WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner, vs. MARIA CARMEN D.

RODRIGUEZ,
HON.
JUDGE
JOSEFINA
GUEVARASALONGA, Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149,
respondents.
G.R. No. 142820 | June 20, 2003 (2D)
Facts:

December 11, 1980 Petitioner, a citizen and resident

of Germany, married private respondent, a Filipina, in
Hamburg, Germany.
Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February
14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.
August 28, 1996: Private respondent filed a petition
for declaration of nullity of marriage before the RTC
of Makati City. Petitioners MTD, even on MR and
certiorari, was denied.
December 16, 1997: Petitioner obtained a decree of
divorce from the Court of First Instance of HamburgBlankenese, with the custody of their children
granted to Petitioner
May 20, 1999: Petitioner filed a Second MTD on the
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action or suit as a decree of
divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the
marriage of petitioner and private respondent.
July 14, 1999: Respondent Judge granted the MTD.
Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed
for the purpose of determining the issues of custody
of children and the distribution of the properties
between petitioner and private respondent.
September 30, 1999: Respondent judge issued the
assailed order partially setting aside her order dated
July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of
property relations of the spouses as well as support
and custody of their children.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence this petition.

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a

judgment of a tribunal of a foreign country, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the
judgment is conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment
is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties
and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but
the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.

Issue: W/N respondent judge gravely abused her discretion

when she assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present
case despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a
divorce decree from a German court
Held: NO
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera: SC specifically recognized the
validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in
his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. A
foreign divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our
civil law on the status of persons.
In this case, the divorce decree issued by the
German court dated December 16, 1997 has not
been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save
for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court
recognized said decree to be valid and binding,
thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to
remarry.
o
Thus, the present controversy mainly relates
to the award of the custody of their two
children, Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine,
to petitioner.
GR: Divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other
countries are recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the
legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and
support of the children, must still be determined by
our courts.
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata
to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody
to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown
that the parties opposed to the judgment had been
given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed
under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now
Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to
wit:

It is essential that there should be an

opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment,
in order for the court in this jurisdiction to
properly determine its efficacy.
In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide
that with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment
merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the
justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is
subject to proof to the contrary.
In the present case, it cannot be said that private
respondent was given the opportunity to challenge
the judgment of the German court so that there is
basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with
regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental
custody of their two children.
o
The proceedings in the German court were
summary.
o
The divorce decree itself states that neither
has private respondent commented on the
proceedings nor has she given her opinion
to the Social Services Office.
o
Unlike petitioner who was represented by
two lawyers, private respondent had no
counsel to assist her in said proceedings.
o
Divorce judgment was issued to petitioner
by virtue of the German Civil Code provision
to the effect that when a couple lived
separately for three years, the marriage is
deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree
did not touch on the issue as to who the
offending spouse was.
Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to
obtain custody of the children, the trial court was
correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine
the issue of parental custody, care, support and
education mindful of the best interests of the
children.
o
This is in consonance with the provision in
the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the
childs welfare is always the paramount
consideration in all questions concerning his
care and custody.
On the matter of property relations, petitioner
asserts that public respondent exceeded the bounds
of her jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of
the issue concerning property relations between
petitioner and private respondent.
o
Private respondent herself has admitted in
Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage dated August 26, 1996
filed with the RTC of Makati, subject of this
case, that: "petitioner and respondent have
not acquired any conjugal or community
property nor have they incurred any debts
during their marriage."
o
Herein petitioner did not contest this
averment. Basic is the rule that a court shall
grant relief warranted by the allegations and
the proof.

Given the factual admission by the parties in

their pleadings that there is no property to
be accounted for, respondent judge has no
basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to
resolve a matter no longer deemed in
controversy.

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE
MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.
G.R. No. 155635 | November 7, 2008
x-------------------------------------------x
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.
G.R. No. 163979 | November 7, 2008 (2D)
Facts:

Petitioner, an American citizen born in Agaa, Guam,

USA, married respondent on April 20, 1979 in
Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills, Mandaluyong City.
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California,
Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra.
Petitioner, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce
proceedings in the Dominican Republic.
February 22, 1996: Court of Dominican Republic
issued a Civil decree ordering the dissolution of the
couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after
completing the legal requirements," but giving them
joint custody and guardianship over Alix.
Over a year later, the same court would issue
another Civil Decree, settling the couple's property
relations pursuant to an Agreement they executed on
December 14, 1996.
March 21, 2001: Rebecca filed another petition
before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of
Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity. She also
sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of
gains with application for support pendente lite for
her and Alix.
Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on, inter alia, the
grounds of lack of cause of action and that the
petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.
To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an
opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as
affirmed by the DOJ, and that, therefore, there is no
valid divorce to speak of.
RTC: Denied MTD
o
The divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as
bar to the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of
defense best taken up during actual trial.
o
As to the grant of support pendente lite, the
trial court held that a mere allegation of
adultery against Rebecca does not operate
to preclude her from receiving legal support.
CA: Reversed RTCs decision and granted a writ of
preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent
staving off the trial court's grant of support pendente
lite to Rebecca.
o
Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this
jurisdiction to have her marriage with
Vicente declared void, the union having
previously been dissolved on February 22,
1996 by the foreign divorce decree she
personally secured as an American citizen.
Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored
Vicente's capacity to contract another
marriage.

Issue: W/N petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time

the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican
Republic, rendering the judgment of divorce as invalid

Held: No
Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case
The
following
are
compelling
circumstances
indicative of her American citizenship:
o
she was born in Agaa, Guam, USA;
o
the principle of jus soli is followed in this
American
territory
granting
American
citizenship to those who are born there; and
o
she was, and may still be, a holder of an
American passport
As aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently
professed, asserted, and represented herself as an
American citizen, particularly:
o
during her marriage as shown in the
marriage certificate;
o
in the birth certificate of Alix; and
o
when she secured the divorce from the
Dominican Republic.
o
Mention may be made of the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment in which she stated being
an American citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau
of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID)
Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport.
o
However, such recognition was given only
on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the
Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's recognition
pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued
by Bureau Associate Commissioner
Validity of Divorce Decree: Civil Decrees issued by the
Dominican court are valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated,
Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for
argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a
Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public
documents as an American citizen. At the very least,
she chose, before, during, and shortly after her
divorce, her American citizenship to govern her
marital relationship.
Second, she secured personally said divorce as an
American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil
Decrees
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound
by the national laws of the United States of America,
a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property
relations of Vicente and Rebecca were properly
adjudicated through their Agreement executed on
December 14, 1996.
Garcia v. Recio: A foreign divorce can be recognized
here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact
and as valid under the national law of the alien
spouse.
o
Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was
clearly an American citizen when she
secured the divorce and that divorce is
recognized and allowed in any of the States
of the Union, the presentation of a copy of
foreign divorce decree duly authenticated
by the foreign court issuing said decree is,
as here, sufficient.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly
recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8,
2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of
the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will
not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the
foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American
citizen on February 22, 1996.
o
In determining whether or not a divorce
secured abroad would come within the pale
of the country's policy against absolute
divorce, the reckoning point is the
citizenship of the parties at the time a valid
divorce is obtained.


Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by
Rebecca, the same shall be given a res judicata
effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the
divorce decree obtained, the marital vinculum
between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed;
they are both freed from the bond of matrimony.
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage,
Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's
obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for
instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.
The divorce decree in question also brings into play
the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Code,
providing as follows:
Art. 26. x x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As
amended by E.O. 227)

Republic v. Orbecido III: Twin elements for the

applicability of the second paragraph of Art.
26:
o
There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
o
A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need
not belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente
and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and
their professed citizenship during the valid divorce
proceedings.

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 145226 | February 06, 2004 (2D)
Facts:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were

boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at
Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol.
August 30, 1990: Both agreed to get married at the
Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
September 8, 1990: Lucia reported back to her work
in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
August 19, 1991: Lucia filed with the Ontario Court
(General Division) a petition for divorce against
appellant which was granted by the court on January
17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
October 4, 1992: Appellant Lucio Morigo married
Maria Jececha Lumbago at the Virgen sa Barangay
Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
September 21, 1993: Accused filed a complaint for
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage on the
ground that no marriage ceremony actually took
place between him and Lucia, docketed as Civil Case
No. 6020

October 19, 1993: Appellant was charged with

Bigamy in an Information filed by the City Prosecutor
of Tagbilaran, with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.
o
RTC found appellant guilty of bigamy: Want
of a valid marriage ceremony is not a
defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties
to a marriage should not be allowed to
assume that their marriage is void even if
such be the fact but must first secure a
judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to
marry again.
o
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by
Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9
which held that the court of a country in
which neither of the spouses is domiciled
and in which one or both spouses may
resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a
divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the
matrimonial status of the parties.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court,
the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No.
6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and
Lucia void ab initio since no marriage ceremony
actually took place. No appeal was taken from this
decision, which then became final and executory.
CA affirmed RTCs decision.
o
The subsequent declaration of nullity of
Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No.
6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is
that what is sought to be punished by
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code is the
act of contracting a second marriage before
the first marriage had been dissolved.
o
The divorce decree obtained by Lucia from
the Canadian court could not be accorded
validity in the Philippines, pursuant to
Article 15 of the Civil Code and given the
fact that it is contrary to public policy in this
jurisdiction. Under Article 17 of the Civil
Code, a declaration of public policy cannot
be rendered ineffectual by a judgment
promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

Issue: W/N petitioner committed bigamy

Held: No
Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis: Elements of bigamy:
o
the offender has been legally married;
o
the first marriage has not been legally
dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse has not been
judicially declared presumptively dead;
o
he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
o
the subsequent marriage would have been
valid had it not been for the existence of the
first
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, the
Court note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol issued a decree of
annulment of marriage entered into by petitioner
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete.
The trial court found that there was no actual
marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and
Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what
transpired was a mere signing of the marriage
contract by the two, without the presence of a
solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the
marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles
3 and 4 of the Family Code.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that
the accused must have been legally married. But in
this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never

married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first

marriage to speak of. Under the principle of
retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab
initio, the two were never married "from the
beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears
no legal effect.
Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for
legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at
the time he contracted the marriage with Maria
Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of
bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said
offense cannot be sustained where there is no first
marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce
be acquitted of the instant charge.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CIPRIANO

ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
G.R. No. 154380 | October 5, 2005 (1D)
Facts:

May 24, 1981: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady

Myros M. Villanueva at the United Church of Christ in
the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City.
In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States
bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later,
Cipriano discovered that his wife had been
naturalized as an American citizen.
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that
his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then
married a certain Innocent Stanley.
Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition
for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was
filed. Finding merit in the petition, the court granted
the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), sought
reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the
instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed
marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a
Filipino citizen and an alien.
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not
directly applicable to his case but insists that when
his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree
which capacitated her to remarry, he is likewise
capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section
12, Article II of the Constitution.

Issue: W/N paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code

applies to the case at bar

Held:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines
in accordance with the laws in force in the country where
they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under
Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis
supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear

to govern the situation presented by the case at
hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties
are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.

The instant case is one where at the time the

marriage was solemnized, the parties were two
Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized
as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a
divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed
she remarried an American citizen while residing in
the U.S.A.
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code
deliberations showed that the intent of Paragraph 2
of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a
member of the Civil Code Revision Committee, is to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties
were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them
obtains a foreign citizenship by naturalization?
o
Quita v. Court of Appeals: The parties were,
as in this case, Filipino citizens when they
got married. The wife became a naturalized
American citizen in 1954 and obtained a
divorce in the same year. The Court therein
hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a
Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse is no longer married under Philippine
law and can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent
and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to
include cases involving parties who, at the time of
the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens,
but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of
the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where
the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
and literal import would lead to mischievous results
or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and
reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of
the law. A statute may therefore be extended to
cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so
long as they come within its spirit or intent.
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to
avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be
deemed as coming within the contemplation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements
for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:
o
There is a valid marriage that has been
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
o
A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the
alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the
parties at the time of the celebration of the marriage,
but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the
latter to remarry.
In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as
an American citizen, there was still a valid marriage
that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano.
As fate would have it, the naturalized alien wife
subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating
her to remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the
application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both

present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced"

Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.
However, we note that the records are bereft of
competent evidence duly submitted by respondent
concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization
of respondents wife. It is settled rule that one who
alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere
allegation is not evidence.

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner, vs. DAISYLYN TIROL

STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
G.R. No. 186571 | August 11, 2010 (3D)
Facts:

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino

citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization.
Gerbert then married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto.
Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.
Due to work and other professional commitments,
Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding.
He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005
to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover
that his wife was having an affair with another man.
Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada
and filed a petition for divorce, which was granted.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiance in the
Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce
decree on his and Daisylyns marriage certificate.
Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an
official of the National Statistics Office (NSO)
informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and
Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be
enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be
judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court,
pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial
recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC.
RTC denied the petition.
o
Gerbert was not the proper party to institute
the action for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized
Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy,
under the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, in order for him or her to
be able to remarry under Philippine law.

Issue: W/N the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family

Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this
jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce decree
Held: No
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the
Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the
legislative history and intent behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in
marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President
Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative
powers under the Freedom Constitution, enacted
Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of
the Family Code to its present wording.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into the
law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. and
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.
o
In both cases, the Court refused to
acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of
marital rights after a foreign courts divorce
decree between the alien and the Filipino.

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was

included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the
alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse." The legislative
intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by
clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially,
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right
to have his or her marriage to the alien spouse
considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.
Additionally, an action based on the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not
limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated
the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare
that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to
contract another marriage.
o
No court in this jurisdiction, however, can
make a similar declaration for the alien
spouse (other than that already established
by the decree), whose status and legal
capacity are generally governed by his
national law.
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment,
and the purpose of the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting
the applicability of the provision for the benefit of the
Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no
right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence
of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the
complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before
the RTC.
o
In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code to aliens does not necessarily strip
Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC
for the recognition of his foreign divorce
decree.
o
The foreign divorce decree itself, after its
authenticity and conformity with the aliens
national law have been duly proven
according to our rules of evidence, serves as
a presumptive evidence of right in favor of
Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of
the Rules of Court which provides for the
effect of foreign judgments.
Petition was granted. Remand of the case to the trial
court was ordered.

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner, vs.

LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Respondent.
G. R. No. 183622 | February 8, 2012 (2D)
Facts:

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American

citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the
United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he
contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein.
When Orlando died, petitioner filed with RTC a
petition for the issuance of letters of administration
for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate
estate of Orlando.
Felicitas Amor then filed a Complaint for bigamy,
alleging that petitioner contracted a second marriage

to Orlando despite having been married to one

Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.
RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy.
o
The trial court ruled that since the deceased
was a divorced American citizen, and since
that divorce was not recognized under
Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between
him and petitioner was not valid.
o
The trial court found that, in the first place,
petitioner had never been married to
Eusebio Bristol.
June 26, 2006: RTC dismissed the Petition for the
issuance of letters of administration filed by
petitioner and granted that of private respondent.
Contrary to its findings in the criminal case, the RTC
held that the marriage between petitioner and
Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she
married Orlando.
o
Without expounding, it reasoned further that
her acquittal in the previous bigamy case
was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court
held that petitioner was not an interested
party who may file a petition for the
issuance of letters of administration
CA upheld the trial court.
o
As a spouse, the petitioner would have been
preferred to administer the estate of
Orlando B. Catalan. However, a marriage
certificate, like any other public document,
is only prima facie evidence of the facts
stated therein.
o
The fact that the petitioner had been
charged with bigamy and was acquitted has
not been disputed by the petitioner. Bigamy
is an illegal marriage committed by
contracting a second or subsequent
marriage before the first marriage has been
dissolved or before the absent spouse has
been declared presumptively dead by a
judgment rendered in a proper proceedings.
The deduction of the trial court that the
acquittal of the petitioner in the said case
negates the validity of her subsequent
marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has not
been disproved by her. There was not even
an attempt from the petitioner to deny the
findings of the trial court. There is therefore
no basis for us to make a contrary finding.
Thus, not being an interested party and a
stranger to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan,
the dismissal of her petition for letters of
administration by the trial court is in place.

Issue: W/N the reasoning of the CA was illogical in stating, on

the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the
other hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando was
invalid
Held:

from the marriage from the standards of American

law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx

Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive

evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce
obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree
itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the
judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written
act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal
of a foreign country.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws.1wphi1
Like any other facts, they must be alleged and
proved. Australian marital laws are not among those
matters that judges are supposed to know by reason
of their judicial function. The power of judicial notice
must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be
resolved in the negative.

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first

determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the
rightful party to be issued the letters of
administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is
hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED.

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, vs. MARIA PAZ GALELA

MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR
OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS
OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 196049 | June 26, 2013 (2D)
Facts:

At the time the bigamy case was dismissed, the

Court had already ruled that under the principles of
comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid divorce
obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This
doctrine was established as early as 1985 in Van
Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. wherein it was ruled that:

It is true that owing to the nationality principle

embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces[,] the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality.
However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they
are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent

Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be

proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio, to
wit:

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki is a Japanese national who

married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay in the
Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not
sit well with petitioners parents. Thus, Fujiki could
not bring his wife to Japan where he resides.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi
Maekara. Without the first marriage being dissolved,
Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008
in Quezon City, Philippines.
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to
reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped
Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in
Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.
Fujiki then filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of
Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."
RTC dismissed the petition, citing the provisions of
the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) which provides that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife, in this
case either Maekara or Marinay.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules
of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural
implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
3753) in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.
o
The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on
the "successful petitioner for divorce or
annulment of marriage to send a copy of the
final decree of the court to the local
registrar of the municipality where the

dissolved
or
annulled
marriage
was
solemnized."
o
Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries
in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and
"judgments declaring marriages void from
the beginning" are subject to cancellation or
correction. The petition in the RTC sought
(among others) to annotate the judgment of
the Japanese Family Court on the certificate
of marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to
recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment may
be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.
o
Corpuz v. Santo Tomas: The recognition of
the foreign divorce decree may be made in
a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule
108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact.
o
While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce
decree, in the present case the Japanese
Family Court judgment also affected the civil
status of the parties, especially Marinay,
who is a Filipino citizen.
o
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108
of the Rules of Court is the procedure to
record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons" in the
civil registry as required by Article 407 of
the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law
requires the entry in the civil registry of
judicial
decrees
that
produce
legal
consequences upon a persons legal
capacity and status x x x." The Japanese
Family Court judgment directly bears on the
civil status of a Filipino citizen and should
therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108
proceeding.

Issue: W/N the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void

Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 0211-10-SC) is applicable
Held: No
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of
a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the
parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner
only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a fact
under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy
of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence
and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
of Court.
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a
foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the
effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines,
Philippine courts must determine if the foreign
judgment is consistent with domestic public policy
and other mandatory laws.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring
a marriage void does not require relitigation under a
Philippine court of the case as if it were a new
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.
Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign
laws under which the foreign judgment was
rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on

the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign

citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another state.
Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the
foreign judgment as a fact according to the
rules of evidence.
Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides
that a foreign judgment or final order against a
person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest
by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the
Rules of Court states that "the judgment or final
order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus,
Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign
judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the
merits of a foreign judgment.
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63
Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce
decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if
they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a
marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree does not involve the extended procedure
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary
trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce
law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a
foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a
Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign
spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to
simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay
and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family
Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine
public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared
void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the
existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in
accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in
relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of
Court.

Issue: W/N the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign
judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.
Held: Yes
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only
requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be
made in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the
Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is
a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact."
Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a
persons life which are recorded by the State
pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.
These are facts of public consequence such as birth,
death or marriage, which the State has an interest in
recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in
Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or
right of a party or a particular fact."
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. Any person

interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the
civil register, may file a verified petition for the
cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,
with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis
supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to

recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and
Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to
Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality
to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil
registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese
Family Court.
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a
personal and material interest in maintaining the
integrity of the marriage he contracted and the
property relations arising from it. There is also no
doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an
entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry,
which compromises the public record of his marriage.
The interest derives from the substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited
instances68) his most intimate human relation, but
also to protect his property interests that arise by
operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.
These property interests in marriage include the right
to be supported "in keeping with the financial
capacity of the family" and preserving the property
regime of the marriage.
The case of Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental where the Court
held that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or
correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court is not applicable in the case at bar because
Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one
of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of
an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is
necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage
under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and
other related laws.
A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts
under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No.
8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil
registry is located." In other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient
of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for
correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry
based on the recognition of a foreign judgment
annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. There is neither
circumvention of the substantive and procedural
safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of
the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369.
A recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action

to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine

courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign
judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. The
procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in
a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a
citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No.
8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.
e. Human Relations; Abuse of Rights, Unjust
Enrichment; Malicious Prosecution; Independent Civil
Action
Article 1724. The contractor who undertakes to build a
structure or any other work for a stipulated price, in
conformity with plans and specifications agreed upon with
the land-owner, can neither withdraw from the contract
nor demand an increase in the price on account of the
higher cost of labor or materials, save when there has
been a change in the plans and specifications, provided:
(1) Such change has been authorized by the proprietor in
writing; and
(2) The additional price to be paid to the contractor has
been determined in writing by both parties.
Article 2142. Certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral
acts give rise to the juridical relation of quasi-contract to
the end that no one shall be unjustly enriched or
benefited at the expense of another.

Article 2154. If something is received when there is no

right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through
mistake, the obligation to return it arises.

Article 2164. When, without the knowledge of the

person obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger,
the latter shall have a right to claim the same from the
former, unless it appears that he gave it out of piety and
without intention of being repaid.

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes

damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

PATRICIA
FIGUEROA,
complainant,
BARRANCO, JR., respondent.
SBC Case No. 519 | July 31, 1997 (EB)
Facts:

vs.

SIMEON

Respondent had passed the 1970 bar examinations

on the fourth attempt, after unsuccessful attempts in
1966, 1967 and 1968.
Before respondent could take his oath, however,
complainant filed the instant petition averring that
respondent and she had been sweethearts, that a
child out of wedlock was born to them and that
respondent did not fulfill his repeated promises to
many her.
The Court resolved to dismiss the complaint for
failure of complainant to prosecute the case for an
unreasonable period of time and to allow Simeon
Barranco, Jr. to take the lawyer's oath upon payment
of the required fees.
Respondent's hopes were again dashed when the
Court, in response to complainant's opposition,
resolved to cancel his scheduled oath-taking. The
Court then referred the case to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
recommendation.
The IBP's report recommended the dismissal of the
case and that respondent be allowed to take the
lawyer's oath.

Issue: W/N respondent should be allowed to take the lawyers

oath
Held: Yes
Respondent was prevented from taking the lawyer's
oath in 1971 because of the charge of gross
immorality made by complainant. To recapitulate,
respondent bore an illegitimate child with his
sweetheart, Patricia Figueroa, who also claims that
he did not fulfill his promise to marry her after he
passes the bar examinations.
These facts do not constitute gross immorality
warranting the permanent exclusion of respondent
from the legal profession. His engaging in premarital
sexual relations with complainant and promises to
marry suggests a doubtful moral character on his
part but the same does not constitute grossly
immoral conduct.
The Court has held that to justify suspension or
disbarment the act complained of must not only be
immoral, but grossly immoral.
o
"A grossly immoral act is one that is so
corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal
act or so unprincipled or disgraceful as to be
reprehensible to a high degree." It is a
willful, flagrant, or shameless act which
shows a moral indifference to the opinion of
respectable members of the community.
Arciga v. Maniwang: Mere intimacy between a man
and a woman, both of whom possess no impediment
to marry, voluntarily carried on and devoid of any
deceit on the part of respondent, is neither so corrupt
nor so unprincipled as to warrant the imposition of

disciplinary sanction against him, even if as a result

of such relationship a child was born out of wedlock.
Respondent and complainant were sweethearts
whose sexual relations were evidently consensual.
We do not find complainant's assertions that she had
been forced into sexual intercourse, credible. She
continued to see and be respondent's girlfriend even
after she had given birth to a son in 1964 and until
1971.
We cannot help viewing the instant complaint as an
act of revenge of a woman scorned, bitter and
unforgiving to the end. It is also intended to make
respondent suffer severely and it seems, perpetually,
sacrificing the profession he worked very hard to be
admitted into. Even assuming that his past
indiscretions are ignoble, the twenty-six years that
respondent has been prevented from being a lawyer
constitute sufficient punishment therefor. During this
time there appears to be no other indiscretion
attributed to him. Respondent, who is now sixty-two
years of age, should thus be allowed, albeit
belatedly, to take the lawyer's oath.

JOYCE V. ARDIENTE, PETITIONER, vs. SPOUSES JAVIER

AND MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN DE ORO
WATER DISTRICT AND GASPAR GONZALEZ,* JR.,
RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 161921 | July 17, 2013 (3D)
Facts:

Herein petitioner and her husband Dr. Roberto S.

Ardiente are owners of a housing unit at Emily
Homes, Balulang, Cagayan de Oro City.
Petitioner then entered into a Memorandum of
Agreement selling, transferring and conveying in
favor of respondent Ma. Theresa Pastorfide all their
rights and interests in the housing unit at Emily
Homes in consideration of P70,000.00.
The Memorandum of Agreement carries a stipulation:
"4. That the water and power bill of the subject
property shall be for the account of the Second Party
(Ma. Theresa Pastorfide) effective June 1, 1994."
For 4 years, Ma. Theresa's use of the water
connection in the name of Joyce Ardiente was never
questioned nor perturbed until on March 12, 1999,
without notice, the water connection of Ma. Theresa
was cut off.
COWD, through the general manager, Gaspar
Gonzalez, Jr., answered the letter of Pastofirde and
reiterated that it was at the instance of Joyce
Ardiente that the water line was cut off.
Aggrieved, Pastorfide filed a complaint for damages
against petitioner, COWD and its manager Gaspar
Gonzalez.
RTC: Ordered defendants to pay damages to
Pastofirde
On appeal, CA affirmed trial courts decision.

Issue: W/N CA erred when it disregarded the fact that

respondent spouses are likewise bound to observe Art. 19 of
the New Civil Code
Held: No
The principle of abuse of rights as enshrined in
Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every
person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets
certain standards which must be observed not only in
the exercise of one's rights, but also in the
performance of one's duties.

These standards are the following:

o
to act with justice;
o
to give everyone his due; and
o
to observe honesty and good faith.

The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation

on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be
observed. A right, though by itself legal because
recognized or granted by law as such, may
nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
When a right is exercised in a manner which does not
conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and
results in damage to another, a legal wrong is
thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a
rule of conduct for the government of human
relations and for the maintenance of social order, it
does not provide a remedy for its violation.
Generally, an action for damages under either Article
20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Corollarilly, Article 20 provides that "every person
who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the
same." It speaks of the general sanctions of all other
provisions of law which do not especially provide for
its own sanction. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform to the standards set
forth in the said provision and results in damage to
another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for
which the wrongdoer must be responsible. Thus, if
the provision does not provide a remedy for its
violation, an action for damages under either Article
20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.
The question of whether or not the principle of abuse
of rights has been violated resulting in damages
under Article 20 or other applicable provision of law,
depends on the circumstances of each case.
To recapitulate, petitioner's acts which violated the
abovementioned provisions of law is her unjustifiable
act of having the respondent spouses' water supply
disconnected, coupled with her failure to warn or at
least notify respondent spouses of such intention.
On the part of COWD and Gonzalez, it is their failure
to give prior notice of the impending disconnection
and their subsequent neglect to reconnect
respondent spouses' water supply despite the latter's
settlement of their delinquent account.
On the basis of the foregoing, the Court finds no
cogent reason to depart from the ruling of both the
RTC and the CA that petitioner, COWD and Gonzalez
are solidarily liable.
The Spouses Pastorfide are entitled to moral
damages based on the provisions of Article 2219, in
connection with Articles 20 and 21 of the Civil Code.

JAIME P. ADRIANO and LEGASPI TOWERS 300, INC.,

Petitioners, vs. ALBERTO LASALA and LOURDES LASALA,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 197842 | October 9, 2013 (3D)
Facts:

Petitioner corporation entered into a security service

contract with respondents for a period of one year.
Respondents then later received a letter signed by
petitioner Adriano, the building administrator,
reminding them of their non-compliance with the
security services agreement, among which were the
failure to assign security guards with the required
height and educational attainment, and the failure to
provide the agreed service vehicle.
Despite their positive responses, respondents
received another letter reiterating the same
instances of non-compliance.
Dismayed, they talked to Adriano who replied with an
invitation to hold a meeting. In the scheduled

meeting, Adriano mentioned that the differences

could only be settled by cooperating with each other.
He then requested from respondents the payment of
P18,000.00, of which P5,000 would be given to
petitioner Emmanuel Santos, the LT300 President;
P3,000.00 to Captain Perez; and the rest to Adriano
himself.
Thereafter, a series of correspondence between the
parties took place, with the petitioners constantly
reiterating respondents alleged violations of the
service contract. In the last letter, they added
another grievance non- payment of the minimum
wage.
In an attempt to finally settle the issues, respondents
sought audience before the LT300 Board but to no
avail. The Board, without giving respondents an
opportunity to explain, terminated the contract as
voted upon in a meeting held on January 28, 1993.
Respondents then filed a complaint for damages
alleging that LT300 and Adriano illegally terminated
their services.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents.
CA affirmed and denied petitioners MR. Hence this
petition.

Issue: CA erred in holding the petitioners liable for illegal pretermination of contract
Held: No
The Court affirms the conclusion of CA that there is
no violation of the contract by respondents for the
following reasons:
o
First, respondents cannot be faulted for the
absorption of personnel who failed to meet
the minimum qualifications of at least 2nd
year of college and 56" in height.

On the representation that it was

made with the approval of the
Board, which was even confirmed
during the trial as true by
petitioner
and
LT300President
Santos, respondents readily hired
Adrianos recommendees even if
they lacked the qualifications
stated in the agreement.
o
Second, the CA was correct in ruling that the
petitioners complaints as to the nonprovision of service vehicle and nonpayment were groundless and flimsy.
Evidence on record does not support the
position that the minimum wage of the
security guards were not being paid. No
proof, such as documented complaints filed
by the affected employees showing noncompliance, was adduced during the trial.
There is no evidence either that the nonparking of the vehicle within the LT300
premises hampered the effective delivery of
security services. For lack of material
evidence, the Court cannot bestow credence
on the petitioners position.
o
Third, the petitioners were the ones who
committed the breach by their abrupt and
groundless termination of the agreement.
Although pre-termination was allowed under
the contract, the petitioners could not just
invoke and exercise the same without a
valid and legal ground. Turning a blind eye
to the compliance already effected and
subsequently
terminating
respondents
services
smack of high
handedness
especially when no single incident of
robbery, theft, drug addiction or prostitution
was reported for the entire duration of the
contract

10

The petitioners are, thus, reminded that "every

person must, in the exercise of his right and in the
performance of his duty, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith."
o
Respondents clearly complied with their part
of the obligation under the security services
agreement but it appeared that whatever
they did, the petitioners were bent on
ending it. This exercise by petitioners of
their right to pre-terminate the contracted
services without a just cause was nothing
but a flagrant violation of the contract.
Hence, no reversible error was committed by the CA
in declaring the respondents free from any violation
of the subject contract.

CALIFORNIA CLOTHING INC. and MICHELLE S. YBAEZ,

Petitioners, vs. SHIRLEY G. QUIONES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 175822 | October 23, 2013 (3D)
Facts:

Respondent Shirley G. Quiones, a Reservation

Ticketing Agent of Cebu Pacific Air, purchased a jeans
from the Guess USA Boutique of Robinsons
Department Store in Cebu City.
A Guess employee then approached and informed
her that she failed to pay the item she got. She,
however, insisted that she paid and showed the
employee the receipt issued in her favor. She then
suggested that they talk about it at the Cebu Pacific
Office located at the basement of the mall.
When she arrived at the Cebu Pacific Office, the
Guess employees allegedly subjected her to
humiliation in front of the clients of Cebu Pacific and
repeatedly demanded payment for the black jeans.
They supposedly even searched her wallet to check
how much money she had, followed by another
argument.
On the same day, the Guess employees allegedly
gave a letter to the Director of Cebu Pacific Air
narrating the incident, but the latter refused to
receive it as it did not concern the office and the
same took place while respondent was off duty.
With the above experience, respondent claimed to
have suffered physical anxiety, sleepless nights,
mental anguish, fright, serious apprehension,
besmirched reputation, moral shock and social
humiliation. She thus filed the Complaint for
Damages
RTC dismissed the complaint but on appeal, CA
reversed the trial courts decision and ordered
petitioners to pay damages to respondent.

Issue: W/N CA erred in finding that the letter sent to Cebu

Pacific office was made to subject herein respondent to
ridicule, humiliation, and similar injury
Held: No
In the sphere of our law on human relations, the
victim of a wrongful act or omission, whether done
willfully or negligently, is not left without any remedy
or recourse to obtain relief for the damage or injury
he sustained. Incorporated into our civil law are not
only principles of equity but also universal moral
precepts which are designed to indicate certain
norms that spring from the fountain of good
conscience and which are meant to serve as guides
for human conduct.
First of these fundamental precepts is the principle
commonly known as "abuse of rights" under Article
19 of the Civil Code. It provides that " Every person
must, in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due and observe honesty and good
faith."x x x

The elements of abuse of rights are as follows:

o
there is a legal right or duty;
o
which is exercised in bad faith;
o
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another
In this case, petitioners claimed that there was a
miscommunication between the cashier and the
invoicer leading to the erroneous issuance of the
receipt to respondent. When they realized the
mistake, they made a cash count and discovered that
the amount which is equivalent to the price of the
black jeans was missing. They, thus, concluded that
it was respondent who failed to make such payment.
It was, therefore, within their right to verify from
respondent whether she indeed paid or not and
collect from her if she did not.
However, the question now is whether such right was
exercised in good faith or they went overboard giving
respondent a cause of action against them.
Under the abuse of rights principle found in Article 19
of the Civil Code, a person must, in the exercise of
legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be
liable if he instead acted in bad faith, with intent to
prejudice another. Good faith refers to the state of
mind which is manifested by the acts of the
individual concerned. It consists of the intention to
abstain from taking an unconscionable and
unscrupulous advantage of another. Malice or bad
faith, on the other hand, implies a conscious and
intentional design to do a wrongful act for a
dishonest purpose or moral obliquity.
Initially, there was nothing wrong with petitioners
asking respondent whether she paid or not. The
Guess employees were able to talk to respondent at
the Cebu Pacific Office. The confrontation started
well, but it eventually turned sour when voices were
raised by both parties. As aptly held by both the RTC
and the CA, such was the natural consequence of two
parties with conflicting views insisting on their
respective beliefs. Considering, however, that
respondent was in possession of the item purchased
from the shop, together with the official receipt of
payment issued by petitioners, the latter cannot
insist that no such payment was made on the basis
of a mere speculation. Their claim should have been
proven by substantial evidence in the proper forum.
It is evident from the circumstances of the case that
petitioners went overboard and tried to force
respondent to pay the amount they were demanding.
In the guise of asking for assistance, petitioners even
sent a demand letter to respondents employer not
only informing it of the incident but obviously
imputing bad acts on the part of respondent.
It can be inferred from the foregoing that in sending
the demand letter to respondents employer,
petitioners intended not only to ask for assistance in
collecting the disputed amount but to tarnish
respondents reputation in the eyes of her employer.
To malign respondent without substantial evidence
and despite the latters possession of enough
evidence in her favor, is clearly impermissible. A
person should not use his right unjustly or contrary to
honesty and good faith, otherwise, he opens himself
to liability.
The exercise of a right must be in accordance with
the purpose for which it was established and must
not be excessive or unduly harsh. In this case,
petitioners obviously abused their rights.

PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., Petitioner, vs.

LEANDRO LEGASPI, Respondent.
G.R. No. 202791 | June 10, 2013 (3D)
Facts:

Respondents employment as Utility Pastry on board

the vessel "Azamara Journey" under the employment

11

of petitioner was covered by a Collective Bargaining

Agreement (CBA) wherein it was agreed that the
company
shall
pay
a
maximum
disability
compensation of up to US$60,000.00 only.
While on board the vessel, respondent suffered
"Cardiac Arrest S/P ICD Insertation."
Respondent was repatriated to receive further
medical treatment and examination. Consequently,
the company designated physician assessed his
condition to be Disability Grade 2.
Not satisfied, respondent filed a complaint for full
and permanent disability compensation against
petitioner before the Labor Arbiter.
LA: Petitioner was ordered to pay respondent
S$80,000.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of
payment as permanent disability compensation
NLRC affirmed LAs decision.
On appeal, CA partially granted the petition for
certiorari and modified the assailed resolutions of the
NLRC, awarding only US$60,000.00 pursuant to the
CBA between Celebrity Cruise Lines and Federazione
Italianaa Transporti CISL.
Petitioner then filed its Manifestation with Motion to
Amend the Dispositive Portion, submitting to the CA
the writ of execution issued by the LA in support of
its motion. Petitioner contended that since it had
already paid the total amount of US$89,452.00, it
was entitled to the return of the excess payment in
the amount of US$29,452.00.
CA denied the motion.

Issue: W/N CA erred in ruling that petitioner is estopped in

collecting the excess payment it made to the respondent
notwithstanding the receipt of judgment award signed by the
respondent
Held: Yes
Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or
effect of failure to make remuneration of or for
property or benefits received under circumstances
that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to
account for them. To be entitled to remuneration, one
must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or
request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of
reconveyance. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the
enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.
There is unjust enrichment when:
o
A person is unjustly benefited; and
o
Such benefit is derived at the expense of or
with damages to another
In the case at bench, petitioner paid respondent
US$81,320.00 in the pre-execution conference plus
attorneys fees of US$8,132.00 pursuant to the writ
of execution. The June 29, 2011 CA Decision,
however, modified the final resolution of the NLRC
and awarded only US$60,000.00 to respondent. If
allowed to return the excess, the respondent would
have been unjustly benefited to the prejudice and
expense of petitioner.
Petitioner's claim of excess payment is further
buttressed by, and in line with, Section 14, Rule XI of
the 20 II NLRC Rules of Procedure which provides:

EFFECT OF REVERSAL OF EXECUTED JUDGMENT.

Where the executed judgment is totally or partially
reversed or annulled by the Court of Appeals or the
Supreme Court, the Labor Arbiter shall, on motion,
issue such orders of restitution of the executed
award, except wages paid during reinstatement
pending appeal.
Although the Court has, more often than not, been
inclined towards the plight of the workers and has
upheld their cause in their conflicts with the
employers, such inclination has not blinded it to the
rule that justice is in every case for the deserving, to

be dispensed in the light of the established facts and

applicable law and doctrine.
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner, vs. ROMEO A.
JADER, respondent.
G.R. No. 132344 | February 17, 2000 (1D)
Facts:

Respondent, enrolled in petitioners College of Law

from 1984 up to 1988, failed to take the regular final
examination in Practice Court I for which he was
given an incomplete grade
He then filed an application for the removal of the
incomplete grade given to him which was approved
by the Dean after payment of the required fee. He
took the examination and Professor Carlos Ortega
then submitted his grade. It was a grade of 5.
The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies
for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws was then
scheduled and in the invitation for that occasion the
name of the plaintiff appeared as one of the
candidates. At the foot of the list of the names of the
candidates there appeared however the following
annotation:
This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon
these candidates who satisfactorily complete
requirements as stated in the University Bulletin and
as approved of the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports.
The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies. He
thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination.
Having learned of the deficiency he dropped his
review class and was not able to take the bar
examination.
Respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging
that he suffered moral shock, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings and sleepless nights when he was not able
to take the 1988 bar examinations arising from the
latter's negligence. He prayed for an award of moral
and exemplary damages, unrealized income,
attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
This was granted by the trial court which was
affirmed with modification by the CA. Hence this
petition.

Issue: W/N an educational institution be held liable for

damages for misleading a student into believing that the
latter had satisfied all the requirements for graduation when
such is not the case
Held: Yes
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the
result of the removal examination, particularly at a
time when he had already commenced preparing for
the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good
faith.
o
Absence of good faith must be sufficiently
established for a successful prosecution by
the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of
right under Article 19 of the Civil Code.
o
Good faith connotes an honest intention to
abstain from taking undue advantage of
another, even though the forms and
technicalities of the law, together with the
absence of all information or belief of facts,
would
render
the
transaction
unconscientious.
o
It is the school that has access to those
information and it is only the school that can
compel its professors to act and comply with
its rules, regulations and policies with
respect to the computation and the prompt
submission of grades. Students do not
exercise control, much less influence, over

12

the way an educational institution should

run its affairs, particularly in disciplining its
professors and teachers and ensuring their
compliance with the school's rules and
orders. Being the party that hired them, it is
the
school
that
exercises
general
supervision and exclusive control over the
professors with respect to the submission of
reports involving the students' standing.
Exclusive control means that no other
person or entity had any control over the
instrumentality which caused the damage or
injury.
Considering further, that the institution of learning
involved herein is a university which is engaged in
legal education, it should have practiced what it
inculcates in its students, more specifically the
principle of good dealings enshrined in Articles 19
and 20 of the Civil Code which states:

make him liable. A person should be protected only

when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right,
that is, when he acts with prudence and in good
faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.
ANITA CHENG, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES WILLIAM SY and
TESSIE SY, Respondents
G.R. No. 174238 | July 7, 2009 (3D)
Facts:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights

and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or
negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.

Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts

by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold
number of moral wrongs which is impossible for
human foresight to provide specifically in statutory
law.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the
students of their academic status and not wait for
the latter to inquire from the former. The conscious
indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the
person/persons who may be affected by his act or
omission can support a claim for damages. Want of
care to the conscious disregard of civil obligations
coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause
naturally calculated to produce them would make the
erring party liable.
o
Petitioner ought to have known that time
was of the essence in the performance of its
obligation to inform respondent of his grade.
It cannot feign ignorance that respondent
will not prepare himself for the bar exams
since that is precisely the immediate
concern after graduation of an LL.B.
graduate. It failed to act seasonably.
Petitioner cannot just give out its student's
grades at any time because a student has to
comply with certain deadlines set by the
Supreme Court on the submission of
requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner's
liability arose from its failure to promptly
inform respondent of the result of an
examination and in misleading the latter
into believing that he had satisfied all
requirements for the course.
Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors
to justify its own negligence that led to the delayed
relay of information to respondent. When one of two
innocent parties must suffer, he through whose
agency the loss occurred must bear it. The modern
tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases
where there is abuse of right, even when the act is
not illicit. If mere fault or negligence in one's acts can
make him liable for damages for injury caused
thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith

Petitioner filed 2 estafa cases against respondent

spouses William and Tessie Sy or issuing to her
checks amounting to P300,000.00, in payment of
their loan, both of which were dishonored upon
presentment for having been drawn against a closed
account.
Meanwhile, based on the same facts, petitioner filed
against respondents 2 cases for violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 22.
The estafa cases were dismissed for failure of the
prosecution to prove the elements of the crime. On
the other hand, the Order in one of the cases
contained a statement, "Hence, if there is any
liability of the accused, the same is purely civil, not
criminal in nature."
Later, the BP 22 cases were also dismissed on
account of the failure of petitioner to identify the
accused respondents in open court. The Order also
did not make any pronouncement as to the civil
liability of accused respondents.
Petitioner then lodged against respondents before
the RTC for collection of a sum of money with
damages (Civil Case No. 05-112452) based on the
same loaned amount of P600,000.00 covered by the
two PBC checks previously subject of the estafa and
BP Blg. 22 cases.
RTC: Dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction,
ratiocinating that the civil action to collect the said
amount with damages was already impliedly
instituted in the BP Blg. 22 cases in light of Section 1,
paragraph (b) of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which
the court denied. Hence, this petition.

Issue: W/N Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal

Procedure and Supreme Court Circular No. 57-97 on the Rules
and Guidelines in the filing and prosecution of criminal cases
under BP Blg. 22 are applicable to the present case
Held:

The rule is that upon the filing of the estafa and BP

Blg. 22 cases against respondents, where the
petitioner has not made any waiver, express
reservation to litigate separately, or has not
instituted the corresponding civil action to collect the
amount of P600,000.00 and damages prior to the
criminal action, the civil action is deemed instituted
with the criminal cases.
This rule applies especially with the advent of the
2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Thus,
during the pendency of both the estafa and the BP
Blg. 22 cases, the action to recover the civil liability
was impliedly instituted and remained pending
before the respective trial courts.
This is consonant with our ruling in Rodriguez v.
Ponferrada that the possible single civil liability
arising from the act of issuing a bouncing check can
be the subject of both civil actions deemed instituted
with the estafa case and the prosecution for violation
of BP Blg. 22, simultaneously available to the
complaining party, without traversing the prohibition
against forum shopping.
The dismissal of the estafa cases for failure of the
prosecution to prove the elements of the crime
beyond reasonable doubt produced the legal effect of

13

a reservation by the petitioner of her right to litigate

separately the civil action impliedly instituted with
the estafa cases, following Article 29 of the Civil
Code.
However, although this civil action could have been
litigated separately on account of the dismissal of the
estafa cases on reasonable doubt, the petitioner was
deemed to have also elected that such civil action be
prosecuted together with the BP Blg. 22 cases in light
of the Rodriguez v. Ponferrada ruling.
With the dismissal of the BP Blg. 22 cases for failure
to establish the identity of the accused, the question
that arises is whether such dismissal would have the
same legal effect as the dismissed estafa cases. Put
differently, may petitioners action to recover
respondents civil liability be also allowed to prosper
separately after the BP Blg. 22 cases were
dismissed?
Section 1 (b), Rule 111 of the 2000 Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure states

Section 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions.

ASJ CORPORATION and ANTONIO SAN JUAN, petitioners,

vs. SPS. EFREN & MAURA EVANGELISTA, respondents.
G.R. No. 158086 | February 14, 2008 (3D)
Facts:

xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 shall be deemed to include the corresponding civil
action. No reservation to file such civil action separately
shall be allowed.

Petitioner is in error when she insists that the 2000

Rules on Criminal Procedure should not apply
because she filed her BP Blg. 22 complaints in 1999.
It is now settled that rules of procedure apply even to
cases already pending at the time of their
promulgation. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants rights does not
preclude their retroactive application to pending
actions. It is axiomatic that the retroactive
application of procedural laws does not violate any
right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The
reason for this is that, as a general rule, no vested
right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws.
Indeed, under the present revised Rules, the criminal
action for violation of BP Blg. 22 includes the
corresponding civil action to recover the amount of
the checks. It should be stressed, this policy is
intended to discourage the separate filing of the civil
action. In fact, the Rules even prohibits the
reservation of a separate civil action, i.e., one can no
longer file a separate civil case after the criminal
complaint is filed in court. The only instance when
separate proceedings are allowed is when the civil
action is filed ahead of the criminal case. Even then,
the Rules encourages the consolidation of the civil
and criminal cases. Thus, where petitioners rights
may be fully adjudicated in the proceedings before
the court trying the BP Blg. 22 cases, resort to a
separate action to recover civil liability is clearly
unwarranted on account of res judicata, for failure of
petitioner to appeal the civil aspect of the cases. In
view of this special rule governing actions for
violation of BP Blg. 22, Article 31 of the Civil Code is
not applicable.
However, in applying the procedure discussed above,
it appears that petitioner would be left without a
remedy
to
recover
from
respondents
the
P600,000.00 allegedly loaned from her. Expectedly,
respondents would raise the same defense that
petitioner had already elected to litigate the civil

action to recover the amount of the checks along

with the BP Blg. 22 cases.
It is in this light that we find petitioners contention
that she was not assisted by a private prosecutor
during the BP Blg. 22 proceedings critical. Petitioner
indirectly protests that the public prosecutor failed to
protect and prosecute her cause when he failed to
have her establish the identities of the accused
during the trial and when he failed to appeal the civil
action deemed impliedly instituted with the BP Blg.
22 cases. On this ground, we agree with petitioner.

Respondents, engaged in the large-scale business of

buying broiler eggs, hatching them, and selling their
hatchlings (chicks) and egg by-products, availed of
the hatchery services of ASJ Corp., a corporation duly
registered in the name of San Juan and his family.
For failure to settle accrued service fees on several
setting reports, San Juan repeatedly refused to
release the products to Efren.
The parties tried to settle amicably their differences
before police authorities, but to no avail. Thus,
respondents filed with the RTC an action for damages
based on petitioners retention of the chicks and byproducts covered by Setting Report Nos. 108 to 113.
RTC ruled in favor of respondents which was affirmed
by CA.

Issue: W/N CA erred in holding that petitioners have violated

the principles enunciated in Art. 19 of the New Civil Code and
consequently awarding damages
Held: No
San Juans subsequent acts of threatening
respondents should not remain among those treated
with impunity.
Under Article 1931 of the Civil Code, an act
constitutes an abuse of right if the following
elements are present:
o
the existence of a legal right or duty;
o
which is exercised in bad faith; and
o
for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring
another.
Here, while petitioners had the right to withhold
delivery, the high-handed and oppressive acts of
petitioners, as aptly found by the two courts below,
had no legal leg to stand on.
We need not weigh the corresponding pieces of
evidence all over again because factual findings of
the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the
appellate court, are binding and conclusive and will
not be disturbed on appeal.
At bottom, we agree that petitioners conduct flouts
the norms of civil society and justifies the award of
moral and exemplary damages. As enshrined in civil
law jurisprudence: Honeste vivere, non alterum
laedere et jus suum cuique tribuere. To live
virtuously, not to injure others and to give everyone
his due. Since exemplary damages are awarded,
attorneys fees are also proper. Article 2208 of the
Civil Code provides that:
In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and
expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs,
cannot be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
xxxx

14

UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. PHILAB

INDUSTRIES, INC., respondent.
G.R. No. 152411 | September 29, 2004 (2D)
Facts:

Petitioner decided to construct an integrated system

of research organization known as the Research
Complex. As part of the project, laboratory
equipment and furniture were purchased for the
National Institute of Biotechnology and Applied
Microbiology (BIOTECH) at the UP Los Baos.
Providentially, the Ferdinand E. Marcos Foundation
(FEMF) came forward and agreed to fund the
acquisition of the laboratory furniture, including the
fabrication thereof.
Dr. William Padolina, the Executive Deputy Director of
BIOTECH, arranged for
Philippine Laboratory
Industries, Inc. (PHILAB), to fabricate the laboratory
furniture and deliver the same to BIOTECH for the
BIOTECH Building Project, for the account of the
FEMF.
The Executive Assistant of the FEMF then directed
Padolina to give the go-signal to PHILAB to proceed
with the fabrication of the laboratory furniture, and
requested Padolina to forward the contract of the
project to FEMF for its approval.
Subsequently, PHILAB made partial deliveries of
office and laboratory furniture to BIOTECH after
having been duly inspected by their representatives
and FEMF Executive Assistant.
PHILAB submitted to BIOTECH Invoice No. 01643 in
the amount of P702,939.40 for the final payment of
laboratory furniture. Representatives from BIOTECH,
PHILAB, and Lirio for the FEMF, conducted a
verification of the accomplishment of the work and
confirmed the same.
UP Chancellor then informed Philab President
Navasero that PHILAB and FEMF did not execute any
contract regarding the fabrication and delivery of
laboratory furniture to BIOTECH. Exasperated,
PHILAB filed a complaint for sum of money and
damages against UP.
In its answer, UP denied liability and alleged that
PHILAB had no cause of action against it because it
was merely the donee/beneficiary of the laboratory
furniture in the BIOTECH; and that the FEMF, which
funded the project, was liable to the PHILAB for the
purchase price of the laboratory furniture. UP
specifically denied obliging itself to pay for the
laboratory furniture supplied by PHILAB.
RTC dismissed the complaint without prejudice to
PHILABs recourse against the FEMF.
CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC.
The appellate court ruled that, although UP did not
bind itself to pay for the laboratory furniture;
nevertheless, it is liable to PHILAB under the maxim:
"No one should unjustly enrich himself at the
expense of another."

Issue: W/N CA erred in applying the legal principle of unjust

enrichment when it held that the University, and not the
Marcos Foundation, is liable to Philab
Held: Yes
Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because
one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of
others, but instead it must be shown that a party was
unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly
could mean illegally or unlawfully.
Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust
enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove
that another party knowingly received something of
value to which he was not entitled and that the state
of affairs are such that it would be unjust for the
person to keep the benefit.

Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or

effect of failure to make remuneration of or for
property or benefits received under circumstances
that give rise to legal or equitable obligation to
account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one
must confer benefit by mistake, fraud, coercion, or
request.
Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey.
Rather, it is a prerequisite for the enforcement of the
doctrine of restitution.
Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:

Every person who, through an act of performance by

another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter
without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the

essential elements must be present:
o
that the defendant has been enriched,
o
that the plaintiff has suffered a loss,
o
that the enrichment of the defendant is
without just or legal ground, and
o
that the plaintiff has no other action based
on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasidelict.
An accion in rem verso is considered merely an
auxiliary action, available only when there is no other
remedy on contract, quasi-contract, crime, and
quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action under
any other institution of positive law, that action must
be resorted to, and the principle of accion in rem
verso will not lie.
The essential requisites for the application of Article
22 of the New Civil Code do not obtain in this case.
o
The respondent had a remedy against the
FEMF via an action based on an implied-infact contract with the FEMF for the payment
of its claim.
o
The
petitioner
legally
acquired
the
laboratory furniture under the MOA with
FEMF;
o
Hence, it is entitled to keep the laboratory
furniture.

OFELIA P. TY, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, and

EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.
G.R. No. 127406 | November 27, 2000 (2D)
Facts:

Even
before
the
decree
nullifying
private
respondents marriage with Anna Maria Villanueva,
private respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner.
Subsequently, private respondent filed with RTC for
nullity of his marriage with petitioner, alleging that
they had no marriage license when they got married.
He also averred that at the time he married
petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He
stated that at the time he married petitioner the
decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had
not been issued.
RTC granted the petition. This was affirmed by the
CA.

Issue: W/N the decree of nullity of the first marriage is

required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into
validly

15

Held:

Private respondents first and second marriages

contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are
governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. The
present case differs significantly from the recent
cases of Bobis v. Bobis and Mercado v. Tan, both
involving a criminal case for bigamy where the
bigamous marriage was contracted during the
effectivity of the Family Code, under which a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly required.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a
void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains
no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on
the matter, however, appears to be conflicting.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was
put to rest under the Family Code. Article 40 of said
Code expressly required a judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage
may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
However, the provisions of the Family Code cannot
be retroactively applied to the present case, for to do
so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and
of her children.
As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code
has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of
vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of
vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent.
Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent
to the appellate courts finding that despite private
respondents "deceit and perfidy" in contracting
marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her
silence on the issue.

Issue: W/N the Court can grant petitioners claim for

reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment
Held: No
As held in Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a
foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for
money spent on purchase of Philippine land, the
provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the
action is proscribed by the Constitution, to wit:
Petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil
Code is futile.

Issue: W/N CA erred in not granting moral and exemplary

damages to defendant-appellant
Held: No
Although the appellate court admitted that they
found private respondent acted "duplicitously and
craftily" in marrying petitioner, it did not award moral
damages because the latter did not adduce evidence
to support her claim.
Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no
damages should be awarded in the present case, but
for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to
private respondent held valid and subsisting. She is
suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the
same breath, she asks for damages from her
husband for filing a baseless complaint for
annulment of their marriage which caused her
mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation,
social humiliation and alienation from her parents.
Should we grant her prayer, we would have a
situation where the husband pays the wife damages
from conjugal or common funds. To do so, would
make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not
common sense, militates against such incongruity.
Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for
damages between husband and wife merely because
of breach of a marital obligation. There are other
remedies.
WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner, vs
AVELINA
Respondent.
G.R. No. 195670 | December 3, 2012 (2D)
Facts:

AMORES,

Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a

Filipina, married in March 29, 1980.
After several years, the RTC of Negros Oriental
declared the nullity of their marriage.

Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for

Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership.
In defense, respondent averred that, with the
exception of their 2 residential houses on Lots 1 and
2142, she and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal
properties during their marriage, the truth being that
she used her own personal money to purchase said
Lots.
RTC awarded the subject lots to respondent.
CA affirmed RTCs decision and stressed the fact that
petitioner was "well-aware of the constitutional
prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in the
Philippines." Hence, he cannot invoke equity to
support his claim for reimbursement.

The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO

CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No
person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense
of another). An action for recovery of what has been
paid without just cause has been designated as an
accion in rem verso.
o
This provision does not apply if, as in this
case, the action is proscribed by the
Constitution or by the application of the pari
delicto doctrine.
o
It may be unfair and unjust to bar the
petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso
over the subject properties, or from
recovering the money he paid for the said
properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in
the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The
objection that a contract is immoral or
illegal as between the plaintiff and the
defendant, sounds at all times very ill in the
mouth of the defendant. It is not for his
sake, however, that the objection is ever
allowed; but it is founded in general
principles of policy, which the defendant has
the advantage of, contrary to the real
justice, as between him and the plaintiff."
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an
injustice based on his foreign citizenship. Precisely, it
is the Constitution itself which demarcates the rights
of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land.
To be sure, the constitutional ban against foreigners
applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not
to the improvements built thereon, such as the two
(2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were
properly declared to be co-owned by the parties
subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of
the prohibition is to conserve the national patrimony
and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to
protect.

PFIZER, INC. AND/OR REY GERARDO BACARRO, AND/OR

FERDINAND CORTES, AND/OR ALFRED MAGALLON,
AND/OR ARISTOTLE ARCE, Petitioners, vs. GERALDINE
VELASCO, Respondent.
G.R. No. 177467 | March 9, 2011 (1D)
Facts:

16

Private respondent Geraldine L. Velasco was

employed with petitioner PFIZER, INC. as Professional
Health Care Representative.
On 26 June 2003, while Velasco was on leave for her
high-risk pregnancy, PFIZER through its Area Sales
Manager, herein petitioner Ferdinand Cortez,
personally served Velasco a "Show-cause Notice".
Aside from mentioning about an investigation on her
possible violations of company work rules regarding
"unauthorized deals and/or discounts in money or
samples and unauthorized withdrawal and/or pull-out
of stocks" and instructing her to submit her
explanation on the matter within 48 hours from
receipt of the same, the notice also advised her that
she was being placed under "preventive suspension"
for 30 days and consequently ordered to surrender
the following "accountabilities;" 1) Company Car, 2)
Samples
and
Promats,
3)
CRF/ER/VEHICLE/SOA/POSAP/MPOA and other related
Company Forms, 4) Cash Card, 5) Caltex Card, and 6)
MPOA/TPOA Revolving Travel Fund.
Velasco, through a letter, denied the allegations. She
then received a "Second Show-cause Notice"
informing her of additional developments in their
investigation. That same day, Velasco filed a
complaint for illegal suspension with money claims
before the Regional Arbitration Branch.
Velasco received a "Third Show-cause Notice," but
then Finally, on 29 July 2003, PFIZER informed
Velasco of its "Management Decision" terminating
her employment.
LA: Dismissal of Velasco is illegal and ordered her
reinstatement with backwages and further awarding
moral and exemplary damages with attorneys fees.
NLRC denied Petitioners appeal.
CA upheld the validity of respondents dismissal from
employment but directed PFIZER to pay respondent
her wages from the date of the Labor Arbiters
Decision dated December 5, 2003 up to the Court of
Appeals Decision dated November 23, 2005.

Issue: W/N CAs decision of ordering Pfizer to pay Velasco

wages from the date of the Labor Arbiters decision ordering
her reinstatement until the CA decision declaring Velascos
dismissal valid constitutes unjust enrichment
Held: No
The Court reaffirms the prevailing principle that even
if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is
reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the
employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the
dismissed employee during the period of appeal until
reversal by the higher court.
The Court reiterates the principle that reinstatement
pending appeal necessitates that it must be
immediately self-executory without need for a writ of
execution during the pendency of the appeal, if the
law is to serve its noble purpose, and any attempt on
the part of the employer to evade or delay its
execution should not be allowed.
Furthermore, we likewise restate our ruling that an
order for reinstatement entitles an employee to
receive his accrued backwages from the moment the
reinstatement order was issued up to the date when
the same was reversed by a higher court without fear
of refunding what he had received. It cannot be
denied that, under our statutory and jurisprudential
framework, respondent is entitled to payment of her
wages for the period after December 5, 2003 until
the Court of Appeals Decision dated November 23,
2005, notwithstanding the finding therein that her
dismissal was legal and for just cause. Thus, the
payment of such wages cannot be deemed as unjust
enrichment on respondents part.

ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA I. BILDNER

and SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO, JOHN DOE and JANE DOE,
respondents.
G.R. No. 139789 | May 12, 2000 (1D)
Facts:

Erlinda Kalaw and Potenciano Ilusorio contracted

matrimony and lived together for a period 30 years.
In 1972, they separated from bed and board for
undisclosed reasons. Out of their marriage, the
spouses had 6 children.
The children, Sylvia and Erlinda alleged that during
the time Potenciano arrived from US and lived with
Erlinda for 5 months, their mother gave Potenciano
an overdose of 200 mg instead of 100 mg Zoloft, an
antidepressant drug prescribed by his doctor in New
York, U.S.A. As a consequence, Potencianos health
deteriorated.
Erlinda then filed with RTC a petition for guardianship
over the person and property of Potenciano Ilusorio
due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor
eyesight and impaired judgment.
Subsequently, after attending a corporate meeting in
Baguio City, Potenciano Ilusorio did not return to
Antipolo City and instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium, Makati.
Erlinda filed with the CA a petition for habeas corpus.
She alleged that respondents refused petitioners
demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited
Potenciano from returning to Antipolo City.
CA allowed visitation rights to Erlinda but ordered
that the writ of habeas corpus previously issued be
recalled and the herein petition for habeas corpus be
dismissed for lack of unlawful restraint or detention
of the subject of the petition.

Issue: W/N a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel

her husband to live with her in conjugal bliss
Held: No
The essential object and purpose of the writ of
habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint, and to relieve a person
therefrom if such restraint is illegal.
To justify the grant of the petition, the restraint of
liberty must be an illegal and involuntary deprivation
of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty
must be actual and effective, not merely nominal or
moral.
The evidence shows that there was no actual and
effective detention or deprivation of lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorios liberty that would justify the
issuance of the writ. The fact that lawyer Potenciano
Ilusorio is about 86 years of age, or under medication
does
not
necessarily
render
him
mentally
incapacitated. Soundness of mind does not hinge on
age or medical condition but on the capacity of the
individual to discern his actions.
The Court of Appeals also observed that lawyer
Potenciano Ilusorio did not request the administrator
of the Cleveland Condominium not to allow his wife
and other children from seeing or visiting him. He
made it clear that he did not object to seeing them.
As to lawyer Potenciano Ilusorios mental state, the
Court of Appeals observed that he was of sound and
alert mind, having answered all the relevant
questions to the satisfaction of the court.
With his full mental capacity coupled with the right of
choice, Potenciano Ilusorio may not be the subject of
visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise,
we will deprive him of his right to privacy. Needless
to say, this will run against his fundamental
constitutional right.
The Court of Appeals exceeded its authority when it
awarded visitation rights in a petition for habeas
corpus where Erlinda never even prayed for such

17

right. The ruling is not consistent with the finding of

subjects sanity.
The Court of Appeals missed the fact that the case
did not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor
child but the right of a wife to visit a husband. In case
the husband refuses to see his wife for private
reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat of any
penalty attached to the exercise of his right.
No court is empowered as a judicial authority to
compel a husband to live with his wife. Coverture
cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas
corpus carried out by sheriffs or by any other mesne
process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority
and is best left to the man and womans free choice.

Facts:

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS

OF POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO,
petitioner, vs. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-BILDNER, SYLVIA K.
ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES and JANE DOES, respondents.
G.R. No. 139789 | July 19, 2001 (1D)
Facts: See facts above
Issue: What is now before the Court is Erlinda's motion to
reconsider the decision.
Held:

The fact of illegal restraint has not been proved

during the hearing at the CA. Potenciano himself
declared that he was not prevented by his children
from seeing anybody and that he had no objection to
seeing his wife and other children whom he loved.
Erlinda highlighted that her husband suffered from
various ailments. Thus, Potenciano Ilusorio did not
have the mental capacity to decide for himself.
Hence, Erlinda argued that Potenciano be brought
before the Supreme Court so that we could
determine his mental state.
We were not convinced that Potenciano Ilusorio was
mentally incapacitated to choose whether to see his
wife or not. Again, this is a question of fact that has
been decided in the CA.
As to whether the children were in fact taking control
of the corporation, these are matters that may be
threshed out in a separate proceeding, irrelevant in
habeas corpus.
Erlinda states that Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
and Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code support
her position that as spouses, they (Potenciano and
Erlinda) are duty bound to live together and care for
each other. We agree.
o
The law provides that the husband and the
wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity. The
sanction therefor is the "spontaneous,
mutual affection between husband and wife
and not any legal mandate or court order"
to enforce consortium.
o
Obviously, there was absence of empathy
between spouses Erlinda and Potenciano,
having separated from bed and board since
1972. We defined empathy as a shared
feeling
between
husband
and
wife
experienced
not
only
by
having
spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep
sense of spiritual communion. Marital union
is a two-way process.
Marriage is definitely for two loving adults who view
the relationship with "amor gignit amorem" respect,
sacrifice
and
a
continuing
commitment
to
togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime
social institution.

Lavia and Nestor were both Filipino diplomats

assigned in Kenya as Ambassador and Consul
General, respectively.
In the course of their stay in Kenya, the residence of
Lavia was raided twice. Subsequently, both Nestor
and Lavia were recalled from their posts in Kenya.
Lavia then filed before the RTC a complaint for
damages against Nestor and his wife, alleging
following causes of action, to wit: (a) affront against
his privacy and the sanctity and inviolability of his
diplomatic residence during the two raids conducted
by the Kenyan officials, supposedly instigated by
Padalhin and participated by all the defendants as
conspirators; (b) infringement of his constitutional
rights against illegal searches and seizures when the
investigating team sent by the DFA entered into his
residence without a warrant, court order or letter
from the DFA Secretary and confiscated some of his
personal belongings; and (c) bad faith, malice and
deceit exhibited by the defendants, including
Padalhin, in conspiring on the conduct of the raids,
engaging in a smear campaign against him, and
seizing without authority his personal effects. Lavia
sought payment of actual, moral, exemplary and
nominal damages, attorneys fees and costs of suits.
RTC ordered Nestor to pay Lavia moral, nominal,
and exemplary damages.
o
Nestor admitted in his sworn statement that
he caused the taking of pictures of the raw
elephant tusks in the official residence of
the ambassador
CA denied Nestors appeal but however reduced the
award of attorneys fees and litigation expenses
made in Lavias favor.

Issue: W/N the award of damages in favor of Lavia by the

trial court, as upheld by the CA, is proper
Held: Yes
SC upheld CAs decision: Plaintiff-appellants
complaint is mainly anchored on Article 19 in relation
to Articles 21 and 26 of the New Civil Code. These
provisions of the law state thus:
Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his
rights and in the performance of his duties, act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith.

Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury

to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for
the damage.

NESTOR N. PADALHIN and ANNIE PADALHIN, Petitioners,

vs. NELSON D. LAVINA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 183026 | November 14, 2012 (1D)

18

(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence:

(2) Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family
relations off [sic] another;
(3) Intriguing to cause another to be alienated from his
friends;
(4) Vexing or humiliating another on account of his beliefs,
lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or
other personal condition.
The Comment of Tolentino on what constitute an
abuse of rights under Article 19 of the New Civil Code
is pertinent:
o
Test of Abuse of Right. Modern
jurisprudence does not permit acts which,
although not unlawful, are anti-social. There
is undoubtedly an abuse of right when it is
exercised for the only purpose of prejudicing
or injuring another. When the objective of
the actor is illegitimate, the illicit act cannot
be concealed under the guise of exercising a
right. The principle does not permit acts
which, without utility or legitimate purpose
cause damage to another, because they
violate the concept of social solidarity which
considers law as rational and just.
The question, therefore, is whether Nestor intended
to prejudice or injure Lavia when he did the acts as
embodied in his affidavit.
o
We rule in the affirmative. Nestors
participation in the invasion of Lavias
diplomatic residence and his act of ordering
an employee to take photographs of what
was inside the diplomatic residence without
the consent of Lavia were clearly done to
prejudice the latter.
o
Moreover, we find that Nestor was not
driven by legitimate reasons when he did
the questioned acts. As pointed out by the
court a quo, Nestor made sure that the
Kenyan Minister of Foreign Affairs and the
Filipino community in Kenya knew about the
alleged illegal items in Lavias diplomatic
residence.

Issue: W/N CA erred in ruling that the right to privacy of

residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil Code was not
violated since the property subject of the controversy is not
used as a residence
Held: Yes
The right to privacy under Article 26(1) of the Civil
Code covers business offices where the public are
excluded therefrom and only certain individuals are
allowed to enter.
Article 26(1) of the Civil Code, on the other hand,
protects an individuals right to privacy and provides
a legal remedy against abuses that may be
committed against him by other individuals. It states:
Art. 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,
personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons. The following and
similar acts, though they may not constitute a
criminal offense, shall produce a cause of action for
damages, prevention and other relief:

SPOUSES BILL AND VICTORIA HING, Petitioners, vs.

ALEXANDER CHOACHUY, SR. and ALLAN CHOACHUY,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 179736 | June 26, 2013 (2D)
Facts:

Petitioner-spouses filed with RTC a Complaint for

Injunction and Damages with prayer for issuance of a
Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction/Temporary
Restraining Order against respondents Alexander
Choachuy, Sr. and Allan Choachuy,
In the said complaint, petitioners alleged that:
o
Aldo Development & Resources, Inc., owned
by respondents, was located adjacent to the
property of petitioners
o
Aldo filed a case against petitioners for
Injunction and Damages with Writ of
Preliminary Injunction/TRO, claiming that
petitioners were constructing a fence
without a valid permit and that the said
construction would destroy the wall of its
building, which is adjacent to petitioners
property

In order to get evidence to support the said

case, respondents illegally set-up and
installed on the building of Aldo Goodyear
Servitec two video surveillance cameras
facing petitioners property and that
respondents, through their employees and
without the consent of petitioners, also took
pictures
of
petitioners
on-going
construction, thus violating petitioners right
to privacy
RTC: Granted application for TRO.
This was reversed and set aside by CA.
o
The CA explained that the right to privacy of
residence under Article 26(1) of the Civil
Code was not violated since the property
subject of the controversy is not used as a
residence.
o

Article 26. Every person shall respect the dignity,

personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors
and other persons. The following and similar acts, though
they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce
a cause of action for damages, prevention and other
relief:

(1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence;

This provision recognizes that a mans house is his
castle, where his right to privacy cannot be denied or
even restricted by others. It includes "any act of
intrusion into, peeping or peering inquisitively into
the residence of another without the consent of the
latter."
The phrase "prying into the privacy of anothers
residence," however, does not mean that only the
residence is entitled to privacy. As elucidated by Civil
law expert Arturo M. Tolentino:
o
Our Code specifically mentions "prying into
the privacy of anothers residence." This
does not mean, however, that only the
residence is entitled to privacy, because the
law covers also "similar acts." A business
office is entitled to the same privacy when
the public is excluded therefrom and only
such individuals as are allowed to enter may
come in
Thus, an individuals right to privacy under Article
26(1) of the Civil Code should not be confined to his
house or residence as it may extend to places where
he has the right to exclude the public or deny them
access. The phrase "prying into the privacy of
anothers residence," therefore, covers places,
locations, or even situations which an individual
considers as private. And as long as his right is
recognized by society, other individuals may not
infringe on his right to privacy. The CA, therefore,
erred in limiting the application of Article 26(1) of the
Civil Code only to residences.
In ascertaining whether there is a violation of the
right to privacy, courts use the "reasonable
expectation of privacy" test. This test determines
whether a person has a reasonable expectation of

19

privacy and whether the expectation has been

violated.
In Ople v. Torres, we enunciated that "the
reasonableness of a persons expectation of privacy
depends on a two-part test:
o
whether, by his conduct, the individual has
exhibited an expectation of privacy; and
o
this expectation is one that society
recognizes as reasonable."
Customs, community norms, and practices may,
therefore, limit or extend an individuals "reasonable
expectation of privacy. Hence, the reasonableness of
a persons expectation of privacy must be
determined on a case-to-case basis since it depends
on the factual circumstances surrounding the case.
The RTC considered that petitioners have a
"reasonable expectation of privacy" in their property,
whether they use it as a business office or as a
residence and that the installation of video
surveillance cameras directly facing petitioners
property or covering a significant portion thereof,
without their consent, is a clear violation of their
right to privacy. As we see then, the issuance of a
preliminary injunction was justified. We need not
belabor that the issuance of a preliminary injunction
is discretionary on the part of the court taking
cognizance of the case and should not be interfered
with, unless there is grave abuse of discretion
committed by the court. Here, there is no indication
of any grave abuse of discretion. Hence, the CA erred
in finding that petitioners are not entitled to an
injunctive writ.

LILY LIM, Petitioner, vs. KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO,

Respondent
G.R. No. 175256 | August 23, 2012 (1D)
Facts:

FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a

cement
manufacturing
plant,
issued
several
withdrawal authorities for the account of cement
dealers and traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt.
Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt sold the withdrawal
authorities covering 50,000 bags of cement to Co,
who later on sold these withdrawal authorities to Lim
Using the withdrawal authorities, Lim withdrew the
cement bags from FRCC on a staggered basis. She
successfully withdrew 2,800 bags of cement, and
sold back some of the withdrawal authorities,
covering 10,000 bags, to Co.
Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to
withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags covered by the
withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the matter with
Co and Borja, who explained that the plant
implemented a price increase and would only release
the goods once Lim pays for the price difference or
agrees to receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim
objected and maintained that the withdrawal
authorities she bought were not subject to price
fluctuations. Lim sought legal recourse after her
demands for Co to resolve the problem with the plant
or for the return of her money had failed.
Lim filed with RTC Information for Estafa through
Misappropriation or Conversion against Co. RTC
acquitted Co.
After the trial on the civil aspect of the criminal case,
the RTC also relieved Co of civil liability to Lim
Lim then filed a complaint for specific performance
and damages before the RTC.
Co filed a Motion to Dismiss, maintaining that the two
actions raise the same issue, which is Cos liability to
Lim for her inability to withdraw the bags of cement,
and should be dismissed on the ground of lis
pendens and forum shopping.

Issue: W/N petitioner committed forum shopping in filing the

civil case for specific performance and damages during the
pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal
case for estafa
Held: No
Independent civil liabilities are separate from the
criminal action and may be pursued independently,
as provided in Articles 31 and 33 of the Civil Code,
which state that:
ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation
not arising from the act or omission complained of as a
felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.

ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical

injuries a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the
injured
party.
Such
civil
action
shall
proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.

Because of the distinct and independent nature of

the two kinds of civil liabilities, jurisprudence holds
that the offended party may pursue the two types of
civil liabilities simultaneously or cumulatively,
without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis
pendentia, or res judicata.
Since civil liabilities arising from felonies and those
arising from other sources of obligations are
authorized by law to proceed independently of each
other, the resolution of the present issue hinges on
whether the two cases herein involve different kinds
of civil obligations such that they can proceed
independently of each other. The answer is in the
affirmative.
o
The first action is clearly a civil action ex
delicto, it having been instituted together
with the criminal action.
o
On the other hand, the second action,
judging by the allegations contained in the
complaint, is a civil action arising from a
contractual obligation and for tortious
conduct (abuse of rights).
Lim includes allegations that the actions of the
defendants were committed in such manner as to
cause damage to Lim without regard for morals, good
customs and public policy. These allegations, if
proven, would constitute tortious conduct (abuse of
rights under the Human Relations provisions of the
Civil Code).
Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 involves only the
obligations arising from contract and from tort,
whereas the appeal in the estafa case involves only
the civil obligations of Co arising from the offense
charged. They present different causes of action,
which under the law, are considered "separate,
distinct, and independent"62 from each other. Both
cases can proceed to their final adjudication, subject
to the prohibition on double recovery under Article
2177 of the Civil Code.

20

f. Civil Personality; Birth; Death

Civil Code Provisions
Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the
conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes
that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the
conditions specified in the following article.

Article 712. Ownership is acquired by occupation and by

intellectual creation.
Ownership and other real rights over property are
acquired and transmitted by law, by donation, by testate
and intestate succession, and in consequence of certain
contracts, by tradition.
They may also be acquired by means of prescription.

Article 777. The rights to the succession are transmitted

from the moment of the death of the decedent.

Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered

born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered
from the mother's womb. However, if the fetus had an
intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not
deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its
complete delivery from the maternal womb.
Family Code Provisions

Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death.

The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the
deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.

Article 390. After an absence of seven years, it being

unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall
be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.
The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose
of opening his succession till after an absence of ten
years. If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five
years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order
that his succession may be opened.

Article 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all

purposes, including the division of the estate among the
heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage,
or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been heard
of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in
war, and has been missing for four years;

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during

subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present has a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage
under the preceding paragraph the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Code
for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.
Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the
community property shall belong to both spouses jointly.
In case of disagreement, the husband's decision shall
prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife for
proper remedy, which must be availed of within five years
from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the common
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall
be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors.

(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other

circumstances and his existence has not been known for
four years.

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Art. 124.
The administration and enjoyment of
the conjugal partnership shall belong to both spouses
jointly. In case of disagreement, the husband's decision
shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the wife
for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five
years from the date of the contract implementing such
decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall
be void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse and
the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors.
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the
marriage under Article 134 to 138.

Art. 126.

The conjugal partnership terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the
marriage under Articles 134 to 138

Section 2.
Meaning of word "incompetent."
Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes persons
suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are
hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are
unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind,
even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not
being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease,
weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without
outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their
property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and
exploitation.
CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
vs.
HON.
ACCREDITED
VOLUNTARY
ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAO and NAGKAKAISANG
MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATIONSOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR
EMPOWERMENT
AND
REFORMS
(NMCSC-SUPER),
Respondents.
G.R. No. 182836 | October 13, 2009 (3D)
Facts:

Art. 142. The administration of all classes of exclusive

property of either spouse may be transferred by the court
to the other spouse:

(1) When one spouse becomes the guardian of the other;

(2) When one spouse is judicially declared an absentee;
(3) When one spouse is sentenced to a penalty which
carries with it civil interdiction; or

(4) When one spouse becomes a fugitive from justice or is

in hiding as an accused in a criminal case.

If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of

incompetence, conflict of interest, or any other just cause,
the court shall appoint a suitable person to be the
administrator.
Rule 92, Revised Rules of Court

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental

Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel)
and a member of respondent Union, filed a claim for
Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and
Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the
Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded
between Continental and the Union.
The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos
unborn child. Hortillanos wife had a premature
delivery while she was in the 38th week of
pregnancy. According to the Certificate of Fetal
Death, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal
Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency.
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos
claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and other death benefits,
consisting of the death and accident insurance.
Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental
Steel of Hortillanos claims for bereavement and
other death benefits, the Union resorted to the
grievance machinery provided in the CBA.
Despite the series of conferences held, the parties
still failed to settle their dispute,8 prompting the
Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)
During the proceedings of voluntary arbitration,
Continental Steel posited that the express provision
of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an
unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality.
Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 4216
of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil
personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never
died because it never acquired juridical personality.
The voluntary arbitrator ordered Continental Steel to
pay Hortillano his bereavement leave pay and other
death benefits.
CA affirmed the order. Hence this petition.

Issue: W/N Hortillano is entitled to the accident and death

insurance pursuant to the CBA
Held:

The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41

and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of
death is misplaced.
o
Article 40 provides that a conceived child
acquires personality only when it is born,
and Article 41 defines when a child is
considered born.
o
Article 42 plainly states that civil personality
is extinguished by death.

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First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant

herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on
natural persons, must be applied in relation to Article
37 of the same Code, the very first of the general
provisions on civil personality, which reads:
Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be
the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every
natural person and is lost only through death.
Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with
legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
o
We need not establish civil personality of
the unborn child herein since his/her
juridical capacity and capacity to act as a
person are not in issue. It is not a question
before us whether the unborn child acquired
any rights or incurred any obligations prior
to his/her death that were passed on to or
assumed by the childs parents. The rights
to bereavement leave and other death
benefits in the instant case pertain directly
to the parents of the unborn child upon the
latters death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do
not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover,
while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil
personality may be extinguished by death, it does
not explicitly state that only those who have acquired
juridical personality could die.
And third, death has been defined as the cessation of
life. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One
need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die. Even a child inside the womb already has
life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life
of the unborn from conception, that the State must
protect equally with the life of the mother. If the
unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof
even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as
death.
It is apparent that according to the Family Code and
the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child attaches upon his/her
conception. In the present case, it was not disputed
that Hortillano and his wife were validly married and
that their child was conceived during said marriage,
hence, making said child legitimate upon her
conception.
Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able
to comply with the fourth element entitling him to
death and accident insurance under the CBA, i.e.,
presentation of the death certificate of his unborn
child.
Given the existence of all the requisites for
bereavement leave and other death benefits under
the CBA, Hortillanos claims for the same should have
been granted by Continental Steel.
We emphasize that bereavement leave and other
death benefits are granted to an employee to give
aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said
employee and his family who suffered the loss of a
loved one. It cannot be said that the parents grief
and sense of loss arising from the death of their
unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life
of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less
than that of parents whose child was born alive but
died subsequently.

GLORIA SANTOS DUEAS, petitioner, vs. SANTOS

SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, respondent.
G.R. No. 149417 | June 4, 2004 (2D)
Facts:

Petitioner Gloria Santos Dueas is the daughter of

the late Cecilio J. Santos who, during his lifetime,
owned a parcel of land located at General T. De Leon,
Valenzuela City

Cecilio had the realty subdivided into smaller lots,

the whole forming the Cecilio J. Santos Subdivision
(for brevity, Santos Subdivision)
The members of Santos Subdivision Homeowners
Association (SSHA) submitted to the petitioner a
resolution asking her to provide within the
subdivision an open space for recreational and other
community activities, in accordance with the
provisions of P.D. No. 957
Petitioner, however, rejected the request, thus,
prompting the members of SSHA to seek redress
from the NHA.
Regional Director of the Expanded NCR Field Office,
HLURB, opined that the open space requirement of
P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D. No. 1216, was not
applicable to Santos Subdivision.
In dismissing the case, the HLURB-NCR office ruled
that while SSHA failed to present evidence showing
that it is an association duly organized under
Philippine law with capacity to sue, nonetheless, the
suit could still prosper if viewed as a suit filed by all
its members who signed and verified the petition.
CA: Reversed and set aside HLURB; Ordered remand
of the case to the HLURB for the determination of the
definitive land area

Issue: W/N CA erred in not finding that respondent SSHA

lacked the the legal personality to sue
Held: Yes
Under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court,
only natural or juridical persons, or entities
authorized by law may be parties in a civil action.
Article 4425 of the Civil Code enumerates the various
classes of juridical persons. Under said Article, an
association is considered a juridical person if the law
grants it a personality separate and distinct from that
of its members.
The records of the present case are bare of any
showing by SSHA that it is an association duly
organized under Philippine law. It was thus an error
for the HLURB-NCR Office to give due course to the
complaint, given the SSHAs lack of capacity to sue in
its own name. Nor was it proper for said agency to
treat the complaint as a suit by all the parties who
signed and verified the complaint. The members
cannot represent their association in any suit without
valid and legal authority. Neither can their signatures
confer on the association any legal capacity to sue.
Nor will the fact that SSHA belongs to the Federation
of Valenzuela Homeowners Association, Inc., suffice
to endow SSHA with the personality and capacity to
sue.
Mere allegations of membership in a federation are
insufficient and inconsequential. The federation itself
has a separate juridical personality and was not
impleaded as a party in the HLURB Case nor in this
case. Neither was it shown that the federation was
authorized to represent SSHA. Facts showing the
capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority
of a party to sue or be sued in a representative
capacity or the legal existence of an organized
association of persons that is made a party, must be
averred.
Hence, for failing to show that it is a juridical entity,
endowed by law with capacity to bring suits in its
own name, SSHA is devoid of any legal capacity,
whatsoever, to institute any action.
g. Domicile; Residence vs. Domicile; Annulment or
Nullity of Marriages AM 02-11-110 SC; Settlement of
Estate; Election Laws
Civil Code Provisions

23

Article 50. For the exercise of civil rights and the

fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural
persons is the place of their habitual residence.

Art. 68. The husband and wife are obliged to live

together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and
render mutual help and support.

Article 51. When the law creating or recognizing them,

or any other provision does not fix the domicile of juridical
persons, the same shall be understood to be the place
where their legal representation is established or where
they exercise their principal functions.

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family
domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.

Family Code Provisions

The court may exempt one spouse from living with the
other if the latter should live abroad or there are other
valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However,
such exemption shall not apply if the same is not
compatible with the solidarity of the family.

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, vs. THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE
MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents. See digest above

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