Professional Documents
Culture Documents
VI
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
by the GSIS Act of 1997, sec. 39. The subject real property taxes for the years 19921994 were assessed against GSIS while the LGC provisions prevailed and thus may be
collected by the City of Davao.
Datu Michael Abas Kida v. Senate of the Philippines, et al., G.R. No. 196271, October
18, 2011
ISSUE: Whether or not the GSIS tax exemptions can be deemed as withdrawn by the
Local Government Code (LGC).
Held: No. In the first place, neither RA No. 9333 nor RA No. 10153 amends RA No. 9054.
As an examination of these laws will show, RA No. 9054 only provides for the schedule of
the first ARMM elections and does not fix the date of the regular elections. A need therefore
existed for the Congress to fix the date of the subsequent ARMM regular elections, which it
did by enacting RA No. 9333 and thereafter, RA No. 10153. Obviously, these subsequent
laws RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 cannot be considered amendments to RA No.
9054 as they did not change or revise any provision in the latter law; they merely filled in a
gap in RA No. 9054 or supplemented the law by providing the date of the subsequent
regular elections.
HELD:Reading together sec.133, 232, and 234 of the LGC, as a general rule: the taxing
powers of LGUs cannot extend to the levy of taxes, fees, and charges of any kind on
the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, and LGUs.
However, under sec. 234, exemptions from payment of real property taxes
granted to natural or juridical persons, including GOCCs, except as provided in said
section, are withdrawn upon effectivity of LGC. GSIS being a GOCC, then it necessarily
follows that its exemption has been withdrawn.Regarding P.D. 1446 which laid down
requisites for repeal on the laws granting
exemption, Supreme Court found a fundamental law in Sec. 33, particularly the
amendatory second paragraph. Said paragraph effectively imposes restrictions on the
competency of the Congress to enact future legislation on the taxability of GSIS. This
places an undue restraint on the plenary power of the legislature to amend or repeal
laws. Only the Constitution may operate to preclude or place restrictions on the
amendment or repeal laws. These conditions imposed under P.D. 1146, if honored,
have the precise effect of limiting the powers of Congress.
Supreme Court held that they cannot render effective the amendatory second
paragraph of sec. 33, for by doing so, they would be giving sanction to a disingenuous
means employed through legislative power to bind subsequent legislators to a
subsequent mode of repeal. Thus, the two conditions under sec. 33 cannot bear
relevance whether the LGC removed the tax-exempt status of GSIS.
Furthermore, sec. 5 on the rules of interpretation of LGC states that any tax
exemption, incentive or relief granted by any LGU pursuant to the provision of this Code
shall be construed strictly against the person claiming it.
The GSIS tax-exempt, in sum, was withdrawn in 1992 by the LGC but restored
Another law, RA 9140, reset the elections to November 26 of the same year. RA 9333
further moved the elections to August 2005 and established that elections be made every
three years after. Following RA 9333, next elections should transpire on 2011 but upon
enactment of another law, RA 10153, it was moved to May 2013, to synchronize with the
countrys national and local elections.
Issue/s: WON RA 9333 and RA 10153 validly amended RA 9054 considering its
supermajority voting requirement
Even assuming that RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 did in fact amend RA No. 9054, the
supermajority (2/3) voting requirement required under Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054
has to be struck down for giving RA No. 9054 the character of an irrepealable law by
requiring more than what the Constitution demands. Section 16(2), Article VI of the
Constitution provides that a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business. In other words, as long as majority of the members of the House of
Representatives or the Senate are present, these bodies have the quorum needed to
conduct business and hold session. Within a quorum, a vote of majority is generally
sufficient to enact laws or approve acts.
In contrast, Section 1, Article XVII of RA No. 9054 requires a vote of no less than two-thirds
(2/3) of the Members of the House of Representatives and of the Senate, voting separately,
in order to effectively amend RA No. 9054. Clearly, this 2/3 voting requirement is higher
than what the Constitution requires for the passage of bills, and served to restrain the
plenary powers of Congress to amend, revise or repeal the laws it had passed. Thus, while
a supermajority is not a total ban against a repeal, it is a limitation in excess of what the
Constitution requires on the passage of bills and is unconstitutional because it is limiting the
plenary authority of the legislators.
League Of Cities V. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, November 18, 2008-11
During the 11th Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into component
cities were filed before the House of Representatives. However, Congress acted only on 33
bills. It did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th
Congress, R.A. No. 9009 became effective revising Section 450 of the Local Government
Code. It increased the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from P20
million annual income to P100 million locally-generated income. In the 13th Congress, 16 of
the 24 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Each
of the cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting the particular municipality
from the 100 million income requirement imposed by R.A. No. 9009. Are the cityhood laws
converting 16 municipalities into cities constitutional?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
November 18, 2008 Ruling
No. The SC (voting 6-5) ruled that the exemptions in the City Laws is unconstitutional
because sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution requires that such exemption must be written into
the LGC and not into any other laws. The Cityhood Laws violate sec. 6, Art. X of the
Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local
government units. The criteria, as prescribed in sec. 450 of the LGC, must be strictly
followed because such criteria prescribed by law, are material in determining the just share
of local government units (LGUs) in national taxes. (League of Cities of the Philippines v.
Comelec GR No. 176951, November 18, 2008)
March 31, 2009 Ruling
No. The SC denied the first Motion for Reconsideration. 7-5 vote.
April 28, 2009 Ruling
No. The SC En Banc, by a split vote (6-6), denied a second motion for reconsideration.
December 21, 2009 Ruling
Yes. The SC (voting 6-4) reversed its November 18, 2008 decision and declared as
constitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into
cities. It said that based on Congress deliberations and clear legislative intent was that the
then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of
PhP100 million that Senate Bill No. 2159 proposes; and RA 9009 would not have any
retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned. The conversion of a
municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as
such, it added. The Court held that the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen
municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction.
The Court stressed that respondent LGUs were qualified cityhood applicants before the
enactment of RA 9009. To impose on them the much higher income requirement after what
they have gone through would appear to be indeed unfair. Thus, the imperatives of fairness
dictate that they should be given a legal remedy by which they should be allowed to prove
that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under
the LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. (GR No. 176951, League of Cities of
the Philippines v. COMELEC; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the Philippines v.
COMELEC; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the Philippines v. COMELEC, December
21, 2009) NOTE: The November 18, 2008 ruling already became final and executory and
was recorded in the SCs Book of Entries of Judgments on May 21, 2009.)
August 24, 2010 Ruling
No. The SC (voting 7-6) granted the motions for reconsideration of the League of Cities of
the Philippines (LCP), et al. and reinstated its November 18, 2008 decision declaring
unconstitutional the Cityhood Laws or Republic Acts (RAs) converting 16 municipalities into
cities. Undeniably, the 6-6 vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18
November 2008, as well as the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying
reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a
tie-vote on the main decision where there is no prior decision, the Court said. In the latest
resolution, the Court reiterated its November 18, 2008 ruling that the Cityhood Laws violate
sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution which expressly provides that no cityshall be
createdexcept in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code. It
stressed that while all the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in
the Local Government Code, the assailed Cityhood Laws provided an exemption from the
increased income requirement for the creation of cities under sec. 450 of the LGC. The
unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an
exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution.Congress exceeded and
abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being
violative of the Constitution, the Court held.
The Court further held that limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the
requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the
same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16
respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the
Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would
still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. (GR No. 176951,
League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 177499, League of Cities of the
Philippines v. Comelec; GR No. 178056, League of Cities of the Philippines v. Comelec,
August 24, 2010)
February 15, 2011 Ruling
Yes, the laws are constitutional. The February 15, 2011 resolution is the fourth ruling since
the High Court first resolved the Cityhood case in 2008.
April 12, 2011Ruling
Yes! Its final. The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. We should not ever lose sight of the
fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills pending
during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the [Local
Government Code] LGC prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress
undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded.
Hence, this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and
unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of
Congress, the SC said.
The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local government units covered
by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which imposes a higher
income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities.
The Court reiterated that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was
well aware of the pendency of conversion bills of several municipalities, including those
covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001,
when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear legislative intent to exempt
the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, the
House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to
Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001
from the coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said
Joint Resolution. Even so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution
No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and forwarded the same for approval to the Senate, which
again failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion bills of respondents were individually filed
in the Lower House and fellesters.blogspot.com were all unanimously and favorably voted
upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously approved. The acts of
both Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the
Cityhood Laws are but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the
respondents, without exception, from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and,
by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by repeal but by way of the express exemptions
being embodied in the exemption
clauses.(http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/news/courtnews%20flash/2011/04/04141101.php)
The Court held that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local
sources under RA 9009 was arbitrary. While the Constitution mandates that the creation of
local government units must comply with the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be
justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to every amendment to the LGC
despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the original thrusts of the
LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the concomitant
national growth.
2. PRINCIPLE OF NON-DELEGABILITY OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
a. Permitted delegation/power of subordinate legislation
ABAKADA vs Executive
On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform Act.
Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining government
from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari and prohibition
questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6:
That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall, effective
January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%, after any of the following
conditions has been satisfied:
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);
or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds one
and one-half percent (1%)
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the VAT
rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such delegation is
not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They argue that VAT is a tax levied on the
sale or exchange of goods and services which cant be included within the purview of tariffs
under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties, tolls or tribute payable
upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on imported/exported goods.
They also said that the President has powers to cause, influence or create the conditions
provided by law to bring about the conditions precedent. Moreover, they allege that no
guiding standards are made by law as to how the Secretary of Finance will make the
recommendation.
Issue: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the
VAT rate, especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of
Finance, constitutes undue delegation of legislative power? NO
Held: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly,
or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which can never be
delegated is the authority to make a complete law- complete as to the time when it shall
take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable, and to determine the expediency of its
enactment. It is the nature of the power and not the liability of its use or the manner of its
exercise which determines the validity of its delegation.
The exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution
(b) delegation of emergency powers to President under Constitution
(c) delegation to the people at large
(d) delegation to local governments
(e) delegation to administrative bodies
For the delegation to be valid, it must be complete and it must fix a standard. A sufficient
standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its boundaries
and specifies the public agency to apply it.
In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power BUT a delegation of ascertainment of
facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increased rate under the law is
contingent. The legislature has made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1,
2006, contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the entire operation or nonoperation of the 12% rate upon factual matters outside of the control of the executive. No
discretion would be exercised by the President. Highlighting the absence of discretion is the
fact that the word SHALL is used in the common proviso. The use of the word SHALL
connotes a mandatory order. Its use in a statute denotes an imperative obligation and is
inconsistent with the idea of discretion.
Thus, it is the ministerial duty of the President to immediately impose the 12% rate upon the
existence of any of the conditions specified by Congress. This is a duty, which cannot be
evaded by the President. It is a clear directive to impose the 12% VAT rate when the
specified conditions are present.
Congress just granted the Secretary of Finance the authority to ascertain the existence of a
fact--- whether by December 31, 2005, the VAT collection as a percentage of GDP of the
previous year exceeds 2 4/5 % or the national government deficit as a percentage of GDP
of the previous year exceeds one and 1%. If either of these two instances has occurred,
the Secretary of Finance, by legislative mandate, must submit such information to the
President.
In making his recommendation to the President on the existence of either of the two
conditions, the Secretary of Finance is not acting as the alter ego of the President or even
her subordinate. He is acting as the agent of the legislative department, to determine and
declare the event upon which its expressed will is to take effect. The Secretary of Finance
becomes the means or tool by which legislative policy is determined and implemented,
considering that he possesses all the facilities to gather data and information and has a
much broader perspective to properly evaluate them. His function is to gather and collate
statistical data and other pertinent information and verify if any of the two conditions laid out
by Congress is present.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate power when it describes what
job must be done, who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex
economy that is frequently the only way in which the legislative process can go forward.
There is no undue delegation of legislative power but only of the discretion as to the
execution of a law. This is constitutionally permissible. Congress did not delegate the power
to tax but the mere implementation of the law.
KILOSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER vs. GARCIA
On June 26 1990, then Secretary of DOTC, Oscar Orbos, issued Memorandum Circular No.
90-395 to then LTFRB Chairman, Remedios A.S. Fernando allowing provincial bus
operators to charge passengers rates within a range of 15% above and 15% below the
LTFRB official rate for a period of one (1) year.
On December 5, 1990, private respondent Provincial Bus Operators Association of the
Philippines, Inc. (PBOAP) filed an application for fare rate increase. An across-the-board
increase of eight and a half centavos (P.0085) per kilometre for all types of provincial buses
with a minimum-maximum fare range of 15% over and below the proposed basic per
kilometre fare rate, with the said minimum-maximum fare range applying only to ordinary,
first class and premium class buses and a fifty-centavo (P0.50) per kilometre fare for aircon
buses were sought. Later on, PBOAP reduced its applied proposed fare to an across-theboard increase of six and a half (P0.065) centavos per kilometre for ordinary buses.
Although opposed, the LTRFB rendered a decision granting the fare rate increase.
A further delegation of such power would indeed constitute a negation of the duty in
violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. This would
leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who may increase fares every
hour, every day, every month or every year, whenever it pleases them or whenever they
deem it "necessary" to do so.
One veritable consequence of the deregulation of transport fares is a compounded fare. If
transport operators will be authorized to impose and collect an additional amount equivalent
to 20% over and above the authorized fare over a period of time, this will unduly prejudice a
commuter who will be made to pay a fare that has been computed in a manner similar to
those of compounded bank interest rates.
The present administrative procedure, to our mind, already mirrors an orderly and
satisfactory arrangement for all parties involved. To do away with such a procedure and
allow just one party, an interested party at that, to determine what the rate should be, will
undermine the right of the other parties to due process. The purpose of a hearing is
precisely to determine what a just and reasonable rate is. Discarding such procedural and
constitutional right is certainly inimical to our fundamental law and to public interest.
Echegaray v Secretary G.R. No. 132601 October 12, 1998
The SC affirmed the conviction of petitioner Leo Echegaray y Pilo for the crime of rape of
the 10 year-old daughter of his common-law spouse and the imposition upon him of the
death penalty for the said crime.
He filed an MFR and a supplemental MFR raising for the first time the issue of the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7659 and the death penalty for rape. The Court denied
both motions.
In the meantime, Congress had seen it fit to change the mode of execution of the death
penalty from electrocution to lethal injection, and passed Republic Act No. 8177, AN ACT
DESIGNATING DEATH BY LETHAL INJECTION AS THE METHOD OF CARRYING OUT
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE ARTICLE 81 OF THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, AS AMENDED BY SECTION 24 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659.
The convict filed a Petition for prohibition from carrying out the lethal injection against him
under the grounds that it constituted cruel, degrading, or unusual punishment, being
violative of due process, a violation of the Philippines' obligations under international
covenants, an undue delegation of legislative power by Congress, an unlawful exercise by
respondent Secretary of the power to legislate, and an unlawful delegation of delegated
powers by the Secretary of Justice to respondent Director.
In his motion to amend, the petitioner added equal protection as a ground.
The Office of the Solicitor General stated that this Court has already upheld the
constitutionality of the Death Penalty Law, and has repeatedly declared that the death
penalty is not cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual punishment; execution by lethal injection,
as authorized under R.A. No. 8177 and the questioned rules, is constitutional, lethal
injection being the most modern, more humane, more economical, safer and easier to apply
(than electrocution or the gas chamber); the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights does not expressly or impliedly prohibit the imposition of the death penalty; R.A. No.
8177 properly delegated legislative power to respondent Director; and that R.A. No. 8177
confers the power to promulgate the implementing rules to the Secretary of Justice,
Secretary of Health and the Bureau of Corrections.
The Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and/or
Appear as Amicus Curiae with the attached Petition to Intervene and/or Appear as Amicus
Curiae. They alleged similarly with Echegarays arguments.
The petitioner filed a reply similar to his first arguments. The court gave due course to the
petition.
Concisely put, petitioner argues that R.A. No. 8177 and its implementing rules do not pass
constitutional muster for: (a) violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment, (b) violation of our international treaty obligations, (c)
being an undue delegation of legislative power, and (d) being discriminatory.
Issue: 1. Is it a violation of the constitutional proscription against cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment?
2. Is it a violation of our international treaty obligations?
3. Is it an undue delegation of legislative power?
4. Is it discriminatory and contrary to law?
Held: No 1st three. Yes to last. Petition denied.
Ratio:1. Petitioner contends that death by lethal injection constitutes cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment considering that (1) R.A. No. 8177 fails to provide for the drugs to be
used in carrying out lethal injection, the dosage for each drug to be administered, and the
procedure in administering said drug/s into the accused; (2) R.A. No. 8177 and its
implementing rules are uncertain as to the date of the execution, time of notification, the
court which will fix the date of execution, which uncertainties cause the greatest pain and
suffering for the convict; and (3) the possibility of "botched executions" or mistakes in
administering the drugs renders lethal injection inherently cruel.
Now it is well-settled in jurisprudence that the death penalty per se is not a cruel, degrading
or inhuman punishment.
Harden v. Director of Prisons- "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a
lingering death; but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as
used in the constitution. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something
more than the mere extinguishment of life." Would the lack in particularity then as to the
details involved in the execution by lethal injection render said law "cruel, degrading or
inhuman"? The Court believes not. For reasons discussed, the implementing details of
R.A. No. 8177 are matters which are properly left to the competence and expertise of
administrative officials.
Petitioner contends that Sec. 16 of R.A. No. 8177 is uncertain as to which "court" will fix the
time and date of execution, and the date of execution and time of notification of the death
convict. As petitioner already knows, the "court" which designates the date of execution is
the trial court which convicted the accused. The procedure is that the "judgment is entered
fifteen (15) days after its promulgation, and 10 days thereafter, the records are remanded to
the court below including a certified copy of the judgment for execution. Neither is there any
uncertainty as to the date of execution nor the time of notification. As to the date of
execution, Section 15 of the implementing rules must be read in conjunction with the last
sentence of Section 1 of R.A. No. 8177 which provides that the death sentence shall be
carried out "not earlier than one (1) year nor later then eighteen (18) months from the time
the judgment imposing the death penalty became final and executory, without prejudice to
the exercise by the President of his executive clemency powers at all times." Hence, the
death convict is in effect assured of eighteen (18) months from the time the judgment
imposing the death penalty became final and executor wherein he can seek executive
clemency and attend to all his temporal and spiritual affairs.
Petitioner further contends that the infliction of "wanton pain" in case of possible
complications in the intravenous injection that respondent Director is an untrained and
untested person insofar as the choice and administration of lethal injection is concerned,
renders lethal injection a cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. This is
unsubstantiated.
First. Petitioner has neither alleged nor presented evidence that lethal injection required the
expertise only of phlebotomists and not trained personnel and that the drugs to be
administered are unsafe or ineffective. Petitioner simply cites situations in the United States
wherein execution by lethal injection allegedly resulted in prolonged and agonizing death for
the convict, without any other evidence whatsoever.
Second. Petitioner overlooked Section 1, third paragraph of R.A. No. 8177 which requires
that all personnel involved in the execution proceedings should be trained prior to the
performance of such task. We must presume that the public officials entrusted with the
implementation of the death penalty will carefully avoid inflicting cruel punishment.
Third. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying out the
execution of death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against
cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense, anything is cruel which is
calculated to give pain or distress, and since punishment imports pain or suffering to the
convict, it may be said that all punishments are cruel. But of course the Constitution does
not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go unpunished." The cruelty against which the
Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty inherent in the method of punishment, not
the necessary suffering involved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely.
What is cruel and unusual "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as
public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice" and "must draw its meaning from
the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
2. International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights states:
2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be
imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of
the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and
to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This
penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgment rendered by a competent court."
The punishment was subject to the limitation that it be imposed for the "most serious
crimes".
Included with the declaration was the Second Optional Protocol to the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Aiming at the Abolition of the Death Penalty was
adopted by the General Assembly on December 15, 1989. The Philippines neither signed
nor ratified said document.
3. R.A. No. 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its
limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried out. R.A.
No. 8177 specifically requires that "the death sentence shall be executed under the
authority of the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, endeavoring so far as possible to
mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during the lethal injection as well as
during the proceedings prior to the execution." Further, "the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections shall take steps to ensure that the lethal injection to be administered is sufficient
to cause the instantaneous death of the convict." The legislature also mandated that "all
personnel involved in the administration of lethal injection shall be trained prior to the
performance of such task." The Court cannot see that any useful purpose would be served
by requiring greater detail. The question raised is not the definition of what constitutes a
criminal offense, but the mode of carrying out the penalty already imposed by the Courts. In
this sense, R.A. No. 8177 is sufficiently definite and the exercise of discretion by the
administrative officials concerned is, canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.
However, the Rules and Regulations to Implement Republic Act No. 8177 suffer serious
flaws that could not be overlooked. To begin with, something basic appears missing in
Section 19 of the implementing rules which provides a manual for the execution procedure.
It was supposed to be confidential.
The Court finds in the first paragraph of Section 19 of the implementing rules a vacuum.
The Secretary of Justice has practically abdicated the power to promulgate the manual on
the execution procedure to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, by not providing for a
mode of review and approval. Being a mere constituent unit of the Department of Justice,
the Bureau of Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not bear the
imprimatur of the administrative superior, the Secretary of Justice as the rule-making
authority under R.A. No. 8177. Such apparent abdication of departmental responsibility
renders the said paragraph invalid.
4. Petitioner contends that Section 17 of the Implementing Rules is unconstitutional for
being discriminatory as well as for being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by
respondent Secretary. Petitioner insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal
injection may be suspended, without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
"SEC. 17. SUSPENSION OF THE EXECUTION OF THE DEATH SENTENCE. Execution
by lethal injection shall not be inflicted upon a woman within the three years next following
the date of the sentence or while she is pregnant, nor upon any person over seventy (70)
years of age. In this latter case, the death penalty shall be commuted to the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided in Article 40 of the Revised Penal
Code."
Petitioner contends that Section 17 is unconstitutional for being discriminatory as well as for
being an invalid exercise of the power to legislate by respondent Secretary. Petitioner
insists that Section 17 amends the instances when lethal injection may be suspended,
without an express amendment of Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
section 25 of R.A. No. 7659, stating that the death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a
woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over
seventy years of age.
While Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 25 of Republic Act No.
7659, suspends the implementation of the death penalty while a woman is pregnant or
within one (1) year after delivery, Section 17 of the implementing rules omits the one (1)
year period following delivery as an instance when the death sentence is suspended, and
adds a ground for suspension of sentence no longer found under Article 83 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended, which is the three-year reprieve after a woman is sentenced. This
addition is, in petitioner's view, tantamount to a gender-based discrimination sans statutory
basis, while the omission is an impermissible contravention of the applicable law.
Being merely an implementing rule, Section 17 aforecited must not override, but instead
remain consistent and in harmony with the law it seeks to apply and implement.
Republic Act No. 9136, the Electric Power Industry Reform act of 2001 (EPIRA Law), was
approved and signed into law by Gloria Arroyo on June 8, 2001 and it took effect on June
26, 2001. The EPIRA law states that it will provide an orderly and transparent privatization
of assets and liabilities of the NPC. Under this law, a new National Power Board of Directors
was constituted with the new chairman and members.
their own sound discretion in exercising the corporate powers of the NPC. Resolutions were
declared void and without legal effect.
The Secretary of the Department of Energy (DOE) promulgated the Implementing Rules and
Regulations (IRR) of the EPIRA Law, pursuant to Section 77. The Restructuring Committee
proposed a new NPC Table of Organization which was approved by the NPB to serve as
the overall organizational framework for the realigned functions of the NPC mandated under
the EPIRA Law. They also reviewed the proposed 2002 NPC Restructuring Plan and
assisted in the implementation of Phase I (Realignment), and recommended to the NPB for
approval the adoption of measures pertaining to the separation and hiring of NPC
personnel.
The NPB passed NPB Resolution No. 2002-124 which provided for the Guidelines on the
Separation Program of the NPC and the Selection and Placement of Personnel in the NPC
Table of Organization. Under this, all NPC personnel shall be legally terminated on 31
January 2003, and shall be entitled to separation benefits. A memorandum circulated to all
NPC officials and employees providing for a checklist of the documents required for
securing clearances for the processing of separation benefits of all employees who shall be
terminated under the Restructuring Plan.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Injunction to restrain respondents from implementing NPB
Resolutions. Since only 3 of the 9 members voted, petitioners conclude that the questioned
Resolutions have been illegally issued as it were not issued by a duly constituted board
since no quorum existed and that the resolution be void. Petitioners also argued that if ever
there is abolition in their positions, it should require the endorsement of the Joint
Congressional Power Commission and the approval of the President of the Philippines. The
Resolution will have an adverse effect on its employees and contrary to the mandate of the
Constitution to promote full employment and security of tenure.
Respondent argued that while it is true that only 3 members of the NPB were not the actual
signatories but they were represented by their respective alternates. Respondents claim that
the validity of such administrative practice whereby an authority is exercised by persons or
subordinates appointed by the responsible official has long been settled. Respondents
further contend that Section 48 of the EPIRA Law does not in any way prohibit any member
of the NPB from authorizing his representative to sign resolutions adopted by the Board.
Issue:
Whether or not the implementation of the NPB Resolutions are void and without
legal effect since the votes casted were not from the actual signatories.
Ruling: The petition was granted. They lack the necessary number of votes for their
adoption.
Since the votes were only casted by 3 out of 9 members favor of the adoption of the said
Resolutions, it must not be considered in determining whether or not the necessary number
of votes was garnered in order that the assailed Resolutions may be validly enacted. It is the
representatives of the secretaries of the different executive departments and not the
secretaries themselves who exercised judgment in passing the assailed Resolution. This
violates the duty imposed upon the specifically enumerated department heads to employ
President Arroyo replaced all the members of the PRCs Board of Nursing and ordered the
examinees to re-take the board exams. She issued EO 566 which authorized CHED to
supervise the establishment and operation of all review centers in the Philippines. CHED,
through Chairman Carlito Puno, approved the CHED Memorandum Order No. 49, series of
2006 (IRR).
The Review Center Association of the Philippines, petitioners, asked CHED to amend, if
not withdraw the IRR arguing that giving permits to operate a review center to Higher
Education Institutions (HEIs) or consortia of HEIs and professional organizations will
effectively abolish independent review centers.
Chairman Puno stated that if they will suspend the implementation of the IRR, it would be
inconsistent with the mandate of EO 566. The petitioners comments and suggestions would
be considered revisions to the IRR.
There was a dialogue between petitioners and CHED for the revisions and the RIRR were
approved. Petitioner filed a Petition to Clarify/Amend Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations in amending the RIRR by excluding independent review centers from the
coverage of the CHED; to clarify the meaning of the requirement for existing review centers
to tie-up with HEIs; to revise the rules to make it conform with RA 7722 limiting the CHEDs
coverage to public and private institutions of higher.
CHED issued a resolution that if they will exclude the operation of independent review
centers from the coverage of CHED would contradict the intention of EO 566. In the request
to clarify what is being meant by tie-up/ be integrated with an HEI, it just means to be in
partner with an HEI.
Petitioner filed a petition for Prohibition and Mandamus praying for the annulment of the
RIRR, the declaration of EO 566 as invalid and unconstitutional and the prohibition against
CHED from implementing the RIRR.
Issues:
1.
Whether EO 566 is an unconstitutional exercise by the Executive of legislative
power as it expands the CHEDs jurisdiction.
2.
Whether the RIRR is an invalid exercise of the Executives rule-making power.
Ruling: EO 566 and CHED Memorandum Order No. 30 are declared void and
unconstitutional. The scopes of EO 566 and the RIRR expand the CHEDs coverage under
RA 7722. EO 566 directed the CHED to formulate a framework for the regulation of review
centers and similar entities. CHEDs coverage under RA 7722 is limited to public and private
institutions of higher education and degree-granting programs in all public and private postsecondary educational institutions.
The review center under EO 566 covers the operation or conduct of review classes or
courses provided by individuals whether for a fee or not in preparation for the licensure
examinations given by the PRC. A review center is not an institution of higher learning as
contemplated by RA 7722. It does not offer a degree-granting program that would put it
under the jurisdiction of the CHED.
The OSG argues that President Arroyo was merely exercising her executive power to
ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. The exercise of the Presidents residual powers
under this provision requires legislation. There is no law granting the President the power to
amend the functions of the CHED. The President may not amend RA 7722 through an
Executive Order without a prior legislation granting her such power. The President has no
inherent or delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the CHED under RA 7722.
b.
People vs Dacuycuy
GR No. 45127 May 5, 1989
several pubic school officials of Leyte were charged for violation of RA 4670 (Magna Carta
for public school teachers).These officials motioned to quash the charges against them for
(1)lack of jurisdiction (2) unconstitutionality of Section 32. This motion was denied for lack of
merit. The private respondents filed a petition for certiorari to the Court of First Instance of
Leyte.They added to the grounds of unconsttutionality of Section 32 the following reasons:
(1) it imposes a cruel and unusual punishment (2) it constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power, for the duration of penalty of the imprisonment is left to the discretion of
the court. Judge Dacuycuy, the respondent judge denied the motion saying that RA 4670
particularly Section 32 is valid and constitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not Section 32 of RA 4670 is constitutional
HELD: NO. Section 32 is unconstitutional since it provides an indeterminable period of
imprisonment. Too much discretion was left by the legislature to the court, making it undue
delegation of power of the legislature. Section 32 did not pass the test of sufficient standard.
If section 32 will be allowed, it will violate not just the rules of separation of powers but also
the delegability of legislative powers.
Nota Bene: The charge against the public school officials will still be remanded to the
municipal court where it was first filed. RA 4670 ontains a separability clause in Section 34.
Although Sec 32 was declared unconstitutional, other parts are still valid.
Emmanuel Pelaez Vs. Auditor-General (1965)
This is a special civil action for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunctioninstituted by
Emmanuel Pelaez, as Vice President of the Philippines and as taxpayer,against the Auditor
General, to restrain him, as well as his representatives andagents, from passing in audit any
expenditure of public funds in implementation of the EOs issued by the President creating
33 municipalities and/or any disbursementby said municipalities.
In 1964, the President, pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Codeissued
Executive Orders Nos. 93 to 121, 124 and 126 to 129; creating thirty-three(33)
municipalities.Petitioner alleges that said executive orders are null and void on the ground
thatsaid Section 68 has been impliedly repealed by Republic Act No. 2370 andconstitutes
an undue delegation of legislative power.When RA 2370 (The Barrio Charter) provides that
barrios may "not be created ortheir boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by
Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the
voters in theareas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality
ormunicipalities.Section 68 of RAC, which said EOs are based, provides that the President
maydefine or divide the boundary or boundaries of any province, sub-province,municipality,
municipal district XXX as the public welfare may require provided, thatthe authorization of
the Congress of the Philippines shall first be obtained.Petitioner argues that the President
under the new law cannot create a barrio, howmuch more of a municipality which is
composed of several barrios.Respondent answered that a new municipality can be created
without creating newbarrios, such as, by placing old barrios under the jurisdiction of the
newmunicipality. This answer however overlooks on the main import of the
petitionersargument, which questions the Presidents authority to create
municipalities.Respondent alleges that the power of the President to create municipalities
underthis section does not amount to an undue delegation of legislative power, relyingupon
Municipality of Cardona vs. Municipality of Binagonan.
ISSUE: WON the President has the legislative authority to issue the EOs
creatingmunicipalities.
DECISION: The Court declared the EOs null and void. The Auditor General
permanentlyrestrained from passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementationof said EOs or any disbursement by the created municipalities.
RATIO: The Court said that the respondents argument based on Cardona vs.
Binangonanis untenable because the case do not involve a creation of municipality but
atransfer of municipality. The authority to create municipal corporations is essentially
Legislative in nature. Itis strictly a legislative function. The power to fix such common
boundary, in order toavoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities,
may partake of an administrative nature in the adoption of means and ways to carry into
effect the law creating said municipalities.Although
Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details
in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation
of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
(a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or
implemented by the delegate .
(b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Without the
HELD: No. According to Article VI, Sec 1 of the Phillipine Constitution The legislative power
shall be vested in the congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a senate and a
house of representative, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on
initiative and referendum. The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No.
7719, broad powers to execute the provisions of said Act. in which the Secretary did not go
beyond the powers granted to him. Therefore, there is no undue delegation of legislative
powers since the congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to
promulgate rules and regulations so long that the delegating law be complete in itself, and
has a fix standard.
Here, the RA No. 7719 law is complete in itself and has a fixed standard. The provision is
clear that the Act that the Legislature intended primarily to protect the health of the people
and has mandated several measures to attain this objective. Also, the law has sufficiently
provided a distinct standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out its
provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and adequate supply of
blood through voluntary blood donation.
TATAD VS. SECRETARY
281 SCRA 330 1997
FACTS: In 1971, there was no government agency regulating the oil industry other than
those dealing with ordinary commodities. Oil companies were free to enter and exit the
market without any government interference. In 1971, the country was driven to its knees
by a crippling oil crisis. It created the Oil Industry Commission (OIC) to regulate the
business of importing, exporting, re-exporting, shipping, transporting, processing, refining,
storing, distributing, marketing and selling crude oil, gasoline, kerosene, gas and other
refined petroleum products. The OIC was vested with the power to fix the market prices of
petroleum products, to regulate the capacities of refineries, to license new refineries and to
regulate the operations and trade practices of the industry.
In March 1996, Congress took the audacious step of deregulating the downstream oil
industry. It enacted R.A. No. 8180 entitled the "Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act
of 1996." Under the deregulated environment, "any person or entity may import or purchase
any quantity of crude oil and petroleum products from a foreign or domestic source, lease or
own and operate refineries and other downstream oil facilities and market such crude oil or
use the same for his own requirement," subject only to monitoring by the Department of
Energy, wherein the president Fidel V. Ramos affirmed.
The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled "An Act
Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes." First, section 15 of
R.A. No. 8180 Act deregulating the downstream oil industry and for other purposes
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power to the President and the Secretary of
Energy because it does not provide a determinate or determinable standard to guide the
Executive Branch in determining when to implement the full deregulation of the downstream
oil industry.
Section 15 of R.A 8180 states that Implementation of Full Deregulation. - Pursuant to
Section 5 (e) of Republic Act No. 7638, the Departmen of Energy (DOE) shall, upon
approval of the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not
later than March, 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall time the full deregulation when
the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining and when
the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable. Upon the implementation
of the full deregulation as provided herein, the transition phase is deemed terminated and
the following laws are deemed repealed
ISSUE: Did Sec. 15 of R.A 8180 violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of
power for allowing DOE implement the R.A 8180?
HELD: NO, Sec. 15 of R.A 8180 DID NOT violate the constitutional prohibition on undue
delegation of power. To determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative
power, there are two kinds of test to be done; the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. First, the law is complete on the question of the final date of full deregulation.
The Congress expressly provided in R.A. No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end
of March 1997, regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end of
March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to postpone it for any
purported reason. Second, Section 15 of R.A 8180 lays down the standard to guide the
judgment of the President; he is to time it as far as practicable when the prices of crude oil
and petroleumproducts in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the
peso in relation to the US dollar is stable.
THE SENATE
PIMENTEL, JR VS COMELEC G.R. No. 126394. April 24, 1998
Petitioner filed a case against Election board of canvassers and pertinent persons
responsible in the tally of votes during the senatorial; election in 1995. There were
discrepancy between the Provincial Certificate of Canvas for Ilocos Norte and its supporting
Statement of Votes per precinct or municipality for the province as shown bellow:
Candidate
Votes appearing in the
Votes appearing in the
Increase
Statement of Votes
Provincial Certificate
of Canvas
Enrile
65,343
95,343
30,000
Drilon
48,726
78,726
30,000
Mitra
42,959
62,959
20,000
Comelec ordered investigation on the matter. Petitioner contends that the discrepancies in a
violation of Section 27b of RA 6646. COMELEX resolved to file criminal and administrative
cases against respondents. However, COMELEC reversed its decision and dismissed the
complaint for lack of sufficient evidence to establish probable cause to prosecute criminal
case.
Petitioner then filed for certiorari which the Solicitor General also manifests a motion
favoring petitioner which was held by the Supreme Court as unnecessary. COMELEC
contends that Section 27b gives a remedy to the erring official only when such official
refuses to correct his act will he be prosecuted. Respondent did not deny the error in
canvassing but claim honest mistake or simple error.
ISSUE: Whether respondent can be held liable for tampering election results under Section
27b of RA6646?
Ruling: Yes. Section 27b of RA 6646 states that: Any member of the board of election
inspectors or board of canvassers who tampers increases or decreases the votes received
by a candidate in any election or any member of the board who refuses offer proper
verification and hearing to credit the correct votes or deduct such tampered votes. The or
is disjunctive term signifying dissociation and independence of one thing from the other
things enumerated. Therefore said official can be prosecuted for said tampering.
Is the senate/the house of congress a continuing body?
Arnault v. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950
The Senate is investigating pertinent government purchases of two parcels of land, known
as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. Apparently the senate found quite irregularity of the
governments payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total sum
of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two estates that only amounted to
Php20,000.00, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought
to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the
expense of the government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the subject transactions, was
one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of the
investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to divulge the name of the person to whom
he gave the amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds
pertaining to Ernest Burt.Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and was
committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment until he answers
the questions. He thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme
Court questioning the validity of his detention. the petitioner contented that the power may
be abusively and oppressively exerted by the Senate which might keep the witness in prison
for life.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Senate has the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a
term beyond its period of legislative session?
RULING: YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a term
beyond its period of legislative session. The senate is a continuing body and which does not
cease to exist upon periodical dissolution of the Congress.
Garcillano vs. The House of Representatives
G.R. No. 170338 (Dec. 23, 2008)
The case involves the Hello Garci scandal in which Garcillano was allegedly told by then
president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo to manipulate the 2004 elections results in her favor.
The investigation to this scandal started on June 8, 2005, with a privilege speech delivered
by then Minority Floor Leader Francis Escudero. The hearings were however suspended
indefinitely on August 3, 2005.
In her privilege speech 2 years later (Aug. 28, 2007), Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago
recommended the continuation of hearings on the said scandal. Co-petitioners Santiago
Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili filed a Petition for Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of
a Temporary Restraining Order and Injunction, praying for the barring of the Senate from
conducting the inquiry. Petitioners argued that the current Senate has no authority to
continue the legislative inquiry on the Garci tapes because the Senate is not a continuing
body.
Issue: Whether or not the current Senate has the authority to continue with the inquiry on
the Hello Garci scandal.
Held: No. The Court ruled that the Senate has no authority to continue the said inquiry
without its duly published Rules of Procedure, as required whenever the terms of the
previous (half) set of Senators expire. This is in accordance with Sec. 21, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution. This is because the Senate is considered a non-continuing body, which
means that each business each set of Senators have is non-binding to the next set, unless
the rulings of procedure of each are duly published.
In this case, the previous set of Senators was not able to publish its Rules of Procedure
regarding the inquiry of the Hello Garci scandal (as it was suspended indefinitely, and was
not finished by them). Therefore, they (the present set of Senators) should not be allowed to
continue the inquiry regarding the said scandal, as they do not have the authority to do so.
League of cities, supra
one representative. The provision of this section pertains to the city population, not the
required district population.
VICTORINO B. ALDABA, CARLO JOLETTE S. FAJARDO, JULIO G. MORADA, and
MINERVA ALDABA MORADA, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.
G.R No. 188078
March 15, 2010
This case is about the declaration of R.A. 9591, creating a legislative district for City of
Malolos, Bulacan. It was alleged that such R.A. violates the minimum population
requirement stated in the constitution. Before the May 1, 2009, the province of Bulacan was
represented in Congress through 4 legislative districts. Before the passage of the Act
through House Bill 3162 (later converted to House Bill 3693) and Senate Bill 1986, Malolos
City had a population of 223, 069 in 2007.
House Bill 3693 cites the undated Certification, as requested to be issued to Mayor
Domingo (then Mayor of Malolos), by Region III Director Miranda of NSO that the population
of Malolos will be as projected, 254,030 by the year 2010.
Petitioners contended that R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for failing to meet the minimum
population threshold of 250,000 for a city to merit representative in Congress.
Issue: Whether or not R.A. 9591, An act creating a legislative district for the City of Malolos,
Bulacan is unconstitutional as petitioned. And whether the City of Malolos has at least
250,000 actual or projected.
Held: It was declared by the Supreme Court that the R.A. 9591 is unconstitutional for being
violative of Section 5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the 1987 Constitution on the grounds that, as required by the 1987
Constitution, a city must have at least 250,000 population. In relation with this, Regional
Director Miranda issued a Certification which is based on the demographic projections, was
declared without legal effect because the Regional Director has no basis and no authority to
issue the Certification based on the following statements supported by Section 6 of E.O. 135
as signed by President Fidel V. Ramos, which provides:
The certification on demographic projection can be issued only if such are declared official
by the Natl Statistics Coordination Board. In this case, it was not stated whether the
document have been declared official by the NSCB.
The certification can be issued only by the NSO Administrator or his designated certifying
officer, in which case, the Regional Director of Central Luzon NSO is unauthorized.
The population projection must be as of the middle of the year, which in this case, the
Certification issued by Director Miranda was undated.
It was also computed that the correct figures using the growth rate, even if compounded, the
Malolos population of 223,069 as of August 1, 2007 will grow to only 249,333 as of August
1, 2010.
It was emphasized that the 1935 Constitution, that this Court ruled that the aim of legislative
reappointment is to equalize the population and voting power among districts.
SENATOR BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III and MAYOR JESSE ROBREDO,
Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS represented by its Chairman JOSE A.R. MELO and its
Commissioners, RENE V. SARMIENTO, NICODEMO T. FERRER, LUCENITO N.
stated in the by-laws of COCOFED that The Chairman of the Philippine Coconut Authority,
an administrative agency of the government, shall be a member of their National Board.
This amounts to participation of the government in the affairs of this group.
The said case was filed by the petitioners by way of a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. It was addressed to nullify and declared as
unconstitutional, R.A. 9716 entitled An Act Reapportioning the Composition of the First
(1st) and Second Legislative Districts (2nd) in the province of Camarines Sur and Thereby
Creating a New Legislative District from such Reapportionment.
Said Act originated from House Bill No. 4264, and it was enacted by President MacapagalArroyo. Effectuating the act, it has divided the existing four districts, and apportioned
districts shall form additional district where the new first district shall be composed of
176,383 population count.
Petitioners contend that the reapportionment runs afoul of the explicit constitutional standard
with a minimum population of 250,000 for the creation of a legislative district under Section
5 (3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It was emphasized as well by the petitioners that if
population is less than that provided by the Constitution, it must be stricken-down for noncompliance with the minimum population requirement, unless otherwise fixed by law.
Respondents have argued that the petitioners are guilty of two fatal technical effects: first,
error in choosing to assail R.A. 9716 via the Remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. And second, petitioners have no locus standi to question the
constitutionality of R.A. 9716.
Issues:
ISSUE: Whether or not Republic Act No. 9716 is unconstitutional and therefore null and
void, or whether or not a population of 250,000 is an indispensable constitutional
requirement for the creation of a new legislative district in a province.
RULING: It was ruled that the said Act is constitutional. The plain and clear distinction
between a city and a province was explained under the second sentence of Section 5 (3) of
the Constitution. It states that a province is entitled into a representative, with nothing was
mentioned about a population. While in cities, a minimum population of 250,000 must first
be satisfied. In 2007, CamSur had a population of 1,693,821 making the province entitled to
two additional districts from the present of four. Based on the formulation of Ordinance,
other than population, the results of the apportionment were valid. And lastly, other factors
were mentioned during the deliberations of House Bill No. 4264.
2. THE PARTY LIST SYSTEM
Republic Act No. 7941 An act providing for the election of party-list representatives
through the party list system and appropriating funds therefor
Ang Bagong Bayani vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 147589 & 147613 June 25, 2003
The Comelec, in compliance to the directions issued by the Court last 2001,
conducted hearings and qualified the list of party-list organizations according to the eightpoint guideline provided by the Supreme Court. The Comelec was refrained from
proclaiming the winner until they have fully complied with the directions. The Comelec then
submitted its compliance reports in 3 sets, declaring 44 organizations as qualified party-lists
organizations. The OSG then recommended for BUHAY and COCOFED to be included in
the list of qualified party-lists. The Comelecs contention was that BUHAY was a mere
extension of El Shaddai and that COCOFED was an adjunct of the government. It was
4.
Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating
the Omnibus Resolution No 3785.
rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination
based on sexual orientation.
Held:
On the first issue, the Court deemed it proper that the petitioners brought such
challenge in the Court. Note that the petitioners filed the case before the Comelec but the
latter failed to act on it. Further, the case was one that is of public interest and with extreme
urgency for it potentially involves the composition of 20% of the House of Representatives.
On the second issue, the Court ruled that political parties may participate in the party-list
elections. Sections 7 and 8, Article IX of the Constitution provides that political parties may
be registered under the party-list system. Further, Sec 2 of RA 7941 also provides for a
party-list system registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations thereof,
xxx and Sec 3 expressly states that a party is either a political party or a sectoral party or
a coalition of parties.
On the third issue, the Court ruled that parties or organizations that will participate
in the party-list elections must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system. As laid
down in the Constitution and RA 7941, party-lists shall be filled by election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth and such other
sectors as provided by law except religious sector. The intent of the Constitution is clear and
that is to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to those who have
less in life, but more so
by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers themselves.
Allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the
party-list system will prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented.
On the fourth issue, the Court held that the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion
when it failed to apply the clear policy of the law and the Constitution. The Court cannot
accept the submissions of the Comelec that the party-list system, without qualification, is
open to all on the grounds cited above.
The case was remanded to the Comelec, which was directed to conduct summary
evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants subject to the
guidelines ordered by the Court.
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and
trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to public
respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition. To buttress
their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also
stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered
nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its
Article 201.
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by
using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of
religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and
genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly
dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT sector is not
among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual
verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.
Held: Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be
registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a sector is
specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At bottom, what our nonestablishment clause calls for is government neutrality in religious matters. Clearly,
governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.
We thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC
to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that
government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to
justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so harmful
as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws
flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as
any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else which shocks,
defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under
the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand,
requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal conviction. It hardly needs to
be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and
a judicial determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental
interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The
denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds amounts more to a statement of
dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public
interest.
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI) represented by its Secretary
General George FGBF George Duldulao, petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. [G.R. No. 190529. April 29, 2010]
Respondent delisted petitioner, a party list organization, from the roster of registered
national, regional or sectoral parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system
through its resolution, denying also the latters motion for reconsideration, in accordance
with Section 6(8) of Republic Act No. 7941 (RA 7941), otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act, which provides:
Section 6. Removal and/or Cancellation of Registration. The COMELEC may motu proprio
or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after due notice and
hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral party, organization or coalition
on any of the following grounds:
x x x x
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least two
per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has registered.[Emphasis supplied.]
Petitioner was delisted because it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not
participate in the 2007 elections. Petitioner filed its opposition to the resolution citing among
others the misapplication in the ruling of MINERO v. COMELEC, but was denied for lack of
merit. Petitioner elevated the matter to SC showing the excerpts from the records of Senate
Bill No. 1913 before it became the law in question.
ISSUES:
Political Law
(1) Whether or not there is legal basis in the delisting of PGBI.
(2) Whether or not PGBIs right to due process was violated.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) Whether or not the doctrine of judicial precedent applies in this case.
RULINGS:
Political Law
(1) No. The MINERO ruling is an erroneous application of Section 6(8) of RA 7941; hence,
it cannot sustain PGBIs delisting from the roster of registered national, regional or sectoral
parties, organizations or coalitions under the party-list system. First, the law is in the plain,
clear and unmistakable language of the law which provides for two (2) separate reasons for
delisting. Second, MINERO is diametrically opposed to the legislative intent of Section 6(8)
of RA 7941, as PGBIs cited congressional deliberations clearly show. MINERO therefore
simply cannot stand.
(2) No. On the due process issue, petitioners right to due process was not violated for [it]
was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of [COMELEC
resolution]. The essence of due process, consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be
heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain
ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The
requirement is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to
explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice
and hearing x x x. [It is] obvious [that] under the attendant circumstances that PGBI was
not denied due process.
Civil Law (Statutory Construction)
(1) No. This case is an exception to the application of the principle of stare decisis. The
doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere (to adhere to precedents and not to unsettle
things which are established) is embodied in Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines
which provides, thus:
ART. 8. Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a
part of the legal system of the Philippines.
The doctrine enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to
follow the rule established in a decision of its Supreme Court. That decision becomes a
judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine
of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined
and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
The doctrine though is not cast in stone for upon a showing that circumstances attendant in
a particular case override the great benefits derived by [SCs] judicial system from the
doctrine of stare decisis, the Court is justified in setting it aside. MINERO did unnecessary
violence to the language of the law, the intent of the legislature, and to the rule of law in
general. Clearly, [SC] cannot allow PGBI to be prejudiced by the continuing validity of an
erroneous ruling. Thus, [SC] now abandons MINERO and strike it out from [the] ruling case
law.
G.R. No. 203766 April 2, 2013
ATONG PAGLAUM, INC., represented by its President, Mr. Alan Igot, Petitioner,
vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.
Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941) and COMELEC
Resolution Nos. 9366 and 9531, approximately 280 groups and organizations registered
and manifested their desire to participate in the 13 May 2013 party-list elections.
The petitioners were included, but the COMELEC disqualified them from the May 2013
party-list race for various reasons.
52 party-list groups and organizations filed separate petitions totaling 54 with the Supreme
Court (SC) in an effort to reverse various resolutions by the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) disqualifying them from the May 2013 party-list race. The Comelec, in its
assailed resolutions issued in October, November and December of 2012, ruled, among
others, that these party-list groups and organizations failed to represent a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, their nominees do not come from a marginalized and
underrepresented sector, and/or some of the organizations or groups are not truly
representative of the sector they intend to represent in Congress.
Petitioners argued that the poll body committed grave abuse of discretion in denying some
of the petitioners application for accreditation and cancelling the existing accreditation of the
rest. They also lamented the poll bodys denial to accord them due process in the
evaluation proceedings.
The high court consolidated these cases; Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio was
tasked as the Member-in-charge of the case.
Status quo ante orders (SQAO) were issued in all 54 petitions which restored the status quo
prior to the disqualification of petitioners. However, only 39 of the 52 petitioners or only 41
petitions were able to secure a mandatory injunction, directing the Comelec to include their
names in the printing of official ballots.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying
the said party-lists.
HELD: No. The COMELEC merely followed the guidelines set in the cases of Ang Bagong
Bayani and BANAT. However, the Supreme Court remanded the cases back to the
COMELEC as the Supreme Court now provides for new guidelines which abandoned some
principles established in the two aforestated cases. The new guidelines are as follows:
I. Parameters. In qualifying party-lists, the COMELEC must use the following parameters:
1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system: (1) national parties or
organizations, (2) regional parties or organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or organizations do not need to
organize along sectoral lines and do not need to represent any marginalized and
underrepresented sector.
3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political party,
whether major or not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in
party-list elections only through its sectoral wing that can separately register under the
party-list system. The sectoral wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked
to a political party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be marginalized and underrepresented or
lacking in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy
pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that are
marginalized and underrepresented include labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The
sectors that lack well-defined political constituencies include professionals, the elderly,
women, and the youth.
5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented must belong to the marginalized and
underrepresented sector they represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
parties or organizations that lack well-defined political constituencies must belong to the
sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the
marginalized and underrepresented, or that represent those who lack well-defined political
constituencies, either must belong to their respective sectors, or must have a track record
of advocacy for their respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or organizations.
6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if some
of their nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified.
II. In the BANAT case, major political parties are disallowed, as has always been the
practice, from participating in the party-list elections. But, since theres really no
constitutional prohibition nor a statutory prohibition, major political parties can now
participate in the party-list system provided that they do so through their bona fide sectoral
wing (see parameter 3 above).
Allowing major political parties to participate, albeit indirectly, in the party-list elections will
encourage them to work assiduously in extending their constituencies to the marginalized
and underrepresented and to those who lack well-defined political constituencies.
Ultimately, the Supreme Court gave weight to the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission when they were drafting the party-list system provision of the Constitution. The
Commissioners deliberated that it was their intention to include all parties into the party-list
elections in order to develop a political system which is pluralistic and multiparty. (In the
BANAT case, Justice Puno emphasized that the will of the people should defeat the intent of
the framers; and that the intent of the people, in ratifying the 1987 Constitution, is that the
party-list system should be reserved for the marginalized sectors.)
III. The Supreme Court also emphasized that the party-list system is NOT RESERVED for
the marginalized and underrepresented or for parties who lack well-defined political
constituencies. It is also for national or regional parties. It is also for small ideology-based
and cause-oriented parties who lack well-defined political constituencies. The common
denominator however is that all of them cannot, they do not have the machinery unlike
major political parties, to field or sponsor candidates in the legislative districts but they can
acquire the needed votes in a national election system like the party-list system of elections.
If the party-list system is only reserved for marginalized representation, then the system
itself unduly excludes other cause-oriented groups from running for a seat in the lower
house.
As explained by the Supreme Court, party-list representation should not be understood to
include only labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, overseas workers, and other sectors that by their nature
areeconomically at the margins of society. It should be noted that Section 5 of Republic Act
7941 includes, among others, in its provision for sectoral representation groups of
professionals, which are not per se economically marginalized but are still qualified as
marginalized, underrepresented, and do not have well-defined political constituencies as
they are ideologically marginalized.
b.
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector. Resolution of COMELEC was assailed regarding the May 11, 1998 election for
party-list representative. COMELEC en banc proclaimed 13 party-list representatives from
12 parties and organizations which had obtained 2% of the total number of votes cast. RA
7641 or the Party List Law provides that only parties with at least 2% of the total votes cast
for the party-list are entitled to one seat in the House of Representative, but no party can
have more than 3 seats even if it gets more than 6% of the votes. Based on the formula,
however, after the 1998 elections, only 14 party-list representatives could be proclaimed
instead of 52, which constitute the 20% allocated by the Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 20% allocation under Sec. 5 (2), ART. VI of the Constitution is
mandatory or merely a ceiling, and whether or not the 2% threshold and 3-seat is a
constitutional limitation.
HELD: Sec. 5 (2), ART. VI of the Constitution is not mandatory that all seats be filled, it is
merely a ceiling .2% threshold and 3-seat limitation are constitutional.
RATIONALE: Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the equally simple
message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the
mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down
only the percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for
party-list representatives. In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted
RA 7941. As said earlier, Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional
representation" in the election of party-list representatives in order to enable Filipinos
belonging to the marginalized and under represented sectors to contribute legislation that
would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require parties, organizations and
coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for
the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat. Those garnering more than
this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in
the House of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law
provides:(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%)
of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided,
That those garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be entitled to additional
seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally, That each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.Considering the
foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2),Article VI of
the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in
Congress.
CIBAC vs COMELEC
BANAT v COMELEC
NOTE: This case is consolidated with BAYAN Muna vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 179295).
In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the National Board of Canvassers, made
a partial proclamation of the winners in the party-list elections which was held in May 2007.
In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats, the COMELEC considered the
following rules:
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats for legislative districts, while the
remaining 20% shall come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article VI, 1987
Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11b of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List System Act, a party-list which garners
at least 2% of the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4%, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners at least 6%,
then it is entitled to 3 seats this is pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban Formula
from the case of Veterans Federation Party vs COMELEC.
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three seats even if if garners more than 6% of
the votes cast for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
The Barangay Association for National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT), a partylist candidate, questioned the proclamation as well as the formula being used. BANAT
averred that the 2% threshold is invalid; Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision
that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast
in the party-list election, is not supported by the Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a
mathematical impossibility to meet the 20% party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is it mandatory. If it is mandatory,
then with the 2% qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would be impossible to fill
the prescribed 20% share of party-lists in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new
computation (which shall be discussed in the HELD portion of this digest).
On the other hand, BAYAN MUNA, another party-list candidate, questions the validity of the
3 seat rule (Section 11a of RA 7941). It also raised the issue of whether or not major
political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections or is the said elections
limited to sectoral parties.
ISSUES:
I. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in the lower house?
II. Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list representatives mandatory or a mere
ceiling.
III. Whether or not the 2% threshold to qualify for a seat valid.
IV. How are party-list seats allocated?
V. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to participate in the party-list elections.
VI. Whether or not the 3 seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is valid.
HELD: I. The 80-20 rule is observed in the following manner: for every 5 seats allotted for
legislative districts, there shall be one seat allotted for a party-list representative. Originally,
the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall be not more than 250 members of the lower
house. Using the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts, and 50 would be
from party-list representatives. However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the
number of the membership of the lower house as in fact, it can create additional legislative
districts as it may deem appropriate. As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were
220 district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule or the 5:1 ratio, there should be
55 seats allotted for party-list representatives.
How did the Supreme Court arrive at 55? This is the formula:
(Current Number of Legislative DistrictRepresentatives 0.80) x (0.20) = Number of Seats
Available to Party-List Representatives
Hence,
(220 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
II. The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely a ceiling meaning, the
number of party-list representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number of the
members of the lower house. However, it is not mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
III. No. Section 11b of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. There is no constitutional basis to allow
that only party-lists which garnered 2% of the votes cast are qualified for a seat and those
which garnered less than 2% are disqualified. Further, the 2% threshold creates a
mathematical impossibility to attain the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court
explained:
To illustrate: There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are 50 million votes cast
for the 100 participants in the party list elections. A party that has two percent of the votes
cast, or one million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further assume that the first 50
parties all get one million votes. Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55
seats. Because of the operation of the two percent threshold, this situation will repeat itself
even if we increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even if we increase the
votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if the maximum number of parties get two percent of
the votes for every party, it is always impossible for the number of occupied party-list seats
to exceed 50 seats as long as the two percent threshold is present.
It is therefore clear that the two percent threshold presents an unwarranted obstacle to the
full implementation of Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment
of the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.
IV. Instead, the 2% rule should mean that if a party-list garners 2% of the votes cast, then it
is guaranteed a seat, and not qualified. This allows those party-lists garnering less than
2% to also get a seat.
But how? The Supreme Court laid down the following rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest
based on the number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total
votes cast for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall
be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes until all the
additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall no longer be included
because they have already been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus,
the remaining available seats for allocation as additional seats are the maximum seats
reserved under the Party List System less the guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are
disregarded in the absence of a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
In short, there shall be two rounds in determining the allocation of the seats. In the first
round, all party-lists which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called the two-percenters)
are given their one seat each. The total number of seats given to these two-percenters are
then deducted from the total available seats for party-lists. In this case, 17 party-lists were
able to garner 2% each. There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence, 55 minus
17 = 38 remaining seats. (Please refer to the full text of the case for the tabulation).
The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be used in the second round,
particularly, in determining, first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and second, in
determining seats for the party-lists that did not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in
the process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list representatives.
How is this done?
Get the total percentage of votes garnered by the party and multiply it against the remaining
number of seats. The product, which shall not be rounded off, will be the additional number
of seats allotted for the party list but the 3 seat limit rule shall still be observed.
Example:
In this case, the BUHAY party-list garnered the highest total vote of 1,169,234 which is
7.33% of the total votes cast for the party-list elections (15,950,900).
Applying the formula above: (Percentage of vote garnered) x (remaining seats) = number of
additional seat
Hence, 7.33% x 38 = 2.79
Rounding off to the next higher number is not allowed so 2.79 remains 2. BUHAY is a twopercenter which means it has a guaranteed one seat PLUS additional 2 seats or a total of 3
seats. Now if it so happens that BUHAY got 20% of the votes cast, it will still get 3 seats
because the 3 seat limit rule prohibits it from having more than 3 seats.
Now after all the tw0-percenters were given their guaranteed and additional seats, and there
are still unoccupied seats, those seats shall be distributed to the remaining party-lists and
those higher in rank in the voting shall be prioritized until all the seats are occupied.
V. No. By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow major political parties (the
likes of UNIDO, LABAN, etc) from participating in the party-list elections.
Although the ponencia (Justice Carpio) did point out that there is no prohibition either from
the Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political parties from participating in the
party-list elections as the word party was not qualified and that even the framers of the
Constitution in their deliberations deliberately allowed major political parties to participate in
the party-list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing which represents the
marginalized (indirect participation), Justice Puno, in his separate opinion, concurred by 7
other justices, explained that the will of the people defeats the will of the framers of the
Constitution precisely because it is the people who ultimately ratified the Constitution and
the will of the people is that only the marginalized sections of the country shall participate in
the party-list elections. Hence, major political parties cannot participate in the party-list
elections, directly or indirectly.
VI. Yes, the 3 seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that no one party shall
dominate the party-list system.
BAGONG BAYANI vs COMELECG.R. No. 147589 - June 26, 2001
Facts:
Bagong Bayani and and Akbayan Citizens Party filed before the COMELEC a Petitionunder
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No. 3785 issued by
theCOMELEC. This resolution approved the participation of 154 organizations and
parties,including those impleaded, in the 2001 party list elections. Petitioners seek
thedisqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party list system
wasintended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented;
not the mainstream politicalparties
, the none-marginalized or overrepresented.
Issues: a. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections b.
Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented
sectors and organizations.
Held:
The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the COMELEC
which will determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and
organizations enumerated in the assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of
the Constitution and RA 7941. The resolution of this Court directed the COMELEC to
refrain proclaiming any winner during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until
after the COMELEC have compiled and reported its compliance
.a. Yes b. No.
Rationale:
a. Political parties, even the major ones, may participate in the party-list elections
. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents
cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are
political parties.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of
Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations."Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of
the Constitution,
political parties may be registered under the party-list system
. For its part, Section 2of RA 7941 also provides for "a party-list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x." Section 3
expressly states that a "party" is "either a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of
parties."
b.
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean,
however, that any political party -- or any organization or group for that matter
may do so. The requisite character of these parties or organizations must be
consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution
and RA7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution.
The provision on the party-list system is not self-executory
. It is, in fact, interspersed with phrases like "in accordance with law" or "as may be provided
by law"; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in granite the lofty objective of the Constitution.
Hence, RA 7941 was enacted.
2.
QUALIFICATIONS
a. District Representatives
May 7, 1995 COMELEC en banc denied Marcos Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution drafted on April 24.
May 11, 1995 COMELEC issued another Resolution allowing Marcos proclamation to the
office should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes.
However, this was reversed and instead directed that the proclamation would be suspended
even if she did win.
May 25, 1995 In a supplemental petitition, Marcos declared that she was the winner of the
said Congressional election.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1) WON plaintiff had established legal residency required to be a voter, and thus
candidate, of the first district of Leyte. Yes.
It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy
which out to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied
the constitutions residency qualification requirement (as intended by the framers
of the constitution)2. The confusion of the honest mistake made when filed her
Certificate of Candidacy can be attributed to the fact that the entry for residence is
immediately followed by the entry for the number of years and months in the
residence where the candidate seeks to hold office immediately after the elections.
This honest mistake should not be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the
First District. The instances (i.e. when Marcos lived in Manila and Ilocos after
marrying her husband) used by the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos were only
actual residences incurred during their marriage; and as such, she was required to
change residences and apply for voters registration in these cited locations. When
she got married to the late dictator, it cannot be argued that she lost her domicile of
origin by operation of law stated in Article 110 of the CC3 and further contemplated
in Article 1094 of the same code. It is the husbands right to transfer residences to
wherever he might see fit to raise a family. Thus, the relocation does not mean or
intend to lose the wifes domicile of origin. After the death of her husband, her
choice of domicle was Tacloban, Leyte as expressed when she wrote the PCGG
chairman seeking permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in Tacloban and
their farm in Olot, Leyte.
(2) WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in disqualifying the plaintiff under Article 78
of the Omnibus Election Code had already lapsed, thereby transmitting jurisdiction
to the House of Representatives. Yes.
The mischief in petitioners contention lies in the fact that our courts and other
quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground
of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period. In any
event, Sections 6
2. As discussed during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution by Mr. Nolledo
and Mr. Davide, and Mrs. Rosario and Mr. De Los Reyes in the RECORD OF THE
1987 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVETION July 22, 1986.
3. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the
wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of
the Republic.
4. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect
and fidelity, and render mutual help and support. and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to
Sec. 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose
jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Sec. 78 of
B.P. 881 even after the elections.
(3) WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction over
the question of the petitioners qualifications after the elections. No.
The HRETs jurisdiction of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a
member of the House of Representatives.
Aquino v COMELEC (1995)
On 20 March 1995, Agapito A. Aquino, the petitioner, filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Representative for the new (remember: newly created) Second Legislative
District of Makati City. In his certificate of candidacy, Aquino stated that he was a resident of
the aforementioned district (284 Amapola Cor. Adalla Sts., Palm Village, Makati) for 10
months.
Move Makati, a registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of LAKAS-NUCDUMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Aquino on the ground
that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which
under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, should be for a period not less than one
year preceding the (May 8, 1995) day of the election.
Faced with a petition for disqualification, Aquino amended the entry on his residency in his
certificate of candidacy to 1 year and 13 days. The Commission on Elections passed a
resolution that dismissed the petition on May 6 and allowed Aquino to run in the election of 8
May. Aquino, with 38,547 votes, won against Augusto Syjuco with 35,910 votes.
Move Makati filed a motion of reconsideration with the Comelec, to which, on May 15, the
latter acted with an order suspending the proclamation of Aquino until the Commission
resolved the issue. On 2 June, the Commission on Elections found Aquino ineligible and
disqualified for the elective office for lack of constitutional qualification of residence.
Aquino then filed a Petition of Certiorari assailing the May 15 and June 2 orders.
Issue:
1. Whether residency in the certificate of candidacy actually connotes domicile to warrant
the disqualification of Aquino from the position in the electoral district.
2. WON it is proven that Aquino has established domicile of choice and not just residence
(not in the sense of the COC)in the district he was running in.
Held:
1. Yes, The term residence has always been understood as synonymous with domicile
not only under the previous constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court
cited the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission wherein this principle was applied.
Mr. Nolledo:
I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of elections.
What is the Committees concept of residence for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is
it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide:
This is in the district, for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of election.
This was in effect lifted from the 1973 constituition, the interpretation given to it was
domicile.
Mrs. Braid:
On section 7, page2, Noledo has raised the same point that resident has been interpreted at
times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Decision
Instant petition dismissed. Order restraining respondent Comelec from proclaiming the
candidate garnering the next highest number of votes in the congressional elections of
Second district of Makati City made permanent.
Dicta:
I. Aquinos petition of certiorari contents were:
A. The Comelecs lack of jurisdiction to determine the disqualification issue involving
congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections, such determination reserved with
the house of representatives electional tribunal
B. Even if the Comelec has jurisdiction, the jurisdiction ceased in the instant case after the
elections and the remedy to the adverse parties lies in another forum which is the HR
Electoral Tribunal consistent with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
C. The COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion when it proceeded to promulagate
its questioned decision despite its own recognition that a threshold issue of jurisdiction has
to be judiciously reviewed again, assuming arguendo that the Comelec has jurisdiction
D. The Comelecs finding of non-compliance with the residency requirement of one year
against the petitioner is contrary to evidence and to applicable laws and jurisprudence.
E. The Comelec erred in failing to appreciate the legal impossibility of enforcing the one
year residency requirement of Congressional candidates in newly created political districts
which were only existing for less than a year at the time of the election and barely four
months in the case of petitioners district in Makati.
F. The Comelec committed serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered
the board of canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified
candidates after the erroneous disqualification of the petitioner in disregard of the doctrine
that a second place candidate or a person who was repudiated by the electorate is a loser
and cannot be proclaimed as substitute winner.
II. Modern day carpetbaggers cant be allowed to take advantage of the creation of new
political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves in such new districts, prejudicing their
genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of existing conditions in these areas.
III. according to COMELEC: The lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one
year residence requirement as a qualification for a candidate of the HR, by establishing a
commencement date of his residence. If a oerfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by itself
establish a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot be better.
Domino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999
Facts: Petitioner Domino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative
of the lone legislative district of the Province of Sarangani indicating that he has resided in
the constituency where he seeks to be elected for 1 year and 2 months. Private respondents
filed a petition seeking to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Domino, alleging that
Domino, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of candidacy, is not a resident, much
less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where he seeks election. Thereafter,
the COMELEC promulgated a resolution declaring Domino disqualified as candidate for the
position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani in the May 11, 1998 polls for lack
of the one-year residency requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate
of candidacy based on his own Voters Registration Record and his address indicated as 24
Bonifacio St., Ayala Hts., Old Balara, Quezon City.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner has resided in Sarangani Province for at least 1 year
immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections
Held: The term residence, as used in the law prescribing the qualifications for suffrage and
for elective office, means the same thing as domicile, which imports not only an intention
to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which,
whenever absent for business, pleasure, or some other reasons, one intends to return.
Records show that petitioners domicile of origin was Candon, Ilocos Sur and that sometime
in 1991, he acquired a new domicile of choice in Quezon City, as shown by his certificate of
candidacy for the position of representative of the Third District of Quezon City in the May
1995 election. Petitioner is now claiming that he had effectively abandoned his residence in
Quezon City and has established a new domicile of choice in the Province of Sarangani.
A persons domicile, once established, is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost
until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose.
The contract of lease of a house and lot entered into sometime in January 1997 does not
adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of Dominos
intention to reside in Sarangani, but it does not engender the kind of permanency required
to prove abandonment of ones original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his
permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result
in loss or change of domicile. Thus, the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot in
Sarangani cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period
of the one-year residence requirement. Further, Dominos lack of intention to abandon his
residence in Quezon City is strengthened by his act of registering as voter in Quezon City.
While voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of
residence especially in this case where Domino registered in his former barangay.
Bengzon vs HRET
The citizenship of respondent Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the constitutional
requirement that no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he
is a natural-born citizen.
Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in Tarlac in 1960 of Filipino
parents. In 1985, however, Cruz enlisted in the US Marine Corps and without the consent of
the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the USA. As a Consequence,
he lost his Filipino citizenship for under CA No. 63 [(An Act Providing for the Ways in Which
Philippine Citizenship May Be Lost or Reacquired (1936)] section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may
lose his citizenship by, among other, rendering service to or accepting commission in the
armed forces of a foreign country.
Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen in 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
In 1994, Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under RA 2630 [(An
Act Providing for Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Persons Who Lost Such
Citizenship by Rendering Service To, or Accepting Commission In, the Armed Forces of the
United States (1960)]. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the 2nd District
of Pangasinan in the 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Bengson who was then running
for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent HRET
claiming that Cruz was not qualified to become a member of the HOR since he is not a
natural-born citizen as required under Article VI, section 6 of the Constitution.
HRET rendered its decision dismissing the petition for quo warranto and declaring Cruz the
duly elected Representative in the said election.
ISSUE: WON Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an American citizen, can still be
considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.
HELD: petition dismissed
YES
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. C.A. No. 63 enumerates the 3 modes by which Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen:
1. by naturalization,
2. by repatriation, and
3. by direct act of Congress.
**
Repatriation may be had under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due to:
1. desertion of the armed forces;
2. services in the armed forces of the allied forces in World War II;
3. service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other time,
4. marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; and
5. political economic necessity
Repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality This means that a naturalized
Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino
citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 2630 provides:
Sec 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to, or
accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation from
the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may reacquire
Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and
registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he resides or last resided in
the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a renunciation of any other
citizenship.
Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited
provision, Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a
status which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father. It bears stressing that the
act of repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his
Philippine citizenship.
Mitra vs. Comelec July 2, 2010
Mitra was the incumbent representative of the 2nd district of Palawan and resided in Puerto
Prinsesa. Before the end of his second term, Puerto Prinsesa was reclassified as highly
urbanized city and thus ceased to be a component city of the Province of Palawan. An
effect of this declaration would be the ineligibility of the residents of Puerto Prinsesa to run
for provincial posts. More than a year before the 2010 elections, with the intention to run for
the position of Governor, Mitra transferred his voters registration record to the Municipality
of Aborlan and subsequently filed for his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) as Governor of
Palawan, as a resident of Aborlan.
Respondents Gonzales and Balbon, Jr. filed a petition to cancel Mitras COC on the grounds
that Mitra cannot claim that he was a resident of Aborlan on the following claims:
1.
Mitra bought a parcel of land in Aborlan, to which a house he constructed was not
yet completed
2.
Documents that show Mitras residence is in Puerto Prinsesa (i.e. Document of
Sales, Building Permit, tax certificate
3.
Affidavits of witnesses attesting that they had not seen Mitra in the municipality of
Aborlan
Mitra, on the other hand, claimed that his residence in Aborlan was in a residential portion of
a Maligaya Feedmill in Aborlan and presented the lease contract, attestations from some
neighbors that he resided in Aborlan , ID issued by the House of Representative that his
address is in Aborlan.
Comelec canceled his COC on the grounds that the evidences presented by Mitra is not
enough to sufficient to prove that he abandoned his domicile of origin and that physical
presence must be established to prove that he established his new domicile in Aborlan.
Issue:
Whether the Comelec exercised grave abuse its discretion by cancelling Mitras COC on the
grounds that there was false material misrepresentation in his declared residence
Held:
Yes. The Supreme Court found that Mitra did not commit any deliberate material
misrepresentation in his COC. From the start, Mitra never hid his intention to transfer his
residence from Puerto Prinsesa to Aborlan to comply with the residence requirement. The
law recognizes implicitly that there can be a change of domicile or residence, but imposes
only the condition that residence at the new place should at least be for a year, which Mitra
has complied. There was no falsity as Mitra transfer his residence within the period required.
Comelec has also failed to present any legally accepted basis to conclude that Mitras
statement in his COC regarding his residence was a misrepresentation.
REP. DANILO RAMON FERNANDEZ VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL and JESUS VICENTE, G.R. No. 187478, December 21, 2009
Petitioner filed for candidacy as Representative of the First Legislative District of the
Province of Laguna in the May 14, 2007 elections. In his Certificate of Candidacy (COC), he
indicated his complete/exact address as No. 13 Maharlika St., Villa Toledo Subdivision,
Barangay Balibago, Sta.Rosa City, Laguna (alleged Sta. Rosa residence). "Private
respondent Jesus L. Vicente (private respondent) filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to
and/or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and Petition for Disqualification before the Office of
the Provincial Election Supervisor of Laguna. He claimed that Fernandez made material
misrepresentation in his COC regarding his place of residence, because during past
elections, he had declared Pagsanjan, Laguna as his address, and Pagsanjan is located in
the Fourth Legislative District of the Province of Laguna. Private respondent likewise
claimed that petitioner maintained another house in Cabuyao, Laguna, which was also
outside the First District. On July 5, 2007, private respondent filed a petition for quo
warranto before the HRET, docketed as HRET CASE No. 07-034 , praying that petitioner be
declared ineligible to hold office as a Member of the House of Representatives representing
the First Legislative District of the Province of Laguna, and that petitioners election and
proclamation be annulled and declared null and void. The HRET ruled in favor of private
st
respondent and held that Fernandez was not qualified to be the representative of the 1
District of Laguna since he failed to comply with the residence requirement under Section 6,
Art. VI of the Constitution.
Issue: Is Fernandez a resident of Sta. Rosa, Laguna where he does not even a house there
th
in because his house is found Pagsanjan, Laguna, which is within the 4 Legislative District
of Laguna?
Held: Fernandez does not deny that his domicile of origin is Pagsanjan in the Fourth District
of Laguna. Pagsanjan is his domicile of origin, or since his birth, where he formerly ran for
provincial Board Member of Laguna in 1998, for Vice-Governor of Laguna in 2001 and for
Governor of Laguna in2004. In all his Certificates of Candidacy when he ran for these
positions, he indicated under oath that his domicile or permanent residence was in
Pagsanjan in the Fourth District of Laguna, not in the First District where he later ran in the
last elections. Petitioner alleges that in the questioned Decision, the HRET added a new
qualification requirement for candidates seeking election to the position of Member of the
House of Representatives, and that is, they must be real property owners or must have a
house to reside in the legislative district where they seek election. We find the interpretation
of the HRET of the residency requirement under the Constitution to be overly restrictive and
unwarranted under the factual circumstances of this case .The HRET puts undue emphasis
on the fact that petitioner is only leasing a townhouse in Sta. Rosa while he owns houses in
Pagsanjan and Cabuyao. His ownership of properties in other places has been taken to
mean that petitioner did not intend to make Sta. Rosa his permanent residence or that he
had not abandoned his domicile of origin. Although it is true that the latest acquired abode is
not necessarily the domicile of choice of a candidate, there is nothing in the Constitution or
our election laws which require a congressional candidate to sell a previously acquired
home in one district and buy a new one in the place where he seeks to run in order to
qualify for a congressional seat in that other district. Neither do we see the fact that
petitioner was only leasing a residence in Sta. Rosa at the time of his candidacy as a barrier
for him to run in that district. Certainly, the Constitution does not require a congressional
candidate to be a property owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he
resides in that district for at least a year prior to election day. To use ownership of property
in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies
that only the landed can establish compliance with the residency requirement. This Court
would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office, which
property requirement would be unconstitutional.
b.
Party Nominees
FILLING OF VACANCY
1969; while the term of the members of the House who participated in the approval of said
Act expired on December 30, 1965.
Issue: Does Sec. 14(now Sec. 10) of the Constitution require that not only the term of all the
members of the House but also that of all the Senators who approved the increase must
have fully expired before the increase becomes effective?
Held: In establishing what might be termed a waiting period before the increased
compensation for legislators becomes fully effective, the Constitutional provision refers to
all members of the Senate and the House of Representatives in the same sentence, as a
single unit, without distinction or separation between them. This unitary treatment is
emphasized by the fact that the provision speaks of the expiration of the full term of the
Senators and Representatives that approved the measure, using the singular form and not
the plural, thereby rendering more evident the intent to consider both houses for the
purpose as indivisible components of one single Legislature. The use of the word term in
the singular, when combined with the following phrase all the members of the Senate and
the House, underscores that in the application of Art. VI, Sec. 14(now Sec. 10), the
fundamental consideration is that the terms of office of all members of the Legislature that
enacted the measure must have expired before the increase in compensation can become
operative.
The Court agreed with petitioner that the increased compensation provided by RA 4134 is
not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and
House that approved it will have expired.
LIGOT vs MATHAY
Ligot served as a member of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the
Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering a twelve-year span from
December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969. During his second term in office (1961-1965),
RA 4134 fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and certain other officials of the
national government was enacted into law and under section 7 thereof took effect on July
1, 1964. The salaries of members of Congress (senators and congressman) were increased
under said Act from P7,200.00 to P32,000.00 per annum, but the Act expressly provided
that said increases shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Ligots term expired on December 30, 1969, so he filed a claim for retirement under
Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by RA 4968 which provided for
retirement gratuity of any official or employee, appointive or elective, with a total of at least
twenty years of service, the last three years of which are continuous on the basis therein
provided in case of employees based on the highest rate received and in case of elected
officials on the rates of pay as provided by law. HOR granted his petition however, Velasco,
the then Congress Auditor refused to so issue certification. The Auditor General then,
Mathay, also disallowed the same. The thrust of Ligots appeal is that his claim for
retirement gratuity computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum
for members of Congress (which was not applied to him during his incumbency which ended
December 30, 1969, while the Court held in Philconsa vs. Mathay that such increases would
become operative only for members of Congress elected to serve therein commencing
December 30, 1969) should not have been disallowed, because at the time of his
retirement, the increased salary for members of Congress as provided by law (under
Republic Act 4134) was already P32,000.00 per annum.
MARTINEZ vs MORFE
Petitioners Manuel Martinez y Festin and Fernando Bautista, Sr., as delegates of the
present Constitutional Convention would invoke what they consider to be the protection of
the above constitutional provision, if considered in connection with Article 145 of the
Revised Penal Code penalizing a public officer or employee who shall, during the sessions
of Congress, arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such member has
committed a crime punishable under [such] Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor.
For under the Constitutional Convention Act, delegates are entitled to the parliamentary
immunities of a senator or a representative. Both petitioners are facing criminal
prosecutions, the information filed against petitioner Manuel Martinez y Festin for
falsification of a public document and two informations against petitioner Fernando Bautista,
Sr. for violation of the Revised Election Code. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the
respondent Judges in the above proceedings, would dispute such a contention on the
ground that the constitutional provision does not cover any criminal prosecution being
merely an exemption from arrest in civil cases, the logical inference being that insofar as a
provision of the Revised Penal Code would expand such an immunity, it would be
unconstitutional or at the very least inoperative.
ISSUE: Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest.
HELD: There is, to be sure, a full recognition of the necessity to have members of
Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost
freedom to enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities, bowing to no other force
except the dictates of their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speech
should be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest, however, it would amount
to the creation of a privileged class, without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their
liability for a criminal offense, they would be considered immune during their attendance in
Congress and in going to and returning from the same. There is likely to be no dissent from
the proposition that a legislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently and well,
without the need for any transgression of the criminal law. Should such an unfortunate event
come to pass, he is to be treated like any other citizen considering that there is a strong
public interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished. To the fear that may be
expressed that the prosecuting arm of the government might unjustly go after legislators
belonging to the minority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguards thrown
around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of the rights of an individual, would
constitute an obstacle to such an attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is
that the judiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in each and every
manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is of the essence. Petitioners cannot claim
their claim to immunity.
***According to Art. VI, Sec. 15 of the Constitution: The Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace,
be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not
be questioned in any other place.
EXEMPTION: They can be arrested in cases of Treason, Felony and Breach of Peace.
Treason exists when the accused levies war against the Republic or adheres to its enemies
giving them aid and comfort. A felony is act or omission punishable by law. Breach of the
peace covers any offense whether defined by the Revised Penal Code or any special
statute. It is a well-settled principle in public law that the public peace must be maintained
and any breach thereof renders one susceptible to prosecution. Petitioners cannot claim
their claim to immunity.
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS
Feb. 3, 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member of Congress who is
confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape and acts of
lasciviousness is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of
a non-bailable offense on the basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents
to be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to discharge mandate as
member of House of Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. However, inspite of its
importance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be enlarged or
restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always been
granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an exemption as a special privilege
cannot be extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by
intendment, implication or equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be exempted from the
operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The
strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal action. That the cited provisions apply equally
to rape and coup dtat cases, both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil.
Within the class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is
clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the crime
charged.
In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for bail and for release
on recognizance was denied. The determination that the evidence of guilt is strong, whether
ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of
conviction, justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to
provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such
cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies
equally to detention prisoners like Trillanes or convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.
The Court in People v. Hon. Maceda said that all prisoners whether under preventive
detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in any
business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a
necessary consequence of arrest and detention.
Trillanes election as Senator not a legislative justification to allow him to serve his mandate
The case against Trillanes is not administrative in nature. And there is no "prior term" to
speak of. In a plethora of cases, the Court categorically held that the doctrine of
condonation does not apply to criminal cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to
office, does not obliterate a criminal charge. Petitioner's electoral victory only signifies
pertinently that when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full awareness
of the limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he could
achieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison.
It is opportune to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the
voice of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the Constitution
and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be harmonized by the overarching
tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the Constitution which the people themselves
ordained to govern all under the rule of law. The performance of legitimate and even
essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in
prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accusedappellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The
accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 membersof the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress
continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x x x
Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from
those others who are validly restrained by law.
Trillanes case fails to compare with the species of allowable leaves
Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners,
at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders. That this discretion was gravely
abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial court previously allowed petitioner to
register as a voter in December 2006, file his certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast
his vote on May 14, 2007, be proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office on
June 29, 2007. In a seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be
accused of taking a complete turn-around, petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to
him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.
b.
Jimenez vs Cabangbang
Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and Chairman of its
Committee on National Defense. On 14 Nov 1958, Cabangbang caused the publication of
an open letter addressed to the Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been
allegedly three operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers, with
the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists have had collusions with
communists and that the Secretary of Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup dtat to
place him as the president. The planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others,
under their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are being used
as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have been published in newspapers of
general circulation. Jimenez then filed a case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of
damages against Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbangs statement is libelous.
Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that as a member of
the HOR he is immune from suit and that he is covered by the privileged communication
rule and that the said letter is not even libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege communication endowed to
members of Congress. Whether or not the said letter is libelous.
HELD: Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace.
Be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall not
be questioned in any other place. The publication of the said letter is not covered by said
expression which refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance of their
official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of
Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in Congress, whether the
same is in session or not, and other acts performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or
outside the premises housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members
of Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as
such at the time of the performance of the acts in question. Congress was not in session
when the letter was published and at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of
the said letter. It is obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he
was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer of any
Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by the lower court the said
communication is not absolutely privileged.
The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support Jimenez action for
damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the persons
unnamed therein alluded to as planners, and that, having been handpicked by Vargas, it
should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that it is of course possible that plaintiffs
are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have absolutely no knowledge. In other
words, the very document upon which plaintiffs action is based explicitly indicates that they
might be absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely
unwitting tools of the planners. The SC does not think that this statement is derogatory to
Jimenez to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they are officers
of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of
National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to suggest
that the group therein described as planners include these two (2) high ranking officers.
Petition is dismissed.
Osmena vs Pendatun
Then Congressman Osmea Jr filed a verified petition for declaratory relief, prohibition and
certiorari with preliminary injunction against Congressman Pendatun and others in their
capacity as members of the Special Committee created by House Resolution 59. He asked
for the annulment of the resolution on the ground of infringement upon his parliamentary
immunity. He further asked that the respondents should not require him to substantiate his
charges against the president with the admonition that if he failed to do so he must show
cause why the House should not punish him. Said charges emanated from his one-hour
privileged speech entitled A Message to Garcia, which constituted a serious assault upon
the dignity of Garcia as the then President.
ISSUE: Whether or not Osmeas immunity has been violated?
HELD: Section 15, Article 6 of the 1935 Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity upon
member s of the legislature which is a fundamental privilege cherished in every parliament
in a democratic world. It guarantees the legislator complete freedom of expression without
fear of being made responsible in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside the Hall of Congress. However, it does not protect him from responsibility
before the legislative body whenever his words and conduct are considered disorderly or
unbecoming of a member therein. Therefore, Osmeas petition is dismissed.
Antero J. Pobre vs. Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago, A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009
In the recent administrative case of ANTERO J. POBRE vs. Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSORSANTIAGO, A.C. No. 7399, August 25, 2009, the Philippine Supreme Court dismissed the
letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-Santiago,
conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, but castigated, so to speak, the feisty
and aggressive, if not foul-mouth, respondent lady senator for using what I would call
intemperate and hate-filled language in a privilege speech she had delivered before the
Philippine Senate which was directed against the Philippine Supreme Court Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).
The JBC had previously rejected her nomination as Chief Justice of the Philippine Supreme
Court.
I am truly glad the JBC had rejected her nomination to the highest tribunal of the land,
considering her notorious public image as a war-freak person.
In the aforecited case, although the Court held that the privilege speech of the combative
lady senator was not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of
Court, it however expressed its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a
member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the
Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good
be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and success for it is
indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and that he should
be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that
liberty may occasion offense, the Court said, citing previous decided cases.
Without parliamentary immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite
and ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the uninhibited
discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private indulgence, but for the public good.
The privilege would be of little value if they could be subjected to the cost and
inconvenience and distractions of a trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard
of a judgment against them based upon a judges speculation as to the motives.
The Court said that it does not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner
they perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any claim of an
unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement uttered by the member of
the Congress does not destroy the privilege. The disciplinary authority of the assembly and
the voters, not the courts, can properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the
name of parliamentary immunity.
Although the Court held that the privilege speech of the combative lady senator was not
actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court, it felt,
however, expressed its deep concern about the language Senator Santiago, a member of
the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the administration of justice. To the Court, the
lady senator has undoubtedly crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct.
It is at once apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly improper
in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she wanted to spit on the face of
Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, and calling the
Court a Supreme Court of idiots.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be
allowed to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. The Court stated that in this case, the
lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which respectively provide:
"Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which
is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
"Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others."
It will be noted that Senator/Atty. Santiago was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law
professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law, an author of
numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land. Needless to stress, Senator
Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of the court, like any other, was duty-bound to
uphold the dignity and authority of this Court and to maintain the respect due its members.
Lawyers in public service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private practice.
Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her
statements would make on the peoples faith in the integrity of the courts.
The Court stressed that a careful re-reading of her foul and repulsive utterances would
readily show that her statements were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not
being considered for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were
outside the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity must
not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy the reputation of the
Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal wrath and disgust. Authorities are
agreed that parliamentary immunity is not an individual privilege accorded the individual
members of the Parliament or Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for
the benefit of the people and the institution that represents them.
The Court stated that Senator Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to what she
considered as an unjust act the JBC had taken in connection with her application for the
position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Courts supervision, its
individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the JBCs ex-officio
chairperson, have no official duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the position of
Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiagos wholesale and
indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical and
defamatory words against all of them.
As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that it is the duty of a lawyer to
maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the temporary
incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its supreme importance. That
same canon, as a corollary, makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the
courts against unjust criticism and clamor. And more. The attorneys oath solemnly binds
him to a conduct that should be with all good fidelity to the courts.
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an instrument or agency to
advance the ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts to
which he owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Faith in the
courts, a lawyer should seek to preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous
to the continuity of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus
has it been said of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to
help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so
essential to the proper administration of justice.
The Court in a subtle way criticized the Senate itself for neglecting its duty to discipline the
respondent senator for her offensive language. The Rules of the Senate itself contains a
provision on Unparliamentary Acts and Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under
any circumstance, offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any
public institution. But as to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the Senate
President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred the matter to the Senate
Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action, as the Rules dictates under such
circumstance. The lady senator clearly violated the rules of her own chamber. It is
unfortunate that her peers bent backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.
3.
Puyat vs De Guzman
On 14 May 1979, Puyat and his group were elected as directors of the International Pipe
Industries. The election was subsequently questioned by Acero (Puyats rival) claiming that
the votes were not properly counted hence he filed a quo warranto proceeding before the
Securities and Exchange Commission on 25 May 1979. Prior to Aceros filing of the case,
Estanislao Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa purchased ten
shares of stock of IPI from a member of Aceros group. And during a conference held by
SEC Commissioner de Guzman (from May 25-31 79) to have the parties confer with each
other, Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Acero. Puyat objected
arguing that it is unconstitutional for an assemblyman to appear as counsel (to anyone)
before any administrative body (such as the SEC). This being cleared, Fernandez inhibited
himself from appearing as counsel for Acero. He instead filed an Urgent Motion for
Intervention in this said SEC case for him to intervene not as a counsel but as a legal owner
of IPI shares and as a person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. The SEC
Commissioner granted the motion in effect granting Fernandez leave to intervene. Puyat
then moved to question the Commissioners action.
ISSUE: Whether or not Fernandez, acting as a stockholder of IPI, can appear and intervene
in the SEC case without violating the constitutional provision that an assemblyman must not
appear as counsel in such courts or bodies?
HELD: No, Fernandez cannot appear before the SEC body under the guise that he is not
appearing as a counsel. Even though he is a stockholder and that he has a legal interest in
the matter in litigation he is still barred from appearing. He bought the stocks before the
litigation took place. During the conference he presented himself as counsel but because it
is clearly stated that he cannot do so under the constitution he instead presented himself as
a party of interest which is clearly a work around and is clearly an act after the fact. A
mere work around to get himself involved in the litigation. What could not be done directly
could not likewise be done indirectly.
Liban vs. Gordon (2009)
Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the QC Red Cross Chapter while
Respondent is the Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of
Governors.
Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors,
respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate - Sec. 13, Art. VI, 1987 Consti: No
Senator or Member of the HoR may hold any other office/employment in the Govt, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including govt-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term w/o forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be
appointed to any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased
during the term for which he was elected).
Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC which held that PNRC is a govt-owned or
controlled corporation. Flores v. Drilon held that incumbent national legislators lose their
elective posts upon their appointment to another government office.
Respondent:
Petitioners have no standing to file petition w/c appears to be an action for quo warranto
they do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent.
Sec. 11, Rule 66, Rules of Civil Procedure: action should be commenced w/in 1 year
after the cause of public officers forfeiture of office respondent has been working as a
Red Cross volunteer for 40 yrs
Petitioners cannot raise a constitutional question as taxpayers no claim that they
suffered some actual damage/threatened injury or illegal disbursement of public funds
If petition is for declaratory relief, SC has no jurisdiction original jurisdiction in RTC
PNRC is not a govt owned/controlled corporation
Sec. 13, Art. VI of Consti does not apply because volunteer service to PNRC is not an
office/employment
those whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law. The law may also authorize
the heads of deparments, agencies, commissions, or boards to appoint officers lower in
rank.
The vast majority of the thousands of PNRC members are private individuals, including
students and foreigners; those contribute to the annual fund campaign of the PNRC (Sec. 5,
PNRC Charter amended by PD 1264).
Sec. 2(13) of he Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code of 1987: A govtowned or controlled corporation must be owned by the govt, and in case of a stock
corporation, at least a majority of its capital stock must be owned by the govt. In case of a
non-stock corporation, at least a majority of the members must be govt officials holding
such membership by appointment/designation by the govt.
WON the office of the PNRC Chairman is a govt office or an office in a governmentowned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13, Art. VI of
Consti.
SC: The office of the PNRC Chairman is a private office. The President cannot review,
reverse or modify the decisions/actions of the PNRC Board and the PNRC Chairman. Only
the PNRC Board can review, reverse or modify the decisions/actions of the PNRC
Chairman.
*The PNRC Charter is Violative of the Constitutional Proscription against the Creation
of Private Corporations by Special Law
1935 (Sec. 7 was in force when PNRC was created by special character on March 22,
1947), 1973 & 1987 (Sec. 16) Constitutions provide that: The Congress shall not, except by
general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations.
Govt-owned or controlled corporations may be created/established by special charters in
the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
Feliciano v. CoA Sec. 16 of 1987 Consti bans private corporations to be created by
special charters, which historically gave individuals, families or groups special privileges
denied to other citizens.
PNRC was created through a special charter, however, the elements of govt ownership
and control (e.g. capital assets and operating funds from govt) are clearly lacking in the
PNRC. It therefore cannot be considered a govt-owned or controlled corporation.
In creating PNRC as a corporate entity, Congress was in fact creating a private
corporation, which is not exempt from constitutional prohibition (Sec. 16 above) even as a
non-profit/charitable corporation.
PNRC Charter insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation and grants it
corporate powers is void for being unconstitutional Sec. 1-13 are void. Other provisions
remain valid as they can be considered as a recognition by the State that PNRC is the local
National Society of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and thus
entitled to the benefits, exemptions and privileges set forth in the PNRC Charter. They also
implement the Phil. Govts treaty obligations based on the Geneva Conventions.
Judgment: Office of the PNRC Chairman declared not a government office.
Dissent: Nachura, J.
The petition is one for prohibition and petitioners have legal standing as citizens
and taxpayers. The remedy sought is preventive and restrictive, an injunction against an
alleged continuing violation of the fundamental law. They raise a constitutional issue, w/o
claiming any entitlement to either the Senate seat or chairmanship of PNRC. The Court has
full authority and bounden duty to assume jurisdiction to determine WON other branches of
govt have kept themselves w/in the limits of the Consti & laws and have not abused
discretion given them.
PNRC is a govt-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC). Its charter does not
violate the constitutional proscription against creation of private corporations by
special law. PNRC was incorporated under RA 95, a special law. It cannot be anything but
a GOCC. PNRC was not impliedly converted into a private corporation simply because its
charter was amended to vest in it authority to secure loans, be exempted from payment of
all duties, tax fees, etc.
The use of Sec. 2(13) of Introductory Provisions of Administrative Code of 1987 by the
ponencia to define a GOCC does not pronounce a definition of a GOCC that strays from
Sec. 16, Art. XII of Consti. It merely declares that a GOCC may either be a stock or nonstock corporation.
Sec. 1 of PNRC Charter PNRC is officially designated to assist the RP in discharging
the obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions therefore, it is engaged in the
performance of the govts public functions.
PNRC is endowed w/ corporate powers. It administers special funds contributions of
members, aid given by govt, supported by PCSO and LGUs. It submits annual reports
receipts and disbursement to the President.
ANRC (precursor of PNRC) is considered a federal instrumentality immunity from state
taxation, subjected to governmental supervision & regular financial audit, principal officer
appointed by the President but remains an independent, volunteer-led org. No basis to
assume that it cannot merit the trust of all and cannot effectively carry out mission as a
National Red Cross Society. Separatists & insurgents do not consider them as the enemy
but as the entity to turn to in the event of injury.
Considering that PNRC is a GOCC, its charter does not violate the constitutional
provision (Sec. 16, Art. XII).
To declare Sec. 1 of PNRC Charter (creation and incorporation of the org) invalid and
the rest valid is to reach an absurd situation in w/c obligations are imposed on and a
framework for its operation is laid down for a legally non-existing entity. Sec. 2-17 of RA 95
are not separable from Sec. 1 cannot stand independently no separability clause.
Presumption of constitutionality of law is presumed. There is no clear showing that the
PNRC Charter runs counter to the consti. All reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor
of the constitutionality of the statute.
Deleterious effects will result if PNRC is declared a private corporation employees will
no longer be covered by the GSIS; it can no longer be extended tax exemptions and official
immunity; and cannot anymore be given support, financial or otherwise, by the National
Govt, LGUs, and PCSO. The Court must not arbitrarily declare a law unconstitutional just to
save a single individual from unavoidable consequences of his transgression of the Consti
even if done in good faith.
Sen. Gordons continuous occupancy of 2 incompatible positions is a clear
violation of the Consti (Sec. 13, Art. VI). The language in the provision is unambiguous;
requires no in-depth construction. A position held in an ex officio capacity (a second post
held by virtue of the functions of the first office) does not violate such constitutional
proscription. The chairmanship of the PNRC Board is not held in an ex officio capacity by a
member of Congress.
members
of
the
Senate
to
continue
the
session
in
order not to paralyze the functions of the Senate. Tanada was subsequently recognized to
deliver his speech. Later, Arranz yielded to Sanidads Resolution (No. 68) that Cuenco be
1. Officers, Quorum
elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was even recognized
by the President of the Philippines the following day. Cuenco took his oath of office
thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the
rightful Senate President.
On 18 Feb 1949, Senator Taada invoked his right to speak on the senate floor to formulate charges against the then Senate President Avelino.
He request to do so on the next session (21 Feb 1949). On the next session however,
opening
of the session
for about two
ISSUE:Avelino
Whether delayed
or not thethe
SC can
take cognizance
of the case.
hours. Upon insistent demand by Taada, Cuenco and Sanidad and others, Avelino was forced to open session. He however, together with his
allies initiated all dilatory and delaying tactics to forestall Taada from delivering
hisBypiece.
Motions
being
raised
by Taada
etcognizance
al were being
HELD:
a vote of
6 to 4, the
SC held
that they
cannot take
of the case. This is
blocked by Avelino and his allies and they even ruled Taada and Sanidad, among
as being
out of
Avelinos
moved
to
in others,
view of the
separation
of order.
powers, the
political camp
naturethen
of the
controversy
and the
adjourn the session due to the disorder. Sanidad however countered and they requested
said
to power
be placed
Avelinowhich power
constitutionalthe
grant
to adjournment
the Senate of the
to electinitsvoting.
own president,
just banged his gavel and he hurriedly left his chair and he was immediately followed
by be
hisinterfered
followers.
stood up,
andshould
askedabstain in this
should not
with, Senator
nor taken Cabili
over, bythen
the judiciary.
The SC
that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate abandonmentcase
of because
the Chair
by
the
Avelino,
made
it
incumbent
upon
Senate
the selection of the presiding officer affects only the Senators themselves
President Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue
session
in time
order
not totheir
paralyze
functions
of them.
the Anyway, if,
who arethe
at liberty
at any
to choose
officers, the
change
or reinstate
Senate. Tanada was subsequently recognized to deliver his speech. Later, Arranz
to Sanidads
Resolutionthe(No.
68)ofthat
Cuencowant
be petitioner to
as theyielded
petition must
imply to be acceptable,
majority
the Senators
elected as the Senate President. This was unanimously approved and was evenpreside,
recognized
by lies
thein President
of theHall
Philippines
following
his remedy
the Senate Session
not in thethe
Supreme
Court.
day. Cuenco took his oath of office thereafter. Avelino then filed a quo warranto proceeding before the SC to declare him as the rightful Senate
President.
ISSUE: Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the
resolution?
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation of
the morning session and that a minority of ten senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving
HELD: By a vote of 6 to 4, the SC held that they cannot take cognizance of the the
case.
is the
in view
of the et
separation
of powers,
the political
Hall,This
prevent
other (Cuenco
al) twelve senators
from passing
a resolution that met
nature of the controversy and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power
elect itsendorsement.
own president,
which
power
should
with theirtounanimous
The answer
might
be different
hadnot
the be
resolution been
interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. The SC should abstain in this case
because
selection
of the presiding officer affects only
approved
only by the
ten or
less.
the Senators themselves who are at liberty at any time to choose their officers, change
or reinstate
asSoto
thewas
petition
mustwhile
imply
**Two senators
were notthem.
presentAnyway,
that time. if,
Sen.
in a hospital
Sen. Confesor
to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy
lies
in
the
Senate
Session
Hall
not
in
the
Supreme
Court.
was in the USA.
ISSUE: Supposed the SC can take cognizance of the case, what will be the resolution?
ISSUE: Is the rump session (presided by Cuenco) a continuation of the morning
There is unanimity in the view that the session under Senator Arranz was a continuation
of the
and
a minority
tenWas there a
session (presided
by morning
Avelino)? session
Are there
twothat
sessions
in one of
day?
senators (Avelino et al) may not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other (Cuencoquorum
et al) twelve
senators
from
passing
a
resolution
that
met
with
constituting such session?
their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been
approved
only
ten or less.
The second
session
is aby
continuation
of the morning session as evidenced by the minutes
**Two senators were not present that time. Sen. Soto was in a hospital while Sen.entered
Confesor
in the There
USA. were 23 senators considered to be in session that time
into was
the journal.
(including Soto, excluding Confesor). Hence, twelve senators constitute a majority of the
Senate of twenty three senators. When the Constitution declares that a majority of each
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that the majority of all the members of
House shall constitute a quorum, the House does not mean all the members. Even a
the National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business and the fact that said provision
majority of all the members constitute the House. There is a difference between a majority
was amended in the Constitution of 1939, so as to read a majority of each House shall
of all the members of the House and a majority of the House, the latter requiring less
constitute a quorum to do business, shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution
number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all the members of the Senate
to base the majority, not on the number fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but
less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the purpose of a quorum.
on actual members or incumbents, and this must be limited to actual members who
Furthermore, even if the twelve did not constitute a quorum, they could have ordered the
arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had been so arrested, there would be
absence from the jurisdiction of the house or for other causes which make
no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been elected just the same
inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one abstained.
which each house is empowered to issue to compel its members to attend the
session in order to constitute a quorum. That the amendment was intentional or made
Avelino and his group (11 senators in all) insist that the SC take cognizance of the case and
for some purpose, and not a mere oversight, or for considering the use of the words of all
that they are willing to bind themselves to the decision of the SC whether it be right or
the members as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5) Title VI of the original
wrong. Avelino contends that there is no constitutional quorum when Cuenco was elected
president. There are 24 senators in all. Two are absentee senators; one being confined and
Assembly to expel a member was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present
the other abroad but this does not change the number of senators nor does it change the
House. Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the
NOT 12. There being only 12 senators when Cuenco was elected unanimously there was
jurisdiction of the Senate, the actual members of the Senate at its session of February 21,
no quorum.
The Supreme Court, by a vote of seven resolved to assume jurisdiction over the case in the
light of subsequent events which justify its intervention. The Chief Justice agrees with the
result of the majoritys pronouncement on the quorum upon the ground that, under the
peculiar circumstances of the case, the constitutional requirement in that regard has
become a mere formalism, it appearing from the evidence that any new session with a
quorum would result in Cuencos election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group,
taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing
compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the
Avelinos persistent efforts to block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason,
the SC believes that the Cuenco group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the
Constitution and that the majoritys ruling is in conformity with substantial justice and with
the requirements of public interest. Therefore Cuenco has been legally elected as Senate
President and the petition is dismissed.
Justice Feria: (Concurring)
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent
Guingona as the minority leader?
HELD: WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO
ORDERED.
In view of constitutional violation
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be
elected by a number constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not
provide that the members who will not vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the "minority",
who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no law or regulation states that the
defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
Definition of minority and majority
Majority may also refer to "the group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,"
not necessarily more than one half. This is sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast,
minority is "a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of votes or adherents than the
majority." Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality, the greater
number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority.
In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as pointed out by
petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be
identified by the Comelec as the "dominant minority party" for purposes of the general
elections. In the prevailing composition of the present Senate, members either belong to
different political parties or are independent. No constitutional or statutory provision
prescribes which of the many minority groups or the independents or a combination thereof
has the right to select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a
House Speaker, it is, however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in
both chambers of Congress. All that the Charter says is that "each House shall choose such
other officers as it may deem necessary." In this regard, the Constitution vests in each
house of Congress the power "to determine the rules of its proceedings."
Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern its internal
affairs. However, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and
minority leaders. Neither is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and
prescribing the manner of creating them or of choosing the holders thereof. At any rate,
such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant.
In view of usurpation
Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power
by one without color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto. A quo warranto proceeding
is the proper legal remedy to determine the right or title to the contested public office and to
oust the holder from its enjoyment. The action may be brought by the solicitor general or a
public prosecutor or any person claiming to be entitled to the public office or position
usurped or unlawfully held or exercise by another.
In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show
that he or she has a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of
the office allegedly usurped or unlawfully held by the respondent. In this case, petitioners
present not sufficient proof of a clear and indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate
minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize
any of his specific acts as minority leader.
In view of Fernans recognition of Guingona
"By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility."
By unanimous resolution of the members of this party that he be the minority leader, he
was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal recognition by Respondent
Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides were
liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment" or of "an arbitrary and despotic manner by
reason of passion or hostility." Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the
rules of the Senate has been clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or
overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done
within their competence and authority.
2. Internal Rules of Proceedings
ARROYO VS. DE VENECIA G.R. NO. 127255, AUGUST 14, 1997
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the House of
Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which petitioners
claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a violation of the
Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with certain
amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral committee submitted
its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made an interruption and
moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair declared the presence of
a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos interpellation of the
sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the approval and
ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for objections to the
motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the same time the Chair
was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker? The Chair and Rep.
Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo subsequently objected to
the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference committee report had by then
already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and
the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries of both Houses of
Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
rules of the House
HELD:Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as
they are primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They
may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to
conform to them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of
members has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body,
the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which
the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that
Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll
call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the
business of the House.
and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be
convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law,
but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits
which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative
proceedings have been filed against him.
In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of
Congress to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated
in the above constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon
determination by the Senate or the HOR, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This
is quite distinct from the suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a
Immigration and Deportation (CID) approved the application for legalization of the stay of
penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not
about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran
counter against RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of such is
But Santiago committed the said act when she was still the CID commissioner, can she still
also a violation of EO 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified aliens. The aliens
be suspended as a senator?
legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two other criminal
In issuing the preventive suspension of petitioner, the Sandiganbayan merely adhered to the
cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Garchitorena, presiding
clear an unequivocal mandate of the law, as well as the jurisprudence in which the SC has,
more than once, upheld Sandiganbayans authority to decree the suspension of public
provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car accident which was approved.
After a long series of appeals and court battles between Santiago and Sandiganbayan, in
Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must
1995 the latter moved for the suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then,
be suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which
from office. Sandiganbayan ordered the Senate president (Maceda) to suspend Santiago
he has been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word office would indicate
that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the
particular office under which he stands accused.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate
Santiago has not yet been convicted of the alleged crime, can she still be suspended?
The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a presuspension proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a
HELD: The Constitution provides that each house may determine the rules of its
proceeding to determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-
gravity of the offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence
thirds of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when
the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence
imposed, shall not exceed sixty days. On the other hand, Sec 13 of RA 3019 provides :
before the court could have a valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the
SEC. 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. any incumbent public officer against whom
trial of the case. All it secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the
any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of
validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he has not been afforded
the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds
the right to due preliminary investigation, that the acts imputed to him do not constitute a
specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds
that the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation were also published in
set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.
within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority effectively prevented it from
pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their members to the Ethics
Committee. Even Senator Villar called the Ethics Committee a kangaroo court and declared
that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics
Committee. Given the circumstances, the referral of the investigation to the Committee of
the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and approved
by a majority of the members of the Senate. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate
Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No.
187714, March 8, 2011.
-----------------------------Senate; Publication of Rules. Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the
Senate Committee of the Whole. Respondent counters that publication is not necessary
because the Senate Committee of the Whole merely adopted the Rules of the Ethics
Committee which had been published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009. Respondent
alleges that there is only one set of Rules that governs both the Ethics Committee and the
Senate Committee of the Whole. The SC held that the Constitution does not require
publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since rules of the House or the
Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or Senate, such rules need
not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their publication before the rules
can take effect. In this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
itself provide that the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even
if publication is not required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole is required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication.
To comply with due process requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal rules if
the rights of its own members are affected. Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate
Committee of the Whole represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No.
187714, March 8, 2011.
Senate; Quorum and Voting. If the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a
majority of the Senate is required to constitute a quorum to do business pursuant to Section
16(2), Article VI of the Constitution. Otherwise, there will be a circumvention of this express
provision of the Constitution on quorum requirement. Obviously, the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole require modification to comply with requirements of quorum and
voting which the Senate must have overlooked in this case. In any event, in case of conflict
between the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole and the Constitution, the latter will
of course prevail. . Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. v. Senate Committee of the Whole
represented by Senate President Juan Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011.
were not delivered to any listed merchant (Beliso not being one). And so the customs
officers conducted an investigation thereby discovering that the 25 barrels of wine actually
contained tins of opium. Since the ct of trading and dealing opium is against Act 2381, Pons
and Beliso were charged for illegally and fraudulently importing and introducing such
contraband material to the Philippines. Pons appealed the sentence arguing that Act 2381
was not approved while the Philippine Commission (Congress) was not in session. He said
that his witnesses claim that the said law was passed/approved on 01 March 1914 while the
special session of the Commission was adjourned at 12MN on 28 Feb 1914. Since this is
the case, Act 2381 should be null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must go beyond the recitals of the Journals to determine if
Act 2381 was indeed made a as law on 28 Feb 1914.
HELD: The SC looked into the Journals to ascertain the date of adjournment but the SC
refused to go beyond the recitals in the legislative Journals. The said Journals are
conclusive on the Court and to inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine
Legislature, when they are, as the SC have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both
the letter and the spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought
into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and
to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions of the Legislature. Pons witnesses
cannot be given due weight against the conclusiveness of the Journals which is an act of
the legislature. The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February
28, 1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind these
journals. The SC passed upon the conclusiveness of the enrolled bill in this particular case.
CASCO V. GIMENEZ 1963
Casco Chemical Co., which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues used in
bonding lumber and veneer by plywood and hardwood producers, bought foreign exchange
for the importation of urea and formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the
production of the said glues. They paid P33,765.42 in November and December 1949 and
P6345.72 in May 1960. Prior thereto, the petitioner sought the refund of the first and second
sum relying upon Resolution No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said bank, dated November
3, 1959, declaring that the separate importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from
said fee. The Auditor of the Bank, Pedro Gimenez, refused to pass in audit and approve the
said refund on the ground that the exemption granted by the board in not in accord with the
provision of section 2 of RA 2609.
ISSUE: Whether or Not Urea and formaldehyde are exempt by law from the payment of the
margin fee.
HELD: No, it is not exempt from payment of the marginal fee. Urea formaldehyde is clearly
a finished product which is distinct from urea and formaldehyde. The petitioners contends
that the bill approved in Congress contained the conjunction and between the terms urea
and formaldehyde separately as essential elements in the manufacture of urea
formaldehyde and not the latter. But this is not reflective of the view of the Senate and the
intent of the House of Representatives in passing the bill. If there has been any mistake in
the printing of the bill before it was passed the only remedy is by amendment or curative
legislation, not by judicial decree.
Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with cost against the petitioner.
ARROYO V. DE VENECIA 1997
Arroyo vs. De Venecia G.R. No. 127255, August 14, 1997
A petition was filed challenging the validity of RA 8240, which amends certain
provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code. Petitioners, who are members of the
House of Representatives, charged that there is violation of the rules of the House which
petitioners claim are constitutionally-mandated so that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of Representatives. The Senate approved it with
certain amendments. A bicameral conference committee was formed to reconcile the
disagreeing provisions of the House and Senate versions of the bill. The bicameral
committee submitted its report to the House. During the interpellations, Rep. Arroyo made
an interruption and moved to adjourn for lack of quorum. But after a roll call, the Chair
declared the presence of a quorum. The interpellation then proceeded. After Rep. Arroyos
interpellation of the sponsor of the committee report, Majority Leader Albano moved for the
approval and ratification of the conference committee report. The Chair called out for
objections to the motion. Then the Chair declared: There being none, approved. At the
same time the Chair was saying this, Rep. Arroyo was asking, What is thatMr. Speaker?
The Chair and Rep. Arroyo were talking simultaneously. Thus, although Rep. Arroyo
subsequently objected to the Majority Leaders motion, the approval of the conference
committee report had by then already been declared by the Chair.
On the same day, the bill was signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the Senate and certified by the respective secretaries
of both Houses of Congress. The enrolled bill was signed into law by President Ramos.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8240 is null and void because it was passed in violation of the
rules of the House
HELD:
Rules of each House of Congress are hardly permanent in character. They are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts ordinarily have no concern with their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere failure to conform to
them does not have the effect of nullifying the act taken if the requisite number of members
has agreed to a particular measure. But this is subject to qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule affects person other than members of the legislative body,
the question presented is necessarily judicial in character. Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private rights are involved.
The matter complained of concerns a matter of internal procedure of the House with which
the Court should not be concerned. The claim is not that there was no quorum but only that
Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented from questioning the presence of a quorum. Rep.
Arroyos earlier motion to adjourn for lack of quorum had already been defeated, as the roll
call established the existence of a quorum. The question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly especially when the quorum is obviously present for the purpose of delaying the
business of the House.
ASTORGA V. VILLEGAS 1974
Journal When to be Consulted
In 1964, Villegas (then Mayor of Manila) issued circulars to the department heads and chiefs
of offices of the city government as well as to the owners, operators and/or managers of
business establishments in Manila to disregard the provisions of RA 4065. He likewise
issued an order to the Chief of Police to recall five members of the city police force who had
been assigned to Vice-Mayor Astorga presumably under authority of RA 4065. Astorga
reacted against the steps carried out by Villegas. He then filed a petition with this Court on
September 7, 1964 for Mandamus, Injunction and/or Prohibition with Preliminary Mandatory
and Prohibitory Injunction to compel Villegas et al and the members of the municipal board
to comply with the provisions of RA 4065. Respondent denied recognition of RA 4065 (An
Act Defining the Powers, Rights and Duties of the Vice-Mayor of the City of Manila, Further
Amending for the Purpose Sections Ten and Eleven of Republic Act Numbered Four
Hundred Nine, as Amended, Otherwise Known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila)
because the said law was considered to have never been enacted. When the this said law
rd
passed the 3 reading in the lower house as HB 9266, it was sent to the Senate which
referred it to the Committee on Provinces and Municipal Governments and Cities headed by
Senator Roxas. Some minor amendments were made before the bill was referred back to
the Senate floor for deliberations. During such deliberations, Sen. Tolentino made significant
amendments which were subsequently approved by the Senate. The bill was then sent back
to the HOR and was thereafter approved by the HOR. The bill was sent to the President for
approval and it became RA 4065. It was later found out however that the copy signed by the
Senate President, sent to the HOR for approval and sent to the President for signing was
the wrong version. It was in fact the version that had no amendments thereto. It was not the
version as amended by Tolentino and as validly approved by the Senate. Due to this fact,
In the case, no rights of private individuals are involved but only those of a member who,
instead of seeking redress in the House, chose to transfer the dispute to the Court.
the Senate president and the President of the Philippines withdrew and invalidated their
signatures that they affixed on the said law. Astorga maintains that the RA is still vald and
readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after the
binding and that the withdrawal of the concerned signatures does not invalidate the statute.
1 reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate
Astorga further maintains that the attestation of the presiding officers of Congress is
passed its own version known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate
could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with the text of
st
SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate version just becomes the
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC must look into the Journal to determine if the said law was
validly enacted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Petitioners are correct in saying that since Republic Act No.
HELD: The journal of the proceedings of each House of Congress is no ordinary record.
7716 did not "originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI,
The Constitution requires it. While it is true that the journal is not authenticated and is
Section 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two
subject to the risks of misprinting and other errors, the journal can be looked upon in this
case. This SC is merely asked to inquire whether the text of House Bill No. 9266 signed by
the President was the same text passed by both Houses of Congress. Under the specific
HELD: This argument will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue
facts and circumstances of this case, the SC can do this and resort to the Senate journal for
the purpose. The journal discloses that substantial and lengthy amendments were
introduced on the floor and approved by the Senate but were not incorporated in the printed
may undergo such extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the
text sent to the President and signed by him. Note however that the SC is not asked to
whole. The possibility of a third version by the conference committee will be discussed later.
incorporate such amendments into the alleged law but only to declare that the bill was not
At this point, what is important to note is that, as a result of the Senate action, a distinct bill
duly enacted and therefore did not become law. As done by both the President of the
may be produced. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the
Senate and the Chief Executive, when they withdrew their signatures therein, the SC also
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same
declares that the bill intended to be as it is supposed to be was never made into law. To
as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only to "concur with
perpetuate that error by disregarding such rectification and holding that the erroneous bill
has become law would be to sacrifice truth to fiction and bring about mischievous
legislative power of the two houses of Congress and in fact make the House superior to the
Senate.
What the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff, or tax bills,
bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must
come from the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the
districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local needs
and problems. On the other hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to
approach the same problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to
That upon the certification of a bill by the President, the requirement of three readings on
separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the
weight of legislative practice.
Nor does the Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of
its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld
Third. Finally it is contended that the bill which became Republic Act No. 7716 is the bill
which the Conference Committee prepared by consolidating H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630.
It is claimed that the Conference Committee report included provisions not found in either
We now pass to the next argument of petitioners that S. No. 1630 did not pass three
the House bill or the Senate bill and that these provisions were "surreptitiously" inserted by
readings on separate days as required by the Constitution[8] because the second and third
readings were done on the same day, March 24, 1994. But this was because on February
24, 1994[9] and again on March 22, 1994,[10] the President had certified S. No. 1630 as
this Court recently held that it is within the power of a conference committee to include in its
urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but
report an entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the Senate
also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the President
bill.[17] If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one or two provisions,
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in Art. VI, Section 26[2] qualifies
the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: [i] the bill has passed three
readings on separate days and [ii] t has been printed in its final form and distributed three
subject of the bills before the committee. After all, its report was not final but needed the
In other words, the "unless" clause must be read in relation to the "except" clause, because
the two are really coordinate clauses of the same sentence. To construe the "except" clause
as simply dispensing with the second requirement in the "unless" clause [i.e., printing and
Fourth. Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716
distribution three days before final approval] would not only violate the rules of grammar. It
must be resolved in its favor. Our cases[20] manifest firm adherence to the rule that an
would also negate the very premise of the "except" clause: the necessity of securing the
enrolled copy of a bill is conclusive not only of its provisions but also of its due enactment.
But where allegations that the constitutional procedures for the passage of bills have not
been observed have no more basis than another allegation that the Conference Committee
may well be doubted whether doing away with the necessity of printing and distributing
"surreptitiously" inserted provisions into a bill which it had prepared, we should decline the
copies of the bill three days before the third reading would insure speedy enactment of a law
invitation to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. To disregard the "enrolled bill" rule in
in the face of an emergency requiring the calling of a special election for President and Vice-
such cases would be to disregard the respect due the other two departments of our
President. Under the Constitution, such a law is required to be made within seven days of
government.
The question is whether this amendment of Section 103 of the NIRC is fairly embraced in
the title of Republic Act No. 7716, although no mention is made therein of P. D. No. 1590 as
among those which the statute amends. We think it is, since the title states that the purpose
HELD: No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are
comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
within its contemplation. To require that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be
expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index of its content. The
purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section 14 of the RA 9006 does
not violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has held that an act having a single
general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method
and means of carrying out the general subject.
Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be
embraced in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its
provisions, and prevent the enactment into law of matters which have not received the
notice, action and study of the legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed
that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of Section 67 of the Code as the same
was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon by the members of the House. In fact, the
petitioners as members of the House of Representatives, expressed their reservations
regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators were aware of
the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Fifth. An additional attack on the formal validity of Republic Act No. 7716 is made by the
Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G. R. No. 11582, namely, that it violates Art. VI, Section
26[1] which provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof." It is contended that neither H. No. 11197 nor
S. No. 1630 provided for removal of exemption of PAL transactions from the payment of the
VAT and that this was made only in the Conference Committee bill which became Republic
Act No. 7716 without reflecting this fact in its title.
of the statute is to expand the VAT system, and one way of doing this is to widen its base by
withdrawing some of the exemptions granted before. To insist that P. D. No. 1590 be
mentioned in the title of the law, in addition to Section 103 of the NIRC, in which it is
specifically referred to, would be to insist that the title of a bill should be a complete index of
its content.
The constitutional requirement that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in its title is intended to prevent surprise upon the
members of Congress and to inform the people of pending legislation so that, if they wish to,
they can be heard regarding it. If, in the case at bar, petitioner did not know before that its
exemption had been withdrawn, it is not because of any defect in the title but perhaps for
the same reason other statutes, although published, pass unnoticed until some event
somehow calls attention to their existence. Indeed, the title of Republic Act No. 7716 is not
any more general than the title of PAL's own franchise under P. D. No. 1590, and yet no
mention is made of its tax exemption.
ISSUE: Whether or not the effectivity clause which states This Act shall take effectupon its
approval(Sec.16) is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution
HELD:
An effectivity clause which provides that the law shall take immediately upon its approval
is defective, but it does not render the entire law invalid, the law shall take effect fifteen days
after its publication in the OG or newspaper of general circulation. In Tanada vs Tuvera, the
court laid down the rule: The clause, unless otherwise provided refers to the date of
effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself. Publication is indispensable in
every case
There is no appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law to annul or modify the proceeding.
-In this case, COMELEC did not commit rave abuse of discretion when it issued a resolution
holding that it had lost jurisdiction upon Unicos proclamation. It demonstrated fealty to the
constitutional fiat regarding HRET
ARNOLD V. GUERRERO V. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, HON. MANUEL B.
VILLAR, JR. 2000
On May 8, 1998, Farias filed his Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC,
substituting candidate Chevylle V. Farias who withdrew on April 3, 1998. On May 9, 1998,
Ruiz filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion To Resolve Petition" with the COMELEC, attaching
thereto a copy of the Certificate of Candidacy of Farias. The Second Division of the
COMELEC dismissed Ruizs petition, and stated, "[T]here is none (sic) inthe records to
consider respondent an official candidate to speak of without the filing of said certificate.
Hence, there is no certificate of candidacy to be cancelled, consequently, no candidate to be
disqualified. On May 11, 1998, the elections pushed through as scheduled. The postelection tally of votes in Ilocos Norte showed that Farias got a total of 56,369 votes
representing the highest number of votes received in the first district. Farias was duly
proclaimed winner. Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that Farias could not
validly substitute for Chevylle V. Farias, since the latter was not the official candidate of the
Lakas ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino (LAMMP), but was an independent candidate.
Another person cannot substitute for an independent candidate.6.On June 3, 1998, Farias
took his oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives.
Then petitioner herein filed his "Petition-In-Intervention" in COMELEC Case No.
SPA 98-227. Petitioner averred that he was the official candidate of the Liberal Party (LP) in
said elections for Congressman, and stood to be adversely affected by Case No. SPA 98227. Guerrero contended that Farias, having failed to file his Certificate of Candidacy on or
before the last day there for, being midnight of March 27, 1998, Farias illegally resorted to
the remedy of substitution provided for under Section 77of the Omnibus Election Code and
thus, Farias disqualification was in order. Guerrero then asked that the position of
Representative of the first district of Ilocos Norte be declared vacant and special elections
called for, but disallowing the candidacy of Farias.8.Petitioner Guerrero argues that the
refusal of the COMELEC to rule on the validity or invalidity of the certificate of candidacy of
Farias amounted to grave abuse of discretion on its part. He claims that COMELEC failed in
its Constitutional duty to uphold and enforce all laws relative to elections.
ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that
the determination of the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Farias is
already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, and whether or not the COMELEC failed in its Constitutional duty to
uphold and enforce all laws relative to elections.
HELD: NO. SC found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it
held that its jurisdiction over Case No.SPA 98-277 had ceased with the assumption of office
of respondent Farias as Representative for the first district of Ilocos Norte. While the
COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its
refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by
Farias is a recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives (HRET).Under Article VI, Section 17 of
the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to
the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus,
once a winning candidate ha sbeen proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
member of the House of Representatives, COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRETs own jurisdiction
begins.
Thus, the COMELECs decision to discontinue exercising jurisdiction over the case is
justifiable, in deference tothe HRETs own jurisdiction and functions.
2 months after the May 14, 2007 national elections, 11 candidates for senatorial posts were
proclaimed and had taken their oaths except to the 12' and last post where Pimentel and
Zubiri were the contenders. A new board of canvassers (Special Provincial Board of
Canvassers for Maguindanao) was created because Pimentel thru his counsel questioned
some irregularities as to the authenticity and due execution of Cert. of Canvass. During the
proceedings, they were not allowed to ask questions and present evidence to prove their
claim. Instead, their questions were noted in the minutes. Hence, Pimentel a petition for
certiorari and mandamus seeking the court to issue tro as to enjoin comelec from
canvassing; to annul such proceedings because it is unconstitutional and illegal proceedings
and; to allow them to raise their objections and present evidence to prove their claims. All
petitions were denied. Eventually, Zubiri were proclaimed, had taken oath and assumed
office. Pimentel protested. Zubiri filed a motion to dismiss contending that Pimentel should
have filed with Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) for the annulment of his proclamation.
ISSUES:
1. WON the case of Pimentel is an exception to the prohibition on pre-proclamation in cases
of Senators
2. WON the comelec has the jurisdiction over the case
RULING:
1. No. The SC did not recognize the pre-proclamation case of Pimentel, which could have
prospered if he met the requirement of law, because SPBOC-Maguindanao is not Congress
nor COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, specifically charged by Section 30 of Republic
Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369, with the duty to determine the
authenticity and due execution of the certificates of canvass submitted to it.
In elections for President, Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives, the general rule still is that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to
the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or
certificates of canvass are still prohibited. As with other general rules, there are recognized
exceptions to the prohibition, namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2) questions
affecting the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; and (3) determination
of the authenticity and due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in Section 30 of
Republic Act No. 7166, as amended by Republic Act No. 9369. And, in this case, the
exception applies only to Congress or the COMELEC en banc acting as the NBC, and not to
local boards of canvassers who must still be deemed covered by the prohibition on preproclamation controversies.
2. No. As provided in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution SET shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
members. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and
assumed office as a senator, COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating to his
election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the SET's own jurisdiction begins. The word
"sole" in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution underscores the exclusivity of the
electoral tribunals' jurisdiction over election contests relating to their respective members. It
is therefore crystal clear that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a petition for certiorari
and mandamus on matters which may be threshed out in an election contest. It is the SET
which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of Pimentel involving, as it does, a
contest relating to the election of Zubiri, now a member of the Senate.
DISMISSED
The Court holds that respondent HRET did not gravely abuse its discretion when it
dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list
but upheld its jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of petitioners Abayon and
Palparan.
Derla, who is not even a member of CIBAC, is thus a virtual stranger to the party-list, and
clearly not qualified to attest to petitioners as CIBAC nominees, or certify their nomination to
the COMELEC. Petitioners cannot use their registration with the SEC as a substitute for the
evidentiary requirement to show that the nominees, including Derla, are bona fide members
of the party. Petitioners Planas and Lokin, Jr. have not even presented evidence proving the
affiliation of the so-called Board of Trustees to the CIBAC Sectoral Party that is registered
with COMELEC.
election to fill such vacancy shall be held simultaneously with the next succeeding regular
election. The law charges the voters with knowledge of this statutory notice and
COMELECs failure to give the additional notice did not negate the calling of such special
election, much less invalidate it. Further, there was No Proof that COMELECs Failure to
Give Notice of the Office to be Filled and the Manner of Determining the Winner in the
Special Election Misled Voters. IT could not be said that the voters were not informed since
there had been other accessible information resources. Finally, the Court held that unless
there had been a patent showing of grave abuse of discretion, the Court will not interfere
with the affairs and conduct of the Comelec.
TOLENTINO VS COMELEC
G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO and ARTURO C. MOJICA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
SENATOR RALPH G. RECTO and SENATOR GREGORIO B. HONASAN
FACTS:
Petitioners assailed the manner by which the simultaneous regular and special elections of
2001 were conducted by the COMELEC.Petitioners contend that, if held simultaneously, a
special and a regular election must be distinguished in the documentation as well as in the
canvassing of their results. Thirteen senators were proclaimed from the said election with
the 13th placer to serve that of the remaining term of Sen. Guingona, who vacated a seat in
the senate.
Petitioners sought for the nullification of the special election and, consequently, the
declaration of the 13th elected senator.
Issue:
1Whether or not Court had jurisdiction.
2Whether or not the petition was moot.
3Whether or not petioners had locus standi.
4Whether a Special Election for a Single, Three-Year Term
Senatorial Seat was Validly Held on 14 May 2001
RULING:
On the issue of jurisdiction, Court had jurisdiction because what petitioners were
questioning was the validity of the special election on 14 May 2001 in which Honasan was
elected and not to determine Honasans right in the exercise of his office as Senator proper
under a quo warranto.
On the issue of mootness, it was held that courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it
is capable of repetition yet evading review.
On the issue of locus standi, the court had relaxed the requirement on standing and
exercised our discretion to give due course to voters suits involving the right of suffrage,
considering that the issue raised in this petition is likely to arise again
On the Validity of the Election, the Court held that the May 14, 2001 Election was valid.
The Court held that COMELECs Failure to Give Notice of the Time of the Special Election
as required under RA 6645, as amended, did Not Negate the Calling of such Election.
Section 2 of R.A. No. 6645 itself provides that in case of vacancy in the Senate, the special
ARROYO VS HRET
Arroyo was proclaimed over Syjuco as Congressman of the lone district of Makati after the
May 11, 1992 elections. A protest was filed praying for revision and recounting. After some
paper battles between the Arroyo and Syjuco, the latter filed a memorandum amending his
protest and prayed for a non-traditional examination of precinct level documents. The House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) set aside Arroyo's proclamation and declared
Syjuco winner. The 3 justices' members of the HRET ruled that such amendment is already
beyond the tribunal's jurisdiction and the 6 representative members ruled otherwise.
Consequently, by a vote of 6-3, the HRET did not dismiss the protest filed by Syjuco and the
HRET later declared Syjuco as the winner.
ISSUE: WON HRET acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction (GADALEJ).
HELD: Yes. With GADALEJ, Syjuco should not have been allowed to amend his protest at
the memorandum stage. The evidence relied on by the HRET was unreliable (precinct level
documents that are mere photocopies and not certified or authenticated). HRET nullified the
election results in violation of its 50% rule (requisites to annul election results based on
fraud, irregularities, or terrorism: (1) more than 50% of the total number of votes were
affected (2) by the fraud, terrorism, or irregularities.)
The SC has the power to determine whether the ETs have acted with GADALEJ. The High
Tribunal ruled in favor of Arroyo saying it has violated the rules of evidence by giving
probative value to unauthenticated documents and for disregarding election results on
several precincts on the basis of omissions committed either through mere oversight or plain
negligence on the part of election officials or employees which is not part of the grounds to
nullify the votes casts by the people in their exercise of suffrage in these precincts. "The
persistent and deliberate violation of the Tribunal's own governing rules and of even the
most basic rules of evidence cannot be justified...the Court, therefore, cannot stamp with
approval the conduct exhibited by public respondent HRET as it was attended by
arbitrariness," Justice Francisco said.
duties of Congressman of the 1st District of Pampanga. Lazatin claims that the HRET and
not the COMELEC is the sole judge of all election contests. Buan, Jr., and Timbol (Lazatin's
opposition), alleged that the instant petition has become moot and academic because the
assailed COMELEC Resolution had already become final and executory when the SC
issued a TRO on October 6, 1987. In the COMMENT of the Sol-Gen, he alleges that the
instant petition should be given due course because the proclamation was valid. The Telex
Order issued by the COMELEC directing the canvassing board to proclaim the winner if
warranted under Section 245 of the Omnibus Election Code," was in effect a grant of
authority by the COMELEC to the canvassing board, to proclaim the winner. A Separate
Comment was filed by the COMELEC, alleging that the proclamation of Lazatin was illegal
and void because the board simply corrected the returns contested by Lazatin without
waiting for the final resolutions of the petitions of candidates Timbol, Buan, Jr., and Lazatin
himself, against certain election returns.
ISSUE: Whether or not the issue should be placed under the HRET's jurisdiction.
C.) COMPOSITION
It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of the SC and
Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both those judicial and legislative
components commonly share the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be
totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election contests, without
doing violence to the spirit and intent of the Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in
saying that no Senator-Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal may, as his
conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution of a case where he sincerely
feels that his personal interests or biases would stand in the way of an objective and
impartial judgment. What SC is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot
legally function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no amendment
of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone the power of valid adjudication
of a senatorial election contest.
ABBAS VS SET
Political Law Inhibition in the Senate Electoral Tribunal
BONDOC VS PINEDA
HELD: The SC in a Resolution dated November 17, 1987 resolved to give due course to the
petition. The petition is impressed with merit because petitioner has been proclaimed winner
of the Congressional elections in the first district of Pampanga, has taken his oath of office
as such, and assumed his duties as Congressman. For this Court to take cognizance of the
electoral protest against him would be to usurp the functions of the House Electoral
Tribunal. The alleged invalidity of the proclamation (which had been previously ordered by
the COMELEC itself) despite alleged irregularities in connection therewith, and despite the
pendency of the
protests of the rival candidates, is a matter that is also addressed, considering the premises,
to the sound judgement of the Electoral Tribunal .
On 9 Oct 1987, the Abbas et al filed before the SET an election contest docketed against 22
candidates of the LABAN coalition who were proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11, 1987
congressional elections by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3)
Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed for the
disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the said election protest on the
ground that all of them are interested parties to said case. Abbas argue that considerations
of public policy and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass
disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Abbas suggested
the following amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) - requiring the concurrence of five
(5) members for the adoption of resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that where
more than four (4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a
quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt resolutions by
majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit the situation created by the
petition for disqualification, this would, in the context of that situation, leave the resolution of
the contest to the only three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose
disqualification is not sought.
Pineda from the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Bondoc of the Nacionalista
Party (NP) were rival candidates for Rep of the 4th district of Pampanga. Pineda was
proclaimed winner of the election. Bondoc filed protest to house of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). The decision held that Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of
23 votes. The LDP insisted a recount and the recount has increased Bondocs win by 107
votes. So congressman Camasura voted with the SC justices and Congressman Cerilles
proclaimed Bondoc the winner of the election.so Camasura being a member of the LDP
revealed to the chief congressman Conjuanco that he voted for Bondoc and he did so in
view of what was in line with truth justice and self respect. The revelation prompted efforts
by the LDP to neutralize pro-Bondoc majority in the Tribunal. So on the eve of promulgation
of Bondocs win, Congress man Jose Conjuangco thru a letter stated that Camasura and
Bautista were being expelled for the LDP for allegedly helping in the organization of Partido
Pilipino of Danding cojuanco and for having members of LDP join said pol party. The LDP
informed Herrera that they were no longer part of LDP hence; his (Camasuras) vote in favor
of Bondoc should be withdrawn. The judges in HRET all wanted out cause of this
distressing development. They were saying that unseating should be prevented in all cost.
They also said that the tribunal should not be hampered in doing its constitutional function
by factors, which have nothing to do with the merits of the cases before it. The Bondoc
promulgation was cancelled because the decision lack the concurrence of 5 members as
required by Section 24 of the rules of the tribunal. Bondoc asked the court to annul the
decision of the House in rescinding Camasuras nomination and restrain the replacement of
Camasura through a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.
rejected as its result. To correct this, the Supreme Court declared the reinstatement of the
petitioner and ordered respondent to vacate and turn over the office in contention.
Issue: Whether or not the House of Representatives is empowered to interfere with the
disposition of an election contest in the HReT by reorganizing the representation of the
majority party in the tribunal?
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives
proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments in
accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A. Daza was
among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
Held: No. Section 17 Articles VI supplies the answer to this question.. So the HRET is the
sole judge of all contests relation to the election, returns and qualification of their respective
members. The operative term found in the section was sole Judge. It (HRET) was made to
function as a non-partisan court although 2/3 of its members are politicians. Its suppose to
provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to legislative
office devoid of partisan consideration.
So they cant just shuffle and manipulate the political component for the electoral tribunal to
serve the interests of party in power.
Its independence would be undermined if the removal of Camasura for as a punishment for
party disloyalty for voting for Bondoc would allow them to change the judgment of the
HRET in the Bondoc case.If allowed so, then the HRET isnt really a sole judge of senatorial
elections. The members of the HRET are entitled to security of tenure just as the members
of the judiciary are. They can only be replaced in cases such as expiration, death,
permanent disability, resignation forms the political party, and formal affiliation with another
party of any valid cause hence mere disloyalty is not a valid cause for termination.
DAZA V. SINGSON
On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in
a political realignment in the House of Representatives. On the basis of this development,
the House of Representatives revised its representation in the Commission on
Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the
newly-formed LDP. The chamber elected a new set of representatives consisting of the
original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as
the additional member from the LDP.
The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the
Commission on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent.
ISSUE: Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the
Commission on Appointments
HELD: At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing
as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of the
Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House of
Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation from
the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie.
The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of
the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of all the
Members.
The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the
Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the
political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such changes must be
permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or factional divisions not involving
severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from
one political party to another.
The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the
Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to
Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.
On September 23, 1992, Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. in his behalf and in behalf of
LAKAS-NUCD filed a petition to prohibit Senator Neptali Gonzales, ex-officio Chairman of
Commission on Appointments from recognizing the membership of Senators Alberto
Romulo and Wigberto Tanada. The resulting composition of proportional representatives is
as follows:
POLITICAL PARTY MEMBERSHIP PROP.
REPRESENTATIVES
LDP
NPC
15 7.5 members
5 2.5 members
LAKAS-NUCD
3 1.5 members
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 .5 members
To resolve the impasse, Senator Arturo Tolentino proposed a compromise to the effect that
the Senate elect 12 members to the Commission on Appointments, 8 from LDP, 2 from
NPC, 9 from liberal party. This proposal was approved despite the objections of Senators
Guingona and Osmena. Senator Romulo occupied the 8th membership of the LDP while
Senator Tanada for LD-PDP-LABAN.
ISSUE: WON the election of Senators Romulo and Tanada as members of Commission
on Appointments is in accordance with Art. 6, Section 18 of the Constitution.
HELD: No, Art.6 Sec. 18 assures representation in the COA of any political party who
succeeds in electing members to the Senate, provided that the number of Senators so
elected enables it to put a representative in the COA. Drawing from the ruling in the case of
Coseteng v Mitra, Jr. a political party must have at least 2 senators in the senate to be able
to have a representative in the COA, so that any member less than 2 will not entitle such a
party a membership in the COA.
In the light of the foregoing and on the basis of the applicable rules and jurisprudence on the
matter before this court, we declare the election of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator
Wigberto Tanada as members of the COA as null and void for being in violation of the rule
on proportional representation under Art VI, Sec 18 of the Philippine Constitution.
Accordingly, a writ of prohibition is hereby issued ordering the said respondents Senator
Romulo and Senator Tanada to desist from assuming, occupying and discharging the
functions of members of the COA; and ordering the respondent Senate President Neptali
Gonzales, in his capacity as ex-officio chairman of the COA, to desist from recognizing the
membership of the respondent Senators and from allowing and permitting them from sitting
and participating as members of said commission.
GUINGONA VS GONZALES
G.R. No. 106971 March 1, 1993
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP senators,
5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-LABAN senator. To suffice the
requirement that each house must have 12 representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to
use the traditional formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of
Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5 members for LDP, 2.5
members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN.
Romulo, as the majority floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he
rounded off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the same party
to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition compromise by Sen Tolentino who
proposed that the elected members of the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDPLABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed
the said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional
representation.
Issue: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys representation in the
Commission on Appointments
Held: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a fractional
membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of each of the political
parties. A literal interpretation of Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other
manner of application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each
of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be
able to elect Romulo. In so doing one other partys fractional membership was
correspondingly reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on
Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate. This is clearly a
violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with its mandate that
membership in the Commission be based on the proportional representation of the political
parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and reduced
the representation of one political party either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC. A party
should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly elected senators-members in the CoA. Where
there are more than 2 parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot
constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may coalesce with each
other in order to come up with proportional representation especially since one party may
have affiliations with the other party.
PIMENTEL VS HRET
On 3 March 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect. On 11 May 1998, in accordance
with the Party-List System Act, national elections were held which included, for the first time,
the election through popular vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees
would become members of the House. Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list
representatives from 13 organizations, including Melvyn D. Eballe, Leonardo Q.
Montemayor, Cresente C. Paez, Loretta Ann P. Rosales and Patricia M. Sarenas from
party-list groups Association of Philippine Electric Cooperatives[5] (APEC), Alyansang
Bayanihan ng mga Magsasaka, Manggagawang Bukid at Mangingisda (ABA), NATCO
Network Party (COOP-NATCCO), Akbayan! Citizens Action Party (AKBAYAN), and Abanse!
Pinay (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to send 2 representatives to
the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one representative each. Also elected
were district representatives belonging to various political parties. Subsequently, the House
constituted its HRET and CA contingent by electing its representatives to these two
constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the nomination by the political
parties of House members who are to occupy seats in the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET) and the Commission on Appointments (CA). From available
records, it does not appear that after the 11 May 1998 elections the party-list groups in the
House nominated any of their representatives to the HRET or the CA. As of the date of filing
of the present petitions for prohibition and mandamus with prayer for writ of preliminary
injunction, the House contingents to the HRET and the CA were composed solely of district
representatives belonging to the different political parties. On 18 January 2000, Senator
Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. wrote two letters addressed to then Senate President Blas F. Ople,
as Chairman of the CA, and to Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Jose A. R. Melo
(now retired), as Chairman of the HRET. The letters requested Senate President Ople and
Justice Melo to cause the restructuring of the CA and the HRET, respectively, to include
party-list representatives to conform to Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution. In its meeting of 20 January 2000, the HRET resolved to direct the Secretary of
the Tribunal to refer Senator Pimentel's letter to the Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives. On the same day, HRET Secretary Daisy B. Panga-Vega, in an
Indorsement of even date, referred the letter to House of Representatives Secretary
General Roberto P. Nazareno. On 2 February 2000, Eballe, et al. filed with this Court their
Petitions for Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order) against the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its
Chairman and Members. They contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List
System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the HRET, and
2.4 seats in the CA. They charge that the HRET, CA, et al. committed grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator Pimentel. In its Resolution of 8
February 2000, the Court en banc directed the consolidation of GR 141490 with GR
141489. On 11 February 2000, Eballe et al. filed in both cases a motion to amend their
petitions to implead then Speaker Manuel B. Villar, Jr. as an additional respondent, in his
capacity as Speaker of the House and as one of the members of the CA. The Court granted
both motions and admitted the amended petitions. Senator Pimentel filed the present
petitions on the strength of his oath to protect, defend and uphold the Constitution and in his
capacity as taxpayer 'and as a member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list
representatives from APEC, ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as copetitioners.
Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this constitutionally mandated
duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.[27] Otherwise, 'the doctrine of separation of powers calls for
each branch of government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit.[28] Neither
can the Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives are
duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The petitions are bereft of any
allegation that respondents prevented the party-list groups in the House from participating in
the election of members of the HRET and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the 11
May 1998 elections, the House barred the party-list representatives from seeking
membership in the HRET or the CA. Rather, it appears from the available facts that the
party-list groups in the House at that time simply refrained from participating in the election
process. The party-list representatives did not designate their nominees even up to the time
they filed the petitions, with the predictable result that the House did not consider any partylist representative for election to the HRET or the CA. As the primary recourse of the partylist representatives lies with the House of Representatives, 'the Court cannot resolve the
issues presented by petitioners at this time.
Issue:
[1] Whether the present composition of the House Electoral Tribunal violates the
constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are no party-list
representatives in the HRET.
[2]: Whether the refusal of the HRET and the CA to reconstitute themselves to include partylist representatives constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
Held: [1] NO. The Constitution expressly grants to the House of Representatives the
prerogative, within constitutionally defined limits, to choose from among its district and partylist representatives those who may occupy the seats allotted to the House in the HRET and
the CA. Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution explicitly confers on the Senate and on the
House the authority to elect among their members those who would fill the 12 seats for
Senators and 12 seats for House members in the Commission on Appointments. Under
Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution, each chamber of Congress exercises the power to
choose, within constitutionally defined limits, who among their members would occupy the
allotted 6 seats of each chamber's respective electoral tribunal. These constitutional
provisions are reiterated in Rules 3 and 4 (a) of the 1998 Rules of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal. The discretion of the House to choose its members to
the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on
proportional representation.[26] However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the
ARNAULT VS NAZARENO
[2]: There is no grave abuse in the action or lack of action by the HRET and the CA in
response to the letters of Senator Pimentel. Under Sections 17 and 18 of Article VI of the
1987
Constitution and their internal rules, the HRET and the CA are bereft of any power to
reconstitute themselves
HELD: It is the inherent right of the Senate to impose penalty in carrying out their duty to
conduct inquiry in aid of legislation. But it must be herein established that a witness who
refuses to answer a query by the Committee may be detained during the term of the
members imposing said penalty but the detention should not be too long as to violate the
witness right to due process of law.
FACTS
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRIES
LIMITATIONS
1. ARNAULT V. NAZARENO
2. BENGZON V. SENATE
3. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE V. MAJADUCON (407 SCRA 356)
On August 28, 1998, Senator Blas F. Ople filed Senate Resolution No.157 directing the Committee on National
Defense and Security to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the charges of then Defense Secretary Orlando
Mercado that a group of active and retired military officers were organizing a coup d 'etat to prevent the administration
of then President Joseph Estrada from probing alleged fund irregularities in the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
On the same date, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III also filed Resolution No.160, "directing the appropriate senate
committee to conduct an inquiry, in aid of legislation, into the alleged mismanagement of the funds and investment
portfolio of the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).
During the public hearings conducted by the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, it appeared that the AFP-RSBS
purchased a lot in General SantosCity, designated as Lot X, MR-1160, for P10,500.00 per square meter from private
respondent Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano. However, the deed of sale filed with the Register of Deeds indicated that the
purchase price of the lot was only P3,000.00 per square meter.
The Committee thereafter caused the service of a subpoena to respondent Atty. Flaviano, directing him to appear and
testify before it. Respondent refused to appear at the hearing. Instead, he filed a petition for prohibition and
preliminary injunction with prayer for temporary restraining order with the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City,
Branch 23, which was docketed as SP Civil Case No. 496.On October 21, 1998, the trial court issued a Temporary
Restraining Order directing the Committee "to CEASE and DESIST from proceeding with the inquiry in P.S.
160 particularly in General Santos City and/or anywhere in Region XI or Manila on matters affecting the
patenting/titling and sale of Lot X,MR-1160-D to AFP-RSBS," and "from issuing subpoenas to witnesses from
Region XI, particularly from General Santos City, pending the hearing of the petition for prohibition and
injunction.
JURISPRUDENCE
Issue: Whether the trial court (Judge Jose Majaducon) can issue a
Temporary Restraining Order directing the Committee "to CEASE
and DESIST from proceeding with the inquiry. NO.
SC: Courts have no jurisdiction to restrain Congress from performing its
constitutionally vested function to conduct investigations in aid of
legislation, following the principle of separation of powers.
The senate conducts legislative inquiries in aid of legislation, and
persons were subpoenaed and invited thereto, the latter cannot go to
the court of justice because it has no authority to prohibit (issue a writ
of injunction) the committee from requiring that person from
appearing and testifying before it; otherwise it will be inconsistent with
the doctrine of separation of powers as the same is an encroachment
to ones prerogatives.
Issue: Whether the pendency of the cases would bar the congress or
senate from continuing with the investigation. NO.
SC:
The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a
court or a quasi- judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct
of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it would be extremely easy to
subvert the intended inquiry.
Petitioners, through counsel, submitted to respondent a letter dated February 24, 2005 presenting their position,
particularly stressing that there were cases pending in court allegedly involving the same issues subject of the
legislative inquiry, thereby posing a challenge to the jurisdiction of respondent to continue with the inquiry.
On February 28, 2005, respondent commenced the investigation. Senator Enrile inquired who among those invited as
resource persons were present and who were absent. Thereafter, Senator Enrile moved that subpoena be issued to
those who did not attend the hearing and that the Senate request the Department of Justice, through the Bureau
of Immigration and Deportation, to issue an HDO against them and/or include them in the Bureaus Watch List.
Senator Juan Flavier seconded the motion and the motion was approved.
Respondent then proceeded with the investigation proper. Towards the end of the hearing, petitioners, through
counsel, made an Opening Statement that brought to the attention of respondent the lack of proper authorization from
affected clients for the bank to make disclosures of their accounts and the lack of copies of the accusing documents
mentioned in Senator Enrile's privilege speech, and reiterated that there were pending court cases regarding the
alleged sale in the Philippines by SCB-Philippines of unregistered foreign securities.
In re: Sabio 504 SCRA 77
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/oct2006/gr_174340_2006.html
Issue: Whether Chairman Sabio and Board of Directors can invoke right
to privacy and right against self-incrimination for refusing to appear
before the Senate. No.
On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate
Res. No. 455),"directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines
Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations
by their respective Board of Directors."
On the same date, February 20, 2006, Senate Res. No. 455 was submitted to the Senate and referred to the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations and Committee on Public Services. However, on
March 28, 2006, upon motion of Senator Francis N. Pangilinan, it was transferred to the Committee on Government
Corporations and Public Enterprises.
On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman
Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the
public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and
Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.
On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. At the same time, he
invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 earlier quoted.
8
On August 10, 2006, Senator Gordon issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum, approved by Senate President Manuel
Villar, requiring Chairman Sabio and PCGG Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, Nicasio Conti, Tereso Javier and
Narciso Nario to appear in the public hearing scheduled on August 23, 2006.
Again, Chairman Sabio refused to appear. In his letter to Senator Gordon dated August 18, 2006, he reiterated his
earlier position, invoking Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1.
10
Thereafter, Chief of Staff Ma. Carissa O. Coscolluela, under the authority of Senator Gordon, sent another notice to
Chairman Sabio requiring him to appear and testify on the same subject matter set on September 6, 2006. The notice
was issued "under the same authority of the Subpoena Ad Testificandum previously served upon (him) last 16 August
2006."
Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm
of proper investigation.
Once more, Chairman Sabio did not comply with the notice. He sent a letter dated September 4, 2006 to Senator
Gordon reiterating his reason for declining to appear in the public hearing.
This prompted Senator Gordon to issue an Order dated September 7, 2006 requiring Chairman Sabio and
Commissioners Abcede, Conti, Javier and Nario to show the caause why they should not be cited in contempt of the
Senate. On September 11, 2006, they submitted to the Senate their Compliance and Explanation.
ROMERO V. SEN. JINGGOY ESTRADA (2009)
http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2009/april2009/174105.htm
FACTS
Petitioners Romero II and other members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders, Inc., were invited on an
investigation with regards to the investment of Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA) funds in the
Smokey Mountain project. The said investigation will aid the Senate in determining possible amendments of Republic
Act 8042 other known as the Migrant Workers Act.
SUBJUDISM- is an ethical rule or professional rule that when use, party litigants and the lawyer in particular
should not talk about it in public.
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the
issue, influencing the court, or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of the sub judice rule may render
one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE
Whether the Senate Committees inquiry is sub judice owing to the
pendency of the Chavez petition.
SC:
It will not avail petitioners any to invoke the sub judice effect of Chavez
and resist, on that ground, the assailed congressional invitations and
subpoenas. The sub judice issue has been rendered moot and academic
by the supervening issuance of the en banc Resolution of July 1, 2008 in
G.R. No. 164527.
A legislative investigation in aid of legislation and court proceedings has
different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct hearings or like
adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual
controversies arising between adverse litigants and involving
demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries in aid of legislation are,
inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather
information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively;1[17] and to
determine whether there is a need to improve existing laws or enact new
or remedial legislation,2[18] albeit the inquiry need not result in any
potential legislation. On-going judicial proceedings do not preclude
congressional hearings in aid of legislation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
ISSUE:
Whether the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer were
covered by executive privilege, making the arrest order issued by the
respondent Senate Committees void.
SC: The court was convinced that the three questions are covered by
presidential communications privilege, and that this privilege has been
validly claimed by the executive department, enough to shield petitioner
Neri from any arrest order the Senate may issue against him for not
answering such questions.
approve it.
Later on, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to appear and
testify on 20 November 2007. However, Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita sent a letter dated 15 November to the
Committees requesting them to dispense with Neri's testimony on the ground of executive privilege. Ermita invoked
the privilege on the ground that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as
economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China, and given the confidential nature in which these information
were conveyed to the President, Neri cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations,
without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. Thus, on 20 November, Neri did not appear
before the respondent Committees.
On 22 November, respondents issued a Show Cause Letter to Neri requiring him to show cause why he should not
be cited for contempt for his failure to attend the scheduled hearing on 20 November. On 29 November, Neri replied
to the Show Cause Letter and explained that he did not intend to snub the Senate hearing, and requested that if there
be new matters that were not yet taken up during his first appearance, he be informed in advance so he can prepare
himself. He added that his non-appearance was upon the order of the President, and that his conversation with her
dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the impact of the bribery scandal
involving high government officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the
Philippines. Respondents found the explanation unsatisfactory, and later on issued an Order citing Neri in contempt
and consequently ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until he appears and
gives his testimony.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neri_vs._Senate
Issue:
Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a
high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the
"Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the Presidents instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to
manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become the subject of
heated legislative hearings conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that he is summoned to attend the Senate
hearings without being apprised not only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended legislation which underpins the
investigation. He further intervenes as a taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds
involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only in
th
1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14 Congress, however, of which the term of half of its
members commenced on June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first
opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated publication by arguing that the rules have
never been amended since 1995 and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for free,
and accessible to the public at the Senates internet web page.
could not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the
legislative inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until
it shall have caused the publication of the rules, because it can do
so only "in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure."
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
SENATE V. ERMITA (2006)
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2006/apr2006/gr_169777_2006.html
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464
Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and
Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees,
conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and
employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and
Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as
resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the
Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3
which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials,
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior
to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
SC:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is
covered by the executive privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is
premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of
necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The
privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to
disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of
such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that
obligation
in
a
particular
case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive
branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch
withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so
assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch
to evade congressional requests for information without need of clearly
asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the
mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
ISSUE:
Whether the three questions that petitioner Neri refused to answer were covered by
executive privilege, making the arrest order issued by the respondent Senate Committees
void.
SC: The court was convinced that the three questions are covered by presidential
communications privilege, and that this privilege has been validly claimed by the executive
department, enough to shield petitioner Neri from any arrest order the Senate may issue
against him for not answering such questions.
executive privilege may be validly claimed by the executive department only in cases where
the power subject of the legislative inquiry is expressly granted by the Constitution to the
President. Such powers include the commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and
diplomatic powers. In light of the doctrine of separation of powers, the said powers of the
President enjoy a greater degree of confidentiality than other presidential powers. In the
present case, Executive Secretary Ermita claimed executive privilege on the argument that
the communications elicited by the three questions fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and
policy decision-making process, and that the information sought to be disclosed might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. It is
with the Peoples Republic of China, and given the confidential nature in which these information
were conveyed to the President, Neri cannot provide the Committee any further details of these
conversations, without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect. Thus, on 20
November, Neri did not appear before the respondent Committees.
On 22 November, respondents issued a Show Cause Letter to Neri requiring him to show cause
why he should not be cited for contempt for his failure to attend the scheduled hearing on 20
November. On 29 November, Neri replied to the Show Cause Letter and explained that he did not
intend to snub the Senate hearing, and requested that if there be new matters that were not yet
taken up during his first appearance, he be informed in advance so he can prepare himself. He
added that his non-appearance was upon the order of the President, and that his conversation
with her dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters relating to the
impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of
confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. Respondents found the explanation
unsatisfactory, and later on issued an Order citing Neri in contempt and consequently ordering his
arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until he appears and gives his
testimony.
clear then that the basis of the claim is a matter related to the quintessential and nondelegable presidential power of diplomacy or foreign relations.
As to the second element, the communications were received by a close advisor of the
President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner Neri can be considered a close
advisor, being a member of the President's Cabinet.
And as to the third element, there is no adequate showing of a compelling need that would
justify the limitation of the privilege and of the unavailability of the information elsewhere by
an appropriate investigating authority. Presidential communications are presumptively
privileged and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere showing of public need
by the branch seeking access to such conversations. In the present case, respondent
Committees failed to show a compelling or critical need for the answers to the three
questions in the enactment of any law under Sec. 21, Art. VI. Instead, the questions veer
more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under Sec. 22, Art. VI. As
ruled in Senate vs. Ermita, the the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by
compulsory process only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation.
ISSUE: Whether the President prevent a member of the armed forces from testifying before a legislative
inquiry.
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of massive
cheating in the 2004 elections and the surfacing of the Hello Garci controversy.
President Arroyo issued E.O 164 enjoining officials of the executive department
including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative inquiry without
her approval. However, the two concluded their testimonies before the Senate in spite
the fact that a directive has been given to them. As a result, both of them were
relieved of their assignments for allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time
honored principle of the Chain of Command.
SC: Yes. Soldiers are constitutionally obliged to obey the President they may dislike or distrust. The
ability of the President to prevent military officials from testifying before Congress DOES NOT TURN ON
EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE BUT ON THE CHIEF EXECUTIVES POWER AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF to
control the actions and speech of the armed forces. Under the Commander in Chief Clause (Art. XVl,
section 5), the President has absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the
armed forces. Such authority includes the ability of the President to restrict travel, movement and
speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned under civilian law.
The rule is not absolute. In as much as it is ill advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents
power as Commander-in-Chief, it is similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with
Congress right to conduct legislative inquiries. xxx Courts are empowered, under the principle of
JUDICIAL REVIEW, to arbitrate disputes between the executive and legislative branches of the
government on the proper parameters of power. By this, if the court so rule, the duty falls on the
shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers
before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disregarded with notion of officers appearing before
the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the
court.
QUESTION HOUR
SENATE V. ERMITA (2006)
ISSUE: Constitutionality of Sec. 1, EO 464
SC:
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Sec. 22 of Art. VI and the absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of
department
heads
in
the
question
hour
contemplated
in
the
provision
of
said
Sec.
22,
Art.
VI
xxx
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Sec. 22, Art. VI, the appearance of
department
heads
in
the
question
hour
is
discretionary
on
their
part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department
head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the
Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid of legislation. Section 22
refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be
held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question
hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as pertaining to the
same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for legislation, while the other
pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the power of Congress to
compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers.
ENACTMENT OF A LAW
ORIGIN OF BILLS
GUINGONA V. CARAGUE (1991)
ISSUE:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1991/apr1991/gr_94571_1991.html
Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher than
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion the
budget
for
education.
for debt service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the
General Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the HELD:
DECS
amount
to
P27,017,813,000.00.
No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to
The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled assign the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby follow that the hands of
Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national
Sixty, as Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the interest
and
for
the
attainment
of
other
state
policies
or
objectives.
Budget Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New
Society, and by PD No.1967, entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is not only a matter of honor and to
out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds For The Purpose. protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at
stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the
The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby
debt service, it being higher than the budget for education; therefore it is against Section assailed as unconstitutional.
5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution which mandates to assign the highest budgetary
priority to education.
TOLENTINO V. SECRETARY (1994)
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/aug1994/gr_115455_1994.html
RA 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law, is an act that seeks
to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by
amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are various suits questioning and
challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
Tolentino contends that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively from the House of
Representatives but is a mere consolidation of HB. No. 11197 and SB. No. 1630 and it
did not pass three readings on separate days on the Senate thus violating Article VI,
Sections 24 and 26(2) of the Constitution, respectively.
Art. VI, Section 24: All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of
the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
Art. VI, Section 26(2): No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has
passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have
been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7716 violated Art. VI, Section 24 and Art. VI, Section 26(2) of the Constitution.
HELD
No. The phrase originate exclusively refers to the revenue bill and not to the revenue law. It is
sufficient that the House of Representatives initiated the passage of the bill which may undergo
extensive changes in the Senate.
SB. No. 1630, having been certified as urgent by the President need not meet the requirement not
only of printing but also of reading the bill on separate days.
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity
or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed,
and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays
entered in the Journal.
ABAKADA v. Exec. Secretary (2005)
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_168056_2005.html
Facts:
On May 24, 2005, the President signed into law Republic Act 9337 or the VAT Reform
Act. Before the law took effect on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a TRO enjoining
government from implementing the law in response to a slew of petitions for certiorari
and prohibition questioning the constitutionality of the new law.
The challenged section of R.A. No. 9337 is the common proviso in Sections 4, 5 and 6:
That the President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Finance, shall,
effective January 1, 2006, raise the rate of value-added tax to 12%, after any of the
following conditions has been satisfied:
Issue: Whether or not the RA 9337's stand-by authority to the Executive to increase the VAT rate,
especially on account of the recommendatory power granted to the Secretary of Finance, constitutes
undue delegation of legislative power? NO
Held: The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or
inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power which can never be delegated is the
authority to make a complete law- complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it
shall be applicable, and to determine the expediency of its enactment. It is the nature of the power
and not the liability of its use or the manner of its exercise which determines the validity of its
delegation.
The exceptions are:
(a) delegation of tariff powers to President under Constitution
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth percent (2 4/5%);
or (ii) National government deficit as a percentage of GDP of the previous year exceeds
one and one-half percent (1%)
Petitioners allege that the grant of stand-by authority to the President to increase the
VAT rate is an abdication by Congress of its exclusive power to tax because such
delegation is not covered by Section 28 (2), Article VI Consti. They argue that VAT is a
tax levied on the sale or exchange of goods and services which cant be included within
the purview of tariffs under the exemption delegation since this refers to customs duties,
tolls or tribute payable upon merchandise to the government and usually imposed on
imported/exported goods. They also said that the President has powers to cause,
influence or create the conditions provided by law to bring about the conditions
precedent. Moreover, they allege that no guiding standards are made by law as to how
the Secretary of Finance will make the recommendation.
Issue:
whether or not considering that the Senate passed SB 1243, its own version of HB 8817, RA 7720
can be said to have originated in the House of Representatives
Held:
Yes. Bills of local application are required to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. Petitioners contend that since a bill of the same import was passed in the Senate, it
RA 7720. When a plebiscite on the Act was held on July 13, 1994, a great majority of the
registered voters of Santiago voted in favor of the conversion of Santiago into a city.
HELD: The law does not violate the equal protection clause. It is intended to ensure the impartiality
of election officials by preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of
assignment. Large-scale anomalies in the registration of voters cannot be carried out without the
complicity of election officers, who are the highest representatives of Comelec in a city or
municipality.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 14 of RA 9006 is a rider.
RULING:
No. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of RA 9006 are comprehensive enough to
include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require
that the said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a
complete index of its content. The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Code and the Section
14 of the RA 9006 does not violate "one subject-one title rule." This Court has held that an act having
a single general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how
diverse they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and
may be considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying
out the general subject.
Section 26(1) of the Constitution provides: Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
The avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its
title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent
the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the
legislators and the public. In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of
the repeal of Section 67 of the Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon
by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners as members of the House of Representatives,
expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the
legislators were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
PJA v. Prado (1993)
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1993/nov1993/gr_105371_1993.html
Facts:
Petitioners, members of the lower courts, are assailing the constitutionality of Sec 35 of
RA 7354 due to, inter alia, its being discriminatory because of withdrawing the franking
privilege from the Judiciary but retaining said privilege for the President, the VP,
members of Congress, the Comelec, former Presidents, and the National Census and
Statistics Office. Respondents counter that there is no discrimination as the franking
privilege has also been withdrawn from the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of
National Language, the Telecommunications Office, the Philippine Deposit Insurance
Corporation, the National Historical Commission, the AFP, the AFP Ladies Steering
Committee, the City and Provincial Prosecutors, the Tanodbayan (Office of the Special
Prosecutor), the Kabataang Baranggay, the Commission on the Filipino Language, the
Provincial and City Assessors, and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled
Persons.
Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600 which prohibits
the reversion of officers with at least 10 years of service.
On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has no
relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item therein.
(RA 1600 was an appropriation law for 1956-57).
It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed in
the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of
the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without effect.
SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.
A. ENACTMENT OF
A LAW
(Sec 24, 26, 27),
(Sec 30-31)
2.) ONE SUBJECT
ONE TITLE RULE
ISSUE: Is RA 4790,
which
created
HELD: No. The said law is void. The baneful effect of the defective title
here presented is not so difficult to perceive. Such title did not inform
the members of Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not
apprise the people in the towns of Buldon and Parang in Cotabato and
located in another
province
Cotabato to be
spared from attack
Province of Lanao del Sur; it kept the public in the dark as to what
towns and provinces were actually affected by the bill that even a
Congressman from Cotabato voted for it only to find out later on that
it is to the prejudice of his own province. These are the pressures
mandate that No
bill which may be
Issue: Whether RA
VI
of
Constitution
9369
violates
Section 26 (1), Art
the
3.) THREE
REASINGS
ISSUE: Whether or
not RA 7354 is
unconstitutional
(1) Violative of Art
VI Sec 26(1) which
says '"Every bill
passed by the
Congress shall
embrace only one
subject which shall
be expressed in
the title thereof."
- Violative of Art VI
Sec 26(2) which
says 'No bill
passed by either
House shall
become a law
unless it has
passed three
readings on
separate days, and
printed copies
thereof in its final
form have been
distributed to its
RULING:
The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec
26(1) ruling further that it's adoption is within the terms
prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to
be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as
to cover every single detail of the measure.
However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal
protection clause. The distinction made by the law is superficial.
It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real
differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the
franking privilege.
Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL
.
Members three
days before its
passage, except
when the President
certifies to the
necessity of its
immediate
enactment to meet
a public calamity or
emergency. Upon
the last reading of
a bill, no
amendment
thereto shall be
allowed, and the
vote thereon
shall be taken
immediately
thereafter, and the
yeas and nays
entered in the
Journal.
- Violative of the
Equal protection
clause
ISSUE: Whether or
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge,
holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the
Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version
originated in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according
to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note
also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its
own version rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and
passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3
st
readings in Senate for after the 1 reading it was referred to the Senate
Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version
known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have
been done.
done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it with
the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the
Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. (Its
ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even
signed the said Senate Bill.)
Abakadavs Executive Secretary (September 1, 2005)
ISSUES:
HELD: :
Fulll text:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2005/sep2005/gr_168056_2005.html
FACTS:Before R.A. No. 9337 took effect, petitioners ABAKADA GURO Party
List, et al., filed a petition for prohibition on May 27, 2005 questioning the
constitutionality of Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending
Sections 106, 107 and 108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue
Code (NIRC). Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and
properties, Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods, and
Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or lease of
properties. These questioned provisions contain a uniformpro v is o
authorizing the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1, 2006, after
specified conditions have been satisfied. Petitioners argue that the law is
unconstitutional.
1. Whether or not
there is a
violation of
Article VI, Section
24 of the
Constitution.
2. Whether or not
there is undue
delegation of
legislative power
in violation of
Article VI Sec
28(2) of the
Constitution.
3. Whether or not
there is a
violation of the
due process and
equal protection
under Article III
Sec. 1 of the
Constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not,
independent of the
matter of
delegation of
legislative
authority, said plan,
nevertheless
became a law by
non-action on the
part of Congress.
ISSUE: Whether
publication in the
Official Gazette is
still required
considering the
clause in Article 2
unless otherwise
provided.
HELD:
Unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and
not with the publication requirement which cannot be omitted as
public needs to be notified for the law to become effective. The
necessity for the publication in the Official Gazette of all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, was affirmed
by the court on April 24, 1985. This is necessary to provide the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which regulate actions and
conduct as citizens. Without this, there would be no basis for Art 3 of
the Civil Code Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the
Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of
general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.
The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the
said petition for the reason that the right sought to be enforced by
petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land.
5.) VETO
A.) Item vs
Provision
B.) Doctrine on
Inappropriate
Provisions
C.) Legislative Veto
A. Item vs
Provision
BengzonvsDrilon
Full text:
FACTS: In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic
Act No. 1797) that were repealed during the time of former President
Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided certain retirement benefits to
retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional commissions.
Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize
retirement benefits among government officials. However, President
Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House Bill No. 16297) on the ground that
the law should not give preferential treatment to certain or select
government officials.
Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the
Supreme Court asking the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed
out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D. No. 644) because the said
PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case
of Taada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non
ISSUE: Whether or
not the veto of the
President on that
portion of the
General
Appropriations bill
is constitutional
HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued
pension that is due to them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which
was never repealed. The president has no power to set aside and
override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president
have the power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her
predecessors much less to the repeal of existing laws.
The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional
since the power of the president to disapprove any item or items in
the appropriations bill does not grant the authority to veto part of an
item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that
in the same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and
retained the others. This cannot be done. The rule is: the Executive
must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must veto an
entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president
did not veto the entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She
merely vetoed the portion which pertained to the pensions of the
justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations to the
other departments of the government.
publication and in effect, RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court
then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General
Appropriations Bill (GAB) for 1992, Congress allotted additional budget for
pensions of retired justices. Congress however did the allotment in the
following manner: Congress made an item entitled: General Fund
Adjustment; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations
in different brances of the government; among such obligations is the
allotment for the pensions of retired justices of the judiciary.
However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for
the pensions of the retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She
explained that that portion of the GAB is already deemed vetoed when
she vetoed H.B. 16297.
This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and
justices to question the constitutionality of the veto made by the
President. The President was represented by then Executive Secretary
Franklin Drilon.
BOLINAO VS VALENCIA (1964)
Full text: http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1964/jun1964/gr_l20740_1964.html
ISSUE: Whether or
not Valencia is
entitled to claim for
damages
ISSUE: Whether or
not the Presidents
veto is valid
FACTS: Bolinao Electronics Corporation was the co-owner and a copetitioner of Chronicle Broadcasting Network, Inc. (CBN) and Montserrat
Broadcasting System Inc. They operate and own television (channel 9) and
radio stations in the Philippines. They were summoned by Brigido
Valencia, then Secretary of Communications, for operating even after
their permit has expired. Valencia claimed that because of CBNs
continued operation sans license and their continuing operation had
caused damages to his department.
B.) Doctrine of
Inappropriate
Provisions
development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate funds
but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be
applied for since that is already the function of the executive.
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions
of the GAB of 1994, neither house of congress took steps to override the
veto. Instead, Senators WigbertoTaada and Alberto Romulo sought the
issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against Executive
Secretary TeofistoGuingona et al. Taada et al contest the
constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items
in the GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the conditions
imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations
for the CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).
properly addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not
delete the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et al
averred that the president cannot validly veto that provision w/o
vetoing the amount allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein
is sustained for the vetoed provision is considered inappropriate; in
fact the Sc found that such provision if not vetoed would in effect
repeal the Foreign Borrowing Act making the legislation as a log-rolling
legislation.
Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), the
President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of income
and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was
likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already
funds allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program.
Taada et al claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the
veto is valid for it is in compliant to the One Fund Policy it avoided
double funding and redundancy.
Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for
road maintenance
The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a
breach of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted may result to
abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special
Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be
the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road
maintenance, and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item
shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The
1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special
provisions, conditions to items in an expenditure bill, which cannot be
vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as they
are appropriate in the budgetary sense. The veto herein is then not
valid.
Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of
military equipment
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and
prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of
contractual obligations, and if allowed, shall effectively alter the
original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military
equipment deemed necessary to modernize the AFP. The SC affirmed
the veto. Any provision blocking an administrative action in
implementing a law or requiring legislative approval of executive acts
must be incorporated in a separate and substantive bill. Therefore,
being inappropriate provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation
benefits should be covered by direct appropriations specifically
approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is
AbakadavsPurisima
Full text:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2008/aug2008/gr_166715_2008.html
FACTS: Republic Act No. 9335 was enacted to optimize the revenuegeneration capability and collection of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) and the Bureau of Customs (BOC). It provides a system of rewards
and sanctions through the creation of Rewards and Incentives Fund (Fund)
and a Revenue Performance Evaluation Board (Board) to BIR and BOC
ISSUE:
Main Issue:
Whether or Not
there is a violation
of equal protection
clause
RULING:
(1) Equality protection is equality among equals, not similarity of
treatment of persons who are classified based on substantial
differences in relation to the object to be accomplished. When things
or persons are different in fact or circumstance, they may be treated in
law differently.
The Constitution does not require that things which are different in
fact be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal
officials and employees if they exceed their revenue targets. It covers all
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC with at least six months of
service, regardless of employment status.
Petitioners, invoking their right as taxpayers, filed this petition challenging
the constitutionality of RA 9335, a tax reform legislation. They contend
that the limiting the scope of the system of rewards and incentives only to
officials and employees of the BIR and the BOC violates the constitutional
guarantee of equal protection. There is no valid basis for classification or
distinction as to why such a system should not apply to officials and
employees of all other government agencies.
Respondent contends that the allegation that the reward system will
breed mercenaries is mere speculation and does not suffice to invalidate
the law. Seen in conjunction with the declared objective of RA 9335, the
law validly classifies the BIR and the BOC because the functions they
perform are distinct from those of the other government agencies and
instrumentalities.
or not the
bicameral
conference
committee is
clothed with an ex
post veto power
become laws. For this reason, a bill has to undergo three (3)
mandatory separate readings in each House.
PROHIBITED
MEASURES (Sec
30, 31)
First Lepanto vs CA
Full text:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1994/mar1994/gr_110571_1994.html
FACTS: The Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended provided that
appeals from decisions of the Board of Investments(BOI) shall be the
exclusive jurisdiction of the CA. Just a few months after the
1987 Constitution took
effect
(July
17,
1987),
the
OmnibusInvestments Code of 1987 (EO 226) was promulgated which
provided in Art 82 thereof that such appeals be directly filed with the SC.
The SC later promulgated, under its rule-making power, CircularNo. 1-91
which confirmed that jurisdiction of the CA over appeals from
the decisions of the BOI. SCs Second Division, relying on saidCircular,
accordingly sustained the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in this present
case. Petitioner now move to reconsider and question the Second
Divisions ruling which provided:
ISSUE: Whether or
not Section 27 of
the
Ombudsman
Act is valid
ISSUE:
Was
it
correct for the
Court
to
have
passed upon and
decided on the
issue
of
the
constitutionality of
the PNRC charter?
Corollarily: What is
the nature of the
PNRC
states that [t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the
formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations, unless such
corporations are owned or controlled by the Government or any
subdivision or instrumentality thereof. The Court thus directed the PNRC
to incorporate under the Corporation Code and register with the
Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private
corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also
declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the
Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as
amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because
they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate
powers.
Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for
Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene
and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically
questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the
pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of
some provisions of the PNRC Charter.
Garcia vs Mata
Full text:
http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1975/jul1975/gr_l_33713_1975.html
FACTS:Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as
amended by PD 1306, the information against him alleging that Soriano
Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game by selling
illegal tickets known as Masiao tickets without any authority from the
Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the government
authorities concerned. Mata claimed that during the hearing of the case,
he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be
found the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the
issuance of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its
whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding
Judge of the City Court of Ormoc replied, it is with the court. The Judge
then handed the records to the Fiscal who attached them to the records.
This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and
for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others,
Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was
denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating that the court has made a
ISSUE: Whether or
not the judge must
before issuing the
warrant personally
examine on oath or
affirmation
the
complainant
and
any witnesses he
may produce and
take
their
depositions
in
writing, and attach
them to the record,
in addition to any
affidavits presented
to him?
ISSUE: Whether or
not the Presidents
veto is valid
Atitiw vs Zamora
Full text:
FACTS: The ratification of the 1987 Constitution ordains the creation of
autonomous regions in MuslimMindanao and in the Cordilleras mandating
the Congress to enact organic acts pursuant to section 18 of article X of
the Constitution. Thus, by virtue of the residual powers of President
Cory Aquino shepromulgated E.O 220 creating CAR. Then the congress
enacted R.A 6766, an act providing for organicact for the cordillera
autonomous region, a plebiscite was cast but was not approve by the
people. Thecourt declared that E.O 220 to be still in force and effect until
properly repealed or amended. Later onFebruary 15, 2000, President
Estrada signed the General Appropriations Act of 2000 (GAA 2000)
whichincludes the assailed special provisions, then issued an E.O 270 to
extend the implementation of thewinding up of operations of the CAR and
extended it by virtue of E.O 328.The petitioners seek the declaration of
nullity of paragraph 1 of the special provisions of RA 870 (GAA2000)
directing that the appropriation for the CAR shall be spent to wind up its
activities and pay theseparation and retirement benefits of all the
affected members and employees.
Power of
Demetria V Alba
ISSUE:
(1) Whether the
assailed special
provisions in RA
8760 is a rider and
as such is
unconstitutional.2.
(2) Whether the
Philippine
Government,
through Congress,
can unilaterally
amend/repeal EO
220.3.
(3) Whether the
Republic should be
ordered to honor
its commitments as
spelled out in
EO.220
HELD: No. The Constitution provides that no law shall be passed authorizing any
Appropriation
(Sec. 25, 29)
transfer of appropriations, however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker,
Demetrio Demetria et al as taxpayers and members of the Batasan
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions
may by law be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law
for their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective
appropriations.
transfer funds from one department, bureau, office or agency of the Executive
included
actually savings in the item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not
in
the
General
Appropriations
Act
or
approved
after
its
the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be
made. It does not only completely disregard the standards set in the fundamental
law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise
goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the
provision in question null and void.
But it should be noted, transfers of savings within one department from one item to
another in the GAA may be allowed by law in the interest of expediency and
efficiency. There is no transfer from one department to another here.
Aglipay V Ruiz
The 33rd International Eucharistic Congress organized by the Roman
Catholic Church took place sometime in 1936. In commemoration
thereof. then Director of Posts, Juan Ruiz, initiated the production of
certain stamps the design of which would have in their center a
chalice, with grape and stalks of wheat as border design. Eventually,
the stamps were produced and some were sold pursuant to Act No.
4052, which provides for appropriation.
Gregorio Aglipay, the head of the Philippine Independent Church,
assailed the production and sale of such stamps. Aglipay contends that
the funding of said stamps commemorative to a particular religious
HELD: No. The sale of stamps is not in violation of the Constitution. In fact, what was
emphasized on the stamps was not the religious event itself but rather the City of
Manila as being the seat of such event. Act No. 4052 on the other hand did not
appropriate any public money to a religious event. Act No. 4052 appropriated the
sum of P60,000.00 for the cost of plates and printing of postage stamps with new
designs and other expenses incident thereto, and merely authorizes the Director of
Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to
dispose of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may
be deemed advantageous to the Government. The fact that the fund is being
used for such is only incidental to the function of Director of Posts and under his
discretion.
On religious freedom
The Supreme Court noted however that the elevating influence of religion is
Constitution.
Garces V Estenzo
HELD:
Yes. Resolution No. 5 of the barangay council of Valencia, Ormoc City, "reviving the
FACTS:
Pursuant to Resolution No. 5 of the Barangay Council of Valencia,
Ormoc City, a wooden image of San Vicente Ferrer was acquired by
the barangay council with funds raised by means of solicitations and
cash, duly ratified by the barangay assembly in a plebiscite, reviving
the traditional socio-religious celebration of the feast day of the saint.
As per Resolution No. 6, the image was brought to the Catholic parish
church during the saint's feast day which also designated the hermano
mayor as the custodian of the image. After the fiesta, however,
petitioner parish priest, Father Sergio Marilao Osmea, refused to return
custody of the image to the council on the pretext that it was the
property of the church because church funds were used for its
acquisition until after the latter, by resolution, filed a replevin case
against the priest and posted the required bond. Thereafter, the parish
priest and his co-petitioners filed an action for annulment of the
council's resolutions relating to the subject image contending that
when they were adopted, the barangay council was not duly
constituted because the chairman of the Kabataang Barangay was
not
allowed
to
participate;
and
that
they
contravened
the
traditional socio-religious celebration" every fifth day of April "of the feast day of
Seor San Vicente Ferrer, the patron saint of Valencia", and providing for: (I) the
acquisition of the image of San Vicente Ferrer; and (2) the construction of a waiting
shed as the barangay's projects, funds for which would be obtained through the
"selling of tickets and cash donations", does not directly or indirectly establish any
religion, nor abridge religious liberty, nor appropriate money for the benefit of any
sect, priest or clergyman. The image was purchased with private funds, not with tax
money. The construction of the waiting shed is entirely a secular matter. The
wooden image was purchased in connection with the celebration of the barrio
fiesta honoring the patron saint, San Vicente Ferrer, and not for the purpose of
favoring any religion or interfering with religious beliefs of the barrio residents. One of
the highlights of the fiesta was the mass. Consequently, the image of the patron
saint had to be placed in the church when the mass was celebrated. If there is
nothing unconstitutional or illegal in holding a fiesta and having a patron saint for
the barrio, then any activity intended to facilitate the worship of the patron saint
(such as the acquisition and display of his image) cannot be branded as illegal. As
noted in the resolution, the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious affair. Its celebration is an
ingrained tradition in rural communities. The fiesta relieves the monotony and
drudgery of the lives of the masses.
constitutional.
Brillantes V Comelec
On December 22, 1997, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 8436
authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES)
for the process of voting, counting of votes and
canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections.
It also required the COMELEC to acquire automated counting
machines (ACMs), computer equipment, devices and materials and
adopt new electoral forms and printing materials.
The COMELEC initially intended to implement the said automation
during the May 11, 1998 presidential elections, particularly in counting
the votes collected from the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao
(ARMM). However, the failure of the machines to correctly read a
number of automated ballots discontinued its implementation.
Contributions for the establishment of the AES persisted that even
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 172 on
January 24, 2003, allocating the sum of P2,500,000,000 to exclusively
fund the AES in time for the May 10, 2004 elections. On February 10,
2003, upon the request of the COMELEC, President Gloria MacapagalArroyo issued Executive Order No. 175 authorizing the release of a
further supplemental P500 million budget for the AES project of the
COMELEC.
The petitioners-in-intervention point to several constitutional infractions
occasioned by the assailed resolution. They advance the view that the
assailed resolution effectively preempts the sole and exclusive authority
of Congress under Article VII, Section 4 of the Constitution to canvass
the votes for President and Vice-President. Further, as there has been
no appropriation by Congress for the respondent COMELEC to conduct
an unofficial electronic transmission of results of the May 10, 2004
elections, any expenditure for the said purpose contravenes Article VI,
Section 29 (par. 1) of the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not the appropriations made by the president
constitutional.
b)
for violating Art. VI, Sec. 29 (par. 1) of the 1987 Constitution that
no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law;
Held. NO
The assailed COMELEC resolution contravenes the constitutional provision that
no money shall be paid out of the treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.[37]
By its very terms, the electronic transmission and tabulation of the election
results projected under Resolution No. 6712 is unofficial in character, meaning
not emanating from or sanctioned or acknowledged by the government or
government body.[38] Any disbursement of public funds to implement this project is
contrary to the provisions of the Constitution and Rep. Act No. 9206, which is the
2003 General Appropriations Act. The use of the COMELEC of its funds appropriated
for the AES for the unofficial quick count project may even be considered as a
felony under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. [39]
Irrefragably, the implementation of the assailed resolution would entail, in due
course, the hiring of additional manpower, technical services and acquisition of
equipment, including computers and software, among others. According to the
COMELEC, it needed P55,000,000 to operationalize the project, including the
encoding process.[40] Hence, it would necessarily involve the disbursement of public
funds for which there must be the corresponding appropriation.
We have reviewed Rep. Act No. 9206, the General Appropriations Act, which took
effect on April 23, 2003 and find no appropriation for the project of the COMELEC
for electronic transmission of unofficial election results. What is appropriated
therein is the amount of P225,000,000 of the capital outlay for the modernization of
the electoral system.
Under paragraph 3 of the special provisions of Rep. Act No. 9206, the amount
of P225,000,000 shall be used primarily for the establishment of the AES prescribed
under Rep. Act No. 8436, viz:
3. Modernization of Electoral System. The appropriations herein authorized for the
Modernization of the Electoral System in the amount of Two Hundred Twenty-Five
Million Pesos (P225,000,000.00) shall be used primarily for the establishment of the
automated election system, prescribed under Republic Act No. 8436, particularly for
the process of voting, counting of votes and canvassing/consolidation of results of
the national and local elections.
Section 52 of Rep. Act No. 9206 proscribes any change or modification in the
expenditure items authorized thereunder. Thus:
Sec. 52. Modification of Expenditure Components. Unless specifically authorized in
this Act, no change or modification shall be made in the expenditure items in this
Act and other appropriations laws unless in cases of augmentation from savings in
appropriations as authorized under Section 25(5), Article VI of the 1987 Philippine
Constitution.
Neither can the money needed for the project be taken from the COMELECs
savings, if any, because it would be violative of Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the 1987
Constitution.
The power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law. In this
case, no law has, thus, far been enacted authorizing the respondent COMELEC to
transfer savings from another item in its appropriation, if there are any, to fund the
assailed resolution. No less than the Secretary of the Senate certified that there is no
law appropriating any amount for an unofficial count and tabulation of the votes
cast during the May 10, 2004 elections.
What is worrisome is that despite the concerns of the Commissioners during
its En Banc meeting on April 27, 2004, the COMELEC nevertheless approved the
assailed resolution the very next day. The COMELEC had not executed any
supplemental contract for the implementation of the project with PMSI. Worse, even
in the absence of a certification of availability of funds for the project, it approved
the assailed resolution.
Constitutionality of
PDAF
from Congressional
Pork
Barrel
to
the
latest
Priority
Development Assistance Fund or PDAF. The allocation for the pork barrel is
integrated in the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
Since 2011, the allocation of the PDAF has been done in the following
manner:
a. P70 million: for each member of the lower house; broken down to P40
million for hard projects (infrastructure projects like roads, buildings, schools,
etc.), and P30 million for soft projects (scholarship grants, medical
assistance, livelihood programs, IT development, etc.);
b. P200 million: for each senator; broken down to P100 million for hard
projects, P100 million for soft projects;
c. P200 million: for the Vice-President; broken down to P100 million for hard
the projects to which his PDAF money should go to is a violation of the rule on
non-delegability of legislative power. The power to appropriate funds is solely
The PDAF articles in the GAA do provide for realignment of funds whereby
lodged in Congress (in the two houses comprising it) collectively and not
certain cabinet members may request for the realignment of funds into their
state that the Congress can delegate the power to the individual member of
Congress.
The president does have his own source of fund albeit not included in the
One feature in the principle of checks and balances is the power of the
GAA. The so-called presidential pork barrel comes from two sources: (a)
the Malampaya Funds, from the Malampaya Gas Project this has been
But this power is already being undermined because of the fact that once
around since 1976, and (b) the Presidential Social Fund which is derived from
the GAA is approved, the legislator can now identify the project to which he
the earnings of PAGCOR this has been around since about 1983.
will appropriate his PDAF. Under such system, how can the president veto the
appropriation made by the legislator if the appropriation is made after the
Ever since, the pork barrel system has been besieged by allegations of
corruption. In July 2013, six whistle blowers, headed by Benhur Luy, exposed
President useless.
that for the last decade, the corruption in the pork barrel system had been
facilitated by Janet Lim Napoles. Napoles had been helping lawmakers in
d. Local Autonomy
funneling their pork barrel funds into about 20 bogus NGOs (non-government
As a rule, the local governments have the power to manage their local
organizations) which would make it appear that government funds are being
affairs. Through their Local Development Councils (LDCs), the LGUs can
used in legit existing projects but are in fact going to ghost projects. An
develop their own programs and policies concerning their localities. But with
audit was then conducted by the Commission on Audit and the results
Motivated by the foregoing, Greco Belgica and several others, filed various
officer) meddles with the affairs of the local government and this is contrary
to the State policy embodied in the Constitution on local autonomy. Its good
if thats all that is happening under the pork barrel system but worse, the PDAF
ISSUES:
HELD:
I. No,
congressional
pork
barrel
system is
unconstitutional. It is
Belgica et al emphasized that the presidential pork comes from the earnings
of the Malampaya and PAGCOR and not from any appropriation from a
funds (power of the purse). The executive, on the other hand, implements the
particular legislation.
laws this includes the GAA to which the PDAF is a part of. Only the executive
may implement the law but under the pork barrel system, whats happening
The Supreme Court disagrees as it ruled that PD 910, which created the
was that, after the GAA, itself a law, was enacted, the legislators themselves
(i) PD 910: Section 8 thereof provides that all fees, among others, collected
was ruled that pork barrel, then called as CDF or the Countrywide
from certain energy-related ventures shall form part of a special fund (the
development and for other purposes which the President may direct;
This is also highlighted by the fact that in realigning the PDAF, the executive
will still have to get the concurrence of the legislator concerned.
War Powers
David V Macapagal
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the
discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then
president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation
1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The
said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of extremists
to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the
same
time
revoked
all
permits issued
for
rallies
and
other
public
write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was
raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested.
His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in
1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail
Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017.
David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national
vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the
averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot
the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as
also averred that the emergency contemplated in the Constitution are those
unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has become moot and
1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents calling out
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly
unconstitutional.
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or
institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On
lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties
the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not
still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can
limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made
take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in
a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency but
part and at the same time some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The
her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it for
such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from Congress
must be based on the following:
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
leading to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious
declared by Congress.
threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist leaders.
There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security Group of
the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and the
military.
any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was
justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the
seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms
and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty
Power of Taxation
(sec. 28)
Public Purpose
RULING:
Fertiphil has locus standi because it suffered direct injury; doctrine of standing is a
mere procedural technicality which may be waived. The imposition of the levy was
an exercise of the taxation power of the state. While it is true that the power to tax
can be used as an implement of police power, the primary purpose of the levy was
revenue generation. If the purpose is primarily revenue, or if revenue is, at least,
one of the real and substantial purposes, then the exaction is properly called a tax.
Police power and the power of taxation are inherent powers of the State. These
powers are distinct and have different tests for validity. Police power is the power of
the State to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in
order to promote the general welfare, while the power of taxation is the power to
levy taxes to be used for public purpose. The main purpose of police power is the
regulation of a behavior or conduct, while taxation is revenue generation. The
"lawful subjects" and "lawful means" tests are used to determine the validity of a law
enacted under the police power. The power of taxation, on the other hand, is
circumscribed by inherent and constitutional limitations.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fertiphil has locus standi to question the constitutionality
of LOI No. 1465.
Delegation to the
President
It is also clear from Section 5 of the SMA that the positive final determination to be
undertaken by the Tariff Commission does not entail a mere gathering of statistical
data. In order to arrive at such determination, it has to establish causal linkages from
the statistics that it compiles and evaluates: after finding there is an importation in
increased quantities of the product in question, that such importation is a substantial
cause of serious threat or injury to the domestic industry.
The Court of Appeals relies heavily on the legislative record of a congressional
debate during deliberations on the SMA to assert a purported legislative intent that
the findings of the Tariff Commission do not bind the DTI Secretary. Yet as explained
earlier, the plain meaning of Section 5 emphasizes that only if the Tariff Commission
renders a positive determination could the DTI Secretary impose a safeguard
measure. Resort to the congressional records to ascertain legislative intent is not
warranted if a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. The legislature is
presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words advisedly, and to
have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.
Ruling:
The SMA establishes a distinct allocation of functions between the Tariff
Commission and the DTI Secretary. The plain meaning of Section 5
shows that it is the Tariff Commission that has the power to make a
positive final determination. This power, which belongs to the Tariff
Commission, must be distinguished from the power to impose general
safeguard measure properly vested on the DTI Secretary. The distinction
is vital, as a positive final determination clearly antecedes, as a
condition precedent, the imposition of a general safeguard
measure. At the same time, a positive final determination does not
necessarily result in the imposition of a general safeguard
measure. Under Section 5, notwithstanding the positive final
determination of the Tariff Commission, the DTI Secretary is tasked to
decide whether or not that the application of the safeguard measures
is in the public interest.
SMA; it does not flow from any inherent executive power. Thus, the limitations
imposed by Section 5 are absolute, warranted as they are by a constitutional fiat.
SC RULING
Police power is inherent in a government to enact laws, within constitutional limits, to
promote the order, safety, health, morals, and general welfare of society. It is
lodged primarily with the legislature. By virtue of a valid delegation of legislative
power, it may also be exercised by the President and administrative boards, as well
as the lawmaking bodies on all municipal levels, including the barangay. Such
delegation confers upon the President quasi-legislative power which may be
defined as the authority delegated by the law-making body to the administrative
body to adopt rules and regulations intended to carry out the provisions of the law
and implement legislative policy provided that it must comply with the following
requisites:
(1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
(2) It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
(3) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and
(4) It must be reasonable.
The first requisite was actually satisfied since EO 156 has both constitutional and
statutory bases. Anent the second requisite, that the order must be issued
or promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, the presumption is
that the said executive issuance duly complied with the procedures and limitations
imposed by law since the respondents never questioned the procedure that paved
way for the issuance of EO 156 but instead, what they challenged was the absence
of substantive due process in the issuance of the EO.
In the third requisite, the Court held that the importation ban runs afoul with the third
requisite as administrative issuances must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of
the authority conferred. In the instant case, the subject matter of the laws
authorizing the President to regulate or forbid importation of used motor vehicles, is
a big portion on the right side of the hospital is being leased for
property tax, there must be clear and unequivocal proof that (1) it is a charitable
institution and (2)its real properties are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used
for charitable purposes. While portions of the hospital are used for treatment of
patients and the dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying or non-
When the City Assessor of Quezon City assessed both its land and
paying, other portions thereof are being leased to private individuals and
hospital building for real property taxes, the Lung Center of the
enterprises.
institution
with
minimum
of
60%
of
its hospital
bedsexclusively used for charity patients and that the major thrust of
from participation or enjoyment. If real property is used for one or more commercial
purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted purposes but is subject to
was denied, prompting a petition for the reversal of the resolution of the
taxation.
under
Section
28(3),
Article
VI
of
the
Constitution,
HELD:
The petition is GRANTED. The General and Supplemental Agreement dated
December 28, 1993, which PCGG and the Marcos heirs entered into are hereby
declared NULL AND VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution.
Under Item No. 2 of the General Agreement, the PCGG commits to exempt from all
forms of taxes the properties to be retained by the Marcos heirs. This is a clear
violation of the Construction. The power to tax and to grant tax exemptions is
vested in the Congress and, to a certain extent, in the local legislative bodies.
Section 28 (4), Article VI of the Constitution, specifically provides: "No law granting
any tax exemption shall be passed without the concurrence of a majority of all the
Member of the Congress." The PCGG has absolutely no power to grant tax
exemptions, even under the cover of its authority to compromise ill-gotten wealth
cases.
Even granting that Congress enacts a law exempting the Marcoses form paying
taxes on their properties, such law will definitely not pass the test of the equal
protection clause under the Bill of Rights. Any special grant of tax exemption in favor
only of the Marcos heirs will constitute class legislation. It will also violate the
constitutional rule that "taxation shall be uniform and equitable."
Neither can the stipulation be construed to fall within the power of the commissioner
of internal revenue to compromise taxes. Such authority may be exercised only
when (1) there is reasonable doubt as to the validity of the claim against the
taxpayer, and (2) the taxpayer's financial position demonstrates a clear inability to
pay. Definitely, neither requisite is present in the case of the Marcoses, because
under the Agreement they are effectively conceding the validity of the claims
against their properties, part of which they will be allowed to retain. Nor can the
PCGG grant of tax exemption fall within the power of the commissioner to abate or
cancel a tax liability. This power can be exercised only when (1) the tax appears to
be unjustly or excessively assessed, or (2) the administration and collection costs
involved do not justify the collection of the tax due. In this instance, the cancellation
of tax liability is done even before the determination of the amount due. In any
event, criminal violations of the Tax Code, for which legal actions have been filed in
court or in which fraud is involved, cannot be compromised.
Initiative and
Referendum (sec.
32)
Garcia V Comelec
FACTS:
On May 24, 1993, petitioners filed a petition with the Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong to annul Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye
1993 which includes the Municipaloty of Morong as part of the Subic
Special Economic Zone in accord with the RA No. 7227.
The municipality did not take any action on the petition within 30 days
after its submission; so, they resorted to their power of initiative under
the Local Government Code of 1991. They solicited the required
number of signatures to repeal the said resolution.
However, the Vice Mayor, Hon. Edilberto de Leon, and the Presiding
Office of the Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong wrote a letter dated June
HELD:
The petition is granted and the decision of the Comelec on July 6, 1993 is annulled
and set aside.
RULING:
The 1987 Constitution installed back the power to the people regarding legislation
because of the event in February 1986. The new Constitution became less trusting
of public officials.
Through initiative, the people were given the power to amend the Constitution
under Sec. 2 Art. 17 which provides amendments to this Constitution may likewise
be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least 12%
of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least 3% of the registered voter therein.
11, 1993 to deny the petition for local initiative and/or referendum.
The Comelec was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an initiative and referendum.
On July 6, 1993, the Comelec denied the petition for local initiative
because its subject is merely a resolution and not an ordinance.
On Aug. 4, 1989, the Congress approved RA No. 6735 entitled An Act Providing for
a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor.
ISSUE:
w/n the Pambansang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is the proper
YES. Sec. 32 of Art. 6 provides the Congress shall provide for a system of initiative
subject of an initiative?
and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can directly
Sub-issue: w/n the decision of the Comelec to deny the petition be set
propose
aside?
and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the
Congress or local legislative body.
Under Sec. 32(a) of RA No. 6735 it provided the 3 systems of initiative, namely:
1. Initiative on the Constitution petition to amend the Constitution
2. Initiative on statutes petition proposing to enact a national legislation
3. Initiative on local legislation petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial,
city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance
Under its Sec.16(a), it provided the limitations on local initiatives, which is the power
of local initiative shall not be exercised more than once a year.
SBMA V COMELEC
Fatcs:
SC:
Initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments not only to the
constitution but also to propose and enact legislation through an election called for
that purpose. It is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, to enact or
reject them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. There is also what
we called as indirect initiative, wherein this is an exercise of the initiative by the
people through a proposition set Congress or local legislative body for action. Tayo
ang nag propose kelangan lang ng isang Congressman to support us to present
before the Congress.
Referendum on the other hand, is the power of the electorate to approve or reject
a legislation through an election called for that purpose. So, it may be a referendum
statute, wherein it is to approve or reject an act or law passed by Congress. Or
referendum of local law, which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law
enacted by the local legislative body.
Initiative is resorted by the people directly, either because the law making body fails
or refuses to enact the law, ordinance or resolution that they desire or because they
want to amend or modify what is already existing. Initiative is the act of the people,
it comes from the people. Referendum on the other hand, the law making body
submits to the people for approval or rejection any ordinance or resolution which is
due to enact thereto. Or approve by such law making authority. It is commenced
by the legislative bodythe referendum. Initiative is entirely the work of the
electorate. Whereas, referendum is began and consented to by the law-making
body. Initiative is the process of law-making by the people themselves without the
participation and even against the wishes of their elected representatives.
Referendum consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been
brought up or enacted by the legislative body.
In other words, the process and voting in initiative is understandably more complex
than in referendum. Because in initiative, it is us the people proposing and there are
several provisions for approval or non-approval. Whereas, in referendum what is only
submitted to the people is only the question of a yes or a no. It follows, that there is
a need for the COMELEC to supervise the initiative more closely. Its authority is not
only on the counting and canvassing of the votes but also to see to it that the
manner as submitted by the people is in the proper form and language. So it is
easily understood and voted by the electorate. This is especially true when the
propose legislation is lengthy and complicated, it should be broken down into
several autonomous parts.
Santiago V COMELEC
HELD:
RA 6735 is intended to include the system of initiative on amendments to the
Facts:
directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve
Peoples Initiative The COMELEC then, upon its approval, a.) set the
per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
time and dates for signature gathering all over the country, b.) caused
district must be represented by at least there per centum of the registered voters
therein. . . The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this
by law to be passed by Congress and no such law has yet been passed
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution through the system of inititative would remain entombed in the cold
niche of the constitution until Congress provides for its implementation. The people
for in Subtitles II and III thereof but no provisions were specifically made
for initiatives on the Constitution. This omission indicates that the matter
of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some future
***Note that this ruling has been reversed on November 20, 2006 when ten justices
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various
opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic
Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a peoples
initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis.
Lambino V Comelec
Lambino et al are also actually proposing a revision of the constitution and not a
mere amendment. This is also in violation of the logrolling rule wherein a proposed
petitioners even includes a transitory provision which would enable the would-be
There is no need to revisit the Santiago case since the issue at hand can be
decided upon other facts. The rule is, the Court avoids questions of constitutionality
Secs 1-7 of Art VI and Sec 1-4 of Art VII and by adding Art XVIII entitled
Lambino Group 10 (ten) Justices of the Supreme Court voted that Republic Act 6735
is adequate.
Ten (10) Members of the Court reiterate their position, as shown by their various
the aforementioned case is only binding to the parties within that case.
opinions already given when the Decision herein was promulgated, that Republic
Act No. 6735 is sufficient and adequate to amend the Constitution thru a peoples
ISSUE: Whether or not the petition for initiative met the requirements of
Sec 2 ArtXVII of the 1987 Constitution.
initiative.
As such, it is insisted that such minute resolution did not become stare decisis
HELD: The proponents of the initiative secure the signatures from the
people. The proponents secure the signatures in their private capacity
The Santiago vs. COMELEC doctrine. The ruling in Santiago vs. COMELEC may be
and not as public officials. The proponents are not disinterested parties
summarized in this manner: RA 6735, also known as the Peoples Initiative and
presumption
The Lambino vs. COMELEC ruling. The Supreme Courts ruling in Lambino vs.
that
the
proponents
observed
the
constitutional
COMELEC, in contrast to the Santiago ruling, states that there is no need to revisit
the sufficiency of R.A. 6735. In the words of the Supreme Court:
FACTS:
Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory
provisions on public consultation and the right to information when they
negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether or not the MOA-AD
brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutional
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are
the province, cities, municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions on Muslim Mindanao and the Cordillera as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the
Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures and other relevant characteristics within the framework of this
constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.
Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions
to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.
Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a
majority of the votes cast by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the
purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this
Constitution and national laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide
1. Administrative organization;
7. Educational policies;
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general
Article II
Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof
shall be valid when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall
be held not earlier than sixty days nor later than ninety days after the approval of
such amendment or revision.
MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the
present constitution and laws shall come into force upon signing of a
comprehensive compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the legal
framework. The presidents authority is limited to proposing constitutional
amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party that the required