SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 6403. August 31, 2004]

RUDECON MANAGEMENT CORPORATION and ATTY.
RUDEGELIO D. TACORDA, complainants, vs. ATTY.
MANUEL N. CAMACHO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
On November 23, 2000, Rudecon Management Corporation and
Atty. Rudegelio D. Tacorda filed with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) a verified complaint for disbarment or suspension
from the practice of law against Atty. Manuel N. Camacho for
knowingly committing forum-shopping, in violation of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 in relation to the provisions of
Section 5, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the Canons of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The factual antecedents leading to the instant complaint are as
follows:
On September 3, 1998, Sisenando Singson, represented by
herein respondent Atty. Manuel N. Camacho, filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a complaint against herein
complainant Rudecon Management Corporation for damages and
reconveyance, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-98-35444.[1] The case
was originally raffled to Branch 79, RTC, Quezon City (Branch 79 for
brevity) but was eventually re-raffled to Branch 85 of the same court.
On September 21, 1998, Singson, again represented by Atty.
Camacho, filed with Branch 78, RTC, Quezon City (Branch 78 for
brevity) a Motion for Intervention (With Attached Answer in
Intervention With Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim)
in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326, entitled, Rudecon Management
Corporation, plaintiff-appellee vs. Ramon M. Veluz, defendantappellant, a case for unlawful detainer on appeal before said court.[2]
On October 1, 1998, Rudecon filed a motion before Branch 78
seeking to cite Singson and his counsel, Atty. Camacho, for contempt
for having allegedly violated the rule against forum shopping. Rudecon
contends that the answer-in-intervention filed before Branch 78
involves the same issues already raised in the complaint filed with
Branch 79.
On November 6, 1998, Branch 78, issued an order, with the
following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, finding appellees herein Motion to be well taken,
this Court finds would-be-intervenor, Sisenando Singson and his
counsel, Atty. Manuel N. Camacho to have violated the rule on forumshopping and holds them liable for contempt of Court under Circular
No. 04-94 and Section 5, Rule 7, Rules of Court in relation to Rule 71
and hereby reprimands both of them
without prejudice to any administrative and appropriate action
against would-be-intervenors counsel.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Singson and Camacho did not appeal the order.
On the basis of the above-cited order, Rudecon and Tacorda filed
the instant complaint for disbarment or suspension against Atty.
Camacho. Complainants submit that aside from disregarding the rule
against forum shopping, contained in Supreme Court Administrative
Circular No. 04-94 and Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court,
respondent is also guilty of violating Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1 and
Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.[4]
Respondent filed his Answer to the instant complaint. He denies
the allegations of complainant and contends that he is not guilty of
forum shopping. He claims that the Answer in Intervention filed with
Branch 78 in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326 and the Complaint filed with
Branch 79 in Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 do not involve the same
issues and reliefs prayed for and that he did not resort to the filing of
both actions in order to increase the chances of his client obtaining a
favorable decision.[5]
The case was docketed by IBP as CBD Case No. 00-779 and
was referred by the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP to an
Investigating
Commissioner
for
investigation,
report
and
recommendation.
On October 24, 2003, Investigating Commissioner Julio C.
Elamparo submitted his report to the IBP Board of Governors with the
following findings and recommendation:
.....
Two court cases gave rise to the present complaint. The first is
Sisenando Singson vs. Rudecon Management Corp., Civil Case No.
Q-98-35444 before Quezon City, RTC Branch 79 and the other case is
Rudecon Management Corp. vs. Ramon M. Veluz, Civil Case No. Q98-35326 before Quezon City, RTC Branch 78.

The respondent does not deny the existence of an Order dated

November 6, 1998 issued by RTC Branch 78 of Quezon City in the
case entitled Rudecon Management Corp. vs. Ramon M. Veluz, Civil
Case No. Q-98-35326. Respondent does not deny also that this Order
has become final and executory. What the respondent asserts is that
he is not guilty of forum shopping because the cause of action and the
reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326 are different from the
cause of action and reliefs prayed for in Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 are
different.
When respondent failed to contest the Order dated November 6,
1998, the same was rendered final and executory. This office is
therefore devoid of any jurisdiction to review the factual
finding of the trial court which give rise to said order finding the
respondent guilty of forum shopping. This office has no other option but
to recognize the validity of said order.
.....
Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the penalty of
warning be meted out against the respondent for violating the
prohibition against forum shopping, specifically, Supreme Court Adm.
No. 04-94, paragraph 2 and Section 5, Rule 7, paragraph 2 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure.[6]
On February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed
Resolution No. XVI-2004-43 adopting and approving the report and
recommendation of Investigating Commissioner Elamparo.[7]
We do not entirely agree with the IBP Resolution.
Based on the records, there are two issues to be resolved: (1)
whether respondent is guilty of forum shopping; and (2) whether
respondent may be held administratively liable for violation of the Code
of Professional Responsibility. As to the first issue, we rule in the
affirmative. As to the second issue, we rule in the negative.
Anent the first issue.
Respondent maintains that he is not guilty of forum shopping.
However, it is not disputed that the RTC found respondent and his
client guilty of forum shopping, on the basis of which it held both of
them in contempt. This order has become final and executory for
failure of respondent to appeal the same. The general rule is that once
an issue has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent
court, it can no longer be controverted anew and should be finally laid
to rest.[8] When a final judgment becomes executory, it becomes
immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified
in any respect, directly or indirectly, even if the modification is meant to
correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law,
and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by
the court rendering it or by this Court.[9] The only recognized
exceptions are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so
called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party,
and, of course where the judgment is void.[10] The instant case does
not fall under any of these exceptions. Indeed, it has been held that
controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound
practice in the courts demand that at the risk of occasional error,
judgments of courts determining controversies submitted to them
should become final at some definite time fixed by law, or by a rule of
practice recognized by law, so as to be thereafter beyond the control
even of the court which rendered them for the purpose of correcting
error of fact or of law, into which, in the opinion of the court it may have
fallen.[11] In the present case, since the order of the trial court dated
November 6, 1998 has already attained finality, we are now precluded
from seeking otherwise.
Anent the second issue.
After a perusal of the records before us, we agree with
respondent that there was no intention on his part to mislead the court
by concealing the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-35444 in Branch
79 when they filed the Motion for Intervention and Answer in
Intervention in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326 in Branch 78. Indeed, the
first paragraph of the said Answer in Intervention shows that
respondent and his client called the trial courts attention with respect
to the pendency of Civil Case No. Q-98-35444. Herein complainant,
which is the plaintiff in Civil Case No. Q-98-35326, does not dispute
respondents allegation that the latter and his client attached to their
Answer in Intervention a copy of their complaint in Civil Case No. Q98-35444.
Rules 1.01, 1.02, Canon 1 and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility provide as follows:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws
of the land and promote respect for law and for legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02 A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
.....

Page 1 of 24

LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the

court.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to
the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be
misled by any artifice.
Complainants seek the disbarment or suspension of respondent
from the practice of law for his having allegedly violated the abovequoted provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility in relation
to Supreme Court Administrative Circular 04-94 and Section 5, Rule
7[12] of the 1997 Rules of Court.
In administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against
lawyers, the quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant
evidence and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.[13]
Moreover, an administrative case against a lawyer must show the
dubious character of the act done as well as of the motivation thereof.
[14] In the present case, complainant failed to present clear and
preponderant evidence to show that respondent willfully and
deliberately resorted to falsehood and unlawful and dishonest conduct
in violation of the standards of honesty as provided for by the Code of
Professional Responsibility which would have warranted the imposition
of administrative sanction against him.
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVI-2004-43 dated February 27,
2004 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is SET ASIDE and the
instant administrative case filed against Atty. Manuel N. Camacho is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[12] Section 5. Certification against forum shopping. The plaintiff
or principal party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other
initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification
annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the
best of his knowledge, no such other action or claim is pending therein;
(b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete statement
of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that
the same or similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he
shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court wherein
his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be
curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without
prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing.
The submission of a false certification or non-compliance with any of
the undertakings therein shall constitute indirect contempt of court,
without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful
and deliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary
dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as
a cause for administrative sanctions.

A.C. No. 6273 March 15, 2010

ATTY. ILUMINADA M. VAFLOR-FABROA, Complainant, vs.
ATTY. OSCAR PAGUINTO, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
An Information for Estafa1 was filed on June 21, 2001 against
Atty. Iluminada M. Vaflor-Fabroa (complainant) along with others based
on a joint affidavit-complaint which Atty. Oscar Paguinto (respondent)
prepared and notarized. As the joint affidavit-complaint did not indicate
the involvement of complainant, complainant filed a Motion to Quash
the Information which the trial court granted.2 Respondents Motion for
Reconsideration of the quashal of the Information was denied3
Respondent also filed six other criminal complaints against
complainant for violation of Article 31 of Republic Act No. 6938
(Cooperative Code of the Philippines) before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor, but he eventually filed a Motion to Withdraw
them.4
On October 10, 2001, complainant, who was Chairperson of the
General Mariano Alvarez Service Cooperative, Inc. (GEMASCO),
received a Notice of Special General Assembly of GEMASCO on
October 14, 2001 to consider the removal of four members of the
Board of Directors (the Board), including her and the General
Manager.5 The notice was signed by respondent.
At the October 14, 2001 Special General Assembly presided by
respondent and PNP Sr. Supt. Angelito L. Gerangco (Gerangco), who
were not members of the then current Board,6 Gerango, complainants
predecessor, as Chair of the GEMASCO board, declared himself Chair,

appointed others to replace the removed directors, and appointed

respondent as Board Secretary.
On October 15, 2001, respondent and his group took over the
GEMASCO office and its premises, the pumphouses, water facilities,
and operations. On even date, respondent sent letter-notices to
complainant and the four removed directors informing them of their
removal from the Board and as members of GEMASCO, and advising
them to cease and desist from further discharging the duties of their
positions.7
Complainant thus filed on October 16, 2001 with the Cooperative
Development Authority (CDA)-Calamba a complaint for annulment of
the proceedings taken during the October 14, 2001 Special General
Assembly.
The CDA Acting Regional Director (RD), by Resolution of
February 21, 2002, declared the questioned general assembly null and
void for having been conducted in violation of GEMASCOs By-Laws
and the Cooperative Code of the Philippines.8 The RDs Resolution of
February 21, 2002 was later vacated for lack of jurisdiction9 of CDA.
In her present complainant10 against respondent for disbarment,
complainant alleged that respondent:
X X X PROMOTED OR SUED A GROUNDLESS, FALSE OR
UNLAWFUL SUIT, AND GAVE AID AND CONSENT TO THE SAME11
X X X DISOBEYED LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE[D]
DISRESPECT FOR LAW AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION12
X X X DID NOT CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY,
FAIRNESS AND CANDOR TOWARD HIS PROFESSIONAL
COLLEAGUE AND ENGAGED IN HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST
OPPOSING COUNSEL13
X X X VIOLATED CANON 19 A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT
HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE BOUNDS OF THE LAW14
X X X RUINED AND DAMAGED NOT ONLY THE GEN.
MARIANO ALVAREZ SERVICES COOPERATIVE, INC. (GEMASCO,
INC.) BUT THE ENTIRE WATER-CONSUMING COMMUNITY AS
WELL15
Despite the Courts grant,16 on respondents motion,17 of
extension of time to file Comment, respondent never filed any
comment. The Court thus required him to show cause why he should
not be disciplinarily dealt with,18 but just the same he failed to
comply.19
The Court thus referred the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.20
It appears that during the mandatory conference before the IBP,
complainant proposed the following issues:
1. Whether or not the acts of respondent constitute violations of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly the following:
1.1 Canon 1 A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the
laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal [processes].
1.2 Canon 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy,
fairness, and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall
avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
1.3 Canon 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to
the court.
1.4 Canon 19 A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within
the bounds of the law.
1.5 Rule 12.03 A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of
time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so.
2. Whether or not the above acts of respondent constitute
violations of his lawyers oath, particularly the following:
2.1 support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein
2.2 will do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court
2.3 will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same
2.4 will delay no man for money or malice
3. Whether or not the above acts of [respondent] complained of
are grounds for disbarment or suspension of attorneys by the Supreme
Court as provided for in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court.21
Respondents counsel who represented him during the
conference proposed the issue of whether, on the basis of the
allegations of the complaint, misconduct was committed by
respondent.22
After the conclusion of the conference, both parties were ordered
to submit position papers.23 Complainant filed hers,24 but respondent,
despite grant, on his motion, of extension of time, did not file any
position paper.
In her Report and Recommendation,25 Investigating
Commissioner Lolita A. Quisumbing found respondent guilty of
violating the Lawyers Oath as well as Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03

Page 2 of 24

LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Noting that respondent had

already been previously suspended for six months, the Commissioner
recommended that respondent be suspended for two years.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) Board of Governors
opted for the dismissal of the complaint, however, for lack of
merit.261avvphi1
On Motion for Reconsideration,27 the IBP-CBD Board of
Governors recommended that respondent be suspended from the
practice of law for six months.
The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking over the
Board of Directors and the GEMASCO facilities, respondent violated
the provisions of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines and the
GEMASCO By-Laws. He also violated the Lawyers Oath, which
provides that a lawyer shall support the Constitution and obey the
laws.
When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal
complaints against complainant, he violated the Lawyers Oath that a
lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless,
false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."
When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment on the
complaint, respondent failed to file any and ignored this Courts
subsequent show cause order, he violated Rule 12.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which states that "A lawyer shall not, after
obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let
the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation
for his failure to do so." Sebastian v. Bajar28 teaches:
x x x Respondents cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the
orders of the Supreme Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial
institution. Respondents conduct indicates a high degree of
irresponsibility. A Courts Resolution is "not to be construed as a mere
request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or
selectively". Respondents obstinate refusal to comply with the Courts
orders "not only betrays a recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also
underscores her disrespect of the Courts lawful orders which is only
too deserving of reproof.
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and
respondents deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard
thereof will subject the lawyer not only to punishment for contempt but
to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver responsibility is
imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the
courts and to show respect to their processes.29 (Citations omitted).
The Court notes that respondent had previously been suspended
from the practice of law for six months for violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility,30 he having been found to have received
an acceptance fee and misled the client into believing that he had filed
a case for her when he had not.31 It appears, however, that
respondent has not reformed his ways. A more severe penalty this time
is thus called for.
WHEREFORE, respondent, Atty. Oscar P. Paguinto, is
SUSPENDED for two years from the practice of law for violation of
Canons 1, 8, 10, and Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Lawyers Oath, effective immediately.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to be appended to respondents personal record as an
attorney; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 7084 February 27, 2009

CONRADO G. FERNANDEZ, Complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIA
ANGELICA P. DE RAMOS-VILLALON, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
For our resolution is this administrative case filed by complainant
Conrado G. Fernandez (Fernandez) against Atty. Maria Angelica P. De
Ramos-Villalon (Atty. Villalon). The complainant was the respondent in
Civil Case No. 05-1017, in which Carlos O. Palacios (Palacios) sought
to nullify a Deed of Donation he purportedly executed in favor of
Fernandez.1 The respondent in
this administrative action, Atty. Villalon, was Palacios counsel in
the early part of the case; she withdrew from the case after her
appointment as prosecutor of Quezon City.2
A brief summary of Civil Case No. 05-1017 is in order to put this
administrative complaint in proper context.
Palacios, in his Complaint in Civil Case No. 05-1017, alleged that
he was the owner of a lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 178587 located in Barangay San Lorenzo, Makati City.3 He
allegedly inherited the lot from his mother. Sometime in June 2004, he

became aware that his lot was being eyed by a land-grabbing

syndicate. The syndicate attempted to obtain a copy of TCT No.
178587 by pretending to be Carlos Palacios, Jr., and by filing a Petition
for Judicial Reconstitution of Lost Owners Duplicate Original Copy of
TCT No. 178587. The petition was docketed as LRC Case No. M4524.4
Palacios received information that Fernandez could help him
oppose the syndicates petition. Thus, Palacios approached
Fernandez, and they eventually succeeded in causing the withdrawal
of LRC Case No. M-4524, with the assistance of a certain Atty.
Augusto P. Jimenez, Jr.. Palacios allegedly agreed to pay Fernandez
P2,000,000.00 for the services he rendered in LRC Case No. M-4524.
On September 27, 2005, when Palacios visited the Village
Administrator of the San Lorenzo Village Association, he bumped into
Mrs. Jocelyn Lirio who expressed her interest in Palacios San Lazaro
property. She had heard it was being sold by Fernandez. Palacios was
surprised by Mrs. Lirios story, as he had no intention of selling the
property. Upon investigation, he discovered that Fernandez had
falsified a Deed of Donation that he (Palacios) purportedly executed in
Fernandez favor. This Deed was duly registered, and on the strength
of the purported donation, TCT No. 178587 in Palacios name was
cancelled, and a new TCT (TCT No. 220869) was issued in Fernandez
name.
Palacios then employed the services of respondent Atty. Villalon
to file a Complaint for the declaration of nullity of the Deed of Donation
that became the basis for the issuance of a title in Fernandez name.5
This complaint was subsequently amended to implead Romeo Castro,
Atty. Augusto P. Jimenez, Jr., Levy R. De Dios, and Rosario T. Abobo.6
In his Answer, Fernandez claimed that the transfer of title in his
name was proper on account of an existing Deed of Absolute Sale
dated January 12, 2005 between him and Palacios. He also alleged
that it was Palacios who falsified a Deed of Donation by forging their
signatures and having it notarized;7 Palacios did this in order to cheat
the government by paying only the donors tax, which was lower than
the capital gains tax he would have paid had the transaction been
represented as a sale. He additionally alleged that Palacios intended to
falsify the Deed of Donation in order to have a ground for the
annulment of the new TCT issued in favor of Fernandez and,
ultimately, to recover the property.
On March 2, 2006, Fernandez filed a complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Villalon for violation of Rule 1.01,8 Rule 7.03,9 Rule
10.01,10 Rule 10.02,11 and Rule 10.0312 of the Canons of
Professional Responsibility.13 Fernandez alleged that Atty. Villalon,
acting as Palacios counsel, deceitfully:
1. suppressed and excluded in the Original and Amended
Complaint her knowledge about the existence of the Deed of Absolute
Sale dated January 12, 2005;
2. used the fake and spurious Deed of Donation to deceive the
court into trying Civil Case No. 05-1071, the action for the annulment of
TCT No. 220869, despite her knowledge of the existence of the Deed
of Absolute Sale;
3. committed misrepresentations as follows: to verify whether the
attached Deed of Absolute Sale was properly notarized, the
respondent Villalon personally inquired before the notarial section of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City thru a letter-request,
whether a record of the deed existed in the said office; in the letterrequest, the respondent misrepresented that there was already a
pending case in the RTC of Makati before November 9, 2005;
4. refused to receive the complainants Answer with Compulsory
Counterclaim so that she could file on behalf of her client an Amended
Complaint without leave of court and without presenting the Deed of
Absolute Sale;
5. induced her witness Agnes Heredia (Heredia) to sign a false
Affidavit by telling her that it would only be for purposes of compelling
Fernandez to pay additional sums to her client; however, Atty. Villalon
used it as evidence to frame the complainant Fernandez for her own
personal gain;
6. only submitted the Deed of Donation for signature examination
and certification by the NBI and intentionally failed to submit the Deed
of Absolute Sale.14
The Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation. On January 30, 2008,
Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa (Commissioner Funa) issued a
Report and Recommendation to dismiss the case, which in part reads:
There is no sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable for
failure to mention in the Complaint and Amended Complaint the
existence of the January 12 Deed of Absolute Sale. No such duty is
imposed upon the legal counsel under any law or the Rules of Court.
This Commissioner agrees with respondents argument that only the
clients operative facts and not the other evidentiary facts need to be

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LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

included in the Complaint. It is correct for the respondent to argue that

pointing out the existence of the January 12 Deed of Absolute Sale
was a matter of defense which the defendant in said civil case can
freely point out to the trial judge through his own pleadings.
It cannot be argued that there was suppression of evidence on
the part of the respondent as she is not the only person who had
access or possession of the said Deed of Absolute Sale. It was a
document readily available to the general public through the Notarial
Office. Moreover, it was a document which was fully known to herein
complainant as he was supposed to be a party to the said Deed of
Absolute Sale. In other words, a person cannot possibly suppress the
existence of a document which everyone else, especially the opposing
party-litigant, knows about.
Furthermore, it is noted that while the letter to the Notarial Office
was dated November 9, it was actually received by said office only on
November 14, 2005. The civil Complaint was filed on November 15, or
on the next day. We take note that there is no indication when the
Notarial Office formally replied to the respondents letter inquiry.
Therefore, it cannot be said with certainty that respondent acquired
knowledge about the Deed of Absolute Sale on November 14 or
November 15.
We also take note that assuming the respondent had knowledge
about (sic) the existence of the Deed of Absolute Sale before the civil
complaint was filed, her role as the legal counsel is limited by the
clients choice of cause of action. Moreover, its mere existence as a
document is not an affirmation of its validity or due execution. In other
words, the client, possibly believing in the invalidity of the Deed of
Absolute Sale, may have chosen to refute the validity of the document
at a later time when and if its existence is raised. This is a choice
within the discretion of the party-litigant. The opposing party cannot
impose it as a duty upon the other party or his legal counsel. There is,
therefore, no sufficient factual basis to hold respondent accountable in
this charge. As it turns out, respondents client claims no consideration
was ever given for the Deed of Absolute Sale and is consequently
arguing that said Deed is void.
As
for
the
accusation
that
respondent
committed
misrepresentation in her November 9 letter by stating that a case had
already been filed when in truth no such case is yet pending, we take
note that assuming a misrepresentation was committed, such act does
not attain a degree of materiality or gravity so as to attribute evil malice
on the part of respondent. The intent on the part of respondent remains
the same, that is, to obtain relevant information. We cannot attribute
any evil deception in the said letter considering the surrounding facts
especially since a civil complaint was in fact filed the very next day the
letter was sent.
As for the accusation that respondent refused or failed to receive
registered mail matters, such has not been factually substantiated. The
same goes with the accusation that respondents failed to furnish
herein complainants lawyer with a copy of the Amended Complaint.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that respondent did
not commit any act for which she should be disciplined or
administratively sanctioned.
It is therefore recommended that this CASE BE DISMISSED for
lack of merit.15
Before this Court, Fernandez filed a Petition for Review raising
the following issues:
1. whether Commissioner Funa committed grave abuse of
discretion in recommending the dismissal of the disbarment case
against the Respondent;
2. whether Commissioner Funa committed grave abuse of
discretion in failing to resolve the matter regarding the affidavit of
Heredia, in which she retracted her affidavit in Civil Case No. 05-1017
and further said that the respondent induced her to issue a false
affidavit by telling her that the said affidavit would only be used to
compel Fernandez to pay additional sums to Palacios.
THE COURTS RULING
We agree with the recommendation of IBP Commissioner Funa.
The charges against the respondent do not constitute sufficient
grounds for disbarment.
A lawyer, as an officer of the court, has a duty to be truthful in all
his dealings.16 However, this duty does not require that the lawyer
advance matters of defense on behalf of his or her clients opponent. A
lawyer is his or her clients advocate; while duty-bound to utter no
falsehood, an advocate is not obliged to build the case for his or her
clients opponent.
The respondents former client, Palacios, approached her to file a
complaint for the annulment of the Deed of Donation. This was the
cause of action chosen by her client. Assuming arguendo that the
respondent knew of the presence of the Deed of Absolute Sale, its
existence, is, indeed, a matter of defense for Fernandez. We cannot

fault the respondent for choosing not to pursue the nullification of the
Deed of Absolute Sale. The respondent alleged that her former client,
Palacios, informed her that the Deed of Absolute Sale was void for lack
of consideration. Furthermore, unlike the Deed of Donation, the Deed
of Absolute Sale was not registered in the Registry of Deeds and was
not the basis for the transfer of title of Palacios property to Fernandez.
Under the circumstances, it was not unreasonable for a lawyer to
conclude, whether correctly or incorrectly, that the Deed of Absolute
Sale was immaterial in achieving the ultimate goal the recovery of
Palacios property.
On the second issue, the petitioner complains that Commissioner
Funa failed to consider Heredias affidavit of retraction.17 As a rule, we
view retractions with caution; they can be bought and obtained through
threats, intimidation, or monetary consideration.18 The better rule is to
examine them closely by considering the original, the new statements
and the surrounding circumstances, based on the rules of evidence.19
The petitioner raised the retraction for the first time in his
Supplemental to (sic) Reply to Comment filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant on November 10, 2006.20 The petitioner attached Heredias
affidavit of December 11, 2005 and her affidavit of retraction.
In her affidavit of December 11, 2005, Heredia attested that: 1)
Palacios sought her help when a syndicate attempted to grab his land;
2) she referred Palacios to the group of Castro, Fernandez, and
Jimenez who were then helping her with her own legal problems; 3)
she
regretted having referred Palacios to this group as she herself
was later "victimized by the group; 4) they made her sign blank papers
after gaining her trust and confidence, which signed blanks the group
later filled up to make it appear that they bought and paid for her real
property; 5) she terminated the services of this group sometime in April
2005; 6) she only recently came to know of this groups modus
operandi; and 7) Palacios eventually became one of the groups
victims.
In her affidavit of retraction, Heredia basically averred that the
statements in the affidavit of December 11, 2005 were prepared by
Villalon who asked her, in the presence of Palacios, to sign the
affidavit; that the affidavit contained lies which she rejected outright,
but Palacios and the respondent convinced her that they would only
use the affidavit to convince Fernandez to give additional sums of
money for Palacios property; that Palacios admitted getting a
motorcyle from Fernandez; that Palacios had been paid not less than
P6,000,000.00 for his property; that the respondent and Palacios used
her affidavit in the cases they filed against Fernandez; that this violated
their agreement that the affidavit would only be used in their
negotiations to get more money for the property; that Palacios admitted
to her that he executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with Fernandez; that
the execution of the Deed of Donation was his idea; that Palacios had
Fernandez signature in the Deed of Donation forged and was
regretting having done so because Fernandez filed various charges,
including perjury, against him; that she executed the affidavit of
retraction in the interest of justice, to tell the truth about the
circumstances surrounding the affidavit of December 11, 2005, to clear
her name, to show that she is not part of the lies concocted by Atty.
Villalon and Palacios, and to correct the wrong that was done by the
affidavit of December 11, 2005 to the persons of Conrado Fernandez,
Romeo Castro, and Atty. Augusto Jimenez, Jr.
In the Mandatory Conference and Hearing held on July 4, 2007,
Commissioner Funa asked the respondent, through counsel, whether
she wanted to cross-examine Heredia regarding her affidavit of
retraction.21 The respondent passed up the chance for a direct
confrontation and opted to adopt her comment as her position paper. In
the position paper she submitted on January 14, 2008, she attacked
the credibility of Heredias affidavit of retraction. She posited that
Heredia contradicted herself when she said that she rejected the preprepared contents of the first affidavit outright but still signed it; that
Heredias claim that she had been hoodwinked into signing the first
affidavit because she was assured that it was a mere scrap of paper,
was unbelievable; and that Heredia failed to rebut her earlier statement
that she regretted having referred Fernandez group to Palacios
because she herself fell victim to the group.
In disbarment proceedings, the burden of proof rests on the
complainant.22 Considering the gravity of the penalty of disbarment or
suspension as a member of the Bar, a lawyer may only be disbarred or
suspended if there is clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof that he
or she committed transgressions defined by the rules as grounds to
strip him or her of his professional license.23
In this case, we find no clear evidence we can satisfactorily
accept showing that the respondent improperly induced Heredia to
sign the affidavit of December 11, 2005, as alleged in Heredias
affidavit of retraction.

Page 4 of 24

LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

First, the original affidavit and the retraction stand uncorroborated

by any other evidence and, in our view, stand on the same footing.
Neither affidavit provides clear, convincing and satisfactory proof of
what they allege. They cannot therefore stand as meritorious basis for
an accusation against the respondent.
Second, the allegations in both sworn statements are so
contradictory that we can only conclude that Heredia had grossly lied
in either or even in both instruments. We find it incredible that Heredia,
as stated in her affidavit of retraction, vehemently rejected the
statements in the first affidavit, but nevertheless agreed to sign it
because it would only be used to aid Palacios in his negotiations with
Fernandez. Effectively, she admitted in her retraction that she had lied
under oath and entered into a conspiracy to extract additional funds
from Fernandez who would not have accepted the demand if they were
falsely made. Why she did what she said she did is not at all clear from
her retraction, which itself was not convincingly clear on why she was
retracting. For this Court to accept a retraction that raises more
questions than answers, made by a witness of doubtful credibility
allegedly for the sake of truth, is beyond the limits of what this Court
can accept.
In these lights, the retraction has no particular relevance so that
the Commissioners failure to consider it would matter.
WHEREFORE, the complaint for Disbarment is hereby ordered
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
* Designated additional member of the Second Division per
Special Order No. 571 dated February 12, 2009.
8 Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
9 Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or
private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.
10 Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to
be misled by any artifice.
11 Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or
mispresent the contents of a paper, the language or the argument of
opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly
cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or
amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
12 Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and
shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

Adm. Case No. 7252 November 22, 2006 [CBD 05-1434]

JOHNNY NG, Complainant, vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN C. ALAR,
Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is Resolution No. XVII-2006-223 dated April 27,
2006 of the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED
and APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation
of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein
made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents propensity to
resort to undeserved language and disrespectful stance, Atty.
Benjamin C. Alar is hereby REPRIMANDED with a stern Warning that
severe penalties will be imposed in case similar misconduct is again
committed. Likewise, the counter complaint against Atty. Jose Raulito
E. Paras and Atty. Elvin Michael Cruz is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
A verified complaint1 dated February 15, 2005 was filed by
Johnny Ng (complainant) against Atty. Benjamin C. Alar (respondent)
before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar
Discipline (CBD), for Disbarment.
Complainant alleges that he is one of the respondents in a labor
case with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) docketed
as NLRC NCR CA No. 040273-04, while respondent is the counsel for
complainants. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint. On
appeal, the NLRC rendered a Decision2 affirming the decision of the
LA. Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration with Motion to
Inhibit (MRMI),3 pertinent portions of which read:
x x x We cannot help suspecting that the decision under
consideration was merely copied from the pleadings of respondentsappellees with very slight modifications. But we cannot

accept the suggestion, made by some knowledgeable individuals,

that the actual writer of the said decision is not at all connected with
the NLRC First Division.
x x x Why did the NLRC, First Division, uphold the Labor Arbiter in
maintaining that the separation pay should be only one half month per
year of service? Is jurisprudence on this not clear enough, or is there
another reason known only to them?
x x x If this is not grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
NLRC, First Division, it is ignominious ignorance of the law on the part
of the commissioners concerned.
The NLRC wants proof from the complainants that the fire actually
resulted in prosperity and not losses. xxx Respondents failed to prove
their claim of losses. And the Honorable Commissioners of the First
Division lost their ability to see these glaring facts.
x x x How much is the separation pay they should pay? One
month per year of service and all of it to the affected workers not to
some people in the NLRC in part.
x x x They should have taken judicial notice of this prevalent
practices of employers xxx. If the Honorable Commissioners, of the
First Division do not know this, they are indeed irrelevant to real life.
x x x we invite the Honorable Commissioners of the First Division
to see for themselves the evidence before them and not merely rely on
their reviewers and on the word of their ponente. If they do this
honestly they cannot help seeing the truth. Yes, honesty on the part of
the Commissioners concerned is what is lacking, not the evidence.
Unfair labor practice stares them in the face.
If labor arbiter Santos was cross-eyed in his findings of fact, the
Honorable Commissioners of the First Division are doubly so and
with malice thrown in. If the workers indeed committed an illegal strike,
how come their only "penalty" is removing their tent? It is obvious that
the Labor Arbiter and the Honorable Commissioners know deep in their
small hearts that there was no strike. This is the only reason for the
finding of "illegal strike". Without this finding, they have no basis to
remove the tent; they have to invent that basis.
x x x The union in its "Union Reply To The Position Paper Of
Management" and its Annexes has shown very clearly that the so
called strike is a myth. But Commissioner Dinopol opted to believe the
myth instead of the facts. He fixed his sights on the tent in front of the
wall and closed his eyes to the open wide passage way and gate
beside it. His eyes, not the ingress and egress of the premises, are
blocked by something so thick he cannot see through it. His impaired
vision cannot be trusted, no doubt about it.
Commissioner Dinopol has enshrined a novel rule on money
claims. Whereas, before, the established rule was, in cases of money
claims the employer had the burden of proof of payment. Now it is the
other way around. x x x For lack of a better name we should call this
new rule the "Special Dinopol Rule". But only retirable
commissioners are authorized to apply this rule and only when the
money claims involved are substantial. When they are meager the
ordinary rules apply.
x x x how Commissioner Dinopol is able to say that the pay slips
proved that the sixteen (16) claimants were already paid their service
incentive leave pay. This finding is copied verbatim from the crosseyed decision of Labor Arbiter Santos x x x .
The evidence already on record proving that the alleged blocking
of the ingress and egress is a myth seem invisible to the impaired sight
of Commissioner Dinopol. He needs more of it. x x x
Commissioner Dinopol by his decision under consideration (as
ponente [of] the decision that he signed and caused his cocommissioners in the First Division to sign) has shown great and
irreparable impartiality, grave abuse of discretion and ignorance of the
law. He is a shame to the NLRC and should not be allowed to have
anything to do with the instant case any more. Commissioner Go and
Chairman Seeres, by negligence, are just as guilty as Dinopol but,
since the NLRC rules prohibit the inhibition of the entire division,
Chairman Seeres should remain in the instant case and appoint two
(2) other commissioners from another division to sit with him and pass
final judgment in the instant case.4 (Emphasis supplied)
In his Answer with Counter-Complaint dated April 6, 2005,
respondent Alar contends that the instant complaint only intends to
harass him and to influence the result of the cases between
complainant and the workers in the different fora where they are
pending; that the Rules of Court/Code of Professional Responsibility
applies only suppletorily at the NLRC when the NLRC Rules of
Procedure has no provision on disciplinary matters for litigants and
lawyers appearing before it; that Rule X of the NLRC Rules of
Procedure provides for adequate sanctions against misbehaving
lawyers and litigants appearing in cases before it; that the Rules of
Court/Code of Professional Responsibility does not apply to lawyers
practicing at the NLRC, the latter not being a court; that LAs and NLRC

Page 5 of 24

LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

Commissioners are not judges nor justices and the Code of Judicial
Conduct similarly do not apply to them, not being part of the judiciary;
and that the labor lawyers who are honestly and conscientiously
practicing before the NLRC and get paid on a contingent basis are
entitled to some latitude of righteous anger when they get cheated in
their cases by reason of corruption and collusion by the cheats from
the other sectors who make their lives and the lives of their
constituents miserable, with impunity, unlike lawyers for the employers
who get paid, win or lose, and therefore have no reason to feel
aggrieved.5
Attached to the Counter-Complaint is the affidavit of union
president Marilyn Batan wherein it is alleged that Attys. Paras and Cruz
violated the Code of Professional Responsibility of lawyers in several
instances, such that while the labor case is pending before the NLRC,
respondents Paras and Cruz filed a new case against the laborers in
the Office of the City Engineer of Quezon City (QC) to demolish the
tent of the workers, thus splitting the jurisdiction between the NLRC
and the City Engineer's Office (CEO) of QC which violates Canon 12,
Rules 12.02 and 13.03; that although Ng signed the disbarment
complaint against Alar, respondents Parass and Cruzs office
instigated the said complaint which violates Canon 8; that Ng's
company did not pay
income tax for the year 2000 allegedly for non-operation due to
fire and respondents consented to this act of the employer which
violates Canon 19, Rule 19.02; and that when the case started, there
were more or less 100 complainants, but due to the acts of the
employer and the respondents, the number of complainants were
reduced to almost half which violates Canon 19, Rule 19-01, 19-02 and
19-03.6
In Answer to the Counter-Complaint dated April 14, 2005,7
respondents Paras and Cruz alleged: At no time did they file multiple
actions arising from the same cause of action or brook interference in
the normal course of judicial proceedings; the reliefs sought before the
CEO has nothing to do with the case pending before the NLRC; the
demolition of the nuisance and illegal structures is a cause of action
completely irrelevant and unrelated to the labor cases of complainant;
the CEO was requested to investigate certain nuisance structures
located outside the employer's property, which consist of shanties,
tents, banners and other paraphernalia which hampered the free
ingress to and egress out of the employer's property and present clear
and present hazards; the Office of the City Engineer found the
structures violative of pertinent DPWH and MMDA ordinances; the
pendency of a labor case with the NLRC is completely irrelevant since
the holding of a strike, legal or not, did not validate or justify the
construction of illegal nuisance structures; the CEO proceeded to
abate the nuisance structures pursuant to its power to protect life,
property and legal order; it was not their idea to file the disbarment
complaint against respondent Alar; they merely instructed their client
on how to go about filing the case, after having been served a copy of
the derogatory MRMI; Canon 8 should not be perceived as an excuse
for lawyers to turn their backs on malicious acts done by their brother
lawyers; the complaint failed to mention that the only reason the
number of complainants were reduced is because of the amicable
settlement they were able to reach with most of them; their
engagement for legal services is only for labor and litigation cases; at
no time were they consulted regarding the tax concerns of their client
and therefore were never privy to the financial records of the latter; at
no time did they give advice regarding their client's tax concerns;
respondent Alar's attempt at a disbarment case against them is
unwarranted, unjustified and obviously a mere retaliatory action on his
part.
The case, docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1434, was assigned by
the IBP to Commissioner Patrick M. Velez for investigation, report and
recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation, the
Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of using improper
and abusive language and recommended that respondent be
suspended for a period of not less than three months with a stern
warning that more severe penalty will be imposed in case similar
misconduct is again committed.
On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner did not find
any actionable misconduct against Attys. Paras and Cruz and therefore
recommended that the Counter-Complaint against them be dismissed
for lack of merit.
Acting on the Report and Recommendation, the IBP Board of
Governors issued the Resolution hereinbefore quoted. While the Court
agrees with the findings of the IBP, it does not agree that respondent
Alar deserves only a reprimand.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates:

CANON 8 A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness

and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 11 A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due
to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct
by others.
Rule 11.03 A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
The MRMI contains insults and diatribes against the NLRC,
attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, replete with implied
accusations of partiality, impropriety and lack of diligence. Respondent
used improper and offensive language in his pleadings that does not
admit any justification.
In Lacurom v. Jacoba,8 the Court ratiocinated as follows:
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the
court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and
through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges. However,
even the most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous
attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacurom's
Resolution. On its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly
and decided the case according to supporting law and jurisprudence.
Though a lawyer's language may be forceful and emphatic, it should
always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession. The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to
promote high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration.
In Uy v. Depasucat,9 the Court held that a lawyer shall abstain
from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before
the Courts.
It must be remembered that the language vehicle does not run
short of expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but
not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.10 A lawyer's language
should be forceful but dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an
advocate and in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.11
Submitting pleadings containing countless insults and diatribes against
the NLRC and attacking both its moral and intellectual integrity, hardly
measures to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.
Respondent's assertion that the NLRC not being a court, its
commissioners, not being judges or justices and therefore not part of
the judiciary; and that consequently, the Code of Judicial Conduct does
not apply to them, is unavailing. In Lubiano v. Gordolla,12 the Court
held that respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing
the NLRC, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oathbound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the
administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be
scrupulously observant of law and ethics.13
Respondents argument that labor practitioners are entitled to
some latitude of righteous anger is unavailing. It does not deter the
Court from exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers who
misbehave or fail to live up to that standard expected of them as
members of the Bar.14
The Court held in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer,15 thus:
2. What we have before us is not without precedent. Time and
again, this Court has admonished and punished, in varying degrees,
members of the Bar for statements, disrespectful or irreverent,
acrimonious or defamatory, of this Court or the lower courts. Resort by
an attorney in a motion for reconsideration to words which may
drag this Court down into disrepute, is frowned upon as "neither
justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the
attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied
upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many
reasons stated in the motion" are "sufficient," and such words
"superfluous." It is in this context that we must say that just because
Atty. Armonio "thought best to focus the attention" of this Court "to the
issue in the case" does not give him unbridled license in language. To
be sure, lawyers may come up with various methods, perhaps much
more effective, in calling the Courts attention to the issues involved.
The language vehicle does not run short of expressions, emphatic but
respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
To be proscribed then is the use of unnecessary language which
jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or promotes distrust in
judicial administration, or which could have the effect of "harboring and
encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of
disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that
bulwark called judicial power to which those who are aggrieved turn for
protection and relief." Stability of judicial institutions suggests that the
Bar stand firm on this precept.

Page 6 of 24

LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

The language here in question, respondents aver, "was the result

of overenthusiasm." It is but to repeat an old idea when we say that
enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is not really bad. In fact, the one or
the other is no less a virtue, if channeled in the right direction.
However, it must be circumscribed within the bounds of propriety and
with due regard for the proper place of courts in our system of
government.16
Respondent has clearly violated Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. His actions erode the publics perception of
the legal profession.
However, the penalty of reprimand with stern warning imposed by
the IBP Board of Governors is not proportionate to respondents
violation of the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thus, he deserves a stiffer penalty of fine in the amount of P5,000.00.
Anent the Counter-Complaint filed against Attys. Paras and Cruz,
the Court finds no reason to disturb the following findings and
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, as approved by
the IBP Board of Governors, to wit:
The Counter-complainant Batan failed to submit any position
paper to substantiate its claims despite sufficient opportunity to do
so.1wphi1
At any rate, it must be noted that the alleged case with the Office
of the City Engineer really partakes of a different cause of action,
which has nothing to do with the NLRC case. The decision was made
by the city engineer. Respondents remedy should be to question that
decision, not bring it to this Commission which has no jurisdiction over
it. We can not substitute our judgment for the proper courts who should
determine the propriety or sagacity of the city engineers action.
Furthermore, parties are not prohibited from availing themselves
of remedies available in law provided; these acts do not exceed the
bounds of decency. In supporting the action against respondents
conduct, no such abuse may be gleaned. Indeed, it is the attorneys
duty as an officer of the court to defend a judge from unfounded
criticism or groundless personal attack. This requires of him not only to
refrain from subjecting the judge to wild and groundless accusation but
also to discourage other people from so doing and to come to his
defense when he is so subjected. By the very nature of his position a
judge lacks the power, outside of his court, to defend himself against
unfounded criticism and clamor and it is the attorney, and no other,
who can better or more appropriately support the judiciary and the
incumbents of the judicial positions. (Agpalo, p. 143 citing People v.
Carillo, 77 Phil. 572 (1946); Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v.
Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1 (1970); see Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil.
152 (1957) Whether the disbarment complaint was filed by Ng or by his
lawyers is therefore not of great import, what is more apropos would be
the contents of the complaint and whether the same is sufficient to
consider disciplinary sanctions.
Likewise, the tax case is a different matter altogether. Since the
respondent lawyers have already stated that they were not engaged as
counsels to take care of their clients tax problems, then they cannot be
held accountable for the same. If any wrongdoing has been committed
by complainant Ng, he should answer for that and those lawyers who
were responsible for such acts be held liable jointly. There is no
showing [that] attorneys Paras and Cruz were responsible for that tax
fiasco.1wphi1
Finally, while it may be true that Batans group has been greatly
diminished from about 100 claimants to less than half the number is
not by itself an actionable misconduct. Lawyers are duty bound to
foster amicable settlement of cases; litigation and adversarial
proceedings while a necessary part of the practice is not encouraged,
because it will save expenses and help unclogged [sic] the dockets. If
the compromise is fair then there is no reason to prevent the same.
There is nothing in the counter-complaint which shows that the
compromise agreement and waivers executed appear to be unfair,
hence no reason to hold lawyers liable for the same. Besides, a
"compromise is as often the better part of justice as prudence the part
of valor and a lawyer who encourages compromise is no less the
clients champion in settlement out of court than he is the clients
champion in the battle in court." (Curtis, The Advocate: Voices in Court,
5 (1958); cited in Agpalos Legal Ethics, p. 86, 1980 ed.) What is
therefore respondent Alar[]s beef with the execution of these waivers if
these were executed freely by his clients?
All told, we do not find anything actionable misconduct against
Attorneys Paras and Cruz; hence the dismissal of the countercomplaint against them is proper for absolute lack of merit.17
ACCORDINGLY, we find respondent Atty. Benjamin C. Alar
GUILTY of violation of Canons 8 and 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is imposed a fine of P5,000.00 with STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar act in the future will
be dealt with more severely.

The Counter-Complaint against Atty. Jose Raulito E. Paras and

Atty. Elvin Michael Cruz is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

CARMELITA FUDOT V CATLEYA

RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
For resolution is the charge of indirect contempt initiated
motu proprio[1] by the Court against Atty. Victor De La Serna.[2]
On 9 November 2007, the Court received from De La Serna a
request for the inhibition of Associate Justice Dante O. Tinga,[3]
claiming that Justice Tinga received P10 Million from Mr. Johnny
Chan (Mr. Chan) in exchange for a favorable decision in the instant
case.[4] He alleges:
After the usual exchange of civilities, JOHNNY CHAN
curtly told the undersigned that all negotiations for the purchase of
petitioners rights between us were off. He further stated that he had
already given out TEN MILLION PESOS to JUSTICE DANTE O.
TINGA in exchange for a favorable Decision in this case. Hence,
there is no more reason for him to talk to us. Justice Dante O. Tinga
is the ponente of the Decision subject to [sic] this Motion for
Reconsideration.[5]
Atty. De La Serna relates that sometime in 2006, he was
prevailed upon by former BIR Commissioner Tomas Toledo to meet
with Mr. Chan. In the meeting, Mr. Chan informed him that he had
already bought the interest of Cattleya Land, Inc. (Cattleya) over a
property adjacent to the property subject of the case and that he was
interested in putting up a resort/hotel in the property. He wanted to
purchase Carmelita Fudots interest in the property as well to put an
end to the litigation. They did not reach an agreement on the
purchase price.[6]
Another meeting was set, this time, through the
intercession of Atty. Dionisio De La Serna, former Secretary of the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, and upon the request of
Mr. Chans lawyer, Atty. Paulino Petralba (Atty. Petralba). In this
meeting, Atty. Petralba offered P4 Million. Again, no agreement was
reached on the purchase price, De La Serna narrates.[7]
Sometime in August 2007, Atty. Petralba sought out Atty. De La
Sernas son, Atty. Victor De La Serna, Jr., and informed him that the
Supreme Courts decision in the instant case was forthcoming.[8] This
advance knowledge of the decision only confirms the bribery
bragged about by Mr. Chan, De La Serna claims.[9]
In another meeting on 26 September 2007, Mr. Chan told Atty.
De La Serna that there would no more negotiations for the purchase
of Fudots rights and he had already given P10 Million to Justice
Tinga. By way of consuelo de bobo, Mr. Chan offered De La Serna
a legal retainer of P200,000.00 down and a monthly fee ofP15,000.00
to act as his lawyer in Bohol. [10] A day later, or on 27 September
2007, as De La Serna notes, in a bid to tie the loose ends of his tale,
the decision in this case was mailed at the Central Post Office,[11] a
copy of which was received by him on 10 October 2007.
Atty. De La Serna adds:
ALL WE NEED TO HAVE IS A LITTLE COMMON SENSE
TO CONCLUDE THAT INDEED, THE FAVORABLE DECISION OF
THIS HONORABLE COURT WAS OBTAINED THRU BRIBERY. This
is what JOHNNY CHAN was bragging and this is what happened.[12]
(Emphasis supplied)
Atty. De La Serna insists that the decision was contrary to
the principles enunciated by Justice Tinga in the case of Lim v.
Jorge.[13] He states:
III. THE DECISION OF JUSTICE TINGA IN THE CASE REEKS
OF BRIBERY. HE HAS REPUDIATED ALL THE DOCTRINES HE
HAS SUMMARIZED AND ENUNCIATED IN LIM v. JORGE, A
DECISION HE PENNED ONLY IN 2005.

Page 7 of 24

LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

Only two years ago, in Lim v. Jorge, (G.R. No. 161861,

March 11, 2005) Justice Dante Tinga made a learned treatise when
he summarized and further expounded on all the long- established
doctrines on the law and jurisprudence governing the Torrens System
of land titles in the Philippines. It was indeed a brilliant anthology
worthy of publication into a book.

to the lot subject of the case.[23] He admitted that he approached De

La Serna for the purpose of amicably settling their case with
Cattleya, and offered him to be their retainer in Bohol. [24] However,
he denied having said to De La Serna that he had already spent so
much money for the Supreme Court.[25] He added that the hearing
was the first time that he saw all the justices.[26]

In this instant Decision however, Justice Tinga has

swallowed all the noble doctrines he has enunciated so brilliantly,
and instead repudiated and contradicted everything he has said just
to accommodate JOHNNY CHAN and all his cohorts and his money.

Mr. Chan related that during the 25 September 2007

meeting, he offered Atty. De La Serna P4 Million and an additional
incentive as retainer of their company.[27] In his testimony:
xxx

xxx

Mr. Chan:

If this is not a CLEAR CASE OF BRIBERY, then we dont

know what is.
The Decision of Justice Tinga in this case is simply a
ROGUE DECISION. It is illegal. It is immoral. And like a mad dog, it
should be slain at sight.[14] (Emphasis supplied)

Well, as I said, I offered. I was trying to convince him to

accept that amicable settlement and aside from that, to be my friend,
maybe you can be our company retainer in Bohol. Thats what we
discussed about, your honor.[28]
Justice Carpio Morales: So, how did the
meeting end?

Atty. De La Serna also finds it surprising that the instant

case was decided less than two (2) years after it was submitted for
resolution. He compares the instant case to a criminal case which
has been pending for ten (10) years before the Court.[15] He states:

conversation or that

Mr. Chan:Well, we end-up, he was kind of unhappy.

Justice Carpio Morales: Why?
Mr. Chan: I dont know; maybe angry.

Yet, in this instant case, TWO (2) YEARS is all it took for
Justice Dante Tinga to come up with a favorable Decision for
JOHNNY CHAN.
Where is equity? Where is the justice? IF THIS IS NOT
BRIBERY, THEN THE SUN RISES EVERY MORNING FROM THE
WEST.

Justice Carpio Morales: Why? What is your basis in saying that?

Mr. Chan.: Because my offer to him for the amicable settlement
still stands for Four Million.

Justice Carpio Morales: Did he counter[-] offer?

This case must have been plucked out from underneath a

stack of older cases which have been prioritized for resolution.
There could be no other explanation.

Mr. Chan: Well, he said Ten and I said thats too much.
Justice Carpio Morales: And that was it?
Mr. Chan: That was it.[29]

xxx
There is a difference of some 20,000 intervening cases
between Oppus and Fudot. WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN THE
REASON WHY THIS INSTANT CASE WAS SELECTED AND
PLUCKED OUT FROM UNDERNEATH 20,000 OTHER CASES, AND
DECIDED IN LESS THAN TWO (2) YEARS?
Your Honors, the answer is in Your hands, but it seems
quite obvious.[16] (Emphasis supplied)

On 6 February 2008, the Court issued a

Resolution
requiring Atty. De La Serna to explain in writing why he should not be
punished for indirect contempt of court.[17] On 27 March 2008, De
La Serna submitted his explanation, stating that he believes in
utmost good faith that all the statements he made in recent pleadings
he submitted in this case do not constitute improper conduct and
that his statements were not intended to impede, obstruct or
degrade the administration of justice, as they were made, on the
contrary, TO PREVENT THE
COMMISSION OF A GRAVE
INJUSTICE.[18]

For his part, Atty. Petralba clarified that the third meeting
he had with Atty. De La Serna was on 4 September 2007, and not in
August as what De La Serna claimed, presenting his detailed diary for
the purpose. [30] Thus:
Atty. Paulino Petralba:
The third meeting alluded to by Atty. de la Serna was not
in August, Your Honors. It was on September 4, 2007. It is recorded
in my PDA and I do keep a diary where I list and narrate what
happens to my life everyday. In fact, Your Honor, I have my diary
herethe diary for June 2007 to December 2007, this is for last year
and I have marked September 4, 2007 and, with your indulgence,
Your Honors, if I may be permitted to read even extraneous matters
because that will prove something also?

JUSTICE QUISUMBING: Yes.

Justice Carpio Morales: Yes.
Atty. Paulino Petralba:

In a resolution dated 14 April 2008, the Court set the

hearing on the charge of indirect contempt on 18 June 2008.[19] In
the hearing, Atty. De La Serna, together with his son Atty. Victor De
La Serna, Jr., Mr. Chan, Atty. Petralba and Atty. Alex Monteclar (Atty.
Monteclar) of Cattleya appeared.
Atty. De La Serna mainly reiterated his arguments during
the hearing. His son, Atty. De La Serna, Jr., corroborated his
statements. De La Serna, Jr. claimed that he heard Mr. Chan
bragging that he spent so much for the Supreme Court; afterwards,
he heard Mr. Chan mention of Justice Tingas name and the amount
of P10 Million, [20]only to clarify later that he did not hear Mr. Chan
say for whom or which person the money was spent on.[21]
Mr. Chan informed the Court that he represents Ryan,
Patrick and John (RPJ) company which owns Bellevue Hotel.[22] He
testified that RPJ bought a property from Cattleya which was adjacent

September 4, 2007, Tuesday, Office, 11:00 a.m.: Tennis

at Makati Sports Club with my son, score 8-5, I won; Meeting with
Ryan Chan, Cecil, and Atty. Vic and Junior de la Serna; He said his
price is Ten Million, I offered Four Million; Home, 9:30 p.m.; I did not
attend my Tuesday club, Your Honor, the third meeting was on
September 4, 2007; therefore, my encounter with de la Serna, Jr.
could not have happened prior to that because my encounter with him
was regarding the September 25, 2000 proposed meeting between
Johnny Chan and Atty. De la Serna. And may I relate, Your Honor,
how that happened?[31]
Atty. Petralba claimed that his conversation with Atty. De
La Serna, Jr. was a chance encounter in the tennis court, and that
he did not tell Atty. De La Serna, Jr. that a decision was forthcoming.
Instead, he told him that the client wants to have another meeting
baka sakali there will be a favorable result.[32] He maintained that

Page 8 of 24

LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

he never intimated a bribery of a Supreme Court Justice.[33] In his

testimony, Atty. Petralba stated:

Atty. Paulino Petralba: the case was already decided

Justice Carpio: YaahIf your client really paid Ten Million, he
would be the first to know right away.
Atty. Paulino Petralba: Exactly, Your Honor.

Atty. Paulino Petralba:

I will proceed. After the third meeting in September 4,
2007 which is by the way, Your Honors, is only nine days prior to the
promulgation of the case on September 13. Ahhhmy birthday is
September 13, Your Honors, and I went to the tennis court on
September 17, 2007 to give a blow out to my tennis buddies and I
also played one game of tennis on September 17. If I may be
permitted, Your Honors, may I read my entries in this diary?
JUSTICE QUISUMBING: Go ahead.
Atty. Paulino Petralba:
September 27, 1007, Monday, lunch at office; Ordoez of
tour organizers came to my office; went to GBH for meeting; from
GBH returned to office, conference with another client; then went to
BF tennis court, played one game and gave birthday blow out inom
for my group: Ernie, Glen, Roy, etc., etc; had short chat with Junior
de la Serna, 5:00 p.m. This is how it transpired, Your Honor.
JUSTICE QUISUMBING: 17 September .
Atty. Paulino Petralba:
After my game, I sat down, had beer, then Junior de la
Serna was walking out of another tennis court. He walked infront of
our table and I said, O Junior, gusto daw makipagmeeting uli ng
kliyente

ko baka sakaling may favorable result, and he said Aba, okay,

Ill tell my papa, my father. I said, No, no kasi Im not going to
arrange it anymore because Im on vacation and Im going abroad.
Thats all that happened in that meeting, your Honor. I did not seek
him out, Your Honor. It was a chance meeting.[34]

Justice Carpio: And on September 25, he would not have agreed

to a meeting anymore.
Atty. Paulino Petralba: Yes, Your Honor. [35]

Atty. Monteclar confirmed that Mr. Chan bought a land

adjacent to the property subject of the petition, and that Mr. Chan,
interested in buying the property of Fudot, told them that he would try
to expedite the matter and talk to De La Serna.[36] He mentioned
that he and his client, Cattleya, refused to negotiate with De La Serna
because they had a sad experience with him when he accused one of
Cattleyas lawyers of making Cattleya a milking cow. Said lawyer
even filed an administrative case against De La Serna for making
baseless accusations and using intemperate language against
opposing lawyers in his pleadings in this very case when it was still
before the trial court.[37] Atty. Monteclar admitted that he was the one
who informed Atty. Petralba of the Supreme Courts decision.[38] He
denied any knowledge about the attempt to bribe any of the Justices
of the Court.[39]
Mr. Chan and Atty. Petralba both admitted that they had
never met Justice Tinga before and it was only during the hearing on
18 June 2008 that they saw Justice Tinga in person.[40] On the other
hand, Atty. Monteclar stated that he had not known Justice Tinga
personally, although he met Justice Tinga way back in 2003 in a
hotel in Makati when Justice Tinga was given an honor by the Council
of Deans by the Philippine Association of Law Schools.[41]
The parties were then required to submit their respective
memoranda. [42]

Pursuing a vital point, Justice Carpio inquired and Atty.

Petralba answered, thus:

Atty. De La Serna submitted a two-page Memorandum of

Points. He pointed out that it was Mr. Chan who sought him out
using different intermediaries and who acted as if he had advance
knowledge of the decision; moreover, it was Mr. Chan who said that
he had given P10 Million to Justice Tinga. Thus, if there was anyone
guilty of contemptible conduct, it was Mr. Chan, and not him. De
La Serna added that anyone in his situation would have acted
similarly.[43]

Justice Carpio: Okay that was September 17, four days after the
promulgation of the decision. September 13 was the date the
decision was made.

Atty. Petralba and Mr. Chan jointly submitted their

Comment[44]
(Memorandum)
while
Cattleya filed its own
Memorandum.[45]

xxx

Atty. Paulino Petralba: Yes, Your Honor.

We find Atty. De La Serna guilty of indirect contempt.

Justice Carpio: So if Mr. Chan really paid Ten Million to anyone

here, Mr. Chan would have known immediately that the case was
decided because he paid for it, correct?
Atty. Paulino Petralba: Logically.

Justice Carpio: So he would have told you to forget about paying

anything we won already.
Atty. Paulino Petralba: Logically, Your Honor.
Justice Carpio:
So your offer to meet again your offer on September 17 to
meet againwould be irrational because you won already had that
money been given really.
Atty. Paulino Petralba: Exactly, Your Honor, and in fact the
meeting on September 25 would have been an absurd meeting.
Justice Carpio: Absurd meeting because if

Contempt is defined as a disobedience to the Court by

setting up an opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It
signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts
orders but such conduct that tends to bring the authority of the court
and the administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to
impede the due administration of justice.[46] Indirect contempt is
one committed out of or not in the presence of the court that tends to
belittle, degrade, obstruct or embarrass the court and justice.[47] Any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or
degrade the administration of justice has also been considered to
constitute indirect contempt.[48]
An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to
disprove, the complainant must present panoply of evidence in
support of such an accusation.[49] It will take more than the
uncorroborated and independent statements of Atty. De La Serna to
cast an aura of credibility to his accusations.
We reviewed the records of the case and find that the decision
was made in accordance with law and established jurisprudence.
The principles enunciated in Lim v. Jorge,[50] now being invoked by
Atty. De La Serna, simply do not find application in this case. His
insistence that Justice Tinga repudiated and contradicted everything

Page 9 of 24

LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

he enunciated in the Lim case just to accommodate Mr. Chan and

all his cohorts and his money[51] is not only groundless, it is also
downright contemptuous.

Justice Quisumbing:
offer of Four Million?
Atty. Paulino Petralba:

In the first place, Mr. Chan, the person most involved[52] had
categorically denied making the statement to the effect that he gave
P10 Million to Justice Tinga, or to any other justice in the division.[53]

Justice Quisumbing:
Atty. Paulino Petralba:

Justice Quisumbing:
You denied. You said you did not
make any statement to Atty. De la Serna concerning giving of Ten
Million to Mr. Justice Tinga?

Justice Quisumbing:

I see. But in any case, you made an

Yes, Your Honor.
But it was not accepted?
He said his price is Ten Million.
And you did not agree to Ten Million?

Atty. Paulino Petralba:

Mr. Chan:

I did not.

Well, the client told me thats too much.[58]

Justice Quisumbing:
I ask you now that you have not given
anything to the other justices in this panel?
Mr. Chan:

I did not, Your Honor.

Justice Quisumbing:
And also deny that you have told Atty.
De La Serna, Sr. that you have spent Ten Million for the Supreme
Court?
Mr. Chan:

Earlier, Justice Velasco pointed out the ludicrousness of

Atty. De La Sernas claim in the following exchange with Atty. De La
Serna himself:
Justice Velasco: That is correct.
In your offer, the price that your client
Pesos?

Atty. De La Serna claims that Mr. Chan and Atty. Petralba had
advance knowledge of the Courts decision, based on the fact that
Atty. Petralba and Mr. Chan were already intimating a favorable
decision even before the decision was released. He points out that
the decision was released only on 27 September 2007, when it was
mailed at the Central Post Office, implying that if not for the fact that
Mr. Chan paid for the decision, he would not have known of the
outcome of the case even before the decision was released on 27
September 2007.
The decision was promulgated on 13 September 2007.
Decisions of the Court are posted in its website a few days after their
promulgation. In this case, the decision was published in the web on
19 September 2007, or before the decision was posted in the Manila
Central Post Office on 27 September 2007. However, Mr. Chan
stated that he learned of the decision only sometime in October
of 2007, after Atty. Petralba had told him about it.[55] On the other
hand, Atty. Monteclar admitted that he was the one who called up
Atty. Petralba to inform him about the outcome of the case after he
received a copy of the decision.[56]
Moreover, Atty. De La Sernas attribution of advance
knowledge to Mr. Chan, apart from being incongruent with the
declarations of the other personalities, does not dovetail with logic
and common sense. For one, Mr. Chan was earnest in asking for,
and pushing through with, the meeting on 25 September 2007 with
De La Serna. Had he known about the decision earlier, and more
importantly, had he really paid P10 Million for a favorable decision,
he would not have reiterated his offer or suggest any further meeting
with De La Serna for the purchase of the subject property. The
exercise would be downright irrational.[57]
From a related perspective, it would be plainly foolhardy
for Mr. Chan to go through all the trouble and risk of bribing a
Supreme Court Justice in the amount of P10Million when he could
have directly acquired the property by paying off De La Serna with
the same amount which the latter had demanded in the first place.
This aspect was clearly demonstrated during the hearing, thus:
Justice Quisumbing:
From your point of view, is there any
indication from your own circle of anything spent for the Supreme
Court by Mr. Chan?

Justice Quisumbing:

No, Your Honor. May I add something

Yes.

Atty. Paulino Petralba:

My own observation, Your Honors. If
he was willing to spend Ten Million, why go through the difficult
process of committing a crime of bribery and not just give it to the
other party?
Justice Quisumbing:

Ten Million

Atty. De La Serna:Ten Million.

I did not spend that on you, Your Honor.[54]

Atty. Paulino Petralba:

to that, Your Honor?

want is

I see.

Atty. Paulino Petralba:

It would be easier, Your Honor,
because once a compromise agreement is signed, we submit it to the
Court. In fact, I can already advise my client, even if the Court has
not resolved the compromise agreement, go ahead construct
because the compromise agreement will then bind the other party.
Its much easier, Your Honor. Its much more logical.

Justice Velasco:
So if thats the price for the lot of petitioner Fudot and he spent
Ten Million, wouldnt it be a lot easier for him to just have paid your
client the price that she was asking for her lot in Bohol?
Atty. De la Serna:
Im not thinking for Johnny Chan, Your Honor. Im just
what he told me. [59]

relaying

Atty. De La Sernas other basis for believing that the

decision was prompted by bribery was the time it took for this case to
be decided, which he intimated was uncommonly short. He bewails
that the case was pinpointed, then plucked out from underneath
20,000 other cases, and thereafter resolved in less than two (2)
years. He also compared the case with Oppus v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 150186; a case which he previously handled, claiming
that accused Oppus continues to languish in jail because the
Supreme Court had not resolved his appeal even after the lapse of
more than ten (10) years.[60] De La Sernas plaint is baseless and
non sequitur.
Atty. De La Serna seems to be unaware that the Supreme Court
is mandated by the Constitution to decide cases within two (2) years
from the date of submission.
Art. VIII, Section 15(1) of the
Constitution reads:
Section 15 (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this
Constitution must be decided or resolved within twenty- four months
from date of submission for the Supreme Court, twelve months for all
lower collegiate courts, and three months for all lower courts.
(2) A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or
memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.
The instant petition was filed on 6 March 2006. Respondent was
required to file its comment thereon, which it submitted on 1 June
2006. The Court thereafter required petitioner to file her reply, and
petitioner filed one on 11 September 2006. Her reply was noted on
13 November 2006. Thus, as of 13 November 2006, the case was
deemed submitted, there being no other pleading required by the
Court. From that point on, it is but logical to assume that a decision
would be forthcoming.
As for the Oppus case, it appears from the records that
De La Serna used to be Oppuss lawyer, but he was replaced upon
Oppuss motion. Moreover, the case was already deemed closed and
terminated as of 15 October 2007, when the Court granted Oppuss
Motion to Withdraw Petition/Appeal filed on 19 September 2007.
Contrary to De La Sernas claim, the case is no longer pending as it
was already been disposed of. Moreover, the Oppus case was
assigned to another ponente, not Justice Tinga. The period during

Page 10 of 24

LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

which the Oppus case was pending cannot serve as sound basis for
comparison with this case.
In addition, Atty. De La Sernas assumption that the instant
case was decided ahead of 20,000 other cases is preposterous.
Deducting the General Register Number ( G.R. No.) of the Oppus
case from the instant case would lead one to infer that 20,000 cases
are still pending, which is not the case, since as pointed out by
Justice Carpio, there are no more than ten thousand cases pending
in the Supreme Court at any one time.[61] Besides, in between the
G.R. No. of the Oppus case (G.R. No. 171008) and that of this case
(G.R. No.150186), are thousands of cases.
A lawyer is, first and foremost, an officer of the court. Corollary
to his duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and judicial officers is to support the courts against "unjust
criticism and clamor."[62] His duty is to uphold the dignity and the
authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, "not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice, as it is his sworn and moral
duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice."[63] As we held in one case:
It is [the] respondents duty as an officer of the court, to uphold
the dignity and authority of the courts and to promote confidence in
the fair administration of justice and in the Supreme Court as the last
bulwark of justice and democracy. x x x[64]

As part of the machinery for the administration of justice, a

lawyer is expected to bring to the fore irregular and questionable
practices of those sitting in court which tend to corrode the judicial
machinery. Thus, if he acquired reliable information that anomalies
are perpetrated by judicial officers, it is incumbent upon him to report
the matter to the Court so that it may be properly acted upon. An
omission or even a delay in reporting may tend to erode the dignity of,
and the publics trust in, the judicial system.
The Court is perplexed by the actuations of Atty. De La Serna.
Claiming that he had been informed that a member of the Court was
involved in bribery, yet he chose to remain silent in the meantime
and to divulge the information long after he had come to know
that he lost the case. He claims that as early as 25 September 2007,
Mr. Chan told him that he had already spent P10 Million for Justice
Tinga; yet he failed to inform the Court of this matter waited until 4
November 2007 before he divulged the alleged bribery in his Request
for Inhibition. According to him, he only became convinced that the
bribe took place after he received a copy of the decision. Yet there
was no mention of the alleged bribery in his motion for
reconsideration dated 20 October 2007. For this, he offers the
lame pretext that adverted bribery is a mere extraneous matter (that)
is not relevant as far as the legal issues are concerned in this case,
and because his request for inhibition dated 4 November 2007,
where the matter was mentioned for the first time, at least does not
have a deadline.[65] While admitting that he did not even verify
from other sources if Mr. Chans statement had any factual basis, De
La Serna offers another feeble explanation for his delayed reaction in
that he could not just go to the Supreme Court and request for
investigation, as he could not even pass through the guards.[66] A
lawyer of De La Sernas caliber and experience would know that
there is a proper way of lodging a formal complaint for investigation,
including sending it by registered mail.
That De La Serna did not report the matter immediately to the
Court suffuses unshakeable dubiety to his claim that Mr. Chan had
uttered the statements attributed to him. That De La Serna brought
up the issue of bribery after an unfavorable decision was issued
makes the allegation all the more a contrived afterthought, a hastily
concocted story brought to cast doubts on the integrity not only of
Justice Tinga, but also of the entire Supreme Court.
This is not to say, however, that as an officer of the court,
Atty. De La Serna cannot criticize the court.[67] We have long
recognized and respected the right of a lawyer, or any person, for
that matter, to be critical of courts and magistrates as long as they are
made in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels.
The Court, in In re: Almacen,[68] held:

Moreover, every citizen has the right to comment upon and

criticize the actuations of public officers. This right is not diminished
by the fact that the criticism is aimed at a judicial authority, or that is it
articulated by a lawyer. Such right is especially recognized where the
criticism concerns a concluded litigation, because then the courts
actuation are thrown open to public consumption. x x x
xxx
Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and
expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive
and the legislative branches, the judiciary is rooted in the soil of
democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizen
whom it is expected to serve.
Well-recognized therefore is the right of a lawyer, both as
an officer of the court and as a citizen, to criticize in properly
respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts
and judges. x x x
xxx
Hence, as a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is
expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty
to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he
professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of
the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a
citizen.
xxx
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it
shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and
propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one
hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof,
on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation
of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects
a lawyer to disciplinary action.[69]
Everything considered on the basis of the proofs on
record, reason and normal discernment, Atty. De La Sernas
statements bear the badges of falsehood while the common version
of the witnesses who disputed his statements is imbued with the
hallmarks of truth. There is more. De La Sernas declarations were
maliciously and irresponsibly made. They exceeded the boundaries
of decency
and propriety. The libelous attack on the integrity and credibility
of Justice Tinga tend to degrade the dignity of the Court and erode
public confidence that should be accorded to it. As we stated in In re:
Wenceslao Laureta,[70] thus:
To allow litigants to go beyond the Courts resolution and claim
that the members acted with deliberate bad faith and rendered an
unjust resolution in disregard or violation of the duty of their high
office to act upon their own independent consideration and judgment
of the matter at hand would be to destroy the authenticity, integrity
and conclusiveness of such collegiate acts and resolutions and to
disregard utterly the presumption of regular performance of official
duty. To allow such collateral attack would destroy the separation of
powers and undermine the role of the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter of all justiciable disputes.[71]
Atty. De La Serna has transcended the permissible
bounds of fair comment and criticism. His irresponsible and baseless
statements, his unrepentant stance and smug insistence of his
exceeding six (6) months or both under the Rules.[72]
The power to declare a person in contempt of court and in
dealing with him accordingly is a means to protect and preserve the
dignity of the court, the solemnity of the proceedings therein and the
administration of justice from callous misbehavior and offensive
personalities.[73] Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of
the judicial institution. Without such guarantee, the institution would
be resting on a very shaky foundation. [74]The Court will not hesitate
to wield this inherent power to preserve its honor and dignity and
safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.[75]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Atty. Victor De La
Serna is found GUILTY of indirect contempt of court. He is hereby

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LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

FINED in the amount of P30,000.00 to be paid within ten (10)

days from receipt of this Resolution and WARNED that a repetition of
a similar act will warrant a more severe penalty.
Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to Atty. De La
Sernas personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies
thereof furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
The IBP is ordered to submit with DISPATCH its Report on
the investigation in Gabriel T. Ingles v. Atty. Victor De La Serna,
docketed as A.C. No. 5763.
This Resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. RTJ-90-483 September 25, 1998

ATTY. ANTONIO T. GUERRERO, complainant, vs. HON.
ADRIANO VILLAMOR, respondent.
A.M. No. RTJ-90-617 September 25, 1998
GEORGE CARLOS, complainant, vs. HON. ADRIANO
VILLAMOR, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
In a sworn letter-complaint 1 addressed to this Court through the
Court Administrator, dated March 8, 1990, Atty. Antonio Guerrero
charges Judge Adriano Villamor of the Regional Trial
Court at Naval, Sub-Province of Biliran, Leyte, Branch 16, with
serious misconduct, ignorance of the law, knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment, misfeasance, malfeasance and neglect of duty for
issuing an Order 2 dated December 11, 1987 declaring the
complainant and one George Carlos guilty of direct contempt.
In a separate verified complaint, involving exactly the same
incident, George Carlos also charges Judge Adriano Villamor with
substantially the same offenses. 3
By resolution dated February 5, 1991, this Court referred to
Associate Justice Cancio C. Garcia of the Court of Appeals the
complaint of Atty. Guerrero, docketed as Administrative Matter (A.M.)
RTJ 90-483, for investigation, report and recommendation. This was
followed by another resolution, 4 pursuant to which the records of the
case relating to Carlos' complaint, docketed, as A.M. RTJ-90-617, were
forwarded to said investigator for consolidation with A.M. RTJ 90-483.
The said administrative matters have now to be resolved in view
of respondent's pending claims, for gratuity granted by this Court per
its Resolution dated April 12, 1994, which reads as follows:
A.M. No. RTJ-90-474 (Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. vs. Judge
Adriano Villamor, Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte) and
A.M. No. RTJ-90-606 (Clemencio C. Sabitsana, JR. vs. Judge Adriano
Villamor, Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Naval, Leyte). Acting on
the plea for mercy and compassion, dated February 2, 1994, filed by
counsel for respondent judge, and it appearing that the Court in its per
curiam resolution, dated February 7, 1992, amended the dispositive
portion of its decision, dated October 4, 1991, by allowing Judge
Villamor to enjoy all vacation and sick leave benefits that he has
earned during the period of his government service and in the
resolution of May 11, 1993, denied the motion for reconsideration filed
by the respondent for having been filed late, and although the Court
will not condone the wrongdoings of any member of the bench, neither
will it negate any move to recognize and remunerate their lengthy
Service in the government, more so, if this will greatly benefit the last
days of their remaining life, the Court Resolved to GRANT former
Judge Adriano Villamor a gratuity equivalent to 25% of his retirement
benefits. The payment of this benefit, however, shall be subject to the
availability of funds and the usual clearance requirements. This ruling
is pro hac vice and is not a precedent for other cases.
As gleamed from the report by the Investigating Justice, the
antecedent facts of the present consolidated cases are as follows:
Sometime in November 1968, one Gloria Pascubillo filed a
complaint against George Carlos for quieting of title. Docketed as Civil
Case No. B-0168 in the Regional Trial Court at Naval, Leyte, the case
ended in a compromise agreement approved by the court whereby
Carlos agreed to deliver possession of the property in question to
Pascubillo who, in turn, undertook to pay the
former the sum of P5,000.00 as purchase price. For some reason
or another, the judgment by compromise remained dormant for five (5)
years.

On November 23, 1977, Gloria Naval, nee Pascubillo, filed before

the Regional Trial Court at Naval, Leyte, Civil Case No. B-0398 against
Carlos for revival and enforcement of the judgment in Civil Case No. B0168. In turn, Carlos filed Criminal Cases Nos. N-989, N-990, N-991,
N-992 and N-993 for qualified theft against Naval and her helpers.
These criminal cases, like Civil Case No. B-0398, were raffled to the
sala of Judge Villamor.
Due to the pendency of Civil Case No. B-0398, Judge Villamor
had the criminal cases archived, noting in his Orders 5 of January 4,
1984 that both sets of cases have for their subject the same parcel of
land.
Eventually, Judge Villamor rendered judgment in Civil Case No.
B-0398, declaring Naval to be the lawful owner/possessor of the land
being disputed, and ordering Carlos to vacate the same.
Forthwith, Carlos moved to reactivate the archived aforecited
criminal cases. Acting on the motion of the accused, Judge Villamor
dismissed the cases. As he observed in his dismissal order dated
December 5, 1986, Naval and her helpers cannot be held liable for
qualified theft for gathering coconuts on a piece of land of which Naval
is the owner. 6
Meanwhile, Carlos appealed the decision in Civil Case No. B0398. During the pendency of the appeal, Judge Villamor issued an
order granting execution which Carlos, in due time, challenged through
a petition for certiorari before this Court. The case was certified to the
Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 12011. In its
Decision dated October 7, 1987, amending its earlier decision of July
24, 1987, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the order of
immediate execution issued by Judge Villamor. Later, this Court, in
G.R. No. 81826, resolved to deny the petition for review filed by Carlos
for failure to show that the Appellate Court committed reversible error
in sustaining the trial court's order granting execution pending appeal.
7
On July 28, 1987, Carlos filed with this Court an administrative
case against Judge Villamor, docketed as A.M. RTJ 87-105 charging
the latter with having issued an illegal order and unjust decision
principally in the aforementioned criminal cases and in Civil Case No.
B-0398. In its En Banc Resolution dated November 21, 1988, as
reiterated in another resolution of January 26, 1989, this Court
dismissed the said administrative case for being premature but
"without prejudice to refiling should the Supreme Court decision later in
G.R. 81826 warrants its refiling." 8
Dissatisfied with the outcome of his administrative case, Carlos,
through Atty. Antonio Guerrero, filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu a civil action for damages against Judge Villamor. In his
complaint, docketed as CEB-6478, and raffled to Branch 21 presided
by then Judge Juanito Bernad, Carlos alleged that Judge Villamor
knowingly rendered an unjust judgment when he dismissed the five
criminal cases against Naval and her co-accused.
The summons in Civil Case No. CEB-6478 was served on Judge
Villamor on December 10, 1987. The following day, instead of
answering the complaint, Judge Villamor issued in Criminal Cases
Nos. N-0989 to 0993 an order declaring Carlos and his lawyer, Antonio
Guerrero guilty of direct contempt for "degrading the respect and
dignity of the court through the use of derogatory and contemptuous
language before the court," 9 In full, the contempt order reads:
ORDER OF CONTEMPT OF COURT
It is indeed unfortunate and regrettable that George Carlos and
his counsel, Atty. Antonio T. Guerrero have brushed aside the warning
of this Court not to mistake its maximum tolerance as weakness. Once
again, they have defiled this Court with abusive, offensive and
disrespectful language in their complaint for Damages, Civil Case CEB
6478, RTC, 7th Judicial Region, Cebu City against the herein presiding
judge for dismissing the aforementioned cases on December 5, 1986.
Neither George Carlos, the private prosecutor or public
prosecutor questioned the said dismissal in the proper forum. It was
only on December 3, 1987 that George Carlos and his counsel Atty.
Antonio T. Guerrero when they filed civil case CEB 6478 peremptorily
labelled the dismissal as "unjust decision."
And in their complaint they alleged:
Par. 12. That the dismissal of criminal cases Nos. 0989, 0990,
0991, 0992 and 0993 for qualified theft was arrived at certainly without
circumspection without any moral or legal basis a case of
knowingly rendering unjust judgment since the dismissal was
tantamount to acquittal of the accused Gloria P. Naval who is now
beyond the reach of criminal and civil liability all because the
defendant Hon. Adriano R. Villamor was bent backwards with his eyes
and mind wilfully closed under these circumstances which demanded
the scrutiny of the judicial mind and discretion from bias, . . .
Par. 14. By the standard of a public official and a private person
the conduct of defendant Honorable Judge not only shocking, but

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LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

appalling in giving the plaintiff before his court the run-around is at

the very least distasteful, distressing and mortifying and moral
damages therefor would warrant on this kind of reprehensible behavior
....
Par. 15. That the aforecited manifestly malicious actuations,
defendant judge should also visit upon him . . . for reducing plaintiff his
agonizing victim of his disdain and contempt for the
former who not only torn asunder and spurned but also humiliated
and spitefully scorned.
The foregoing specially chosen language by George Carlos and
Atty. Guerrero is what Dean Pound aptly termed as "Epithetical
Jurisprudence". And to paraphrase then Chief Justice Bengzon in
Lagumbay v. Comelec (16 SCRA 175) the employment of intemperate
language serves no purpose but to detract the force of the argument.
That is to put as its mildest a well-deserved reproach to such
propensity. A member of the bar who has given vent to such
expressions of ill will, not to say malevolence, betrays gross disrespect
not only to the adverse party, but also to this Tribunal (Surigao Mineral
Reservation Board v. Cloribel, 31 SCRA 1).
These epithets undermines (sic) the dignity of the court. It (sic)
affronts its majesty and puts (sic) it in disrepute and disrespect. Not
only are they unfounded and unsubstantiated. They constitute direct
contempt or contempt in facie curiae summarily punishable without
hearing.
The Court finds George Carlos and Atty. Antonio T. Guerrero
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of Direct Contempt of Court and
sentences both to an imprisonment of five (5) days and to pay a fine of
Five Hundred (P500.00) Pesos.
xxx xxx xxx
Carlos and Atty. Guerrero afterwards went to this Court on a
petition for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary injunction against
Judge Villamor. On November 13, 1989, this Court, in G.R. No. 8223842, promulgated a decision annulling the contempt order 10.
On March 8, 1990, Atty. Guerrero filed this instant case. Eight
months later, Carlos followed with his complaint.
Complainant Atty. Guerrero, joined for the most part by
complainant Carlos, alleged that the respondent judge issued the
contempt order (a) as an incident of Criminal Case Nos. N-989 to N993 which have long been terminated, (b) without informing them of
the charge, (c) without a hearing, or at least a show cause order to
determine whether their alleged contemptuous utterances constitute
direct or indirect contempt, and (d) without following the prescription of
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court on contempt. Complainant Atty. Guerrero
adds that the supporting cases cited by the respondent in his order
referring to Lagumbay vs. COMELEC 11 and Surigao Mineral
Reservation Board vs. Cloribel 12 are contextually not at all in point.
Thus, it is contended that respondent is ignorant of the law and/or has
knowingly rendered an unjust judgment. It is also contended that
respondent stands liable for serious misconduct for adjudging
complainants guilty of direct contempt despite their non-presence in
court. 13
In his comment, respondent submits that the various reverses
encountered by the complainants before his court and the appellate
courts impelled them to institute their complaint as a measure of
harassment. 14 He, however, anchors his defense on the following
terse line: What happened was an error in judgment. 15 In connection
with this main posture, respondent submitted a Manifestation of
Supervening Supreme Court Decision 16, attaching therewith a copy of
the decision promulgated on November 13, 1991 by this Court in the
consolidated cases of Hon. Judge Adriano Villamor vs. Hon. Judge
Bernardo LI. Salas & George Carlos and Hon. Judge Adriano Villamor
vs. Antonio Guerrero & Hon. Peary G. Aleonar 17. In the decision, this
Court said:
Nowhere in this Court's decision annulling Judge Villamor's order
of direct contempt (G.R. Nos. 82238-42, November 13, 1989) can
there be found a declaration that the erroneous order was rendered
maliciously or with conscious and deliberate intent to commit an
injustice. In fact, a previous order of direct contempt issued by Judge
Villamor against Carlos' former counsel was sustained by this Court
(Jaynes C. Abbarientos, et al. vs. Judge Villamor, G.R. No. 82237,
June 1, 1988).
At most, the order of direct contempt which we nullified may only
be considered an error of judgment for which Judge Villamor may not
be held criminally or civilly liable to the respondents.
A judge is not liable for an erroneous decision in the absence of
malice or wrongful conduct in rendering it (Barroso vs. Arche, 67 SCRA
161).
Investigating Justice Garcia recommends the dismissal of the
complaints against respondent judge. This Court agrees with this
recommendation.

With regard to the charge of malfeasance, misfeasance, neglect

of duty, or misconduct, complainants have not established a primafacie case against respondent judge. After a careful examination of the
records of this case, the Court concurs with the findings of the
investigating Justice that the acts or omission allegedly constituting
any of these offenses have either not been spelled out with definite
specificity, or the causal connection between the given act/omission
and the resulting offense/s not logically demonstrated.
The other charges, namely ignorance of the law and issuing an
unjust judgment, deserve consideration, since the direct contempt
order of the respondent judge, under the attending circumstances it
was issued, appears to be clearly erroneous. The supposedly
contemptuous language used in a pleading was not submitted to
respondent, but filed in another court presided by another judge
stationed in Cebu literally miles away from where respondent holds
court in Leyte. As this Court ruled in Ang vs. Castro: 18
Use of disrespectful or contemptuous language against a
particular judge in pleadings presented in another court or proceeding
is indirect, not direct,
contempt as it is not tantamount to a misbehavior in the presence
of or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the administration of
justice.
However, administrative liability for ignorance of the law and/or
knowingly rendering an unjust judgment does not immediately arise
from the bare fact of a judge issuing a decision/resolution/order later
adjudged to be erroneous. 19 Otherwise, perhaps no judge, however
competent, honest or dedicated he may be, can ever hope to retire
from the judiciary with an unblemished record. 20
For liability to attach for ignorance of the law, the assailed order,
decision or actuation of the judge in the performance of official duties
must not only be found erroneous but, most importantly, it must also be
established that he was moved by bad faith, dishonesty, hatred, or
some other like motive. 21 Similarly, a judge will be held
administratively liable for rendering an unjust judgment one which is
contrary to law or jurisprudence or is not supported by evidence
when he acts in bad faith, malice, revenge or some other similar
motive. In fine, bad faith is the ground for liability in either or both
offenses. 22
Conversely, a charge for either ignorance of the law or rendering
an unjust judgment will not prosper against a judge acting in good faith.
Absent the element of bad faith, an erroneous judgment cannot be the
basis of a charge for any said offenses, mere error of judgment not
being a ground for disciplinary proceedings.
From the record before us we agree with the finding of the
investigating Justice that respondent, in issuing his erroneous
contempt order, was not moved by ill-will or by an impulse to do an
injustice. To be sure, complainants have not presented evidence or
offered logical arguments tending to show that bad faith accompanied
the issuance of the contempt order. It ought to be remembered that
bad faith is not presumed and he who alleges the same has the onus
of proving it. In this regard, complainants have not discharged that
burden of proof sufficiently.
Should a circumstance tend to becloud the bona fides of
respondent's actuation, it could only refer to the strained relationship
existing between him and complainants brought about by the
cumulative effect of the reverses Carlos encountered in respondent's
sala, on one hand, and the filing by complainant Carlos, through Atty.
Guerrero, of the damage suit against respondent, on the other. 23 The
text of the contempt order, however, yields no indication that
respondent, in mistakenly citing complainants for direct contempt, was
prevailed upon by personal animosity or by a desire to exact revenge.
On the contrary, respondent stressed in his order that he observed
"maximum tolerance" in dealing with complainants, previous legal
skirmishes notwithstanding.
The fact that respondent did not accord complainants a hearing
nor informed them beforehand of the charges relative to the contempt
incident cannot, without more, be indicative of bad faith or malice. For,
respondent labored under the impression, mistaken as it turned out to
be,
that complainants committed an act constituting direct contempt
summarily punishable. 24 Assuming, as respondent did assume, that
complainants did indeed commit an act punishable by direct contempt,
then a formal hearing would hardly be necessary.
Needless to underscore, the utilization by respondent of the longterminated criminal cases as the vehicle for his contempt order formed
a part of his error. Bad faith, however, cannot be inferred from this
particular error, per se.
Incidentally, the invocation in the contempt order of the cases
Lagumbay and Cloribel is not at all misplaced as complainants now
urge. To be sure, respondent cited these cases not so much to support

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LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

the propriety of the contempt order as to accentuate the pernicious

effect of the use of intemperate language in pleadings on the orderly
administration of justice.
In all, the assailed act of the respondent judge appears to be a
case of error of judgment not subject to disciplinary action. The
decision of this Court in the consolidated cases of Hon. Judge Adriano
Villamor vs. Hon. Judge Bernardo Ll. Salas & George Carlos and Hon.
Judge Adriano Villamor vs. Antonio Guerrero & Hon. Peary G. Aleonar
25 concedes as much. In the decision, this Court held:
At most, the order of direct contempt which we nullified may only
be considered as error of judgment for, which Judge Villamor may not
be held criminally or civilly liable to the respondents [herein
complainants].
While the quoted portion of the foregoing ruling speaks only of
exemption from criminal or civil liability, there is no reason not to
include from its reach administrative liability as well. After all, this Court
had occasion to rule that:
[A] judge may not be administratively charged for mere errors of
judgment in the absence of showing of any bad faith, malice or corrupt
purpose. 26
Moreover, it is settled that judges cannot be held to account
criminally, civilly, or administratively for an erroneous decision rendered
by them in good faith. 27
In sum, there is no legal basis nor convincing evidence, to support
the proposition that the respondent judge, in issuing his controversial
contempt order, acted in bad faith or with ill-will or malice as to justify
holding him liable for an error in judgment.
WHEREFORE, herein administrative complaints against Judge
Adriano Villamor are hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-33037-42 August 17, 1983

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant vs.
DEMETRIO JARDIN, accused-appellee.
The Solicitor-General for plaintiff-appellant.
Marcos C. Lucero, Jr. for accused-appellee.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Two constitutional rightsspeedy trial and freedom from double
jeopardyare interposed as defenses by the accused in this petition
for review on certiorari.
The petitioner asks us to review and annul the orders of the Court
of First Instance of Quezon, Branch V, which dismissed the criminal
cases against accuse Demetrio Jardin because his constitutional right
to speedy trial was allegedly violated.
The criminal prosecutions originated from a letter complaint of the
Provincial Auditor of Quezon requesting the Provincial Fiscal to file the
necessary criminal action under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
against Demetrio Jardin for malversation of public funds thru
falsification of public documents on six counts.
The cases were assigned to Assistant Fiscal Meliton V. Angeles
who set them for preliminary investigation.The accused moved to
postpone the investigation twice. On the third time that the
investigation was re-set, the accused and his counsel failed to appear.
On the fourth resetting, the accused and his counsel again failed
to appear. Inspire of their absence, the preliminary investigation was
conducted and shortly afterwards, six informations were filed against
the accused before the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch II,
docketed as Cases Nos. 16052 (0043-M), 16053 (0044-M), 16054
(0045-ML 16055 (0046-M), 16056 (0047-M), and 16057 (0048-M). The
arraignment was set for May 9, 1967.
The records show that from May 9, 1967, the arraignment was reset for June 6; then re-set for June 26; then from August 16, the same
was re-set for September 5, all because of the motions for
postponement filed at the instance of the accused. (Original records
[0043-M] pp. 54, 61, 66 and 69).
When the arraignment of the accused was called on September
5, 1967, counsel for the accused verbally moved for reinvestigation on
the ground that the accused was not given the opportunity to present
his defense during the preliminary investigation. This was granted by
the court and the first reinvestigation was set on November 24, 1967.
On this date, however,
the Investigating Fiscal motu proprio postponed said
reinvestigation due to the non-appearance of accused and his counsel
and re-set the date for December 21, 1967.
A series of postponements was again filed by the accused
causing further. delays of the reinvestigation. On June 27, 1968,
accused and his counsel appeared together but requested for a period
of fifteen (15) days within which to file a memorandum.

In view of the expiration of the 15-day period, the Investigating

Fiscal filed a manifestation before the court that the records of these
cases be returned and the trial on the merits of the same be set.
The court without acting on said manifestation, issued an order
transferring the six (6) cases to the new branch (Branch V) of the Court
of First Instance at Mauban, Quezon. Upon receipt by the latter of the
records of these cases, the arraignment and trial were set for
December 3, 1968.
On the latter date, the counsel for the accused sought again the
postponement of the arraignment and this was followed by more
postponements, all at the instance of the accused. (Original records,
[0043-M] pp. 90,93,120 and 125).
On March 31, 1969, counsel for the accused moved for the
postponement of the arraignment and requested the court that the
records be returned again to the Office of the Fiscal for further
reinvestigation. This was granted and the reinvestigation was again set
for May 5, 1969. The accused and his counsel, however, failed to
appear and thus, the said reinvestigation was re-set for June 2, 1969.
On this date, counsel for accused requested that he be given five (5)
days within which to file a written sworn statement of the accused
which would constitute the defense of the latter, subject to the crossexamination of the Investigating Fiscal.
Considering the fact that the period to file such sworn statement
had already expired without anything being filed, the records of the
cases were returned to the court which set said cases for arraignment
and trial on September 2, 1970. On this date, the accused again
moved for postponement.
When these cases were called for arraignment on September 8,
1970, Demetrio Jardin, pleaded not guilty to the crime as charged,
after which he requested that the trial be postponed and re-set for
September 29, 1970.
On September 29, 1970, the trial scheduled on that day was
postponed again on motion of counsel for the accused. The trial was
re-set for October 12, 1970, with notice to both parties.
On October 12, 1970, when the said criminal cases were called
for hearing, no one appeared for the prosecution, except a state
witness, Mr. Cesar Alcala of the Provincial Auditor's office who
remained silent during the proceedings.
Invoking his client's constitutional right to speedy trial and seizing
the opportunity to take advantage of the prosecution's failure to appear
on that day, the defense counsel moved for the dismissal of the cases.
The respondent court granted the oral motion for dismissal "for
reasons of constitutional rights of the accused Demetrio Jardin. "
Two questions are now raised by the People in this appeal:
I. Considering the factual setting in the criminal cases at bar, was
the respondent Court correct in dismissing the cases and in predicating
the dismissal on the right of the defendant to a speedy trial?
II. Does the present appeal place the respondent accuse in
double jeopardy?
The respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
dismissing the cases and in basing the dismissal on the constitutional
right of the accused to speedy trial. The right to a speedy trial means
that the accused is free from vexatious, capricious, and oppressive
delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person
may be free from anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if
otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible
time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever
legitimate defense he may interpose. (See Andres v. Cacdac, 113
SCRA 216)
[From a perusal of the facts, it is readily seen that all the delays in
the prosecution of the cases were caused by the accused himself.] All
the postponements of proceedings were made at his instance and for
his behalf. Hence, the constitutional right to a speedy trial afforded to
an accused by our Constitution cannot be invoked. From the start of
the preliminary investigation of the cases up to the trial on the merits,
the accused always managed to delay the proceedings through
postponements and requests for reinvestigation. [It would, therefore,
be a mockery of the criminal justice system if the accused would be
allowed to benefit from his own wrongdoings or tactical maneuvers
intended to frustrate the administration of justice. By his own deliberate
acts, he is deemed to have waived or abandoned his right to a speedy
trial. In the case of Andres v. Cacdac, 113 SCRA 216, we ruled:]
In this case, however, there was a waiver or abandonment of the
right to a speedy trial in the first case when the herein petitioners
sought and obtained several postponements of the trial: first, when
they asked for the deferment of the arraignment because the accused
Ladislao Tacipit was not present; second, when they asked for the
postponement of the trial for March 5, 1968 upon the ground that they
have requested the Provincial Fiscal of Cagayan for a reinvestigation

Page 14 of 24

LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

of the case; and finally, when they agreed, with the prosecution, to
postpone the hearing set for November 28, 1968 to January 4, 1969..
The dismissal of the criminal cases against the accused by the
respondent court on the ground that his right to speedy trial had beer
violated was devoid of factual and legal basis. The order
denying the motion for reconsideration is similarly infirm. There
being no basis for the questioned orders, they are consequently null
and void.
Would a reinstatement of the dismissed cases place the accused
in double jeopardy?
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure to
the benefit of an accused, the following requisites must be present in
the first prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a
competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and (d)
the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. (Rule
117, Section 9, Rules of Court; People v. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77). The
last requisite assumes a valid acquittal and a valid acquittal
presupposes a valid judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Since in the instant cases, the dismissal was void for having been
issued without legal basis, it follows that the acquittal brought about by
the dismissal is also void. Hence, no jeopardy can attach from such
acquittal. The act of respondent judge in discussing the cases
amounted to lack of jurisdiction which would prevent double jeopardy
from attaching. In the case of People v. Court of appeals (10 1 SCRA
450) we ruled:
Private respondents further argue that a judgment of acquittal
ends the case which cannot be appealed nor reopened, otherwise,
they would be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense. That is the
general rule and presupposes a valid judgment. As earlier pointed out,
however, respondent Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void
judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction No double
jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no
judgment at all. (Comia v. Nicolas, 29 SCRA 492 [1969]) By it no rights
are divested Through it, no rights can be attains & Being worthless, all
proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless It neither binds nor
bars anyone. All acts performed under it and all claims flowing out of it
are void. (Gomez v. Concepcion, 47 Phil. 717, 722.[1925]; Chavez vs.
Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, 685 [1968]; Parades v. Moya, 61
SCRA 526, [1974]). ...
We also note that the dismissall of the criminal cases was upon
motion and with the wxpress consent of respondent Demetrio Jardin.
For double jeopardy to attach, the general rule is that the dismissal of
the case must be without the express consent of the accused. (People
v. Salico, 84 Phil. 722; People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249; People v.
Pilpa, 79 SCRA 81; and People v. Cuevo, 104 SCRA 312).
If the accused had been denied his right to speedy trial or if some
other basic right had been impaired, the doctrine of waiver of the right
to invoke double jeopardy would not apply even if the accused had
expressly moved for the termination of proceedings. In the instant
case, however, the defendant had deliberately used all the available
dilatory tactics he could utilize and abused the principle that the
accused must be given every opportunity to disprove the criminal
charge. The doctrine of double jeopardy was never intended for this
purpose.
Even as we rule that the lower court acted with grave abuse of
discretion, we also rebuke the attorneys for both the defense and the
prosecution and to a certain extent, the court itself because of the
breach of duties to the courts and to the administration of justice
apparent in this case.
The duties of an attorney found in Rule 138, Section 20 include: xxx xxx xxx
(d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided
to him, such means only as are consistent with truth and honor,...
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the
continuance of an action or proceeding, or delay any man's cause,
from any corrupt motive or interest.
xxx xxx xxx
The dilatory tactics of the defense counsel and the failure of both
the judge and the fiscal to take effective counter measures to obviate
the delaying acts constitute obstruction of justice.
As aptly stared:
12.09 Obstructing the administration of justice
An attorney as an officer of the court is called upon to assist in the
due administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to
advance its cause. (Surigao Mineral Reservation Board vs. Cloribel,
G.R. No. 11071, Jan. 9, 1972, 31 SCRA 1; In re Climaco, G.R. Adm.
Case No. 134-J, Jan. 21, 1974, 55 SCRA 107) For this reason, any act
on the part of a lawyer that obstructs, perverts or impedes the

administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies

disciplinary action against him. (Cantorne vs. Ducasin 57 Phil, 23
[1932]; De los Santos vs. Sagalongos 69 Phil. 406 [1940]).
Acts which amount to obstruction in the administration of justice
may take many forms. They include such acts as instructing a
complaining witness in a criminal action not to appear at the scheduled
hearing so that the case against the client, the accused, would be
dismissed. (Cantorne vs. Ducasin supra) asking a client to plead guilty
to a crime which the lawyer knows his client did not commit, (Nueno v.
Santos, 58 Phil. 557 [1933]) advising a client who is detained for a
crime to escape from prison, (Cf. Medina v. Yan, G.R. No. 30978, Sept.
30, 1974) employing dilatory tactics to frustrate satisfaction of clearly
valid claims, Pajares vs. Abad Santos, G.R. No. 29543, Nov. 29, 1969,
30 SCRA 748) prosecuting clearly
frivolous cases or appeals to drain the resources of the other
party and compel him to submit out of exhaustion (Samar Mining Co.
vs. Arnado, G.R. No. 22304. July 30, 1968) and filing multiple petitions
or complaints for a cause that has been previously rejected in the false
expectation of getting favorable action. (Gabriel vs. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 43757, July 30, 1976, 72 SCRA 173; Ramos vs. Potenciano,
G.R. No. 27104, Dec. 20, 1976, 74 SCRA 345; Macias v. Uy Kim, G.R.
No. 31174, May 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 251) Acts of this or similar nature
are grounds for disciplinary action." Agpalo Legal Ethics, U.P. Law
Center, 1980 Edition, pp. 405-406)
The invocation of constitutional rights by the private respondent is
without merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned
orders of the respondent court are hereby SET ASIDE. Criminal Cases
Nos. 0043-M, 0044-M, 0045-M, 0046M, 0047-M, and 0048-M are
reinstated and the proper regional trial court is ordered to proceed with
all deliberate speed in these cases.
SO ORDERED.

A.C. No. 3923. March 30, 1993.

CONCORDIA B. GARCIA, complainant, vs. ATTY.
CRISANTO L. FRANCISCO, respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LEGAL ETHICS; MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL; VIOLATION
OF OATH NOT DELAY ANY MAN OR MONEY OR MALICE;
SUSPENSION FOR ONE YEAR FROM PRACTICE OF LAW FOR
GROSS ABUSE OF RIGHT OF RECOURSE TO THE COURTS BY
ARGUING A CAUSE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY WITHOUT MERIT. The
cause of the respondent's client is obviously without merit. The
respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted to the
gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that was
consistently denied, as he should have expected . . . By grossly
abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a
cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the
obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or proceedings
as appear to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to
be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath not to delay
any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the name of an
honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of the trust
reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court . . . For this serious
transgression of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he deserves
to be sanctioned, not only as a punishment for his misconduct but also
as a warning to other lawyers who may be influenced by his example.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the
practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges
appurtenant to membership of the Philippine bar.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM, p:
In a sworn complaint filed with the Court on October 6, 1992,
Concordia B. Garcia seeks the disbarment of Atty. Crisanto L.
Francisco.
On March 9, 1964, Concordia B. Garcia and her husband
Godofredo, the Dionisio spouses, and Felisa and Magdalena Baetiong
leashed a parcel of land to Sotero Baluyot Lee for a period of 25 years
beginning May 1, 1964. Despite repeated verbal and written demands,
Lee refused to vacate after the expiration of the lease. Lee claimed
that he had an option to extend the lease for another 5 years and the
right of pre-emption over the property.
In this disbarment case, the complainant claims that Lee's
counsel, respondent Francisco, commenced various suits before
different courts to thwart Garcia's right to regain her property and that
all these proceedings were decided against Lee. The proceedings
stemmed from the said lease contract and involved the same issues
and parties, thus violating the proscription against forum-shopping.

Page 15 of 24

LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

Respondent, in his comment, says that he inserted in defense of

his client's right only such remedies as were authorized by law.
The tangle of recourses employed by Francisco is narrated as
follows:
1. On March 29, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed a complaint
against Garcia and the other lessors for specific performance and
reconveyance with damages in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-89-2118. On June 9,
1989, Garcia filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the grounds of
failure to state a cause of action, laches and prescription. The case
was dismissed by Judge Felimon Mendoza on August 10, 1989.
2. On May 29, 1989, Garcia and the other lessors filed a
complaint for unlawful detainer against Lee in the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Quezon City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1455.
Through Francisco, Lee filed an answer alleging as special and
affirmative defense the pendency of Civil Case no. Q-89-2118 in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. On September 5, 1989, Judge
Marcelino Bautista issued a resolution rejecting this allegation on the
ground that the issues before the two courts were separate and
different.
3. On October 24, 1989, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary injunction against Judge Bautista, Garcia
and the other lessors. This was docketed as civil Case No. Q-89-3833.
In filing this petition, Francisco knew or should have known that it
violated the Rule on Summary Procedure prohibiting the filing of
petitions for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any
interlocutory order issued by the court.
Francisco claims that what he appealed to the Regional Trial
Court in Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was the denial of his prayer for
dismissal of Civil Case No. 1455. This is not true. Civil Case Q-893833 was clearly a special civil action and not an appeal.
On November 13, 1989, Judge Abraham Vera issued an order
enjoining Judge Bautista from proceeding with the trial of the unlawful
detainer case. Upon motion of the complainant, however, the injunction
was set aside and Civil Case No. Q-89-3833 was dismissed on
January 9, 1990. Lee did not appeal.
4. On April 6, 1990, Lee through Francisco, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction with the
Court of Appeals against Judge Vera, Judge Singzon, Garcia and the
other lessors. Docketed as CA G.R. Sp No. 20476, the petition
assailed the January 9, 1990 order of Judge Vera dismissing Civil
Case No. Q-89-3833. On May 31, 1989, the petition was denied.
5. On June 14, 1990, Judge Singzon decided Civil Case no. 1455
in favor of complainant Garcia and the other lessors. Lee did not
appeal. Instead, on, June 21, 1990, through Francisco again, he filed a
petition against Judge Singzon and the other lessors for certiorari and
annulment of the decision in Civil Case No. 1455 and damages with
prayer for issuance of preliminary injunction. This was docketed as
Civil case No. 90-5852 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 98, presided by Judge Cesar C. Paralejo.
In Francisco's comment before us, he alleges that Civil Case No.
Q-90-5852 is an appeal from the unlawful detainer case. Again, he lies.
Civil Case No. Q-90-5852 was a specified civil action and not an
appeal.
On July 2, 1990, Garcia's group filed an Omnibus Motion to
Dismiss Civil Case No. 90-5852. On July 13, 1990, Judge Paralejo
issued an order enjoining Judge Singzon from enforcing the decision in
that case. Garcia attacked this order in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for preliminary injunction docketed as CA Sp.
No. 22392. The petition was granted by the Court of Appeals on
September 19, 1991, on the ground that the judgment in the unlawful
detainer case had come final and executory as June 30, 1990.
6. On September 24, 1991, Garcia filed a motion for execution in
the unlawful detainer case. On September 27, 1991, Lee, through
Francisco, filed a motion to inhibit Judge Singzon and to defer the
hearing of the motion. A writ of execution was nonetheless issued by
Judge Singzon on October 8, 1991.
7. Two days later, Lee, through Francisco, filed with the Supreme
Court a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and temporary
restraining order against the Court of Appeals, Judge Singzon, Garcia
and the other lessors. This Court denied the petition on January 27,
1992, and reconsideration on April 8, 1992.
8. Finally, Lee, still through Francisco, filed a petition for certiorari
with preliminary injunction against Judge Singzon, Garcia and the
other lessors in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to set aside
and declare the writs of execution in Civil Case No. 1455. This was
dismissed on August 4, 1992, and Lee, through Francisco, filed a
motion for reconsideration. According to Francisco, he was relieved as
counsel while this motion was pending.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the
expense of truth and the administration of justice.
The cause of the respondent's client in obviously without merit.
The respondent was aware of this fact when he wilfully resorted to the
gambits summarized above, continuously seeking relief that was
consistently denied, as he should have expected. He thereby added to
the already clogged dockets of the courts and wasted their valuable
time. He also caused much inconvenience and expense to the
complainant, who was obliged to defend herself against his every
move.
By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the
purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was
disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only such actions or
proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defense only as he
believes to be honestly debatable under the law. By violating his oath
not to delay any man for money or malice, he has besmirched the
name of an honorable profession and has proved himself unworthy of
trust reposed in him by law as an officer of the Court.
Atty. Crisanto l. Francisco took his oath as a lawyer on March 2,
1956. Considering his age and experience in the practice of the laws,
he should have known better than to trifle with it and to use it as an
instrument for harassment of the complainant and the misuse of
judicial processes. For this serious transgression of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he deserves to be sanctioned, not only as
punishment for his misconduct but also as a warning to other lawyers
who may be influenced by his example.
Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED for ONE YEAR from the
practice of law and from the enjoyment of all the rights and privileges
appurtenant to membership in the Philippine bar.
Let a copy of this Resolution be served immediately on the
respondent and circularized to all courts and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-38377 October 15, 1975

CAPT. CONRADO M. CABAGUI, petitioner, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS THIRD DIVISION, and THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents, EUGENIO M.
MILLADO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The Court finds respondent, Attorney Eugenio M. Millado, guilty of
gross negligence in not having complied with a "show cause"
resolution and of abusing the right of recourse to the Court by filing
multiple petitions for the same cause in the false expectation of getting
favorable action from one division as against the adverse action of the
other division. The Court deems his suspension from the practice of
law since February, 1975 as sufficient penalty and now lifts his
suspension with the warning that the commission in the future by
respondent of the same or other infractions shall be dealt with
severely.
Under its Resolution of November 20, 1974, the Court, acting on
a third petition for review of a Court of Appeals decision affirming
petitioner's conviction of the crime of malversation of public funds, as
filed on November 13, 1974 by his attorney, Eugenio M. Millado, with
address at Koronadal, South Cotabato, ordered that said petition be
expunged from the records and required "Atty. Eugenio Millado to
SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from notice hereof why disciplinary
action should not be taken against him for trifling with the Court by
filing this third petition despite previous resolutions of this Court." In its
previous Resolution of May 8, 1974 referring to the first two petitions
filed by respondent Millado on behalf of the same petitioner, 1 the
Court had dismissed the second petition (filed on March 18, 1974) by
respondent Millado in the guise of a new petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction but which merely raised again the same
questions in his first petition (filed on January 9, 1974) seeking to set
aside petitioner's conviction for malversation of public funds, by
decision of the court of first instance of Misamis Oriental dated June
20, 1963 as affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals'
decision dated June 8, 1973, for alleged lack of jurisdiction and praying
for reversal of the conviction or for a reduction of his criminal liability by
finding appellant-petitioner guilty of technical malversation only for the
amount of P1,161.65. Said first petition had been denied on January
15, 1974 by virtue of the petition having been filed late by 4 months
and 25 days beyond the last date for filing which fell due since August
15, 1973. The Court therein reiterated its warning to litigants and
counsels against the filing of multiple petitions for the same cause in
the false expectation of getting favorable action from one division as

Page 16 of 24

LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

against the adverse action of the other division, since "such conduct
would tend to trifle with the Court and impede, obstruct and degrade
the administration of justice," as follows:
In a similar case (L-37411, Teodoro Fojas vs. CA), the Court per
its resolution of March 20, 1974 admonished that "(L)itigants and their
counsels are warned under pain of contempt and disciplinary action
that a party who has already failed to have a decision of the Court of
Appeals set aside through a petition for review by certiorari with the
denial of his petition (by the First Division to which such petitions for
review are assigned under the Court's standing resolution of November
15, 1973) should not under the guise of a special civil action file a
second petition for the same purpose of setting aside the same
Court of Appeals' decision to be acted upon by the Second Division (to
which special civil actions are assigned under the Court's resolution of
November 15, 1973), and vice-versa, for such conduct would tend to
trifle with the Court and impede, obstruct and degrade the
administration of justice." 2
For failure on the part of respondent to submit the explanation
required under the Court's Resolution of November 20, 1974,
notwithstanding the lapse on January 3, 1975 of the period therein
given him, the Court per its Resolution of February 7, 1975 resolved to
suspend respondent from the practice of law effective immediately and
until further action in the premises.
On April 14, 1975, respondent filed his "Petition for Relief from
Resolutions and Compliance" pleading inter alia "mistake and/or
excusable negligence" for his failure to take note of and attend to the
filing of the explanation required in the Court's Resolution of November
20, 1974 and that he was seeking to render "optimum legal service" to
petitioner and "to exhaust all remaining legal remedies." He added with
reference to the third petition that "if, however, there is any portion
thereof that can suggest that its filing trifles with this Honorable Court,
he respectfully begs the indulgence and tolerance thereof, and he
condescendingly (sic) APOLOGIZES therefor, respectfully assuring
that he will be more cautious hereafter." 3
The Court set the petition for relief for hearing on June 2,1975 on
which date it heard respondent and further granted him time to submit
his memorandum.
In respondent's memorandum filed on June 27, 1975, he again
urges that at either of his three petitions be given due course,
notwithstanding that he well knows that the Court's Resolutions
denying and dismissing the first two petitions have long become final
and entries of judgment made since March 12, 1974 and May 13,
1974, respectively, and that his third petition was ordered expunged
from the records, i.e. stricken from the records and therefore
considered non-existent. Respondent's interjection of the same
irrelevant matter here denotes either a stubborn refusal to comprehend
or abide by the Court's injunction that he cannot be filing one petition
after another for the same cause or worse a deliberate attempt to drag
out the case and impede the execution of the judgment of conviction
against his client which had become final and executory since August
15, 1973, date of finality of the Court of Appeals' decision of June 8,
1973 affirming the conviction. Such misconduct on the part of a
member of the bar cannot be tolerated.
The Court thus finds that respondent was grossly negligent, to
say the least, in failing to comply within the required period with the
Court's Resolution requiring him to show cause why disciplinary action
should not be taken against him for filing multiple petitions for the same
cause notwithstanding the Court's previous adverse resolutions. His
original period to file the required explanation expired on January 3,
1975 and more than a month elapsed thereafter without his having
done anything until the Court took note thereof on February 7, 1975
and
ordered his suspension. As already indicated, the Court also finds
respondent's explanation for his having filed multiple petitions one after
the other to be unsatisfactory and untenable.
Considering, however, that respondent has been under
suspension since the Court's Resolution of February 7, 1975, since
after respondent filed his belated compliance, the Court as per its
Resolution of April 21, 1975 ordered that respondent remain under
suspension until it could hear the matter on the merits, the Court is
inclined to view with liberality respondent's plea that "he has been
sufficiently punished" and that "his suspension ... is substantial enough
as to make him improve his professional service to his client and duties
to the bench ..." The Court will thus consider the suspension so far
served by respondent as sufficient penalty for the serious infractions
committed by him..
ACCORDINGLY, respondent's suspension from the practice of
law is lifted effective as of the promulgation of this Resolution with the
warning that the commission in the future by respondent of the same

infractions or other violations of his duties as a lawyer shall be dealt

with severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be circularized to all the courts and
entered in respondent's personal record.

G.R. No. L-26694 December 18, 1973

NELITA MORENO VDA. DE BACALING, petitioner, vs.
HECTOR LAGUNA, HON. VALERION ROVIRA, Judge,
Court of First Instance and HON. JUDGE ROSENDO
BALTAZAR, Judge, City Court of Iloilo, respondents.
Nicanor D. Sorongon for petitioner.
Apeles L. Padilla for respondents.
ESGUERRA, J.:
I.
Nature of the Case
The petitioner seeks a writ of certiorari with preliminary injunction
to annul an Order of Hon. Rosendo Baltazar, as Judge of the City
Court of Iloilo, dated June 30, 1966, ordering the demolition of the
residential house of petitioner. 1 Assailed likewise is an Order, dated
August 25, 1966, of Hon. Valerio V. Rovira, as Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Iloilo, stationed at Iloilo City, approving said
demolition. 2
II.
Facts of the Case
The record of this case discloses the following facts:
Private respondent Hector Laguda is the registered owner of a
residential land known as lot No. 3508 situated at La Paz, Iloilo City 3
many years back, petitioner and her late husband, Dr. Ramon
Bacaling, with the acquiescence of private respondent Laguda,
constructed a residential house on a portion of said lot fronting
Huevana Street, paying a monthly rental of P80.00. 4 Unable to pay
the lease rental from July 1959 to September 1961, totalling
P2,160.00, an action for ejectment (Civil Case No. 6823) was filed by
private respondent Laguda against petitioner in her capacity as judicial
administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Dr. Bacaling, in the
City Court of Iloilo City. 5 The filing of said case spawned various court
suits.
Petitioner on July 23, 1962, filed certiorari proceedings in this
Court (G.R. No. L-20061) but was dismissed for lack of merit on
August 3, 1962. 6 With this setback, petitioner on November 12, 1962,
filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo a petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 6162) but the same was
dismissed on December 1, 1962. 7 Unsuccessful in her motion for
reconsideration, petitioner went to the Court of Appeals by way of
certiorari (CA-G.R. No. 31882-R) but her petition was dismissed by
that Court on March 7, 1967. 8
Suffering from these series of legal reverses, the petitioner
entered into a compromise agreement on July 29, 1964, with private
respondent Laguda relative to Civil Case No. 6823. 9 Said agreement
inter alia, provides as follows:
1. Defendant (petitioner herein) agreed to vacate the premises
and remove ... the residential house therefrom ... before December 31,
1966;
2. For the use and occupation ... of the said premises ... from
June 1964 to December 31, 1969, the said defendant will pay plaintiff a
monthly rent ... of Eighty (P80.00) Pesos per calendar month ...;
3. Upon failure of defendant to comply with any ... provision of the
amicable settlement within ... fifty (50) days ... the plaintiff shall be
entitled to "immediate execution to restore plaintiff in possession of the
premises and to recover all the unpaid monthly rents from June 1,
1964 until said premises are vacated" by defendant;
4. Defendant "waive her right, under Sec. 6, Rule 39, Rules of
Court, to bar enforcement of the execution of the judgment in the case
at anytime within one year from December 31, 1969".
In a decision dated July 30, 1964, the City Court of Iloilo City
approved the amicable settlement and enjoined the parties to comply
with its terms. For failure of the petitioner to satisfy the conditions of
the settlement within the 50-day period, private respondent Laguda
moved for execution which the Court granted on July 7, 1965. 10

Page 17 of 24

LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

On July 14, 1965, petitioner moved for reconsideration to quash

the writ of execution, but before the Court could resolve the motion,
petitioner on July 19, 1965, served notice of her intention to take the
case to the Court of Appeals. 11 Meanwhile on July 23, 1965,
respondent Laguda filed an opposition to the petitioner's July 14, 1965,
motion, alleging that as judicial administratrix as of July 29, 1964, she
was legally authorized to enter into the amicable settlement which was
the basis of the decision dated July 30, 1964, of the City Court of Iloilo
sought to be executed and, therefore, her act was binding upon the
present judicial administrator, Atty. Roberto Dineros, who replaced
petitioner upon her discharge as such on November 28, 1964. 12
Denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration and to quash
writ of execution on September 30, 1965, the City Court however, held
in abeyance the enforcement of the alias writ of execution until the
Court of First Instance of Iloilo stamped its imprimatur considering the
pendency of Special Proceedings No. 1469 and of the fact that the
properties involved therein are in custodia legis. 13 Thereafter, on
October 25, 1965, private respondent Laguda moved the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 1469 for the approval of
the City Court's order of execution which was granted despite
petitioner's opposition. 14 With the denial of petitioner's motion for
reconsideration on December 4, 1965, a petition for certiorari with
preliminary injunction was brought before the Court of Appeals (CAG.R. No. 36939-R) which dismissed the same on January 18, 1966. 15
On April 14, 1966, the respondent City Judge of Iloilo City issued
an alias writ of execution upon representations of private respondent
Laguda, copies of which were served sheriff upon the petitioner and
Atty. Roberto Dineros in his capacity as judicial administrator of the
estate of the deceased, Dr. Ramon Bacaling, in Special Proceedings
No. 1469. 16
On June 30, 1966, a Special Order of Demolition was issued by
the respondent City Judge upon motion of private respondent Laguda
and over petitioner's opposition, subject, however, to the approval of
the Court of First Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 1469. 17
Upon the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, respondent
Laguda on July 12, 1966, filed a manifestation in the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo in Special Proceedings No. 1469, praying for the
confirmation of the Order to demolish the house under custodia legis.
18
On August 4, 1966, petitioner interposed an opposition alleging:
1. That she was no longer in control of the estate funds when the
stipulated obligations in the amicable settlement became due and
payable;
2. That the residential house to be demolished is worth
P35,000.00 for which she is entitled to reimbursement as a builder in
good faith, in addition to reasonable expenses they may incur in
transferring the same to another place; and
3. That the guardian ad litem of the minor children was not
notified of the motion for the issuance of an order of demolition; 19
On August 25, 1966, respondent Laguda by way of reply disputed
petitioner's claim and supported the legality of the court's ruling. 20 On
the same date, the probate court in Special Proceedings No. 1469
approved the order of demolition of the house in controversy. 21
Impugning the said Order as violative of the provisions of Sec. 14, Rule
39, of the Rules of Court, and of the constitutional mandate on due
process, petitioner moved to reconsider the same but the motion was
denied by the Court on September 26, 1966. 22 Frustrated in her effort
to set aside the Order of Demolition, petitioner brought this present
action of certiorari with preliminary injunction. Upon giving due course
to the petition, this Court issued a temporary restraining order on
October 21, 1966, to prevent the enforcement of the order of
demolition in Special Proceedings No. 1469 of the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo, but when served upon the respondents, the building
in question was already partially demolished. 23 Upon petitioner's
posting a bond of P1,000.00, this Court on November 10, 1966, issued
a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the herein respondents from
proceeding with the order of demolition, until further orders. 24
III.
Issues of the Case
The issues raised in the instant petition boil down to the following:
1. Whether or not the acts of the petitioner as judicial
administratrix prior to her discharge or removal are valid and binding
upon her successor;
2. Whether or not petitioner is a builder in good faith and,
therefore, entitled to reimbursement, and/or reasonable expenses that
may be incurred in transferring the house to another place;
3. Whether or not due process was denied to the minor children of
deceased Ramon Bacaling, and petitioner in connection with the
motion for the issuance of the order of demolition.
IV.

Discussion
Petitioner claims before this Court that since she was no longer
the judicial administratrix of the estate of her late husband, Dr. Ramon
Bacaling, and was no longer in control of estate funds when the
stipulated obligations in the amicable settlement became due and
payable, the special order of demolition could not be enforced.
Such a view is not tenable. Under Section 3, Rule 82 of the Rules
of Court, petitioner's lawful acts before the revocation of her letters of
administration or before her removal shall have the same validity as if
there was no such revocation or removal. It is elementary that the
effect of revocation of letters testamentary or of administration is to
terminate the authority of the executor or administrator, but the acts of
the executor or administrator, done in good faith prior to the revocation
of the letters, will be protected, and a similar protection will be
extended to rights acquired under a previous grant of administration.
25
In connection with the petitioner's contention that she be
considered a builder in good faith and, therefore, entitled to
reimbursement in addition to reasonable expenses that may be
incurred in transferring the house to another place, the same cannot
stand legal scrutiny. The rule is well-settled that lessees, like petitioner,
are not possessors in good faith, because they knew that their
occupancy of the premises continues only during the life of the lease,
and they cannot as a matter of right, recover the value of their
improvements from the lessor, much less retain the premises until they
are reimbursed. Their rights are governed by Article 1678 of the Civil
Code which allows reimbursement of lessees up to one-half of the
value of their improvements if the lessor so elects. 26
It is next urged by petitioner that there was a denial of process for
failure of private respondent to notify the guardian ad litem of the minor
children of the deceased Ramon Bacaling, of the motion for execution.
A perusal of the pleadings yields the conclusion that petitioner
failed to meet the burden of demonstrating that there was denial of due
process. On the contrary, there is evidence to show that Acting Fiscal
Alfonso Illemberger guardian ad litem of the minor children of the late
Ramon Bacaling, has been duly apprised of the issuance of the
assailed special order to demolish, as shown by the certification of the
counsel for petitioner at the foot of his opposition dated August 4,
1966, 27 filed with the Court of First Instance of Iloilo, and as also
shown by the certification of private respondent's counsel at the foot of
his opposition dated September 15, 1966, 28 likewise filed with the
same Court.
V.
Conclusion
The petitioner is not entitled to the writ of certiorari. In the case at
bar, there is absolutely no showing that the respondent courts acted so
"arbitrarily", "despotically" or "capriciously" as to amount to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders.
"Grave abuse of discretion" which is a ground for certiorari means
"such capricious and arbitrary exercise of judgment as is equivalent, in
the eyes of the law, to lack of jurisdiction." 29 Even mere abuse of
discretion is not sufficient by itself to justify the issuance of a writ of
certiorari. For that purpose the abuse of discretion must be grave and
patent, and it must be shown that it was exercised arbitrarily or
despotically, which is not the case made out by the present petition. 30
There is something more to be said about the nature and
apparent purpose of this case which has its genesis in the case for
illegal detainer (Civil Case No. 6823) brought before the Iloilo City
Court. What transpired therein presents a glaring example of a
summary proceeding which was deliberately protracted and made to
suffer undue delay in its disposal. It was originally filed on September
13, 1960; 31 it reached the appellate courts five (5) times, twice before
the Court of Appeals 32, Once before the Court of First Instance of
Iloilo 33, and twice before this Court. 34 The present petition smacks of
a dilatory tactic and a frivolous attempt resorted to by petitioner to
frustrate the prompt termination of the ejectment case and to prolong
litigation unnecessarily. Such conduct on the part of petitioner and her
counsel deserves the vigorous condemnation of this Court, 35 because
it evinces a flagrant misuse of the remedy of certiorari which should
only be resorted to in case of lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion by a inferior court. A recourse of this kind unduly taxes the
energy and patience of courts and simply wastes the precious time that
they could well devote to really meritorious cases.
VI.
Judgment
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the
instant petition should be, as it is hereby, dismissed.
The writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court on
November 10, 1966, is immediately set aside. 36
Treble costs against the petitioner for the reasons above set forth.

Page 18 of 24

LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

ADM. CASE No. 7006 October 9, 2007

RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO,
FORMER SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the events of the
proceedings in Crim. Case No. 5144, entitled People v. Luis Bucalon
Plaza, heard before the sala of Presiding Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan,
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch 29.
Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge
Floripinas C. Buyser, RTC of Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order
dated March 14, 2002, Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to the
Evidence of the accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented
by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and
not the charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense
filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio
Z. Bagabuyo, then Senior State Prosecutor and the deputized
prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground that the
original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was not
subject to bail under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.1
In an Order dated August 30, 2002,2 Judge Buyser inhibited
himself from further trying the case because of the "harsh insinuation"
of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo that he "lacks the cold
neutrality of an impartial magistrate," by allegedly suggesting the filing
of the motion to fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.
The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao
City, presided by Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan. In an Order dated
November 12, 2002, Judge Tan favorably resolved the Motion to Fix
the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of the bond at P40,000.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated
November 12, 2002, which motion was denied for lack of merit in an
Order dated February 10, 2003. In October, 2003, respondent
appealed from the Orders dated November 12, 2002 and February 10,
2003, to the Court of Appeals (CA).
Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent
caused the publication of an article regarding the Order granting bail to
the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star
Daily. The article, entitled "Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge
for allowing murder suspect to bail out," reads:
SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge in Surigao City
for allowing a murder suspect to go out on bail.
Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge
Manuel Tan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29 based in
Surigao City for ruling on a motion that sought a bailbond for Luis
Plaza who stands charged with murdering a policeman . . . .
Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.
Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable
offense. But Bagabuyo admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a
murder suspect to bail out in cases when the evidence of the
prosecution is weak.
But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously
handled it, Judge F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the evidence to be
strong. B[uy]ser inhibited from the case for an unclear reason.
xxx
Bagabuyo said he would contest Tan's decision before the Court
of Appeals and would file criminal and administrative charges of
certiorari against the judge.
Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by
Judge Tan.
"This is the only way that the public would know that there are
judges there who are displaying judicial arrogance." he said.3
In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City,
Branch 29, directed respondent and the writer of the article, Mark
Francisco of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, to appear in court on
September 20, 2003 to explain why they should not be cited for indirect

contempt of court for the publication of the article which degraded the
court and its presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentation.
The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the
article, Judge Buyser described the evidence for the prosecution as not
strong, but sufficient to prove the guilt of the accused only for
homicide. Moreover, it was not true that Judge Buyser inhibited himself
from the case for an unclear reason. Judge Buyser, in an Order dated
August 30, 2002, declared in open court in the presence of respondent
that he was inhibiting himself from the case due to the harsh
insinuation of respondent that he lacked the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge.
On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark
Francisco admitted that the Mindanao Gold Star Daily caused the
publication of the article. He disclosed that respondent, in a press
conference, stated that the crime of murder is non-bailable. When
asked by the trial court why he printed such lies, Mr. Francisco
answered that his only source was respondent.4 Mr. Francisco clarified
that in the statement alleging that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from
the case for an unclear reason, the phrase "for an unclear reason,"
was added by the newspaper's Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez.5
Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press
conference, but refused to answer whether he made the statements in
the article until after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss. For his
refusal to answer, the trial court declared him in contempt of court
pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.6 The Court's Order
dated September 30, 2003 reads:
ORDER
Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a lie clothed
in half truth to give it a semblance of truth is hereby ordered to pay a
fine of P10,000. Prosecutor Bagabuyo, for obstinately refusing to
explain why he should not be cited for contempt and admitting that the
article published in the Mindanao Gold Star Daily on August 18, 2003
and quoted in the Order of this Court dated August 21, 2003 which is
contemptuous was caused by him to be published, is hereby adjudged
to have committed indirect
contempt of Court pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court and he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of 30 days in jail.
The BJMP is hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo
if he does not put up a bond of P100,000.00.
SO ORDERD.7
Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the
custody of the law. He appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA.
Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented
himself to the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again
attacked the integrity of Judge Tan and the trial court's disposition in
the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.
In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City,
Branch 29, required respondent to explain and to show cause within
five days from receipt thereof why he should not be held in contempt
for his media interviews that degraded the court and the presiding
judge, and why he should not be suspended from the practice of law
for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule
11.05 of Canon 118 and Rule 13.02 of Canon 13.9
In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed
by Jun Clergio, and that the interview was repeatedly aired on
September 30, 2003 and in his news program between 6:00 and 8:00
a.m. on October 1, 2003. He was also interviewed by Tony Consing on
October 1 and 2, 2003, between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in his radio
program. In those radio interviews, respondent allegedly called Judge
Tan a judge who does not know the law, a liar, and a dictator who does
not accord due process to the people.
The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on
December 4, 2003.
On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for
Extension of Time to File Answer to Contempt alleging that he was
saddled with work of equal importance and needed ample time to
answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of particulars in order to
properly prepare for his defense.
In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the
motion. It stated that a bill of particulars is not applicable in contempt
proceedings, and that respondent's actions and statements are
detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.
On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent
neither appeared in court nor informed the court of his absence. The
trial court issued an Order dated December 4, 2003 cancelling the
hearing "to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the chances he asks for," and
ordered him to appear on January 12, 2004 to explain in writing or
orally why he should not be cited in contempt of court pursuant to the
facts stated in the Order dated October 20, 2003. However, respondent
did not appear in the scheduled hearing of January 12, 2004.

Page 19 of 24

LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondent's

Answer dated January 8, 2004. Respondent denied the charge that he
sought to be interviewed by radio station DXKS. He, however, stated
that right after the hearing of September 30, 2003, he was approached
by someone who asked him to comment on the Order issued in open
court, and that his comment does not fall within the concept of indirect
contempt of court. He also admitted that he was interviewed by his
friend, Tony Consing, at the latter's instance. He justified his response
during the interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional right of
freedom of speech and that it was not meant to offend or malign, and
was without malice.
On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that Prosecutor
Bagabuyo has grossly violated the Canons of the legal profession and
[is] guilty of grave professional misconduct, rendering him unfit to
continue to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging
to the office of an attorney, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the
practice of law.
Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of court, for
which he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of IMPRISONMENT
for ninety (90) days to be served at the Surigao City Jail and to pay the
maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00). Future
acts of contempt will be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of the relevant records be immediately forwarded to
the Supreme Court for automatic review and for further determination
of grounds for [the] disbarment of Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo.10
The trial court found respondent's denials to be lame as the tape
of his interview on October 2, 2003, duly transcribed, showed
disrespect of the court and its officers, thus:
TONY CONSING: Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay
ang gamay'ng panahon ang samad sa imong kasingkasing nagpabilin
pa ba ni. O ingnon nato duna na bay pagbag-o sa imong huna-huna
karon?
(Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or have you not
changed your mind yet?)
BAGABUYO : Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling
pagbag-o ang pagsiguro, ang mga Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod
tangtangon pagka abogado, mao kana.
(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges
who are ignorant of the law should be disbarred. That's it.)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong
guibatonan karon nga hunahuna mahitungod nianang mga Huwes nga
dili kahibalo sa balaod, magkadugay magkalami. Kada adlao nagatoon
ako. Nagabasa ako sa mga bag-ong jurisprudence ug sa atong balaod
aron sa pagsiguro gayod nga inigsang-at unya nako sa kaso nga
disbarment niining di mahibalo nga Huwes, sigurado gayod ako nga
katangtangan siya sa lisensiya . . . . Ang kini nga Huwes nga dili
mahibalo sa balaod, pagatangtangon na, dili lamang sa pagka-Huwes
kon dili sa pagka-abogado. Tan-awa ra gyod kining iyang gibuhat nga
Order, Ton, ang iyang pagkabakakon . . . .
(That's true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges who
are ignorant of the law is made firmer by time. I study everyday. I read
new jurisprudence and the law to insure that when I file the disbarment
case against this Judge who does not know his law, I am certain that
he loses his license. . . . This judge who is ignorant of the law should
not only be removed as a judge but should also be disbarred. Just take
a look at his Order, Ton, and see what a liar he is . . . .)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order. . . . Ngano nga
nakaingon ako nga bakakon kini, nag-ingon nga kini konong order
given in open court, ang kalooy sa dios, ang iyang order sa Korte wala
siya mag-ingon ug kantidad nga P100,000.00 nga bail bond. . . .
(Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It
states that this Order was "given in open court," and in God's mercy,
he did not state the amount of P100,000.00 as bail bond. . . .)
BAGABUYO : Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ako
siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor, I have the right to appeal. Mibalik
dayon, ug miingon siya, BJMP arrest Bagabuyo.
(Because he does not know the law, I said, "Your Honor, I have
the right to appeal." Then he came back and said, "BJMP, arrest
Bagabuyo.")
xxx
BAGABUYO : . . . P100,000.00 ang iyang guipapiyansa.
Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo ang iyang pagka gross ignorance
of the law. . . .
(He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where
you will see his gross ignorance of the law. . . . )
xxx

TONY CONSING : So karon, unsay plano nimo karon?

(So what is your plan now?)
BAGABUYO : Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako
kon matangtang na siya sa pagka abogado. . . .
(As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero
angayan niyang hibaw-an nga ang trabajo sa Huwes dili ang pagtanaw kon ang tawo hambugero . . . . Ug ang akong gisulti mao lamang
ang balaod nga siya in fact at that time I said he is not conversant of
the law, with regards to the case of murder. . . .
(He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should
know that it is not for a judge to determine if a person is a
braggart. . . .And what I said was based on the law. In fact, at that time,
I said he is not conversant of the law, with regards to the case of
murder . . . .)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Ah, mi sit down sab ako, contempt ra ba kadto . . . .
Mao kana, pero unsa may iyang katuyoan ang iyang katuyoan nga
ipa-adto ako didto kay didto, iya akong pakauwawan kay iya kong
sikopon, iya kong ipa-priso, pero kay di man lagi mahibalo sa balaod,
ang iyang gui orderan BJMP, intawon por dios por Santo, Mr. Tan,
pagbasa intawon ug balaod, naunsa ka ba Mr. Tan? Unsa may imong
hunahuna nga kon ikaw Huwes, ikaw na ang diktador, no way, no sir,
ours is a democratic country where all and everyone is entitled to due
process of law you did not accord me due process of law . . . .
(I sat down. . . . That's it. But what was his purpose? He made me
come in order to humiliate me because he wanted me arrested, he
wanted me imprisoned, but because he is ignorant of the law, he
ordered the BMJP. For God's sake, Mr. Tan, what's wrong with you, Mr.
Tan? Please read the law. What is your thinking? That when you are a
judge, you are also a dictator? No way, no sir, ours is a democratic
country where all and everyone is entitled to due process of law you
did not accord me due process of law. . . .)
TONY CONSING: So mopasaka kang disbarment, malaumon kita
nga maaksiyonan kini, with all this problem sa Korte Suprema.
(So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that this be given
action with all the problems in the Supreme Court.)
BAGABUYO : Dili ako mabalaka niana kay usa ka truck ang
akong jurisprudence, nga ang mga Huwes nga di mahibalo sa balaod
pagatangtangon gayod sa ilang pagka Huwes. . . . Apan unsa man
intawon ang balaod ang iyang gibasa niini nadunggan ko nga kini kuno
siya madjongero, mao bitaw na, madjong ang iyang guitunan?
(I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence that
judges who are ignorant of the law must be removed from the Bench.
But what law has he been reading? I heard that he is a mahjong
aficionado (mahjongero) and that is why he is studying mahjong.11
The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar
and an officer of the court, is duty bound to uphold the dignity and
authority of the court, and should not promote distrust in the
administration of justice.
The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent
from the practice of law under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court12 for any of the causes mentioned in Sec. 2713 of the same
Rule. Respondent was given the opportunity to be heard, but he opted
to be silent. Thus, it held that the requirement of due process has been
duly satisfied.
In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29,14 Rule 138 and
Sec. 9,15 Rule 139 of the Rules of Court, the RTC of Surigao City,
Branch 29, transmitted to the Office of the Bar Confidant the Statement
of Facts of respondent's suspension from the practice of law, dated
July 14, 2005, together with the order of suspension and other relevant
documents.
In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar
Confidant found that the article in the August 18, 2003 issue of the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which maligned the integrity and
independence of the court and its officers, and respondent's criticism of
the trial court's Order dated November 12, 2002, which was aired in
radio station DXKS, both in connection with Crim. Case No. 5144,
constitute grave violation of oath of office by respondent. It stated that
the requirement of due process was complied with when respondent
was given an opportunity to be heard, but respondent chose to remain
silent.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation
of the trial court's order of suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one year, with a
stern warning that the repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with
more severely.
The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant. It has been reiterated in Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr.16 that:

Page 20 of 24

LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his

oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment
unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds enumerated in Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice; gross
misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude; any violation of the oath which he is required
to take before admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of
any lawful order of a superior court; corrupt or willful appearance as an
attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The grounds
are not preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover
practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits in his
professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no time be
wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions
precedent to his entrance to the Bar, but are likewise essential
demands for his continued membership therein.
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to
appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.17
Membership in the bar imposes upon them certain obligations.18
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a
lawyer to "observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others."
Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer "shall submit grievances
against a judge to the proper authorities only."
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly
caused the holding of a press conference where he made statements
against the Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in
Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that
Judge Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled,
Senior prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect
to bail out, which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the
Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondent's statements in the article,
which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court,
also violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that "a lawyer shall
not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case
tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party."
In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent
violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for not resorting to the proper authorities only for redress
of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon
11 for his disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that
Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he
was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a
liar.
Respondent also violated the Lawyer's Oath, as he has sworn to
"conduct [himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge
and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his]
clients."
As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent
should have set the example of observing and maintaining the respect
due to the courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo v. Gica19 held:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a
respectful attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the
dignity and authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to
the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability
of our democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be
resting on a very shaky foundation.
The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring
judges but the rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure
for doing so, precisely because respect for the institution must always
be maintained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z.
Bagabuyo is found guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule
13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and of
violating the Lawyer's Oath, for which he is SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for one (1) year effective upon finality of this Decision,
with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall
be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar
Confidant to be appended to respondent's personal record as an
attorney, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Department of
Justice, and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Footnotes
1 Sec. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception.-- All persons in custody
shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right x x x (b) before conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

2 Rollo, p. 45.
3 Id. at 101.
4 Id. at 115.
5 Id. at 114-115.
6 Sec. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity
given to the respondent to comment thereon within such period as may
be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person
guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
xxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice.
7 Rollo, p. 126.
8 CANON 11 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN
THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL
OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY
OTHERS
xxx
Rule 11.05. A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to
the proper authorities only.
9 CANON 13 A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS
OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH
TENDS TO INFLUENCE OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF
INFLUENCING THE COURT
xxx
Rule 13.02. A lawyer shall not make public statements in the
media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or
against a party.
10 Rollo, pp. 153-154.
11 RTC Order, February 8, 2004, Rollo, pp. 144-147. Emphasis
supplied.
12 Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a
Regional Trial Court. -- The Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court
may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named in
the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney
shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme
Court in the premises.
13 Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme
Court, grounds therefor.-- A member of the Bar may be disbarred or
suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or
for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; corrupt
or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice.
14 Sec. 29. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Regional
Trial Court, further proceedings in Supreme Court. Upon such
suspension, the Court of Appeals or the Regional Trial Court shall
forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of
suspension and a full statement of the facts upon which the same was
based. Upon the receipt of such certified copy and statement, the
Supreme Court shall make full investigation of the facts involved and
make such order revoking or extending the suspension, or removing
the attorney from his office as such, as the facts warrant.
15 Sec. 9. Procedure in Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court.
As far as may be applicable, the procedure above outlined shall
likewise govern the filing and investigation of complaints against
attorneys in the Court of Appeals or in Regional Trial Court. In case of
suspension of the respondent, the judge of [the] Regional Trial Court or
Justice of the Court of Appeals shall forthwith transmit to the Supreme
Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of
the facts upon which [the] same is based.

A.C. No. 7199 July 22, 2009 [Formerly CBD 04-1386]

FOODSPHERE, INC., Complainant, vs. ATTY. MELANIO L.
MAURICIO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the
business of meat processing and manufacture and distribution of
canned goods and grocery products under the brand name "CDO,"
filed a Verified Complaint1 for disbarment before the Commission on

Page 21 of 24

LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)

against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as "Batas
Mauricio" (respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids including Balitang
Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!, and a host of a
television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and
of a radio program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB, for
(1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyers oath and (3)
disrespect to the courts and to investigating prosecutors.
The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero)
purportedly bought from a grocery in Valenzuela City canned goods
including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as Cordero
and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they
found the spread to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms
inside the can.
Corderos wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and
Drug Administration (BFAD). Laboratory examination confirmed the
presence of parasites in the Liver spread.
Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series
of 1993, the BFAD conducted a conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004
during which the spouses Cordero demanded P150,000 as damages
from complainant. Complainant refused to heed the demand, however,
as being in contravention of company policy and, in any event,
"outrageous."
Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and
incidental expenses incurred by the Corderos as long as they were
supported by receipts, but the offer was turned down. And the
Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the media.
Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to
the complaint. In the meantime or on August 6, 2004, respondent sent
complainant via fax a copy of the front page of the would-be August
10-16, 2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No. 122
which complainant found to contain articles maligning, discrediting and
imputing vices and defects to it and its products. Respondent
threatened to publish the articles unless complainant gave in to the
P150,000 demand of the Corderos. Complainant thereupon reiterated
its counter-offer earlier conveyed to the Corderos, but respondent
turned it down.
Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000,
P15,000 of which would go to the Corderos and P35,000 to his Batas
Foundation. And respondent directed complainant to place paid
advertisements in the tabloids and television program.
The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN3 seeking the
withdrawal of their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus
dismissed the complaint.4 Respondent, who affixed his signature to
the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his
articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the document.
On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising
Contract5 asking complainant to advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas
BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues at P15,000 per issue or a total
amount of P360,000, and a Program Profile6 of the television program
KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS also asking complainant to place spot
advertisements with the following rate cards: (a) spot buy 15-second
TVC at P4,000; (b) spot buy 30-second TVC at P7,700; and (c) season
buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30-second TVC for P130,000.
As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page
advertisements in the tabloid amounting to P45,000 at P15,000 per
advertisement, and three spots of 30-second TVC in the television
program at P7,700 each or a total of P23,100. Acting on complainants
offer, respondent relayed to it that he and his Executive Producer were
disappointed with the offer and threatened to proceed with the
publication of the articles/columns.7
On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double BBatas ng Bayan at radio station DZBB, announced the holding of a
supposed contest sponsored by said program, which announcement
was transcribed as follows:
"OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha,
meron pa-contest si Batas Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung
ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa telepono, 433-7549 at
433-7553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito
muna ang contest, o, aling liver spread ang may uod? Yan kita ninyo
yan, ayan malalaman ninyo yan. Pagka-nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot
kayo sa akin, aling liver spread ang may uod at anong companya ang
gumagawa nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549 st 433-7553. Open po
an[g] contest na ito sa lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang
mananalo, kung tama ang inyong sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver spread
sa Pilipinas an[g] may uod? 8 (Emphasis and italics in the original;
underscoring supplied)
And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which
put complainant in bad light. Thus, in the August 31- September 6,

2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an article captioned

"KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD!" In another article, he wrote "IBA
PANG PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN!"9 which appeared in the same
publication in its September 7-13, 2004 issue. And still in the same
publication, its September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote another article
entitled "DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO."10
Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his
column LAGING HANDA published in another tabloid, BAGONG
TIKTIK, with the following articles:11 (a) "Uod sa liver spread,"
Setyembre 6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.276);12 (b) "Uod, itinanggi ng CDO,"
Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.277);13 (c) "Pagpapatigil sa CDO,"
Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278);14 (d) "Uod sa liver spread
kumpirmado," Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.279);15 (e) "Salaysay
ng nakakain ng uod," Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.280);16 (f)
"Kaso VS. CDO itinuloy," Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.281);17 (g)
"Kasong Kidnapping laban sa CDO guards," Setyembre 14, 2004
(Taon 7, Blg.284);18 (h) "Brutalidad ng CDO guards," Setyembre 15,
2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285);19 (i) "CDO guards pinababanatan sa PNP,"
Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.287);20 (j) "May uod na CDO liver
spread sa Puregold binili," Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.288);21
(k) "Desperado na ang CDO," Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7,
Blg.290);22 (l) "Atty. Rufus Rodriguez pumadrino sa CDO," Setyembre
21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291);23 (m) "Kasunduan ng CDO at Pamilya
Cordero," Setyembre 22, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 292);24 (n) "Bakit
nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO," Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg.
293).25
In his September 8, 2004 column "Anggulo ng Batas" published in
Hataw!, respondent wrote an article "Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO
Liver Spread."26
And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his
television program Kakampi Mo ang Batas aired over UNTV,
repeatedly complained of what complainant claimed to be the "same
baseless and malicious allegations/issues" against it.27
Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent
and several others for Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel under
Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The
complaints were pending at he time of the filing of the present
administrative complaint.28
In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933,
respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to
Elevate These Cases to the Department of Justice,29 alleging:
xxxx
2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???)
Prosecutors of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City?
xxxx
2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed
around, waiting for miracles to happen?
2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before
this Office would ever act on his complaint?
xxxx
8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed
by Villarez, and with an investigating prosecutor virtually kowtowing to
the wishes of his boss, the Chief Prosecutor, can Respondents expect
justice to be meted to them?
9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe
that justice would elude them in this Office of the City Prosecutor of
Valenzuela City, not because of the injustice of their cause, but, more
importantly, because of the injustice of the system;
10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office
in Valenzuela City had been the willing recipient of too many
generosities in the past of the Complainant, and also with reports that
a top official of the City had campaigned for his much coveted position
in the past distributing products of the Complainant, what would one
expect the Respondents to think?
11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and
behavior displayed even by mere staff and underlings of this Office to
people who dare complain against the Complainant in their respective
turfs. Perhaps, top officials of this Office should investigate and ask
their associates
and relatives incognito to file, even if on a pakunwari basis only,
complaints against the Complainant, and they would surely be given
the same rough and insulting treatment that Respondent Villarez got
when he filed his kidnapping charge here;30
And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction31
which respondent filed, as counsel for his therein co-respondentsstaffers of the newspaper Hataw!, before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent alleged:
xxxx

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LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of

whatever is inside their thick skulls, they would have clearly deduced
that this Office has no jurisdiction over this action.32 (Emphasis
supplied)
xxxx
Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case
against respondent and several others, docketed as Civil Case No.
249-V-04,33 before the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City and
raffled to Branch 75 thereof.
The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo
order notwithstanding, respondent continued to publish articles against
complainant34 and to malign complainant through his television
shows.
Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating
Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) came up
with the following findings in his October 5, 2005 Report and
Recommendation:35
I.
xxxx
In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled "Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty.
[Melanio] Mauricio, et al.", the Order dated 10 December 2004 (Annex
O of the Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge Dionisio C. Sison
which in part reads:
"Anent the plaintiffs prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order included in the instant plaintiffs motion, this Court,
inasmuch as the defendants failed to appear in court or file an
opposition thereto, is constrained to GRANT the said plaintiffs prater,
as it is GRANTED, in order to maintain STATUS QUO, and that all the
defendants, their agents, representatives or any person acting for and
in behalf are hereby restrained/enjoined from further publishing,
televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in
the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or
defects on plaintiff and its products."
Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on
respondent by the Branch Sheriff on 13 December 2004. Respondent
has not denied the issuance of the Order dated 10 December 2004 or
his receipt of a copy thereof on 13 December 2004.
Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and
the clear directive therein addressed to him to desists [sic] from "further
publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the
Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices
and/or defects on plaintiff and its products", respondent in clear
defiance of this Order came out with articles on the prohibited subject
matter in his column "Atty. Batas", 2004 in the December 16 and 17,
2004 issues of the tabloid "Balitang Bayan Toro" (Annexes Q and Q-1
of the Complaint).
The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule
13.03 of the Canon of Professional Responsibility which reads: "A
lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a
pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party."
II.
xxxx
In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent filed his "Entry of
Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases To the
Department of Justice". In said pleading, respondent made the
following statements:
xxxx
The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts
aspersions on the integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all
the Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent clearly
assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling
cases filed before it and did not even design to submit any evidence to
substantiate said wild allegations. The use by respondent of the abovequoted language in his pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: "A lawyer
[s]hall [o]bserve and [m]aintain [t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts
[a]nd [t]o [j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd [s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct
[b]y [o]thers."
III.
The "Kasunduan" entered into by the Spouses Cordero and
herein complainant (Annex C of the Complaint) was admittedly
prepared, witnessed and signed by herein respondent.
xxxx
In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs
recognized that the said "Kasunduan" was not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order and policy, and this accordingly dismissed
the complaint filed by the Spouses Cordero against herein
complainant.

However, even after the execution of the "Kasunduan" and the

consequent dismissal of the complaint of his clients against herein
complainant, respondent inexplicably launched a media offensive
intended to disparage and put to ridicule herein complainant. On
record are the numerous articles of respondent published in 3 tabloids
commencing from 31 August to 17 December 2004 (Annexes G to Q1). As already above-stated, respondent continued to come out with
these articles against complainant in his tabloid columns despite a
temporary restraining order issued against him expressly prohibiting
such actions. Respondent did not deny that he indeed wrote said
articles and submitted them for publication in the tabloids.
Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public
service, that is, to expose the defects of complainants products to the
consuming public. Complainant claims that there is a baser motive to
the actions of respondent. Complainant avers that respondent
retaliated for complainants failure to give in to respondents "request"
that complainant advertise in the tabloids and television programs of
respondent. Complainants explanation is more credible. Nevertheless,
whatever the true motive of respondent for his barrage of articles
against complainant does not detract from the fact that respondent
consciously violated the spirit behind the "Kasunduan" which he
himself prepared and signed and submitted to the BFAD for approval.
Respondent was less than forthright when he prepared said
"Kasunduan" and then turned around and proceeded to lambaste
complainant for what was supposedly already settled in said
agreement. Complainant would have been better of with the BFAD
case proceeding as it could have defended itself against the charges of
the Spouses Cordero. Complainant was helpless against the attacks of
respondent, a media personality. The actuations of respondent
constituted, to say the least, deceitful conduct contemplated under
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.36
(Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114
dated March 20, 2006, adopted the findings and recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner to suspend respondent from the
practice of law for two years.
The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken.
The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the
necessity for every lawyer to act and comport himself in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession,37
which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper
conduct of a member of the bar.
By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain
from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia,
taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest
to obtain funds for
his Batas Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements
for the tabloids and his television program.
He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which mandates:
A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding
a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the
issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing,
televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of
CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and
its products. At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to
"uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for law and legal processes." For he defied said status quo
order, despite his (respondents) oath as a member of the legal
profession to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities."
Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility which mandate, viz:
CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness
and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper, by using
intemperate language.
Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong:38
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has
tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their
duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor
and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and
abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for

Page 23 of 24

LEGETH- CANONS 10-13

one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,

illuminating but not offensive.1awphi1
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar
to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact
prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party or witness, unless
required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In
keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language
even in his pleadings must be dignified.39 (Underscoring supplied)
By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting
standards of the legal profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
directs a lawyer to "at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity
of the legal profession."401avvph!1
The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot
be underestimated. In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr.,41 the therein
complainant engaged therein-herein respondents services as "she
was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of
respondent, a media personality,"42 only to later find out that after he
demanded and the therein complainant paid an exorbitant fee, no
action was taken nor any pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was
suspended for six months.

On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention

listening to him over the radio and watching him on television, it cannot
be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent, have affected the
sales of complainant.
Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondents
motion for reconsideration, took note of the fact that respondent was
motivated by vindictiveness when he filed falsification charges against
the therein complainant.43
To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law
for three years is, in the premises, sufficient.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the
lawyers oath and breach of ethics of the legal profession as embodied
in the Code of Professional Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the
practice of law for three years effective upon his receipt of this
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will
be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and
copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts.
SO ORDERED.

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LEGETH- CANONS 10-13