EN BANC

[G.R. No. 106560. August 23, 1996]

FLOREZIL AGUJETAS and SALVADOR BIJIS, petitioners, vs. COURT

OF
APPEALS
and
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:

Petitioners Florezil Agujetas and Salvador Bijis, former Chairman and ViceChairman, respectively of the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the Province of Davao
Oriental assail the decision of the public respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mati, Davao Oriental finding them guilty as
charged for failure to proclaim a winning elected candidate. The dispositive portion of
the Court of Appeals decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 09689 reads:
[1]

"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with a modification in

that the actual damages of P50,000.00 are hereby reduced to P40,000.00 and the
moral damages P100,000.00 awarded to Erlinda Irigo are deleted. Costs de officio.
"SO ORDERED."
The antecedents:
In the fateful evening of January 21, 1988, the Provincial Board of Canvassers for
the Province of Davao Oriental, composed of 1.) the Provincial Election Supervisor
Florezil Agujetas, as Chairman, 2.) Provincial Prosecutor Salvador Bijis, as Vice
Chairman, and 3.) Division Superintendent of Public Schools in said province, Benjamin
Miano, as member, proclaimed the winners for Governor, Vice-Governor, and
Provincial Board Members for Davao Oriental in the January 18, 1988 election. The
candidates proclaimed were:
[2]

PROCLAIMED CANDIDATES
Name
For Governor:
Leopoldo Lopez
Francisco Rabat
For Vice-Governor:

No. of Votes
59,309 votes
51,191 votes

Modesto Avellanosa
Josefina Sibala
For Provincial Board Members
1. Cirilo R. Valles
2. Ma. Elena Palma Gil
3. Antonio Alcantara
4. Dr. Capistrano Roflo
5. Orlando Rodriguez
6. Alfredo Abayon
7. Justina Yu
8. Pedro Pena

46,353 votes
54,083 votes
42,394 votes
41,557 votes
39,104 votes
37,301 votes
34,914 votes
34,191 votes
32,360 votes
30,679 votes

The eighth board member proclaimed, Pedro Pena, garnered 30,679 votes when
another candidate for the Board, Erlinda Irigo, got 31,129 or 450 more votes than Pena.
Before the proclamation was made, when the certificate of canvass and
proclamation statements of winning candidates were finished, a verbal protest was
lodged by Mrs. Maribeth Irigo Batitang, daughter of candidate Irigo and her designated
representative during the canvassing proceedings, addressed to the Tabulation
Committee.
At 8:00 o'clock in the morning of January 22, 1988, the Board resumed its session
and undertook the following activities:

"1. Opening of Ballot Box No. CA-301596 and sealed by Metal Seal No. 204767 at
exactly 10:25 a.m.
"2. Continued preparing all reports called for submissions to COMELEC, Regional
Office and Manila.
"3. Reconciliation of entries in the tally sheets. (Exhs. "E" and "E-1")
Considering, however, that the protest was verbal and not officially brought to the
attention of the Provincial Board of Canvassers during official session, the same was
not given appropriate official recognition. (Exh. "7-B", p. 2, Minutes of Provincial Board
of Canvassers, January 21, 1988)
The following day, January 23, 1988, Board Member Candidate Erlinda V. Irigo filed
her written protests with the Board of Canvassers. (Exh. "F")
[3]

Meanwhile, Francisco Rabat, a losing gubernatorial candidate in Davao Oriental

filed with the COMELEC a complaint against the three board members for violation of
BP 881 (Omnibus Election Code) and RA 6646 (The Electoral Reform Law of
1987). After a preliminary investigation was conducted by the COMELEC, criminal
charges were filed against the Board Members. The pertinent portions of the

information in Criminal Case No. 1886 for Violation of 2nd Paragraph of Section 231 in
Relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election Code read:

"That on or about January 21, 1988, in the Municipality of Mati, Province of Davao
Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused as Chairman, Vice-Chairman and Third Member, respectively, of the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Davao Oriental in the January 18, 1988 elections,
conspiring with, confederating together and mutually helping one another, did, then
and there, willfully and unlawfully fail to proclaim Erlinda Irigo as elected
Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member candidate who obtained 31,129 votes, the eighth
highest number of votes cast in said province but instead proclaimed candidate Pedro
Pena who obtained only 30,699 votes."
"CONTRARY TO LAW"

[4]

After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, Criminal Cases Nos.

1885 and 1887 are hereby DISMISSED, with costs de oficio, and the accused
considered acquitted. Their bail bonds are ordered canceled and released.
"In Criminal Case No. 1886, the Court finds the accused Florezil Agujetas, Salvador
Bijis and Benjamin Miano GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals for
violation of Section 231, second paragraph, of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, as amended,
otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines", and hereby
sentences each of them to ONE (1) YEAR IMPRISONMENT which shall not be
subject to probation. In addition, they are sentenced to suffer disqualification to hold
public office and deprivation of the right of suffrage. Said accused are ordered to pay,
jointly and severally, Erlinda Irigo the amounts of P50,000.00 as actual damages,
P15,000.00 as and for attorney's fees, and P100,000.00 as moral damages, plus the
costs of the proceedings.
"Let copies hereof be furnished the Honorable Chairman, Commission on Elections,
and the Honorable Secretaries of Justice and Education, Culture and Sports.
"SO ORDERED." (pp. 43-44, Decision)
The three accused appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the decision
assailed in this petition.
Petitioners impute to the respondent court the following errors:
I

The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of conviction because:

a. It is the failure to make a proclamation on the basis of the Certificate of Canvass,
and not mere erroneous proclamations, which is punishable under Sec. 262 in
relation to Sec. 231 (2) of the Omnibus Election Code.
b. A protest made to the verification/tabulation committee does not constitute a protest
to the Board of Canvassers itself.
c. The functus oficio rule is applicable to the present case.
d. Credence should not have been given to hearsay testimony to establish the alleged
protest to the Board of Canvassers.
II

The Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages to a person who is not a party to
the case.
We find the petition without merit.
On the first assigned error, the issue hinges on the question of what is being
penalized by the pertinent provision of the Omnibus Election Code. Petitioners argue
that they are not liable under the said law because they complied with all the
requirements of Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code - 1. a certificate of canvass was
prepared, 2. the same was duly supported by a statement of votes of each of the
candidates, and 3. it was on the basis of the certificate of canvass that the winners were
proclaimed. Only, the certificate was erroneous.
According to petitioners, the Omnibus Election Code does not punish the
preparation of an incorrect certificate of canvass, nor an erroneous proclamation made
by the Board; what it does punish is that, having thus prepared the corresponding
certificate, the board for some reason fails to make the corresponding proclamation on
the basis thereof.
On the other hand, the People's counsel maintains that petitioners' challenges on
this particular issue is a question of semantics, a mere play of words; for while the
prosecution maintains that there was a failure to proclaim the winning candidate,
petitioners on the other hand, counter that there was merely an erroneous proclamation
of the losing candidate; that petitioners forget that in proclaiming an erroneous winner
they actually failed to proclaim the winning candidate, in this case, Erlinda
Irigo. Respondents further argue that the situation presented by petitioners would not
exculpate them from criminal responsibility for, whichever way the matter may be looked
into, whether as erroneous proclamation of a losing candidate or failure to proclaim the
winning candidate, the result is the same - the winning candidate was not proclaimed,
and hence, injustice is the end result.
We agree with the respondents.
The second paragraph of Section 231 of the Omnibus Election Code reads:

The respective board of canvassers shall prepare a certificate of canvass duly signed
and affixed with the imprint of the thumb of the right hand of each member, supported

by a statement of the votes and received by each candidate in each polling place and,
on the basis thereof, shall proclaim as elected the candidates who obtained the highest
number of votes cast in the province, city, municipality or barangay. Failure to
comply with this requirement shall constitute an election offense."
To go by the explanation as proposed by the petitioner would be tantamount to
tolerating and licensing boards of canvassers to "make an erroneous proclamation" and
still be exculpated by just putting up the inexcusable defense that the "foul-up resulted
from the erroneous arrangement of the names of candidates" in one municipality or
that "the basis of their proclamation was the erroneous ranking made by the tabulation
committee." That would be a neat apology for allowing the board to be careless in their
important task by simply claiming that they cannot be held liable because they did their
"duty" of proclaiming the winning candidates on the basis of the certificate of canvass even "erroneous" certificates - which they made.
[5]

At this point, it is appropriate to quote certain portions of the Resolution in IPD Case
No. 88-100, disposing of the complaint filed with the COMELEC issued by Regional
Election Director Resurreccion Borra of Region XI, in relation to the preliminary
investigation conducted by him on said case. Director Borra testified on this
resolution (Exh. Z) under cross-examination by the prosecution, certain portions of
which are material to the case:
[6]

"But there is one incontrovertible fact that the respondents miserably failed to
dispute. This undeniable fact is conveniently ignored by Respondents'
Memorandum. In the exhibits of the complainant, the computerized tabulation of
votes based from the statements of votes by precinct in each of the 121 Municipalities
of Davao Oriental for all of the 600 precincts and even admitted by the Respondents
that there was no error in the tabulation of votes in CA 26-A. Erlinda V. Irigo got
31,129 votes and Pedro T. Pena only 30,679 votes or a margin of 450 votes by Irigo
over Pena. From the ranking, Irigo would have been ahead of Pena, and she should
have been No. 8 in the winning list of 8 candidates instead of Pena. But in the
Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of Winning Candidates for
Provincial Offices, Pedro T. Pena was included as No. 8 in the winning list and
proclaimed as No. 8 Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Davao Oriental by
the Provincial Board of Canvassers.
xxx

xxx

xxx

"The Complainant, in presenting the computerized summary tabulation of votes for

each precinct per municipality of the Province, admitted that the PBC prepared the
statements of votes. x x x The statements of votes (CE 26-A) should have been the
basis for the proclamation of the winning candidates for Provincial Offices.
Complainant's documentary and testimonial evidences showed that the PBC
proclaimed Pedro Pena who was not among those candidates who obtained the 8

highest number of votes cast in the province per municipality by precinct which
violated the legal requirement of the 2nd paragraph of Section 231 of BP No. 881 as
amended.
"The respondents were not able to explain their failure to comply with the requirement
that (sic) the basis for the proclamation of Pena when he was not among the eight
candidates who obtained the highest number of votes as evidenced by the statements
of votes. In fact they admitted that the basis was not the statement of votes but the
erroneous ranking by the Tabulators. x x x"
[7]

It appears from the foregoing resolution of Director Borra that it was difficult to make
a mistake in selecting the 8 candidates with the highes votes for purposes of making the
certificate of canvass because there was no error in the tabulation of votes as CE Form
No. 26-A (which is the statement of votes) shows that Erlinda V. Irigo got 31,129 votes
and Pedro T. Pena only 30,679 votes. The mistake could only be made through utter
carelessness, if not made deliberately. This situation only illustrates that the questioned
provision cannot be construed in the manner as argued by petitioners for it would defeat
the purpose and spirit for which the law was enacted, i.e., to achieve the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. In Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, the court
observed:
[8]

"Experience and observations taught legislature and courts that, at the time of a hotly
contested election, the partisan spirit of ingenious and unscrupulous politicians will
lead them beyond the limits of honesty and decency and by the use of bribery, fraud
and intimidation, despoil the purity of the ballot and defeat the will of the people at
the polls. Such experience has led the legislature to adopt very stringent rules for the
purpose of protecting the voter in the manner of preparing and casting his ballot to
guard the purity of elections." "The infinite ingenuity of violent spirit in evading the
rules and regulations of elections and the use of bribery, fraud and intimidation has
made necessary the establishment of elaborate and rigid rules for the conduct of
elections. The very elaborateness of these rules has resulted in their frequent violation
and the reports of the courts are replete with cases in which the result of an election
has been attacked on the ground that some provisions of the law have not been
complied with. Presumably, all the provisions of the election laws have a purpose and
should be observed.
On the second assigned error, petitioners contend that assuming ex gratia
argumenti that the protest made by candidate Irigo's daughter Maribeth Irigo Batitang
was the verbal protest contemplated under Sec. 245 of the Omnibus Election Code,
such fact could not be deemed to be a protest made to the Board of Canvassers itself;
and that the failure of the member of the verification/tabulation committee concerned to
apprise the Board prior to the proclamation cannot be taken against the members of the
Board.

We find the above contentions untenable. As aptly stated by Director Borra in his
aforementioned resolution:

"The timely verbal protest of the daughter-watcher of Mrs. Erlinda Irigo did not
trigger on the part of the PBC (Provincial Board of Canvassers) the responsible action
of verifying the basis of the protest. The 3 Members of the PBC could not attribute to
the Committee on Tabulation the blame for their errors as the PBC members
themselves were the ones who certified under oath the said Certificate of
Proclamation and the Tabulation Committee members were totally under their direct
supervision and control."
Petitioners also raised the issue that it was only after the proclamation had been
made that the Board was informed of the fact that an error may have been committed in
the tabulation; and that however, having discharged its function of making the
canvass and proclamation of the winning candidates, the Board of Canvassers
became functus oficio and could no longer correct the erroneous proclamation.
As to this issue, suffice it to state that whether or not "the Board of Canvassers
became functus oficio" after it proclaimed the winning candidates, is beside the
point. What matters is whether or not petitioners committed an election offense.
Besides, as stated earlier, Mrs. Irigo's watcher made a timely verbal protest to the
Tabulation Committee.
Petitioners further contend that Maribeth Irigo Batitang, the daughter of candidate
Irigo and her designated representative during the canvassing proceedings, was never
presented as a witness; that Erlinda Irigo, upon whose testimony the trial court relied
heavily to establish the fact of protest, was not present during the canvassing
proceedings; that Mrs. Irigo's testimony on this point is inadmissible as being hearsay
and should not have been considered by the trial court; that no other evidence having
been adduced with respect to the protest allegedly made by Irigo's representative, such
fact should be deemed as not having been established; and that there was thus no
basis, therefore, for the respondent Court of Appeals to hold that the Board was
deemed to have been constructively informed of the verbal protest and that the
members thereof were liable for having failed to act on the basis thereof.
We are not persuaded. Even if we tentatively grant that Mrs. Irigo's testimony is
hearsay evidence, there is still ample evidence which proves that the Board was
deemed to have been informed of the verbal protest and that the members thereof were
liable for having failed to act on the basis thereof.
The resolution of Director Borra quoted the questions and answers during the
preliminary investigation. The import of those deliberations show that petitioner
Agujetas, as Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, admitted that the
tabulation committee was under the supervision of the Board. As regards petitioner
Bijis, Vice Chairman of the Board, he admitted that he signed the minutes of the Board
to the effect that on January 22, 1988 in the morning after the proclamation, the Board's
business was "reconciliation of entries in the tally sheet," thus showing that the
[9]

[10]

[11]

proclamation in question had been made even before the votes were reconciled on the
tally sheets. And as to accused Miano, Secretary of the Board, he admitted having
stated in the minutes that an oral complaint was made by Mrs. Batitang, representative
of Erlinda Irigo, but that the complaint was lodged with the tabulation committee and not
with the Board; and that he did not care to examine the partial results for each provincial
candidate, including Erlinda Irigo and Pedro Pena.
[12]

[13]

An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings in

the same case, does not require proof.
[14]

On the last error assigned by petitioners, they maintain that the present case was
filed by Francisco Rabat, the losing gubernatorial candidate in the Province of Davao
Oriental; that Mrs. Irigo never joined the Complaint as a party-plaintiff at any stage of
the proceedings; that she was merely presented as a witness; and thus, for the court to
have awarded damages to Mrs. Irigo was a patent error. We find petitioners' allegations
untenable. Except where the law specifically provides the contrary, a complaint that a
public crime has been committed may be laid by any competent person. The Omnibus
Election Code does not specifically provide that a particular person must file the
complaint and hence, the complaint filed by Francisco Rabat is valid.
[15]

The counsel for the people points out and we agree-

"Even an offended party not mentioned in the Information may claim the civil liability
during the trial if he has not waived it.
[16]

"In the case at bar, Erlinda Irigo clearly, was the party offended or the person whose
rights were trampled upon, by the indecent haste with which petitioners proclaimed
Teodoro Pena (sic) as the winner of the 8th seat of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
"The persistence of Erlinda Irigo's lawyers to participate, as in fact they participated,
in the proceedings a quo as private prosecutors over the vehement objections of
petitioners' counsel clearly indicates that Erlinda Irigo intended to claim damages
from petitioners."
[17]

In U.S. v. Heery, this court held that "If the injured party has not expressly waived
the civil liability of the accused nor reserved his right to file a separate civil action, it is
error for the court to refuse a request of the injured party during the course of the
criminal prosecution to submit evidence of his damages. Thus, the arguments of the
petitioners notwithstanding, respondent court did not err in awarding damages to Mrs.
Irigo.
[18]

After the People's counsel has filed respondents' comment, petitioners filed their
Reply wherein they raised for the first time (not even in their Petition), the issue that the
crime under which petitioners were convicted no longer exists because Republic Act
Nos. 6646 (the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) and 7166 (Electoral Reforms Law of
1991) were subsequently approved on January 5, 1988 and November 26, 1991,
respectively; that these two laws amended the Omnibus Election Code by deleting

certain provisions thereof or adding new ones; and that among those amended was
Section 231, which was modified by Section 28 of RA No. 7166 by removing the specific
manner by which the proclamation of winning candidates by the Board of Canvassers
should be made and thereby, in effect, repealing the second paragraph of Sec. 231 of
the old Omnibus Election Code under which Petitioners had been convicted.
Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not adequately brought to the
attention of the trial court need not be, and ordinarily will not be considered by a
reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. However, since
RA 7166 was enacted after the trial court had rendered its decision, and while the case
was already pending appeal in the Court of Appeals, and in order to settle the issue
once and for all, this court will make a clear-cut ruling on the issue.
[19]

Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) was not
expressly repealed by R.A. 7166 because said Sec. 231 is not among the provisions
repealed by Sec. 39 of R.A. 7166 which we quote:

"Sec. 39. Amending and Repealing Clause. - Sections 107, 108 and 245 of the
Omnibus Election Code are hereby repealed. Likewise, the inclusion in Section 262 of
the Omnibus Election Code of the violations of Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110,
111 and 112 as among election offenses is also hereby repealed. This repeal shall
have retroactive effect.
"Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, Republic Act No. 6646, Executive Order Nos. 144 and
157 and all other laws, orders, decrees, rules and regulations or other issuances, or any
part thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby amended or
repealed accordingly."
The statement "All laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly," certainly is not an express repealing clause
because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be
repealed. If repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper step is to
so express it.
[20]

Neither is there an implied repeal of Sec. 231 by the subsequent enactment of RA

6646 and RA 7166.
While Sec. 28 of RA 7166, like Sec. 231 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881)
pertains to the Canvassing by the Boards of Canvassers, this fact of itself is not
sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act. The provisions of the subject laws
are quoted below for comparison:
[21]

"Sec. 231. - Canvass by the board. - The board of canvassers shall meet not later than
six o'clock in the afternoon of election day at the place designated by the Commission
to receive the election returns and to immediately canvass those that may have already
been received. It shall meet continuously from day to day until the canvass is
completed, and may adjourn but only for the purpose of awaiting the other election

returns from other polling places within its jurisdiction. Each time the board
adjourns, it shall make a total of all the votes canvassed so far for each candidate for
each office, furnishing the Commission in Manila by the fastest means of
communication a certified copy thereof, and making available the data contained
therein to the mass media and other interested parties. As soon as the other election
returns are delivered, the board shall immediately resume canvassing until all the
returns have been canvassed.
"The respective board of canvassers shall prepare a certificate of canvass duly signed
and affixed with the imprint of the thumb of the right hand of each member, supported
by a statement of the votes and received by each candidate in each polling place and,
on the basis thereof, shall proclaim as elected the candidates who obtained the
highest number of votes cast in the province, city municipality or barangay. Failure
to comply with this requirement shall constitute an election offense.
"Subject to reasonable exceptions, the board of canvassers must complete their
canvass within thirty-six hours in municipalities, forty-eight hours in cities and
seventy-two hours in provinces. Violation hereof shall be an election offense
punishable under Section 264 hereof.
"With respect to the election for President and Vice-President, the provincial and city
boards of canvassers shall prepare in quintuplicate a certificate of canvass supported
by a statement of votes received by each candidate in each polling place and transmit
the first copy thereof to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa. The second copy
shall be transmitted to the Commission, the third copy shall be kept by the provincial
election supervisor or city election registrar; the fourth and the fifth copies to each of
the two accredited political parties. (Sec. 169, 1978 EC)."
[22]

"Sec. 28. Canvassing by Provincial, City, District and Municipal Boards of

Canvassers. - (a) The city or municipal board of canvassers shall canvass the election
returns for President, Vice-President, Senators and members of the House of
Representatives and/or elective provincial and city or municipal officials. Upon
completion of the canvass, it shall prepare the certificate of canvass for President,
Vice-President, Senators and Members of the House of Representatives and elective
provincial officials and thereafter, proclaim the elected city or municipal officials, as
the case may be.
"(b) The city board of canvassers of cities comprising one or more legislative districts
shall canvass the election returns for President, Vice-President, Senators, Members of
the House of Representatives and elective city officials. Upon completion of the
canvass, the board shall prepare the certificate of canvass for President, Vice-

President, and Senators and thereafter, proclaim the elected Members of House of
Representatives and city officials.
"(c) (1) In the Metro Manila Area, each municipality comprising a legislative district
shall have a district board of canvassers which shall canvass the election returns for
President, Vice-President, Senators, Members of the House of representatives and
elective municipal officials. Upon completion of the canvass, it shall prepare the
certificate of canvass for President, Vice-President, and Senators and thereafter,
proclaim the elected Members of the House of Representatives and municipal
officials.
"(2) Each component municipality in a legislative district in the Metro Manila Area
shall have a municipal hoard of canvassers which shall canvass the election returns for
President, Vice-President, Senators, xxx
"(3) The district board of canvassers of each legislative district comprising two (2)
municipalities in the Metro Manila Area shall canvass the certificates of canvass for
President, Vice-President, xxx
"(d) The provincial board of canvassers shall canvass the certificates of canvass for
President, Vice-President, Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and
elective provincial officials as well as plebiscite results, if any plebiscite is conducted
simultaneously with the same election, as submitted by the board of canvassers of
municipalities and component cities. Upon completion of the canvass, it shall prepare
the certificate of canvass for President, Vice-President and Senators and thereafter,
proclaim the elected Members of the House of Representatives and provincial officials
as well as the plebiscite results, if any."
[23]

While the two provisions differ in terms, neither is this fact sufficient to create
repugnance. In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so
irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made
to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case possible must be made before the
inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never presumed. "It is
necessary, says the court in a case, before such repeal is deemed to exist that it be
shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and
that the latter be inconsistent with the former. There must be a showing of repugnance
clear and convincing in character. The language used in the later statute must be such
as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency
that falls short of that standard does not suffice." For it is a well-settled rule of statutory
construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The presumption is
against inconsistency or repugnance and, accordingly, against implied repeal. For the
legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
[24]

[25]

[26]

[27]

[28]

[29]

In the case at bar, the needed manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal is
not present. Neither is there any inconsistency between the two subject
provisions. The explanation of a legal scholar on the subject, particularly on Section 1
of BP 881 is enlightening:
[30]

"The Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines is Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, which
was enacted into law on December 3, 1985. It codified all previous election laws. It
has undergone some amendments, basically by the 1987 Constitution, Republic Act
No. 6646, otherwise known as "The Electoral Reform Law of 1987," and Republic
Act No. 7166, providing for synchronized national and local elections on May 11,
1992.
"The Omnibus Election Code is the basic law on elections. While legislations have
been enacted every time an election for elective officials is scheduled, the Omnibus
Election Code remains the fundamental law on the subject and such pieces of
legislations are designed to improve the law and to achieve the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections."
Consistently, while Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code provides that penal laws
shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony xxx, this
provision cannot be applied to benefit the petitioners because Section 231 of BP
881 was not repealed by subsequent legislations, contrary to petitioners contention
that Section 231 was so repealed by R.A. Nos. 6646 and 7166.
[31]

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the assailed decision
of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 150605. December 10, 2002]

EUFROCINO M. CODILLA, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. JOSE DE

VENECIA, ROBERTO P. NAZARENO, in their official capacities
as Speaker and Secretary-General of the House of
Representatives,
respectively, and
MA.
VICTORIA L.
LOCSIN, respondents.
DECISION

PUNO, J.:

In a democracy, the first self-evident principle is that he who has been rejected by
the people cannot represent the people. Respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin lost to
petitioner Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. by 17,903 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections as
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte. The most sophisticated legal
alchemy cannot justify her insistence that she should continue governing the people of
Leyte against their will. The enforcement of the sovereign will of the people is not
subject to the discretion of any official of the land.
This is a Petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto directed against respondents
Speaker Jose De Venecia and Secretary-General Roberto P. Nazareno of the House of
Representatives to compel them to implement the decision of the Commission on
Elections en banc by (a) administering the oath of office to petitioner as the duly-elected
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, and (b) registering the name of the
petitioner in the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives, and against
respondent Ma. Victoria L. Locsin for usurping, intruding into, and unlawfully holding
and exercising the said public office on the basis of a void proclamation.
The facts are uncontroverted. Petitioner and respondent Locsin were candidates for
the position of Representative of the 4 th legislative district of Leyte during the May 14,
2001 elections. At that time, petitioner was the Mayor of Ormoc City while respondent
Locsin was the sitting Representative of the 4 th legislative district of Leyte. On May 8,
2001, one Josephine de la Cruz, a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, filed directly with
the COMELEC main office a Petition for Disqualification against the petitioner for
indirectly soliciting votes from the registered voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte, in
violation of Section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code. It was alleged that the
petitioner used the equipments and vehicles owned by the City Government of Ormoc
to extract, haul and distribute gravel and sand to the residents of Kananga and Matagob, Leyte, for the purpose of inducing, influencing or corrupting them to vote for him.
Attached to the petition are the (a) Affidavits of Basilio Bates, Danilo D. Maglasang,
Cesar A. Laurente; (b) Joint Affidavit of Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Salvera;
(c) Extract Records from the Police Blotter executed by Police Superintendent Elson
G. Pecho; and (d) Photographs showing government dump trucks, haulers and
surfacers and portions of public roads allegedly filled-in and surfaced through the
intercession of the respondent. The case was docketed as SPA No. 01-208 and
assigned to the COMELECs Second Division.
[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

On May 10, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an Order delegating the
hearing and reception of evidence on the disqualification case to the Office of the
Regional Director of Region VIII. On May 11, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division
sent a telegram informing the petitioner that a disqualification case was filed against him
and that the petition was remanded to the Regional Election Director for investigation.
[8]

[9]

At the time of the elections on May 14, 2001, the Regional Election Director
had yet to hear the disqualification case. Consequently, petitioner was included in
the list of candidates for district representative and was voted for. The initial results
showed that petitioner was the winning candidate.

On May 16, 2001, before the counting could be finished, respondent Locsin joined
as intervenor in SPA No. 128 and filed a Most Urgent Motion to Suspend
Proclamation of Respondent [herein petitioner] with the COMELEC Second Division.
Respondent Locsin alleged that the evidence on record against respondent is very
strong and unless rebutted remains. She urged the Commission to set the hearing of
the disqualification case and prayed for the suspension of the proclamation of the
respondent so as not to render the present disqualification case moot and
academic. A copy of the Motion was allegedly served on petitioner by registered
mail but no registry receipt was attached thereto.
[10]

[11]

On May 18, 2001, respondent Locsin filed a Second Most Urgent Motion to
Suspend Proclamation of Respondent stating there is clear and convincing
evidence showing that the respondent is undoubtedly guilty of the charges against him
and this remains unrebutted by the respondent. A copy of the Motion was sent to the
petitioner and the corresponding registry receipt was attached to the pleading. The
records, however, do not show the date the petitioner received the motion.
[12]

On the same day, May 18, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division issued an ExParte Order directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the
proclamation of petitioner in case he obtains the highest number of votes by reason of
the seriousness of the allegations in the petition for disqualification. It also directed
the Regional Election Director to speed up the reception of evidence and to forward
immediately the complete records together with its recommendation to the Office of the
Clerk of the Commission. As a result, petitioner was not proclaimed as winner even
though the final election results showed that he garnered 71,350 votes as against
respondent Locsins 53,447 votes.
[13]

[14]

[15]

[16]

At the time that the COMELEC Second Division issued its Order suspending his
proclamation, the petitioner has yet to be summoned to answer the petition for
disqualification. Neither has said petition been set for hearing. It was only on May 24,
2001 that petitioner was able to file an Answer to the petition for his disqualification with
the Regional Election Director, alleging that: (a) he has not received the summons
together with the copy of the petition; (b) he became aware of the matter only by virtue
of the telegram sent by the COMELEC Second Division informing him that a petition
was filed against him and that the Regional Election Director was directed to investigate
and receive evidence therewith; and (c) he obtained a copy of the petition from the
COMELEC Regional Office No. 8 at his own instance. Petitioner further alleged that
the maintenance, repair and rehabilitation of barangay roads in the municipalities of
Matag-ob and Kananga were undertaken without his authority, participation or directive
as City Mayor of Ormoc. He attached in his Answer the following: (a) Affidavit of Alex B.
Borinaga; (b) Copy of the Excerpt from the Minutes of the Regular Session of
Barangay Monterico; (c) Affidavit of Wilfredo A. Fiel; (d) Supplemental Affidavit of
Wilfredo A. Fiel; and (e) Affidavit of Arnel Y. Padayao.
[17]

[18]

[19]

[21]

[20]

[22]

On May 25, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, alleging
that (a) he did not receive a copy of the Motion to Suspend his Proclamation and hence,
was denied the right to rebut and refute the allegations in the Motion; (b) that he did not
receive a copy of the summons on the petition for disqualification and after personally
[23]

obtaining a copy of the petition, filed the requisite answer only on May 24, 2001; and (c)
that he received the telegraph Order of the COMELEC Second Division suspending his
proclamation only on May 22, 2001. He attached documentary evidence in support of
his Motion to Lift the Suspension of his proclamation, and requested the setting of a
hearing on his Motion.
[24]

On May 30, 2001, an oral argument was conducted on the petitioners Motion and
the parties were ordered to submit their respective memoranda. On June 4, 2001,
petitioner submitted his Memorandum in support of his Motion assailing the
suspension of his proclamation on the grounds that: (a) he was not afforded due
process; (b) the order has no legal and factual basis; and (c) evidence of his guilt is
patently inexistent for the purpose of suspending his proclamation. He prayed that his
proclamation as winning congressional candidate be expediently made, even while the
disqualification case against him continue upon due notice and hearing. He attached the
following additional evidence in his Memorandum: (a) Copy of certification issued by
PNP Senior Inspector Benjamin T. Gorre; (b) Certification issued by Elena S. Aviles,
City Budget Officer; (c) Copy of certification issued by Wilfredo A. Fiel, City Engineer
of Ormoc; (d) Joint Affidavit of Antonio Patenio and Pepito Restituto; and (e)
Affidavits of Demetrio Brion, Igmedio Rita and Gerardo Monteza. Respondent
Locsins memorandum also contained additional affidavits of his witnesses.
[25]

[26]

[27]

[28]

[29]

[30]

[31]

[32]

[33]

[34]

Petitioners Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension, however, was not

resolved. Instead, on June 14, 2001, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated
its Resolution in SPA No. 01-208 which found the petitioner guilty of indirect
solicitation of votes and ordered his disqualification. It directed the immediate
proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes xxx. A
copy of said Resolution was sent by fax to the counsel of petitioner in Cebu City in the
afternoon of the following day.
[35]

[36]

By virtue of the said Resolution, the votes cast for petitioner, totaling 71,350,
were declared stray even before said Resolution could gain finality. On June 15,
2001, respondent Locsin was proclaimed as the duly elected Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte. It issued
a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and Proclamation of the Winning Candidates for
Member of the House of Representatives stating that MA. VICTORIA LARRAZABAL
LOCSIN obtained a total of FIFTY THREE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED FORTY
SEVEN (53,447) votes representing the highest number of votes legally cast in the
legislative district for said office. Respondent Locsin took her oath of office on
June 18, 2001 and assumed office on June 30, 2001.
[37]

On June 20, 2001, petitioner seasonably filed with the COMELEC en banc a
Motion for Reconsideration from the June 14, 2001 Resolution of the COMELEC
Second Division which ordered his disqualification, as well as an Addendum to the
Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioner alleged in his Motion for Reconsideration that
the COMELEC Second Division erred: (1) in disqualifying petitioner on the
basis solely of the dubious declaration of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; (2) in
adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses for respondent Locsin; and (3) in
promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of procedure and in directing
[38]

[39]

therein the immediate proclamation of the second highest vote getter. Respondent
Locsin and her co-petitioner in SPA No. 01-208 filed a joint Opposition to the Motion for
Reconsideration.
[40]

On June 21, 2001, petitioner filed with the COMELEC en banc a Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Proclamation, docketed as SPC No. 01-324, assailing the
validity of the proclamation of respondent Locsin who garnered only the second
highest number of votes. Respondent Locsin filed her Answer alleging that: (1) the
Commission lost jurisdiction to hear and decide the case because of the proclamation of
Locsin and that any question on the election, returns, and qualification of Locsin can
only be taken cognizance of by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET); (2) the case should be filed and heard in the first instance by a Division of the
Commission and not directly by the Commission en banc; and (3) the proclamation of
Locsin was valid because she received the highest number of valid votes cast, the votes
of Codilla being stray.
[41]

On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Manifestation stating that he was
deprived of a fair hearing on the disqualification case because while the documentary
evidence adduced in his Memorandum was in support of his Motion for the lifting
of the suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC Second Division instead
ruled on the main disqualification case. In consonance with his prayer that a fulldress hearing be conducted on the disqualification case, he submitted Affidavits of
additional witnesses which he claims would refute and substantially belie the
allegations of petitioners/intervenors witnesses. A Reply, Rejoinder and SurRejoinder were respectively filed by the parties. Consequently, the motion for
reconsideration in SPA No. 01-208 and the petition for declaration of nullity in SPC No.
01-324 were submitted for resolution.
[42]

[43]

[44]

[45]

[46]

From the records, it appears that initially, a Resolution penned by Commissioner

Rufino S.B. Javier, dated July 24, 2001, was submitted to the Office of the Chairman,
dismissing the petition for declaration of nullity for lack of jurisdiction and denying the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Codilla. Commissioners Florentino A.
Tuason, Jr. and Resurreccion Z. Borra submitted their respective dissenting
opinions to the Javier resolution. It bears emphasis that Commissioner Tuason, Jr.
was the ponente of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division which ordered the
disqualification of petitioner but after considering the additional evidence presented by
the latter, he concluded that the totality of the evidence was clearly in petitioners favor.
Equally worth mentioning is the fact that Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion, who was the
Presiding Commissioner of the Second Division, also dissented and voted to grant
Codillas motion for reconsideration on the ground that [T]he people of Leyte have
spoken and I respect the electorates will. x x x.
[47]

[48]

[49]

On August 29, 2001, then COMELEC Chairman Alfredo L. Benipayo issued a Vote
and Opinion and Summary of Votes reversing the resolution of the Second Division
and declaring the proclamation of respondent Locsin as null and void. The
dispositive portion reads:
JUDGMENT

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, I concur with Commissioner

Resurreccion Z. Borra, Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. and Commissioner
Ralph C. Lantion, in SPA No. 01-208, to GRANT the motion for reconsideration and to
REVERSE the resolution of the Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 1,
2001, disqualifying Codilla; and subsequently, in SPC No. 01-324, to GRANT the
petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null and void the proclamation of
losing candidate Locsin.
Accordingly:
1.
On the Motion for Reconsideration of the disqualification resolution against
Codilla, promulgated by the Commission (Second Division) on June 14, 2001 (SPA No.
01-208), I vote:
(a) to GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration of respondent-movant
Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and to REVERSE the Resolution of the
Commission (Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, for
insufficiency of evidence;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla, issued
by the Commission (Second Division) on May 18, 2001, having been
issued without hearing and without any finding that the evidence of guilt
of petitioner Codilla is strong and, thus, null and void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, for (t)he immediate
proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes,
to the exclusion of respondent and the concurrent order for the
Provincial Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to immediately reconvene
and thereafter proclaim forthwith the candidate who obtained the highest
number of votes counting out the Respondent the same being violative
of election laws, established jurisprudence, and resolutions of the
Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated o June 14, 2001, that the votes of
respondent Codilla are considered stray and invalid said ruling being
issued on the basis of an inapplicable decision, and contrary to
established jurisprudence;
(e) to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality of
this resolution, to reconvene and proclaim petitioner Codilla as the
winning candidate for Representative of the Fourth Legislative district of
Leyte to comply with its ministerial duty to proclaim the candidate who
garnered the highest number of votes in the elections for that position;
and
(f) to order intervenor-oppositor Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to
vacate the office of Representative of the House of Representatives
representing the Fourth legislative district of Leyte and, for this purpose,
to inform the House of Representatives through the Honorable Speaker
of this resolution for its attention and guidance; and

2.
On the petition for Declaration of Nullity of proclamation of respondent Ma.
Victoria L. Locsin (SPC No. 01-324), I vote:

(a) to GRANT the petition of Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr., and declare as null
and void the proclamation of losing candidate Locsin, the proclamation
being violative of election laws, established jurisprudence, and
resolutions of the Commission on Elections;
(b) to lift the order of suspension of proclamation of petitioner Codilla, issued
by the Commission (Second Division) on May 18, 2001, in SPA No. 01208, having been issued without hearing and without any finding that the
evidence of guilt of petitioner Codilla is strong and, thus, null and void;
(c) to nullify the order contained in the Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208, for
(t)he immediate proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest
number of votes, to the exclusion of respondent and the concurrent
order for the provincial Board of Canvasser (sic) of Leyte to immediately
reconvene and thereafter proclaim forthwith the candidate who obtained
the highest number of votes counting out the Respondent the same
being violative of election laws, established jurisprudence, and
resolutions of the Commission;
(d) to nullify the ruling contained in the Resolution of the Commission
(Second Division) promulgated on June 14, 2001, in SPA No. 01-208,
that the votes of respondent Codilla are considered stray and invalid
said ruling being issued on the basis of an inapplicable decision, and
contrary to established jurisprudence;
(e) to order the provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte, upon the finality of
this resolution, to reconvene and proclaim petitioner Codilla as the
winning candidate for Representative of the Fourth legislative district of
Leyte he (sic) having garnered the highest number of votes in the
elections for the position; and
(f) to order respondent Locsin, upon the finality of this resolution, to vacate
the office of Representative of the House of Representatives representing
the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte and, for this purpose, to inform the
House of Representatives through the Honorable Speaker of this
resolution for its attention and guidance.

Summary of Votes
Considering the FOUR (4) VOTES of the Chairman and Commissioners Resurreccion
Z. Borra, Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., and Ralph C. Lantion, to grant the Motion for
Reconsideration of Codilla and reverse the disqualification Resolution of the
Commission (Second Division) in SPA No. 01-208, promulgated on June 14, 2001, and
as an inevitable consequence, in voting to grant the petition for declaration of nullity of
the proclamation of Ma. Victoria L. Locsin in SPC No. 01-324, the verdict/opinion of the
Chairman and the three (3) Commissioners taken together now stands, as it is, the
MAJORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both cases; and the Resolution
submitted by three (3) Commissioners, namely, Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier,
Commissioner Luzviminda G. Tancangco, and Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, is
considered, as it is, the MINORITY DECISION of the Commission En Banc in both
cases.

The MAJORTIY DECISION was arrived at after proper consultation with those who
joined the majority. The Chairman and the three (3) Commissioners comprising the
majority decided that no one will be assigned to write a Majority Decision. Instead, each
one will write his own separate opinion. Commissioners Borra, Tuason, Jr. and the
undersigned Chairman submitted separate opinions. Commissioner Lantion wrote an
explanation on his vote.
[50]

The aforequoted judgment was adopted in a Vote of Adoption signed by

Commissioners Ralph C. Lantion, Resurreccion Z. Borra and Florentino A. Tuason, Jr.
[51]

Respondent Locsin did not appeal from this decision annulling her
proclamation. Instead, she filed a Comment and Manifestation with the
COMELEC en banc questioning the procedure and the manner by which the decision
was issued. In addition, respondent Locsin requested and was issued an opinion by
House of Representatives Executive Director and Chief Legal Counsel Leonardo B.
Palicte III declaring that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to nullify the proclamation of
respondent Locsin after she had taken her oath and assumed office since it is the HRET
which is the sole judge of election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House.
Relying on this opinion, respondent Locsin submitted a written privileged speech to
the House during its regular session on September 4, 2001, where she declared that
she will not only disregard but will openly defy and disobey the COMELEC en
bancresolution ordering her to vacate her position.
[52]

[53]

[54]

On September 6, 2001, the COMELEC en banc issued an Order constituting the

members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to implement the aforesaid
decision. It likewise ordered the Board to reconvene and proclaim the candidate who
obtained the highest number of votes in the district, as the duly-elected Representative
of the Fourth Legislative district of Leyte, and accordingly issue a Certificate of Canvass
and Proclamation of Winning Candidate for Member of the House of Representatives x
x x, based on the city/municipal certificates of canvass submitted beforehand to the
previous Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte x x x.
[55]

On September 12, 2001, petitioner Codilla was proclaimed by the Provincial

Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected Representative of the 4 th legislative
district of Leyte, having obtained a total of 71,350 votes representing the highest
number of votes cast in the district. On the same day, petitioner took his oath of office
before Executive Judge Fortunito L. Madrona of the Regional Trial Court of Ormoc City.
[56]

[57]

On September 14, 2001, petitioner wrote the House of Representatives, thru

respondent Speaker De Venecia, informing the House of the August 29, 2001
COMELEC en bancresolution annulling the proclamation of respondent Locsin, and
proclaiming him as the duly-elected Representative of the 4 th legislative district of Leyte.
Petitioner also served notice that I am assuming the duties and responsibilities as
Representative of the fourth legislative district of Leyte to which position I have been
lawfully elected and proclaimed. On behalf of my constituents, I therefore expect that all
rights and privileges intended for the position of Representative of the fourth legislative
district of Leyte be accorded to me, including all physical facilities and staff
support. On the basis of this letter, a Memorandum dated October 8, 2001 was
[58]

[59]

issued by Legal Affairs Deputy Secretary-General Gaudencio A. Mendoza, Jr., for

Speaker De Venecia, stating that there is no legal obstacle to complying with the duly
promulgated and now final and executory COMELEC Decision of August 29, 2001 x
x x.
These notwithstanding, and despite receipt by the House of Representatives of a
copy of the COMELEC en banc resolution on September 20, 2001, no action was
taken by the House on the letter-appeal of petitioner. Hence, petitioner sought the
assistance of his party, LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP, which sent a letter addressed to
respondent Speaker De Venecia, dated October 25, 2001, and signed by Party
President Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., Secretary-General Heherson T. Alvarez, and Region
VIII Party Chairman Sergio Antonio F. Apostol, requesting the House of Representatives
to act decisively on the matter in order that petitioner can avail of whatever remedy is
available should their action remain unfavorable or otherwise undecisive.
[60]

[61]

In response, Speaker De Venecia sent a letter

that:

[62]

dated October 30, 2001, stating

We recognize the finality of the COMELEC decision and we are inclined to sustain
it. However, Rep. Locsin has officially notified the HOUSE in her privilege speech,
inserted in the HOUSE Journal dated September 4, 2001, that she shall openly defy
and disobey the COMELEC ruling. This ultimately means that implementing the
decision would result in the spectacle of having two (2) legislators occupying the same
congressional seat, a legal situation, the only consideration, that effectively deters the
HOUSEs liberty to take action.
In this light, the accepted wisdom is that the implementation of the COMELEC
decision is a matter that can be best, and with finality, adjudicated by the
Supreme Court, which, hopefully, shall act on it most expeditiously. (emphases
supplied)
Hence, the present petition for mandamus and quo warranto.
Petitioner submits that by virtue of the resolution of the COMELEC en banc which
has become final and executory for failure of respondent Locsin to appeal therefrom, it
has become the ministerial duty: (1) of the Speaker of the House of Representatives, as
its Administrative Head and Presiding Officer, to implement the said resolution of the
COMELEC en banc by installing him as the duly-elected Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte; and (2) of the Secretary-General, as official custodian of
the records of the House, to formally register his name in the Roll of Members of the
House and delete the name of respondent Locsin therefrom. Petitioner further contends
that respondent Locsin has been usurping and unlawfully holding the public office of
Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte considering that her premature
proclamation has been declared null and void by the COMELEC en banc. He alleges
that the action or inaction of public respondents has deprived him of his lawful right to
assume the office of Representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte.
In his Comment, public respondent Speaker De Venecia alleged that mandamus
will not lie to compel the implementation of the COMELEC decision which is not merely
a ministerial duty but one which requires the exercise of discretion by the Speaker of the
[63]

House considering that: (1) it affects the membership of the House; and (2) there is
nothing in the Rules of the House of Representatives which imposes a duty on the
House Speaker to implement a COMELEC decision that unseats an incumbent House
member.
In his Comment, public respondent Secretary-General Nazareno alleged that in
reading the name of respondent Locsin during the roll call, and in allowing her to take
her oath before the Speaker-elect and sit as Member of the House during the Joint
Session of Congress, he was merely performing official acts in compliance with the
opinions rendered by House of Representatives Chief Counsel and Executive Director
Leonardo C. Palicte III stating that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to declare the
proclamation of respondent Locsin as null and void since it is the HRET which is the
sole judge of all election, returns and qualifications of Members of the House. He also
contends that the determination of who will sit as Member of the House of
Representatives is not a ministerial function and cannot, thus, be compelled by
mandamus.
[64]

[65]

Respondent Locsin, in her Comment, alleged that the Supreme Court has no
original jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a member of the House of
Representatives for under Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution it is the HRET which
is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
Members of the House of Representatives. She likewise asserts that this Court cannot
issue the writ of mandamus against a co-equal legislative department without grossly
violating the principle of separation of powers. She contends that the act of recognizing
who should be seated as a bona fide member of the House of Representatives is not a
ministerial function but a legislative prerogative, the performance of which cannot be
compelled by mandamus. Moreover, the prayer for a writ of mandamus cannot be
directed against the Speaker and Secretary-General because they do not have the
authority to enforce and implement the resolution of the COMELEC.
[66]

Additionally, respondent Locsin urges that the resolution of the COMELEC en

banc is null and void for lack of jurisdiction. First, it should have dismissed the case
pending before it after her proclamation and after she had taken her oath of
office. Jurisdiction then was vested in the HRET to unseat and remove a Member of the
House of Representatives. Second, the petition for declaration of nullity is clearly a preproclamation controversy and the COMELEC en banc has no original jurisdiction to
hear and decide a pre-proclamation controversy. It must first be heard by a COMELEC
Division. Third, the questioned decision is actually a hodge-podge decision because
of the peculiar manner in which the COMELEC disposed of the case.
Finally, respondent Locsin asserts that the matter of her qualification and eligibility
has been categorically affirmed by the HRET when it dismissed the quo warranto case
filed against her, docketed as HRET Case No. 01-043, entitled Paciano Travero vs.
Ma. Victoria Locsin, on the ground that the allegations stated therein are not proper
grounds for a petition forquo warranto against a Member of the House of
Representatives under section 253 of the Omnibus Election Code and Rule 17 of the
HRET Rules, and that the petition was filed late.
[67]

In his Reply, petitioner asserts that the remedy of respondent Locsin from the
COMELEC decision was to file a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, not to
seek an opinion from the Chief Legal Counsel of the House of Representatives; that the
HRET has no jurisdiction over a petition for declaration of nullity of proclamation which
is based not on ineligibility or disloyalty, but by reason that the candidate proclaimed as
winner did not obtain the highest number of votes; that the petition for annulment of
proclamation is a pre-proclamation controversy and, hence, falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC pursuant to section 242 of B.P. Blg. 881 and section 3,
Article IX (C) of the Constitution; that respondent Speaker De Venecia himself
recognizes the finality of the COMELEC decision but has decided to refer the matter to
the Supreme Court for adjudication; that the enforcement and implementation of a final
decision of the COMELEC involves a ministerial act and does not encroach on the
legislative power of Congress; and that the power to determine who will sit as Member
of the House does not involve an exercise of legislative power but is vested in the
sovereign will of the electorate.
[68]

[69]

The core issues in this case are: (a) whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin
by the COMELEC Second Division is valid; (b) whether said proclamation divested the
COMELECen banc of jurisdiction to review its validity; and (c) assuming the invalidity of
said proclamation, whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to
recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.
I
Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin is valid.
After carefully reviewing the records of this case, we find that the proclamation of
respondent Locsin is null and void for the following reasons:
First. The petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings
leading to the proclamation of respondent Locsin.
COMELEC Resolution Nos. 3402 sets the procedure for disqualification cases
pursuant to section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
[70]

C. PETITION TO DISQUALIFY A CANDIDATE PURSUANT TO SEC. 68 OF THE

OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE AND PETITION TO DISQUALIFY FOR LACK OF
QUALIFICATIONS
OR
POSSESSING
SAME
GROUNDS
FOR
DISQUALIFICATION

(1) The verified petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the

Omnibus Election Code and the verified petition to disqualify a candidate for
lack of qualifications or possessing same grounds for disqualification, may
be filed any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy but not
later than the date of proclamation.
(2) The petition to disqualify a candidate pursuant to Sec. 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code shall be filed in ten (10) legible copies by any citizen of voting
age, or duly registered political party, organization or coalition of political

parties against any candidate who in an action or protest in which he is a

party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by
the Commission of:
2.a having given money or other material consideration to influence, induce
or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions;
2.b having committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy;
2.c having spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by the Omnibus Election Code;
2.d having solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under
Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104 of the Omnibus Election Code;
2.e having violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e,
k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6 of the Omnibus Election Code, shall be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected,
from holding the office.
x
x

xxx
(4) Upon payment of the filing fee of P1,000.00 and legal research fee of
P20.00, the offices concerned shall docket the petition and assign to it a
docket number which must be consecutive, according to the order of receipt
and must bear the year and prefixed as SPA with the corresponding initial of
the name of the office, i.e. SPA (RED) No. C01-001; SPA (PES) No. C01001;
(5) Within three (3) days from filing of the petitions, the offices concerned shall
issue summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the
petition and its enclosures, if any;
(6) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of summons
within which to file his verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition
in ten (10) legible copies, serving a copy thereof upon the petitioner.
Grounds for Motion to Dismiss may be raised as an affirmative defense;
(7) The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of the testimonies, the
parties shall submit their affidavits or counter-affidavits and other
documentary evidences including their position paper;
(8) The hearing must be completed within ten (10) days from the date of the
filing of the answer. The hearing officer concerned shall submit to the Clerk
of the Commission through the fastest means of communication, his findings,
reports and recommendations within five (5) days from the completion of the
hearing and reception of evidence together with the complete records of the
case;
(9) Upon receipt of the records of the case of the findings, reports and
recommendation of the hearing officer concerned, the Clerk of the
Commission shall immediately docket the case consecutively and calendar
the same for raffle to a division;
(10) The division to whom the case is raffled, shall after consultation, assign the
same to a member who shall pen the decision, within five (5) days from the
date of consultation.

Resolution No. 3402 clearly requires the COMELEC, through the Regional Election
Director, to issue summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the
petition and its enclosures, if any, within three (3) days from the filing of the petition for
disqualification. Undoubtedly, this is to afford the respondent candidate the opportunity
to answer the allegations in the petition and hear his side. To ensure compliance with
this requirement, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requires the return of the
summons together with the proof of service to the Clerk of Court of the COMELEC
when service has been completed, viz:
Rule 14. Summons
x
x

xxx

Section 5. Return.- When the service has been completed by personal service, the
server shall give notice thereof, by registered mail, to the protestant or his counsel and
shall return the summons to the Clerk of Court concerned who issued it, accompanied
with the proof of service.
Section 6. Proof of Service.- Proof of service of summons shall be made in the manner
provided for in the Rules of Court in the Philippines.
Thereafter, hearings, to be completed within ten (10) days from the filing of the
Answer, must be conducted. The hearing officer is required to submit to the Clerk of the
Commission his findings, reports and recommendations within five (5) days from the
completion of the hearing and reception of evidence together with the complete records
of the case.
(a) Petitioner was not notified of the petition for his disqualification through the
service of summons nor of the Motions to suspend his proclamation.

The records of the case do not show that summons was served on the
petitioner. They do not contain a copy of the summons allegedly served on the
petitioner and its corresponding proof of service. Furthermore, private respondent
never rebutted petitioners repeated assertion that he was not properly notified of the
petition for his disqualification because he never received summons. Petitioner claims
that prior to receiving a telegraphed Order from the COMELEC Second Division on May
22, 2001, directing the District Board of Canvassers to suspend his proclamation, he
was never summoned nor furnished a copy of the petition for his disqualification. He
was able to obtain a copy of the petition and the May 22 Order of the COMELEC
Second Division by personally going to the COMELEC Regional Office on May 23,
2001. Thus, he was able to file his Answer to the disqualification case only on May 24,
2001.
[71]

More, the proclamation of the petitioner was suspended in gross violation of section
72 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority.- The Commission and the courts
shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the
end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the
election in which the disqualification is sought.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any
reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not
prevent his proclamation and assumption to office. (emphases supplied)
In the instant case, petitioner has not been disqualified by final judgment when the
elections were conducted on May 14, 2001. The Regional Election Director has yet to
conduct hearing on the petition for his disqualification. After the elections, petitioner was
voted in office by a wide margin of 17,903. On May 16, 2001, however, respondent
Locsin filed a Most Urgent Motion for the suspension of petitioners proclamation. The
Most Urgent Motion contained a statement to the effect that a copy was served to the
petitioner through registered mail. The records reveal that no registry receipt was
attached to prove such service. This violates COMELEC Rules of Procedure requiring
notice and service of the motion to all parties, viz:
[72]

Section 4. Notice.- Notice of a motion shall be served by the movant to all parties
concerned, at least three (3) days before the hearing thereof, together with a copy of the
motion. For good cause shown, the motion may be heard on shorter notice, especially
on matters which the Commission or the Division may dispose of on its own motion.
The notice shall be directed to the parties concerned and shall state the time and place
of the hearing of the motion.
Section 5. Proof of Service.- No motion shall be acted upon by the Commission
without proof of service of notice thereof, except when the Commission or a Division is
satisfied that the rights of the adverse party or parties are not affected.
Respondents Most Urgent Motion does not fall under the exceptions to notice and
service of motions. First, the suspension of proclamation of a winning candidate is not a
matter which the COMELEC Second Division can dispose of motu proprio. Section 6 of
R.A. No. 6646 requires that the suspension must be upon motion by the complainant
or any intervenor, viz:
[73]

Section 6. Effect of Disqualification Case.- Any candidate who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before
an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the Court or Commission (COMELEC) shall continue with
the trial or hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his
guilt is strong. (emphases supplied)
Second, the right of an adverse party, in this case, the petitioner, is clearly
affected. Given the lack of service of the Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner, said
Motion is a mere scrap of paper. It cannot be acted upon by the COMELEC Second
Division.
[74]

On May 18, 2001 at exactly 5:00 p.m., respondent Locsin filed a Second Most
Urgent Motion for the suspension of petitioners proclamation. Petitioner was served a
copy of the Second Motion again by registered mail. A registry receipt was attached
evidencing service of the Second Most Urgent Motion to the petitioner but it does not
appear when the petitioner received a copy thereof. That same day, the COMELEC
Second Division issued an Order suspending the proclamation of petitioner. Clearly, the
petitioner was not given any opportunity to contest the allegations contained in the
petition for disqualification. The Order was issued on the very same day the Second
Most Urgent Motion was filed. The petitioner could not have received the Second Most
Urgent Motion, let alone answer the same on time as he was served a copy thereof by
registered mail.
[75]

[76]

Under section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, the COMELEC can suspend proclamation only
when evidence of the winning candidates guilt is strong. In the case at bar, the
COMELEC Second Division did not make any specific finding that evidence of
petitioners guilt is strong. Its only basis in suspending the proclamation of the
petitioner is the seriousness of the allegations in the petition for disqualification.
Pertinent portion of the Order reads:
Without giving due course to the petition xxx the Commission (2 nd Division), pursuant to
Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646
xxx andconsidering the serious allegations in the petition, hereby directs the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to suspend the proclamation of
respondent, if winning, until further orders. (emphases supplied)
[77]

We hold that absent any finding that the evidence on the guilt of the petitioner is
strong, the COMELEC Second Division gravely abused its power when it suspended his
proclamation.
(b) The COMELEC Second Division did not give ample opportunity to the
petitioner to adduce evidence in support of his defense in the petition for his
disqualification.

All throughout the proceeding, no hearing was conducted on the petition for
disqualification in gross violation of section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 which specifically enjoins
the COMELEC to continue with the trial or hearing of the action, inquiry, or
protest. This is also in violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 3402 requiring the
Regional Election Director to complete the hearing and reception of evidence within
ten (10) days from the filing of the Answer, and to submit his findings, reports, and
recommendations within the five (5) days from completion of the hearing and the
reception of evidence.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension of his proclamation on
May 25, 2001. Although an oral argument on this Motion was held, and the parties were
allowed to file their respective memoranda, the Motion was not acted upon. Instead, the
COMELEC Second Division issued a Resolution on the petition for disqualification
against the petitioner. It was based on the following evidence: (a) the affidavits attached
to the Petition for Disqualification; (b) the affidavits attached to the Answer; and (c) the
respective memoranda of the parties.

On this score, it bears emphasis that the hearing for Motion to Lift the Order of
Suspension cannot be substituted for the hearing in the disqualification case. Although
intrinsically linked, it is not to be supposed that the evidence of the parties in the main
disqualification case are the same as those in the Motion to Lift the Order of
Suspension. The parties may have other evidence which they may deem proper to
present only on the hearing for the disqualification case. Also, there may be evidence
which are unavailable during the hearing for the Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension
but which may be available during the hearing for the disqualification case.
In the case at bar, petitioner asserts that he submitted his Memorandum merely to
support his Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. It was not intended to answer and
refute the disqualification case against him. This submission was sustained by the
COMELEC en banc. Hence, the members of the COMELEC en banc concluded, upon
consideration of the additional affidavits attached in his Urgent Manifestation, that the
evidence to disqualify the petitioner was insufficient. More specifically, the ponente of
the challenged Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division held:
Indeed, I find from the records that the May 30, 2001 hearing of the COMELEC
(Second Division) concerns only the incident relating to the Motion to Lift Order of
Suspension of Proclamation. It also appears that the order for the submission of the
parties respective memoranda was in lieu of the parties oral argument on the motion.
This would explain the fact that Codillas Memorandum refers mainly to the validity of
the issuance of the order of suspension of proclamation. There is, however, no record of
any hearing on the urgent motion for the suspension of proclamation. Indeed, it was
only upon the filing of the Urgent Manifestation by Codilla that the Members of
the Commission (Second Division) and other Members of the Commission en
banc had the opportunity to consider Codillas affidavits. This time, Codilla was
able to present his side, thus, completing the presentation of evidentiary
documents from both sides. (emphases supplied)
[78]

Indeed, careful reading of the petitioners Memorandum shows that he confined his
arguments in support of his Motion to Lift the Order of Suspension. In said
Memorandum, petitioner raised the following issues: (a) he was utterly deprived of
procedural due process, and consequently, the order suspending his proclamation is
null and void; (b) the said order of suspension of proclamation has no legal and factual
basis; and (c) evidence of guilt on his part is patently inexistent for the purpose of
directing the suspension of his proclamation. He urged the COMELEC Second
Division to conduct a full dress hearing on the main disqualification case should the
suspension be lifted.
[79]

[80]

(c) the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division disqualifying the petitioner
is not based on substantial evidence.

The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division cannot be considered to be

based on substantial evidence. It relied merely on affidavits of witnesses attached to
the petition for disqualification. As stressed, the COMELEC Second Division gave
credence to the affidavits without hearing the affiants. In reversing said Resolution, the
COMELEC en banc correctly observed:

Lacking evidence of Codilla, the Commission (Second Division) made its decisions
based mainly on the allegation of the petitioner and the supporting affidavits. With this
lopsided evidence at hand, the result was predictable. The Commission (Second
Division) had no choice. Codilla was disqualified.
[81]

Worse, the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division, even without the
evidence coming from the petitioner, failed to prove the gravamen of the offense for
which he was charged.
[82]

Petitioner allegedly violated section 68 (a) of the Omnibus Election Code which
reads:
Section 68. Disqualifications.- Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a
party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the
Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence,
induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing official functions, xxx shall be
disqualified from continuing as candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding office
To be disqualified under the above-quoted provision, the following elements must be
proved: (a) the candidate, personally or through his instructions, must have given
money or other material consideration; and (b) the act of giving money or other material
consideration must be for the purpose of influencing, inducing, or corrupting the voters
or public officials performing electoral functions.
In the case at bar, the petition for disqualification alleged that (a) petitioner ordered
the extraction, hauling and distribution of gravel and sand, and (b) his purpose was to
induce and influence the voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to vote for him.
Pertinent portion of the petition reads:
[T]he respondent [herein petitioner], within the election period, took advantage of his
current elective position as City Mayor of Ormoc City by illegally and unlawfully using
during the prohibited period, public equipments and vehicles belonging to and owned by
the City Government of Ormoc City in extracting, hauling and distributing gravel and
sand to the residents and voters of the Municipalities of Kananga and Matag-ob Leyte,
well within the territorial limits of the 4th Congressional District of Leyte, which acts were
executed without period, and clearly for the illicit purpose of unduly inducing or directly
corrupting various voters of Kananga and Matag-ob, within the 4 th legislative district of
Leyte, for the precise purpose of inducing and influencing the voters/beneficiaries of
Kananga and Matag-ob, Leyte to cast their votes for said respondent.
[83]

The affidavits relied upon by the COMELEC Second Division failed to prove these
allegations. For instance, Cesar A. Laurente merely stated that he saw three (3) tenwheeler dump trucks and a Hyundai Payloader with the markings Ormoc City
Government extracting and hauling sand and gravel from the riverbed adjacent to the
property owned by the Codilla family.
[84]

Agripino C. Alferez and Rogelio T. Sulvera in their Joint Affidavit merely stated that
they saw white trucks owned by the City Government of Ormoc dumping gravel and
sand on the road of Purok 6, San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte. A payloader then scattered
the sand and gravel unloaded by the white trucks.
[85]

On the other hand, Danilo D. Maglasang, a temporary employee of the City

Government of Ormoc assigned to check and record the delivery of sand and gravel for
the different barangays in Ormoc, stated as follows:
3. That on April 20, 2001, I was ordered by Engr. Arnel Padayo, an employee of the
City Engineering Office, Ormoc City to go to Tagaytay, Kangga (sic), Leyte as that will
be the source of the sand and gravel. I inquired why we had to go to Kananga but Engr.
Padayao said that its not a problem as it was Mayor Eufrocino M. Codilla, Sr. who
ordered this and the property is owned by the family of Mayor Codilla. We were to
deliver sand and gravel to whoever requests from Mayor Codilla.
[86]

Similarly, the Affidavit of Basilio Bates cannot prove the offense charged against the
petitioner. He alleged that on April 18, 2001, a white truck with the marking City
Government of Ormoc came to his lot at Montebello, Kananga, Leyte and unloaded
mixed sand and that the driver of the truck told him to vote for Codilla as
a (sic) congressman during election. His statement is hearsay. He has no personal
knowledge of the supposed order of the petitioner to distribute gravel and sand for the
purpose of inducing the voters to vote for him. The same could be said about the
affidavits of Randy T. Merin, Alfredo C. De la Pea, Miguel P. Pandac, Paquito
Bregeldo, Cristeta Alferez , Glicerio Rios, Romulo Alkuino, Sr., Abner Casas, Rita
Trangia, and Judith Erispe attached to respondent Locsins Memorandum on the
Motion to Lift the Suspension of Proclamation.
[87]

[88]

[89]

[90]

[91]

[94]

[92]

[93]

[95]

Also valueless are the affidavits of other witnesses of respondent Locsin, all
similarly worded, which alleged that the petitioner ordered the repair of the road in
Purok 6, Barangay San Vicente, Matag-ob, Leyte and the flattening of the area where
the cockfights were to be held. These allegations are extraneous to the charge in the
petition for disqualification. More importantly, these allegations do not constitute a
ground to disqualify the petitioner based on section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.
[96]

To be sure, the petition for disqualification also ascribed other election offenses
against the petitioner, particularly section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code, viz:
Section 261. Prohibited Acts.- The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling.- (1) Any person who gives, offers or promises money
or anything of value, gives or promises any office or employment, franchise or grant,
public or private, or make or offers to make an expenditure, directly or indirectly, or
cause an expenditure to be made to any person, association, corporation, entity or
community in order to induce anyone or the public in general, to vote for or against
any candidate or withhold his vote in the election, or to vote for or against any
aspirant for the nomination or choice of a candidate in a convention or similar
selection process of a political party.

x
x

x
xxx

(o) Use of public funds, money deposited in trust, equipment, facilities owned or
controlled by the government for an election campaign.- Any person who uses under
any guise whatsoever directly or indirectly, xxx (3) any equipment, vehicle, facility,
apparatus, or paraphernalia owned by the government or by its political

subdivisions, agencies including government-owned or controlled corporations, or

by the Armed Forces of the Philippines for any election campaign or for any partisan
political activity x x x.

However, the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to

those enumerated in section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. All other election
offenses are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not
administrative in nature. Pursuant to sections 265 and 268 of the Omnibus Election
Code, the power of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of preliminary
investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged
offenders before the regular courts of justice, viz:
[97]

Section 265. Prosecution.- The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal
officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may
avail of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government: Provided,
however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four
months from his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal
or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
x

xxx

Section 268. Jurisdiction.- The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original
jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceeding for violation of this Code,
except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be
under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or municipal trial courts. From the decision of the
courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases.
The COMELEC Second Division grievously erred when it decided the
disqualification case based on section 261 (a) and (o), and not on section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code.
(d) Exclusion of the votes in favor of the petitioner and the proclamation of
respondent Locsin was done with undue haste.

The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of the votes cast in favor of
the petitioner, and the proclamation of the respondent Locsin, without affording the
petitioner the opportunity to challenge the same. In the morning of June 15, 2001, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers convened, and on the strength of the said Resolution
excluding the votes received by the petitioner, certified that respondent Locsin received
the highest number of votes. On this basis, respondent Locsin was proclaimed.
Records reveal that the petitioner received notice of the Resolution of the
COMELEC Second Division only through his counsel via a facsimile message in the
afternoon of June 15, 2001 when everything was already fait accompli. Undoubtedly,
he was not able to contest the issuance of the Certificate of Canvass and the
proclamation of respondent Locsin. This is plain and simple denial of due process.
[98]

The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a party is

deprived of that basic fairness, any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is
void.
Second. The votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered stray
and respondent cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis.
The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division in SPA No. 01-208 contains two
dispositions: (1) it ruled that the petitioner was disqualified as a candidate for the
position of Congressman of the Fourth District of Leyte; and (2) it ordered the immediate
proclamation of the candidate who garnered the highest number of votes, to the
exclusion of the respondent [herein petitioner].
As previously stated, the disqualification of the petitioner is null and void for being
violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Even assuming,
however, that the petitioner was validly disqualified, it is still improper for the COMELEC
Second Division to order the immediate exclusion of votes cast for the petitioner as
stray, and on this basis, proclaim the respondent as having garnered the next highest
number of votes.
(a) The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence, the votes cast in favor of
the petitioner cannot be considered stray.

Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code require
a final judgment before the election for the votes of a disqualified candidate to be
considered stray. Hence, when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final
judgment during the election day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot
be declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom
sovereignty resides. For in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by
final judgment during the election day, the people voted for him bona fide, without any
intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief that the candidate was
then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the exercise of the powers of
government.
[99]

[100]

This principle applies with greater force in the case at bar considering that
the petitioner has not been declared by final judgment to be disqualified not only
before but even after the elections. The Resolution of the COMELEC Second
Division disqualifying the petitioner did not attain finality, and hence, could not be
executed, because of the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration. Section 13, Rule
18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure on Finality of Decisions and Resolutions
reads:
Sec. 13. Finality of Decisions or Resolutions.- (a) In ordinary actions, special
proceedings, provisional remedies and special reliefs, a decision or resolution of the
Commission en banc shall become final and executory after thirty (30) days from its
promulgation.
(b) In Special Actions and Special Cases a decision or resolution of the Commission
en banc shall become final and executory after five (5) days in Special Actions
and Special Cases and after fifteen (15) days in all other proceedings, following
their promulgation.

(c) Unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed, a decision or

resolution of a Division shall become final and executory after the lapse of
five (5) days in Special Actions and Special Cases and after fifteen (15)
days in all other actions or proceedings, following its promulgation.
(emphasis supplied)
In this wise, COMELEC Resolution No. 4116, issued in relation to the finality of
resolutions or decisions in disqualification cases, provides:
[101]

This pertains to the finality of decisions or resolutions of the Commission en banc or

division, particularly on Special Actions (Disqualification Cases).
Special Action cases refer to the following:
(a) Petition to deny due course to a certificate of candidacy;
(b) Petition to declare a candidate as a nuisance candidate;
(c) Petition to disqualify a candidate; and
(d) Petition to postpone or suspend an election.
Considering the foregoing and in order to guide field officials on the finality of decisions
or resolutions on special action cases (disqualification cases) the Commission,
RESOLVES, as it is hereby RESOLVED, as follows:
(1) the decision or resolution of the En Banc of the Commission on
disqualification cases shall become final and executory after five (5) days
from its promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court;
(2) the decision or resolution of a Division on disqualification cases shall
become final and executory after the lapse of five (5) days unless a motion
for reconsideration is seasonably filed;
(3) where the ground for disqualification case is by reason of non-residence,
citizenship, violation of election laws and other analogous cases and on the
day of the election the resolution has not become final and executory the BEI
shall tally and count the votes for such disqualified candidate;
(4) the decision or resolution of the En Banc on nuisance candidates,
particularly whether the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona
fide candidate shall be immediately executory;
(5) the decision or resolution of a DIVISION on nuisance candidate, particularly
where the nuisance candidate has the same name as the bona fide
candidate shall be immediately executory after the lapse of five (5) days
unless a motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. In which case, the
votes cast shall not be considered stray but shall be counted and tallied for
the bona fide candidate.
All resolutions, orders and rules inconsistent herewith are hereby modified or repealed.
Considering the timely filing of a Motion for Reconsideration, the COMELEC
Second Division gravely abused its discretion in ordering the immediate disqualification
of the petitioner and ordering the exclusion of the votes cast in his favor. Section 2, Rule
19 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is very clear that a timely Motion for
Reconsideration shall suspend the execution or implementation of the resolution, viz:
Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from

the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution or
implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling. (emphases supplied)
(b) Respondent Locsin, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed.
More brazen is the proclamation of respondent Locsin which violates the settled
doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be
proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. In every election, the
peoples choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must at all
times be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by
giving him the highest number of votes cast in the election for the office, no one can be
declared elected in his place. In Domino v. COMELEC, this Court ruled, viz:
[102]

[103]

[104]

It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed

right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed winner and imposed as representative of a constituency, the majority of
which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. To
simplistically assume that the second placer would have received that (sic) other votes
would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voters. He could not be
considered the first among the qualified candidates because in a field which excludes
the qualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed.
x

xxx

The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the
election fails entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred from the
disqualified winner to the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes
a declaration in favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and does not
entitle the candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected.
In such case, the electors have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity. To
allow the defeated and repudiated candidate to take over the elective position despite
his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on
their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the peoples
right to elect officials of their choice.
[105]

Respondent Locsin proffers a distinction between a disqualification based on

personal circumstances such as age, residence or citizenship and disqualification based
on election offenses. She contends that the election of candidates later disqualified
based on election offenses like those enumerated in section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code should be invalidated because they violate the very essence of suffrage and as
such, the votes cast in his favor should not be considered.
[106]

This contention is without merit. In the recent case of Trinidad v. COMELEC, this
Court ruled that the effect of a judgment disqualifying a candidate, after winning the
election, based on personal circumstances or section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
is the same: the second placer could not take the place of the disqualified winner.
[107]

II

Whether the proclamation of respondent Locsin divested the COMELEC en

banc of jurisdiction to review its validity.
Respondent Locsin submits that the COMELEC en banc has no jurisdiction to annul
her proclamation. She maintains that the COMELEC en banc was been divested of
jurisdiction to review the validity of her proclamation because she has become a
member of the House of Representatives. Thus, she contends that the proper forum to
question her membership to the House of Representatives is the House of
Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
We find no merit in these contentions.
First. The validity of the respondents proclamation was a core issue in the
Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.
In his timely Motion for Reconsideration with the COMELEC en banc, petitioner
argued that the COMELEC Second Division erred thus:
(1) in disqualifying petitioner on the basis solely of the dubious declaration of
the witnesses for respondent Locsin;
(2) in adopting in toto the allegations of the witnesses for respondent Locsin;
and
(3) in promulgating the resolution in violation of its own rules of
procedure and in directing therein the immediate proclamation of the
second highest vote getter.(emphases supplied)
In support of his third assignment of error, petitioner argued that the Second
Divisions directive for the immediate proclamation of the second highest vote-getter is
premature considering that the Resolution has yet to become final and
executory. Clearly, the validity of respondent Locsins proclamation was made a
central issue in the Motion for Reconsideration seasonably filed by the petitioner.
Without doubt, the COMELEC en banc has the jurisdiction to rule on the issue.
[108]

The fact that the Petition for Nullity of Proclamation was filed directly with the
COMELEC en banc is of no moment. Even without said Petition, the COMELEC en
banc could still rule on the nullity of respondents proclamation because it was properly
raised in the Motion for Reconsideration.
Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC en
banc to review, on motion for reconsideration, decisions or resolutions decided by a
division, viz:
Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decision shall be
decided by the Commission en banc.
Pursuant to this Constitutional mandate, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
provides:

Rule 19. Motions for Reconsideration.Section 1. Grounds for Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion for reconsideration may
be filed on the grounds that the evidence is insufficient to justify the decision, order or
ruling, or that the said decision, order or ruling is contrary to law.
Section 2. Period for filing Motion for Reconsideration.- A motion to reconsider a
decision, resolution, order, or ruling of a Division shall be filed within five (5) days from
the promulgation thereof. Such motion, if not pro forma, suspends the execution or
implementation of the decision, resolution, order or ruling.
Section 3. Form and Contents of Motion for Reconsideration.- The motion shall be
verified and shall point out specifically the findings or conclusions of the decision,
resolution, order or ruling which are not supported by the evidence or which are contrary
to law, making express reference to the testimonial or documentary evidence or to the
provisions of law alleged to be contrary to such findings or resolutions.
Section 4. Effect of Motion for Reconsideration on Period to Appeal.- A motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling when not pro forma, suspends the
running of the period to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court.
Section 5. How Motion for Reconsideration Disposed Of.- Upon the filing of a motion to
reconsider a decision, resolution, order or ruling of a Division, the Clerk of Court
concerned shall, within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, notify the Presiding
Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the
Commission en banc.
Section 6. Duty of the Clerk of Court of the Commission to set Motion for Hearing.- The
Clerk of Court concerned shall calendar the motion for reconsideration for the resolution
of the Commission en banc within ten (10) days from the certification
thereof. (emphases supplied)
Since the petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of
the Second Division suspending his proclamation and disqualifying him, the
COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the validity of the said
Order of the Second Division. The said Order of the Second Division was yet
unenforceable as it has not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for
reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis for the
assumption in office of the respondent as the duly elected Representative of the
4th legislative district of Leyte.
Second. It is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which
has no jurisdiction in the instant case.
Respondent contends that having been proclaimed and having taken oath as
representative of the 4th legislative district of Leyte, any question relative to her election
and eligibility should be brought before the HRET pursuant to section 17 of Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.
[109]

We reject respondents contention.

(a) The issue on the validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division
has not yet been resolved by the COMELEC en banc.

To stress again, at the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the validity of
the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division was seasonably challenged by the
petitioner in his Motion for Reconsideration. The issue was still within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve. Hence, the HRET cannot assume
jurisdiction over the matter.
In Puzon vs. Cua, even the HRET ruled that the doctrinal ruling that once a
proclamation has been made and a candidate-elect has assumed office, it is this
Tribunal that has jurisdiction over an election contest involving members of the House of
Representatives, could not have been immediately applicable due to the issue
regarding the validity of the very COMELEC pronouncements themselves. This is
because the HRET has no jurisdiction to review resolutions or decisions of the
COMELEC, whether issued by a division or en banc.
[110]

(b) The instant case does not involve the election and qualification of respondent
Locsin.

Respondent Locsin maintains that the proper recourse of the petitioner is to file a
petition for quo warranto with the HRET.
A petition for quo warranto may be filed only on the grounds of ineligibility and
disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines. In the case at bar, neither the eligibility of
the respondent Locsin nor her loyalty to the Republic of the Philippines is in
question. There is no issue that she was qualified to run, and if she won, to assume
office.
[111]

A petition for quo warranto in the HRET is directed against one who has been duly
elected and proclaimed for having obtained the highest number of votes but whose
eligibility is in question at the time of such proclamation. It is evident that respondent
Locsin cannot be the subject of quo warranto proceeding in the HRET. She lost the
elections to the petitioner by a wide margin. Her proclamation was a patent nullity. Her
premature assumption to office as Representative of the 4 th legislative district of Leyte
was void from the beginning. It is the height of absurdity for the respondent, as a loser,
to tell petitioner Codilla, Sr., the winner, to unseat her via a quo warranto proceeding.
III
Whether it is the ministerial duty of the public respondents to
recognize petitioner Codilla, Sr. as the legally elected Representative
of the 4th legislative district of Leyte vice respondent Locsin.
Under Rule 65, section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, any person may file
a verified petition for mandamus when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from
the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. For a petition
for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition for
[112]

mandamus is a ministerial act or duty, and not purely discretionary on the part of the
board, officer or person, and that the petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain
right to warrant the grant thereof.
The distinction between a ministerial and discretionary act is well delineated. A
purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state
of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority,
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety
of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to
decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not
ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither
the exercise of official discretion or judgment.
[113]

In the case at bar, the administration of oath and the registration of the petitioner in
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives representing the 4 th legislative
district of Leyte is no longer a matter of discretion on the part of the public respondents.
The facts are settled and beyond dispute: petitioner garnered 71,350 votes as against
respondent Locsin who only got 53, 447 votes in the May 14, 2001 elections. The
COMELEC Second Division initially ordered the proclamation of respondent Locsin; on
Motion for Reconsideration the COMELEC en banc set aside the order of its Second
Division and ordered the proclamation of the petitioner. The Decision of the
COMELEC en banc has not been challenged before this Court by respondent Locsin
and said Decision has become final and executory.
In sum, the issue of who is the rightful Representative of the 4 th legislative district of
Leyte has been finally settled by the COMELEC en banc, the constitutional body with
jurisdiction on the matter. The rule of law demands that its Decision be obeyed by
all officials of the land. There is no alternative to the rule of law except the reign
of chaos and confusion.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition for Mandamus is granted. Public Speaker of the
House of Representatives shall administer the oath of petitioner EUFROCINO M.
CODILLA, SR., as the duly-elected Representative of the 4 th legislative district of Leyte.
Public respondent Secretary-General shall likewise register the name of the petitioner in
the Roll of Members of the House of Representatives after he has taken his oath of
office. This decision shall be immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, YnaresSantiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo,
Sr., and Azcuna, JJ.,concur.
Carpio, J., no part.

Synopsis/Syllabi

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 135691. September 27, 1999]

EMMANUEL SINACA, petitioner, vs. MIGUEL MULA and COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS, respondents.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

Before us is a special civil action for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, with a prayer for
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order assailing the Resolution of 6 October
1998, of respondent Commission on Elections (hereafter COMELEC) in SPA No. 98-292,
declaring as invalid the substitution of mayoralty candidate Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr. by herein
petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca.[1]
The records disclose that in the 11 May 1998 elections, the two opposing factions of the
ruling party LAKAS-NUCD-UMPD (hereafter LAKAS) filled in separate candidates for the
position of mayor of the Municipality of Malimano, Surigao del Norte. One faction headed by
Robert Z. Barbers (hereafter BARBERS Wing) nominated Grachil G. Canoy (hereafter
CANOY), while the other group lead by Francisco T. MATUGAS (hereafter MATUGAS
Wing) endorsed the candidacy of Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr. (hereafter TEODORO).
Miguel H. Mula (hereafter MULA), a candidate for vice-mayor and belonging to the
BARBERS Wing, filed before the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against
TEODORO which was docketed as SPA 98-021. On 8 May 1998, the Second Division of the
COMELEC issued a resolution disqualifying TEODORO as candidate for mayor of the
Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte and ordering the cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy because of prior conviction of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude.[2]
On 10 May 1998, TEODORO filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid
resolution. On even date, herein petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca, (hereafter EMMANUEL), an
independent candidate, withdrew his certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan Member,
joined and became a member of the LAKAS party and was nominated by the LAKAS
MATUGAS Wing as the substitute mayoralty candidate for the Municipality of Malimono,
Surigao del Norte. On the basis of said nomination, EMMANUEL filed his certificate of
candidacy[3] attached thereto is his certificate of nomination as LAKAS mayoralty candidate

signed by Governor Francisco T. MATUGAS (hereafter MATUGAS), as party provincial

chairman together with EMMANUEls written acceptance of the partys nomination.[4]
On 11 May 1998, MULA filed through mail another petition for disqualification, this time
against EMMANUEL, which was received by the COMELEC on 14 May 1998 and was
docketed as SPA No. 98-292. In his petition MULA contended that the nomination of
EMMANUEL as substitute candidate is illegal on the following grounds:
a) The substitute, before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy as LAKAS candidate, was an
independent candidate. Being so, he cannot rightfully substitute the disqualified one;
b) The nomination of respondent substitute bears only the approval of Provincial Chairman
Matugas and without consultation and consent of the higher political hierarchy especially
Mr. Robert Ace Barbers who has also a say on nomination of candidates within his
jurisdiction, as evidenced by an authority hereto attached as Annex E;
c) Substitution generally takes place when by reason of a candidates disqualification the party
to which he belongs loses such representation. In the instant case, the disqualification did
not at all prejudice LAKAS NUCD-UMDP because Mr. Garchil G. Canoy is still there
representing the party after the disqualification. The substitution is a redundancy and not
necessary under the circumstances, more so that it was done with malice and without the
required consensus of the political hierarchy.[5]

In his answer, EMMANUEL moved for the dismissal of the petition for the following
reasons:
a) The petition does not state a cause of action as it is not based on any of the grounds for
disqualification as provided under Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec. 40(A) of
the Local Government Code of 1991;
b) The issue of who in LAKAS has the authority to nominate candidates for local officials, is
an intra-party matter hence beyond the jurisdiction of the Comelec;
c) Gov. Matugas was duly authorized by LAKAS as its Provincial Chairman and official
candidate for Provincial Governor to nominate the partys local candidates; and
d) The petition is already moot and academic because of the proclamation of EMMANUEL as
mayor of the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte. [6]

On 28 May 1998, the COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for
disqualification and upheld the candidacy for mayor of EMMANUEL.[7] The pertinent part of
the resolution reads:

It is therefore clear, that candidate for governor Matugas was clothed with the
authority to nominate the respondent as substitute candidate for the position of mayor
of Malimono, Surigao del Norte, vice the disqualified candidate, Apropos thereto,
Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code states:
xxx
Considering that on May 10, 1998 the proper nomination was issued by the official of
the party authorized therefor, it stands to reason that the substitution was valid,

respondent having accepted the nomination and his certificate of candidacy dated May
10, 1998, correspondingly filed.
Respondent is correct in stating that the question of nomination is a party concern
which is beyond the ambit of the Commission. What matters is, the candidate has
been certified as a party member and the nomination duly issued in his favor.
Be that as it may, the petition is rendered moot and academic by the proclamation of
respondent on May 12, 1998, as evidenced by the certificate of canvass and
proclamation of winning candidates for municipal offices with SN 16671298 and his
oath of office dated May 13, 1998, which forms part of the record of this case.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (Second Division) RESOLVES
to DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit.
MULA filed a motion for reconsideration raising in the main that the signature alone of
MATUGAS in the nomination was not sufficient because the partys authority to nominate was
given to both MATUGAS and Senator Robert S. Barbers (hereafter BARBERS), in their joint
capacity, and that the nomination of EMMANUEL is void since he was an independent candidate
prior to his nomination.[8]
On 6 October 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution[9] which set aside the
resolution dated 28 May 1998 of the Second Division and disqualified EMMANUEL, for the
following reasons:

In the motion for reconsideration, petitioner argues that the signature only of
Governor Matugas in the nomination was not sufficient because the partys authority
to nominate was given to both Governor Matugas and Senator Robert Barbers, in their
joint capacity.
We do not have to resolve this issue because the more important issue is whether
respondent is disqualified as a substitute candidate. He was an independent candidate
for councilor at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor as a substitute
of a disqualified candidate. Thus, he did not belong to the same political party as the
substituted candidate.
We sustain petitioners position. We declare that the substitution of disqualified
mayoralty candidate Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr. by respondent Emmanuel D. Sinaca was
not valid because the latter was an independent candidate for councilor prior to his
nomination as substitute candidate in place of the withdrawing candidate who was a
Lakas party member.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Commission en banc hereby resolves to SET ASIDE the
Commission (Second Division)s resolution dated May 28, 1998. We declare
Emmanuel D. Sinaca DISQUALIFIED to be a substitute candidate for mayor of
Malimono, Surigao del Norte, and ANNUL his proclamation as such being void ab
initio. Upon finality of this resolution, he is ordered to vacate the position of mayor of
the municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte, to which the vice-mayor elected in
the May 11, 1998 elections shall succeed by operation of law.
Not satisfied therewith, EMMANUEL is now before us alleging that the COMELEC
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolution. EMMANUEL principally
contends that his nomination as a substitute candidate was regular and valid hence, his
proclamation as mayor of the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte must be upheld.
In the assailed resolution, the COMELEC disqualified EMMANUEL solely on the basis that
he was an independent candidate prior to his nomination as a substitute candidate.
The rule on substitution of an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party
who dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause after the last day for the filing of certificates
of candidacy is governed by Sec. 77 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides:

If after the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy, an official candidate of a
registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause,
only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a
certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was
disqualified. The substitute candidate nominated by the political party concerned may
file his certificate of candidacy for the office affected in accordance with the
preceding sections not later than mid-day of the day of the election. If the death,
withdrawal or disqualification should occur between the day before the election and
mid-day of election day, said certificate maybe filed with any board of election
inspectors in the political subdivision where he is a candidate, or, in the case of
candidates to be voted for by the entire electorate of the country, with the
Commission.
Thus, under the said provision it is necessary, among others, that the substitute candidate
must be of the same political party as the original candidate and must be duly nominated as such
by the political party.
In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with the above said
requirements. EMMANUEL was properly nominated as substitute candidate by the LAKAS
party MATUGAS wing to which TEODORO, the disqualified candidate, belongs, as
evidenced by the Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance signed by MATUGAS, the Partys
provincial chairman.[10] That EMMANUEL is a bona fidemember of the LAKAS party is shown
not only by the certificate of membership,[11] which is being controverted for having been
presented as new evidence for the first time before this court, but more importantly by his
certificate of candidacy filed before the COMELEC stating therein that he belongs to the
LAKAS party.[12]

A certificate of candidacy is in the nature of a formal manifestation to the whole world of the
candidates political creed or lack of political creed. [13] It is a statement of a person seeking to run
for a public office certifying that he announces his candidacy for the office mentioned and that
he is eligible for the office, the name of the political party to which he belongs, if he belongs to
any, and his post-office address for all election purposes being as well stated.[14]
The certificate of candidacy of EMMANUEL permitted the placing of his name before the
electorate. It constituted an authorized badge, which the voter could scrutinize before casting his
ballot. Thus, with the declaration of EMMANUEL in his certificate of candidacy that he is
affiliated with the LAKAS party, he was effectively voted by the electorate not as an independent
candidate, but as a member of the LAKAS party. His allegation in the certificate of candidacy as
to political party to which he belongs is sufficient to make the electorate conscious of the
platform of the said political party.[15]
The fact that EMMANUEL was an independent candidate prior to his nomination is
immaterial. What is more significant is that he had previously withdrawn his certificate of
candidacy as independent candidate for Sangguniang member before he filed his certificate of
candidacy as a substitute for TEODORO at which time he was, for all intents and purposes,
already deemed a member of the LAKAS party MATUGAS wing. As such, EMMANUEL is
obliged to pursue and carry out the partys ideology, political ideas and platforms of
government. As the official candidate of an organized political party, he is bound by the partys
rule. He owes loyalty to the party, its tenet and its policies, its platforms and programs of
government. To the electorate he represents the party, its principles, ideals and objectives.[16]
Even the fact that EMMANUEL only became a member of the LAKAS party after the
disqualification of TEODORO, will not affect the validity of the substitution. There is nothing in
the Constitution or the statute which requires as a condition precedent that a substitute candidate
must have been a member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before he can be
nominated as such. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a substitute
candidate should be a person belonging to and certified by the same political party as the
candidate to be replaced. We cannot provide for an additional requirement or condition not
provided under the said provision without encroaching into the domain of the legislative
department.
As aptly observed by Commissioner Teresita Dy-Liacco Flores in her dissenting opinion, to
wit:

x x x. With due respect to the majority opinion, I find that at the time the substitute
candidate filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor and at the time of his election as
such, he was an independent candidate no more. He was, at that time, a nominee of
the LAKAS NUCD-UMDP Political Party. This fact is evidenced by the Certificate
of Nomination and Acceptance dated 10 May 1998 executed by the Provincial
Chairman of the said party of Surigao del Norte and by herein respondent. This
certificate presupposes that respondent is a bonafide member of the said party. To rule
that respondent was still an independent candidate and not a member of the LAKAS
NUCD-UMDP political party at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy as a
substitute candidate for mayor is to arrogate upon this Commission what would have

been the sole and exclusive prerogative of any political organization -- to determine
party membership and its nominees to elective positions. It is an accepted fact that, in
this country, politicians switch party affiliations more frequently than the ebb and flow
of the tides.[17]
The argument advanced by private respondent MULA that MATUGAS has no authority to
nominate a candidate without the concurrence of BARBERS is devoid of merit.
Firstly, MATUGAS, was designated by the LAKAS National Headquarters through its
Deputy Secretary General and National Secretariat Executive Director Reynaldo L. Maclang, as
the party officer authorized to nominate, sign, attest under oath, and issue Certificates of
Nomination and Acceptance for the Partys official candidates for the positions of Board
Members, City Councilors, Municipal Mayors, Vice-mayors and councilors for the Province of
Surigao del Norte.[18]
This authorization which was dated March 26, 1998 replaced and/or modified the former
authorization given by the party to both BARBERS and MATUGAS. [19] Both BARBERS and
MATUGAS were given separate and distinct authorizations when the mother of BARBERS ran
for governor against MATUGAS.
Secondly, there are only two official candidates for mayor of Malimono, Surigao del Norte,
namely TEODORO and CANOY,[20] both of whom are members of the LAKAS party but from
different factions. TEODORO was indorsed by the MATUGAS wing and CANOY by the
BARBERS Wing. The certificates of candidacy of these candidates were never questioned
despite the fact that they belong to the same political party and were separately and
independently endorsed by either BARBERS or MATUGAS. Therefore, if the absence of a joint
nomination is to be considered fatal to the validity of the certificate of candidacy of TEODORO
or CANOY, then there would in effect no candidates running for mayor in the Municipality of
Malimono, Surigao del Norte.
Verily, it stands to reason that with the disqualification of TEODORO, who is a member of
the LAKAS MATUGAS wing, the substitute must come from the same faction as the
candidate to be substituted and since it was MATUGAS who indorsed the nomination of
TEODORO, then MATUGAS nomination of EMMANUEL in substitution of TEODORO is
sufficient and in order.
There is also no irregularity in the act of EMMANUEL in joining a political party. The right
of individuals to form an association as guaranteed by the fundamental law includes the freedom
to associate or refrain from association. [21] No man is compelled by law to become a member of a
political party; or after having become such, to remain a member. He may join such a party for
whatever reason seems good to him, and may quit the party for any cause, good, bad, or
indifferent, or without cause.[22] The decision of a candidate on whether to run as an independent
candidate or to join a political party, group or aggrupation is left entirely to his discretion.[23]
We also agree with the contention of EMMANUEL that the decision as to which member a
party shall nominate as its candidate is a party concern which is not cognizable by the courts.
A political party has the right to identify the people who constitute the association and to
select a standard bearer who best represents the partys ideologies and preference. [24] Political

parties are generally free to conduct their internal affairs free from judicial supervision; this
common-law principle of judicial restraint, rooted in the constitutionally protected right of free
association, serves the public interest by allowing the political processes to operate without
undue interference.[25] Thus, the rule is that the determination of disputes as to party nominations
rests with the party, in the absence of statutes giving the courts jurisdiction.[26]
Quintessentially, where there is no controlling statute or clear legal right involved, the court
will not assume jurisdiction to determine factional controversies within a political party, but will
leave the matter for determination by the proper tribunals of the party itself or by the electors at
the polls.[27] Similarly, in the absence of specific constitutional or legislative regulations defining
how nominations are to be made, or prohibiting nominations from being made in certain ways,
political parties may handle party affairs, including nominations, in such manner as party rules
may establish.[28]
An election in which the voters have fully, fairly, and honestly expressed their will is not
invalid even though an improper method is followed in the nomination of candidates. [29] This is
because in determining the effect of a particular irregularity in a party nomination for office on
the result of the general election, the pivotal issue is whether the irregularity complained of has
prevented a full, fair, and free expression of the public will. Thus, in the absence of a statutory
provision to the contrary, an election may not even be invalidated by the fact that the nomination
of the successful candidate was brought about by fraud, and not in the manner prescribed by the
statute, provided it appears that noncompliance with the law did not prevent a fair and free vote.
[30]

None of the situations adverted to above are obtaining in the case at bar as to warrant this
Courts intervention in ascertaining the propriety of EMMANUELs nomination as a substitute
candidate by the LAKAS MATUGAS wing.
Finally, the issue as to the validity of EMMANUELs nomination as substitute candidate has
been rendered moot and academic by his proclamation on May 12, 1998, by the Board of
Canvassers of Malimono as the duly elected municipal mayor and after he has assumed into
office. The fact that the nomination of a substitute lacks the signature of one of the authorized
signatory is but a technicality which cannot be used to frustrate the will of the electorate.
It has been held that the provisions of the election law regarding certificates of candidacy,
such as signing and swearing on the same, as well as the information required to be stated
therein, are considered mandatory prior to the elections. Thereafter, they are regarded as merely
directory. With respect to election laws, it is an established rule of interpretation that mandatory
provisions requiring certain steps before election will be construed as directory after the
elections, to give effect to the will of the electorate. Thus, even if the certificate of candidacy
was not duly signed or if it does not contain the required data, the proclamation of the candidate
as winner may not be nullified on such ground. The defects in the certificate should have been
questioned before the election; they may not be questioned after the election without invalidating
the will of the electorate, which should not be done. [31] In Guzman v. Board of Canvassers,[32] the
Court held that the will of the people cannot be frustrated by a technicality that the certificate of
candidacy had not been properly sworn to. This legal provision is mandatory and noncompliance therewith before the election would be fatal to the status of the candidate before the
electorate, but after the people have expressed their will, the result of the election cannot be
defeated by the fact that the candidate has not sworn to his certificate of candidacy.

Thus, were a candidate has received popular mandate, overwhelmingly and clearly
expressed, all possible doubts should be resolved in favor of the candidates eligibility for to rule
otherwise is to defeat the will of the people. [33] Above and beyond all, the determination of the
true will of the electorate should be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that
must prevail. This, in essence, is the democracy we continue to hold sacred.[34]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed resolution of 6 October 1998 of
the COMELEC en banc is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and another one rendered
declaring EMMANUEL SINACA as having been duly elected mayor of the Municipality of
Malimono, Surigao del Norte.
SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 113539. March 12, 1998]

CELSO R. HALILI and ARTHUR R. HALILI, petitioners, vs. COURT OF

APPEALS, HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN, DAVID REY GUZMAN and
EMILIANO CATANIAG, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The factual findings of a trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, may no
longer be reviewed and reversed by this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The transfer of an interest in a piece of land to an alien may no
longer be assailed on constitutional grounds after the entire parcel has been sold to a
qualified citizen.
The Case

These familiar and long-settled doctrines are applied by this Court in denying this
petition under Rule 45 to set aside the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-GR CV
No. 37829 promulgated on September 14, 1993, the dispositive portion of which states:
[3]

WHEREFORE, and upon all the foregoing, the Decision of the court below
dated March 10, 1992 dismissing the complaint for lack of merit is AFFIRMED
without pronouncement as to costs.

The Facts

The factual antecedents, as narrated by Respondent Court, are not disputed by the
parties. We reproduce them in part, as follows:

Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968,

leaving real properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow,
defendant appellee [herein private respondent] Helen Meyers Guzman,
and his son, defendant appellee [also herein private respondent] David
Rey Guzman, both of whom are also American citizens. On August 9,
1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim (Annex A-Complaint),
assigning[,] transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles
and interests in and over six parcels of land which the two of them
inherited from Simeon.
Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation, x x
x situated in Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, containing an area of 6,695
square meters, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-170514 of the
Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. The quitclaim having been registered, TCT
No. T-170514 was cancelled and TCT No. T-120259 was issued in the
name of appellee David Rey Guzman.
On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to
defendant-appellee [also herein private respondent] Emiliano Cataniag, upon which
TCT No. T-120259 was cancelled and TCT No. T-130721(M) was issued in the
latters name.[4]
Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint before the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, questioning the constitutionality and validity of
the two conveyances -- between Helen Guzman and David Rey Guzman, and between
the latter and Emiliano Cataniag -- and claiming ownership thereto based on their right
of legal redemption under Art. 1621[5]of the Civil Code.
In its decision[6] dated March 10, 1992,[7] the trial court dismissed the complaint. It
ruled that Helen Guzmans waiver of her inheritance in favor of her son was not contrary
to the constitutional prohibition against the sale of land to an alien, since the purpose of
the waiver was simply to authorize David Rey Guzman to dispose of their properties in
accordance with the Constitution and the laws of the Philippines, and not to subvert
them. On the second issue, it held that the subject land was urban; hence, petitioners
had no reason to invoke their right of redemption under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code.
The Halilis sought a reversal from the Court of Appeals which, however, denied their
appeal. Respondent Court affirmed the factual finding of the trial court that the subject
land was urban. Citing Tejido vs. Zamacoma[8] and Yap vs. Grageda,[9] it further held
that, although the transfer of the land to David Rey may have been invalid for being

contrary to the Constitution, there was no more point in allowing herein petitioners to
recover the property, since it has passed on to and was thus already owned by a
qualified person.
Hence, this petition.[10]
Issues

The petition submits the following assignment of errors:

x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals 1. Erred in affirming the conclusion of the trial court that the land in question
is urban, not rural
2. Erred in denying petitioners right of redemption under Art. 1621 of the Civil
Code
3. Having considered the conveyance from Helen Meyers Guzman to her son
David Rey Guzman illegal, erred in not declaring the same null and void[.] [11]
The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.

First Issue: The Land Is Urban;
Thus, No Right of Redemption

The first two errors assigned by petitioners being interrelated -- the determination of
the first being a prerequisite to the resolution of the second -- shall be discussed
together.
Subject Land Is Urban
Whether the land in dispute is rural or urban is a factual question which, as a rule, is
not reviewable by this Court.[12] Basic and long-settled is the doctrine that findings of fact
of a trial judge, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme
Court. This admits of only a few exceptions, such as when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; when an inference made by the
appellate court from its factual findings is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; when the findings of
the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of

the parties to the case or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; when there is a misappreciation of facts;
when the findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on
which they are based, are premised on the absence of evidence or are contradicted by
evidence on record.[13]
The instant case does not fall within any of the aforecited exceptions. In fact, the
conclusion of the trial court -- that the subject property is urban land -- is based on clear
and convincing evidence, as shown in its decision which disposed thus:
x x x As observed by the court, almost all the roadsides along the national ghighway
[sic] of Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, are lined up with residential, commercial or
industrial establishments. Lined up along the Bagbaguin Road are factories of feeds,
woodcrafts [sic] and garments, commercial stores for tires, upholstery materials, feeds
supply and spare parts. Located therein likewise were the Pepsi-Cola Warehouse, the
Cruz Hospital, three gasoline stations, apartment buildings for commercial purposes
and construction firms. There is no doubt, therefore, that the community is a
commercial area thriving in business activities. Only a short portion of said road [is]
vacant. It is to be noted that in the Tax Declaration in the name of Helen Meyers
Guzman[,] the subject land is termed agricultural[,] while in the letter addressed to
defendant Emiliano Cataniag, dated October 3, 1991, the Land Regulatory Board
attested that the subject property is commercial and the trend of development along the
road is commercial. The Boards classification is based on the present condition of the
property and the community thereat. Said classification is far more later [sic] than the
tax declaration.[14]
No Ground to Invoke Right of Redemption
In view of the finding that the subject land is urban in character, petitioners have
indeed no right to invoke Art. 1621 of the Civil Code, which presupposes that the land
sought to be redeemed is rural. The provision is clearly worded and admits of no
ambiguity in construction:

ART. 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right
of redemption when a piece of rural land, the area of which does not
exceed one hectare, is alienated, unless the grantee does not own any
rural land.
xxx xxx

xxx

Under this article, both lands -- that sought to be redeemed and the adjacent lot
belonging to the person exercising the right of redemption -- must be rural. If one or
both are urban, the right cannot be invoked. [15] The purpose of this provision which is
limited in scope to rural lands not exceeding one hectare, is to favor agricultural
development.[16] The subject land not being rural and, therefore, not agricultural, this
purpose would not be served if petitioners are granted the right of redemption under Art.
1621. Plainly, under the circumstances, they cannot invoke it.

Second Issue: Sale to Cataniag Valid

Neither do we find any reversible error in the appellate courts holding that the sale
of the subject land to Private Respondent Cataniag renders moot any question on the
constitutionality of the prior transfer made by Helen Guzman to her son David Rey.
True, Helen Guzmans deed of quitclaim -- in which she assigned, transferred and
conveyed to David Rey all her rights, titles and interests over the property she had
inherited from her husband -- collided with the Constitution, Article XII, Section 7 of
which provides:

SEC. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands

shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
The landmark case of Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds[17] settled the issue as to who
are qualified (and disqualified) to own public as well as private lands in the
Philippines. Following a long discourse maintaining that the public agricultural lands
mentioned in Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution, include residential,
commercial and industrial lands, the Court then stated:

Under section 1 of Article XIII [now Sec. 2, Art. XII] of the Constitution,
natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land,
shall not be alienated, and with respect to public agricultural lands, their
alienation is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose
conserving agricultural resources in the hands of Filipino citizens may
easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate
their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result
that section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural
land will be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which
agricultural resources may leak into aliens hands. It would certainly be futile to
prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be
freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of
Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 [now Sec. 7] is
intended to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1 [now Sec.
2]. Both sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose
and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the
prohibition is directed in section 5 [now Sec. 7] are the very same persons who

under section 1 [now Sec. 2] are disqualified to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain in the Philippines. And the subject matter of both sections is the same,
namely, the non transferability of agricultural land to aliens. x x x[18]
[19]

The Krivenko rule was recently reiterated in Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals,
which involves a sale of land to a Chinese citizen. The Court said:

The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the

capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may
be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities qualified to
acquire lands of the public domain (II Bernas, The Constitution of the
Philippines 439-440 [1988 ed.]).
The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the disposition,
exploitation, development and utilization of all lands of the public domain and other
natural resources of the Philippines for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty
percent of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals
or corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they
have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands. [20]
In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the
public domain, except only by way of legal succession.[21]
But what is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a
qualified Filipino citizen? This is not a novel question. Jurisprudence is consistent that
if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or
transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the
title of the transferee is rendered valid. [22]
Thus, in United Church Board of World Ministries vs. Sebastian, [23] in which an alien
resident who owned properties in the Philippines devised to an American non-stock
corporation part of his shares of stock in a Filipino corporation that owned a tract of land
in Davao del Norte, the Court sustained the invalidity of such legacy. However, upon
proof that ownership of the American corporation has passed on to a 100 percent
Filipino corporation, the Court ruled that the defect in the will was rectified by the
subsequent transfer of the property.
The present case is similar to De Castro vs. Tan.[24] In that case, a residential lot was
sold to a Chinese. Upon his death, his widow and children executed an extrajudicial
settlement, whereby said lot was allotted to one of his sons who became a naturalized
Filipino. The Court did not allow the original vendor to have the sale annulled and to
recover the property, for the reason that the land has since become the property of a
naturalized Filipino citizen who is constitutionally qualified to own land.
Likewise, in the cases of Sarsosa vs. Cuenco,[25] Godinez vs. Pak Luen,[26] Vasquez
vs. Li Seng Giap[27] and Herrera vs. Luy Kim Guan,[28] which similarly involved the sale of
land to an alien who thereafter sold the same to a Filipino citizen, the Court again

applied the rule that the subsequent sale can no longer be impugned on the basis of the
invalidity of the initial transfer.
The rationale of this principle was explained in Vasquez vs. Li Seng Giap thus:
x x x [I]f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as
construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nations lands for future
generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but achieved by
making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became Filipino citizens by
naturalization.[29]
Accordingly, since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent Cataniag,
a Filipino citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. The objective of
the constitutional provision -- to keep our land in Filipino hands -- has been served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The challenged Decision is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 141723. April 20, 2001]

NILO D. SOLIVA, ROGELIO B. DOCE, HERNANITA M. BACQUIAL,

ULYSSES B. SUCATRE, ANTONIO D. DURON, EDUARDO
HINUNANGAN, MONICA P. LASALA, CARLOS E. MARTINEZ, and
ROSIANA L. POPADERA, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, ALEXANDER C. BACQUIAL, ISMAEL O. TITO,
FAUSTINO A. ABATAYO, DAVID P. ALEJO, MAMERTO L. BACON,
CESAR C. OSA, PRUDENCIO L. PABILLORE, ARMANDO S.
PANGADLIN, ENICETO U. SALAS, and QUINTIN A. SAYAO, respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with a prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining
order to nullify and set aside the resolution of public respondent Commission on Elections

(COMELEC) dated February 11, 2000 in Comelec SPA No. 98-324, declaring a failure of
election in the entire municipality of Remedios T. Romualdez (RTR), Agusan del Norte and
nullifying the proclamation of herein petitioners as the winning candidates in the May 11, 1998
local election. The petition also seeks to enjoin and prohibit respondent COMELEC from
enforcing and implementing the aforesaid resolution.
The factual antecedents from which the present petition proceeds are as follows:
Herein petitioners and private respondents vied for the local posts in RTR during the local
elections of May 11, 1998. Petitioners belonged to the Lakas-NUCD party while private
respondents ran under the Laban ng Makabayan Masang Pilipino (LAMMP) banner.[1]
On May 12, 1998, all the LAKAS candidates (herein petitioners) were proclaimed as the
winning candidates. Six days after, or on May 18, 1998, respondent Alexander Bacquial filed a
petition to declare a failure of election due to alleged massive fraud, terrorism, ballot switching,
stuffing of ballots in the ballot boxes, delivery of ballot boxes by respondent Soliva, his wife and
men from several precincts to the supposed canvassing area, failure of the counting of votes in
the precincts or polling places upon instructions of respondent Soliva and other anomalies or
irregularities, not to mention the alleged attempt of one of Solivas men later on identified as
Eliseo Baludio to assasinate Mr. Bacquial when he was about to cast his vote in Precinct 17-A in
San Antonio, RTR in the early morning of May 11, 1998. [2] The petition was later amended to
include the other co-candidates of respondent Bacquial in the LAMMP party.
In support of their allegations, herein private respondents (petitioners before the
COMELEC) presented the sworn statements of witnesses Nestor Fuentes, Faustino Abatayo,
Eddie Roa, Max C. Ponce, Danilo Taculayan, Alejandre Martinez, Enecito Salas and the joint
affidavit of Alejandre Martinez, Eddie Roa, Max Ponce, Danilo Taculayan, Rudy Alima, Warlito
Mandag and Apolinario Pesitas who all attested to particular incidents involving alleged
irregularities in certain polling precincts.
Private respondents also submitted in evidence the Order of the Provincial Election
Supervisor, Atty. Roland Edayan, dated May 12, 1998, directing Col. Felix P. Ayaay, the
Provincial Director of the Philippine National Police, to investigate reports of grave threats,
intimidation and coercion directed against the supporters of mayoralty candidate respondent
Bacquial. Copies of several election returns which did not bear the signatures of the LAMMP
pollwatchers were likewise presented to prove that such watchers were not allowed inside the
municipal gymnasium where the canvassing of votes was conducted.
Petitioners, on the other hand, denied that violence, terrorism, fraud and other similar causes
attended the conduct of the election. To disprove private respondents allegations, they appended
photocopies of the Minutes of Voting and Counting of Votes in Precinct Nos. 17-A and 16-A.
They insisted that the LAMMP pollwatchers signed the election returns; that the Board of
Election Inspectors (BEI) announced the results of the counting and accomplished the election
returns in their respective precincts; and that these elections returns were thereafter submitted to
the Municipal Board of Canvassers (MBC).
Petitioners also alleged that at six oclock in the evening of May 11, 1998, the MBC
convened and around one-thirty in the morning of May 12, 1998, the canvass of election returns
started. After all election returns from the thirty-three (33) electoral precincts had been
canvassed, the MBC proclaimed the winners.

Mr. Tago M. Mangontra, who was impleaded before the COMELEC in his capacity as
Chairman of the MBC, maintained that a public counting was had in all the thirty-three (33)
precincts although the venue of the counting was transferred to the multi-purpose gymnasium of
the municipality. He admitted having received a letter-protest calling for the suspension of the
canvassing due to failure of election but claimed that there was no evidence to substantiate the
allegations; and that the grounds alleged in the letter-protest were proper in a pre-proclamation
controversy and, therefore, not within the competence and jurisdiction of the MBC. Mangontra
denied having told a certain Ms. Faith Tanguilan that the canvassing of votes for the local posts
were finished ahead of those for the national candidates. He likewise averred that all the
candidates and their respective representatives were duly notified of the canvassing and that the
proclamation was concluded without any objection from the parties representatives.
After the arguments were heard on June 16, 1998, the parties agreed to submit the case for
resolution five (5) days thereafter, with or without their respective memoranda.
On February 11, 2000, the COMELEC rendered the assailed resolution declaring a failure of
election in the municipality of RTR, holding thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition is GRANTED. A failure of election

is hereby declared in the Municipality of Remedios T. Romualdez, Agusan del Norte
and the proclamation of the private respondents as the winning candidates during the
May 11, 1998 elections is declared null and void.
Consequently, let a special election be held thereat on a date fixed by the Commission
en banc thru a separate resolution as soon as the funds for the purpose shall have been
released.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Secretary of the Department of Interior
and Local Government and the Governor of Agusan del Norte.
Meanwhile, let the Law Department investigate the alleged irregularities herein and
determine the extent of the culpability of each of the respondents and file the
appropriate charge or charges against them as the evidence so warrants.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Hence, the present petition, attributing grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of, or in
excess of, jurisdiction to respondent COMELEC for the following reasons:
5.1

RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK, OR IN EXCESS, OF JURISDICTION WHEN,
WITHOUT ANY FORMAL PROCEEDINGS AND ABSENT ANY FORMAL
PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE AND WITNESSES, IT DECLARED A
FAILURE OF ELECTION IN REMEDIOS T. ROMUALDEZ ONLY ON

FEBRUARY 11, 2000, OVER ONE (1) YEAR AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS
AFTER THE MAY 11, 1998 ELECTIONS.
5.2

RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN,
CONTRARY TO RULE 26, SECTIONS 4 AND 6 OF THE COMELEC RULES
OF PROCEDURE, IT DECLARED A FAILURE OF ELECTION IN
REMEDIOS T. ROMUALDEZ ONLY ON FEBRUARY 11, 2000 AND AFTER
OVER TWENTY (20) LONG MONTHS FROM THE MAY 11, 1998
ELECTIONS AND THE FILING OF THE PETITION.
5.3

RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OF, OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
DECLARED A FAILURE OF ELECTION ON FEBRUARY 11, 2000 IN
REMEDIOS T. ROMUALDEZ, NOTWITHSTANDING THE ABSENCE OF
LEGITIMATE AND LAWFUL GROUNDS OR CAUSES, AND AFTER OVER
ONE (1) YEAR AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS AFTER THE MAY 11, 1998
ELECTIONS.
5.4

RESPONDENT COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION

AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN,
NOTWITHSTANDING THE OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE OF THE
REGULAR VOTING, NORMAL COUNTING OF VOTES AND THE
CANVASSING OF ELECTION RESULTS, IT STILL DECLARED A FAILURE
OF ELECTION IN REMEDIOS T. ROMUALDEZ ON THE BASIS OF
ALLEGED EVIDENCE CONSISTING OF AFFIDAVITS WHICH IDENTIFIED
ONLY THREE (3) SPECIFIC PRECINCTS OF THE THIRTY THREE (33) FOR
THE ENTIRE MUNICIPALITY, AND THE DECLARATION WAS MADE
ONLY ON FEBRUARY 11, 2000 AND OVER TWENTY (20) LONG MONTHS
AFTER THE MAY 11, 1998 ELECTION.[4]
In sum, the issue posed for resolution by this Court is whether or not the COMELEC erred
in declaring a failure of election in the entire municipality of RTR.
The Solicitor General, on his part, maintains that the declaration of a failure of election was
proper under the circumstances because (1) the counting of ballots and the canvass of the returns
were fraught with fraud as the transfer of counting from the polling precincts to the multipurpose gymnasium was irregular and without authority of the COMELEC and the conformity of

the private respondents or their representatives; (2) the proclamation of petitioners was irregular
as the Certificate of Proclamation was signed by the MBC on May 12, 1998 while the tabulation
of the votes, verification and preparation of the Statement of Votes, Certificate of Canvass and
the proclamation of the winning candidates for President down to the local officials were
finished only on May 14, 1998; and (3) the election was marred by threats, violence,
intimidation, coercion, and harassment as attested to in the sworn statements attached to the
memorandum of private respondents.
We dismiss the petition.
The 1987 Constitution vested upon the COMELEC the broad power to enforce all the laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of elections as well as the plenary authority to decide all
questions affecting elections except the question as to the right to vote. [5] Section 4 of Republic
Act 7166, or the Synchronized Elections Law of 1991, states:

Sec. 4. Postponement, Failure of Elections and Special Elections. - The

postponement, declaration of failure of elections and the calling of special elections as
provided in Sections 5, 6 and 7 of the Omnibus Election Code shall be decided by the
Commission sitting en banc by a majority vote of its members. xxx
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code also provides:

Sec. 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism,

fraud, or other analogous causes the election in any polling place has not been held on
the date fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of
the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the
election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure
to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the
result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified petition by any
interested party and after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation
of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later
than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of such postponement or suspension of
the election or failure to elect.
In Mitmug v. Commission on Elections,[6] we held that before the COMELEC can act on a
verified petition for the declaration of a failure of election, two conditions must first concur: (1)
that no voting has taken place on the date fixed by law or even if there was, the election results in
a failure to elect, and (2) the votes not cast would affect the result of the election.
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code contemplates three instances when the COMELEC
may declare a failure of election and call for the holding of a special election. First, when the
election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account of force majeure,
violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous cases. Second, when the election in any polling
place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting. And third,
after the voting and during the preparation and the transmission of the election returns or in the
custody or canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect.[7]

We agree with the findings of the COMELEC that there was a failure of election in the
municipality of RTR, as the counting of the votes and the canvassing of the election returns was
clearly attended by fraud, intimidation, terrorism and harassment. Findings of fact of
administrative bodies charged with a specific field of expertise are afforded great weight and
respect by the courts, and in the absence of substantial showing that such findings are made from
an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive and should not be
disturbed. The COMELEC, as the administrative agency and specialized constitutional body
charged with the enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has more than enough
expertise in its field that its findings and conclusions are generally respected and even given
finality.[8]
It is not controverted by the petitioners that the counting of the votes was transferred from
the polling places to the multi-purpose gymnasium without the knowledge and permission of
herein private respondents or their representatives and that the counting of the votes and the
canvassing of the election returns were done without the latters presence. Thus, the COMELEC
was correct in finding that:
The counting by the BEI and the canvassing by the MBC were done without the accredited
watchers or duly authorized representatives of the petitioners thus making the election returns
and the statements of votes not worthy of faith and credit and not reliable documents to gauge
the fair and true expression of the popular will.
The rights of watchers as embodied in our election laws are not ineffectual rights. They are
part and parcel of the measures to protect the sanctity of the sovereign will.
To cite a few of these rights:

1. witness and inform themselves of the proceedings of the board;

2. take note of what they may see or hear;
3. take photographs of the proceedings and incidents, if any, during the counting of
votes, as well as the election returns, tally board and ballot boxes;
4. file a protest against any irregularity or violation of law which they believe have
been committed by the board or by any of its members or by any person;
5. obtain from the board a certificate as to the filing of such protest and/or of the
resolution thereon;
6. read the ballots after it shall have been read by the chairman, as well as the election
returns after it shall have been completed and signed by the members of the board
without touching said election documents; and
7. be furnished, upon request, with a certificate of votes casts for the candidates, duly signed and
thumbmarked by the chairman and all members of the board.[9]

It is likewise not denied that the transfer of the counting from the polling places to the multipurpose gymnasium was without the authority of the COMELEC as required by law. The
irregularity of the transfer of venue was highlighted by the fact that the same was not recorded
by the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI). The COMELEC learned of said transfer only from
the answer of Mr. Mangontra to the petition [10]filed with the COMELEC by the herein private
respondents. Truth to tell, the Commissions authority was never sought to effect the transfer of
venue. Thus, we accord respect its finding on this matter:

Apparently, when the venue for the counting was transferred without notice to or
conforme by the petitioners or their duly authorized representatives or accredited
watchers and more so, when the counting by the Board of Election Inspectors and the
canvassing by the Municipal Board of Canvassers were both conducted without their
presence, their aforesaid rights were violated. This therefore put the integrity of the
ballots to serious doubt. It is not surprising therefore when, as pointed out by both
public and private respondents, not one of the election returns was objected to during
the canvassing. Experience taught us that more often than not, representatives of
parties, specially those for the losing candidates, have the inclination to object to the
conclusion of election returns during the canvassing. This is an admitted reality in
this jurisdiction. With the scenario being painted to us by the respondents, we are
constrained to conclude that the same was a result of the absence of the petitioners or
their representatives during the canvassing for as alleged by the petitioners, they were
forcibly barred from witnessing the proceedings. And the Minutes of Voting and
Counting of Votes which private respondents attached as annexes 1 and 2 to their
answer to the amended petition bolster our findings. Where not one of the LAMMP
poll watchers signed in the space provided therefor in Precinct 17-A while the two
watchers for precinct 16-A, namely, Homer Sajulan and Apolinario Pecitas, although
they had purportedly affixed their names and signatures therein, the same appear to
have been prepared by one and the same person only as can be inferred from the
handwriting or penmanship which interestingly, is also similar to the penmanship of
and the pen used by the one who wrote the names of those illiterate and/or physically
disabled voters in the space likewise provided therefor. Besides, only these two
watchers left at 10:00 while there is no indication that the others also left at the same
time.
What is more glaring is the absence of the signature and thumbmark of the petitioners
assigned poll watchers on the election returns from the different precincts which they
submitted as their Exhs. M to M-14, inclusive. As shown thereon, not one of the
names listed in Annex 2 of private respondents memorandum which is the list of
the official poll watchers of the LAMMP Party was present during the time that the
same was prepared.[11]

Sections 39 and 40 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 2971, entitled The General
Instructions of the Board of Election Inspectors on the Casting and Counting of Votes for the
May 11, 1998 Elections were clearly violated and they read as follows:

SEC. 39. Counting of votes to be public and without interruption. After the voting
is finished, the board shall count the votes cast and ascertain the results in the polling
place. Unless otherwise ordered by the Commission, the board shall not adjourn,
postpone or delay the counting.
SEC. 40. Transfer of counting of votes to safer place. If on account of imminent
danger of violence, terrorism, disorder or similar causes, it becomes necessary to
transfer the counting of votes to a safer place, the Board may effect such transfer to
the nearest safe barangay or school building within the municipality by unanimous
approval of the board and concurred by the majority of the watchers present. This fact
shall be recorded in the Minutes of Voting and Counting of Votes, and all the members
of the board and the watchers shall manifest their approval and concurrence by
affixing their signatures therein.
In effecting the transfer, the board shall ensure the safety and integrity of all election
documents and paraphernalia. The PNP and/or the AFP in the area in consultation
with the election officer shall provide adequate security and transport facilities to the
members of the board and the election documents and paraphernalia during the
transfer and counting of votes.
The preceding provisions are related to, and are in consonance with, Section 18 of R.A. No.
6646, The Electoral Reforms Law of 1989, which reads:

Section 18. Transfer of Counting of Votes to Safer Place. If on account of imminent

danger of violence, terrorism, disorder or similar causes it becomes necessary to
transfer the counting of votes to a safer place, the board of inspectors may effect such
transfer by unanimous approval of the board and concurrence by the majority of the
watchers present. This fact shall be recorded in the minutes of the voting and the
members of the board and the watchers shall manifest their approval or concurrence
by affixing their signatures therein. The Commission shall issue rules and guidelines
on the matter to secure the safety of the members of the board, the watchers, and all
election documents and paraphernalia.
All these provisions emphasize the need to safeguard the popular will, hence, the counting
of votes must be done openly and publicly with all the parties represented therein.
Also, petitioners were irregularly proclaimed winners on May 12, 1998 as shown in the
Certificate of Proclamation which was signed by the members of the MBC on the same
day. The Minutes of Canvass reveal that the MBC finished reading the election returns only on

May 13, 1998 at eight oclock in the evening after which their proceedings were terminated on
May 14, 1998.
The pertinent portions of the Minutes of Canvass reveal the following:
xxx

At the Sangguniang Bayan Session Hall of Remedios R. Romualdez, Agusan del

Norte on May 11, 1998 at 6:00 oclock in the evening the Municipal Board of
Canvassers was called for order by the Chairman, Mrs. Charlita B. Furinas was
requested to lead the opening prayer. It was followed by an oath-taking by all the
members of the Board and their support Staff.
There being no election return to canvass, the Chairman declared a recess and to
resume at 10:00 P.M. or at any time the Board will receive an election return to
canvass.
At 1:30 A.M. of May 12, 1998 the first election return in Precinct No. 2-A-1 was
received and the Chairman immediately called for the resumption of the Canvass.
xxx xxx

xxx

The reading of election returns was exactly finished at 8:00 P.M. of May 13,
1998. The Board and the supporting staff proceed with the tabulation of results and
the typing of the Certificate of Canvass and the Proclamation of the winning
candidates.
After the typing, the Board with the assistance of the support Staff took through the
review of the tallies [and] the totals of the votes obtained by each candidates (sic)
from President down to the Local Positions. Verification was made until the Board
signed and thumbmarked all the documents particularly the Statements of Votes, the
Certificate of Canvass, the Certificate of Proclamation of winning candidates, paper
seal, etc.
The Municipal Board of Canvassers finished the works at exactly 2:00 A.M. of May
14, 1998. The Vice-Chairman moved for the adjournment of the meeting and it was
duly seconded and approved by the Chairman.
xxx[12]
The irregular proclamation of the petitioners on May 12, 1998 was made more apparent by
the answer of Mr. Mangontra to the petition filed with the COMELEC by the private
respondents, thus:

Herein respondent likewise ADMITS the allegations in said paragraph 6 of the

petition that a certain MS. FAITH TRANQUILAN appeared before him in the
evening of May 13, 1998, but with the qualification that undersigned respondent did
not inform her that the canvassing for local candidates was made ahead and was
already finished, for the Board never canvassed the election returns for local and
national candidates separately but at one time in immediate succession in the
following order, viz: first, the votes for candidates for national positions; second, the
votes for the party-list, and; third, the votes for candidates for local
positions. Candidates and representatives of political parties having been duly
notified, the Board proceeded with the canvass and proclamation, as no election
returns had been contested or objected to during the canvass. [13]
How then could there have been a valid proclamation on May 12, 1998 when the reading of
the votes was finished only on May 13, 1998?
To be sure, the sworn statements[14]attached to the Memorandum of private respondents
which attest to the fact that the May 11, 1998 election in RTR was marred with intimidation,
terrorism and harassment was corroborated by the Order dated May 12, 1998 issued by
Provincial Election Supervisor Atty. Roland G. Edayan addressed to Col. Felix P. Ayaay, PNP
Provincial Director which reads:

ORDER
xxx xxx

xxx

xxx

There are reports reaching my office that in yesterdays elections many people,
especially the supporters of mayoralty candidate Alexander C. Bacquial, were
prevented from voting in several barangays of the municipality of Remedios T.
Romualdez allegedly because of grave threats, intimidations, and coercions coming
from armed men belonging to the political opponents of mayoralty candidate
Bacquial.
In this connection, you are hereby ordered to conduct the necessary investigation of
said incident and to submit to me your findings and recommendations thereon as early
as possible.
Compliance herewith is hereby enjoined.[15]
Significantly, herein petitioners did not submit any counter affidavits to rebut the sworn
statements submitted by the witnesses for private respondents.
In sum, the election held at RTR on May 11, 1998 cannot be accorded regularity and validity
as the massive and pervasive acts of fraud, terrorism, intimidation and harassment were
committed on such day. While it may be true that election did take place, the irregularities that
marred the counting of votes and the canvassing of the election returns resulted in a failure to

elect. And when there is a failure of election, the COMELEC is empowered to annul the election
and to call a special election.[16] Thus, we find that the COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed resolution.
WHREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for
hereby DISMISSED and the status quo ante order issued by this Court lifted.
SO ORDERED.

certiorari

is