Professional Documents
Culture Documents
61594
vs.
HON. BLAS F. OPLE, in his capacity as Minister of
Labor; HON. VICENTE LEOGARDO, JR., in his capacity
as Deputy Minister; ETHELYNNE B. FARRALES and
MARIA MOONYEEN MAMASIG, Respondents.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De los
Angeles for petitioner.
Ledesma,
Saludo
respondents.
&
Associates
for
private
FELICIANO, J.:
On
2
December
1978,
petitioner
Pakistan
International Airlines Corporation ("PIA"), a foreign
corporation licensed to do business in the Philippines,
executed in Manila two (2) separate contracts of
employment, one with private respondent Ethelynne
B. Farrales and the other with private respondent Ma.
M.C. Mamasig. 1 The contracts, which became
effective on 9 January 1979, provided in pertinent
portion as follows:
5.
xxx
xxx
6.
TERMINATION
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xxx
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xxx
10.
APPLICABLE LAW:
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2.
The second contention of petitioner PIA is
that, even if the Regional Director had jurisdiction,
still his order was null and void because it had been
issued in violation of petitioner's right to procedural
due process . 6 This claim, however, cannot be given
serious consideration. Petitioner was ordered by the
Regional Director to submit not only its position
paper but also such evidence in its favor as it might
have. Petitioner opted to rely solely upon its position
paper; we must assume it had no evidence to sustain
its assertions. Thus, even if no formal or oral hearing
was conducted, petitioner had ample opportunity to
explain its side. Moreover, petitioner PIA was able to
appeal his case to the Ministry of Labor and
Employment. 7
There is another reason why petitioner's claim of
denial of due process must be rejected. At the time
the complaint was filed by private respondents on 21
September 1980 and at the time the Regional
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DECISION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Whether or not the judicial interpretation of the lease
contract amounts to the courts contracting for the
parties is the issue in this petition for review of the
decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
which upheld the Court of First Instance of Manila
dismissing the petitioners complaint for recovery of
the balance of unpaid rentals due for one year under
the lease contract in question.
The petitioner leases out office spaces in her building
at #494 Soldado Street, Ermita, Manila. The lessee in
the disputed lease contract was designated as Sto.
Nio Travel and Tour Agency, a sole proprietorship
duly organized and existing under the laws of the
Philippines, represented by private respondent Ely
Fuderanan, its President and General Manager.
On May 15, 1980, the petitioner received the sum of
P8,000.00 as "reservation deposit" for Apartment No.
116 at Luz J. Henson Building for which she issued a
receipt to private respondent Fuderanan as follows:
"This reservation is good up to May 15, 1980, at 4:00
P.M.; failure to sign the Lease Contract, pay the
required Three (3) months advance rental and Three
(3) months guarantee deposits, the reservation is
forfeited, monthly rental is P2,000.00 - net of W. H.
Tax. Lease Contract is for one year."
On the same day, the petitioner and private
respondent Fuderanan entered into a lease contract
which, in part, provides:
"1.
That this contract shall have a duration of
one year, commencing from May 15, 1980; Provided
that, at the expiration hereof, the lease shall be
deemed renewed on a month to month basis under
the same terms and conditions as this contract,
unless either party, at least one month before this
contract expires, informs the other in writing of his
desire not to be bound anymore after said period;
Provided Further, that should LESSEE terminate this
contract before its termination or be cancelled for
any of the causes enumerated, the LESSEE shall for
his breach of this contract, have his guarantee
deposit automatically forfeited and still be liable to
LESSOR as penalty and liquidated damages for the
rentals of the unexpired portion of this lease,
irrespective of whether or not LESSOR subsequently
finds another person to lease the vacated premises
for the duration of said unexpired portion;
"2.
That LESSEE agrees to pay rentals for the
premises leased as above-described at the rate of
TWO THOUSAND PESOS Net of Withholding Tax
I
The Intermediate Appellate Court erred when its
decision `made a new contract for the parties.
II
The Intermediate Appellate Court erred in rendering
a decision not sanctioned by equity.
The Intermediate Appellate Court dismissed the
petitioners complaint thereby giving the private
respondents the right to a refund of the sum they
advanced as rental fees when they executed the
contract of lease. The court did not find the private
respondents in breach of their obligations under said
contract. In the words of the appellate court:
"The reason for the non-compliance of the obligation
to occupy the leased premises came from a third
party."
By "third party," it meant the Chief of the Licensing
and Inspection Division of the Bureau of Tourism
Services, Ministry of Tourism.
We are constrained under the circumstances of this
case to uphold the time-honored principle that
contracts are respected as the law between the
contracting parties (Castro v. Court of Appeals, 99
SCRA 722; Escano v. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA
197). In the case at bar, the lease contract executed
by the petitioner and the private respondents
remains as the law between them. In litigations
involving the adjudication of rights and obligations
between the lessor and the lessee, the lease contract
shall govern (Chua Peng Hian v. Court of Appeals,
133 SCRA 572).
The disputed lease contract is plain and unequivocal
in its terms. The stipulations are expressed in clear
and explicit language that leaves no doubt as to the
intention of the contracting parties. Nowhere is it
provided in the contract that the fulfillment of the
terms and conditions of the lease depend upon an
act of a third party, i.e., the final action to be taken
by the Chief of the Licensing and Inspection Division
of the Bureau of Tourism. Neither is there any
indication from the evidence presented that would
justify either of the contracting parties to impugn the
lease contract they executed.
The facts of the case constrain us to apply the rule
that contracts are to be interpreted according to their
literal meaning when the terms and conditions are
clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the
contracting parties (Gonzales v. Court of Appeals,
124 SCRA 630; Matienzo v. Servidad, 107 SCRA 276;
see also Article 1370 of the Civil Code of the
DECISION
MAPA, J. :
This is an action to recover a debt due upon a
contract executed July 27, 1903, whereby plaintiff
transferred to the defendant the abaca and coprax
business theretofore carried on by him at various
places in the Island of Catanduanes, with all the
property and right pertaining to the said business, or
the sum of 134,636 pesos and 12 cents, payable in
Mexican currency or its equivalent in local currency.
Defendant paid at the time of the execution of the
contract, on account of the purchase price, the sum
of P33,659 pesos and 3 cents, promising to pay the
balance on three installments P33,659 pesos and 3
cents each, with interest at the rate of 5 per cent per
annum from the date of the contract. The first
installment became due July 27, 1904. It was for the
recovery of this first installment that their action was
brought in the Court of First Instance of the City of
Manila.
SYLLABUS
1. SHIPPING; TRANSPORTATION OF PERSONS AND
BAGGAGE FROM HONGKONG TO MANILA; LAW OF
CONTRACT. A contract made in Hongkong for the
transportation of persons and baggage from
Hongkong to Manila will be construed according to
the law of the Colony of Hongkong and will be
enforced in the Philippine Islands in accordance with
that law, provided it is not in violation of a law or the
public policy of the Philippine Islands.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; LIMITATION OF LIABILITY OF CARRIER.
A contract printed in legible type upon the back of
a ticket purchased in Hongkong for the transportation
of purchaser and his baggage to Manila, limiting the
liability of the carrying company with respect to
purchasers baggage, is, according to the law of that
colony, a valid and binding contract even though the
attention of the purchaser is not specially drawn
thereto at the time of purchase, and will be so
regarded here provided it does not violate a law or
the public policy of the Philippine Islands.
3. ID., ID.; ID., ID. A contract printed in legible type
upon the back of a ticket purchased in Hongkong for
the transportation of purchaser and baggage to
Manila, providing that "the company will not hold
itself responsible for any loss, or damage to or
detention, or overcarriage of luggage, under any
circumstances whatsoever unless it has been booked
and paid for as freight" is valid and binding in the
Colony of Hongkong upon the purchaser of the ticket.
Such a stipulation, however, does not, according to
the law of that colony, relieve the carrying company
from liability for negligence of its servants by which
the baggage of the passenger is lost or damaged.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. Such a limitation, according to
the law of the Colony of Hongkong, is strictly
construed against the carrier and will not, by
construction or interpretation, be held to include an
exemption from damages by negligence.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ACTION FOR DAMAGES.
Therefore, when the baggage of a passenger who
has purchased a ticket with the limitation as to
liability above set forth, is injured or destroyed in
Manila by the negligence of the carriers servants,
the passenger is entitled, under the lex loci
contractus, to recover for the damages caused
thereby in spite of the limitations upon the carriers
liability as above set forth.
6. ID.; NEGLIGENCE. Where it appears undisputed
that the usual and customary method of unloading
baggage from a ship is by a rope or wire net attached
to a rope running over the end of a crane, which net
completely surrounds and incloses the baggage and
thereby prevents it from escaping, or by means of a
the wharf, with the result that the trunks were forced
from the sling and fell into the water. It is customary
to use a rope sling or a cargo chute running from the
deck to the pier. The slings vary in size but are
sufficiently large to contain a large number of trunks
and are formed of ropes running in opposite
directions forming a rope net. If these trunks had
been in a rope sling they would not have fallen in the
water."
Mr. Chapman testified: "When the steamship St.
Albans came alongside the pier I took all her lines
and berthed her in a position for the gangway and
hatchways to work. Immediately after the ship was
made fast I requested to be informed from the chief
officer where the baggage would be discharged from;
he told me hatch No. 4; I went to No. l hatch and
asked the second officer who was there in charge of
the hatch where the baggage was to be discharged
from; he said, Right here, indicating No. 4 hatch. I
then told him I would have a chute there for him right
away and he answered: All right. I immediately
went into the pier and ordered one of the foremen
and the men to take a chute to No. 4 hatch. I was
following with the foreman and behind the chute
when Mr. Stanley informed me that the baggage was
over the side. The chute at this time was just through
the door about 75 feet from the hatch. On arriving
there I saw that the sling and these trunks were all
lying in the water. The stevedore had a lot of his men
over the side picking up the trunks with the men
from the pier helping."
It is the contention of the defendant company that it
is exempt from liability by virtue of the contract
appearing on the tickets already referred to and
quoted; as that contract was valid in the place where
made, namely, the Colony of Hongkong, and that
that being the case, it will be enforced according to
its terms in the Philippine Islands. It is also urged that
it was not necessary specifically to direct the
attention of the passengers to the stipulations on the
back of the ticket introduced in evidence.
The evidence relative to the law governing these
contracts in Hongkong consists of the testimony of a
Hongkong barrister, learned in the law of England
and her colonies, and is to the effect that, under the
law in force at the place where the contract was
made, the contract was valid and enforceable, and
that it is not necessary that the attention of persons
purchasing tickets from common carriers be drawn
specially to the terms thereof when printed upon a
ticket which on its face shows that it is issued subject
to such conditions. The barrister also testified that
under the law of England and her colonies everything
was done which was necessary to make the terms
printed on the back of the tickets a part of the
contract between the parties.
xxx
xxx 9
Sec. 4(2).
Neither the carrier nor the ship
shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or
resulting from
(b)
Fire, unless caused by the actual fault or
privity of the carrier.
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xxx 22
Separate Opinions
YAP, J., concurring and dissenting:
With respect to G.R. No. 71478, the majority opinion
holds that the 128 cartons of textile materials, and
not the two (2) containers, should be considered as
the shipping unit for the purpose of applying the
$500.00 limitation under the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act (COGSA).
The majority opinion followed and applied the
interpretation of the COGSA "package" limitation
adopted by the Second Circuit, United States Court of
Appeals, in Mitsui & Co., Ltd. vs. American Export
Lines, Inc., 636 F. 2d 807 (1981) and the
Smithgreyhound v. M/V Eurygenes, 666, F 2nd, 746.
Both cases adopted the rule that carrier-furnished
containers whose contents are fully disclosed are not
"packages" within the meaning of Section 4 (5) of
COGSA.
I cannot go along with the majority in applying the
Mitsui and Eurygenes decisions to the present case,
for the following reasons: (1) The facts in those cases
differ materially from those obtaining in the present
case; and (2) the rule laid down in those two cases is
by no means settled doctrine.
In Mitsui and Eurygenes, the containers were
supplied by the carrier or shipping company. In Mitsui
the Court held: "Certainly, if the individual crates or
cartons prepared by the shipper and containing his
goods can rightly be considered "packages" standing
by themselves, they do not suddenly lose that
character upon being stowed in a carrier's container.
I would liken these containers to detachable stowage
compartments of the ship." Cartons or crates placed
inside carrier-furnished containers are deemed
stowed in the vessel itself, and do not lose their
character as individual units simply by being placed
Special Provisions.
x
4.
Arbitration. Any dispute arising from the
making, performance or termination of this Charter
Party shall be settled in New York, Owner and
Charterer each appointing an arbitrator, who shall be
a merchant, broker or individual experienced in the
shipping business; the two thus chosen, if they
cannot agree, shall nominate a third arbitrator who
shall be an admiralty lawyer. Such arbitration shall be
conducted in conformity with the provisions and
procedure of the United States arbitration act, and a
judgment of the court shall be entered upon any
award made by said arbitrator. Nothing in this clause
shall be deemed to waive Owners right to lien on the
cargo for freight, deed of freight, or demurrage."
Clearly, the Bill of Lading incorporates by reference
the terms of the Charter Party. It is settled law that
the charter may be made part of the contract under
which the goods are carried by an appropriate
reference in the Bill of Lading (Wharton Poor, Charter
Parties and Ocean Bills of Lading (5th ed., p. 71). This
should include the provision on arbitration even
without a specific stipulation to that effect. The entire
contract must be read together and its clauses
interpreted in relation to one another and not by
parts. Moreover, in cases where a Bill of Lading has
been issued by a carrier covering goods shipped
aboard a vessel under a charter party, and the
charterer is also the holder of the bill of lading, "the
bill of lading operates as the receipt for the goods,
and as document of title passing the property of the
goods, but not as varying the contract between the
charterer and the shipowner" (In re Marine Sulphur
Queen, 460 F 2d 89, 103 [2d Cir. 1972]; Ministry of
Commerce v. Marine Tankers Corp. 194 F. Supp 161,
163 [S.D.N.Y. 1960]; Greenstone Shipping Co., S.A. v.
Transworld Oil, Ltd., 588 F Supp [D.E.I. 1984]). The
Bill of Lading becomes, therefore, only a receipt and
not the contract of carriage in a charter of the entire
vessel, for the contract is the Charter Party (Shell Oil
Co. v. M/T Gilda, 790 F 2d 1209, 1212 [5th Cir. 1986];
Home Insurance Co. v. American Steamship
Agencies, Inc., G.R. No. L-25599, 4 April 1968, 23
SCRA 24), and is the law between the parties who are
bound by its terms and condition provided that these
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public
order and public policy (Article 1306, Civil Code).
As the respondent Appellate Court found, the
INSURER "cannot feign ignorance of the arbitration
clause since it was already charged with notice of the
existence of the charter party due to an appropriate
Arbitration
The sales contract in question states in part:
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hereof leave a very little room for doubt that the said
causes of action are embraced within the phrase
"any and all questions, disputes or differences
between the parties hereto relative to the
construction of the building," which must be
determined by arbitration of two persons and such
determination by the arbitrators shall be "final,
conclusive and binding upon both parties" unless
they go to court, in which the case the determination
by arbitration is a condition precedent "for taking any
court action."
xxx
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xxx
July 7, 1966
x xx
x xx
or
other
natural
of
competent
public
Esguerra
and
Muoz
Footnotes
1 See 51 O.G. 4933 et seq. for text of Presidential
Proclamation of adherence dated September 23,
1955. See 51 O.G. 5084 et seq. for full text of the
Convention.
2 Article I (3) provides: "Transportation to be
performed by several successive air carriers shall be
deemed, for the purposes of this Convention, to be
one undivided transportation, if it has been regarded
by the parties as a single operation, whether it has
been agreed upon under the form of a single contract
or of a series of contracts, and it shall not lose its
international character merely because one contract
or a series of contracts is to be performed entirely
within the territory subject to the sovereignty,
suzerainty, mandate, or authority of the same High
Contracting Party."
3 Article 22 of the Convention limits the liability of an
air carrier in the transportation of passengers to
125,000 francs except where both carrier and
passenger "agree to a higher limit of liability."
vs.
JOSE K. RAPADAS and THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
Froilan P. Pobre for private respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review assailing the decision of
the respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed in
toto the trial court decision on the liability of
petitioner Pan American World Airways for damages
due to private respondent. The trial court ruled that
the petitioner can not avail of a limitation of liabilities
for lost baggages of a passenger. The dispositive
portion of the trial court decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to
pay plaintiff by way of actual damages the equivalent
peso value of the amount of $5,228.90 and 100
paengs, nominal damages in the amount of
P20,000.00 and attorney's fees of P5,000.00, and the
costs of the suit. Defendant's counterclaim is
dismissed. (Rollo, p. 13)
On January 16, 1975, private respondent Jose K.
Rapadas held Passenger Ticket and Baggage Claim
Check No. 026-394830084-5 for petitioner's Flight
No. 841 with the route from Guam to Manila. While
standing in line to board the flight at the Guam
airport, Rapadas was ordered by petitioner's
handcarry control agent to check-in his Samsonite
attache case. Rapadas protested pointing to the fact
that other co-passengers were permitted to
handcarry bulkier baggages. He stepped out of the
line only to go back again at the end of it to try if he
can get through without having to register his
attache case. However, the same man in charge of
handcarry control did not fail to notice him and
ordered him again to register his baggage. For fear
that he would miss the plane if he insisted and
argued on personally taking the valise with him, he
acceded to checking it in. He then gave his attache
case to his brother who happened to be around and
who checked it in for him, but without declaring its
contents or the value of its contents. He was given a
Baggage Claim Tag No. P-749-713. (Exhibit "B" for
the plaintiff-respondent)
Upon arriving in Manila on the same date, January
16, 1975, Rapadas claimed and was given all his
checked-in baggages except the attache case. Since
Rapadas felt ill on his arrival, he sent his son, Jorge
Rapadas to request for the search of the missing
luggage. The petitioner exerted efforts to locate the
luggage through the Pan American World AirwaysManila International Airport (PAN AM-MIA) Baggage
Service.
and
the
not
that
affirmative
defenses,
petitioner
claim
of
defendant
is
hereby
memoranda
in
contentions. 9
support
of
their
respective
Branch Supervisor
Cebu
(Exhibit G, Folder of Exhibits) 1
On September 13, 1967, petitioner filed a Complaint
against PAL for damages for breach of contract of
transportation with the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch V, docketed as Civil Case No. R-10188,
which PAL traversed. After due trial, the lower Court
found PAL to have acted in bad faith and with malice
and declared petitioner entitled to moral damages in
the sum of P80,000.00, exemplary damages of
P30,000.00, attorney's fees of P5,000.00, and costs.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals
petitioner in so far as he was awarded only the sum
of P80,000.00 as moral damages; and defendant
because of the unfavorable judgment rendered
against it.
On August 22, 1974, the Court of Appeals,* finding
that PAL was guilty only of simple negligence,
reversed the judgment of the trial Court granting
petitioner moral and exemplary damages, but
ordered PAL to pay plaintiff the sum of P100.00, the
baggage liability assumed by it under the condition
of carriage printed at the back of the ticket.
Hence, this Petition for Review by Certiorari, filed on
May 2, 1975, with petitioner making the following
Assignments of Error:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
HOLDING RESPONDENT PAL GUILTY ONLY OF SIMPLE
NEGLIGENCE AND NOT BAD FAITH IN THE BREACH OF
ITS
CONTRACT
OF
TRANSPORTATION
WITH
PETITIONER.
II.
THE
HONORABLE
COURT
OF
APPEALS
MISCONSTRUED THE EVIDENCE AND THE LAW WHEN
IT REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE LOWER COURT
Ortega
&
Castillo
for
private
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the
Court of Appeals, 1 in CA-G.R. CV No. 09514,
P 46,400.00
2. Hangang Glory (Exh. H) July 10 July 13 (4 days)
1st 4 days:
4 days x P4 x 40 ft. x 2 ctnrs. P 1,280.00
TOTAL P 20,160.00
(Exh. L-4)
(Exh. H-2)
B. Container demurrage paid on July 19, 1979
1. Far East Friendship
a. on 2 containers released July 16
3 days x P8 x 40 ft. x 2 ctnrs. P 1,920.00
(Exh. L-2)
b. on 1 container released July 17
4 days x P8 x 40 ft. x 7 cntrs. P 1,280.00
(Exh. L-3)
c. remaining 7 containers as of July 19
The RTC held that the bill of lading was the contract
between the parties and, therefore, petitioner was
liable for demurrage charges. It rejected petitioner's
claim of force majeure. It held:
Vol. IV, 1962 Ed., p. 462, citing Mr. Justice JBL Reyes,
Lawyer's Journal, Jan. 31, 1951, p. 49).
Second. With respect to the period of petitioner's
liability, private respondent's position is that the
"free time" expired on June 26, 1979 and demurrage
began to toll on June 27, 1979, with respect to 10
containers which were unloaded from the SS Far East
Friendship, while with respect to the 2 containers
which were unloaded from the SSHangang Glory, the
free time expired on July 9, 1979 and demurrage
began to run on July 10, 1979.
This contention is without merit. Petitioner cannot be
held liable for demurrage starting June 27, 1979 on
the 10 containers which arrived on the SS Far East
Friendship because the delay in obtaining release of
the goods was not due to its fault. The evidence
shows that because the manifest issued by the
respondent K-Line, through the Smith, Bell & Co.,
stated only 10 containers, whereas the bill of lading
also issued by the K-Line showed there were 12
containers, the Bureau of Customs refused to give an
entry permit to petitioner. For this reason, petitioner's
broker, the IBC, had to see the respondent's agent
(Smith, Bell & Co.) on June 22, 1979 but the latter did
not immediately do something to correct the
manifest. Smith, Bell & Co. was asked to "amend" the
manifest, but it refused to do so on the ground that
this would violate the law. It was only on June 29,
1979 that it thought of adding instead a footnote to
indicate that two other container vans to account
for a total of 12 container vans consigned to
petitioner had been loaded on the other vessel
SS Hangang Glory.
It is not true that the necessary correction was made
on June 22, 1979, the same day the manifest was
presented to Smith, Bell & Co. There is nothing in the
testimonies of witnesses of either party to support
the appellate court's finding that the footnote,
explaining the apparent discrepancy between the bill
of lading and the manifest, was added on June 22,
1979 but that petitioner's representative did not
return to pick up the manifesst until June 29, 1979. To
the contrary, it is more probable to believe the
petitioner's claim that the manifest was corrected
only on June 29, 1979 (by which time the "free time"
had already expired), because Smith, Bell & Co. did
not immediately know what to do as it insisted it
could not amend the manifest and only thought of
adding a footnote on June 29, 1979 upon the
suggestion of the IBC.
Now June 29, 1979 was a Friday. Again it is probable
the correct manifest was presented to the Bureau of
Customs only on Monday, July 2, 1979 and, therefore,
it was only on July 3 that it was approved. It was,
therefore, only from this date (July 3, 1979) that
OVERPAYMENT (P 39,360)
As shown above there is an overpayment of
P39,360.00 which should be refunded to petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is SET
ASIDE and another one is RENDERED, ORDERING the
private respondents to pay to petitioner the sum of
P39,360.00 by way of refund, with legal interest.
SO ORDERED.
are
Deed Restrictions: 2
a) The total height of the building to be constructed
on the lot shall not be more than forty-two (42)
meters, nor shall it have a total gross floor area of
more than five (5) times the lot area; and
b) The sewage disposal must be by means of
connection into the sewerage system servicing the
area.
Special Conditions: 3
vs.
RAY
BURTON
respondent.
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
MARTINEZ, J.:
Petitioner Ayala Corporation (AYALA) is the owner of
the Ayala estate located in Makati City. The said
estate was originally a raw land which was
subdivided for sale into different lots devoted for
residential, commercial and industrial purposes. The
development of the estate consisted of road and
building construction and installation of a central
sewerage treatment plant and drainage system
which services the whole Ayala Commercial Area.
On March 20, 1984, Karamfil Import-Export Company
Ltd. (KARAMFIL) bought from AYALA a piece of land
identified as Lot 26, Block 2 consisting of 1,188
square meters, located at what is now known as H.V.
de la Costa Street, Salcedo Village, Makati City. The
said land, which is now the subject of this case, is
more particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land (Lot 26, Block 2, of the subdivision
plan [LRC] Psd-6086, being a portion of Block D,
described as plan [LRC] Psd-5812 LRC [GLRO] Rec.
No. 2029) situated in the Municipality of Makati,
Province of Rizal, Is. of Luzon. Bounded on the NE.,
points 2 to 3 by Lot 31, Block 2 (Creek 6.00 m. wide)
of the subdivision plan, on the SE., points 3 to 4 by
Lot 27, Block 2 of the Subdivision plan; on the SW,
points 4 to 5, by proposed Road, 17.00 m. wide
(Block C[LRC] Psd-5812); points 5 to 1 by Street Lot 2
(17.00 m. wide) of the subdivision plan. On the NW,
points 1 to 2 by Lot 25, Block 2 of the subdivision
plan. . . . beginning, containing an area of ONE
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY EIGHT (1,188)
SQUARE METERS.
xxx xxxxxx. 57
However, the record reveals that construction of
Trafalgar Plaza began in 1990, and a certificate of
completion thereof was issued by the Makati City
Engineer's Office per ocular inspection on November
7, 1996. 58 Apparently Trafalgar Plaza has been fully
built, and we assume, is now fully tenanted. The
alternative prayers of petitioner under the CRDRs,
i.e., the demolition of excessively built space or to
permanently restrict the use thereof, are no longer
feasible.
Thus, we perforce instead rule that RBDC may only
be
held
alternatively
liable
for
substitute
performance of its obligations the payment of
damages. In this regard, we note that the CRDRs
impose development charges on constructions which
exceed the estimated Gross Limits permitted under
the original Deed Restrictions but which are within
the limits of the CRDRs.
In this regard, we quote hereunder pertinent portions
of The Revised Deed Restrictions, to wit:
3. DEVELOPMENT CHARGE
For any building construction within the Gross Floor
Area limits defined under Paragraphs C-2.1 to C-2.4
above, but which will result in a Gross Floor Area
exceeding certain standards defined in Paragraphs C3.1-C below, the OWNER shall pay MACEA, prior to
the start of construction of any new building or any
expansion of an existing building, a DEVELOPMENT
CHARGE as a contribution to a trust fund to be
administered by MACEA. This trust fund shall be used
to improve facilities and utilities in the Makati Central
Business District.
3.1 The amount of the development charge that shall
be due from the OWNER shall be computed as
follows:
DEVELOPMENT CHARGE = A x (B - C - D)
where:
A is equal to the Area Assessment which shall be
set at Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) until December
31, 1990. Each January 1st thereafter, such amount
shall increase by ten percent (10%) over the Area
Assessment charged in the immediately preceding
year; provided that, beginning 1995 and at the end
of every successive five-year period thereafter, the
increase in the Area Assessment shall be reviewed
and adjusted by the VENDOR to correspond to the
accumulated increase in the construction cost index
during the immediately preceding five years as