2013 AND 2014 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

ON POLITICAL LAW
By: Jacinto D. Jimenez
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES
On October 21, 2003, Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch withheld and remitted to the Bureau
of Internal Revenue fifteen percent of the profit it remitted to Deutsche Bank Germany in
accordance with Section 28(A)(5) of the National Internal Revenue Code. Believing that it
made an overpayment, Deutsche Bank AG Manila filed a claim for refund because of the
preferential rate of ten percent under the Republic of the Philippines Germany Tax Treaty.
The Court of Tax Appeals denied the claim for refund for failure of Deutsche Bank AG Manila
to file an application for tax treaty relief at least fifteen days before the transaction as
required by Revenue Memorandum Order No. 1-2000. HELD: The Constitution provides for
adherence to the general principles of international law as part of the law of the land.
Obligations under a treaty must be complied with in good faith. The Bureau of Internal
Revenue must not impose additional requirements that will negate the availment of the
reliefs paid for under international agreements (Deutsche Bank AG Manila Branch vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 704 SCRA.)
Section 12 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act authorizes law enforcement authorities, with due
cause, to collect or record by terminal or electronic means traffic data in realtime associated
with specific communications transmitted by a computer system. Traffic data refer to the
communications origin, destination, route, time, date, size, duration or type of underlying
service, but not content nor identities. The petitioners argue that this violates the right to
privacy. HELD: When seemingly random bits of traffic data are gathered in bulk, pooled and
analyzed, they record patterns of activity which can be used to create profiles of the person
under surveillance. The phrase with due cause does not even relate the collection of data
to the probable cause of a particular crime. The authority it gives law enforcement agencies
is too sweeping. The power is virtually limitless. It threatens the right to privacy. Section 12
cannot be stricken due for vagueness or overbreadth. It does not regulate or punish any type
of speech. It should be narrowly drawn to prevent abuses. (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice,
G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.)

BILL OF RIGHTS
A. Substantive Due Process
1.

Existence of Violation

St. Scholasticas College owned four adjoining parcels of land in Marikina City. The
parcels of land are enclosed by a tall concrete perimeter fence built thirty years before.
In 1994, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Marikina approved Ordinance No. 912, which
regulated the construction of fences and walls. Later on, Ordinance No. 912 was
amended.
Section 3(1) of Ordinance No. 912, as amended, provided that required fences on the
front yard should not be more than one meter in height and the required fences in excess
of one meter in height should be open and should allow at least 80% visibility.
Section 5 of Ordinance No. 912, as amended, prohibited the construction of walls and
fences within the five-meter parking allowance between the front monument line and the
building line of commercial and industrial and establishments and educational and
religious institutions.
The City of Marikina required St. Scholasticas College to comply with Ordinance No. 912,
as amended. It claimed that the ordinance was an exercise of police power for security
and beautification. HELD: The ordinance must be struck down for having no reasonable
necessity to accomplish its purpose. It has not been shown that an 80 percent (80%)
visibility will provide better protection than a tall solid concrete. The intent of the
setback required was to make the parking space free for use of the public. Its

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implementation would be tantamount to taking private property for public use without
just compensation, in contravention of the Constitution.
Providing for a parking area has no logical connection to the avowed purpose of
prevention of concealment of unlawful acts. Owners cannot be divested of the beneficial
use of their property for aesthetic purposes. Since the residence of the Benedictine nuns
is also within the property, requiring a fence with visibility is violation of their right to
privacy. (Fernando vs. St. Scholasticas College, 693 SCRA 141.)
2.

Absence of Violation

The Department of Education, Culture and Sports issued a Revised Manual of Regulations
for private schools, which required that college faculty members have a masters degree
as a minimum qualification for acquiring regular status. The University of the East hired
Mariti Bueno and Analiza Pepanio as teachers. They could not qualify for probationary or
regular status because they lacked post graduate degrees. Later on, they demanded
that they be considered as regular employees based on their years of service. When this
demand was not granted, they filed a case for illegal dismissal. HELD: The requirement
of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable. The operation
of educational institutions involves public interest. The government has a right to ensure
that only qualified persons, in possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching
skills are allowed to teach in such institutions. (University of the East vs. Pepanio, 689
SCRA 250.)
The Regional Trial Court granted the petition of Rosalie Jaypee-Garcia for a temporary
protection order against her husband, Jesus Garcia, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262.
Jesus Garcia argued that the law is unconstitutional for vagueness, because it removed
the distinction between violent action and simple marital tiffs. The phrases depriving or
threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right, solely controlling the
conjugal or common money or properties, marital infidelity, and causing mental or
emotional anguish are vague. HELD: For a statute to be upheld, a reasonable degree
of certainty and not absolute precision is required. (Garcia vs. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352.)
Republic Act No. 7432 amended Republic Act No. 9257 by granting a 20% discount for
funeral and burial services for the death of senior citizens. The discount granted can be
claimed by the establishment concerned as a tax deduction.
Manila Memorial Park, Inc. and La Funeraria Paz-Sucat, Inc. claimed that the tax
deduction scheme violated the constitutional prohibition against the expropriation of
private property without just compensation, because only 35% of it was returned.
HELD: The 20% discount, as well as the tax deduction scheme, is a valid exercise of
police power. It is intended to improve the welfare of senior citizens, who are less likely
to be gainfully employed, more prone to illnesses and other disabilities, and in need of
subsidy in purchasing basic commodities. (Manila Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Secretary of
the Department of Social Welfare and Development, 711 SCRA 302.)
Remman Enterprises, Inc. and the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association
questioned the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9646, the Real Estate Service Act, for
violation of due process, because it is unduly oppressive and infringes the constitutional
prohibition against deprivation of property without due process. They stressed that the
law requires real estate developers to employ real estate brokers to sell, market and
dispose of their properties and real estate developers will have less control in managing
their business and will be burdened with additional expenses. HELD: The contention
has no basis. The requirement of engaging the services of licensed real estate
professionals in the sale and marketing of their properties is an unavoidable consequence
of a reasonable regulatory measure. The proper regulation of a business or trade is a
legitimate subject of the exercise of police power, particularly, when its conduct affects
the execution of legitimate governmental functions and public welfare. Where the liberty
curtailed affects property rights, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is much
wider. The legislature recognized the importance of professionalizing the ranks of real
estate practitioners by increasing their competence and raising ethical standards.
(Remman Enterprises, Inc. vs. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, G.R.
No. 197670 February 4, 2014.)
Section 4(a)(1) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act penalizes access to the whole or any
part of a computer system without right. The petitioners argued that it failed to meet the
strict scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with fundamental rights. HELD:
No fundamental freedom, like speech, is involved in punishing a universally condemned
act accessing the computer system of another without right. (Disini vs. Secretary of
Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.)

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The charge of invalidity because of overbreadth is baseless, since the penalized conducts
do not intrude into freedom of speech. There is no right to acquire the personal data of
another.
The petitioners claim that this violates freedom of the press, because journalists will be
hindered in accessing the account of a person in the news to secure information that
could be published. This is not identity theft. The theft of identity must be intended for
an illegitimate purpose. (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18,
2014.)
Section 4(b)(3) penalizes the intentional acquisition, use, reuse, transfer, possession,
alteration, or deletion of identifying information belonging to another. The petitioners
claim that this violates the right to due process and privacy and freedom of the press. It
is also overbroad. HELD: The petitioners failed to show how government effort to curb
computer-related identity theft violates the right to privacy and due process of law.
(Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.)
Section 13 of the Cybercrime Prevention Law requires service providers to preserve for at
least six months traffic data and subscriber information relating to communication
service. Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time extension for another six
months. Once computer data are used as evidence in a case, the furnishing to the
service provider of the document of transmittal to the Office of the Prosecutor shall be
deemed notification to preserve the data until the termination of the case. The
petitioners claim this constitutes undue deprivation of the right to property, because it
prevents internet users from accessing and disposing of their traffic data. HELD: The
data that service providers preserve are not made inaccessible to users by reason of the
orders. The use of normal transmission or use of the data will not be hampered. (Disini
vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.)
Section 17 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act provides that upon expiration of the period
in Sections 13 and 15, service providers and law enforcement authorities shall destroy
the computer data subject of preservation and examination. The petitioners claim that
this constitutes deprivation of property without due process. HELD: The user has no
right to require the service provider to have the copy of the data saved indefinitely. If he
wanted them preserved, he should save them in his computer. (Disini vs. Secretary of
Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.)
3.Requirement of Publication
President Carlos Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423 reserving parcels of land in the
Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, and Paranaque and Pasay City for a military reservation.
Later on, President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 208, which amended
Proclamation No. 2476 by excluding Lower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from
Proclamation No. 423. At the bottom, he wrote, P.S. This includes Western Bicutan.
Informal settlers started occupying the excluded lots, including Western Bicutan. When
Proclamation No. 2476 was published, it did not include Western Bicutan. HELD: The
handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No. 2476 was published.
Without publication, the handwritten note never had any legal form and effect.
(Nagkakaisang Maralita vs. Sitio Masigasig, Inc. and Military Shrine Services Philippine
Veterans Affairs Office, 697 SCRA 359.)
B.

Procedural Due Process

1.

Existence of Violation

For failure of the Balangues to pay to Leticia Diona their loan, which was secured by a
real estate mortgage, Leticia Diona filed an action for foreclosure of the real estate
mortgage. She prayed for the payment of interest on the loan at the rate of 12% per
annum. The Regional Trial Court rendered a judgment by default against the Balangues
for their failure to file an answer. The decision ordered them to pay interest at the rate of
5% a month. The Balangues failed to appeal. The Balangues filed a petition for
annulment of judgment and execution sale in the Court of Appeals. They contended that
the award of interest at the rate of 5% a month violated their right to due process.
HELD: Lack of due process is a ground to annul a judgment. Courts cannot grant a relief
in excess of what is being sought by the party. The grant of a monthly interest of 5% is
way beyond the interest of 12% per annum sought in the complaint and is a violation of
due process. (Diona vs. Balangue, 688 SCRA 22.)
The Commission on Elections accredited the Senior Citizen as a party-list organization. It
consisted of two factions. The two factions entered into a term-sharing agreement of
their nominees. The Commission on Elections issued a resolution prohibiting termsharing. The Commission on Elections scheduled summary evidentiary hearings to

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review the registration of existing party-list organizations. The two factions of the senior
citizens submitted evidence to establish their continuing compliance with the
requirements for accreditation. The Commission on Elections cancelled the registration
of the senior citizens for violation of the resolution against term-sharing. HELD: Due
process violation was committed when the two factions were not apprised that the termsharing agreement would be a material consideration in the evaluation of the
qualification of the organization as a party-list. Both factions were not able to address
these issues. Besides, the term-sharing agreement was not actually implemented.
(Coalition of Association of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. vs. Commission on
Elections, 701 SCRA 786.)
Primo Miro, the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, found Marilyn Mendoza Vda. De
Erederos, Catalina Alingasa and Porferio Mendoza, who were officers of the Land
Transportation Office, guilty of grave misconduct for selling confirmation certificates,
which were supposed to be free of charge. HELD: The affidavits of the complainants
show that they lacked personal knowledge of the participation of Porferio Mendoza and
Marilyn Mendoza Vda. De Erederos in the anomalous transactions. The affidavits
uniformly alleged that to secure the confirmation certificates, an amount of P2,500 would
be paid to Catalina Alingasa, who would remit her collections to Marilyn Mendoza Vda. De
Erederos and Porferio Mendoza. While the payment to Catalina Alingasa may be based
on personal knowledge, the remittance is hearsay. Mere uncorroborated hearsay does
not constitute substantial evidence. The personal knowledge of the couple is limited to
the receipt of the payments to Catalina Alingasa. The affidavits failed to specify any act
of personally demanding P2,500, a crucial element in determining her guilt or innocence
(Miro vs. Vda de Mendoza, 710 SCRA 371.)
Pursuant to Section 10 of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, upon petition of the Anti-Money
Laundering Council, the Court of Appeals issued on July 3, 2005 an order freezing the
properties of Lieutenant General Jacinto Ligot and his family. On September 20, 2005,
the Court of Appeals extended the order. Lieutenant General Jacinto Ligot filed a motion
to lift the freeze order, as no action for forfeiture had been filed against them. HELD:
Pursuant to its power under the Constitution to promulgate rules concerning the
protection of constitutional rights, the Supreme Court issued a resolution limiting the
effectivity of an extension of freeze orders to six months. The period of inaction of six
years of the government exceeded what is reasonable. (Ligot vs. Republic, 692 SCRA
509.)
2.

Absence of Violation

The mere fact that the respondent was not able to cross-examine the complainant
because of the failure of respondent to appear does not constitute denial of due process.
(Ylaya vs. Gacott, 689 SCRA 52.)
A government supplier of pharmaceutical products whose accreditation was suspended
because of the unfitness for human consumption of its products after it was given a
notice to submit its explanation but did not do so cannot invoke denial of due process.
(Department of Health vs. Philippine Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 691 SCRA 421.)
Due process in administrative proceedings does not require a trial-type hearing with right
of cross-examination. (Civil Service Commission vs. Almojuela, 694 SCRA 441; Pat-Og vs.
Civil Service Commission, 697 SCRA 567.)
The Regional Trial Court granted the petition of Rosalie Jaypee-Garcia for a temporary
protection order against her husband, Jesus Garcia, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262.
Jesus Garcia argued that the law violated due process, because under it, a husband could
be stripped of everything on the basis of unsubstantiated allegations and without any
opportunity to respond. HELD: The victim is required to verify the allegations in the
petition and to attach the affidavits of her witnesses to it. The temporary protection
order is issued without notice and hearing because of the necessity to protect women
and children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security. The court
will then order that copies of the petition, the temporary protection order, and the notice
to file an opposition to be immediately served upon the respondent. (Garcia vs. Drilon,
699 SCRA 352.)
This was reiterated in Tua vs. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014.
C.

Equal Protection
The Spouses Augusto Dacudao and Ofelia Dacudao filed cases against Celso de los
Angeles, Jr. and his associates in Davao City for syndicated estafa.
The Secretary of Justice issued an order to all prosecutors to forward all cases against
Celso de los Angeles, Jr. to the Special Panel he created with the exception of the cases

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already filed in Cagayan de Oro City. The Dacudao Spouses claimed that the exclusion of
the cases in Cagayan de Oro City violated equal protection. HELD: The Secretary of
Justice took into account the distance between Cagayan de Oro City, where many
complainants resided, and Manila. The Secretary of Justice was justified in excluding the
cases in Cagayan de Oro City from the ambit of his order. (Dacudao vs. Secretary of
Justice, 699 SCRA 109.)
Goldenway Merchandising Corporation mortgaged three parcels of land in favor of
Equitable PCI Bank to secure the payment of a loan. As it failed to pay, Equitable PCI
Bank foreclosed the real estate mortgage extrajudicially. It acquired the parcels of land
and registered the certificate of sale in its name on February 16, 2001. In a letter dated
March 8, 2001, Goldenway Merchandising Corporation offered to redeem the properties.
Equitable PCI Bank refused on the ground that under Section 47 of the Republic Act No.
8791, the redemption period in the case of juridical persons commences from the date of
the foreclosure sale and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three
months after the foreclosure, whichever is earlier.
Goldenway Merchandising Corporation sued Equitable PCI Bank for redemption. It argued
that Section 47 of Republic Act No. 8791 violated equal protection, because the
redemption period for natural persons is one year from the date of the registration of the
certificate of sale. HELD: Equal protection does not require absolute equality. It permits
reasonable classifications. The difference in the treatment of juridical persons and
natural persons is based on the nature of the properties foreclosed whether these are
used as residence or used for industrial or commercial purposes. In the latter case, a
shorter term is deemed necessary to reduce the period of uncertainty in the ownership of
the property and enable banks to dispose of the acquired assets sooner. This is aimed at
ensuring the solvency and liquidity of banks. (Goldenway Merchandising Corporation vs.
Equitable PCI Bank, 693 SCRA 439.)
Employees of the Philippine Ports Authority questioned the decision which ruled that
pursuant to the Salary Standardization Law, its officials receiving a representation and
transportation allowance on August 31, 1979 continue enjoying the grant violated equal
protection, because it did not apply to those employed after August 31, 1979. HELD:
The equal protection clause allows classification. The different treatment lies in the
intention of a legislature to gradually phase out the benefits without upsetting the policy
of non-diminution of pay and benefits. (Aquino vs. Philippine Ports Authority, 696 SCRA
666.)
Rosalie Jaypee-Garcia filed a petition for a temporary protection order against her
husband, Jesus Garcia, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262, the Act Defining Violence
against Women and Their Children. Jesus Garcia argued that the law violated equal
protection, because it did not include men as victims of violence. HELD: The fact that
women are more likely than men to be victims of violence and there is widespread
gender prejudice against women make for real differences justifying the classification.
The distinction is germane to the purpose of the law, to address violence committed
against women and children. The law applies to future conditions. The law applies to all
women and children who suffer violence and abuse. (Garcia vs. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352.)
Remman Enterprises, Inc. and the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association
questioned the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9646, the Real Estate Service Act, for
violation of equal protection, because it exempted from its coverage natural and juridical
persons dealing with their own properties and receivers, trustees and assignees in
insolvency proceedings. HELD: Real estate developers constitute a sector that employs
the largest number of brokers, salespersons, appraisers and consultants due to the
number of products they advertise and sell nationwide. Unlike individuals or entities
having isolated transactions over their own property, real estate developers sell lots,
houses and condominium units in the ordinary course of business. (Remman Enterprises,
Inc. vs. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, G.R. No. 197676, February
4, 2014.)
Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act penalizes the acquisition of domain
name over the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the reputation, and deprive
others from registering it, if the domain name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an existing registered trademark;
(ii)

Identical or similar with the name of any person other than the registrant, in case of

a personal name; and

(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual property interests in it.

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The petitioners argued that this violated equal protection, because it will cause a user
using his real name to suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the name of
another in satire, spoof, or any other literary name. HELD: The challenge is baseless.
The law is penalizing acquiring the domain name in bad faith. (Disini vs. Secretary of
Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.)
Section 6 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act makes the commission of crimes penalized by
the Revised Penal Code and special laws through the internet a qualifying circumstance
by making the penalty one degree higher. Held: There is a substantial distinction
between crimes committed through the use of information and communication
technology and similar crimes using other means. In every cybercrime, the offender
often evades identification and is able to reach more victims or cause greater crime.
(Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.)

D.

Searches and Seizures

1.

Existence of Probable Cause

Ling Na Lau, who was doing business under the name Worldwide Pharmacy, was the
registered owner of the trademark Top Gel T.G. & Device of a Leaf, a papaya whitening
soap. Her representative asked the National Bureau of Investigation to investigate
drugstores that were selling counterfeit whitening papaya soap bearing the general
appearance of the soap of Worldwide Pharmacy.
Joseph Furing was the agent assigned to the case. He and Junaya Esmael bought
commercial quantities of whitening soap from several drugstores which were counterfeit
reproductions of the soap of Worldwide Pharmacy.
Joseph Furing applied for search warrants against the pharmacy for unfair competition
and infringement of trademark. The Regional Trial Court granted the applications. The
petitioner moved to quash the search warrants on the ground there was a case filed by
Zemma Chemical Industry against Ling Na Lau for infringement of trademark and unfair
competition, which constituted a prejudicial question.
Ling Na Lau also filed a case against Benjamin Yee in the Intellectual Property Office for
infringement of trademark and unfair competition. The parties executed a compromise
agreement in which Benjamin Yee acknowledged the exclusive right of Ling Na Lau to the
trademark Top Gel 7, 6 & Device of a Leaf for Papaya whitening soap. Nevertheless, the
Regional Trial Court granted the motion to quash the search warrants on the ground that
the case filed by Zemma Chemical Industry involved a prejudicial question. HELD: Ling
Na Lau, the registered owner of the trademark, had the authority to protect her
intellectual property rights over it. The National Bureau of Investigation conducted a
series of test buys. The inspection confirmed that the examined goods were counterfeit.
The requisites for the issuance of search warrants were complied with. There was
probable cause to believe that offenses had been committed and the objects sought in
connection with the offenses were in the places to be searched. The case which the
Regional Trial Court found to involve a prejudicial question had already been dismissed.
(Century Chinese Medicine Company vs. People, 709 SCRA 177.)
The National Bureau of Investigation obtained two search warrants to search a
warehouse and an office at the Probest International Trading allegedly owned by Michael
Tan for counterfeit Unilever shampoo products intended to be disposed of in relation of
Section 168, in relation to Section 170 of the Intellectual Property Code. In the course of
their search, the agents of the National Bureau of Investigation seized sachets containing
counterfeit hair conditioner and shampoo. The National Bureau of Investigation filed a
case for unfair competition.
The respondent claimed that he was Paul Tan and not Michael Tan, that his business was
selling leather goods and materials for leather products, that his business was named
Probest International Trading, that he was not selling counterfeit Unilever shampoo
products, that he did not own or operate the warehouse, and the sachets of Unilever
shampoo products contained genuine shampoo products used for his personal
consumption. HELD: The pieces of evidence were sufficient to form a reasonable
ground to believe that Paul Tan committed unfair competition. First, the huge volume
and the location of the shampoo products belie the claim that they are for personal
consumption. Shampoo products for personal consumption are ordinarily found inside
the house. Second, ownership of the warehouses is not crucial to a finding of probable
cause. Third, the striking similarities between the genuine Unilever shampoo products
and the counterfeit sachets support the belief that Paul Tan is distributing counterfeit

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Unilever shampoo products. Finally, Paul Tan resumed his operations involving
counterfeit Unilever products. (Unilever Philippines, Inc. vs. Tan, G.R. No. 179367,
January 29, 2014.)
2.

Absence of Probable Cause

The warrantless search and seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride made because

the person in question shouted in public lacks probable cause. (Martinez vs. People, 690
SCRA 656.)
Nazareno Villareal was charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride. The arresting Officer alleged that while he was driving his motorcycle, he
saw Nazareno Villareal between a distance of 8 to 10 meters holding a sachet of
methamphetamine hydrochloride. He alighted from his motorcycle, arrested Nazareno
Villareal and seized the plastic sachet in his possession. HELD: It is inconceivable how
the police officer would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy from a distance of 8
to 10 meters and while driving a motorcycle a negligible amount of a powdery substance
inside the plastic sachet held by Nazareno Villareal. The act of walking and examining
something in ones house, cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. (People vs.
Villareal, 693 SCRA 549.)
Four police officers and the civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle saw
two men rush out of a house. They pushed the door of the house wide open to peep.
They saw George Antiquera holding a tooter and a lighter, while Corazon Cruz was
holding an aluminum foil and a burner. They entered the house and arrested the couple.
HELD: The police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the
street where they stood. As they peeked into the door, they saw no activity that
warranted their entering it. No crime was plainly exposed to their view that authorized
the arrest without a warrant. The search and seizure that resulted from it was illegal.
(Antiquera vs. People, 712 SCRA 339.)
3. Particularity of Description
Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas applied for warrants to search the offices of
Worldwide Web Corporation and Planet Internet Corporation, because they were
conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation of
Presidential Decree No. 401.
Jose Enrico Rivera, an employee of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
testified that a legitimate long distance call should pass through the public switch
telephone network and on to the toll center of the international gateway facilities in the
Philippines. The call was then transmitted to the other country through voice circuits,
and passes the toll center of the international gateway facilities in the destination
country. The toll center would meter the call and pass through the public switch
telephone network of the called number to complete the circuit. The two companies that
were searched were able to provide international long distance call services by using the
telephone lines of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company by bypassing its
international gateway facilities.
Raymond Gali, another employee of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company,
testified that a telephone number serviced by it and registered to Worldwide Web
Corporation was used to provide Global Talk, an internet-based international call service,
which can be availed of by prepaid or post-paid accounts. The international call using
Global Talk would bypass the international gateway facilities of Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company.
The Regional Trial Court granted the application for search warrants. Over a hundred
items were seized. The two companies moved to quash the search warrants for lack of
probable cause. HELD: Toll bypass enables international calls to appear as local calls. It
deprives Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company of the compensation to which it is
entitled had the call has been routed through its network. Toll bypass operation
constitutes theft.
Toll bypass operations cannot be accomplished without the installation of
telecommunications equipment to the telephone lines of Philippine Long Distance
Telephone Company. This is violation of Presidential Decree No. 401. (Worldwide Web
Corporation vs. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 161106, January 13, 2014.)
A search warrant was issued for the office premises of Worldwide Web Corporation for
theft. Another search warrant for the office premises of Planet Internet Corporation was
issued for violation of Presidential Decree No. 401. Both were issued with Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company as the offended party. Over a hundred items were seized
as a result of the issuance of the search warrants. The two companies argued that the

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search warrants were general warrants. HELD: A search warrant fulfills the requirement
of particularity in the description of the things to be seized when the things described are
limited to those that bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is being
issued. The Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company was able to establish the
connection between the items to be searched as identified in the warrants and the crime
of theft of the telephone services and business. (Worldwide Web Corporation vs. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 161106, January 13, 2014.)
4. Warrantless Searches
Passengers departing from an airport can be searched without need for a search
warrant. (Sales vs. People, 690 SCRA 141; People vs. Cadidia, 707 SCRA 494.)
A person caught selling methamphetamine hydrochloride can be searched without need
for a search warrant. (People vs. De Jesus, 690 SCRA 180.)
5. Section 15 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act
When a search warrant has been properly issued, law enforcement authorities shall have
the power:
(i) to secure a computer system or a computer data storage medium;
(ii) to make and retain a copy of the computer data;
(iii) to maintain the integrity of the relevant stored computer data;
(iv) to conduct forensic examination of the computer data storage medium; and
(v)

to render inaccessible or remove the computer data in the accessed computer or

computer and communications network.

The petitioners argued that this supplants the search and seizure procedure. HELD:
Section 15 merely enumerates the duties of the enforcement authorities to insure the
proper collection, preservation, and use of the computer system or data. It does not
supersede search and seizure rules but merely supplements them. (Disini vs. Secretary
of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.)
6. Void Search and Seizure
Section 19 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act authorizes the Secretary of Justice to restrict
or block access to computer data found to be in violation of the law. The petitioners
argue that this violates the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. HELD:
Section 19 precludes judicial intervention. It disregards guidelines to determine the
validity of restrictions on speech. It violates the constitutional guarantees to freedom of
expression and against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Disini vs. Secretary of
Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.)
E.

Freedom of Speech and of the Press

1. Existence of Violation
Atty. Jesusa Quinsayas filed a disbarment case against Atty. Philips Sigfrid Fortun for
abusing legal remedies to delay the murder cases he was handling. She then
disseminated it in the television stations and newspapers. Atty. Philips Sigfrid Fortun filed
a petition for contempt because of the confidentiality of disbarment cases. HELD: The
filing of the disbarment case is a matter of public concern since it arose from a
celebrated massacre case. The media had a right to publish the filing of the disbarment
case under freedom of the press.
However, Atty. Jesusa Quinsayas as a complainant in the disbarment case and as lawyer
is bound by the confidential nature of the disbarment proceedings. She is guilty of
contempt. (Fortun vs. Quinsayas, 690 SCRA 623.)
Section 4(c)(3) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act prohibits the transmission of commercial
electronic communication with the use of a computer system to advertise, sell or offer for
sale products and services unless:
(i) there was prior affirmative consent from the recipient; or
(ii)

the primary intent is for service and/or administrative announcements from the

sender to the users, subscribers or customers;

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(iii) the following conditions are present:

(a)

the commercial electronic communication contains a simple, valid and reliable way

for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages from the
same source;
(b)

the commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of

the electronic message; and

(c)

the commercial electronic communication does not purposely include misleading

information to induce the recipients to read the message.

The Solicitor General argued that spams waste the storage and natural capacities
internet service process, reduces the efficiency of commerce and technology; interferes
with the peaceful enjoyment by the owner of his
property; and transmitting spams
amount to violation of privacy. HELD: Even before the arrival of the age of computers,
people have been receiving unsolicited ads by mail. The recipients always have the
option to delete or not read them. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads will
violate the right to read emails, even unsolicited ads. Commercial speech is entitled to
protection. (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.)
Section 5 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act penalizes abetting or aiding in the
commission of any offense enumerated in the law or attempting to commit any offense
enumerated in the Cybercrime Prevention Act. The petitioners argued that Section 5 is
overbroad. HELD: Penalizing, aiding or abetting wrongdoings on line threatens the
popular and unchallenged dogmas of cyberspace use. Two of the more popular social
networking sites are Facebook and Twitter.
A user can post a statement, a photo, or a video on Facebook. If the post is made
available to the public, anyone can react by clicking Like to specify he likes the
posting. Comment enables him to post on line his feelings or views. Share makes it
visible to his friends.
On the other hand, Twitter is an internet social networking and microblogging service that
enables users to send and read short text-based messages. These are Tweets.
Microblogging is the posting of small pieces of digital content. A twitter user can make
his tweets available only to his Followers, those who subscribe to his posts, or to the
general public.
Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest are knee-jerk sentiments
of readers who may think little or haphazardly of their response to the posting. Unless
the law takes to account the unique circumstances and culture of cyberspace, such a law
will create a chilling effect in the millions that use this new medium of communication in
violation of their freedom of expression.
The term aiding or abetting constitutes a broad sweep that generates chilling effect on
those who express themselves through cyberspace. Section 5 which punishes aiding or
abetting libel on the cyberspace is void.
In regard to child pornography, when Google facilitates the dissemination of child
pornography, does this make Google and the users, aiders and abettors in child
pornography crimes? When a person replies to a Tweet containing child pornography, he
republishes it. Does this make him a willing accomplice to the distribution of child
pornography? The legislature should address this clearly to relieve users of fear of
criminal prosecution. Section 4(c)(2) on child pornography cannot stand scrutiny.
The crime of aiding or abetting the commission of a cybercrime under Section 5 should
be punishable to offenses that do not involve freedom of expression, under Section 4(a)
(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal Interference, Section 4(a)(3) on Data
Interference, Section 4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of
Devices. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-related
Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on computer-related
Identity Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. For the same reason, the crime of
willfully attempting to commit any of these offenses is not objectionable. (Disini vs.
Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.)
2.

Absence of Violation

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Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act penalizes the intentional or recklessalteration, damaging , deletion or deterioration of computer data, electronic documents,
or electronic data message, without right, including the introduction or transmission of
virus. The petitioners claimed that this is overbroad. HELD: It does not encroach on
freedom of speech. It simply penalizes a form of vandalism. There is no freedom to
destroy other peoples computer systems and their private documents. (Disini vs.
Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.)
Section 4(c)(1) penalizes cybersex. The petitioners claim that this violates freedom of
expression, because private communication of sexual character between spouses or
consenting adults, would become a crime. HELD: The element of engaging in a
business is necessary to constitute illegal cybersex. The law seeks to punish cyber
prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for consideration. (Disini vs. Secretary
of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.)
Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act incorporated the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code on libel. The petitioners argue that it violated freedom of
expression. HELD: Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and the government
has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation. (Disini vs. Secretary of
Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.)
F.

RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
A parcel of land owned by the Iglesia Filipina Independiente was subdivided into four
lots. On February 5, 1976, Supreme Bishop Rev. Macario Ga sold two of the lots to
Bernardino Taezo. In January 1990, Supreme Bishop Most Rev. Tito Poso filed a complaint
against his heirs for annulment of the sale on the ground that under Article IV(a) of their
Canons, all real properties could be disposed of only with the approval of the laymens
committee, the parish priest, the Diocesan Bishop, with sanction of the Supreme Council
and the approval of the Supreme Bishop and the required approval was not obtained.
HELD: The laymens committee objected to the sale. The sale is an unenforceable
contract under Article 1403(1) of the Civil Code. Bernardino Taezo was not authorized to
transfer ownership to the lots, since they were acquired by mistake. Article 1456 of the
Civil Code states a person acquiring property by mistake is considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property came. An action for
reconveyance based on an implied trust involves an obligation created by law and
prescribes in ten years. The period begins to run from the registration of the deed or the
issuance of the certificate of title over the property. The transfer certificates of title were
issued to Bernardino Taezo on February 7, 1990. The action for annulment was filed on
January 19, 1990. The complaint was filed within the prescriptive period (Iglesia Filipina
Independiente vs. Heirs of Bernardino Taezo, G.R. No. 179592, February 3, 2014.)

G.

RIGHT TO INFORMATION
The Philippine National Construction Corporation was acquired by the National
Government because of its debts to various government financial institutions. To
privatize it, the Asset Privatization Trust conducted a public bidding. The rules of the
bidding provided that the Asset Privatization Trust would announce the indicative price
for the shares on the day of the bidding and that it reserved the right to reject all bids.
The Dory-A-Consortium consisting of Strategic Alliance Development Corporation and
Dory-A Pharmaceuticals submitted a bid of P,228,888,800, the highest bid. The Asset
Privatization Trust announced an indicative price of seven billion pesos and rejected all
bids. The Day-A Consortium filed a case for the award of the contract to it, because the
refusal of the Asset Privatization Trust to give the basis of the indicative price violated its
right to information and entitled it to the award of the contract. HELD: The right to
information does not extend it to causing the award of the sale of government assets in
failed public bidding. (Privatization and Management Office vs. Strategic Alliance
Development Corporation, 698 SCRA 517.)

H.

EMINENT DOMAIN
1. Expropriation Case
An action for an easement of right of way for transmission lines should be considered an
action for expropriation. (Cabahug vs. National Power Corporation, 689 SCRA 666.)
2.

Just Compensation

The National Power Corporation filed an action against the Spouses Rodolfo Zabala and
Lilia Baylon for an easement of right of way for its transmission lines. It argued that in
accordance with Section 3A of Republic Act No. 6395, the just compensation should not
exceed 10% of the fair market value of the property. HELD: Determining just

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compensation is a judicial function that cannot be usurped by any other branch of the
government. (National Power Corporation vs. Zabala, 689 SCRA 554.)
The just compensation in case of expropriation of property should be based on its fair
market value at the time of taking. (Secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Highways vs. Tecson, 700 SCRA 243; National Power Corporation vs. YCLA Sugar
Development Corporation, 712 SCRA 550.)
The concept of just compensation requires promptness in the payment. (Land Bank of
the Philippines vs. Gallego, 702 SCRA 377.)
The Department of Public Works and Highways filed a case for expropriation of a portion
of the land owned by the Bank of the Philippine Islands. In determining the just
compensation, the court included just compensation for the building of the Bank of the
Philippine Islands. The Department of Public Works and Highways questioned the award
on the ground that building was not taken. HELD: Consequential damages are awarded
if as a result of the expropriation, the remaining property of the owner suffers
impairment. No actual taking of the building is necessary to grant consequential
damages. (Republic vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands, 705 SCRA 650.)
I.PROHIBITION AGAINST IMPAIRMENT OF OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS
On November 29, 1985, Goldenway Merchandising Corporation mortgaged three parcels
of land in favor of Equitable PCI Bank to secure the payment of a loan. As Goldenway
Merchandising Corporation failed to pay, on December 13, 2000, it foreclosed the real
estate mortgage extrajudicially. On January 26, 2001, a certificate of sale was issued in
favor of Equitable PCI Bank as the buyer. On February 16, 2001, it registered the
certificate of sale. In a letter dated March 8, 2001, Goldenway Merchandising
Corporation offered to redeem the properties. Equitable PCI Bank refused on the ground
that the certificate of sale had been registered.
Goldenway Merchandising Corporation sued Equitable PCI Bank for redemption. It argued
that it is the one-year redemption period under Republic Act No. 3135 and not the shorter
redemption period under Republic Act No. 8791 that should apply. To apply it to the real
estate mortgage retroactively would violate the constitutional prohibition against the
impairment of the obligations of contracts. HELD: Section 47 of Republic Act No. 8791
did not divest juridical persons of the right of redemption but only reduced the one-year
original period. The new redemption period commences from the date of the foreclosure
sale and expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three months after the
foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is no retroactive application of the new
redemption period, because the law exempted from its operations properties foreclosed
prior to its effectivity. (Goldenway Merchandising Corporation vs. Equitable PCI Bank, 693
SCRA 439.)
Pryce Corporation filed a petition for corporate rehabilitation. The Regional Trial Court
gave due course to the petition. The rehabilitation receiver submitted an amended
rehabilitation plan. The Regional Trail Court approved it. It also identified the assets to
be held and disposed by Pryce Corporation and the manner by which the liabilities would
be paid. The Order provided that the indebtedness to China Banking Corporation would
be paid by dacion en pago of developed real estate assets of Pryce Corporation. China
Banking Corporation contended that the approval without its consent impaired the
obligations of contract. HELD: This case does not involve a law or executive issuance
declaring the modification of the contract. Thus, the non-impairment clause may not be
invoked. The non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State.
Successful rehabilitation of a distressed corporation will benefit its debtors, creditors,
employees and the economy in general. (Pryce Corporation vs. China Banking
Corporation, G.R. No. 72302, February 18, 2014.)
J. RIGHTS DURING INVESTIGATION
1.

Absence of Counsel

An extrajudicial confession obtained without the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in

evidence. (People vs. Soriano, 693 SCRA 404.)
2.

Assistance of Counsel

The counsel assisting a person under investigation must explain to him the nature and
consequence of his confession and its impact on his constitutional rights. (People vs.
Ibanez, 698 SCRA 161.)
3.

Administrative Investigation

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The right to counsel does not apply during an administrative investigation. (Tanenggee
vs. People, 699 SCRA 639.)
K.

RIGHT TO BE INFORMED
Edna Jaca, the accountant of Cebu City; Alan Gaviola, the administrator of Cebu City; and
Eustaquio Cesa, the treasurer of Cebu City, were charged with violation of Section 3(e) of
the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The information alleged that they committed
the offense with deliberate intent, manifest partiality, evident bad faith and gross
inexcusable negligence. They were convicted. They argued that their right to be
informed was violated, because the different modes of commission alleged were
inconsistent. HELD: Gross inexcusable negligence and evident bad faith or manifest
partiality are not highly opposite concepts that can result in a fatally defective
information. The fact that the information alleged the different modes alternatively only
means that the conviction may be based on the evidence supportive of a particular
mode. (Jaco vs. People, 689 SCRA 276.)
Rita Jaime and her daughter-in-law, Cynthia Jaime, were engaged in the jewelry
business. They delivered to Ramoncita Senador several pieces of jewelry to be sold on
commission basis. She signed a trust receipt with Cynthia Jaime as the entrustee.
Ramoncita Senador failed to turn over the proceeds from the sale of the jewelry or to
return the unsold jewelry. An information for estafa was filed against her. The
information alleged that it was Cynthia Jaime who delivered the jewelry to her. During
the trial, it was Rita Jaime who testified as the complainant. Ramoncita Senador was
convicted. She argued that her right to be informed was violated, because of the
discrepancy in the identity of the offended party between the information and the
evidence. HELD: In offenses against property, if the subject of the offense is specific
and identifiable, an error in the designation of the offended party is immaterial. In this
case, the information specified the various kinds of jewelry as the subject of the offense.
(Senador vs. People, 692 SCRA 669.)
The information filed against Mike Alvin Pielago accused him of acts of lasciviousness
committed by kissing the vagina of the victim and inserting his finger in it. He was
convicted of rape. The accused argued that the conviction violated his right to be
informed. HELD: The allegations contained in the information and not the designation
of the offense determine the crime charged. (Pielago vs. People, 693 SCRA 476)
Chad Manansala was charged with illegally selling marijuana. He was convicted instead
of illegal possession of marijuana. He argued that his conviction violated his right to be
informed. HELD: The illegal possession of marijuana is a crime that is necessarily
included in the crime of selling marijuana. (People vs. Manansala, 695 SCRA 70.)
Fernando Espino was charged with six counts of estafa in violation of Paragraph 2(b) of
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. The information alleged that Fernando Espino
received checks from his employer, Kuehne and Nagel, Inc., for delivery to Florante
Banaag, an import coordinator, as payment for his commission. Instead, he forged the
indorsements of Florante Banaag on the checks, rediscounted them with his account, and
converted the proceeds for his own benefit. The Regional Trial Court convicted him
instead of violation of Paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Fernando
Espino argued that the decision violated his right to be informed. HELD: The controlling
words of the information are found in the body. Fernando Espino represented to Kuehne
and Nagel, Inc. that he would deliver the checks payable to Florante Banaag as his
commission, but instead he rediscounted the checks. The offense committed is estafa
through the abuse of confidence under Paragraph 1(b) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code. The information charged the accused with both estafa under Paragraph 1(b) and
Paragraph 2(a) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. (Espino vs. People, 700 SCRA
570.)
1.

Right to Speedy Trial

Vivencio Roallos was convicted of child abuse in violation of Republic Act No. 7610. He
argued that his right to a speedy trial was violated. HELD: The postponements sought
by the prosecution did not seriously prejudice him. The delay was attributable to the
ordinary processes of justice. (Roallos vs. People, 712 SCRA 593.)
L. RIGHT TO SPEEDY DISPOSITION OF CASE
1.

Violation of Right

On November 9, 2001, a complaint was filed against Rafael Coscolluela, the provincial
governor of Negros Occidental, and his subordinates, with the Ombudsman for the
anomalous purchase of agricultural and medical equipment. On April 16, 2002, the Case
Building Team upgraded the complaint to a criminal case. Rafael Coscolluela and his

12 | P a g e

subordinates filed their counter-affidavits. On March 27, 2003, the Graft Investigation
Officer issued a Resolution finding probable cause for violation of the Section 3(e) of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and prepared an information. On June 5, 2003, the
Deputy Ombudsman recommended approval of the information. On May 4, 2009, the
acting Ombudsman approved it. On June 19, 2009, the case was filed before the
Sandiganbayan. Rafael Coscolluela and his subordinates alleged that their right to the
speedy disposition of cases was violated. HELD: The preliminary investigation took a
protracted amount of time to complete. The delay is unjustified. The right of Rafael
Coscolluela and his subordinates to the speedy disposition of cases was violated.
(Coscolluela vs. Sandiganbayan, 701 SCRA 188.)
Congressman Wilfrido Villarama delivered a privileged speech denouncing a ranking
government official for bribery. The President directed the Presidential Anti-Graft
Commission to investigate the matter. On November 25, 2002, the Ombudsman
requested the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission to submit documents on the alleged
bribery. On December 23, 2002, Congressman Mark Jimenez submitted his complaintaffidavit. On November 6, 2006, the Special Panel created to investigate the complaint,
issued a resolution recommending the filing of criminal informations. The motion for
reconsideration was denied on April 15, 2008. The Ombudsman approved them on April
15, 2008. The informations were filed on April 15, 2008. HELD: The preliminary
investigation lasted nearly five years and five months. The Office of the Ombudsman
took an unusually long period of time to investigate the complaint and the decided
matter to charge the respondents. Such long delay constituted a violation of the right of
the respondents to the speedy disposition of their cases. (People vs. Sandiganbayan,
712 SCRA 359.)
2.

Absence of Violation

The accused cannot invoke his right to the speedy disposition of cases during the
preliminary investigation if he did not invoke them, he contributed to the delay, and the
case was complicated. (Borja vs. Sandiganbayan, 691 SCRA 421.)

M. PROPORTIONALITY OF PENALTY
Section 4(c)(2) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act penalizes child pornography. The
petitioners claimed that this merely expanded the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography
Act. HELD: The definition of child pornography in the Anti-Child Pornography Act
already includes the use of electronic, mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other
means. The law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in
Cyberspace. The duration of the penalty is a legislative prerogative and there is a
rational basis for a higher penalty because of a potential for uncontrolled proliferation of
child pornography (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.)
Section 8 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act prescribed severe penalties for deleterious
cybercrime. HELD: The fixing of penalties for a crime is a legislative prerogative. They
are proportionate to the evil sought to be punished. (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R.
No. 203335, February 18, 2014.)
N.

PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY

1.

Acquittal in Contempt Proceeding

The Mayor and the Chief of the Permit and License Division ordered Digitial
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. to cease its business operations because of its
refusal to pay real property taxes. Digitial Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. filed a
case in the Regional Trail Court to annul the order on the ground that under its legislative
franchise, only the properties not used in connection with its franchise were subject to
real property tax. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of Digitial Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc., and the decision became final.
The Provincial Treasurer of Batangas levied on the properties of Digitial
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. because of its refusal to pay real property tax.
Digitial Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. filed a petition for prohibition. Upon its
petition, the Regional Trial Court issued a temporary restraining order. However, the
Provincial Treasurer claimed that the public auction of the levied properties had already
been held when he received it.
Digitial Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. filed a petition for indirect contempt against
the Provincial Treasurer. The Regional Trial Court denied it. Digitial Telecommunications

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Philippines, Inc. appealed. HELD: A charge of contempt of court partakes of the nature
of a criminal action. Rules that govern criminal prosecution strictly apply to it. The
dismissal of the indirect contempt charge amounts to an acquittal, which bars a second
prosecution. (Digital Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. vs. Cantos, 710 SCRA 514.)
2.

Review by Petition for Certiorari

The Regional Trial Court convicted Efren Almuete for violation of Section 68 of the
Revised Forestry Code. The decision was promulgated in his presence. He questioned
the decision by filing a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals granted the petition and acquitted him. HELD: In filing a petition for certiorari
instead of an appeal, Efren Almuete availed himself of the wrong remedy. The decision
was no longer open to an appeal. An acquittal through a petition for certiorari is not
allowed. (Almuete vs. People, 693 SCRA 167.)
An acquittal cannot be reviewed by filing a petition for certiorari on the ground of
misappreciation of the evidence. (Villareal vs. Alegre, G.R. No. 166995, January 13,
2014.)
Jonathan Dy, Castel Estacio and Carlo Castro were charged with selling a dangerous drug
commonly known as ecstasy. After the prosecution rested its case, they filed a demurrer
to the evidence. The Regional Trial Court granted it and acquitted the accused. The
prosecution questioned the acquittal by filing a petition for certiorari. HELD: The
Regional Trial Court held that the witnesses, the arresting officers, had no personal
knowledge of the illegal sale. It committed grave abuse of discretion. The first police
officer posed as the buyer. The second police officer frisked the accused and recovered
the money. The third police officer identified the pills. The validity of buy-bust
transactions to apprehend drug dealers in the act of committing an offense is wellsettled. (People vs. Lagos, 692 SCRA 602.)
3.

Identity of Offenses

A criminal case was filed against Isabelo Braza in the Sandiganbayan for violation of
Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, because the street lighting
systems installed for the Summit Meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
were highly overpriced. He filed a motion with Sandiganbayan for permission to travel
abroad. The court required him to undergo arraignment as a condition for granting his
motion. He pleaded not guilty.
Later on, Isabelo Braza filed a motion for reinvestigation. The Sandiganbayan treated it
as a motion for reconsideration of its resolution which denied the motion for
reinvestigation of his co-accused. He filed a manifestation stating that he was
maintaining his plea of not guilty without any condition.
The Sandiganbayan reconsidered its previous resolution and ordered a reinvestigation.
Isabelo Braza filed a manifestation stating that he was abandoning his motion for
reinvestigation. The Ombudsman issued a resolution amending the charge to violation of
Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and filed a motion to admit the
amended information. Isabelo Braza asked for the dismissal of the case on the ground of
double jeopardy. HELD: The arraignment of Isabelo Braza was subject to the condition
that if the information would be amended, he would waive his right against double
jeopardy. He was now estopped. Besides, the offense charged in the second information
was different and not included in the offense charged in the first information. Prosecution
for the same act is not prohibited. What is prohibited is prosecution for the same
offense. (Braza vs. Sandiganbayan, 691 SCRA 471.)
For engaging in sexual intercourse with Iris Kristine Alberto, who was then sixteen years
old, on December 28, 2001 and April 23, 2002, the Secretary of Justice issued a
resolution directing the filing of two cases against Gil Anthony Calianga of rape in relation
to child abuse. HELD: In view of the substantial identity of the elements of child abuse
with those of rape, Gil Anthony Calianga could be charged with both. So as not to violate
his right against double jeopardy, the charges for rape should be dismissed. (Alberto vs.
Court of Appeals, 699 SCRA 104.)
Section 7 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act provides that prosecution under it shall be
without prejudice to any liability for violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code
of special laws. It is claimed that this violates the prohibition against double jeopardy.
HELD: A single set of facts may be penalized simultaneously under a special law and the
Revised Penal Code. This does not apply to libel and child pornography. In Article 353 of
the Revised Penal Code and Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act, the
elements of the offenses are the same. Section 4(c)(4) merely establishes the computer
system as another means of publication. The same is true with child pornography. The

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offenses of child pornography in the Anti-Child Pornography Act already covers, the use
of electronic, mechanical, digital, optional, magnetic or any other means. (Disini vs.
Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.)
O.BILL OF ATTAINDER
Section 20 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act provides the failure to comply with the
provisions of Chapter IV regarding orders from law enforcement authorities should be
punished as obstruction of justice under Presidential Decree No. 1829. The petitioners
allege that this is a bill of attainder. HELD: There will be a judicial determination of guilt.
The provision is valid. (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18,
2014.)
P.WRIT OF AMPARO
The spouses Nerio and Soledad Pador and Rey Pador filed a petition for a writ of amparo.
They alleged that three barangay tanods raided their farm to look for marijuana but
found none, that the Barangay Chairman sent them letters inviting them for a conference
without stating the purpose, that when they delivered the reply of their lawyer, the
Barangay Chairman refused to receive it, and that they anticipated the possibility of
harassment cases, false accusation, and violence. HELD: All the allegations are
insufficient bases for a grant of the privilege of the writ of amparo. To be entitled to the
privilege of the writ, the spouses Nerio and Soledad Pador and Rey Pador must prove that
their rights to life, liberty and security were being violated or threatened by an unlawful
act or omission. The intrusion into their farm was merely a violation of property rights.
The last allegation was grounded merely on pure speculations and conjectures. (Pador
vs. Arcayan, 693 SCRA 192.)

II. LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT

A. DELEGATION OF RULE-MAKING POWER
1. Valid Delegation
Alfeo Vivas, as stockholder and officer of Euro-Credit Community Bank, Inc. questioned
the constitutionality of the power granted by Section 30 of the New Central Bank Act to
place distressed banks under receivership for constituting an undue delegation of
legislative power. HELD: The legislature clearly spelled out the reasonable parameters
of the power entrusted to the Monetary Board and assigned to it only the manner of
enforcing the power to attain the objective of protecting the interest of the public, the
banking industry, and the economy. (Vivas vs. Monetary Board of the Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, 703 SCRA 290.)
Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Prevention Law created the Cybercrime
Investigation and Coordinating Center for policy coordination among concerned agencies
and for the formulation of a national cyber security plan and extend immediate
assistance in case of commission of cybercrimes through a computer emergency
response team. The petitioners contended that this was an invalid delegation of power
to the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center. HELD: The law is complete
when it directed the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center to formulate and
implement a national cyber security plan. This is consistent with the policy to prevent
and combat cyber offenses by facilitating the detection, investigation, and prosecution
and by providing arrangements for fast and reliable operations. This policy is adopted in
the interest of law and order. That has been considered a sufficient standard. (Disini vs.
Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014.)
2.

Void Delegation

Petitions were filed asking the Supreme Court to declare the pork barrel system
unconstitutional and to prohibit it. The presidential pork barrel is a lump-sum,
discretionary fund which allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization.
Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 910 provides the fees, revenues and receipts of the
Energy Development Board from any and all sources shall form part of a special fund to
be used to finance energy resource development and exploration programs and projects
of the government and for such other purposes as may be hereafter be directed by the
President.
This constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power since the phrase, for such
other purposes as may be hereafter directed by the President does not lay down a
sufficient standard to determine the limits of the authority of the President with respect
to the purpose. The principle of ejusdem generiscannot be applied. The phrase energy

15 | P a g e

resource development and exploration, and programs of the government states a

singular and a general class and cannot be used as a reference of specific things. The
phrase also exhausts the class it represents.
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1869, as amended, provides that after deducting a
five percent franchise tax, the 50% share of the government in the gross earnings of the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, or 60% if the gross earnings be less than
P150,000,000, shall be set aside to finance priority infrastructure development projects
and to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as
may be directed and authorized by the President. The first purpose is an undue
delegation of legislative power. It does not define priority infrastructure development
projects. Infrastructures can pertain to any kind of facility (Belgica vs. Ochoa Jr., 710
SCRA 1.)
B. PARTY-LIST SYSTEM
1. Qualifications
A total of 280 groups and organizations registered to participate in the party-list elections
in 2013. The Commission on Elections denied some of the new petitions for registration
and cancelled some of the existing registrations. HELD: The framers of the 1987
Constitution intended the party-list system to include not only sectoral parties but also
non-sectoral parties. Section 5(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides that the partylist system is to be composed of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations. The sectoral parties belong to only one of the three groups. National and
regional parties or organizations need not be organized along sectoral lines and need not
represent any particular sector. To require all national and regional parties to represent
the marginalized and underrepresented is to deprive ideology-based and cause-oriented
parties from the party-list system. The major political parties are those that field
candidates in the legislative district elections. They cannot participate in the party-list
elections since they do not lack well-defined political constituents nor represent
marginalized and under-represented sectors. Major political parties can participate in the
party-list system only through their sectoral wings, a majority of whose members are
marginalized and underrepresented or lacking in well-defined constituencies. The
sectoral wing is in itself an independent sectoral party and is linked to a major party
through a coalition.
A party-list nominee must be a bona fidemember of the party or organization he seeks to
represent. In the case of a sectoral party, to be a bona fide party-list nominee, one must
belong to the sector represented or have a track record of advocacy of such sector.
In determining who may participate in the party-list elections, the Commission on
Elections should adhere to the following guidelines:
1. National, regional, and sectoral parties and organizations may participate;
2.

National and regional parties or organizations need not organize along sectoral lines

nor represent any marginalized and underrepresented sector;

3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in legislative district elections. A political
party that fields candidates in legislative district elections can participate in party-list
elections through its sectoral wing, which can separately register under the party-list
system. The sectoral wing is an independent sectoral party and is linked to a political
party through a coalition.
4. Sectoral parties or organizations may be marginalized or underrepresented or lacking
in well-defined political constituencies. It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains
to the special interests of their sector. The marginalized and underrepresented sectors
include labor, peasant, fisher folk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers.

The sectors that lack well-defined

constituencies include professionals, the elderly, women and the young.

5.

A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations that represent the

marginalized and underrepresented and lack well-defined political constituencies must

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belong to the sectors they represent. The nominees must belong to their sectors or must
have a track record of advocacy of their sectors. The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona fidemembers of such parties or organizations.
6.

National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not be disqualified if

some of their nominees are disqualified, if they have at least one nominee who is
qualified. (Atong Panglaum, Inc. vs. Commission on Elections, 694 SCRA 477.)
The Commission on Elections cancelled the registration of Abang-Lingkod Party-List for
failure to present evidence of track record in representing the marginalized and
underrepresented. HELD: Sectoral parties are no longer required to adduce evidence
showing their track record that they have undertaken to further the cause of the sector
they represent. It is sufficient that their ideals are geared towards the cause of the
sector they represent. The disqualification of some of the nominees of a party-list
gravely should not automatically result in the disqualification of the party list. It is the
fact that it satisfied the qualifications of the law that is material. The party-list group is
separate and distinct from its nominees. (Abang-Lingkod Party-List vs. Commission on
Elections, 708 SCRA 133.)
2.

Cancellation of Registration

The COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. was registered as a party-list

organization. For submitting less than five nominees, as required by Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 7941, the registration was cancelled by the Commission on Elections.
HELD: Under Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 7941, failure to comply with laws relating
to elections is a ground for the cancellation of registration. Even if a party-list group can
have a maximum of three seats only, the requirement of the additional nominees
addresses the contingencies that may happen during the term of the party-list
representatives.
(COCOFED-Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc. vs.
Commission on Elections, 703 SCRA 165.)
This was reiterated in Alliance for Nationalism of Democracy vs. Commission on
Elections, 703 SCRA 348.
C. ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
Regina Ongsiako Reyes filed her certificate of candidacy for representative of the lone
district of Marinduque. A registered voter filed in the Commission on Elections a petition
to deny due course or to cancel her certificate of candidacy on the ground that she is an
American citizen. The petition submitted a copy of an article indicating that Regina
Ongsiako Reyes was an American citizen and holder of an American passport and a
certificate of her use of an American passport during her travels abroad.
On March 27, 2013, the First Division of the Commission on Elections issued a resolution
canceling the certificate of candidacy of Regina Ongsiako Reyes. On May 14, 2013, the
Commission on Elections en banc denied her motion for reconsideration. On May 18,
2013, she was proclaimed winner in the election. She argued that the Commission on
Elections had no jurisdiction over her, once she had been duly proclaimed winner and
had taken her oath of office. HELD: The jurisdiction of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal begins only after a candidate is considered a Member of the House of
Representatives. To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there
must be a valid proclamation, a proper oath, and assumption of office, Regina Ongsiako
Reyes has not assumed office. (Reyes vs. Commission on Elections, 699 SCRA 522.)
Once a candidate for membership in the House of Representatives has been proclaimed
and has assumed office, questions regarding the election, returns, and qualifications of
the winner falls under the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
(Taada vs. Commission on Elections, 708 SCRA 188.)
D. TITLE OF BILL
The repeal by the Fair Election Act of the provision stating that an elected official who
runs for another elective office is deemed automatically resigned is constitutional. (Giron
vs. Commission on Elections, 689 SCRA 97.)
Republic Act No, 9646, the Real Estate Service Act, is entitled An Act Regulating the
Practice of Real Estate Service in the Philippines, Creating for the Purpose a Professional
Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for Other
Purposes. Remman Enterprises, Inc. and the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Association claimed that Republic Act No. 9646 is unconstitutional, because the

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requirement that partnerships and corporations engaged in the marketing or selling of

real estate development projects in the regular course of business are required to be
handled by full-time, registered and licensed real estate brokers and this is not reflected
in the title. HELD: Republic Act No. 9646 does not violate Section 26(1), Article VI of the
Constitution scheme. The inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the primary
goal of the law of developing a corps of technically competent, responsible and respected
real estate service practitioners whose standards of procedure shall be globally
competitive and will promote the growth of the real estate industry. Since the marketing
aspect of real estate development projects entails the performance of the acts and
transactions defined as real estate practices under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 9696,
it is logically covered by the regulatory scheme to professionalize the entire real estate
sector. (Remman Enterprises Inc. vs. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate
Service, G.R. No. 197676, February 9, 2014.)

III. EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

A. EXECUTIVE POWER
Petitions were filed asking the Supreme Court to declare the pork barrel system
unconstitutional and prohibiting it. The pork barrel system is the collective body of rules
and procedures that govern the manner by lump-sum, discretionary funds, intended
primarily for local projects utilized through the respective participations of the legislative
and executive branches of government, including the members. HELD: The principle of
separation of powers may be violated in two ways, when one branch interferes
impermissibly with the performance of another branch of its constitutionally assigned
functions or when one assumes a function that is more properly entrusted to another.
The enforcement of the national budget is a function constitutionally assigned to the
executive branch of government. Upon approval of the general appropriations act, the
law-making role of Congress comes to an end.
Through project lists, prior consultations or program reviews, legislators have been
accorded post-enactment authority to identify projects they desire to be funded from the
pork barrel allocations. Legislators have also been accorded post-enactment authority in
the areas of fund release and realignment. All requests or release of funds are required
to be supported by the prescribed documents and favorably endorsed by the House
Committee on Appropriations and Senate Committee on Finance. Any realignment of
funds must be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement.
The post-enactment identification authority given to individual legislators violates the
principle of non-delegability of legislative power, since legislators are allowed individually
to exercise the power to appropriate, which is lodged in Congress.
For the President to exercise his item veto power, there must exist a proper item. To
ensure that the President may be able to cast his power of item veto, the appropriation
act must contain specific appropriations of money, and not only general provisions. An
item must be a specified singular amount for a specified regular purpose. The calamity
fund, the contingent fund, and the intelligence fund, being appropriations which state a
specified amount for a specific purpose, is a line-item appropriate subject to item veto.
An appropriation may apportion into component percentages, but each percentage must
be allocated for its own corresponding purpose. An appropriation may have several
related purposes that by accounting and budgetary practice are considered as one
purpose, such as maintenance and other operating expenses. A singular lump-sum
appropriation for multiple purposes is infirim. It requires further determination of the
actual amount to be expended and the actual purpose from multiple purposes. The
President then would have to veto the entire appropriation or approve the entire
appropriation. This renders the item veto power of the President useless.
The congressional pork barrel system goes against the principle of local autonomy, since
it allows national officers to substitute their projects in utilizing public funds for local
development. (Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1.)
B. POWER OF APPOINTMENT
The President appointed Alberto Agra as acting Solicitor General and acting Secretary of
Justice in a concurrent capacity. Dennis Funa questioned the constitutionality of the
concurrent appointments on the ground that these are prohibited under Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution. Alberto Agra argued that the appointments were merely
temporary and were not covered by the constitutional prohibition and that he merely
remained as acting Solicitor General in a hold-over capacity. HELD: The designation of

18 | P a g e

Alberto Agra as acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his position as acting
Solicitor General is in violation of the constitutional prohibition. It is of no moment that
the designation was in a temporary capacity. The Constitution makes no reference to the
nature of the designation. (Funa vs. Agra, 691 SCRA 196.)
C. MERGER OF ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS
The President issued Executive Order No. 304, which ordered the transfer to Koronadal
City of all departments, bureaus and offices of the National Government in Cotobato City.
Employees of the Department of Agriculture questioned its validity. HELD: The power to
merge administrative regions is lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the
power of general supervision over local governments. The transfer of the regional center
to Koronadal City is an executive function. (Republic vs. Bayao, 697 SCRA 313.)
D. SELECTION OF NATIONAL ARTISTS
Republic Act No. 7356 created the National Commission for Culture and the Arts. The
Board of Trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines and the National Commission
for Culture and the Arts were authorized to give awards to deserving Filipino artists and
to administer the National Artists Award. In 2009, they jointly recommended to the
President, the proclamation of Manuel Conde, Ramon Santos, Lazaro Francisco, and
Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz as national artists. The President excluded Ramon Santos and
included Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Jose Moreno and Francisco
Maosa in the proclamation as National Artists. The Order of National Artists, which is
composed exclusively of national artists, questioned the proclamation. HELD: The
recommendation is subject to the discretion of the President. However, the President
considered names that were not recommended. The discretion of the President is
confined to the names submitted. Otherwise, this will render the selection process futile,
and the mandate of the National Commission for Culture and Arts and the Board of
Trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines to administer the conferment of awards
meaningless. (Almario vs. Executive Secretary, 701 SCRA 269.)
E. DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY
Section 8(2) of Republic Act No. 6770 conferred upon President the disciplinary authority
over Deputy Ombudsmen. HELD: The alter egos of the President and the officials of the
Executive Department are subject to the disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. The
Deputy Ombudsmen act as agents of the Ombudsman in the performance of their
duties. Subjecting them to the power to discipline and removal by the President will
seriously place at risk the independence of the Ombudsman. Section 8(2) of Republic Act
No. 6770 should be declared void. The authority granted by the Constitution to Congress
to provide the names and the removal of other public officers must be consistent with the
principle of independence of the Ombudsman. However, Section 8(2) of Republic Act No.
6770 is valid insofar as the Special Prosecutor is concerned, because, he is not within the
Office of the Ombudsman. (Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, G.R. No. 196232,
January 28, 2014.)

IV. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

A. JUDICIAL POWER
The Regional Trial Court granted the petition of Rosalie Joyce Garcia for a temporary
protection order against her husband, Jesus Garcia, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262.
Jesus Garcia argued that the grant to the Punong Barangay or the Barangay Kagawad in
case of his absence, of the power to issue barangay protection orders constitutes an
invalid grant of judicial power to barangay officials. HELD: The barangay protection
order merely orders the perpetrator to desist from causing physical harm to a woman or
her children, and from threatening to cause the woman or her children physical harm.
Such function is purely executive pursuant to the duty under the Local Government Code
to enforce all laws and ordinances and to maintain public order. The mere fact that an
officer is required to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law to
determine what his official conduct shall be and that his acts may affect private rights
does not constitute an exercise of judicial power. (Garcia vs. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352.)
Homero Mercado was included as respondent in the investigation of a tax credit scam
against officials of the Department of Finance. The Ombudsman agreed to grant him
immunity if he would testify against the other respondents. The Sandiganbayan refused
to discharge him on the ground that the conditions required in the Rules of Criminal
Procedure were not established. HELD: The authority to grant immunity is not an
inherent judicial function. Congress vested such power in the Ombudsman. (People vs.
Sandiganbayan, 699 SCRA 713.)

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Section 14 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act provides that upon securing a court warrant,
law enforcement authorities shall order any person or service provider to disclose
subscribers information, traffic data or relevant data in his possession or control within
72 hours from receipt of the order in relation to an investigation. The petitioners claimed
the order is like a subpoena and the issuance of a subpoena is a judicial form. HELD:
The power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively a judicial function. Executive agencies
have the power to issue a subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers. Section
14 merely enforces the court warrant. (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335,
February 18, 2014.)
B. JUDICIAL REVIEW
1.

Possession of Power

The Regional Trial Court granted the petition of Rosalie Jaypee Garcia for a temporary
protection order against her husband, Jesus Garcia, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9262,
the Act Defining Violence against Women and Their Children. Jesus Garcia questioned
the validity of the temporary protection order by filing a petition for prohibition in the
Court of Appeals. He questioned in his petition the constitutionality of Republic Act No.
9262. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, because he did not raise the question
of constitutionality in the Regional Trial Court. Jesus Garcia argued that as a Family Court,
the Regional Trial Court cannot pass upon the issue of constitutionality. HELD: In spite
of its description as a Family Court, the Regional Trial Court remains a court of general
jurisdiction and has jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute. The
respondent is not allowed to file a counterclaim, a cross-claim and a third-party
complaint. The unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action and can be raised
in the opposition. It affects the resolution of a right to a temporary protection order.
Although the proceedings are summary, the question of constitutionality can be raised in
the opposition. It is a question of law and does not need to be supported by evidence.
(Garcia vs. Drilon, 699 SCRA 352.)
The City of Manila assessed the SM Mart, Inc., SM Prime Holdings, Inc., Watsons Personal
Care Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippine Corporation, Surplus Marketing Corporation, and
Signature Lines for additional taxes under Section 21 of the Revised Revenue Code of
Manila in addition to the taxes imposed under its Sections 14, 15, 16, and 17. The
business establishments paid under protest so that their business permits would be
issued and sued for refund in the Regional Trial Court. They applied for a writ of
preliminary injunction. The Regional Trial Court granted the petition. The City of Manila
assailed the order by filing a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals held that the petition should be filed with the Court of Tax Appeals. HELD:
Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution vests judicial power in the Supreme Court and in
the lower courts established by laws. Judicial power includes the power to determine
whether there has been grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. The judicial power of the Court of Tax Appeals
includes the determination of whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Regional Trail Court in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within its
exclusive appellate jurisdiction. The Court of Tax Appeals is vested with jurisdiction to
issue writs of certiorari in these cases.
For any appellate courts to effectively exercise its appellate jurisdiction, it must have the
authority to issue writs of certiorari. Section 6, Rule 135 of the Rules of Court provides
that when by law, jurisdiction is conferred on a court, all auxiliary writs, processes, and
other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by it. (City of Manila vs.
Grecia-Cuerdo, G.R. No. 175723, February 4, 2014.)
2.

Standing

Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation applied for a Financial and Technical
Assistance Agreement with the Mines and Geosciences Bureau Regional Office III in
Bulacan. The application was denied. The denial was appealed to the Mines and
Conference Bureau Central Office. While the appeal was pending, four applications for a
quarry permit involving the same area were filed. The appeal was denied. Atlantic Mines
and Trading applied for an exploration permit covering a portion of the area covered by
the application of Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation. The application for a
quarry period was converted to an application for a small-scale mining permit. Governor
Josefina dela Cruz issued the permits.
Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation appealed to the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, who decided in its favor. The decision explained that the appeal of
Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation suspended the order of denial of the
Regional Director, the area was still closed to mining location when the governor granted

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the permits, the area was never proclaimed to be under the Peoples Small Scale Mining
Program, and the area is not considered among the quarrying resources. The League of
Provinces filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court. HELD: The League of
Provinces has standing to file the petition, because it is tasked under Section 504 of the
Local Government Code to promote local autonomy at the provincial level, to accept
measures for the promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its officials, and to
exercise other powers as the league may prescribe for the welfare of provinces. (League
of Provinces of the Philippines vs. Department of Environment and Natural Resources,
696 SCRA 190.)
The Sangguniang Bayan of Agoo passed resolutions authorizing the Mayor to obtain loans
from the Land Bank of the Philippines to convert the plaza to a commercial center.
Eduardo Cacayuran sued in his capacity as a taxpayer to nullify the loans. The Land
Bank of the Philippines questioned the standing of Eduardo Cacayuran to file the case.
HELD: A person suing as a taxpayer must show that the act complained of directly
involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and that he is
directly affected by the act. Although the construction of the commercial center was
sourced from the proceeds of loans, the municipality assigned a portion of its internal
revenue allotment as security for the loans. This is in the nature of public funds derived
from taxation. Since the plaza is a property for public use, Eduardo Cacayuran has a
direct interest in ensuring that it will not be exploited for commercial purposes, (Land
Bank of the Philippines vs. Cacayuran, 696 SCRA 861.)
Marietta OHara de Villa donated a parcel of land to the Philippine Government. Later on,
it filed a case to expropriate the rest of the parcel of land. The parties reached a
compromise agreement and agreed on the price of P400,000. Juanito Remulla filed a
petition for annulment of judgment in his capacity as taxpayer and as vice governor on
the ground that the price was excessive, there was no authorization from the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, there was no certification of availability of funds, and that
there was a collusion between the parties. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
on the ground that Juanito Remulla had no standing to file it. HELD: A taxpayer may be
allowed to sue if there is a claim that public funds are being illegally disbursed and as
vice governor, he represents the interests of the province. (Remulla vs. Maliksi, 706
SCRA 35.)
Petitions were filed asking the Supreme Court to declare the pork barrel system
unconstitutional and to prohibit it. HELD: As taxpayers, the petitioners possess the
requisite standing to question the validity of the pork barrel system. They are bound to
suffer from the unconstitutional usage of public funds. They also fulfilled the standing
requirement for citizens, as the issues they have raised are of transcendental
importance. (Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1.)
The Philippines ended its diplomatic relations with Taiwan when it recognized the
Government of the Peoples Republic of China as the sole legal government of China.
However, the Philippines maintained an unofficial relationship with the people of Taiwan
through the Manila Economic and Cultural Office, which was organized as a non-stock,
non-profit corporation.
Dennis Funa asked the Commission on Audit for a copy of its latest financial and audit
report of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office. An Assistant Commissioner of the
Manila Economic and Cultural Office issued a memorandum stating that it was not among
the agencies audited by any of the three clusters of the Corporate Governance Sector.
Dennis Funa filed a petition to compel the Commission on Audit to audit the accounts of
the Manila Economic and Cultural Office. HELD: The petition raises issues of
transcendental importance as they involve the performance of a constitutional duty
allegedly neglected by the Commission on Audit. As a concerned citizen, Dennis Funa
has legal standing to file the petition. (Funa vs. Manila Economic and Cultural Office, G.R.
No. 193462, February 4, 2014.)
The Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. and Eduardo Olaguer questioned the validity of
Circular No. 905, which lifted the ceiling on interest rates, on the ground that Section 109
of Republic Act No. 265 authorized the Monetary Board merely to set the maximum
interest rates which banks may charge. HELD: The petitioners have no standing to file
the case. They do not allege that they sustained any personal injury because of the
issuance of Circular No. 905. They do not claim that public funds were being misused to
enforce Circular No. 905. Neither were they borrowers who were affected by the
suspension of the Usury Law. (Advocates for Truth in Lending, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral
Monetary Board, 688 SCRA 530.)
3. Actual Controversy

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Petitions were filed asking the Supreme Court to declare the pork barrel system
unconstitutional and to prohibit it. HELD: There exists an actual controversy in these
cases. The requirement is satisfied by the antagonistic positions of the parties on the
constitutionality of the pork barrel system. The questions are ripe for adjudicating the
challenged funds and the provisions allowing their use as existing and operational.
(Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1.)
Petitions were filed asking the Supreme Court to declare the pork barrel system
unconstitutional and to prohibit it. HELD: The issues raised do not present political but
legal questions, which are within the province of the Supreme Court to resolve. The
intrinsic constitutionality of the pork barrel system is not an issue dependent upon the
wisdom of the political branches of government but rather a legal one which the
Constitution has commanded the Supreme Court to act upon. (Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr., 710
SCRA 1.)
Republic Act No. 9646, the Real Estate Service Acts provided for the licensing of real
estate service practitioners and placed them under the supervision of the Professional
Regulation Commission through a Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service.
The Remman Enterprises, Inc. and the Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association
questioned the constitutionality of the law. HELD: The petitioners are real estate
developers and are directly affected by the prohibition against the performance of acts
constituting practice of real estate service without complying with the registration and
licensing requirements. They assert that the prohibition violates their rights as property
owners to dispose of their properties. A justiciable controversy calls for immediate
resolution. (Remman Enterprises, Inc. vs. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate
Service, G.R. No. 197676, February 4, 2014.)
4.

Lis Mota

Dennis Funa filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Commission on Audit to audit
the accounts of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office. It claimed that since it had
issued Office Order No. 2011-698, it had already conceded its jurisdiction over the
accounts of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office. HELD: The Supreme Court should
refrain from dismissing the case. First, the petition alleges that the Commission on Audit
had been remiss in its constitutional duty to audit the accounts of the Manila Economic
and Cultural Office. Second, there is paramount public interest in the resolution of this
issue. Third, there is paramount public interest in resolving the issue regarding the legal
status of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office, a novelty. The case is capable of being
repeated yet evades review. (Funa vs. Manila Economic and Cultural Office, G.R. No.
193462, February 4, 2014.)
5. Operative Fact Doctrine
On March 28, 2003, San Roque Power Corporation filed with Bureau of Internal Revenue
an amended claim for refund for excess input value added tax. On April 10, 2003, it filed
a petition for review with the Court of Tax Appeals. Section 112(d) of the National
Internal Revenue Code grants the Commissioner of Internal Revenue 120 days from
submission of the complete documents to act on a claim for refund. The decision of the
Supreme Court held that the petition was prematurely filed, because the waiting period is
mandatory. San Roque Power Corporation argued that the ruling should not be applied
retroactively because of the post operative fact doctrine. HELD: The doctrine of
operative fact states that a judicial declaration of invalidity may not necessarily
obliterate all the effects of a void act prior to the declaration. For the operative fact
doctrine to apply, there must be a law or an executive issuance invalidated by the court.
Its effect, when relied upon by the public good faith, may have to be recognized as valid.
San Roque Power Corporation asserted that the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Court
of Tax Appeals in practice did not require compliance with the waiting period. An
administrative practice is not a law or an executive issuance. (Commissioner of Internal
Revenue vs. San Roque Power Corporation, 707 SCRA 66.)
C. Supervision over the Judiciary
The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over administrative cases involving
employees of the Judiciary. (Civil Service Commission vs. Ramoncito Pita, 696 SCRA 151.)
Section 7, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations implementing Republic Act No. 10154,
which requires retiring government employees to get a clearance of administrative cases
from the Civil Service Commission should not apply to employees of the Judiciary.
Otherwise, it will disregard the power of supervision of the Supreme Court over its
personnel. (In re Request for Guidance/ Clarification of Section 7, Rule III of Republic Act
No. 10154, 706 SCRA 502.)

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D. Judicial and Bar Council

Francisco Chavez questioned the inclusion of a Senator and a Congressman as members
of the Judicial and Bar Council, since the Constitution provides for only one representative
of Congress. It was argued that the failure to include both a Senator and a Congressman
as members was due to oversight. HELD: The argument that the framers of
Constitution failed to adjust the representation of Congress to a bicameral legislature due
to inadvertence is not persuasive. The framers of the Constitution did not adjust the
provision on congressional representation, because it did not involve the exercise of its
primary function legislation. The tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is
to treat each ex-officio member as representative one co-equal branch of government.
The lone representative of Congress is entitled to one full vote. The scheme of splitting
the vote into halves between two representatives of Congress is disallowed. The
Supreme Court cannot supply what it thinks the framers of the Constitution would have
supplied had its attention been called to the omission. (Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar
Council, 696 SCRA 496.)

V. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

A. Rule-Making Power
Arsenio de Guzman was appointed Financial Management Specialist IV of Trade and
Investment Development Corporation. The Civil Service Commission disallowed it on the
ground that it was not included in the Index of Occupational Service prepared by the
Department of Budget and Management. Trade and Investment Development
Corporation argued that Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8494 exempted it from the position
classification system. The Civil Service Commission argued that CSC Memorandum
Article No. 15, Series of 1999 required that the position title indicated in an appointment
should conform to the Index of Occupational Service. HELD: Although the rule-making
power of the Civil Service Commission is granted by the Constitution, it is still limited to
the implementation of the laws it is tasked to enforce. The laws that the Civil Service
Commission interprets and enforces fall within the prerogative of Congress. The rule that
it formulates must be in harmony with the law it seeks to implement. Section 7 of
Republic Act No. 8494 exempted Trade and Investment Development Corporation from
the laws on position classification. The appointment of Arsenio de Guzman is valid.
(Trade and Investment Development Corporation vs. Civil Service Commission, 691 SCA
384.)
B. Temporary Appointment
President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo appointed Emanuel de Castro as assistant general
manager for operations of the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority. President
Benigno Aquino III replaced him with Emerson Carlos. Emmanuel de Castro argued that
his position did not belong to the career executive service office and his removal violated
his security of tenure. HELD: The assistant general manager for operations performs
functions which are managerial in character. It is within the coverage of the career
executive service. Emmanuel de Castro lacked the career executive service eligibility. His
appointment was temporary and coterminous with the appointing authority. (De Castro
vs. Carlos, 696 SCRA 400.)
C. Multiple Positions
Roger Posadas, the chancellor of the University of the Philippines, was appointed director
of the Technology Management Center and received an honorarium of P30,000 per
month. He was charged with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
HELD: There was a violation of the prohibition against multiple positions. (Posadas vs.
Sandiganbayan, 701 SCRA 403.)

VI. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

A.

Decision
Since a majority vote of the Commission on Elections requires four votes for a valid en
banc resolution, if the six members are evenly divided, the Commission on Elections
should rehear the case. (Sevilla vs. Commission on Elections, 693 SCRA 622.)

B.

Judicial Review
Sadikul Sahali and Rashidin Matba ran for governor, while Ruby Sahali and Jilkasi Usman
ran for vice governor. The Board of Canvassers proclaimed Sadikul Sahali and Ruby
Sahali as the elected governor and vice governor, respectively. Both Rashidin Matba and

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Jilkas Usman filed election protests. Instead of recounting the ballots, the Commission on
Elections ordered a technical examination of the ballots, the computerized list of voters,
the registration records, and the book of voters. Sadikul Sahali and Ruby Sahali
questioned the order of the Commission on Elections for lack of published rules
governing such examination. HELD: Under the Constitution, the power of the Supreme
Court to review election case within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission
on Elections extends only to final decisions of the Commission on Elections and does not
extend to interlocutory orders of a Division. (Sahali vs. Commission on Elections, 688
SCRA 552.)
C.

Administrative Powers
1.

Leadership of Political Party

The Commission on Elections has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of leadership of a

political party (Alcantara vs. Commission on Elections, 696 SCRA 547)
2.

Disqualification of Convicted Candidate

Romeo Jalosjos was convicted of two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of
lasciviousness. He was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal for each count, respectively, with the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification to vote in any elections. He was discharged from prison on March 18,
2008, because the President commuted his sentence.
Romeo Jalosjos applied to register as a voter. His application was denied because of his
conviction. He filed a petition for inclusion in the list of voters. He filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor. The Municipal Court denied his petition because of his conviction.
He appealed to the Regional Trial Court. It denied his appeal with finality.
Five petitions were filed in the Commission on Elections to cancel and deny due course to
the certificate of candidacy of Romeo Jalosjos. The Commission on Elections en banc
motu propioissued a resolution canceling and denying due course to his certificate of
candidacy. Romeo Jalosjos argued that the resolution violated Section 3, Article IX-C of
the Constitution and his right to due process. HELD: The Commission on Elections
merely performed its duty to enforce election laws on the basis of the perpetual absolute
disqualification of Romeo Jalosjos, a fact already established by his final conviction. The
Commission on Elections was exercising its administrative functions. Section 3, Article
IX-C of the Constitution does not apply. When the ground for the denial in due course or
cancellation of a certificate of candidacy is based on a final judgment, it falls within the
administrative functions of the Commission on Elections. There is no violation of
procedural due process. (Jalosjos vs. Commission on Elections, 698 SCRA 742.)

VII. COMMISISON ON AUDIT

A. Audit of Public Funds
Dennis Funa filed a petition for mandamus to compel the Commission on Audit to audit
the accounts of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office. HELD: The Manila Economic
and Cultural Office is not a government-owned or controlled corporation. It was
organized as a non-stock, non-profit corporation under the Corporation Code. None of its
money is distributable as dividends. It seeks to promote the general interest of the
Filipino people in a foreign land. It performs functions which partake of the nature of
governmental functions. Its functions are of the kind that would otherwise be performed
by the diplomatic and consular offices of the Philippines. None of the members are
officers of the Manila Economic and Cultural Office are government officials. It is not a
government instrumentality. It is sui generis.
The Manila Economic and Cultural Office collects verification fees from Taiwanese
employers on behalf of the Department of Labor and Employment. It is mandated to
remit a portion of the verification fees to the National Government. The accounts
pertaining to the verification fees are subject to the audit jurisdiction of the Commission
on Audit. The Manila Economic and Cultural Office also collect consular fees. The
consular fees may be audited by the Commission on Audit. (Funa vs. Manila Economic
and Cultural Office, G.R. No. 193462, February 4, 2014.)
B. Settlement of Money Judgment
For enforcement of the judgment against the City of Cebu to pay the heirs of Reverend
Father Vicente Pallos the just compensation adjudged for the expropriation of their two
lots, they asked for a writ of execution. HELD: Under Section 26 of the Government
Auditing Code, the Commission on Audit has jurisdiction to settle all debts and claims due

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from the Government and any of its subdivisions, agencies and instrumentalities. The
heirs of Reverend Father Vicente Rallos should first seek approval by the Commission on
Audit of the monetary claim. (Rallos vs. City of Cebu, 704 SCRA 378.)
C.

Disallowance of Excessive Expenditures

Melinda Ocampo was appointed as member of the Energy Regulatory Board and served
for two years and four months. She was given a five-year lump sum gratuity and was
also given a monthly pension. Two months later, she was appointed Chairman of the
Energy Regulatory Board. She served for two years and eleven months. She applied
again for similar retirement gratuity. The Commission on Audit disallowed the payment
of a second five-year lump-sum gratuity and granted her one month pension as her last
retirement benefit. HELD: The Commission on Audit could audit the first retirement
gratuity paid to Melinda Ocampo. Its pre and post-audit authority is enshrined in the
Constitution. The Commission on Audit looked into the first retirement gratuity because
she claimed a second retirement gratuity under the same law. The scope of authority of
the Commission on Audit includes the disallowance of excessive expenditure of
government funds.
Republic Act No. 1568, as amended, does not allow the payment of more than one
gratuity as a consequence of several retirements from the same agency. Melinda
Ocampo may receive one gratuity in an amount equal to her last annual salary multiplied
by her years of service but not to exceed five years. In addition, she is entitled to an
annuity equivalent to her last monthly salary. (Ocampo vs. Commission on Audit, 698
SCRA 136.)

D.

Creation of Special Audit Team

The Commission on Audit created a Special Audit Team to audit the Government Service
Insurance System. The Government Service Insurance System argued that it had no
power to create the Special Audit Team. HELD: The Constitution grants the Commission
on Audit the exclusive authority to define the scope of the audit and establish techniques
and methods for it. (Special Audit Team, Commission on Audit vs. Court of Appeals, 696
SCRA 166.)

VIII.
A.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

Power of Supervision
The League of Provinces of the Philippines argued that the provisions of law granting the
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources the power of control over small-scale
mining in the provinces are unconstitutional, as under the Constitution, the President and
his alter-egos have the power of supervision only over acts of local governments. HELD:
Paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution provides that the exploration,
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. Paragraph 3 of Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution
provides that Congress may by law allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by
Filipino citizens.
The constitutional guarantee of local autonomy referred to administrative autonomy of
local government units. Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but
subject to limitations like national policies or standards. The Local Government Code did
not fully devolve the enforcement of small-scale mining laws to provincial governments,
as the enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources.
Section 29 of the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act provides that the power of the
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board to settle disputes over conflicting claims shall be
subject to review by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources. The decision
of the Secretary of Natural Resources was rendered in accordance with his power of
review. (League of Provinces of the Philippines vs. Department of Environment and
Natural Resources, 696 SCRA 190.)

B.

Term Limits of Elective Officials

A mayor who served only for a part of his third consecutive term, because he assumed
office only upon winning in an election protest is not disqualified to run for a fourth
consecutive term. (Abundo vs. Commission on Elections, 688 SCRA 149.)

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IX.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

The Ombudsman has jurisdiction to entertain administrative cases against elective officials.
(Alejandro vs. Office of the Ombudsman Fact-Finding Bureau, 695 SCRA 35.)

X. ACADEMIC FREEDOM
Floro Mison Calauag, Micaeli Espia, Jose Marie Nosalga, and Che Che Salcepuedes enrolled for
Master of Science in Fisheries Biology. After their first year, they submitted their tentative
thesis titles and the names of the faculty members who consented to be members of the
thesis committees. Dean Carlos Baylon disapproved their tentative thesis titles and the
composition of their thesis committees on the ground that their thesis topics were not
appropriate to their degrees. They filed a case to nullify the order of Dean Carlos Baylon.
HELD: The academic freedom accorded to institutions of higher learning includes the
prerogative to establish requirements for graduation, such as the completion of a thesis and
the manner of its accomplishment. The thesis required and the compliance with the
procedures leading to it are part of reasonable academic requirements. (Calauag vs.
University of the Philippines Visayas, 703 SCRA 373.)

XI. STATE IMMUNITY FROM SUIT

The Secretary of Health issued guidelines for the accreditation of government suppliers of
pharmaceutical products for distribution to the public subject to suspension or revocation
after deliberation and proper notice. Phil Pharmaceuticals, Inc. was given a report finding its
products unfit for human consumption and was required to submit its explanations. It argued
that the suspension was void, because it was made by the Accreditation Committee while the
power was conferred upon the Bureau of Food and Drugs and that the suspension without the
benefit of notice and hearing violated due process. It sued the Secretary of Health and the
Undersecretary of Health for damages. HELD: The Department of Health, being an
unincorporated agency which performs governmental functions can invoke the defense of
immunity from suit, because it has not consented to be sued. (Department of Health vs. Phil
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 691 SCRA 421.)

PUBLIC CORPORATIONS
I. QUALIFICATION AND DISQUALIFICATION OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
A. Residence
Svetlana Jalosjos filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of the Municipality of
Baliangao, Misamis Occidental. A petition to deny due course to or to cancel the
certificate of candidacy was filed with the Commission on Elections on the ground that
her domicile of origin was in Dapitan City and that she had not acquired a domicile in
Baliangao, Misamis Occidental. HELD: Svetlana Jalosjos failed to prove that she had
resided in Baliangao, Misamis Occidental one year prior to the elections. (Jalosjos vs.
Commission on Elections, 691 SCRA 646.)
B.

Dual Citizenship
Rommel Armado, a natural born Filipino citizen, became a naturalized American citizen.
Later on, he repatriated and executed an affidavit or renunciation of his foreign
citizenship. He then filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor. HELD: Between the
date Rommel Armado renounced his foreign citizenship and the date he filed his
certificate of candidacy, he used his American passport four times. By doing so, he
reverted to his status as a dual citizen. It effectively imposed on him a disqualification to
run for an elective local position. (Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections, 696 SCRA
420.)

C.

Criminal Conviction
Romeo Jalosjos was convicted of two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of
lasciviousness. He was sentenced to suffer the penalties of reclusion perpetua and
reclusion temporal for each count, respectively, with the accessory penalty of perpetual
absolute disqualification to hold public office. He was discharged from prison on March
18, 2009, because the President commuted his sentence. He ran for mayor in 2013 on
the ground that under Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code, a person convicted of
an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by at least one year of
imprisonment is disqualified to run for any elective local office within two years after

26 | P a g e

serving sentence, HELD: Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code should not be
deemed to cover cases where the law imposes a penalty which has the effect of
disqualifying to run for elective office. Article 41 in relation to Article 30 of the Revised
Penal Code is more specific insofar as it disqualifies a candidate to run for elective office
due to his conviction, as compared to Section 40(a) of the Local Government Code. They
generally speak of offenses involving moral turpitude and thus, punishable by at least
one year of imprisonment without referring to disqualifying effects on the right to
suffrage. (Jalosjos vs. Commission on Elections, 698 SCRA 742.)
II. ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES
Franklin Alejandro was ordered to be dismissed by the Overall Deputy Ombudsman for grave
misconduct. He argued that the Overall Deputy Ombudsman had no jurisdiction over the
case because of the provisions in the Local Government Code for disciplining elective
officials. HELD: The two statutes are not inconsistent. Any act or omission of a public officer
occupying a salary grade lower than 27 is within the concurrent jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman and other investigative agencies. (Alejandro vs. Office of the Ombudsman FactFinding and Intelligence Bureau, 695 SCRA 35.)
III. HIRING OF PRIVATE COUNSEL
Officials of a local government unit who were sued personally for damages may retain the
services of private counsel. (Gontang vs. Alazan, 688 SCRA 659.)
IV. TEMPORARY VACANCY
Philip Corpus Velasco, the municipal mayor, filed a complaint against Pacifico Velasco, the
former mayor, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practice Act and the Revised Penal
Code. The Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon dismissed it. As Philip Corpus Velasco was abroad,
Inocencio Dela Cruz, the vice mayor, filed a motion for reconsideration. Pacifico Velasco
questioned his capacity to file the motion. HELD: Under Section 46 of the Local Government
Code, the vice mayor automatically assumes the powers and duties of the mayor in case of
his temporary absence. (Velasco vs. Sandiganbayan, 691 SCRA 293.)
V. TAXATION
Joseph Lara obtained an industrial sand and gravel permit from the Mines and Geosciences
Bureau authorizing him to engage in quarrying operations in Cagayan. The governor ordered
him to stop his quarrying operations because of his failure to get a provincial permit. Joseph
Lara filed an action for injunction. HELD: Section 138(2) of the Local Government Code
requires that an entity undertaking a quarrying business must first secure a permit from the
governor. (Province of Cagayan vs. Lara, 702 SCRA 183.)
VI. CONTRACTS
The Sangguniang Bayan of Agoo passed resolutions authorizing the Mayor to obtain loans
from the Land Bank of the Philippines to convert the plaza to a commercial center. Pursuant
to them, the Mayor obtained loans from the Land Bank of the Philippines for the purpose.
Eduardo Cacayuran questioned the validity of the loans. HELD: Under Section 44A(B)(1)(vi)
of the Local Government Code, the authority of the mayor to sign a contract may be in the
form of a resolution, but the obligation which he is authorized to enter into, must be
authorized by an ordinance. No rights can be conferred by the resolution. Besides, the
Sangguniang Bayan failed to submit the resolution to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for
review in accordance with Section 56 of the Local Government Code and was not published
and posted as required by Section 59 of the Local Government Code. (Land Bank of the
Philippines vs. Cacayuran, 696 SCRA 861.)

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
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I. ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS
Section 26(a) of the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act authorized the Secretary of Health to issue
rules and regulations to implement its provisions. In 1989, the Secretary of Health issued
Administrative Order No. 67, which required drug manufacturers to register certain drugs and
medicines with the Food and Drug Administration before selling them to the market and
required a satisfactory bio-availability / bio-guidance list. The implementation was deferred
because of lack of local facilities for testing. With the establishment of testing facilities in
1997, the Food and Drug Administration issued Circular No. 1, which implemented the testing
required, and Circular No. 8, which provided additional details for the testing requirements.
The Drugmakers Laboratories, Inc. and Terramedic, Inc. questioned the validity of Circular
Nos. 1 and 8 on the ground that it was the Secretary of Health who was authorized to issue
implementing rules and regulations for the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act and that there was
no prior policy. HELD: Administrative Order No. 67, which introduced the regulations, is an
administrative regulation issued by the Secretary of Health in consonance with the express
authority granted to him by the Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act. The only purpose of Circular
Nos. 1 and 8 is to administer and supervise the implementation of Administrative Order No.
67. The Food and Drug Authority has sufficient authority to issue them and no prior hearing,
consultation and publication are needed for their validity, as they are not administrative
regulations. (Republic vs. Drugmakers Laboratories, Inc., G.R. No, 90837, March 5, 2014.)
II. POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Republic Act No. 7611 provided for an Environmentally Critical Areas Network for protection
and development control over Palawan. It vested the task of creating and implementing it on
the Palawan Council for Sustainable Development. Pursuant to its rule-making authority, the
council required a clearance from it for all proposed undertakings before application for any
permit, license, or concession. It issued a clearance to the Patricia Louise Mining and
Development Corporation for a small scale market mining project in Barangay Calategas.
The farmers and residents asked for the recall of the clearance. The request was denied. The
farmers and residents questioned the denial by filing a petition for certiorari and mandamus.
HELD: Republic Act No. 7611 does not confer quasi-judicial powers upon the council. The
process outlined for the clearance does not involve adjudication. The council does not decide
rights and obligations of adverse parties with finality. All it does is to allow the project
proponent to proceed with its application with the relevant government agencies. At most, it
is an investigatory function to determine the truth behind the claims of the project
proponent. The power to investigate is not the same as adjudication so long as there is no
final determination of rights and obligations. The public consultation is merely to ascertain
the acceptability of the project in the community. (Villanueva vs. Palawan Council for
Sustainable Development, 691 SCRA 556.)
III. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
A.

Absence of Administrative Remedies

Alfredo Alejandro was illegally using water from a fire hydrant for his car- wash business.
Police officers arrested the car-wash boys who were illegally getting water from a fire
hydrant and confiscated the containers they were using. Franklin Alejandro, his father
and barangay chairman, interfered. The car-wash boys were able to escape. An
administrative case was filed against him with the Deputy Ombudsman. The Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman found him guilty of grave misconduct. He filed a petition for
review in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for his failure
to exhaust all administrative remedies by appealing to the Ombudsman. HELD: There
was no further need for the appeal to the Ombudsman, since the Deputy Ombudsman
was acting in behalf of the Office of the Ombudsman. (Alejandro vs. Office of the
Ombudsman Fact-Finding Bureau, 695 SCRA 35.)
The Board of Directors of the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation suspended
Mark Jerome Maglalang, a teller, for thirty days for discourtesy to a customer. He filed a
motion for reconsideration, but it was denied. He questioned his suspension by filing a
petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals dismissed it because
of his failure to exhaust all administrative remedies by appealing to the Civil Service
Commission. HELD: There was no appeal available. Under Section 27 of the Civil
Service Decree, the decisions of the heads of offices in administrative cases are final if
the penalty is suspension for not more than 30 days. (Maglalang vs. Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation, 712 SCRA 472.)

B.

Availability of Administrative Remedies

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The Special People, Inc. Foundation applied for exemption from the requirement to obtain
an environmental compliance certificate for its project to tap water from Loboc River.
The Chief of the Environmental Management Bureau in Bohol denied the application. The
Special People, Inc. Foundation appealed to the Regional Director of the Environmental
Management Bureau. The Regional Director affirmed the decision. The Special People,
Inc. Foundation filed a petition for mandamus. HELD: The Special People, Inc.
Foundation failed to exhaust the available remedies. It should have appealed to the
Director of the Environmental Management Bureau, who exercised supervision and
control over the Regional Director. (Special People, Inc. Foundation vs. Cando, 688 SCRA
403.)
The Commission on Audit created a Special Audit Team to audit the Government Service
Insurance System. The Government Service Insurance System filed a petition for
prohibition in the Court of Appeals on the ground that the Special Audit Team was
biased. HELD: Section 48 of Presidential Decree No. 1445 provides that any person
aggrieved by a decision of an auditor may appeal to the Commission on Audit. An
administrative remedy was available. (Special Audit Team, Commission on Audit vs.
Court of Appeals, 696 SCRA 166.)
Smart Communications, Inc. leased a parcel of land and built a cellular base station on it.
The owners of properties close to it filed an action for injunction in the Regional Trial
Court. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals reversed the
decision on the ground that the non-compliance of the cellular base station was a
nuisance that endangered the health and safety of the residents. HELD: The Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board provides administrative remedies for non-compliance
with its requirements. On the basis of the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, it is premature for the Court of Appeals
to rule upon the validity of the locational clearance. (Smart Communications, Inc. vs.
Aldecoa, 705 SCRA 392.)
IV. DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
San Miguel Properties, Inc. bought 130 residential lots of BF Homes, Inc. from its rehabilitation
receiver in three deeds of sale. BF Homes, Inc. refused to deliver 20 of the lots involved in
the third deed of sale on the ground that at the time of the sale, the rehabilitation receiver
had already been replaced.
San Miguel Properties, Inc. filed an action for specific performance in the Housing and Land
Use Regulatory Board. It then filed a criminal case against the officers of BF Homes, Inc. for
their failure to deliver the titles to the lots in violation of Presidential Decree No. 957. HELD:
In accord with the principle of primary jurisdiction, the criminal case should be suspended,
because it involves a question within the competence of an administrative body requiring its
special knowledge. (San Miguel Properties, Inc. vs. Perez, 705 SCRA 38.)
The Province of Aklan and Jody King Construction and Development Corporation entered into
a contract for the design and construction of a jetty port and phase I of a terminal building for
P38,800,000. In the course of the construction, there were change orders agreed upon by
the parties. Later on, the parties entered into a second contract for phase II of the terminal
building at a cost of P2,475,345.59.
Jody King Construction and Development Corporation demanded the payment of
P22,419,112.96. The Province of Aklan claimed that the sum was not indicated in the Change
Order No. 3 as approved and denied that there was any balance due Jody King Construction
and Development Corporation. Jody King Construction and Development Corporation filed a
collection case in the Regional Trial Court. HELD: Under Commonwealth Act No. 327, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1445, it is the Commission on Audit which has primary
jurisdiction over money claims against government subdivision agencies and
instrumentalities. All the proceedings in a court in violation of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction are null and void. (Province of Aklan vs. Jody King Construction and Development
Corporation, 711 SCRA 60.)

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LAW ON PUBLIC OFFICERS

I. APPOINTMENT
Paulino Rafanan was appointed general manager of Pililla Water District. He was considered
separated from the service when he reached his 65 th birthday. Later on, he was reappointed.
Mayor Leandro Masikip, Jr. questioned his reappointment, since he was holding a career
position and had reached retirement age. HELD: Section 23 of the Provincial Water Utilities
Act was amended by Republic Act No. 9286 to provide that the general manager shall not be
removed except for cause and after due process. Paulino Rafanan was reappointed when the
board of directors no longer had the authority to terminate the general manager at pleasure.
However, the position of general manager of water is primarily confidential. A primarily
confidential position is characterized by the close proximity of the position of the appointer
and the appointee and the high degree of trust and confidence inherent in their relationship.
The general manager is directly accountable to the board of directors, which has disciplinary
authority over him. The provision that he shall not be removed except for cause and after
due process did not convert his appointment to a permanent one. The general manager is
appointed on a coterminous status and may serve for a maximum of six years, the tenure of
the appointing authority, subject to reappointment. Paulino Rafanan was validly reappointed
despite having reached the compulsory retirement age. (Civil Service Commission vs. Pililia
Water District, 692 SCRA 406.)
II. DE FACTO OFFICER
The President appointed Alberto Agra as acting Solicitor General and acting Secretary of
Justice concurrently. The designation is in violation of constitutional prohibition in Section 13,
Article VII of the Constitution. HELD: He was a de facto officer during his tenure as acting
Secretary of Justice. He was discharging his duties under color of authority derived from his
appointment. (Funa vs. Agra, 691 SCRA 196.)
III. TERMINATION
A.

Expiration of Term of Confidential Officer

On April 1, 1991, Beatriz Gonzales was appointed Provincial Administrator. On March 8,
1999, the new Provincial Governor filed an administrative case against her. She was
found guilty and ordered dismissed. On appeal to the Civil Service Commission, her
penalty was reduced to suspension for six months. The Provincial Governor reinstated
her and then terminated her for lack of confidence. HELD: Section 480 of the Local
Government Code made the position of Provincial Administrator as primarily confidential.
This is a valid exercise of the legislative power to create public offices. In determining
whether her termination violated her security of stature, it is its nature at the time of her
removal that should be considered. (Provincial Government of Camarines Norte vs.
Gonzales, 701 SCRA 635.)

B.

Removal
Republic Act No. 8494 authorized the reorganization of the Trade and Investment
Development Corporation. Maria Rosario Manalang-Demigillo, Senior Vice-President of
the Legal and Corporate Services Department, was appointed as Senior Vice-President of
the Remedial and Credit Management Support Sector.
She questioned her
reappointment as an illegal removal. Without waiting for the board of directors to decide
her appeal, she appealed to the Civil Service Commission. The board of directors
dismissed her appeal for lack of merit.
The President informed her of her poor performance rating for 2002. She appealed her
rating. The President stated that he found no justification to change her rating. In 2003,
she was informed that her performance rating needed improvement. She appealed the
rating. The board of directors rendered a decision dropping her from the rolls.
The Civil Service Commission ruled that there was a demotion in her function and
authority in violation of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6656 and that dropping from the
rolls did not comply with Memorandum Circular No. 40, Series of 1998. HELD: The
board of directors argued that its acts were also acts of the President. The doctrine of
qualified political agency cannot be extended to the board of directors although some of
them are appointees to the cabinet. It was the law and not the President who made
them ex-officio members of the board. However, the reorganization was not arbitrary. It
was formulated after lengthy consultations and close coordination with the affected

30 | P a g e

offices.Maria Rosario Manalang-Demigillo was appointed only as Senior Vice-President. It

did not indicate that she was to hold that position in the Legal and Corporate Services
Department. Her re-assignment was not a demotion in rank and status.
After her poor performance rating in 2002, she was given enough time to show
improvement before she was dropped from the rolls in August 2003. The reasons for her
poor performance rating were stated. (Manalang-Demigillo vs. Trade and Investment
Development Corporation, 692 SCRA 359.)
C.

Dropping from the Rolls

Diego Lim and Francisco Adalim were opposing candidates for mayor. Diego Lim was
proclaimed the winner. Francisco Adalim filed an election protest in the Regional Trial
Court. The Regional Trial Court decided in his favor and granted his motion for execution
pending appeal. Francisco Adalim issued a memorandum temporarily locating the office
of the municipality in a hotel. He then issued a memorandum directing all employees to
submit their daily time records. The municipal treasurer submitted a certification listing
of employees with no daily time records for three months. Francisco Adalim dropped
them from the rolls because of their absence. HELD: The employees were not absent
without leave. They continuously performed their functions in the municipal building.
(Adalim vs. Taninas, 695 SCRA 648.)
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE CASES

A.

Effect of Retirement
After the retirement on November 25, 2009 of Judge Jesus Grajeda, a judicial audit of his
court was conducted. The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that he be
held administratively liable. HELD: An administrative complaint must be filed during the
incumbency of a public officer. Its filing is predicated on his holding of a position in the
government service. (Office of the Court Administrator vs. Grajeda, 693 SCRA 15.)

B.

Jurisdiction
The Civil Service Commission has concurrent jurisdiction with the committee created
under the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers to entertain an administrative
complaint against a public school teacher. (Pat-Og vs. Civil Service Commission, 697
SCRA 567.)

C.

Proceedings
Teresita Silva, the President of Palawan State University, assigned Flaviana Valle, a
teacher, to Brookes Point. She sent a letter stating that she needed financial assistance
to support her stay there and asked that she be allowed to stay at the main campus
pending approval of her request. Teresita Silva issued a memorandum asking her to
explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against her for failing to report to her
new assignment. She stated that upon approval of her request for financial assistance,
she would report to her new place of assignment. Her request for financial assistance
was approved.
The director at Brookes Point informed Teresita Silva that Flaviana Valle reported for two
to three hours only and never returned. Teresita Silva issued a memorandum to Flaviana
Valle asking her to explain why she should not be charged with insubordination. She
explained that her failure to report to her new station was due to her poor financial
status.
Finding the explanation unsatisfactory, Teresita Silva suspended Flaviana Valle for one
month. Upon the expiration, Teresita Silva ordered her to report at Brookes Point. When
she stressed that her relocation would result in financial dislocation, Teresita Silva asked
her to explain why she should not be charged with insubordination. She answered
instead that she had appealed to the board of regents. Teresita Silva dismissed her for
insubordination. Flaviana Valle appealed to the board of regents. The board of regents
confirmed the orders of Teresita Silva. A referendum of the board of regents approved
the confirmation of the orders. Flaviana Valle appealed. HELD: A formal charge must
contain a specification of the charge, a brief statement of the relevant facts, certified true
copies of any documentary evidence, sworn statements of witnesses, and a directive to
answer under oath. Since the formal charge does not contain them, Flaviana Valle was
not formally charged. There was no formal investigation conducted. The right to due
process of Flaviana Valle was violated. (Salva vs. Valle, 694 SCRA 422.)

D.

Appeal

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The Civil Service Commission can appeal the reversal of its decision in an administrative
case. (Civil Service Commission vs. Almojuela, 694 SCRA 491.)
V. BENEFITS
A.

Need for Appropriation

Republic Act No. 8439 created a program for human resources development in science
and technology. It granted certain allowances and benefits to the officers and employees
of the Department of Science and Technology. Regional Office No. IX of the Department
of Science and Technology granted the benefits despite the absence of any
appropriation. The Commission on Audit disallowed the payment of the benefits.
The Secretary of Science and Technology requested the Office of the President to allow
the payment of the benefits from savings. The Executive Secretary approved the
request. HELD: The request stated that the Department of Science and Technology had
used savings to pay the benefits in 1998 and 1999, that the General Appropriation Act
did not authorize the use of savings and that the favorable consideration was being
expected. The request asked her authority for a limited period until 2000. It did not
request that the authorization be extended indefinitely. Republic Act No. 8439 alone
could not fund the payment of the benefits. (Nazareth vs. Villar, 689 SCRA 385.)

B.

Refund
A government employee who received in good faith benefits disallowed later on by the
Commission on Audit need not return the money. (Nazareth vs. Villar, 689 SCRA 385;
Mendoza vs. Commission on Audit, 705 SCRA 306.)

C.

Retirement Benefits
When Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban retired, he was credited with eleven years, one
month and twenty-seven days of government service. He requested that he be credited
with his service as legal counsel of the Department of Education for four years and as
consultant to the Bureau of National Education. He would then be credited with fifteen
years of government service and be entitled to a lifetime pension and his widow would
also be entitled to a survivorship annuity. HELD: The absence of a specific position in
the government is not a hindrance to give weight to the government service of Chief
Justice Panganiban. The law does not require a specific job description and job
specification. (In re Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban, 690 SCRA 242.)
Associate Judge Manuel Gruba of the Court of Tax Appeals was appointed on September
17, 1992. He died on June 25, 1996 while in service because of a stroke. In 2010,
Republic Act No. 9946 introduced four major innovations in the retirement benefits of
members of the Judiciary. First, it included additional allowances in the computations of
monthly pension and gratuity payments. Second, for compulsory retirement, only 15
years of service in the Judiciary and any other branch of the government was required.
For optional retirement, the last three years must be rendered in the Judiciary. Third,
non-compliance with the service requirement entitles the retiree to a monthly pension,
prorated to the number of years in the government. Fourth, benefits were given to
members of the Judiciary who contracted permanent disability during incumbency. Fifth,
the pension benefits will also be given to the surviving spouse upon the death of the
retired member of the Judiciary. The widow of Associate Judge Manuel Gruba applied for
benefits under Republic Act No. 9946. HELD: Since the law applies also to those who
retired due to permanent disability, the innovations apply to those who died while in the
service. Providing retroactivity to those who died while in the service enforces the
doctrine that retirement laws should be liberally construed. The proviso in Section 13
that the benefits shall be prospective should be interpreted to mean that the benefits
apply to those who were members of the Judiciary prior to retirement, disability
retirement or death. The provision excludes those who were former members of the
Judiciary but accepted positions in other branches of government.
According to Section 3, surviving spouses of retired members of the Judiciary are entitled
to the survivorship pension benefits, if the deceased member of the Judiciary was at least
60 years old, rendered at least 15 years of service in the Judiciary or any other branch in
the government, or in case of eligibility for optional retirement, served the last three
years in the Judiciary. Since Associate Judge Manuel Gruba did not retire and was not
eligible to retire, his widow is not entitled to the survivorship pension benefits. (In re
Application for Survivorship Pension Benefits of Mrs. Pacita Gruba, 709 SCRA 603.)
VI. LIABILITY

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The Sangguniang Bayan of Agoo passed a resolution authorizing the Mayor to obtain loans
from the Land Bank of the Philippines to convert the plaza to a commercial center. Pursuant
to them, the Mayor obtained two loans for the purpose. The Sangguniang Bayan passed an
ordinance declaring the site of the commercial center as patrimonial property. Eduardo
Cacayuran questioned the validity of the loans. HELD: An act which is outside the powers of
a municipality is a void ultra viresact. The conversion of the public plaza to a commercial
center is beyond the powers of the municipality. It cannot be converted to patrimonial
property without an express grant by the National Government. As public land for public use,
it belongs to and is subject to administration and control of the Republic of the Philippines.
The public officials can be held personally accountable since they acted ultra vires. (Land
Bank of the Philippines vs. Cacayuran, 696 SCRA 861.)
On May 2, 1997, the Secretary of Labor and Employment dismissed Leonel Labrador, the
Chief of the Employment Services Regulations Division of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration. He was also convicted of bribery by the Sandiganbayan.
Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoza, the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, paid his salaries and benefits from August 31,1999 to March 15, 2004, until
she received a copy of the resolution of Sandiganbayan denying the approval of his discharge
from probation, because his application for probation was erroneously granted. The
Commisison on Audit disallowed the payment of the salaries and benefits of Leonel Labrador
and ordered Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz to refund the amount paid to Leonel Labrador.
HELD: The actuations of Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz were impressed with good faith and
negate her personal liability. The personnel files of Leonel Labrador had no record of his
case. She was apprised of his conviction only when her office was furnished a copy of the
resolution of the Sandiganbayan. (Dimapilis-Baldoz vs. Commission on Audit, 701 SCRA 318.)

ELECTION LAW
I. DISQUALIFICATION
Kamarudin Ibrahim ran for vice mayor. Because of the recommendation of the Law
Department that he be disqualified because he was not a registered voter, the Commission
on Elections disqualified him. He got the majority of the votes, but the board of canvassers
suspended his proclamation because of the issue regarding his qualification. HELD: The
Commission on Elections disqualified Kamarudin Ibrahim although no petition was filed
against him. The board of canvassers had no authority to suspend his proclamation.
(Ibrahim vs. Commission on Elections, 688 SCRA 129.)
II. SUBSTITUTION
Edna Sanchez and Osmundo Maligaya were opposing candidates for mayor. Armando
Sanchez, the husband of Edna Sanchez and candidate for governor, died. Edna Sanchez
withdrew her certificate of candidacy for mayor and filed her certificate of candidacy for
governor as substitute for her husband. On May 5, 2010, Renato Federico filed his certificate
of candidacy as substitute for mayor because of the withdrawal of Edna Sanchez.
The Commission on Elections gave due course to the certificates of candidacy of Edna
Sanchez and Renato Federico as substitute candidates. By that time, the official ballots had
already been printed with Edna Sanchez as official candidate for mayor. On May 11, 2010,
the board of canvassers proclaimed her as the winning candidate for mayor. Later on, the
board of canvassers proclaimed Renato Federico as the winning candidate for mayor. On June
1, 2010, Osmundo Maligaya, the opposing candidate, filed a petition to annul his
proclamation as mayor on the ground that it was illegal. Renato Federico argued that his
filing of his certificate of candidacy was valid, because under the law he had until noon of
election day to file his certificate of candidacy. HELD: Republic Act No. 9369 empowered the
Commission on Elections to set the dates for certain pre-election proceedings. As automated
election had been mandated by law, there was a need for the early printing of ballots.
Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9006 provided that to avoid confusion, the surname of the
substitute candidate should as much as possible be the same as that of the substituted
candidate.
Resolution No. 8678 provided that the substitute for a candidate who withdrew may file his
certificate of candidacy not later than December 14, 2009. However, the substitute for a
candidate who died, suffered permanent incapacity or was disqualified may file his certificate
of candidacy up to noon of election day. The substitution by Renato Federico for Edna
Sanchez as mayoralty candidate was not valid.

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The petition of Osmundo Maligaya was filed on time. He became aware of the proclamation
of Renato Federico only on May 27, 2010. He had ten (10) days from that date to file his
petition. His petition was filed on time.
As Osmundo Maligaya is the only candidate for mayor, he should be proclaimed as the duly
elected mayor. (Federico vs. Commission on Elections, 689 SCRA 134.)
Richard Gomez ran for congressman of the fourth legislative district of Leyte. His opponent,
Buenaventura Juntilla, filed a petition for his disqualification on the ground that he was a
resident of Ormoc City and failed to meet the one-year residency requirement. The
Commission on Elections granted the petition. Richard Gomez accepted the decision with
finality to facilitate his substitution. His wife, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez, filed her certificate of
candidacy as the substitute candidate. The Commission on Elections approved the
substitution. Buenaventura Juntilla filed a motion for reconsideration.
The name of Richard Gomez remained in the ballot. He received the highest number of
votes. His votes were credited in favor of Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez. She was proclaimed
elected. Buenaventura Juntilla filed a petition for quo warranto against her on the ground
that she failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement and that she did not
validly substitute for Richard Gomez. The House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
dismissed the petition. HELD: The law requires that one must have validly filed a certificate
of candidacy to be considered a candidate. Only an official candidate may be substituted. If
the certificate of candidacy has been denied due course or was cancelled, the candidate
cannot be substituted. Richard Gomez was disqualified due to his failure to comply with oneyear residency requirement. The petition to disqualify Richard Gomez for non-compliance
with the one-year residency requirement actually involved the denial of due course or
cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of Richard Gomez. Consequently, the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal should not have sanctioned the substitution. (Tagolino vs.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 693 SCRA 574.)
III. DISQUALIFICATION AFTER PROCLAMATION
Armado Rommel, a natural born Filipino citizen, became a naturalized American citizen. He
repatriated and renounced his allegiance to the United States. He filed his certificate of
candidacy for municipal mayor. His opponent filed a petition to disqualify him or to cancel his
certificate of candidacy, because he used his American passport four times to travel abroad
after his renunciation of his allegiance to the United States. He was proclaimed as the
winning candidate. Afterwards, he was declared disqualified. HELD: Cesar Maquiling
became the winner and obtained the highest number of votes among the qualified
candidates. The second placer is actually the first placer among the qualified candidates.
The disqualification of Armado involved his citizenship. It does not involve the commission of
election offenses, the effect of which is to disqualify him from continuing as a candidate or
from holding office, If he has already been elected. (Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections,
696 SCRA 420.)
Svetlana Jalosjos was proclaimed elected as municipal mayor. There was a pending petition
for cancellation of her certificate, because she was not a resident of the municipality. HELD:
The falsity of her representation in her certificate of candidacy shows that she has not been a
resident of the municipality for at least one year before the election and justified the
cancellation. She was never a valid candidate from the very beginning. She was a de facto
officer by virtue of the ineligibility. The eligible candidate who garnered the highest number
of votes must assume the office. The rule on succession in the Local Government Code
cannot apply. The ouster of the de facto officer cannot create a permanent vacancy, because
it was the de jure officer, the rightful winner in the election, who has the right to assume the
position. (Jalosjos vs. Commission on Elections, 699 SCRA 507.)
IV. ELECTION CONTESTS
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato and Elmer Panotes were opposing candidates for representative of
the second legislative district of Camarines Norte. Elmer Panotes was proclaimed the winner.
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato filed an election protest claiming that there were irregularities in the
condition of the ballot boxes. Elmer Panotes moved that the picture images of the ballots in
the data storage device for the questioned precincts be printed. The motion was granted.
Liwayway Vinzons-Chato argued that the picture images of the ballots could not be regarded
as the equivalent of the original paper ballots. HELD: During the demonstration tests, the
system captured the images of the ballots in encrypted format which when decrypted were
found to be digitized representations of the ballots cast. The print outs of the ballots are the
functional equivalent of the ballots and may be used for revision of votes in the election
protest. (Vinzons-Chato vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 689 SCRA 107.)

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Homer Saquilayan and Emmanuel Maliksi were opposing candidates for mayor. Homer
Saquilayan was proclaimed the winner. Emmanuel Maliksi filed an election protest in the
Regional Trial Court. The Regional Trial decided in his favor. Homer Saquilayan appealed to
the Commission on Elections. Without notifying the parties, the Commission on Elections
decided to review the ballots through the use of the picture images of the ballots. HELD:
The rules for the revision of ballots still consider the official ballots to be the best evidence of
the will of the voters. The picture images are to be used only when it is shown that the
official ballots are lost or their integrity has been compromised. The disregard of the right of
Maliksi to be informed of the decision to print picture images of the ballots and to conduct the
recount proceedings during the appellate stage denied Imannuel Maliksi due process.
(Maliksi vs. Commission on Elections, 696 SCRA 272.)
V. PLEBISCITE
Republic Act No. 10360 created the Province of Davao Occidental. It was published in two
newspapers on January 26, 2013. In view of the preparations for the election on May 13,
2013, the Commission on Elections decided to hold the plebiscite on the creation of the
Province of Davao Occidental on October 28, 2013 together with the barangay elections.
Douglas IV Caparas filed a petition for prohibition on the ground that Republic Act No. 10360
provided that the plebiscite shall be held within sixty days after the elections. HELD:
Sections 5 and 6 of the Omnibus Election Code grant the Commission on Elections the power
to set elections on another date. The logistic and financial responsibility of holding a
plebiscite close to the elections is a case analogous to force majeure. (Cagas vs. Commission
on Elections, 708 SCRA 672.)

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