ADDITIONAL CASES

days, fixed by the Constitution, should be enough for the Court to

fulfill its duty without pre-empting congressional action.

invasion or rebellion, even in localized areas, it is still the President

who possesses the sole authority to exercise calling-out powers.

FORTUN vs ARROYO 2012

If the Congress procrastinates or altogether fails to fulfill its duty

respecting the proclamation or suspension within the short time
expected of it, then the Court can step in, hear the petitions
challenging the Presidents action, and ascertain if it has a factual
basis.

The governor, as local chief executive of the province, is certainly

empowered to enact and implement emergency measures during
calamities and disasters,. But the kidnapping incident in the case at
bar cannot be considered as a calamity or a disaster.

-MARTIAL LAW IN MAGUINDANAO

President Arroyo withdrew her proclamation of martial law and
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the
joint houses of Congress could fulfill their automatic duty to review
and validate or invalidate the same.
HELD: It is evident that under the 1987 Constitution the President
and the Congress act in tandem in exercising the power to proclaim
martial law or suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus. They exercise the power, not only sequentially, but in a
sense jointly since, after the President has initiated the proclamation
or the suspension, only the Congress can maintain the same based
on its own evaluation of the situation on the ground, a power that the
President does not have.
although the Constitution reserves to the Supreme Court the power to
review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation or
suspension in a proper suit, it is implicit that the Court must allow
Congress to exercise its own review powers, which is automatic
rather than initiated. Only when Congress defaults in its express duty
to defend the Constitution through such review should the Supreme
Court step in as its final rampart. The constitutional validity of the
Presidents proclamation of martial law or suspension of the writ
of habeas corpus is first a political question in the hands of Congress
before it becomes a justiciable one in the hands of the Court.
Here, President Arroyo withdrew Proclamation 1959 before the joint
houses of Congress, which had in fact convened, could act on the
same. Consequently, the petitions in these cases have become
moot and the Court has nothing to review.
The proclamation of martial law and suspension of the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus have not been meaningfully implemented. The
military did not take over the operation and control of local
government units in Maguindanao. The President did not issue any
law or decree affecting Maguindanao that should ordinarily be
enacted by Congress. No indiscriminate mass arrest had been
reported. Those who were arrested during the period were either
released or promptly charged in court. Indeed, no petition for habeas
corpus had been filed with the Court respecting arrests made in those
eight days.
Justice Carpio points out in his dissenting opinion the finding of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City that no probable cause
exist that the accused before it committed rebellion in Maguindanao
since the prosecution failed to establish the elements of the
crime. But the Court cannot use such finding as basis for striking
down the Presidents proclamation and suspension. For, firstly, the
Court did not delegate and could not delegate to the RTC of Quezon
City its power to determine the factual basis for the presidential
proclamation and suspension. Secondly, there is no showing that the
RTC of Quezon City passed upon the same evidence that the
President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, had in her
possession when she issued the proclamation and suspension.
Justice Carpio of course points out that should the Court regard the
powers of the President and Congress respecting the proclamation of
martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus as sequential or joint, it would be impossible for the Court to
exercise its power of review within the 30 days given it. But those 30

But what if the 30 days given it by the Constitution proves

inadequate? the 30-day period does not operate to divest this Court
of its jurisdiction over the case. The settled rule is that jurisdiction
once acquired is not lost until the case has been terminated.
KULAYAN vs GOV OF SULU 2012
-Declaration of State of Emergency
ISSUE: whether or not Section 465, in relation to Section 16, of the
Local Government Code authorizes the respondent governor to
declare a state of emergency, and exercise the powers enumerated
under Proclamation 1-09, specifically the conduct of general searches
and seizures
HELD: NO. there is nothing in the Local Government Code which
justifies the acts sanctioned under the said Proclamation.
ONE executive, one commander-in-chief. Corollarily, it is only the
President, as Executive, who is authorized to exercise emergency
powers as provided under Section 23, Article VI, of the Constitution,
as well as what became known as the calling-out powers under
Section 7, Article VII thereof.
When the President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily exercises a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.

Armed Forces of the Philippines does not fall under the category of a
national law enforcement agency, to which the National Police
Commission (NAPOLCOM) and its departments belong. There was
no evidence or even an allegation on record that the local police
forces were inadequate to cope with the situation or apprehend the
violators. If they were inadequate, the recourse of the provincial
governor was to ask the assistance of the Secretary of Interior and
Local Government, or such other authorized officials, for the
assistance of national law enforcement agencies.
Provincial governor is not authorized to convene Civilian
Emergency Force
Pursuant to the national policy to establish one police force, the
organization of private citizen armies is proscribed.
Section 24 of Article XVIII of the Constitution mandates that:
Private armies and other armed groups not recognized by duly
constituted authority shall be dismantled. All paramilitary forces
including Civilian Home Defense Forces (CHDF) not consistent with
the citizen armed force established in this Constitution, shall be
dissolved or, where appropriate, converted into the regular force.
Additionally, Section 21of Article XI states that, The preservation of
peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the
local police agencies which shall be organized, maintained,
supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws. The
defense and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the
National Government.

Under the foregoing provisions, Congress may revoke such

proclamation or suspension and the Court may review the sufficiency
of the factual basis thereof. However, there is no such equivalent
provision dealing with the revocation or review of the Presidents
action to call out the armed forces

- Intervention of a rival candidate in a disqualification case is proper

when there has not yet been any proclamation of the winner.

Regarding the countrys police force, Section 6, Article XVI of the

Constitution states that: The State shall establish and maintain one
police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character,
to be administered and controlled by a national police commission.
The authority of local executives over the police units in their
jurisdiction shall be provided by law.

The use of foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign

citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to
ones nationality and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino
citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the Oath of
Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective
position.

A local chief executive, such as the provincial governor, exercises

operational supervision over the police, and may exercise control only
in day-to-day operations

The renunciation of foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can

simply be professed at any time, only to be violated the next day. It
requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted
by the foreign country which granted the citizenship.

It is still the President who is authorized to exercise supervision and

control over the police, through the National Police Commission. the
framers never intended for local chief executives to exercise
unbridled control over the police in emergency situations.
The provincial governor does not possess the same calling-out
powers as the President.
Governor Tan exceeded his authority when he declared a state of
emergency and called upon the Armed Forces, the police, and his
own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated
under the Constitution is exclusive to the President.
In all situations involving threats to security, such as lawless violence,

MAQUILING vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 2013

This act of using a foreign passport after renouncing ones foreign

citizenship is fatal to Arnados bid for public office, as it effectively
imposed on him a disqualification to run for an elective local position.
Arnados category of dual citizenship is that by which foreign
citizenship is acquired through a positive act of applying for
naturalization. This is distinct from those considered dual citizens by
virtue of birth, who are not required by law to take the oath of
renunciation as the mere filing of the certificate of candidacy already
carries with it an implied renunciation of foreign citizenship. 39 Dual
citizens by naturalization, on the other hand, are required to take not

only the Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines but also
to personally renounce foreign citizenship in order to qualify as a
candidate for public office.
Arnado was solely and exclusively a Filipino citizen only for a period
of eleven days, or from 3 April 2009 until 14 April 2009, on which date
he first used his American passport after renouncing his American
citizenship.
Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must
be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or
assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of
the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably
challenged
The citizenship requirement for elective public office is a continuing
one. It must be possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of
the foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates the
oath of renunciation opens the citizenship issue to attack.
The popular vote does not cure the ineligibility of a candidate.
When the law requires certain qualifications to be possessed or that
certain disqualifications be not possessed by persons desiring to
serve as elective public officials, those qualifications must be met
before one even becomes a candidate. When a person who is not
qualified is voted for and eventually garners the highest number of
votes, even the will of the electorate expressed through the ballot
cannot cure the defect in the qualifications of the candidate.
(Quizon v. COMELEC and Saya-ang v. COMELEC):
The Old Ruling that: While provisions relating to certificates of
candidacy are mandatory in terms, it is an established rule of
interpretation as regards election laws, that mandatory provisions
requiring certain steps before elections will be construed as directory
after the elections, to give effect to the will of the people HAS BEEN
ABANDONED. For one, such blanket/unqualified reading may
provide a way around the law that effectively negates election
requirements aimed at providing the electorate with the basic
information to make an informed choice about a candidates eligibility
and fitness for office.
To allow the sovereign voice spoken through the ballot to trump
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications and
disqualifications of candidates is not democracy or republicanism.
It is electoral anarchy.
Maquiling is not a second-placer as he obtained the highest
number of votes from among the qualified candidates.
With Arnados disqualification, Maquiling then becomes the winner in
the election as he obtained the highest number of votes from among
the qualified candidate
a void COC cannot produce any legal effect. the votes cast in favor of
the ineligible candidate are not considered at all in determining the
winner of an election.
The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the
sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in
favor of eligible and legitimate candidates form part of that voice and
must also be respected.
There is no need to apply the rule cited in Labo v. COMELEC that
when the voters are well aware within the realm of notoriety of a
candidates disqualification and still cast their votes in favor said
candidate, then the eligible candidate obtaining the next higher
number of votes may be deemed elected. That rule is also a mere

obiter that further complicated the rules affecting qualified candidates

who placed second to ineligible ones.

Not a consented warrantless search. Consent to a search is not to

be lightly inferred, but shown by clear and convincing evidence.

The very existence of a disqualifying circumstance makes the

candidate ineligible. Knowledge by the electorate of a candidates
disqualification is not necessary before a qualified candidate who
placed second to a disqualified one can be proclaimed as the winner.
The second-placer in the vote count is actually the first-placer among
the qualified candidates.

Not stop and frisk rule. While the rule normally applies when a
police officer observes suspicious or unusual conduct, which may
lead him to believe that a criminal act may be afoot, the stop and frisk
is merely a limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons.

That the disqualified candidate has already been proclaimed and has
assumed office is of no moment. The subsequent disqualification
based on a substantive ground that existed prior to the filing of the
certificate of candidacy voids not only the COC but also the
proclamation.
The disqualifying circumstance surrounding Arnados candidacy
involves his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of election
offenses as provided for in the first sentence of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, the effect of which is to disqualify the
individual from continuing as a candidate, or if he has already been
elected, from holding the office.
With Arnado being barred from even becoming a candidate, his
certificate of candidacy is thus rendered void from the
beginning. Arnado being a non-candidate, the votes cast in his favor
should not have been counted. This leaves Maquiling as the qualified
candidate who obtained the highest number of votes. Therefore, the
rule on succession under the Local Government Code will not apply.
LUZ VS. PEOPLE 2012
there was no valid arrest of petitioner.
NOT AN ARREST - When he was flagged down for committing a
traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason,
arrested. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he
or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the
general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest
of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter.
detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively
temporary and brief.
the usual traffic stop is more analogous to a so-called Terry stop,
see Terry v. Ohio, 392 U. S. 1 (1968), than to a formal arrest.
This ruling does not imply that there can be no arrest for a traffic
violation. Certainly, when there is an intent on the part of the police
officer to deprive the motorist of liberty, or to take the latter into
custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. In
this case, however, the officers issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic
citation ticket negates the possibility of an arrest for the same
violation.
Even if one were to work under the assumption that petitioner was
deemed arrested upon being flagged down for a traffic violation and
while awaiting the issuance of his ticket, then the requirements for a
valid arrest were not complied with.
there being no valid arrest, the warrantless search that resulted from
it was likewise illegal.
It must be noted that the evidence seized, although alleged to be
inadvertently discovered, was not in plain view. It was actually
concealed inside a metal container inside petitioners pocket. Clearly,
the evidence was not immediately apparent.

This is not to say that the concern for officer safety is absent in the
case of a routine traffic stop. But while the concern for officer safety
in this context may justify the minimal additional intrusion of ordering
a driver and passengers out of the car, it does not by itself justify the
often considerably greater intrusion attending a full fieldtype search .
Even without the search authority, officers have other, independent
bases to search for weapons and protect themselves from danger.
Examples:

order out of a vehicle both the driverand any passengers,

perform a patdown of a driver and any passengers

upon reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and
dangerous, Terry v. Ohio

conduct a Terry patdown of the passenger compartment

of a vehicle upon reasonable suspicion that an occupant
is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a
weapon,

even conduct a full search of the passenger

compartment, including any containers therein, pursuant
to a custodial arrest.
While he may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the
earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not,
however, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized
during the illegal warrantless arrest.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO
AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ,
NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ vs. ARROYO 2011
Whether former President Arroyo should be dropped as a
respondent in Amparo and Habeas Data Proceeding on the basis
of the presidential immunity from suit? NO.
Since no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in
amparo and habeas data proceedings, courts can only go as far as
ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced
disappearance or extrajudicial killing.
It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the
disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility, or at least
accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of
imposing the appropriate remedies to address the disappearance.
Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established
by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by
action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of
the remedies this Court shall craft, among them, the directive to file
the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible
parties in the proper courts.
Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies
that should be addressed to those who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity
to the level of responsibility defined above
It is clear that the former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential
immunity from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would

assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was

responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.

Whether Rodriguez has proven through substantial evidence

that former President Arroyo is responsible or accountable for
his abduction. NO

A non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for
acts committed during the latters tenure.
Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in
amparo and habeas data cases. YES.
command responsibility pertains to the "responsibility of commanders
for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or
other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict.
command responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil
cases for human rights abuses.
it is our view that command responsibility may likewise find
application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo.
Command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in
order to identify those accountable individuals that have the power to
effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would
issue. In such application, the amparo court does not impute criminal
responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in
the best position to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.
Whether the president, as commander-in-chief of the military,
can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings
and enforced disappearances. YES
To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility,
the following elements must obtain:
a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the
accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his
subordinate;
b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about
to be or had been committed; and
c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures
to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof.
The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces,
necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as a
superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.
In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted an superiors may be
charged with constructive knowledge.
Executive Order No. 226 (Institutionalization of the Doctrine of
Command Responsibility in all Government Offices), particularly at
all Levels of Command in the Philippine National Police and other
Law Enforcement Agencies: a government official may be held liable
for neglect of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility if he
has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be committed, is being
committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others
within his area of responsibility and, despite such knowledge, he did
not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or
immediately after its commission. Knowledge of the commission of
irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are
widespread within the government officials area of jurisdiction; (b)
the acts have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area
of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate staff or office
personnel are involved.

ONGSIAKO vs COMELEC 2013

Resolution to MR
-the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioners
qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions,
unless a petition is duly filed with said tribunal.
-the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives
To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there
must be a concurrence of the following requisites:
(1) a valid proclamation,
(2) a proper oath, and
(3) assumption of office.
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office.
To repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member
of the House of Representatives begins only "at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election." Thus, until such time, the
COMELEC retains jurisdiction.
Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it
must be made (1) before the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, and (2) in open session. Here, although she made
the oath before Speaker Belmonte, there is no indication that it was
made during plenary or in open session and, thus, it remains unclear
whether the required oath of office was indeed complied with.
More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy
that before the proclamation of petitioner, the COMELEC En Banc
had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioners lack of Filipino
citizenship and residency. After 14 May 2013, there was, before the
COMELEC, no longer any pending case on petitioners qualifications
to run for the position of Member of the House of Representative.
The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates
for the House of Representatives who have acquired foreign
citizenship. It merely applied the qualifications prescribed by Section
6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that the candidate must be a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and must have one-year
residency prior to the date of elections. Such being the case, the
COMELEC did not err when it inquired into the compliance by
petitioner of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A. No. 9225 to determine if she
reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen. It simply
applied the constitutional provision and nothing more.
ROMERO II vs ESTRADA 2009
The Subject Matter of the Senate Inquiry Is no Longer Sub
Judice
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to
judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the
court, or obstructing the administration of justice.
While Sabio and Standard Chartered Bank advert only to pending
criminal and administrative cases before lower courts as not posing a
bar to the continuation of a legislative inquiry, there is no rhyme or
reason that these cases doctrinal pronouncement and their rationale

cannot be extended to appealed cases and special civil actions

awaiting final disposition before this Court.
the Court has no authority to prohibit a Senate committee from
requiring persons to appear and testify before it in connection with an
inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules
of procedure.21Sabio emphasizes the importance of the duty of those
subpoenaed to appear before the legislature, even if incidentally
incriminating questions are expected to be asked:
DISBURSEMENT ACCELERATION PROGRAM OR DAP
The general appropriation law is composed of essentially two
components containing a list of items for its regular appropriation.
One component is called the "Programmed Appropriation". This
involves very specific items such as bridges, roads, salaries, and
allowances which are already identified and for which money has
been specifically allocated.
The other is the "Unprogrammed Appropriation" which involves an
authority to undertake priority activities disbursing funds sourced from
excess revenue collection or additional generated funds. The items
involved here are those not specifically particularized but which must
be financed when they happen or have to be incurred. An example
financial aid for those damaged by calamities. Or money appropriated
to fund the repair of damaged schools which were not so damaged at
the time the GAA was passed.
Under the aforementioned constitutional provision, the President is
authorized to augment any item from the savings coming from
another item. Since the constitution does not specifically limit or
narrow down the type of augmentations resulting from transfers of
saved-funds, the President may do any of the following:
Transfer of savings from an item listed in the
Programmed Appropriation to augment an item listed in
the Unprogrammed Appropriation; or
Transfer of savings from an item listed in the
Unprogrammed Appropriation to an item listed in the
Programmed Appropriation;
There is already a law for this purpose. It is the 1987 Administrative
Code governing the operations of all departments of government.
Under Section 39 thereof, with the approval of the President,
savings in any department may be used "to cover a deficit in any
other item of the regular appropriations." Again, these "regular
appropriations" include "programmed appropriation" and
"unprogrammed appropriation."
Section 49 of the same Administrative Code also provides that
savings "may be used for the settlement of the following
obligations incurred during a current fiscal year or previous fiscal
years as may be approved by the Secretary in accordance with rules
and procedures as may be approved by the President." It also
provides the particular obligations, transactions or activities that can
be funded. Among others, included are :

Priority activities that will promote the economic wellbeing of the nation, including food production, agrarian
reform, energy development, disaster relief, and
rehabilitation.

Repair, improvement and renovation of government

buildings and infrastructure and other capital assets
damaged by natural calamities;
To illustrate, let us imagine these scenarios:
The Department of Finance was allocated an amount of P10,000,000
for the construction of its new headquarters. It was accomplished only
at a cost of P5,000,000, thereby resulting in savings in the amount

the P5,000,000. During the year, a strong typhoon hit Quezon and
destroyed its only school. Reconstruction entailed P10,000,000. The
Department of Education only had P5,000,000. It had a deficit of
P5,000,000. Under the Constitution, the President can augment or
cover the DepEd P5,000,000-deficit to make it P10,000,000 by
transferring the savings of P5,000,000 of the Department of Finance.
Obligations were incurred during that year to repair a government
infrastructure, (school) damaged by natural calamities. Undoubtedly
schools for children are a priority projects. Pursuant to the 1987
Adminstrative Code, disbursement was allowed by the Secretary of
Budget. This was done because the reconstruction of the school was
an activity which will promote disaster relief and rehabilitation.
Nothing wrong. All activities were within the bounds of the constitution
and the law.
DAP therefore is nothing else but the disbursement of funds
sourced from savings of a particular item to fund a deficit in
another item for the purpose of immediately accomplishing a
priority activity.
The only transfer that cannot be made in this process is a
transfer of saved-funds from one great government department
to another. But within the executive branch which is composed of so
many departments, the President may do so pursuant to the
Constitution and the Administrative Code.
RH LAW
What Are The Constitutional Bases For The Enactment Of A
Reproductive Health Law?
a. Art. XIII, 11The State shall adopt an integrated and
comprehensive approach to health development
b. Art. II, 9The State shall xxx free the people from poverty
through policies that provide adequate social services, xxx, a rising
standard of living, and an improved quality of life for all.
c. Art. II, 15The State shall protect and promote the right to health
of the people and instillhealth consciousness among them.

HOWEVER, it has been medically proven that the contraceptives

included in the full range of reproductive health services have grave
eff ects on health. Arti cle XVI Sec. 9 of the Constion states The
State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from
substandard or hazardous products.
Does the RH Bill Conflict with the State Policy to Equally
Protect the Life of the Mother and the Life of the Unborn from
Conception?
Answer: NO. The records of the ConCom show that the objective of
some of those in favor of that particular provision was to prevent the
Supreme Court from deciding in favor of the constitutionality of
abortion, as in the case of Roe v. Wade where the U.S.
Supreme Court held that a woman has the fundamental right to
terminate her pregnancy.
Even assuming the Constitution actually prohibits the passage of an
abortion statute, the RH bill would still not pose any constitutional
issue. This is because the RH bill does not legalize abortion, as it
explicitly states in its consolidated version. What the bill seeks to do
is make accessible to poor individuals and couples reproductive
health information and contraceptives that are otherwise already
available in the private market.
Even if the RH Bill does not sanction abortion, does it not
unreasonably privilege the Interests (or Life) of the Mother Over
the Interests (or Life) of the Unborn?
Answer: No. The Constitution does not create a full equivalence
between interests of the mother and those of the unborn, for several
reasons
1. To equally protect does not necessarily mean that both the
interests of themother and of the unborn are entitled to the same
degree of protection. Thephrase equally protect only means that
both the interests of the mother and of the unborn are enti tled to
protection and thus valid objects of regulation.
2. That the life of the mother and of the unborn are equally

protected is different from stating that they are to be protected

equally. TheConstitution does not create a conceptual equivalence
between the mother and the unborn. Neither does it say that they are
materially equivalent.
3. The distinction between the phrases equally protect and protect
equally findssupport in the language of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Bill of Rights. the unborn that has no memory, life experiences,
much less vital organs,it becomes readily apparent that the State can
treat differently these categories of existence.
Does the RH Bill Violate Parents Constitutional Right and
Duty over The Rearing of the Youth for Civic Efficiency and
theDevelopment of Moral Character?
Answer: No. In the fi rst place, parents are not property owners of
their children.Parental rights over the moral development of their
children are a set of default rules, not exclusive mandates.
absolute authority over their children. Parental rights over children are
notincompatible with the constitutional obligation of the State under
Art. II, 13 topromote and protect [the youths] physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual, andsocial wellbeing.
If A Patient Consults A Doctor On Family Planning, Can That
Doctor Legally Refuse To Provide Medical Advice And Care On
Account OfHis/Her Own Religious Beliefs?
Answer: The absolute privileging of a doctors religion based
conscientious objection would amount to a viewpoint discrimination,
which the State cannot do without violating the free speech and the
non-establishment clauses. Any doctor who objects to State
requirements with respect to the way he/she exercises his/her
profession cannot simply object on philosophical, religious, or
any other personal grounds. The very nature of the profession
requires that doctors act professionally, that is, that they divorce their
personal views in the exercise of their profession.