block vs rutherford 468 US 576

US vs Villareal 28 Phil 390

Chaves vs Executive Secretay june 9, 2004
Tanada vs Tuvera 146 SCRA 421
PITC vs Angeles 236 SCRA 41
Republic vs Extelcom January 15, 2002
Banco Espanol v palanca 37 Phil 921
People vs de la Piedra January 24, 2001
Fabella vs Cour of appeals, 282 SCRA 256
Ang Tibay v. CIR 69 Phil 635

BLOCK v. RUTHERFORD, 468 U.S. 576 (1984)

468 U.S. 576
BLOCK, SHERIFF OF THE COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, ET AL. v. RUTHERFORD ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
No. 83-317.
Argued March 28, 1984
Decided July 3, 1984
Respondents, pretrial detainees at the Los Angeles County Central Jail, brought a class action in Federal
District Court against the County Sheriff and other officials, challenging, on due process grounds, the jail's
policy of denying pretrial detainees contact visits with their spouses, relatives, children, and friends, and
the jail's practice of conducting random, irregular "shakedown" searches of cells while the detainees were
away at meals, recreation, or other activities. The District Court sustained the challenges, and ordered
that low risk detainees incarcerated for more than a month be allowed contact visits and that all detainees
be allowed to watch searches of their cells if they are in the area when the searches are conducted. The
Court of Appeals affirmed.
Held:
1. Where it is alleged that a pretrial detainee has been deprived of liberty without due process, the
dispositive inquiry is whether the challenged practice or policy constitutes punishment or is reasonably
related to a legitimate governmental objective. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 . In considering whether a
specific practice or policy is "reasonably related" to security interests, courts should play a very limited
role, since such considerations are peculiarly within the province and professional expertise of corrections
officials. Id., at 540-541, n. 23. Pp. 583-585.
2. Here, the Central Jail's blanket prohibition on contact visits is an entirely reasonable, nonpunitive
response to legitimate security concerns, consistent with the Fourteenth Amendment. Contact visits invite
a host of security problems. They open a detention facility to the introduction of drugs, weapons, and
other contraband. Moreover, to expose to others those detainees who, as is often the case, are awaiting
trial for serious, violent offenses or have prior convictions carries with it the risks that the safety of
innocent individuals will be jeopardized. Totally disallowing contact visits is not excessive in relation to
the security and other interests at stake. There are many justifications for denying contact visits entirely,
rather than attempting the difficult task of establishing a program of limited visits such as that imposed
here. Nothing in the Constitution requires that detainees be allowed contact visits; responsible,
experienced administrators have determined, in their sound discretion, that such visits will jeopardize
the security of the facility and other persons.
3. The Central Jail's practice of conducting random, irregular "shakedown" searches of cells in the absence
of the cell occupants is also a reasonable response by the jail officials to legitimate security concerns. Bell
v. Wolfish, supra. This is also a matter lodged in the sound discretion of those officials.

We granted certiorari to decide whether pretrial detainees have a right guaranteed by the United States
Constitution to contact visits and to observe shakedown searches of their cells by prison officials.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

[G.R. No. 9480. November 13, 1914. ]

THE UNITED STATES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BALBINO VILLAREAL, Defendant-Appellant.
G. E. Jose, for Appellant.
Solicitor-General Corpus, for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. WEAPONS; POWER TO MAKE REGULATIONS. There is nothing in the Constitution of the United States
nor the Philippine Bill of Rights which forbids the enactment of penal statutes by the Philippine Legislature
prohibiting the carrying of concealed deadly weapons, or the use of firearms without a license.

DECISION

CARSON, J. :

The evidence of record conclusively establishes the guilt of the appellant of the offense of carrying a
concealed deadly weapon as defined and penalized in section 26 of Act No. 1780. The weapon was a sort of
dagger or sharp-pointed knife with a blade about 8 inches long. It was carried in a leather sheath, attached
to a belt which was strapped round the body, and hung down on the left hip of the accused concealed from
public view inside his trousers.
The only contention of counsel which would appear to necessitate comment is the claim that the statute
penalizing the carrying of concealed weapons and prohibiting the keeping and the use of firearms without a
license, is in violation of the provisions of section 5 of the Philippine Bill of Rights.
Counsel does not expressly rely upon the prohibition in the United States Constitution against the
infringement of the right of the people of the United States to keep and bear arms (U. S. Constitution,
amendment 2), which is not included in the Philippine Bill. But it may be well, in passing, to point out that in
no event could this constitutional guaranty have any bearing on the case at bar, not only because it has not
been expressly extended to the Philippine Islands, but also because it has been uniformly held that both this
and similar provisions in State constitutions apply only to arms used in civilized warfare (see cases cited in
40 Cyc., 853, note 18); and further, because even in those jurisdictions wherein the constitutional guaranty
of the right to keep and bear arms is in force, while it is beyond the power of a legislature or municipal body
to prohibit entirely the keeping and use of military arms, it may, in the exercise of its police powers, for the
purpose of suppressing crime and lawlessness, lawfully regulate the use of such weapons by providing that
they shall not be carried in a concealed manner, or that they shall not be pointed at another, or fired within
the limits of a city. (See many cases cited in 40 Cyc., p. 853.)
Counsels contention seems to be based on those provisions of the Philippine Bill of Rights which prohibit the
enactment of a law depriving any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or denying
to any person the equal protection of the laws. He insists that restrictions placed on the carrying of deadly
weapons have the effect of depriving the owner of the free use and enjoyment of his property, and that the
granting of licenses to some persons to carry firearms and the denial of that right to others is a denial to the
latter of the equal protection of the laws.
Both the statute in question and the provision of the Philippine Bill of Rights with which it is claimed it is in
conflict were enacted under American sovereignty, and both are to be construed more especially in the light
of American authority and precedent. The earliest English statute (St. 2 Edw. III, c. 3) regulating the
bearing of arms, enacted in the year 1328 A. D., was but an affirmation of the common law offense of going
around with unusual and dangerous weapons to the terror of the people. Many statutes have been enacted
since that time in England and the United States, regulating the carrying and the use of weapons, and these
have, as a rule, been held to be constitutional, especially when the prohibitions have been directed to the
wearing or carrying of deadly weapons in a concealed manner. (See 48 Cent. Digest, tit. Weapons, and,
many cases there cited.)

There can be no real question as to the police power of the state to regulate the use of deadly weapons for
the purpose of suppressing or restraining crime and lawlessness. Undoubtedly there are many deadly
weapons, such as knives, bolos, krises and the like which every citizen has a right to own and to use in the
various activities of human life. But the right to own and to, use such weapons does not carry with it the
right to use them to the injury of his neighbor or so as to endanger the peace and welfare of the community.
"It is a settled principle, growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil society, that every holder of property,
however absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under his implied liability that his use of it may
be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community." Com. v. Alger, 7 Cush. (Mass.) ,
53, 84.) Provided the means adopted are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the end in view,
not unduly oppressive upon individuals, and in the interest of the public generally rather than of a particular
class, the legislature may adopt such regulations as it deems proper restricting, limiting, and regulating the
use of private property in the exercise of its police power. (U. S. v. Toribio, 15 Phil. Rep., 85.)
We think there can be no question as to the reasonableness of a statutory regulation prohibiting the carrying
of concealed weapons as a police measure well calculated to restrict the too frequent resort to such weapons
in moments of anger and excitement. We do not doubt that the strict enforcement of such a regulation
would tend to increase the security of life and limb, and to suppress crime and lawlessness, in any
community wherein the practice of carrying concealed weapons prevails, and this without being unduly
oppressive upon the individual owners of these weapons. It follows that its enactment by the legislature is a
proper and legitimate exercise of the police power of the state.
The right to regulate the use of firearms, and to prescribe the conditions under which they may be kept and
used by their owners rests upon substantially similar grounds. The general provisions touching the licensing
of the use of such arms are mere police regulations, intended to limit such use so that firearms will not fall
into the hands of persons whose use of them might endanger the peace of the state or the safety and
security of individuals. While it may be true that those charged with the issuing of such licenses willfully or
mistakenly decline to issue or approve licenses in some cases in which the applicants are equally entitled
with others to receive them, nevertheless the regulations themselves are of general application and in no
wise deny the equal protection of the law to all applicants. The fault in such cases is not with the law, but
with those charged with its administration.
We find no errors in the proceedings prejudicial to the rights of the accused. The judgment entered in the
court below should therefore be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the Appellant. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Torres and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur in the result.

G.R. No. 157036, June 9, 2004

A mere license is always revocable

FACTS:

This case is about the ban on the carrying of firearms outside of residence in order
to deter the rising crime rates. Petitioner questions the ban as a violation of his right
to property.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the revocation of permit to carry firearms is unconstitutional
Whether or not the right to carry firearms is a vested property right

HELD:

Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.

In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be
whether life, liberty or property interest exists. The bulk of jurisprudence is that a
license authorizing a person to enjoy a certain privilege is neither a property nor
property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry, we ruled that a license is merely
a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it
property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right. In a more emphatic
pronouncement, we held in Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. that:

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action.
It is not a contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause
of the Constitution.
xxx

In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of
PTCFOR. This is evident from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
P.D. No. 1866 which state that the Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases
as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize
lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence. Following the
American doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a
property right protected under our Constitution.

Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be
revoked any time. It does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege
to be exercised under existing restrictions, and such as may thereafter be
reasonably imposed. A licensee takes his license subject to such conditions as the
Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is
that it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a
contract, and a revocation of it does not deprive the defendant of any property,
immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these words in the Declaration of
Rights. The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co, held: The
correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the
main power. A mere license by the State is always revocable.

Case Digest: Taada vs. Tuvera

G.R. No. L-63915 (146 SCRA 446) April 24, 1985
Taada vs. Tuvera
FACTS:
Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish,
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters of public concern as
recognized by the 1973 constitution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general
orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders
is necessary before its enforcement.
RULING:
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days
following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is
otherwise provided The Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is
necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its
effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date
of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the
law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article 2 does not preclude
the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides
for the date of its effectivity.
The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general
applicability is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for
fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the
people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons
such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

Republic vs Extelcom, [373 SCRA 316; GR 147096, January 15, 2002]

Posted by Pius Morados on November 9, 2011

(Administrative Law, quasi-legislative power, proper procedure, filing and
publication)

Facts: National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) granted Bayantel the

provisional authority to operate a Cellular Mobile Telephone System/Service (CMTS)
on its own initiative applying Rule 15, Section 3 of its 1987 Rules of Practice and
Procedures.

Respondent Extelcom contends that the NTC should have applied the Revised Rules
which were filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register where the
phrase on its own initiative were deleted and since the 1993 Revised Rules were
filed with the UP Law Center.

Issue: WON the 1993 Revised Rules which was filed in the UP Law Center is the law
in force and effect in granting provisional authority.

Held: No. There is nothing in the Administrative Code of 1987 which implies that the
filing of the rules with the UP Law Center is the operative act that gives the rules
force and effect. The National Administrative Register is merely a bulletin of codified
rules. Publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a
condition sine qua non before statutes, rules and regulations can take effect.

BANCO ESPANOL VS PALANCA

37 Phil. 921
FACTS: Engracio Palanca was indebted to El Banco and he had his parcel of land as security to his debt.
His debt amounted to P218,294.10. His property is worth 75k more than what he owe. Due to the failure
of Engracio to make his payments, El Banco executed an instrument to mortgage Engracios property.
Engracio however left for China and he never returned til he died. Since Engracio is a non resident El
Banco has to notify Engracio about their intent to sue him by means of publication using a newspaper.
The lower court further orderdd the clerk of court to furnish Engracio a copy and that itd be sent to
Amoy, China. The court eventually granted El Banco petition to execute Engracios property. 7 years
thereafter, Vicente surfaced on behalf of Engracio as his administrator to petition for the annulment of the
ruling. Vicente averred that there had been no due process as Engracio never received the summons.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was not observed.
HELD: The SC ruled against Palanca. The SC ruled that the requisites for judicial due process had been
met. The requisites are;
1 There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the
matter before it.
2 Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property
subject of the proceedings.
3 The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard.
4 Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee

vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant
G.R. No. 121777 (350 SCRA 163) January 24, 2001
KAPUNAN, J.

FACTS: On the afternoon of January 30, 1994, Maria Lourdes Modesto and Nancy
Araneta together with her friends Jennelyn Baez, and Sandra Aquino went to the
house of Jasmine Alejandro, after having learned that a woman is there to recruit job
applicants for Singapore. Carol dela Piedra was already briefing some people when
they arrived. Jasmine, on the other hand, welcomed and asked them to sit down.
They listened to the recruiter who was then talking about the breakdown of the
fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as
placement fee and for the processing of the papers. The initial payment was
P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction. The recruiter said that she was
recruiting nurses for Singapore.
Araneta, her friends and Lourdes then filled up bio-data forms and were required to
submit pictures and a transcript of records. After the interview, Lourdes gave the
initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured her that she was authorized to
receive the money.
Meanwhile, in the morning of the said date, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an
unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by
a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of
suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth
Bellotindos, so they could both go the place where the recruitment was reportedly
being undertaken. Upon arriving at the reported area at around 4:00 p.m.,
Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained
outside and stood on the pavement, from where he was able to see around six (6)
persons in the sala. Ramos even heard a woman, identified as Carol Figueroa, talk
about the possible employment she has to provide in Singapore and the documents
that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos
came out with a bio-data form in hand.
Thereafter, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. A
surveillance team was then organized to confirm the report. After which, a raid was
executed.

Consequently, Carol was charged and convicted by the trial court of illegal
recruitment.
Upon appeal, accused questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large
scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing
said crime. First, accused submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining
recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due
process clause.
The provision in question reads:
ART. 13. Definitions.(a) x x x.
(b)
Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be
deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

ISSUES: (1) Whether or not sec. 13 (b) of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as
the illegal recruitment law is unconstitutional as it violates the due process clause.
(2) Whether or not accused was denied equal protection and therefore should be
exculpated

HELD:
(1)
For the First issue, dela Piedra submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code
defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the
due process clause.
Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit
to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will render them
liable to its penalties.
In support of her submission, dela Piedra invokes People vs. Panis, where the
Supreme Court criticized the definition of recruitment and placement.
The Court ruled, however, that her reliance on the said case was misplaced.
The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of
illegal recruitment could be committed only whenever two or more persons are in
any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. In this case, the Court
merely bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed light on the meaning of

the proviso. The absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to
arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal
law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b),
therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at
all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was salvaged
by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.

Dela Piedra further argues that the acts that constitute recruitment and
placement suffer from overbreadth since by merely referring a person for
employment, a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment.
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary
and harmless acts such as labor or employment referral (referring an applicant,
according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not render
the law overbroad. Evidently, Dela Piedra misapprehends concept of overbreadth.
A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of
individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the
freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to
punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally
vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between
the constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible applications
of the statute.

(2)
Anent the second issue, Dela Piedra invokes the equal protection clause in
her defense. She points out that although the evidence purportedly shows that
Jasmine Alejandro handed out application forms and even received Lourdes
Modestos payment, appellant was the only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on
the other hand, remained scot-free. From this, she concludes that the prosecution
discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana
while Alejandro is a Zamboanguea, and the alleged crime took place in
Zamboanga City.
The Supreme Court held that the argument has no merit.
The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted,
is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful
administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its unequal
application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal
protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or
purposeful discrimination. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there
must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination.

In the case at bar, Dela Piedra has failed to show that, in charging her, there was a
clear and intentional discrimination on the part of the prosecuting officials.
Furthermore, the presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed
their duties, and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary,
not by mere speculation. As said earlier, accused has not presented any evidence
to overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that dela Piedra, a Cebuana,
was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboanguea, the guilty
party in appellants eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the
prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.

Fabella v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 110379, 28 November 1997, 282 SCRA 256.
FACTS:
On September 17, 1990, DECS Secretary Carino issued a return-to-work order to allpublic school
teachers who had participated in walk-outs and strikes on various dates during the period of September to
October 1990. The mass action had been staged to demand payment of 13th month pay, allowances and
passage of debt cap bill in Congress. On October 1990, Secretary Carino filed administrative cases
against respondents, who are teachers of Mandaluyong High School. The charge sheets required
respondents to explain in writing why they should not be punished for having taken part in the mass
action in violation of civil service laws.Administrative hearings started on December 1990. Respondents,
through counsel assailed the legality of the proceedings on the following due process grounds: first, they
were not given copies of the guidelines adopted by the committee for the investigation and denied access
to evidence; second, the investigation placed the burden of proof on respondents to prove their innocence;
third, that the investigating body was illegally constituted, their composition and appointment violated
Sec.9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers. Pending the action assailing the validity of
the administrative proceedings, the investigating committee rendered a decision finding the respondents
guilty and ordered their immediate dismissal.

ISSUE:
Whether or not private respondents were denied due process?

HELD:
YES. In administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the
right to actual or constructive notice of the institution ofproceedings which may affect a respondents

legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present
witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of
honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial
evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the
parties affected. The legislature enacted a special law, RA 4670 known as the Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers, which specifically covers administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers.
Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee to hear public
schoolteachersadministrative cases should be composed of the school superintendent of the division as
chairman, a representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teachers organization and a
supervisor of the division. In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear
the administrativecharges against private respondents did not include a representative of the local or, in
its absence, any existing provincial or national teachers organization as required by Section 9 of RA
4670. Accordingly, these committees were deemed to have no competent jurisdiction. Thus,
all proceedings undertaken by them were necessarily void. They could not provide any basis for the
suspension or dismissal of private respondents. The inclusion of a representative of a teachers
organization in these committees was indispensable to ensure an impartial tribunal. It was this
requirement that would have given substance and meaning to the right to be heard. Indeed, in any
proceeding, the essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a
real opportunity to be heard. Other minor issues: Petitioners allege that Sec 9 of RA 4670 was complied
with because the respondents are members of Quezon City Teachers Federation. We disagree. Mere
membership of said teachers in their respective teachers organizations does not ipso facto make them
authorized representatives of such organizations as contemplated by Section 9 of RA 4670. Under this
section, the teachers organization possesses the right to indicate its choice of representative to be
included by the DECS in the investigating committee. Such right to designate cannot be usurped by
the secretary of education or the director of public schools or their underlings. In the instant case, there is
no dispute that none of the teachers appointed by the DECS as members of its investigating committee
was ever designated or authorized by a teachers organization as its representative in said committee. Sec
9 of RA 4670 was repealed by PD 807. Statcon principle, a subsequent general law cannot repeal a
previous specific law, unless there is an express stipulation. Always interpret laws so as to harmonize
them.

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and

NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD vs. THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC.
G.R. No. 46496 February 27, 1940
FACTS: Toribio Teodoro, the manager and proprietor of Ang Tibay, laid off 89 laborers, who were
members of the National Labor Union (NLU), due to alleged shortages of leather materials. The National
Labor Union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against Ang Tibay, alleging therein, among others,
that Toribio dominates the National Workers Brotherhood (NWB) of Ang Tibay, another union in the
company, and that Toribio discriminated against the NLU and unjustly favoring the NWB, which he
allegedly dominated. The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) ruled in favor of NLU, due to the failure of
Ang Tibay to present records of the Bureau of Customs and Books of Accounts of native dealers in
leather and thus to disprove NLUs allegation that the lack of leather materials as a scheme to discharge
NLU members. The Supreme Court, however, reversed the decision, finding no substantial evidence that
the 89 workers were dismissed due to their union affiliation or activities. Thus, the Solicitor General, in
behalf of the Court of Industrial Relations filed a motion for reconsideration, while the NLU filed a
motion for new trial, praying that the case be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations.
ISSUE: Whether the CIRs freedom from the rigidity of procedural requirements prescribe special
requirements of due process in administrative cases.
HELD: The Court of Industrial Relations (CIR) is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of
procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case,
without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal
evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." The fact, however,
that the CIR may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean
that it can, in justifiable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are cardinal
primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones cause and submit evidence in support
thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) The decision must have something to support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence presented at the hearing; or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its own independent consideration of the law and
facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) The Board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision rendered.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be, and the same is hereby granted,
and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen the case

receive all such evidence as may be relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements
set forth.