's previous authority. And
the court had no power to annul or invalidate the contract in the intestate proceedings wherein it had no
jurisdiction over the person of the lessee. A separate ordinary action is necessary to that effect. Order is
accordingly reversed, with costs against appellee.
ACCOUNTABILITY AND COMPENSATION OF EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS - RULE 85
VICTORINO DE GUZMAN VS CRISPINA DE GUZMAN-CARILLO
FACTS: The deceased testator was survived by eight children named Victorino, Librada, Severino,
Margarita, Josefina, Honorata, Arsenio and Crispina. His will was duly probated. Letters of administration
were issued to his son, Doctor Victorino G. de Guzman.
One of the properties left by the dent was a residential house located in the poblacion. In conformity with
his last will, that house and the lot on which it stands were adjudicated to his eight children, each being
given a one-eighth proindiviso share in the project of partition dated March 19, 1966, which was signed by
the eight heirs and which was approved in the lower court's order of April 14, 1967 but without prejudice to
the final outcome of the accounting.
The administrator submitted 4 accounting reports and 3 heirs Crispina de Guzmans-Carillo Honorata de
Guzman-Mendiola and Arsenio de Guzman interposed objections to the administrator's disbursements as
the administrator was directed to refrain from spending the assets of the estate for reconstructing and

remodeling the house of the deceased and to stop spending any asset of the estate without first during
authority of the court to do so.
LC allowed the items as legitimate expenses of administration thus the 3 oppositors appealed to this Court.
ISSUE: WON these expenditures may be validly charged against the income of the estate.
HELD: An executor or administrator is allowed the necessary expenses in the care, management, and
settlement of the estate. He is entitled to possess and manage the decedent's real and personal estate as
long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and the expenses of administration. He is accountable
for the whole decedent's estate which has come into his possession, with all the interest, profit, and income
thereof, and with the proceeds of so much of such estate as is sold by him, at the price at which it was sold
(Sec. 3, Rule 84; Secs. 1 and 7, Rule 85, Rules of Court).
a)
House repair expenses: YES. Obviously, those expenses redounded to the benefit of the coowners and they were necessary for the preservation and use of the family residence. As a result of those
expenses, the co-owners, including the three oppositors, would be able to use the family home in comfort,
convenience and security.
As clarified in the Lizarraga case, administration expenses should be those which are necessary for the
management of the estate, for protecting it against destruction or deterioration, and, possibly, for the
production of fruits. They are expenses entailed for the preservation and productivity of the estate and its
management for purposes of liquidation, payment of debts, and distribution of the residue among the
persons entitled thereto.
b)
Expenses incurred by Librada de Guzman as occupant of the family residence without paying rent:
NO. The salaries of the house helper, light and water bills, and the cost of gas, oil floor wax and switch nail
are personal expenses incuring only to her benefit and should not be charged against the income of the
estate.
c)
Other expenses: NO. The expenses incurred during the celebration of the deceased first death
anniversary are disallowed because they have no connection with the care, management and settlement
of the decedent's estate.
The expenses for stenographic notes and representation expenses should also be disallowed.
However, the lawyers subsistence and the gift to the physician who attended to the testator during his last
days are allowable expenses.
UY TIOCO VS IMPERIAL
FACTS: Petitioner is the administrator of decedent Basilisa Yangco's estate. He engaged the legal services
of private respondent Alejandro Panis as counsel for the administration of the estate. On 31 October 1927,
before the final settlement of the accounts, private respondent moved in the probate proceedings to hold
the estate liable for the attorney's fees.
Respondent CFI Judge Carlos Imperial granted the motion over the objections of the petitioner. Jacinto
Yangco, in his capacity as guardian ad litem for the heirs of the decedent, filed a Motion for Reconsideration,
raising the follow contentions:
1. That he was not notified of the motion for allowance of fees;
2. That the fees allowed private respondent were excessive and prejudicial to the estate of the
deceased; and
3. That, considering the nature of the work performed by private respondent (counsel in the
administration of the estate of the deceased), the services rendered by him did not warrant the
payment of the sum claimed.
4.
Respondent Judge, however, ruled to deny the motion, on that notice to the administrator was sufficient
notice to the movant. Furthermore, the fact that the movant was a curador ad litem (Spanish for conservator)
did not give rise to a right to be notified of the private respondent's motion. Aggrieved, the guardian ad litem
Jacinto Yangco filed an appeal before the SC. However, on private respondent's motion, respondent Judge
issued an order executing the decision holding the estate liable for the private respondent's attorney's fees.
Consequently, petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, praying that the respondent judge be enjoined from
causing the execution of his order in favor of private respondent.
ISSUE: WON the respondent Judge erred in holding the estate liable for the attorney's fees claimed by
private respondent.
HELD: YES. Rule 85 section 7 states that the executor or administrator shall be allowed the necessary
expenses in the care, management, and settlement of the estate.

This means that, where the executor or administrator engages the services of an attorney to assist in the
administration of the estate, he shall be allowed such expenses by the estate. The recourse of the attorney,
then, is not directly as against the estate, but rather as against the executor or administrator.
The exception is where the fees paid are reasonable and beneficial to the estate. Hence, the respondent
Judge erred in holding the estate liable for the attorney's fees owed to the private respondent.
GAVINO ALDAMIZ, as administrator of the estate of the deceased Santiago Rementeria y
Aldamizcogeascoa VS JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MINDORO, THE
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF MINDORO and JUAN L. LUNA
FACTS: Santiago Rementria died. In a probate proceeding, Aldamiz was appointed as the administrator of
the estate.He was represented by Respondent Atty. Luna. After 10 years from the date of his appointment,
Aldamiz through Atty. Luna submitted his accounts and a project partition with a view to closing the
proceedings.
The court approved the accounts but refused to approve the project partition unless all debts, including
attorneys fees be first paid.
Attorney Luna to comply with the wishes of the court, without previously preparing and filing a written petition
to have his professional fees fixed, and without previous notice to all the interested parties, submitted
evidence of his services and professional standing so that the court might fix the amount of his
compensation and the administrator may make payment thereof. This failure to file a written claim and to
notify the interested parties thereof was not due to bad faith or fraudulent purpose but to an honest belief
on the part of the respondent attorney that such requirements were not necessary under the circumstance.
And when the amount of his fees was fixed by the court and Gavino Aldamiz asked him for a substantial
reduction, he answered that it was not he who had fixed the amount but the court, and advised his client
to file a motion for reconsideration, with the assurance that he would offer no objection to any reduction in
amount and to any extension of the time for paying what might be granted by the court
Only subsequent occurrences, which proved distasteful to the parties, led them to take steps which
culminated in the filing of the instant civil action.
Petitioner alleged that no written claim had ever been filed and the interested parties had not been notified
thereof nor of the hearing, not even petitioner.
The Court, after considering the whole evidence presented, issued its order awarding respondent Attorney
Luna, in payment of his professional services, an aggregate sum of P28,000. In that order it is said that
"said attorney is the one who instituted this testate proceeding ten years ago and has from its incipiency to
the present stage of the proceedings actively intervened in the same." Hence this petition, asking to set
aside the order.
ISSUE: WON the order was valid.
HELD: NO. No written petition for the payment of attorney's fees has ever been filed by the respondent
attorney and the interested parties had not been previously notified thereof nor of the hearing held by the
court. Consequently, the order issued by the respondent court on January 21, 1947, and all subsequent
orders implementing it, are null and void, as having been issued an excess of jurisdiction.
The order of execution issued on April 19,1948, is null and void, not only because it was intended to
implement the order of January 21, 1947, which in itself was null and void, but because a writ of execution
is not the proper procedure allowed by the Rules of the Court for the payment of debts and expenses of
administration. The proper procedure is for the court to order the sale of personal estate or the sale of
mortgaged of real property of the deceased and all debts or expenses of administration should be paid out
of the proceeds of the sale or mortgage. The order for the sale or mortgage should be issued upon motion
of the administrator and with the written notice to all the heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the
Philippines, according to Rule 89, section 3, and Rule 90, section 2. And when sale or mortgage of real
estate is to be made, the regulations contained in Rule 90, section 7, should be complied with.
LACSON VS REYES
FACTS: Ephraim Serquina petitioned the court for the probate of the last will and testament of Carmelita
Farlin, in his capacity as counsel for the heirs and as executor under the will. Granted. He then filed a
motion for attorneys fees against the heirs, alleging that the heirs have agreed to pay, as and for his legal
services rendered the sum of P68,000.00. The heirs denied the claim and alleged that the sum agreed
upon was only P7,000.00 which was already paid. Lower court granted the motion.
ISSUE: WON Serquina is entitled to attorneys fees.
HELD: NO. First, no docket fee was paid, hence, the court did not acquire jurisdiction. Second, The Rules
of Court provides that an administrator or executor may be allowed fees for the necessary expenses he

has incurred as such, but he may not recover attorneys fees from the estate. His compensation is fixed by
the rule but such a compensation is in the nature of executors or administrators commissions, and never
as attorneys fees. Where the administrator is himself the counsel for the heirs, it the latter who must pay
therefore. Court ruled attorneys fees in the amount of P15,000.00 can be recovered from the heirs and not
from the estate of Carmelita Farlin.
KALAW VS IAC
FACTS: Carlos Lim Kalaw died intestate. The trial court issued an order appointing petitioner Ana Lim
Kalaw as special administratrix. Jose Lim filed a motion to require petitioner to render an accounting of her
administration of said estate which was granted by respondent Judge Ricardo Diaz. Private respondent
Rosa Lim Kalaw together with her sisters Victoria and Pura Lim Kalaw filed a motion to remove petitioner
as administratrix of their fathers estate and to appoint instead private respondent Rosa, on the ground of
negligence on the part of petitioner in her duties for failing to render an accounting of her administration
since her appointment as administratrix more than six years ago in violation of Section 8 of Rule 85 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON Ana Lim Kalaw should be removed as administratrix.
HELD: YES. In the case at bar, the removal of petitioner as administratrix was on the ground of her failure
for 6 years and 3 months from the time she was appointed as administratrix to render an accounting of her
administration as required by Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Rules of Court.
The rendering of an accounting by an administrator of his administration within one year from his
appointment is mandatory, as shown by the use of the word "shall" in said rule. The only exception is when
the Court otherwise directs because of extensions of time for presenting claims against the estate or for
paying the debts or disposing the assets of the estate, which do not exist in the case at bar.
DE BORJA VS DE BORJA
FACTS: Quintin, Francisco, Crisanta and Juliana, all surnamed de Borja, are legitimate children of Marcelo
de Borja who, upon his demise sometime in 1924 or 1925, left a considerable amount of property. Intestate
proceedings must have followed, and the pre-war records of the case either burned, lost or destroyed during
the last war, because the record shows that in 1930 Quintin de Borja was already the administrator of the
Intestate Estate of Marcelo de Borja.
In the early part of 1938, Quintin de Borja died and Crisanto de Borja, son of Francisco de Borja, was
appointed and took over as administrator of the Estate.
Juan de Borja and sisters, heirs of the deceased Quintin de Borja, filed their opposition to the statement of
accounts filed by the administrator on the ground that same was not detailed enough to enable the
interested parties to verify the same; that they cannot understand why the Intestate could suffer any loss
considering that during the administration of the same by Quintin de Borja, the Estate accumulated gains
of more than P100,000 in the form of advances to the heirs as well as cash balance; that they desired to
examine the accounts of Dr. Crisanto de Borja to verify the loss and therefore prayed that the administrator
be ordered to deposit with the Clerk of Court all books, receipts, accounts and other papers pertaining to
the Estate of Marcelo de Borja. This motion was answered by the administrator contending that the Report
referred to was already clear and enough, the income as well as the expenditures being specified therein;
that he had to spend for the repairs of the properties of the Estate damaged during the Japanese
occupation; from the year 1942 when his (Crisanto) house was burned, the administrator and his family
took shelter at the house belonging to the Intestate known as "casa solariega" which, in the Project of
Partition was adjudicated to his father, Francisco de Borja. This property, however, remained under his
administration and for its repairs he spent from 1945-1950, P1465,14, duly receipted.
ISSUE: WON the repairs made were extraordinary in nature and deductible from the estate gains.
HELD: NO. None of these repairs appear to be extraordinary for the receipts were for nipa, for carpenters
and thatchers. Although it is true that Rule 85, section 2 provides that: SEC. 2. EXECUTOR OR
ADMINISTRATOR TO KEEP BUILDINGS IN REPAIR. An executor or administrator shall maintain in
tenant able repair the houses and other structures and fences belonging to the estate, and deliver the same
in such repair to the heirs or devisees when directed so to do by the court.
Yet considering that during his occupancy of the said "casa solariega" he was not paying any rental at all,
it is but reasonable that he should take care of the expenses for the ordinary repair of said house. Appellant
asserted that had he and his family not occupied the same, they would have to pay someone to watch and
take care of said house. But this will not excuse him from this responsibility for the disbursements he made
in connection with the aforementioned repairs because even if he stayed in another house, he would have

had to pay rentals or else take charge also of expenses for the repairs of his residence. The administrator
should be held liable to the oppositors in the amount of P366.28.