GEORGE KATON, vs. MANUEL PALANCA JR.

, LORENZO AGUSTIN, JESUS GAPILANGO and JUAN

FRESNILLO, PANGANIBAN, J.: 2004

FACTS:
Katon filed a request with the District Office of the Bureau of Forestry in Puerto Princesa, Palawan, for the reclassification from forest to agricultural of Sombrero Island, and thereafter apply for a homestead patent. The Bureau
ordered the inspection which was allegedly carried out by Officer Mandocdoc in the presence of Katon, Katons
brother, and Katons cousin respondent Mandocdoc. The area had no occupants but Katon and Palanca (allegedly
Katons overseer) claim to have planted some coconut trees.

Katons application was favorably endorsed to the Bureaus man office in Manila. Felicisimo Corpuz, Clemente
Magdayao and Jesus Gapilango (respondent) and Juan Fresnillo (respondent) were included as Katons coapplicants. The subject land was eventually certified and released as agricultural land for disposition under the Public
Land Act.

Katon contends that the reclassification of the entire Sombrero Island was done upon his request and at his
instance. However the land investigator of the District Land Office, Puerto Princesa, Palawan, favorably endorsed the
request of respondents Palanca Jr. and Agustin to survey the land. Subsequent survey authorities were again issued
in favor of respondents. Respondents filed homestead patent applications which were eventually granted.

Katon assailed the validity of the homestead patents and respondents OCTs covering portions of Sombrero Island.
Katon prays for the reconveyance of the whole island on the basis that he has exclusive right to file a homestead
application since it was he who requested for the reclassification.

Respondents filed their Answer in due time and a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of the alleged defiance by Katon of
the trial courts Order to effect a substitution by the legal heirs of the deceased, Respondent Jesus Gapilango. The
Motion to Dismiss was granted. Katons motion for reconsideration was denied for being a third and prohibited
motion.

Katon then filed a petition for Certiorari before the CA. The CA ruled as follows: Katon had no standing to seek
reconveyance since he had no title, not even a homestead application. Katon sought the reclassification but never
filed a homestead application. Only the government may cancel a homesteaders grant throught annulment of patent
and reversion of the property. At any rate, it took Katon 23 years from the time Palanca was issued his titled thus
Katon is barred by laches. However, the CA agreed that the trial court had acted without jurisdiction in dismissing his
September 10, 1999 MR, on the erroneous ground that it was a third and prohibited motion when it was actually only
his first motion. Nonetheless, the complaint was dismissed motu proprio by the CA Special Division of five members
with two justices dissenting pursuant to its residual prerogative under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUES:
1. WON the Court of Appeals correct in invoking its alleged residual prerogative under Section 1, Rule 9 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in resolving the Petition on an issue not raised in the Petition
2. WON the CA is correct in resolving the certiorari petition based on an issue not raised (on its merits, instead of
mere grave abuse of discretion)

1. The CA was correct.

Katons Argument the CA erroneously invoked its residual prerogatives since it is the power of the trial court which, in
the exercise of its original jurisdiction, may still validly exercise even after perfection of an appeal. It is not possessed
by an appellate court.

Petitioner has confused what the CA adverted to as its residual prerogatives under Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules
of Court with the residual jurisdiction of trial courts over cases appealed to the CA.

Section 1 of Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in
the answer are deemed waived, except when (the court shall motu propio dismiss the claim or action):
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
(2) litis pendentia,
(3) res judicata and
(4) prescription are evident from the pleadings or the evidence on record

The residual jurisdiction of trial courts is available at a stage in which the court is normally deemed to have lost
jurisdiction over the case or the subject matter involved in the appeal, upon the perfection of the appeals by the parties
or upon the approval of the records on appeal, but prior to the transmittal of the original records or the records on
appeal. In either case, the trial court retains its residual jurisdiction to issue protective orders, approve compromises,
permit appeals of indigent litigants, order execution pending appeal, and allow the withdrawal of the appeal. The
CAs motu proprio dismissal was not one for the protection and preservation of the rights of the parties, pending the
disposition of the case on appeal but is based on the CAs residual prerogatives upon the grounds in Section 1 of Rule
9 of the Rules of Court.

Katons complaint prayed to (1) nullify the homestead patent applications of Respondents and (2) to order the director
of the Land Management Bureau to reconvey the Sombrero Island to petitioner. However Katons complaint did not
sufficiently make a case for any of such actions, over which the trial court could have exercised jurisdiction. In an
action for nullification, the LMB Directors lack of jurisdiction to bestow title must be established from the allegations
that:
1) that the contested land was privately owned by the plaintiff prior to the issuance of the assailed
certificate of title to the defendant; and
2) that the defendant perpetuated a fraud or committed a mistake in obtaining a document of title over
the parcel of land claimed by the plaintiff

Katons action for reconveyance must also fail since nowhere did Katon allege that he had previous title. He even
acknowledged that it was public land and that he had not applied for a homestead. Neither can Katons case be one
for reversion which may only be instituted by the solicitor general or the officer in his stead.

The dismissal of the Complaint is proper also because of the absence of a cause of action. One who has no right or
interest to protect has no cause of action by which to invoke, as a party-plaintiff, the jurisdiction of the court.

Assuming Katon is the proper party to bring the action for annulment of title or its reconveyance, it is time-barred.
Palanca was issued the OCT in 1977 while Katons complaint was filed in 1998.

2. YES.
Where prescription, lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a cause of action clearly appear from the complaint in the trial
court, the action may be dismissed motu propio by the CA even if the case was elevated for review on different
grounds. This is to appropriately end useless litigations. The dismissal of the Complaint is SUSTAINED on the
grounds of lack of jurisdiction, failure to state a cause of action and prescription. Costs against petitioner.