CANON 17

AURORA CERDAN VS. ATTY. CARLO GOMEZ

A.C. No. 9154 March 19, 2012 CANON 17 CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Facts:
Complainant, Cerdan, and widower, Benjamin Rufino, during their
cohabitation as husband and wife, purchased several real properties
and maintained savings accounts at First Consolidated Bank (FCB), all
of which were made under Rufinos name. Upon Rufinos death,
complainant sought the legal aid of respondent as to what to do with
the real properties. Complainant alleged paying respondent P152,000
in attorneys fees, although only P100,00 was reflected in the receipt.
Complainant further alleged that using the SPA granted to him,
respondent changed FCBs arrangement for the disbursement of
Rufinos savings account, which was split 50-50 between Cerdan and
Rufinos heirs, into that which the latter received 60%, while Cerdan,
only 40%. It was also stated that Gomez SPA only covered the account
in the FCB Quezon Branch, but the respondent also included funds
from the FCB Narra Branch. In another case wherein respondent
represented the complainant, the former has yet to remit the proceeds
of the case amounting to P12,000. In his answer, Gomez denied all the
allegations made in Cerdans affidavit.
Commissioner Dela Rama found that Atty. Gomez violated the Code of
Professional Responsibility and recommended that he be suspended
from the practice of law for six (6) months.
Issue: Whether or not Atty Gomez violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Held:
Yes, the Court agreed with the findings of the IBP. A lawyer-client
relationship is highly fiduciary in nature and it requires a high standard
of conduct and demands utmost fidelity, candor, fairness, and good
faith. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, he is required by the
Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake the task with zeal,
care and utmost devotion. The actions of Atty. Gomez has been in
violation of Canons 16 and 17. For Canon 16, Atty. Gomez failed to
account for the money he received for complainant as a result of the
compromise agreement. Worse, he remitted the amount of
290,000.00 only, an amount substantially less than the share of
complainant. Records reveal that complainants share from the FCB
savings accounts amounted to 442,547.88 but only P290,000.00 was
remitted by Atty. Gomez after deducting his share.
As for Canon 17, it states that, a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of
his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed

in him. Atty. Gomez failed to observe the utmost good faith, loyalty,
candor, and fidelity required of an attorney in his dealings with
complainant. Atty. Gomez exceeded his authority when he entered into
a compromise agreement with regard to the FCB account in Quezon
Branch, where he agreed that complainant shall receive 40 percent of
the proceeds while the heirs of Rufino shall get the 60 percent, which
was contrary to the original agreement of 50-50 sharing. Atty. Gomez
likewise acted beyond the scope of the SPA when he included in the
compromise agreement the FCB account in Narra branch when it was
issued only with respect to the FCB account, Quezon branch. Moreover,
Atty. Gomez entered into a compromise agreement with respect to the
other properties of Rufino without authority from complainant. Lawyers
should always live up to the ethical standards of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. Public confidence
in law and in lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and
comport himself in a manner that would promote public confidence in
the integrity of the legal profession.
WHEREFORE,
respondent
Atty.
Carlo
Gomez
is
hereby
declared GUILTY of violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year

CANON 18
Fidela Vda. de Enriquez v atty. San Jose, AC No. 3569, Feb. 23, 2007 (VELASCO)
This is an administrative complaint for disbarment filed by Fidela Vda. De Enriquez against respondent Atty. Manuel G.
San Jose for gross negligence.
Facts:
Petitioner hired the services of respondent for filing an unlawful detainer case against a lessee who defaulted
in the payment of monthly rentals on petitioners property. Respondent failed to file the appropriate civil case, despite
payment of attorneys fees, so the case was withdrawn from him. Petitioner demanded the return of documents, but
despite repeated demands, respondent refused and failed to return the documents. Thus, the action for unlawful
detainer prescribed. Petitioner alleged further that her daughter who worked for respondent was not paid her salary.
Respondent, in his Comment, denied being negligent. He alleged that petitioner sent him a letter informing
him that the lessee already agreed to vacate the premises, thus filing the case became unnecessary. He also
explained that there was a vacancy in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, therefore he did not file the case because the
case could not be filed until a new judge was appointed. He also claimed that petitioners daughter was paid her salary.
The case was referred to the IBP. The investigating officer found that respondent was indeed remiss in the
performance of his professional duties as counsel. It concluded that respondent was guilty of negligence. The
Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for three months. However, the
penalty imposed by the IBP Board of Governors was only one-month suspension.
Respondent filed a petition to dismiss the case against him. The petition was dismissed by the IBP for lack of
merit.

Issue: WON respondent was negligent.

Held: Yes.
The Court agrees with the IBPs decision. It cites Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility that
enjoins a lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence therewith shall render him liable.
A lawyer engaged to represent a client in a case bears the responsibility of protecting the latters interest with
utmost diligence. It is the duty of a lawyer to serve his client with competence and diligence and he should exert his best
efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interest of his client. It is not enough that a practitioner is qualified to
handle a legal matter; he is also required to prepare adequately and give the appropriate attention to his legal work.
Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action
impliedly stipulates to carry it to its conclusion. However, respondent in this case failed to file the appropriate civil case
after sending a demand letter. The failure to file a pleading is by itself inexcusable negligence on the part of
respondent. The Court finds reprehensible respondents failure to heed the request of his client for the return of the
case documents. That respondent gave no reasonable explanation for that failure makes his neglect patent.
Respondent aggravates his misconduct by blaming the courts. Respondents excuse that the MCTC having
jurisdiction over the case was vacant; that filing of a case would be useless; and that the best thing to do was to wait
for the vacancy to be filled, finds no support in the practice of law. The vacancy in court did not suspend the courts
official existence, much less render it functus oficio.
Respondent also relies in vain on complainants letter dated August 16, 1990, wherein complainant informed
respondent of her decision to withdraw the case. Because of the respondents failure to file the appropriate case, and
his refusal to return the documents, time ran out and the action for unlawful detainer case was barred by prescription.
Damage and prejudice to the clients cause was undeniable.
The Court revised the one-month suspension to six months.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Manuel G. San Jose is hereby declared guilty of violation of Canon 18
specifically Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a
period of six (6) months effective upon notice of this Resolution.

-----

LUISITO BALATBAT, Complainant, vsATTY. EDGARDO ARIAS Y

SANCHEZ, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
The instant administrative complaint refers to the charges of
"malpractice and gross negligence" against Atty. Edgardo Arias y
Sanchez of relative to Civil Case No. 003066-CV for recovery of a
sum of money.
In the Complaint1 dated September 8, 1976, Luisito Balatbat alleged
that he engaged the services of respondent to undertake his defense
in the said civil case. According to complainant, he did not attend the

scheduled hearings because respondent told him that there was no

need to be present. But when he verified the status of the case from
the then City Court of Manila, he was surprised to learn that a
Decision2 dated June 21, 1976 had already been rendered.
Complainant alleged that the enforcement of the decision caused him
and his family "untold miseries, embarrassment and public ridicule." 3
The evidence on record shows that the city court declared
complainant in default for failure to appear during the June 18, 1976
hearing. Plaintiff was, thereafter, allowed to present evidence ex
parte. After three days, a judgment adverse to complainant was
rendered, prompting the plaintiff to move for execution ex-parte; 4 Two
days thereafter, a Writ of Execution5 was issued.
In his Answer,6 respondent claimed that the notice of the hearing of
the June 18, 1976 trial was "made to appear as though signed by
him."7 He insisted that it was not his signature. He, likewise, asserted
that contrary to complainants allegations, he always tried to take the
complainant with him to the city court for all the scheduled hearings; it
was always the complainant who, for one reason or another, could
not go with him.8
Respondent further alleged that complainant had filed a Manifestation
in the City Court terminating his (respondents) legal services, and a
new counsel for complainant entered an appearance. Respondent
claimed that he could not have possibly opposed the Ex Parte Motion
for Execution filed in the civil case since he was not furnished a copy
thereof.9 Respondent prayed that complainant be punished for
contumacy for being motivated by ill will and malice in filing the
instant administrative complaint against him.
The Court referred the complaint to the Office of the Solicitor General
for investigation.
Complainant testified that he had gone to the City Court to make a
follow-up on the status of the case since respondent had not been
communicating nor collecting fees from him for two months. He then
discovered that a decision had already been rendered. 10 He went to
respondents office to inquire the status of his case, and respondent
told him that "they were on the loss." He asked respondent to show

him the copy of the decision, and respondent replied that "it was
already in default." Complainant then demanded that the records of
the case be shown to him but again, respondent refused. 11
Respondent, for his part, claimed that it was complainant who notified
him of the adverse decision and promised that he would verify this
with the city court.12 Respondent then requested the complainant to
return the next day. He insisted that unlike the notices of previous
hearings in the case, he did not receive any notice from the City
Court of the supposed hearing that was reset on June 18, 1976; 13 that
the signature appearing therein was not his; and that he did not know
who had affixed the same. 14 Thereafter, he informed the complainant
that he had already prepared a draft pleading; that he would file it to
have the decision set aside; and that it could easily be proven that
"the signature appearing in the records was not his signature." 15
The presentation of the parties respective evidence was terminated
on September 6, 1977. After they submitted their respective
Memoranda, the case was transferred to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD). The parties were
then required to furnish copies of the documentary exhibits submitted
in evidence.
Incidentally, it appears that a confusion as to the identity of
respondent arose when the IBP-CBD sent a Notice 16 dated January
15, 1992 setting the hearing of the case on February 28, 1992 to a
certain Atty. Edgardo S. Arias at the latters address in Puerto
Princesa City, Palawan. On the date set for hearing, the said Edgardo
S. Arias filed a Motion to Be Furnished Copy of Complaint and for ReSetting of Hearing, averring therein that he did not know the nature of
the charge against him because he had not been furnished a copy of
the complaint and other supporting documents. Accordingly, he
requested that complainant be ordered to furnish him a copy of the
complaint and that he be given at least fifteen days thereafter to file
his answer or comment.17 On May 5, 1992, he filed his comment.
Emphasizing therein that his middle name was SORCA, he lamented
that the instant complaint must have referred to Atty. Edgardo
SANCHEZ Arias, a practicing lawyer in Manila, and not to himself for
the reason that he had been permanently residing and practicing his
profession in Puerto Princesa City, Palawan since 1971. 18

In its Report dated October 20, 1995, the IBP-CBD recommended

that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1)
month, and warned that a repetition of the same act shall be dealt
with more severely. The IBP Board of Governors then issued
Resolution No. XII-96-45 dated January 27, 1996, adopting the said
Report and Recommendation.
We agree that respondent is administratively liable.
Based on respondents own admissions, he did not properly withdraw
as counsel for complainant. The settled rule is that the attorney-client
relation continues until the client gives a notice of discharge, or
manifests to the court or tribunal where the case is pending that
counsel is being discharged, with a copy served upon the adverse
party.19 Thus, the only way to be relieved as counsel is to have either
the written conformity of his client or an order from the court relieving
him of the duties of counsel, in accordance with Rule 138, Section
2620 of the Rules of Court.
This rule is consistent with the principle that an attorney who
undertakes to conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its
termination, and is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable
cause.21 The duty of a lawyer to safeguard his clients interests
commences from his retainer until his effective discharge from the
case or the final disposition of the entire subject matter of the
litigation.22 The discharged attorney must likewise see to it that the
name of the new counsel is properly recorded and the records
properly handed over.23 Verily, the abandonment of a client in violation
of the attorneys contract amounts to an ignorance of the most
elementary principles of professional ethics. 24
As the Investigating Commissioner noted, it was respondents duty,
upon being apprised of the adverse decision, to exhaust all available
remedies at the time to prevent its attaining finality and, more
importantly, to forestall the inevitable execution that would follow
considering that at that time, the winning party had not yet filed the
motion for execution.25 Our pronouncement in Santiago v. Fojas 26 is
instructive on this point:
x x x Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer

owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with
competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with
wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes
entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the
maintenance and defense of his clients rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or
withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This
simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every
remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he
may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If
much is demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted
privilege to practice law carries with its correlative duties not only to
the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer
who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the
interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to
the bar and helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal
profession.
Respondents actuations belie his claim that he had not been remiss
in his duties to his client. The records show that on March 25, 1976,
he received a notice of hearing27 for the setting of the case for trial on
April 30, 1976. He went to the City Court on the appointed day. 28
However, finding that plaintiff and defendant (complainant herein)
therein had not yet arrived, he requested the clerk of court to cancel
the hearing on the ground that he had two (2) criminal cases pending
in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branches 17 and 29 which he
had to attend to.29 He then failed to verify the next hearing date with
the court. When asked why he failed to do so, respondent declared
that it "slipped [his] mind and took the word of the Clerk of Court that
notices [would] be sent to both parties. 30 As it turned out, the said
hearing was re-scheduled to June 18, 1976, the day plaintiff
presented his evidence ex parte. Forthwith, judgment was rendered
based solely thereon after which, execution ensued. 31 Respondent
should have, at the very least, moved to have the hearing postponed
on the ground of conflict in his scheduled hearings in other cases.
Indeed, the negligent failure of respondent to act accordingly under
the circumstances clearly negates not only his claim that he
"appeared in court always mindful of his duties," 32 but also his vow to

serve his client with competence and diligence 33 and not neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him. 34 Respondents actuations likewise
violate Rule 18.04, which mandates that a lawyer keep the client
informed of the status of the case and respond within a reasonable
time to a clients request for information. A client must never be left in
the dark for to do so would destroy the trust, faith and confidence
reposed in the lawyer so retained in particular and the legal
profession in general.35
It must be stressed that public interest requires that an attorney exert
his best efforts in the prosecution or defense of a clients cause. A
lawyer who performs that duty with diligence and candor not only
protects the interests of his client, he also serves the ends of justice,
does honor to the bar and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession. 36 Lawyers are indispensable part
of the whole system of administering justice in this jurisdiction. At a
time when strong and disturbing criticisms are being hurled at the
legal profession, strict compliance with ones oath of office and the
canons of professional ethics is an imperative. 37
CONSIDERING THE FOREGOING, for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, respondent Atty. Edgardo Arias y
Sanchez is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for One (1) month.
He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act
in the future shall be dealt with more severely. He is likewise
DIRECTED to report the date of his receipt of this Decision to enable
the Court to determine when his suspension shall have taken effect.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all the courts of
the country.
SO ORDERED.
----------Atty. Elmer Solidon vs Atty. Ramil Macaladlad

FACTS:

Complainant, through a mutual acquaintance asked respondent to handle

the judicial titling of a parcel of land owned by complainants relatives.
Respondent accepted the task to be completed within a period of eight (8)
months and received Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as initial
payment; the remaining balance of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00)
was to be paid when complainant received the certificate of title to the
property. Respondent has not filed any petition for registration over the
property sought to be titled up to the filing of this case. In the Complaint,
Position Papers and documentary evidence submitted, complainant
claimed that he tried to contact respondent to follow-up on the status of the
case six (6) months after he paid the initial legal fees. He did this through
phone calls and text messages to their known acquaintances and relatives,
and, finally, through a letter sent by courier to the respondent. However,
he did not receive any return communication. Complainant sought the
disbarment of respondent for violations of Rule 16.01, Rule 18.03, and
Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility involving negligence
in handling a case. Complainant argued that he had no intention of
reneging from his obligation, as he already had prepared the draft petition,
and he failed to file it because it lacked the needed documentary
requirements that his clients should have furnished him. The Investigating
Commissioner of IBP made a finding negligence on the part of the
respondent. This was affirmed by the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline.
ISSUE:
Legal Ethics
(1) Whether or not the respondents excuse is exculpatory.
RULING:
Legal Ethics
(1) No. Respondents excuse is not exculpatory. He was imposed the
(modified) penalty of suspension for six (6) months from the practice of law
and was ordered to return to the complainant the amount of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P50,000.00) with interest of twelve percent (12%) per annum from
the date of promulgation of the Decision until the full amount is returned.
In administrative cases against lawyers, the quantum of proof required is

preponderance of evidence which the complainant has the burden to

discharge. We fully considered the evidence presented and we are fully
satisfied that the complainants evidence, as outlined above, fully satisfies
the required quantum of proof in proving respondents negligence. Rule
18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for
the rule on negligence and states:
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
The Court has consistently held, in construing this Rule, that the
mere
failure of the lawyer to perform the obligations due to the client is
considered per se a violation. (underscoring provided)
In addition to the above finding of negligence, [Court] also
[found] respondent guilty of violating Rule 16.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which requires a lawyer to account for all the
money received from the client. In this case, respondent did not
immediately account for and promptly return the money he received from
complainant even after he failed to render any legal service within the
contracted time of the engagement.
----Spouses Aranda vs. Atty Elayda

In 2006, Atty. Emmanuel Elayda was hired by Spouses

Virgilio and Angelina Aranda to be their counsel in a civil
case. However, to their surprise in July 2006, an adverse
judgment was issued against them, thus they lost
possession of their car. Apparently, their counsel never
appeared in court for them. Atty. Elayda failed to inform
the spouses of the date of hearing as well as the order of
judgment. No motion for reconsideration or appeal was
interposed by the lawyer as well.
In his defense, Atty. Elayda said that it was the spouses
who never went to court; that the spouses neglected to
check on their case in court; that one time when their
case was scheduled, he even notified the court

stenographer to notify him if the spouses are in court so

that he could be there for them as he was in another
court branch for another case.
ISSUE: Whether
disciplined.

or

not

Atty.

Elayda

should

be

HELD: Yes. It was established that Atty. Elayda was

remiss and negligent in handling the Aranda case.
Although it is true that the client and their counsel must
equally share the burden of communication, it is the
primary duty of the counsel to inform the client of the
status of their case in court and the orders which have
been issued by the court. He cannot simply wait for his
clients to make an inquiry about the developments in
their case. Close coordination between counsel and
client is necessary for them to adequately prepare for
the case, as well as to effectively monitor the progress of
the case. Also, his excuse that he did not appear in court
because the spouses failed to appear in court is not
tenable. His attendance at the hearing should not be
made to depend on the whether the spouses Aranda will
come or not.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended a 6 month
suspension. This was adopted by the court.

CANON 19
Atty. Briones v Atty. Jimenez, AC No. 6691, April. 27, 2007 (BUENAVENTURA)
Facts: Atty. Briones is the Special Administrator of the Estate of Luz J. Henson. Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez is the counsel
for the Heirs of the late Luz J. Henson (Heirs).

On April 9, 2002, Atty. Jimenez filed with the RTC a notice of appeal from the Order dated April 3, 2002, questioning the
payment of commission to Atty. Briones.
On April 29, 2002, Atty. Jimenez filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 assailing the Order dated March 12, 2002, appointing the firm of Alba,
Romeo & Co. to conduct an audit at the expense of the late Luz J. Henson, as well as the Order dated April 3, 2002,
insofar as it denied their motion for recommendation.
On July 26, 2002, Atty. Jimenez filed with the CA a Petition for Mandamus, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 71844, alleging
that the respondent Judge therein unlawfully refused to comply with his ministerial duty to approve their appeal which
was perfected on time.
Atty. Briones, in his Comment, contends that the heirs of the late Luz J. Henson, represented by Atty. Jimenez, are
guilty of forum shopping for which reason, the petition should be dismissed.
On February 11, 2003, the CA without touching on the forum shopping issue, granted the petition and ordered the
respondent Judge to give due course to the appeal taken by Atty. Jimenez from the Order dated April 3, 2002, insofar
as it directed the payment of commission to Atty. Briones.
Atty. Briones (hereinafter referred to as complainant) filed his "Memorandum with Administrative Complaint for
Disbarment against Atty. Jacinto Jimenez, Counsel for Respondents", for violation of Rule 19.01 and Rule 12.08 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and Revised Circular No. 28-91 on forum shopping.
Complainant claims that Atty. Jimenez (hereinafter referred to as respondent) and the Heirs engaged again in forum
shopping when respondent, as counsel for the Heirs, filed a criminal complaint and executed an affidavit against
complainant for resisting and seriously disobeying the RTC Order dated April 3, 2002 which directed complainant to
deliver the residue of the estate to the Heirs in proportion to their shares, punishable under Article 151 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Complainant further claims that respondent violated Rules 19.01 and 12.08 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
ISSUE: WON respondent Atty. Jimenez violated Canon 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibilty
HELD: Yes.
On January 31, 2007, the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation recommending that the administrative
complaint against Atty. Jimenez be dismissed for lack of merit.
The Court agrees with the OBC that respondent is not guilty of forum shopping. Records show that respondent, as
counsel for the heirs of the late Luz J. Henson, filed a special civil action docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 assailing
the Order of March 12, 2002 appointing the accounting firm of Alba, Romeo and Co. as auditor; and, a regular appeal
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71488 assailing the Order of April 3, 2002, insofar as it directed the payment of
commission to complainant. It is evident that there is identity of parties but different causes of action and reliefs sought.
Hence, respondent is not guilty of forum shopping. The Court likewise finds no fault on the part of respondent in
executing an affidavit in support of the criminal complaint as held in the Santiago case.
However, there is sufficient ground in support of complainants claim that respondent violated Rule 19.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. Records reveal that before respondent assisted the Heirs in filing the criminal complaint
against herein complainant, he sent demand letters to the latter to comply with the Order of Judge Tipon to deliver the
residue of the estate to the heirs of the late Luz J. Henson. Considering that complainant did not reply to the demand
letters, respondent opted to file said criminal complaint in behalf of his clients for refusal to obey the lawful order of the
court.
Respondent claims that he acted in good faith and in fact, did not violate Rule 19.01 because he assisted the Heirs in
filing the criminal complaint against herein complainant after the latter ignored the demand letters sent to him; and that
a lawyer owes his client the exercise of utmost prudence and capability. The Court is not convinced. Fair play demands
that respondent should have filed the proper motion with the RTC to attain his goal of having the residue of the estate
delivered to his clients and not subject complainant to a premature criminal prosecution.
Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a lawyer to represent his client with zeal. However, the
same Canon provides that a lawyers performance of his duties towards his client must be within the bounds of the law.
Rule 19.01 of the same Canon requires, among others, that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain
the lawful objectives of his client. Canon 15, Rule 15.07 also obliges lawyers to impress upon their clients compliance
with the laws and the principle of fairness. To permit lawyers to resort to unscrupulous practices for the protection of
the supposed rights of their clients is to defeat one of the purposes of the state the administration of justice. While
lawyers owe their entire devotion to the interest of their clients and zeal in the defense of their clients right, they should

not forget that they are, first and foremost, officers of the court, bound to exert every effort to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. 17
Although respondent failed to live up to this expectation, there is no evidence that he acted with malice or bad faith.
Consequently, it is but fit to reprimand respondent for his act of unfair dealing with complainant. It must be stressed
that disbarment is the most severe form of disciplinary sanction, and, as such, the power to disbar must always be
exercised with great caution for only the most imperative reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the
standing and moral character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar. Accordingly, disbarment
should not be decreed where any punishment less severe such as reprimand, suspension, or fine would
accomplish the end desired.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Jacinto D. Jimenez is found guilty of and REPRIMANDED for violation of Rule 19.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.

------Dalisay v Atty. Mauricio, AC No.5655, Jan. 23, 2006 (DECALOS)

FACTS:
Dalisay accused Mauricio of negligence and malpractice of in
handling a civil case. In the course of several petitions Attorney
Mauricio alleged that Dalisay falsified documents. He even filed a
case against Dalisay. Dalisay contends that it was a violation of
attorney client privilege.
ISSUE:
WON Atty. Mauricio is guilty of malpractice.
HELD:
Yes. The motion to reconsider is denied based on the fact that
in terms of fraudulent practices the rules are laid out in 19.02. As a
lawyer it is expected that he should know this rule.
When it is discovered he should have terminated the attorney client
relationship. It is clearly laid out in the rule.
The evidence of the falsification came afterwards in terms of the
vindictiveness of his behavior and to justify his negligence.

----Lijuaco v Atty. Terrado, AC No. 6317, Aug.31, 2006 (FABELLA)

FACTS: On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint 1 was filed by complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco against
respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the
court when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite receipt of payment representing attorneys fees.
According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent sometime in January 2001 for P70,000.00 to
assist in recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank, Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of
P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property identified as
Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of said bank is the subject of a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession then pending before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 24 docketed
as LRC Case No. B-2610.

In the instant scenario, despite the strong protestation of respondent that the Php70,000.00 legal fees is purely and
solely for the recovery of the Php180,000.00 savings account of complainant subsequent acts and events say
otherwise, to wit:
1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a Php180,000.00 savings deposit is too high;
2.) Respondent actively acted as complainants lawyer to effectuate the compromise agreement.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Terrado was administratively liable for charging excessive fees.
HELD: Yes. Respondents claim that the attorneys fee pertains only to the recovery of complainants savings deposit
from Planters Development Bank cannot be sustained. Records show that he acted as complainants counsel in the
drafting of the compromise agreement between the latter and the bank relative to LRC Case No. B-2610. Respondent
admitted that he explained the contents of the agreement to complainant before the latter affixed her signature.
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for legal assistance in the recovery of
the deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. 11
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice, and
STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to RETURN,
within thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this
Court proof of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom.

----RCBI vs. FLORIDO

FACTS: Rural Bank of Calape, Inc. filed a complaint for disbarment against respondent. RBCI
alleged that respondent violated his oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
According to RBCI, respondent and his clients, Nazareno-Relampagos group, through force and
intimidation, forcibly took over the management and the premises of RBCI. They also forcibly
evicted Cirilo A. Garay, the bank manager, destroyed the banks vault, and installed their own
staff to run the bank.
Respondent added that the criminal complaint for malicious mischief filed against him by RBCI
was already dismissed; while the complaint for grave coercion was ordered suspended because of
the existence of a prejudicial question. Respondent said that the disbarment complaint was filed
against him in retaliation for the administrative cases he filed against RBCIs counsel and the trial
court judges of Bohol.
Moreover, respondent claimed that RBCI failed to present any evidence to prove their allegations.
Respondent added that the affidavits attached to the complaint were never identified, affirmed, or
confirmed by the affiants and that none of the documentary exhibits were originals or certified
true copies.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent violated his oath and the CPR Canon 19.
HELD: The Court held that respondent was guilty as charged and suspended for a year. The first
and foremost duty of a lawyer is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold
the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. It is the lawyers duty to promote respect for the

law and legal processes and to abstain from activities aimed at defiance of the law or lessening
confidence in the legal system.
Canon 19 of the Code provides that a lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds
of the law. It is his duty to counsel his clients to use peaceful and lawful methods in seeking
justice and refrain from doing an intentional wrong to their adversaries.
A lawyers duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice. To that end, his clients
success is wholly subordinate. His conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant
of the law and ethics.Any means, not honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the
lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion to his clients cause, is condemnable and unethical.
-----

CANON 20
Lijuaco v Atty. Terrado, AC No. 6317, Aug.31, 2006 (FABELLA)
FACTS: On February 13, 2004, an administrative complaint 1 was filed by complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco against
respondent Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado for gross misconduct, malpractice and conduct unbecoming of an officer of the
court when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to him despite receipt of payment representing attorneys fees.
According to the complainant, she engaged the services of respondent sometime in January 2001 for P70,000.00 to
assist in recovering her deposit with Planters Development Bank, Buendia, Makati branch in the amount of
P180,000.00 and the release of her foreclosed house and lot located in Calamba, Laguna. The property identified as
Lot No. 408-C-2 and registered as TCT No. T-402119 in the name of said bank is the subject of a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession then pending before the Regional Trial Court of Binan, Laguna, Branch 24 docketed
as LRC Case No. B-2610.
In the instant scenario, despite the strong protestation of respondent that the Php70,000.00 legal fees is purely and
solely for the recovery of the Php180,000.00 savings account of complainant subsequent acts and events say
otherwise, to wit:
1.) The Php70,000.00 legal fees for the recovery of a Php180,000.00 savings deposit is too high;
2.) Respondent actively acted as complainants lawyer to effectuate the compromise agreement.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Terrado was administratively liable for charging excessive fees.
HELD: Yes. Respondents claim that the attorneys fee pertains only to the recovery of complainants savings deposit
from Planters Development Bank cannot be sustained. Records show that he acted as complainants counsel in the
drafting of the compromise agreement between the latter and the bank relative to LRC Case No. B-2610. Respondent
admitted that he explained the contents of the agreement to complainant before the latter affixed her signature.
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner observed that the fee of P70,000.00 for legal assistance in the recovery of
the deposit amounting to P180,000.00 is unreasonable. A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. 11
WHEREFORE, Atty. Rogelio P. Terrado is found GUILTY of violating Rules 1.01, 9.02, 18.02 and 20.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective from notice, and
STERNLY WARNED that any similar infraction will be dealt with more severely. He is further ordered to RETURN,
within thirty (30) days from notice, the sum of P70,000.00 to complainant Luzviminda C. Lijauco and to submit to this
Court proof of his compliance within three (3) days therefrom.

----Roxas v de Zuzuarregui, G.R. No. 152072, Jan. 31, 2006 (FRANCISCO)

*Petition for review on certiorari
Facts:
-

1977 when the National Housing Authority (NHA) filed expropriation proceedings against the Zuzuarreguis,
parcels of land belonging to the latter situated in Antipolo, Rizal, with a total land area of 1,790,570.36 square
meters, more or less. This case was lodged before the RTC, Branch 141.
On 25 May 1983, said case was ordered archived6 by Branch 141.
About a month before the aforecited case was ordered archived, the Zuzuarreguis engaged the legal
services of Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor civil case, with a letter-agreement:
o Informing Zuzuarreguis that Roxas and Pastor will be the one to represent them in the case.
o Content of the letter-agreement from the 2 lawyers:
We shall endeavor to secure just compensation with the NHA and other govtal agencies
at a price of P11.00 or more per square meter. Any lower amount shall not entitle us to
any attorneys fees. At such price of P11.00 per square meter or more our contingent fee
is 30% of the just compensation.
Our lawyers fees shall be in the proportion of the cash/bonds ration of the just
compensation. Like wise our fees are subject to 10% withholding tax.
o 29 October 1984 partial decision was rendered by Branch 141 fixing the just compensation to be
paid to the Zuzuarreguis at P30.00 per square meter.
o 23 November 1984 NHA filed MR praying that the partial decision be reconsidered and set aside,
and a NEW ONE RENDERED LOWERING AMOUNT of just compensation in accordance with
applicable laws.
o Pending resolution. A Joint Special Power of Attorney was executed by Zuzuaregguis in favor of
Atty. Roxas and Pastor:
Giving full power and authority to their said attorneys on whatsoever requisite or proper
to be done about the premise.
o 10 December 1985 Letter-Agreement was executed by and b/n Zuzuarreguis, and Roxas and
Pastor
content:
an amendment to their first agreement regarding the attorneys fees for their
(Zuzurreguis) properties expropriated by NHA covering 179 hectares; they are now
accepting as final and complete settlement the price of P17.00 per square meter for a
total of 30.4 million pesos.
For the consideration of their service as their lawyers (Roxas and Pastor) they will be
paid as their contingent attys fees any and all amount in excess of the P17.00 per
square meter payable in NHA bonds.
The letter-agreement serves as their authority to collect directly from NHA the amount
pertaining to their contingent attys fees.
The letter-agreement also amends and supersedes the previous agreement regarding
their attys fees.
o 16 December 1985 - Resolution No. 1174 was issued by the NHA stating that Zuzuarregui property
would be acquired at a cost of P19.50 square meter.
o Computed at P19.50 per square meter, the 1,790,570.36 square meters property of the
Zuzuarreguis was expropriated at a total price of P34,916,122.00. The total amount released by
the NHA was P54,500,000.00. The difference of P19,583,878.00 is, undoubtedly, the yield on the
bonds.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioners (Atty. Roxas and Atty. Pastor) charge fair and reasonable in their attorneys fees.
Held: NO.

Attys. Roxas and Pastor, petitioners in G.R. No. 152072, contend in the main that the Zuzuarreguis are only
entitled to the amount of P17.00 per square meter for the 1,790,570.36 square meters expropriated by the
government. This was, according to them, embodied in the Letter-Agreement dated 10 December 1985,
wherein the Zuzuarreguis agreed to accept the price of P17.00 per square meter. Besides, Attys. Roxas and
Pastor contend that the price of P17.00 was even way above the P11.00
The Zuzuarreguis, for their part, though they were triumphant in the Court of Appeals, insist that the amounts
awarded them were not enough. According to them, the P12,596,696.425 awarded by the Court of Appeals
was not correct. They should have been awarded the amount of P17,073,122.70.
It was, therefore, in error to still deduct the amount of P4,476,426.28 from petitioners share in the yield in the
amount of P17,073,122.70 leaving then only P12,596,696.42.
A contract for contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable under all the circumstances of
the case including the risk and uncertainty of the compensation, but should always be subject to the
supervision of a court, as to its reasonableness.
In cases where contingent fees are sanctioned by law, the same should be reasonable under all the
circumstances of the case, and should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness, such that under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer is
tasked to charge only fair and reasonable fees.
Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court partly states:
o SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. An attorney shall be entitled to have
and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with a view
to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and
the professional standing of the attorney. x x x. A written contract for services shall control the
amount to be paid therefore unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.
In the instant case, Attys. Roxas and Pastor received an amount which was equal to forty-four percent (44%)
of the just compensation paid (including the yield on the bonds) by the NHA to the Zuzuarreguis, or an
amount equivalent to P23,980,000.00 of the P54,500,000.00. Considering that there was no full-blown
hearing in the expropriation case, ending as it did in a Compromise Agreement, the 44% is, undeniably,
unconscionable and excessive under the circumstances. Its reduction is, therefore, in order.
It is imperative that the contingent fees received by Attys. Roxas and Pastor must be equitably reduced. In
the opinion of this Court, the yield that corresponds to the percentage share of the Zuzuarreguis in the
P19.50 per square meter just compensation paid by the NHA must be returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor.
The Zuzuarreguis are entitled to the yield equal to 87.18% of the P19,583,878.00, while Attys. Roxas and
Pastor are entitled to 12.82% of said amount. The amount corresponding to 87.17% of P19,583,878.00 is
P17,073,224.84. This is the yield that the Zuzuarreguis are entitled to. Attys. Roxas and Pastor, on the other
hand, are entitled to P2,510,653.16.
Attys. Roxas and Pastor, in the opinion of this Court, were not shortchanged for their efforts for they would
still be earning or actually earned attorneys fees in the amount of P6,987,078.75 (P4,476,425.59 +
P2,510,653.16).
The amount of P17,073,224.84 must therefore be returned by Attys. Roxas and Pastor to the Zuzuarreguis.
They can take this out from the yield in the amount of P19,583,878.00 which they have appropriated for
themselves.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated 25 June 2001 and 06 February 2002, respectively, are AFFIRMED but with the
MODIFICATION that Attys. Romeo G. Roxas and Santiago N. Pastor are hereby ordered to return to the
Zuzuarreguis the amount of P17,073,224.84. No costs.

------

THIRD DIVISION
VALENTIN

C.

MIRANDA,

A.

6281
Complainant,

Pres

PE
- versus-

ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO,

Respondent.

J.,
Chair
ABA
PER

MEN
and
PER
BERN
JJ.

Prom
:

Sept
26, 20
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:

This is a disbarment case against Atty. Macario D.

Carpio filed by Valentin C. Miranda.[1]
The facts, as culled from the records, are as
follows:
Complainant Valentin C. Miranda is one of the
owners of a parcel of land consisting of 1,890 square
meters located at Barangay Lupang Uno, Las Pias,
Metro Manila. In 1994, complainant initiated Land
Registration Commission (LRC) Case No. M-226 for
the registration of the aforesaid property. The case was
filed before the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias City,
Branch 275. During the course of the proceedings,
complainant engaged the services of respondent Atty.
Carpio as counsel in the said case when his original
counsel, Atty. Samuel Marquez, figured in a vehicular
accident.
In complainant's Affidavit,[2] complainant and
respondent agreed that complainant was to pay
respondent Twenty Thousand Pesos (PhP20,000.00) as
acceptance fee and Two Thousand Pesos (PhP2,000.00)
as appearance fee. Complainant paid respondent the
amounts due him, as evidenced by receipts duly signed
by the latter. During the last hearing of the case,
respondent demanded the additional amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (PhP10,000.00) for the preparation of a
memorandum, which he said would further strengthen

complainant's position in the case, plus twenty percent

(20%) of the total area of the subject property as
additional fees for his services.
Complainant did not accede to respondent's
demand for it was contrary to their agreement.
Moreover, complainant co-owned the subject property
with his siblings, and he could not have agreed to the
amount being demanded by respondent without the
knowledge and approval of his co-heirs. As a result of
complainant's refusal to satisfy respondent's demands,
the latter became furious and their relationship became
sore.
On January 12, 1998, a Decision was rendered in
LRC Case No. M-226, granting the petition for
registration, which Decision was declared final and
executory in an Order dated June 5, 1998. On March
24, 2000, the Land Registration Authority (LRA) sent
complainant a copy of the letter addressed to the
Register of Deeds (RD) of Las Pias City, which
transmitted the decree of registration and the original
and owner's duplicate of the title of the property.
On April 3, 2000, complainant went to the RD to
get the owner's duplicate of the Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) bearing No. 0-94. He was surprised to
discover that the same had already been claimed by and
released to respondent on March 29, 2000. On May 4,
2000, complainant talked to respondent on the phone

and asked him to turn over the owner's duplicate of the

OCT, which he had claimed without complainant's
knowledge, consent and authority. Respondent insisted
that complainant first pay him the PhP10,000.00 and the
20% share in the property equivalent to 378 square
meters, in exchange for which, respondent would
deliver the owner's duplicate of the OCT. Once again,
complainant refused the demand, for not having been
agreed upon.
In a letter[3] dated May 24, 2000, complainant
reiterated his demand for the return of the owner's
duplicate of the OCT. On June 11, 2000, complainant
made the same demand on respondent over the
telephone. Respondent reiterated his previous demand
and angrily told complainant to comply, and threatened
to have the OCT cancelled if the latter refused to pay
him.
On June 26, 2000, complainant learned that on
April 6, 2000, respondent registered an adverse claim on
the subject OCT wherein he claimed that the agreement
on the payment of his legal services was 20% of the
property and/or actual market value. To date,
respondent has not returned the owner's duplicate of
OCT No. 0-94 to complainant and his co-heirs despite
repeated demands to effect the same.
In seeking the disbarment or the imposition of the

appropriate penalty upon respondent, complainant

invokes the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Canon 20. A lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees.
Canon 16. A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys
and properties of
his client that may come
into his possession.
Canon 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
properties of his
client when due or upon
demand. x x x

In defense of his actions, respondent relied on his

alleged retaining lien over the owner's duplicate of OCT
No. 0-94. Respondent admitted that he did not turn over
to complainant the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94
because of complainant's refusal, notwithstanding
repeated demands, to complete payment of his agreed
professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area of
the property covered by the title, i.e., 378 square meters
out of 1,890 square meters, or its equivalent market
value at the rate of PhP7,000.00 per square meter, thus,
yielding a sum of PhP2,646,000.00 for the entire 378square-meter portion and that he was ready and willing
to turn over the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94,
should complainant pay him completely the aforesaid
professional fee.
Respondent admitted the receipt of the amount of

PhP32,000.00, however, he alleged that the amount

earlier paid to him will be deducted from the 20% of the
current value of the subject lot. He alleged that the
agreement was not reduced into writing, because the
parties believed each other based on their mutual trust.
He denied that he demanded the payment of
PhP10,000.00 for the preparation of a memorandum,
since he considered the same unnecessary.
In addition to the alleged agreement between him
and complainant for the payment of the 20%
professional fees, respondent invoked the principle of
quantum meruit to justify the amount being demanded
by him.
In its Report and Recommendation[4] dated June
9, 2005, the Integrated Bar of the PhilippinesCommission
on
Bar
Discipline
(IBP-CBD)
recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months for
unjustly withholding from complainant the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 in the exercise of his socalled attorney's lien. In Resolution No. XVII-2005173,[5] dated December 17, 2005, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of
the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting
the report and recommendation of the IBP-CBD.

Pending the resolution of his motion for reconsideration,

respondent filed a petition for review[6] with this Court.
The Court, in a Resolution[7] dated August 16, 2006,
directed that the case be remanded to the IBP for proper
disposition, pursuant to this Court's resolution in Noriel
J. Ramientas v. Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyala.[8]
In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-672,
dated December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors
affirmed Resolution No. XVII-2005-173, dated
December 17, 2005, with modification that respondent
is ordered to return the complainant's owner's duplicate
of OCT No. 0-94 within fifteen days from receipt of
notice. Hence, the present petition.
The Court sustains the resolution of the IBP Board
of Governors, which affirmed with modification the
findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD.
Respondent's claim for his unpaid professional fees that
would legally give him the right to retain the property of
his client until he receives what is allegedly due him has
been paid has no basis and, thus, is invalid.
Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court
specifically provides:
Section 37. Attorneys liens. An attorney
shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and
papers of his client, which have lawfully come into

his possession and may retain the same until his

lawful fees and disbursements have been paid, and
may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He
shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all
judgments for the payment of money, and
executions issued in pursuance of such judgments,
which he has secured in a litigation of his client,
from and after the time when he shall have caused a
statement of his claim of such lien to be entered
upon the records of the court rendering such
judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have
caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his
client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the
same right and power over such judgments and
executions as his client would have to enforce his
lien and secure the payment of his just fees and
disbursements.

An attorney's retaining lien is fully recognized if

the presence of the following elements concur: (1)
lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful possession of the
client's funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied
claim for attorney's fees.[9] Further, the attorney's
retaining lien is a general lien for the balance of the
account between the attorney and his client, and applies
to the documents and funds of the client which may
come into the attorney's possession in the course of his
employment.[10]
In the present case, complainant claims that there
is no such agreement for the payment of professional fee

consisting of 20% of the total area of the subject

property and submits that their agreement was only for
the payment of the acceptance fee and the appearance
fees.
As correctly found by the IBP-CBD, there was no
proof of any agreement between the complainant and
the respondent that the latter is entitled to an additional
professional fee consisting of 20% of the total area
covered by OCT No. 0-94. The agreement between the
parties only shows that respondent will be paid the
acceptance fee and the appearance fees, which the
respondent has duly received. Clearly, there is no
unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees that would entitle
respondent to retain his client's property. Hence,
respondent could not validly withhold the title of his
client absence a clear and justifiable claim.
Respondent's unjustified act of holding on to
complainant's title with the obvious aim of forcing
complainant to agree to the amount of attorney's fees
sought is an alarming abuse by respondent of the
exercise of an attorney's retaining lien, which by no
means is an absolute right, and cannot at all justify
inordinate delay in the delivery of money and property
to his client when due or upon demand.[11]
Atty. Carpio failed to live up to his duties as a
lawyer by unlawfully withholding and failing to deliver

the title of the complainant, despite repeated demands,

in the guise of an alleged entitlement to additional
professional fees. He has breached Rule 1.01 of Canon
1 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which read:
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE
CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW
AND LEGAL PROCESS.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN
TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF
HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS
POSSESSION.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and
property of his client when due or upon demand.
However, he shall have a lien over the funds and
may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to
satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall
also have a lien to the same extent on all judgments
and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.

Further, in collecting from complainant exorbitant

fees, respondent violated Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which mandates that a
lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees. It is
highly improper for a lawyer to impose additional

professional fees upon his client which were never

mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the
engagement of his services. At the outset, respondent
should have informed the complainant of all the fees or
possible fees that he would charge before handling the
case and not towards the near conclusion of the case.
This is essential in order for the complainant to
determine if he has the financial capacity to pay
respondent before engaging his services.
Respondent's further submission that he is entitled
to the payment of additional professional fees on the
basis of the principle of quantum meruit has no merit.
"Quantum meruit, meaning `as much as he deserved' is
used as a basis for determining the lawyer's professional
fees in the absence of a contract but recoverable by him
from his client."[12] The principle of quantum meruit
applies if a lawyer is employed without a price agreed
upon for his services. In such a case, he would be
entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as
much as he has earned.[13] In the present case, the
parties had already entered into an agreement as to the
attorney's fees of the respondent, and thus, the principle
of quantum meruit does not fully find application
because the respondent is already compensated by such
agreement.
The Court notes that respondent did not inform
complainant that he will be the one to secure the owner's

duplicate of the OCT from the RD and failed to

immediately inform complainant that the title was
already in his possession. Complainant, on April 3,
2000, went to the RD of Las Pias City to get the
owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94, only to be surprised
that the said title had already been claimed by, and
released to, respondent on March 29, 2000. A lawyer
must conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his
clients, with integrity in a manner that is beyond
reproach. His relationship with his clients should be
characterized by the highest degree of good faith and
fairness.[14] By keeping secret with the client his
acquisition of the title, respondent was not fair in his
dealing with his client. Respondent could have easily
informed the complainant immediately of his receipt of
the owner's duplicate of the OCT on March 29, 2000, in
order to save his client the time and effort in going to
the RD to get the title.
Respondent's inexcusable act of withholding the
property belonging to his client and imposing
unwarranted fees in exchange for the release of said title
deserve the imposition of disciplinary sanction. Hence,
the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors, adopting and
approving with modification the report and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
(6) months and that respondent be ordered to return the
complainant's owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 is

hereby affirmed. However, the fifteen-day period from

notice given to respondent within which to return the
title should be modified and, instead, respondent should
return the same immediately upon receipt of the Court's
decision.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Macario D. Carpio is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this Decision.
He is ordered to RETURN to the complainant the
owner's duplicate of OCT No. 0-94 immediately upon
receipt of this decision. He is WARNED that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with
more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the
Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the
personal record of Atty. Macario D. Carpio as a member
of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
------