US POLICY ON THE IRAQ WAR AND THE GULF REGION UNDER 44TH

PRESIDENT GEORGE W. BUSH JR.

(Term paper towards partial fulfilment of the assessment in the subject of Contemporary
World Relation)

SUBMITTED TO:

SUBMITTED BY:

DR. OM PRAKASH

BADAPBIANG T. DKHAR-819

ASSISTANT PROFESSOR

DIVA DEVARSHA -822

FACULTY OF POLICY SCIENCE

STUDENTS B.P. SC, LLB

(HONS)

NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

JODHPUR
SUMMER SEMESTER 2013

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
We would like to express our gratitude to Dr. Om Prakash, for allotting us with such a
promising topic and for the guidance he has given us, without which it would have been
impossible for us to accomplish this task.
We would also wish to thank the library staff of the college for their help and cooperation in
compiling material for our project. We wish to take the opportunity to thank each other for
the team work and cooperation and our parents and friends who have always given us a lot of
support and inspiration in all our endeavours.
-Badapbiang T. Dkhar and Diva Devarsha

TABLE OF CONTENT

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT............................................................................................. 2
TABLE OF CONTENT................................................................................................ 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY..................................................................................... 4
INTRODUCTION....................................................................................................... 6
BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND GULF POLICY..............................................................6
A.

PERSIAN GULF POSITION IN GLOBAL AND US ENERGY SUPPLY......................................6

B.

INSTABILITY IN OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES..............................................................7

i.

American Objectives & Policies.........................................................................7

ii.

U.S. and Iran................................................................................................. 8

iii.

US and Iraq............................................................................................... 9

iv.

US and Saudi Arabia..................................................................................... 11

SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE BUSH DOCTRINE..............................................................13

BUSH DOCTRINE.................................................................................................... 13
UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 1441.......................................................................14
A.

POLITICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE AMERICAN-BRITISH INVASION OF IRAQ IN 2003

14

B.

INTERNATIONAL REACTION.................................................................................15

BUSHS AXIS OF EVIL AND STRATEGY LEADING TO THE INVASION OF IRAQ............17

A.

BUSHS ARGUMENT: THE DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR WAR?...........................................17

B.

BUSHS CONVINCING STRATEGY: PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK ON IRAQ......................................18

C.

WAR ON IRAQ AND THE USE OF FORCE....................................................................19

D.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE IRAQ INVASION...................................................20

i.

Realist Perspective........................................................................................ 20

ii.

Liberalism.................................................................................................. 21

iii.

Ideological influences.................................................................................21

THE AFTERMATH................................................................................................... 22
A.

ARAB PERCEPTIONS ON US IRAQ POLICY.................................................................22

B.

WORLD TRIBUNAL ON IRAQ.................................................................................. 23

CONCLUSION........................................................................................................ 26
BIBLIOGRAPHY..................................................................................................... 27

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
AREA:
Gulf policy of United States of America under 44th President George W. Bush Jr.
TOPIC:
US Policy on the Iraq war and the gulf region Under 44th President George W. Bush Jr.
SUBJECT:
Contemporary World Relations
OBJECTIVES:
To analyze the basis of the foreign policy of United States towards the Gulf Region under the
administration of George W. Bush Jr. The most emphasis has been put on the Iraq war and the
after math.
RESEARCH QUESTIONS:
1. What was the basis of the Bush Jr. administration policy in the Gulf region?
2. What was the status of relationship of United States with various prominent Gulf
Nations namely Saudi Arabia, Iran and Iraq?
3. What was Bush's strategy of dealing with the menace of terrorism emanating from the
Gulf Region?
4. What is the concept of Bush's Axis of Evil and strategy leading to Iraq War?
5. What are the various theoretical perceptions of Iraq invasion?
6. Whether the United Nations Doctrine of International Law was followed in the Iraq
war?
HYPOTHESIS:
We have basically analyzed George W. Bush's Policy with respect to Gulf Region with more
emphasis on prominent energy player nations. We have come up with the hypothesis that the
major changes with respect to the Policy under Bush Jr. Regime were related to the energy
control keeping in mind that The Gulf region is the biggest producer of Crude Oil and Natural
Gas. We have examine his various strategy and the method of his policy making, linking it
with the various theories of World Relations. And as it is known that Gulf region is no threat
to United States of America as far as security is concern. Hence our clear hypothesis
concluded to the US need of control on energy Producing and Exporting Nations as US has
the largest population of consumers.

SOURCES:
Secondary in the nature of reports, documents, reviews, articles, etc. Collections are made
from journals, websites to present a holistic view of the current scenario.
DATA:
Inferences have been drawn with the help of international conventions, scholarly articles,
government websites and books.
RESEARCH TECHNIQUES FOR DATA COLLECTION:
Examination of theories and strategic policies through analysis of various decisions taken
under George W. Bush Jr.s administration.
METHODOLOGY TO BE ADOPTED:
A deductive approach will be followed in the project wherein the research has been
conducted by taking certain generalized notions into account and drawing specific inferences
in the light of the fact situations.
MODE OF CITATION:
A uniform mode of citation shall be adopted and followed consistently throughout this
project. The style of footnoting shall be as per the citation followed at National Law
University, Jodhpur.

INTRODUCTION
The Persian Gulf region is home to three-fourth of the worlds proven crude oil reserves. It is
also worlds main supplier of fossil fuel energy. The United States is the worlds major energy
consumer, spending almost one-fourth of the global energy.1
As we know that the US has strategic and well-established relations with the majority of
Persian Gulf littoral states. The direct link between the United States energy security policy
and its military policy in the Persian Gulf can be traced back to the formulation of the various
policies and doctrines in the late 1970s. Then after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001, the Bush administration undertook a complete reorientation of the US policy in the
Middle East. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 was meant as both a preventive war and as an
attempt to create an example of democracy in the heart of the Middle East an operation of
regional political engineering. Therefore, it seems reasonable to say that beyond the war and
the occupation of Iraq, the push for democracy and market economy in the Middle East the
transformation of the region, to borrow a phrase from the Bush administrations rhetoric ,
which is the main substantive pillar of the Bush Doctrine, is now the organizing principle of
the new US Middle East policy, itself at centre of the Bush administrations foreign policy.

This project basically examines the U.S. decision to invade Iraq from a range of analytic
perspectivesrealism, liberalism, elite interests, ideological influences, and personal and
social psychologyin order to better understand the causes of the invasion decision and
implications of the particular case study for general theories of war causes. The project also
delves into the main reasons and international objectives behind the US foreign policy in the
Gulf Region. It also reviews and analyzes the consequences of such policy for the US and
other regional and international players. In the later part of the project we have analyzed
whether the UN Doctrine of International law is followed in the whole strategy leading to
Iraq War.

1 The BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2004, available at: www.bp.cm/ statistical review.

BUSH ADMINISTRATION AND GULF POLICY

Power is not merely shouting aloud. Power is to act positively with all the
components of power.
Gamal Abdel Nasser
A. PERSIAN GULF POSITION IN GLOBAL AND US ENERGY SUPPLY
With 715 billion barrels (bb) of crude oil, the Persian Gulf littoral states of Iran, Iraq, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE, and Oman hold 60 percent of the worlds proven oil
reserves. With well over 267 bb, Saudi Arabia is home to nearly 25 percent of the worlds
crude oil reserves, followed by Iran with 132.5 bb. Next in line are Iraq with 115 bb, Kuwait
with 104 bb and the UAE with 97.8 bb respectively.2 Almost 80 percent of all proven natural
gas reserves of the Middle East are located in the Persian Gulf, and the rest in the North
African states as well as Syria and Yemen.
B. INSTABILITY IN OIL EXPORTING COUNTRIES
The Persian Gulf is the most important and strategic region of the world in terms of great
proven oil and gas reserves. However, has been volatile since the Second World War.
Competition among the regional states and major world powers to control oil resources has
been the main cause of such instability. The Britain, France and US from one hand and
Russia on the other have always tried to control and dominate the Persian Gulf littoral states.
This has turned the region into a battlefield between them and the regional states. 3 More
important though, US and British support for establishing a Jewish state in the Palestine has
similarly created a wide range of perennial crises in this volatile region. These developments
have also affected the Persian Gulf littoral states.
Al-Qaeda terrorist attacks, oil strikes, Iraqi instability that has also affected its neighbors,
dispute over Irans nuclear program, plus domestic disturbances are the main reasons behind
the Persian Gulf instability. Each and every one of these factors has the potential to create
another major oil shock for the United States and the industrial world. 4 At the same time, US
2 Pennwell Corporation, (2005, 19 December) Oil and Gas Journal; Vol. 103, No. 47, available at:
www.eid.doe.gov

3 Ibid
4 Clawson, Patrick & Henderson, Simon (2005, November) Reducing Vulnerability to Middle East Shocks.
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Policy Focus.

presence in the region and its widespread support of authoritarian regimes in the bid to secure
oil supply has led to the rise of anti-American sentiments and anti-Western movements. This
has similarly exacerbated the situation, pushing up energy costs and prices.5
i.
American Objectives & Policies
Energy has always had a special place in the US foreign policy. During the World War II, US
officials were extremely concerned over the potentiality of falling huge energy resources of
Persian Gulf into the hands of their enemies. Price hikes of the 1970s and rising demand for
oil in the industrial nations intensified the so- called anxieties. During the period, US crushed
nationalist movements and fought against the intrusive policies of former Soviet Union in
order to secure and stabilize its own regional position and those of its European allies,
especially England. After the withdrawal of British troops from the Suez Canal, the US
became the only force in charge of the security of oil supply to the industrial world.
Later on after the inclusion of terrorism as a subject of concern with respect to foreign policy,
we can see how the United States Policy reflects strategic importance of terrorism in various
forms. In U.S. Policy towards the Gulf region, democratization as a response to terrorism is
based on a pessimistic cultural assessment of the societies concerned. 6 The strategic vision of
the US administration under Bush Junior was based on considering terrorism as an existential
threat, preventive intervention, transatlantic co- operation, forced changes in other countries
and poor international legality.
ii.
U.S. and Iran
As we all know, the U.S. policy vis--vis Iran was marked by a highly confrontational
attitude. The February 11, 1979, fall of the Shah of Iran, a key U.S. ally, opened a deep and
ongoing rift in U.S.-Iranian relations. Although U.S. concerns about Iran and its nuclear
program are longstanding, Israels threat to use military action against Irans nuclear facilities
with or without U.S. backinghas made U.S. policy toward Iran an urgent issue. Many of
the policy options being implemented or under consideration are the same options that have
faced the United States since 1979. With the exception of a U.S. ground invasion of Iran,
virtually no policy option has been ruled out.
5 Knights, Michael (2006) Troubled Waters, Future US Security Assistance in the Persian Gulf. The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Policy Focus.

6 Roberto Aliboni, Europes Role in Gulf: A Transatlantic Perspective, Paper presented at the seminar
on EU- Gulf Relations: Enhancing Economic, Political and Security Co- operation, in co- operation
with the Gulf Research Center Rome, 26 Nov. 2005

Iran has an interest section in Washington, DC, under the auspices of the Embassy of
Pakistan; it is staffed by Iranian Americans. The U.S. interest section in Tehranunder the
auspices of the Embassy of Switzerland therehas no American personnel stationed there.
There has been occasional U.S. consideration of requesting that Tehran allow U.S. personnel
there, but Iran has not expressed support for the idea. As a temporary alternative, the State
Department is attempting outreach to the Iranian people by establishing, as of November
2011, an Internet-based virtual embassy, that explains the visa application process and other
items of interest to Iranians.
With Irans nuclear program emerging as an issue in 2002, the George W. Bush
Administration tried to limit Irans strategic capabilities through international diplomacy and
sanctions. Although Iran appeared to have no role in the September 11, 2001, attacks,
President Bush appeared to define Iran as an adversary of the United States when he included
Iran as part of an axis of evil in his January 2002 State of the Union message (along with
Iraq and North Korea). President George Bushs January 20, 2005 second inaugural address
and his January 31, 2006 State of the Union message stated that the United States would be a
close ally of a free and democratic Iran reflecting sentiment for efforts to change the
regime.7
On the other hand, Bush Administration statements that it considered Iran a great nation and
respects its history8 reflected the views of those in the Administration who favoured
diplomacy, particularly considering Irans potential to harm U.S. troops in Afghanistan and
Iraq. The Administration engaged Iran on specific issues: for example, it conducted a
dialogue in Geneva with Iran on Iraq and Afghanistan from late 2001 until May 2003. 9 This
represented the first confirmed direct dialogue between the two countries since the 1979
revolution.
The United States aided victims of the December 2003 earthquake in Bam, Iran, including a
reported offer rebuffed by Iranto send a high-level delegation to Iran that would include
then Senator Elizabeth Dole and President Bushs sister, Dorothy. An amendment by then
7 Cooper, Helene and David Sanger. Strategy on Iran Stirs New Debate at White House. New York Times,
June 16,2007.

8 These were prominent themes in speeches by President Bush such as at the Merchant Marine Academy on
June 19, 2006, and his September 18, 2006, speech to the U.N. General Assembly.

9 Wright, Robin. U.S. In Useful Talks With Iran. Los Angeles Times, May 13, 2003.

Senator Joseph Biden to the FY2007 defence authorization bill supported the Administration
joining nuclear talks with Iran.10 The Bush Administration did not offer Iran an unconditional,
direct U.S.-Iran bilateral dialogue on all issues of U.S. concern. However, some say the Bush
Administration missed an opportunity for a grand bargain with Iran on its nuclear
program and other issues of concern by rebuffing a reported comprehensive overture from
Iran just before the May 12, 2003, Riyadh bombing. The Washington Post reported on
February 14, 2007, that the Swiss ambassador to Iran in 2003, Tim Guldimann, had informed
U.S. officials of a comprehensive Iranian proposal for talks with the United States. 11
However, State Department officials and some European diplomats based in Tehran
questioned whether that proposal represented an authoritative Iranian communication. Hence
we can see that even the US policy towards Iran seems a bit in conflict.
iii.
US and Iraq
Efforts to disarm Iraq of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) began in 1991 when it was
ejected from Kuwait. The process was moribund after December 1998 following joint USUK air strikes, Iraq refused to readmit inspectors and disputes arose within the UN Security
Council over the future direction of policy towards Iraq.
By this time the USA had moved towards a policy of supporting regime change in Baghdad,
either by covert means or by providing assistance to Iraqi opposition groups. The UK
indicated general support for the prospect of a change of regime and continued to insist on the
maintenance of UN sanctions pending full, unconditional Iraqi disarmament. Russia and
France expressed their opposition to enforced regime-change, favouring instead a gradual
easing of non-military sanctions and a normalisation of relations with the existing
regime.12The result was deadlock in the Security Council and, in the absence of inspectors on
the ground, mounting uncertainty over Baghdads compliance with its disarmament
obligations.

10 Kenneth Katzman, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, Congressional Research Service,
June 17, 2013
11 Shahram Chubin, Iran and the Arab Spring: Ascendancy Frustrated, GRC GULF PAPERS,
September 2012
12 Library Standard Note, Sanctions on Iraq, SN/IA/1431, of 20 May 2002

Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 the Bush administration devoted
considerable attention to asymmetric threats which, in its view, had multiplied since the
demise of communism in Europe. In his State of the Union address in January 2002 President
Bush spoke of an axis of evil, comprising states that sought the proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and supported international terrorism. He named Iraq as one such state. Mr
Bush said,
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the
peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and
growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match
their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United States. In any of
these cases, the price of indifference would be catastrophic.13
In September 2002 President Bush published a new security doctrine, The National Security
Strategy of the United States of America. This gave greater priority than in the past to the
concept of pre-emption.14 It discussed terrorist threats, including the possibility that terrorists
might obtain weapons of mass destruction. Later, on 12 September 2002 President Bush
spoke to the UN General Assembly, and said that my nation will work with the UN Security
Council to meet our common challenge in respect of Iraq.
Under intense pressure from other Arab governments and the wider international community,
Iraq declared on 16 September 2002 that it would accept an unconditional return of UN
inspectors. The move came as the USA and UK began work on a draft Security Council
resolution aimed at strengthening the existing inspection process, which they believed to be
flawed, establishing a precise timetable for Iraqi compliance, and indicating consequences in
the event of non-compliance.
Finally on 8 November 2002 the Security Council voted unanimously to adopt Resolution
1441 and thereby afford Iraq a final opportunity to comply with its disarmament
obligations.14 There had been doubt over the voting intentions of Syria, the sole Arab
member of the Council, but it voted in favour. In the Resolution, the Council deplored Iraqs
13 Text of the Presidents State of the Union address, 29 January 2002, from the White House web site at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html

14 Library Research Paper Iraq: The debate on policy options, RP 02/53, of 20 September 2002.

failure to provide an accurate, full, final and complete disclosure of its WMD and prohibited
missile programmes, as required under Resolution 687. It also deplored Iraqs repeated failure
to cooperate fully and unconditionally with the inspection process and its decision in 1998 to
cease all cooperation. Later on in the other chapters, we have discussed the US Strategy
leading to Iraq War in more detail.
iv. US and Saudi Arabia
The George W. Bush administration also got off to a bad start with Saudi Arabia in 2001. The
Saudis had great hopes for him because theyd had such a good relationship with Bush
Senior.
Due to 9/11, and the oil for security pact became unglued in stages. Fifteen of the 19
hijackers were Saudis; Osama bin Laden was a Saudi, even if hed been stripped of his
citizenship. Everybodys attitude toward Saudi Arabia changed dramatically.15 Wahhabism
became an issue for the first time in our relationship. Saudi Arabia was viewed as a spiritual
source of terrorism and a funder of terrorists. There were debates in Congress and the media
over whether Saudi Arabia was a friend or foe. Why were so many Saudis involved in this?
What was going on there? It became so serious that the Treasury Department and the FBI
seized all the financial documents of Prince Bandar in the embassy in an attempt to track
down where Saudi money had been going inside the U.S. This is an extraordinary thing to
have happened. They were concerned that the Saudis were financing terrorists or
fundamentalists inside the U.S., tracking down what the charities were doing.
Later the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a major trauma for Saudi Arabia. While the
Saudis were worried about the balance of power in the Gulf, the U.S., their ally, came in and
installed a pro-Iranian Shiite government in Iraq.
Immediately after Saddams ouster, the Saudis sent the U.S. Air Force packing and stopped
the negotiations with American oil companies. They turned instead to Chinese, Russian, and
European oil companies to come in and look for gas and oil. They decided not to buy any
more U.S. aircraft, the main symbol of the military relationship. Instead, they bought
European Typhon jets from Britain. On the other hand, in spring of 2004, the Saudis tried to
15 David Ottaway , The U.S. and Saudi Arabia Since the 1930s presented at U.S. Foreign Policy
and the Modern Middle East, a Summer Institute for Teachers sponsored by The Wachman Center of
the Foreign Policy Research Institute, held June 25-27, 2009, in Philadelphi,. available at:
http://www.fpri.org/footnotes/1421.200908.ottaway.ussaudiarabia.html

do something to control the price of oil. In May 2004 the price of oil went from $26-28 to
$40/barrel, which was then the equivalent of its going to $174 a barrel this time last year.
At Americas behest, the Saudis said they were ready to pump 2 million more barrels of oil a
day to bring the price down. The problem is, the Saudis had lost control of the market. Even
though they pumped close to 2 million more barrels of oil a day, it had no effect on the price
of oil. By election time in the U.S. 2004, it was up to $50 per barrel. 16 So basically the Saudis
had lost control of the market to traders, speculators, forces over which they had no control.
The pact that had held together the U.S. and Saudi Arabia for so many decades, the Saudis
providing US with oil at reasonable prices, while they provided them with their security, no
longer worked.
Bush tried to put the relationship back together starting in April 2005, when King Abdullah
came to Crawford, Texas to meet with him. At the very end of his administration, Bush tried
to re-launch the peace process, but without getting much involved himself. The Saudis were
not impressed. And they had never liked Washingtons democracy agenda, rejecting U.S.
urging that they lead regional democratic reforms.
The September 11 attacks have heightened U.S. concerns about radical Islamic activists
operating in the Gulf states. These activists, who might be linked to or sympathetic to Al
Qaeda, do not currently appear to threaten the stability of any of the Gulf regimes, although
the networks could be planning acts of terrorism against U.S. forces and installations there. 17
The September 11 attacks have stimulated some sources of tension between the United States
and some of the Gulf monarchy states, particularly Saudi Arabia, over allegations that Gulf
donors have, wittingly or unknowingly, contributed to groups and institutions linked to Al
Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.

16 Supra n. 15
17 Kenneth Katzman, The Persian Gulf States: Post-War Issues for U.S. Policy, CRS Report for
Congress, July 14, 2003

SEPTEMBER 11 AND THE BUSH DOCTRINE

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Bush administration undertook a
complete reorientation of the US policy in the Middle East. In this part of the project, we will
be analyzing U.S. efforts to manage remaining Gulf security interests as well the new
challenges highlighted by the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.
BUSH DOCTRINE
Bush Doctrine was the policy of the United States to seek and support democratic
movements and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of ending
tyranny in our world.18 At the core of the new approach under Bush Doctrine is the idea that
to win the war on terrorism, the United States must take advantage of its unprecedented
power to advance freedom promote democracy and market economy throughout the
world, and especially across the Arab-Muslim world. In late 2001, after the infamous terrorist
attacks on the world trade towers and the Pentagon, President Bush announced the first war
of the 21st century.This organizing statement introduced what would become the war on
terror, a narrative formulated and carried out by the Bush presidency.
The second aspect of the Bush Doctrine as the new policy has come to be referred to is
the concept of preemptive war, which actually means preventive war: the nature of the
threat confronting the United States a combination of transnational terrorist networks, evil
regimes, failed States and proliferation of unconventional weapons requires that the US be
ready to act preventively. This second pillar of the Bush Doctrine contributes to its
revolutionary character but is of less importance for the purpose of this article than the
policy of democracy promotion in the Middle East. The first comprehensive policy document
presenting the Bush Doctrine was the National Security Strategy of the United States of
America (NSS) released by the White House in September 2002.
The Bush Doctrine has evoked an intense debate among foreign policy experts 19 but, more
than three years after the launch of the war in Iraq, the promotion of political freedom is still
the guiding principle of the Bush administrations Middle East policy.
18 President George W. Bush, Speech at West Point, U.S. Military Academy, June 1st, 2002; Remarks at the
20th anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy, November 6, 2002; Address at Whitehall
palace, London, November 19, 2003. All speeches are accessible through <www.whitehouse.gov>.

19 Pierre Nol/ US Middle East Policy and Energy Security Challenges, The International Journal (Toronto).
(2006)

UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTION 1441

United States manipulation of the United Nations is a primary factor in the origin and
maintenance of economic sanctions on Iraq and the accompanying military campaigns during
the regime of Bush Senior.20 Iraq no longer threatened international peace because the United
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) confiscated and destroyed its major weapons of
mass destruction while sanctions devastated the Iraqi economy, and left the country without
sufficient resources to rebuild its military strength.21 Here, we can consider this as an accurate
example of lobbying by big powers such US and UK as we know that permanent members
tend to lobby for the favourable cause. United Nations Security Council Resolution 661
established economic sanctions on Iraq, while Resolution 687 established the requirements
Iraq must meet for the United Nations to lift the sanctions.22

A. POLITICAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND OF THE AMERICAN-BRITISH INVASION OF

IRAQ IN 2003
After the adoption of Resolution 687, the UN Security Council passed a dozen resolutions
regarding post-Gulf War Iraq", until the acceptance by unanimity of Resolution 1441 in
November 2002, which was considered only by the US and Britain -amongst the five
permanent members of the Council- as a legal basis ensuring an implied authorization of use
of force against Iraq. On 8 November 2002 the UN Security Council voted unanimously to
adopt Resolution 1441. Holding Iraq in material breach of its obligations under previous
resolutions, the Security Council decided that:
By the unanimous adoption of resolution 1441 (2002), the Council instructed the resumed
inspections to begin within 45 days, and also decided it would convene immediately upon the
receipt of any reports from inspection authorities that Iraq was

interfering with their

activities. It recalled, in that context, that the Council had repeatedly warned Iraq that it
would face "serious consequences" as a result of continued violations.
20 Anthony Arnove, Introduction, in IRAO UNDER SIEGE: THE DEADLY IMPACT OF SANCTIONS AND
WAR 9, 9-16 (Anthony Arnove ed., 2000)

21 John Pilger, Collateral Damage, in IRAQ UNDER SIEGE: THE DEADLY IMPACT OF SANCTIONS
AND WAR 59, 59-64 (Anthony Arnove ed., 2000)

22 S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2933rd mtg. at 19-20, U.N. Doc. S/RES/0661 (1990) (establishing
sanctions on Iraq); S.C. Res. 687, supra note 14 (detailing requirements Iraq must meet for United Nations to
lift sanctions);

Under the new inspection regime established by the resolution, the United Nations
Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) would have immediate, unimpeded, unconditional and
unrestricted access to any sites and buildings in Iraq, including presidential sites. They
would also have the right to remove or destroy any weapons, or related items, they found.
The Council demanded that Iraq confirm, within seven days, its intention to comply fully with
the resolution. It further decided that, within 30 days, Iraq, in order to begin to comply with
its obligations, should provide to UNMOVIC, the IAEA and the Council a complete
declaration of all aspects of its programmes to develop chemical, biological and nuclear
weapons, including chemical, biological and nuclear programmes it claims are for purposes
not related to weapons production or material.
Any false statement or omission in the declaration will be considered a further material
breach of Iraqs obligations, and will be reported to the Council for assessment.23
B. INTERNATIONAL REACTION
President Bush welcomed the passage of Resolution 1441, declaring that:
The resolution approved today presents the Iraqi regime with a test a final test. Iraq must
now, without delay or negotiations, fully disarm; welcome full inspections, welcome full
inspections, and fundamentally change the approach it has taken for more than a decade.
The French Prime Minister, Jean-Pierre Raffarin, welcomed the unanimous vote in the
Security Council, stressing that the Resolution would facilitate disarmament by peaceful
means.24 Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Yuri Fedotov said that the wording of the
Resolution was not ideal but coming from a difficult compromise, adding that the main
thing is that compromise is reached and the world community has managed to avert a real
threat of war. The way for political and diplomatic settlement of the Iraqi situation is open.25
Other Arab governments welcomed the Resolution as an important step towards defusing
tension in the Gulf region and averting the threat of war. The Egyptian Foreign Minister said
23 UNPress Release SC/7564, 8 November 2002,
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm
24 ITAR-TASS news agency, 9 November 2002
25 ITAR TASS, 8 November 2002, from BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 9 November 2002

that his government had played a key role in convincing Washington to address the Iraqi issue
through the UN, adding that he believed Iraq would deal constructively with the inspectors
and allow them unconditional access. He went on to stress his governments view that the
Resolution did not stipulate the automatic use of force.26
The Saudi cabinet urged Iraq to accept the Resolution so as to avoid inflicting harm on the
Iraqi people, and expressed its hope that the Resolution would put an end to the deteriorating
situation in the region and avert the danger of war.27 Kuwait called on Iraq to take the
Resolution seriously and to comply with the UNs demands in order to avert the danger of
war.28
An Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman said his government hoped that Iraq would cooperate
fully with the Security Council and UN arms inspectors so that the stage would not be set for
America to make excuses and conduct adventurism in the region. He also stressed that the
Security Council should be the decision maker and axis for any action against Iraq.29

26 Egyptian news agency MENA, 9 November 2002, from BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 November
2002

27 Saudi News Agency SPA website, 11 November 2002, from BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 13
November 2002

28 Kuna news agency, Kuwait, 9 November 2002, from BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 November
2002

29 IRNA news agency, 9 November 2002, from BBC Monitoring

BUSHS AXIS OF EVIL AND STRATEGY LEADING TO THE INVASION OF IRAQ

A. BUSHS ARGUMENT: THE DETERRENCE OF NUCLEAR WAR?
The Axis of Evil was announcement by President Bush in his State of the Union Address
on January 29, 2002,30 which generated wide reactions and unfavourable remarks. The
President identified Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as the members of this malefic axis,
President Bush resorts to the manipulation of stereotypic visions deeply rooted within
segments of U.S. society and thought. The new Axis of Evil to a certain extent reactivates
the rogue states vision that former President Clinton endorsed until the end of his
presidency when he replaced the vision with a less spectacular view: States of Concern. 31
The Axis of Evil is seen to be a mechanism for the invocation of the war against
international nuclear atrocities and tyranny, so it seemed at the time.
In President Bushs view, the United States must closely monitor the most dangerous regimes
that are developing missiles and mass destruction weapons that might be used against the
United States. This view keeps alive a latent threat from abroad, thereby favouring the
Presidents request for an increase of $48 billion in the defence budget, expected to reach
$379 billion in 2003.32 It is said that this is the largest increase in defence spending since the
Reagan era and would be equivalent to 40% of the world's total military expenditures. 33 Such
military expenditure seemed like an excuse for buying arms or stocking up for an arms race.
In international relations one very effective strategy for influencing another actors plans of
aggression is through deterrence or the threat to punish another actor if it takes certain
negative actions.34 In the present matter it is seen that; Bush waging war in Iraq was to deter
Saddam Husseins from using weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear missiles against
30 President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address (Jan. 29, 2002),
http/www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html.

available at:

31 Luis Mesa Delmonte, Economic Sanctions, Iraq, and U.S. Foreign Policy,11 Transnat'l L. &
Contemp. Probs. 345 (2001) at p.370
32 Budget of the US Government, Office of Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 2003, available
at: http-//www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budgetfy2003/pdf/budget.pdf (last visited Sep. 11, 2013)
33 Ibid

USA. The war according to Bush was for the protection USA or to increase homeland
security. Bush has played his cards very well as he had succeeded to get UKs support in
waging war against oil rich country Iraq.
B. BUSHS CONVINCING STRATEGY: PRE-EMPTIVE ATTACK ON IRAQ
The U.S. response to the Al Qaeda-Taliban axis was largely consistent with a broad yet
appropriately updated interpretation of Article 51 of the UN Charter. It states that:
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council
has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right
of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security
Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and
responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to
take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to
maintain or restore international peace and security.35
In addition, rather than treat 9/11 as a crime as some suggested, Mr. Bush immediately
recognized the event as an act of war, requiring a broad military and diplomatic response
rather than mere criminal prosecution. 36 In the aftermath of 9/11, Mr. Bush's response to the
9/11 attacks were marked by a single-minded decisiveness as the President put the country on
a war footing against international terror. He spoke privately of the need for massive, swift
and lethal force, stating during a national security briefing We're going to win. We are going
to do what it takes to win this war. 37 In the unfolding months, the oft-inarticulate Bush
34 Keohane, Robert O. Reciprocity in International Relations, International Organisation 40(1),
1986: 1-27, also see Joshua S, International Relations, New Delhi: Pearson Education Ltd (2003) at p.
83
35 Charter of the United Nations, available at:
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter7.shtml (last visited Sep. 11, 2013)
36 J M Spectar, Beyond the Rubicon: Presidential Leadership, International Law and Use of Force in
the Long Hard Slog, 22 Conn. J. Int'l L. 47 2006-2007 at p.58
37 Supra n.38, also see Roland Jacquard, The Guidebook of Jihad, TIME, Oct. 29, 2001, at p. 58.

presented a powerful message about the need to be resolute, decisive and relentless against
the menace of Al Qaeda. The President reportedly told his staff that everything was different
after September 11 and he made it clear that the sole organizing principle of his
administration was the fight against terror.38
Thus, the Bush Administration moved supposedly in a manner largely consistent with
international law, citing the principle of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter.
Despite the prohibitions against the use of force in Article 2(4), international law allows for a
limited use of force in self-defence in the event of an armed attack, 39 until the Security
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.40
On the other hand, although there wasn't any connection between Iraqi government and the
September 11. The attacks was in order to justify its policy toward Iraq and other hostile
states, the Bush Administration announced a new doctrine after these attacks, aiming to
materialize pre-emptive or preventive strikes against terrorists, states that support terrorists
and hostile states possessing41 weapons of mass destruction.42 It is possible to say that the
alleged threat caused by Iraq's WMD capabilities was the major reason mentioned for
justifying the US-British invasion in March-April 2003.
C. WAR ON IRAQ AND THE USE OF FORCE
The failure of legal rules established before the Second World War -within the framework of
League of Nations and Kellogg-Briand Pact- regarding the prevention of use of war as an
instrument of international politics gave rise to a relatively concrete prohibition of use of
force in United Nations (UN) Charter.43

38 Ibid, also see David E. Sanger and Elisabeth Bumiller, In One Month, A Presidency Is Transformed, Oct.11,
2001

39 Supra n.30 at p.66

40 U.N. Charter art. 5 1, para. 1.
41 Sean D. Murphy, "Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law".
American Journal of International Law, 2003, Vol.97. 419
42 Hereinafter WMD

Article 2(4) of the UN Charter does not prohibit only "use of force", but also the threat of
force, against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations44
American and British military aircrafts attacked many times Iraqi air defence facilities from
the declaration of no-fly zones until the final invasion of Iraq in 2003. As Erkmen states;
following these events, the US and Britain used to point to the self-defence of patrolling
aircrafts rather than discussing the legality of the zones in question.45
Before the invasion, both President George W. Bush and Ambassador Negroponte expressed
that in case of UN Security Council's failure to enforce Iraq to comply with its obligations,
the US would be able to react for enforcing the resolutions in order to defend itself. This fact
clearly shows that the framework of the military operation against Saddam regime was the
pre-emptive self-defence.46
Thus, by applying Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter it is seen that the US-UK attack on Iraq
was a clearly an action of aggression and use of force against a sovereign state like Iraq.
Further the use of force is disproportionate is also prevalent in the attack against Iraq who
were not as well armed as the US or UK. At the end of the day the major loss was faced by
the Iraqi civilians as their lives and security were shattered after the war for oil.
D. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE IRAQ INVASION
i.
Realist Perspective
Realism helps to explain aspects of foreign policy that remain consistent over time. From a
realist perspective, decisions by governments to go to war are the product of all states
involuntary participation in eternal quests for power and security due to an international
43 Funda Keskin. "BM ve Kuvvet Kullanma (UN and the Use of Force)", Avrasya Dosyas (Eurasian
Dossier), Ankara, Spring 2002. Vol.8, No. 1, 149-153 2
44 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law. Fifth Edition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
(2003). at p.1018
45 Serhat Erkmen. ABD ve Ingiltere'nin Irak Karisindaki Kuvvet Kullanimlarinin Deterlendirilmesi
(The Analyse of US and Britain's Use of Force Against Iraq), Ankara, Spring 2002. Vol.8, No. 325
46 Has The Military Action Against Iraq In Spring 2003 Fundamentally Transformed The System Of
Law Governing The Use Of Force?1 Rev. Int'l L. & Pol. 124 2005

political environment in which each state fears the actual or potential hostility of other states.
Leaders rationally calculate wars costs and benefits in terms of their states power and
security.47
In realist terms, the invasion was a rational means for the U.S. to achieve its primary goal of
demonstrating its power to allies and competitors alike, and of avoiding the appearance of
post-9/11 decline. As well, it was intended to prevent Iraqs actual or potential use of WMD
and oil resources to threaten the U.S. or its allies, and to prevent Iraqs potential collaboration
with anti-U.S. terrorist groups.
A secondary motive for the overthrow of the Iraqi regime, from a realist perspective, would
be to increase the security of Israel, the main U.S. regional ally. In asserting that the road to
Jerusalem goes through Baghdad, it was assumed that loss of Iraqi patronage would lessen
Palestinian militancy in the conflict with Israel and facilitate an Israeli-Palestinian accord on
terms acceptable to Israel.48
Thus, the US used the concept of unipolarity in order to maintain hegemony and avoid post9/11 decline by demonstrating U.S. willingness to use force. Furthermore, the war was fought
to Avoid nuclear proliferation, eliminate Iraqi WMD threat against the U.S. and its allies Gain
regional military bases, pressure Syria and Iran, assist Israel Secure U.S. oil supplies, reduce
energy vulnerabilities U.N. inspections are unreliable, sanctions policy causes resentment.
ii.
Liberalism
According to liberal theories, decisions on war derive from states internal characteristics,
particularly their type of government, and from the influence of international law. 49 Global
security and prosperity depend on the spread of democracy and trade, and on the conflictregulation functions of international institutions.
In short democracies fear that dictatorships will attack them first Security derives from
spreading democracy and human rights. Thus, the US attack on the tyranny of Saddam

47 Daniel Lieberfeld, Theories of Conflict and the Iraq War, International Journal of Peace Studies,
Volume 10, Number 2, Autumn/Winter 2005
48 Deputy Defence Secretary Wolfowitz (United States Department of Defence, 2003)
49 Supra n. 47 at p.6

Hussein. More over as pointed out several times in this article the US used democracy as an
excuse to wage war on Iraq to lay its hands on oil.
iii.
Ideological influences
Neoconservative belief in efficacy of unilateral force, orientalist beliefs about Middle Eastern
peoples, and evangelical Christian beliefs concerning Israel Vengeful U.S. nationalism after
9/11. With the widely felt psychological need to administer punishment unashamed by the
invasion of Afghanistan, and with Bin Laden still at large, the administration may have seen
in Saddam Hussein a scapegoat for the 9/11 attacks: He was, like the perpetrators, an Arab
Muslim and could readily fill the role of evildoer.50
This perspective would help explain why Bush administration policy makers on Iraq
generally excluded State Department personnel with first-hand experience of the region and
knowledge of its politics and history. The Bus administration infused a feeling of religious
combat, the mighty good Christians against evil doer Islamists. To us this seem quite racist
and illogical by instilling hate into the psyche of people.

THE AFTERMATH

A. ARAB PERCEPTIONS ON US IRAQ POLICY

U.S. policy towards the Middle East took a dramatic turn after the attacks of September 11,
2002. Two aspects of this relationship are especially worth our attention. The first is the
reaction of the Arab world to President Bush's agenda. Many Arabs have been increasingly
critical of the U.S. during the months that have passed since 9/1 and due to what has taken
place in the aggressive confrontation of Iraq.
In the first phase starting in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attack on the United States,
the Arab reaction was predominantly sympathetic with America. 51 Arab leaders and private
individuals expressed sincere condolences as soon as they learned of the tragedy. At the same
time, because the United States government identified the terrorist perpetrators as Arab and
Muslim, Arab reaction included a large measure of embarrassment and dismay.
50 Supra n. at p.14
51 William A. Rugh, Perceptions in the Arab World and Debates in Washington: Analyzing U.S.
Mideast Policy After September 11, 27 Fletcher F. World Aff. 47 2003, at p. 47

The subsequent U.S. military action was generally accepted throughout the Arab world as a
legitimate response to the 9/11 attacks, since it was assumed that America had a right to
retaliate against the perpetrators.52 Thus, in this second phase, sympathy and support, or at
least acquiescence to U.S. actions in Afghanistan, characterized the Arab view.
Senior U.S. officials linked Iraq to the War on Terrorism, and sought to tie Osama bin Laden
and his al-Qaeda to Saddam Hussein. The general reaction of Arabs throughout the region,
even in countries close to Iraq, was that Saddam was not in fact an imminent threat to them or
to anyone else, and that the time had come to change the sanctions regime which was only
hurting the Iraqi people. They failed to see any link between Iraq and al-Qaeda, and pointed
out that the strongly secular regime in Baghdad was anathema to Osama bin Laden and his
radical Muslim fundamentalists.53
In the latter phase the Bush administration began to talk about the doctrine of pre-emption.
The White House argued that the policy of containment that had been the favoured approach
to the Soviet Union for decades was no longer sufficient to deal with threats. Accordingly, a
more aggressive and proactive policy was necessary to deal with Saddam Hussein. The Arab
world, especially the Persian Gulf countries, clearly opposed this doctrine. 54 Virtually no one
in the Middle East supports Saddam, and the majority of people would be glad if he were to
disappear, but at the same time they did not want the United States to take direct action to
remove him. Moreover, Arab governments friendly to the United States feared that such an
action would implicate them in an outsider plot against an Arab leader with whom they were
trying to re-establish better relations.55 The Arab leaders clearly saw what the Americans
were after, and that answer was oil, thus the relation of the Arab world towards US policy is
rather hostile due to the misgivings of the USA against democratic Iraq.

52 Ibid
53 Ibid at p.50
54 Ibid
55 Ibid

B. WORLD TRIBUNAL ON IRAQ

Many weeks before the US had declared war on Iraq, millions of people protested in the
streets of the world in February 2003.56 Too much dismay that call went to deaf ears as the
war went as schedule. It is clearly seen that no international institution had the courage or
conscience to stand up against the aggression of the US and UK governments. It has been a
decade since the invasion of Iraq; however no justice has been done to the millions of
civilians who suffered because of it. What was the reason behind the war and its connection
to Al-Qaida and the September 11 attack or was it the oil that attracted such devastation. It is
said that the attack on Iraq is an attack on justice, on liberty, safety, and the future of
everyone.57 Thus, the World Tribunal on Iraq58 was formed to meet as a jury of conscience at
Istanbul on the 27 of June, 2005 to demand justice and a peaceful future.59
The legitimacy of the World Tribunal on Iraq is located in the collective conscience of
humanity.60 The Istanbul session of the WTI, is the result of a series of 20 hearings held in
different cities of the world focusing on the illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq. The
conclusions of these sessions or inquiries held in Barcelona, Brussels, Copenhagen, Genoa,
Hiroshima, Istanbul, Lisbon, London, Mumbai, New York, Ostersund, Paris, Rome, Seoul,
Stockholm, Tunis, various cities in Japan and Germany.61 Therefore the main aim of the WTI
is to bring about justice and find out the facts and truth about the war on Iraq, especially with
reference to the atrocities towards civilians during and after combat.
The major findings after the conclusion of the war was that no weapons of mass destruction
were found anywhere in the country of Iraq. The main focus to wage war on Iraq by George
56 World Tribunal on Iraq, Statements of the Jury Istanbul, Turkey, 27 June, Transnational Institute,
available at: http://www.tni.org/archives/mil-docs_wti
57 Ibid
58 Hereinafter WTI
59 World Tribunal on Iraq: Declaration of Jury of Conscience, 27 th June 2005, Istanbul, 62 Guild
Prac. 95 2005
60 Ibid at p.95
61 Ibid

W. Bush was a mere tool to invade Iraq for the U.K and U.S own economic interest in this
oil rich nation. In pursuit of their agenda on oil, the Bush and Blair governments blatantly
ignored the massive opposition to the war expressed by millions of people around the world. 62
This is a clear cut action against justice and morality that these nations so commonly use in
their tactics to gain control over this oil bearing nation.
The main contentions against the UK and U.S Governments that led the war on Iraq were
based upon the UN doctrine on international law. The charges were on crime against
humanity and the contravention of United Nations Charter and the Nuremberg Principles.
Evidence for this can be found in the leaked Downing Street Memo
of 23rd July, 2002, in which it was revealed: "Military action was
now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to remove Saddam through
military action, justified by the conjunction of terrorism and
WMD. But the intelligence and facts were being fixed around the
policy." Intelligence was manufactured to will fully deceive the
people of the US, the UK, and their elected representatives.63
Using disproportionate force and weapon systems with indiscriminate effects, such as cluster
munitions, incendiary bombs, depleted uranium (DU), and chemical weapons. Detailed
evidence that leukaemia had risen sharply in children residing in those areas that had been
targeted by DU weapons.
Subjecting Iraqi soldiers and civilians to torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment.
Degrading treatment includes subjecting Iraqi soldiers and civilians to acts of discrimination,
as well as denying Iraqi soldiers Prisoner of War status as required by the Geneva
Conventions.
The right to information has also been obstructed which included the censoring of Iraqi
media, such as newspapers and radio stations, the shutting down of the Baghdad offices of
Al Jazeera Television, targeting international journalists, imprisoning and killing
intellectuals and scientists. Torture and illegal detentions were widely practiced by the USA-

62 Ibid at p. 96
63 Ibid at p. 97

UK led alliance, including holding more than 500 people at Guantanamo Bay.64 Denying
legal protection, and using extraordinary renditions to send people to be tortured in other
countries known to commit human rights abuses and torture prisoners. All of which has been
stated in the WTI report.
A good case can be made that propaganda is a more important
means of social control in open societies like the United States
than in closed societies like the late Soviet Union... This system of
thought control is not centrally managed... It operates mainly by
individual and market choices, with the frequent collective service
to the national interest arising from common interests and
internalised beliefs.65

- Edward Herman

However it is rather sad to know that this was a losing battle to fight against such war
crimes. A blanket of almost total media silence covers Bush and Blairs crimes in Iraq, and
their support for relentless corporate exploitation around the globe. Most media personnel
say that these war criminals continue to be presented as world-straddling father figures who
could solve poverty in Africa and so become the beloved figureheads of a great
generation.66 This is rather very ironic because neither Bush nor Tony Blair were ever
punished for the atrocities they unfolded in Iraq. The WTI today stands defunct against the
might of the USA and the UK, its whereabouts are unknown.

64 Guantanamo detainees were tortured, medical exams show, June 18, 2008, available at:
http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2008/06/18/guantanamo-report.html
65 The Mysterious Case of the Vanishing World Tribunal on Iraq, Media Alerts, July 2005, available
at:http://www.medialens.org/index.php/alerts/alert-archive/2005/401-the-mysterious-case-of-the-vanishingworld-tribunal-on-iraq.html

66 Supra n.

CONCLUSION
It is much easier to be critical than to be correct.
Benjamin Disraeli
The American policy makers are devising efficient policies and plans that could help them
find better opportunities in the global energy field, where competition for energy is getting
tougher by the day. They are also very well aware of the strategic position of the Persian
Gulf, whose huge oil and gas reserves are in high demand. The statement, War is a force
that gives us meaning.67 reflects often critical view of American foreign policy. American
arrogance has tended to lead to periodic unwinnable conflicts, Vietnam as an example - and
that the outcome of those conflicts has been a period of American humility in foreign policy.
War also carried powerful collective meanings, meanings that mobilized the U.S. to act
aggressively against a foreign power, meanings about the blood sacrifice a country must give
of its youth, and meanings that emerged after the collapse of Vietnam following U.S.
disengagement.
The American-British military intervention to Iraq in spring 2003 has caused many
controversies and discussions over the legitimacy of the operation, the validity of
international law system regulating the use of force and the future of this system. The Gulf
War (1991) was characterized by a general consent reached in the United Nations Security
Council for the materialization of an enforcement action aiming to end the Iraqi occupation in
Kuwait with a series of resolution reaching finally a clear authorization for use of force.
However, the war in 2003 lacked such an accord within the Council and an authorization for
a military enforcement campaign in order to force Iraq to comply with its obligations settled
by the Resolution 687 after the Gulf War. The war on Iraq had brought nothing but
devastation, the breaking of law and order, safety issues, health and hygiene problems. It is
now a nation scared by war and much of it needs rebuilding in terms of human welfare and
infrastructural development.
The invasion of Iraq and its preparation process intensified the debate on the theories of
implied use of force and of pre-emptive self defense, which are already controversial by their
67 Hedges, Chris (2002) War is a Force That Gives Us Meaning. Anchor Books: Toronto.

challenge against the limits of United Nations system regulating the use of force. On the other
hand, the weapons of mass destruction (that have been cited as the main reason of the war by
the US and the UK within the context of pre-emptive self-defense) haven't been found in
post-war Iraq yet. Moreover, following the collapse of Ba'th regime, Iraq has became a
'heaven' for transnational terrorism under the American-British occupation, despite the fact
that the invasion was materialized as a part of 'war against terrorism'. No matter what the
outcome of its involvement in Iraq, the United States should emphasize that its decisionmaking is independent of terrorist attacks. The commonly asked question by most critics is
Why did the US and the UK not invade Saudi Arabia instead of Iraq when the 15 of the 19
hijackers of the 9/11 planes were from Saudi Arabia? efforts to investigate Saudi Arabias
links to terror were stymied by the Bush administration because the USs oil corporate
interests and role played by Saudi Arabia in it could not be sacrificed.

It can, therefore be concluded in this instance that the US invasion in Iraq was not a
retaliatory action for 9/11 but rather positioning themselves for larger geo-political pursuits as
revealed in the discussions in some of the preceding sections of the US policy documents.
This project clearly specifies this by indicating that the Bush administration cynically
exploited the 9/11 attack to promote USs imperial designs. In all earnest, no evidence had
been found, up to date, to prove that Iraq, a battered and weak country, ever posed to be a
major threat to the US or the UK for them to invade it for their self defence.

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November

2002,

http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm................................................13
World Tribunal on Iraq: Declaration of Jury of Conscience, 27 th June 2005, Istanbul, 62 Guild
Prac. 95 2005........................................................................................................................21