The Enclosure of Consciousness: Theory of Representation in Literature

Author(s): Marcus Bullock

Source: MLN, Vol. 94, No. 5, Comparative Literature (Dec., 1979), pp. 931-955
Published by: The Johns Hopkins University Press
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The Enclosureof Consciousness:

in
Theoryof Representation
Literature
Marcus Bullock
"Was fur eine Philosophie man
wdhle,hangt sonach davon ab, was
fur ein Mensch man sei; denn ein
philosophischesSystemist nichtein
todter Hausrath, den man ablegen
oder annehmenkonnte,wie es uns
beliebte. . ."
JohannGottliebFichte'

The usual procedure in undertakingan analysisof representation

in art is to consider it as defined, before all else, by its polar relationship with abstraction.This polarityis made possible in its
common or uncritical form, however, only by a particular
metaphysics.The simple opposition of these two depends on the
presence of a world which is manifestin a modalityconsidered
external to the systemof representation,and on the notion of a
mode of perceptionwhich is independent of systemsof reference
altogether.The alternativeview is to set the concept'world' more
philosophicallywithinthe systemsin which it is expressed.
Particularsystemsmay then be discussed according to the way
thatconcept figuresin them,fromabstractorders of signification,
where it is not a determinant of meaning, to pre-criticallifesituationusages which assume referenceto a transcendentreality.
Artisticrepresentationdoes not correspond to eitherof these, and
thereforeunderstandingit correctlyrequires thatwe examine this
MLNVol.94 Pp.931-955
Press
$01.00 ? 1979 byTheJohnsHopkinsUniversity
0026-7910/79/0945-0931

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932

MARCUSBULLOCK

foundation. One will of course begin such an enterprise from

the benchmark of Jacques Derrida's critique of metaphysicswith
regard to the theoryof signs,since,despite itssometimesnovel terminology,it offersthe most rapid and directaccess to certainnecessary premises (more specifically,those concerning the assimilation of ontology to semiotics). Nevertheless,this procedure will
open up the field of significationto a new series of possibilities
which curtailat least some of Derrida's claims.
This approach overcomesa primaryproblem forthe question of
representationin literaturepresented by the differingorders of
signin visual and literaryworksof art. As long as we retainthe idea
that the world we experience is a "natural presence," that is, final
in bringingthe media
ratherthan relative,therewillbe a difficulty
whichcan imitateappearances into conformitywiththe principles
governing our grasp of those which refer to them-via arbitrary
codes. If, on the other hand, particular ideas of the world and
experience are determinedor constitutedby the systemsof reference in whichtheyoccur, the differingrelationshipsto meaningsin
"natural" and "arbitrary"signification,and the perceptions they
guarantee,2 may be reconciled within a superordinated body of
principlesdescribingthe formationand statusof those ideas.
Mimesis,in its uncriticalform,as the secondary imitationof a
"true"order of phenomena, is the "natural signification"of a "natural presence." That is to say, it contrastswith the "arbitrarysignifier"of language in bearing a real resemblanceto itsobject. This
resemblanceis incorrectlyposited as a relationshipbetweenobjects,
however,for it stands only between perceptions.The Taj Mahal is
as absent froma hand-sized photographof itas itis fromthe sound
of its name. The association is made only in the perceivingconsciousness. Yet there is a connection there which,withinthese restrictions,merits the provisional designation "real." The consistency between them is called in gestalt theory a "structural
isomorphism,"and because it implies no more than we wish to
claim forit here, we shall adopt thisterminologyin our subsequent
argument.
Wittgenstein's"duck-rabbit"3demonstratesthat this isomorphism is not a unique, specific signifyingproperty,but a range of
permittedpossibilitiesand the exclusion of others. Recognitionof
the two-dimensionalphotographicimage as signifyingthe monument in Agra means ascribinga privilegeto that correspondance
rather than any other, or to none at all. One simply makes the

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reasonable judgement that this is the best candidate among those

objects which could theoreticallyhave produced the same image.
Among other depletions, as is easily understood, the loss of the
thirddimension means the loss of definitescale or orientation,so
that withoutother clues one cannot, for example, distinguishbeand a circleshown obliquely. For
tweenan ellipse viewed frontally,
this reason, the accretionof possible meanings for a visual image
depends on actual or theoreticalperceptionswhich can conform
withit. These are not institutedarbitrarily,but "discovered." The
existenceof interpretantsfor a pictorialimage among isomorphic
objects (i.e., isomorphicperceptionsof object and image) is itselfa
resistanceto the arbitrarymultiplicationof its meanings. The accreted, or in Derrida's term "sedimented," meanings of a lexical
item would appear to arise in a whollydifferentway, yet there is
nonetheless a sense in which it, too, is involved in "discovering"
interpretantsout of a ground of possibilitieswhichconditionsand
limitsits meaning.
Just as one can very rapidly teach someone familiarwith such
signsand contextsthatthe duck is also a rabbit,or make a drawing
in Western perspectiveand lightingcomprehensible to a subject
familiarwithalternativeconventionsin somewhatmore time,one
cannot, for the very same reasons, make the diagram visibleas a
pyramidever.The structuraldifferencebetween the two perceptions is so great that if it were broken down, there would 'be no
possible meaning in seeing at all, so far as recognitionof figuresis
concerned. Furthermore, this resistance to the expansion of
meaningsis not related to culturaldeterminants,but standsa priori
as the possibilityof visual consciousnessaltogether.
Similarly,one cannot inventa word fora colour whichcannot be
seen, nor for a sensation that cannot be felt. R. G. Collingwood
notes that"differentlanguages are not related to one and the same
set of feelingslike his differentsuitsof clothesto one and the same
man. If there is no such thingas an unexpressed feeling,there is
no way of expressing the same feelingin two differentmedia....
An Englishman who can talk French, if he reflectson his own
when he talks
experience,knowsverywell thathe feels differently
a differenttongue.... To be multilingualis to be a chameleon of
the emotions.Stillmore clearlyis it true thatthe emotionswhichwe
express in musiccan neverbe expressed in speech and vice versa."4
Yet the fact that we can learn and use correctlyother languages
without the loss of a coherent personality,and that, despite its

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MARCUSBULLOCK

notoriousshortcomings,good translationis possible,indicatesthat

a language does not generatemeaningsout of itselfas an enclosed,
system,but 'chooses' out of a common ground of
self-sufficient
potentialities.This 'ground' is what Collingwood calls the "psychical level" of the organism. It is anteriorto consciousness,and exteriorto language.
The formationof language, by which is also meant conscious
expressionof all kinds,is the process in which"thatwhichis raised
fromthe psychicallevel to the conscious level is convertedby the
work of consciousness from impression to idea, from object of
sensation to object of imagination"(The PrinciplesofArt,p. 247).
When a word is learned or created,the 'choice' takes the formof a
discovery,foradmission into consciousnessis gained only withthe
presence of a signifyingtoken (or "trace" in Derrida's usage). According to the preceding ideas, then, a meaning of any kind requires a radical addition to the semiologicalview of a structureor
differencewithina systemof reference.Whetherit is the sense of a
word or a visual image, it must have the power to establisha consistencyor coherence in the prior psychicrealm, the being of the
organism beyond its consciousness. This leads to the important
conclusion thatthe limitof significationin general is the demarcabetweenall thatis or can be the
tionof a fundamentaldiscontinuity
objectof consciousnessfora givenculturalconditionof the subject,
and a mode of being which is absolutelyexternal to all conscious
knowledge,experience or imagination.
It will be noted that in settingout this position in the area of
tensionbetweenDerrida and Collingwood,it is impossibleto avoid
the charge of "metaphysicsof presence" in some form.We accept
thishere because, whileDerrida's critiquehas incontestableforcein
the question of signification,he leaves the question of consciousness withoutadequate consideration.For thisreason he has to resort to an extraordinarymeans to account for the phenomena of
concrete human arts and languages, namely the prophecy of the
end of this "epoch." On the other hand, Collingwood goes much
furtherin claiming specificprior identityand accessibilityfor entitiesat the "psychicallevel" than maybe tenable. That is, however,
in no way necessaryfor the formulationpursued here in this attemptto clarifyrepresentationand a congruenttheoryof art.
Although his conception of authenticityis subject to some difficultiesas we understandit,the importanceof havingsuch criteria
does appear very great. His procedure in considering consciousness as the functionof an organism permitsan associated idea of

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935

termed"corruptionsof consciousness,"whichare "the

dysfunction,
malperformanceof the act which convertswhat is merelypsychic
(impression)into what is conscious (idea)" (ThePrinciplesofArt,p.
283). For Derrida, such a possibilitydisappears within"free play,"
for withouta concept of "truth,"the question of admissable and
inadmissable meanings retreatsfromthe orb of the "real"-given
the minimaldefinitionhere of thatwhichis externalto, but limits,
systemsof signification-remainingonly in thatof the institution.
Shiftingvaliditywholly into that enclosure allows a castrationof
language which leaves it without the force to restrain "corruptions."There is a certainsense of liberationinvolvedin relievingit
but from Collingwood's point of
of this power and responsibility,
view, facing the enormous contemporary corruptions of consciousness presentedby European fascism,thiswould be regarded
as a pure loss and great danger.
Though no pretence can be made to resolve these issues, or
propose an adequate theoryof consciousness,it is appropriate to
recognize what large questions cast their shadow over the small
area we attemptto illuminatehere. Nevertheless,we lean on the
authorityof Collingwood to sustain the idea of that fundamental
discontinuitybetween consciousnessand non-consciousness,and it
willbe subsequentlycontended in thispaper, moreover,thatart is
the historyof the movementof this frontier,and that artisticrepresentationspecificallyis the locus of changes in the "world" considered as appearances.
In the lightof this,it is possible also to reconsider the division
between abstractionand representationin art, positingthem now
as reflectingthat between self-consciousnessof the subject and
consciousness of the other as object-a polarity without which
consciousnessis notconceivable.Abstractionin artis therecognition
and clarificationof specificelementsof theactivityof consciousness5
in its self-reflecting
phase before it manifestsor touches on 'the
world.' Artisticrepresentation,bringingin the appearance of the
world, concerns what is constitutedas 'other,' but in doing so, it
makes the world planetaryto the solar position of the individual
It reveals or reflectsthe activityof the subject in creatsubjectivity.
ing it. Art, therefore, generically presents itself as involved in
abstractionin thatit is not produced as restingon the fixed objectivetruthof transcendentbeing, but as relative,a perceptionindivisible from the subject. An artisticimage will always reveal the
active character(or "emotions,"to use Collingwood's word) of the
subject. Only when the image is removed fromthe domain of art

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MARCUSBULLOCK

altogether,as wholly'informative'ratherthan aesthetic,is it caught

in the fixityof absolute being and a transcendentworld. And it
should be noted that what is informativecan include the category
of 'fictive,'for a paradigmaticfiction,proposing a generalized (or
'abstract'in the alternativesense) judgement of the intersubjective
world, need not figureas 'art.'
II
The relationshiptermed 'structuralisomorphism'establishes a
particularsituationfor mimeticsignification,for it holds between
signifierand signifieras well as signifierand signified.All representationsof a given visual object and the object itselfare comprised withina certain formof unity.Also, if the object is an artifact,though usually a void and disregarded point, none has a
logical, but only a historical priorityover any other since, for
example, there may be no certain basis for deciding whether a
drawing was the architect'sdesign, or a picture of the completed
building. This is a point of radical contrastwith the situationbetweena meaning and a word or synonymsin a particularlanguage,
or equivalentsin differentlanguages. Such an elementof 'realism'
in meaningsis consequentlya zone of resistanceto the 'nominalism'
of semiology.It is also a potentialobstacleto the territorialclaimsof
deconstructionism.The isomorphicelement,we will endeavour to
show,is the possibilityof an alternativestructureof significationto
thatof the "institutedtrace"as determinedbyJacques Derrida, and
of "differencewithin a structureof reference where difference
appears as such and thus permits a certain libertyof variations
among the full terms."6The alternativestructureforeseen here
does not reversethe expansion of readings in virtueof this"certain
a tighter
libertyof variationsamong the fullterms,"by reinstituting
rule of law,but ratherdelegates the variabilityto a separate sphere,
or perhaps it would be more descriptiveof the situation to say
establisha separate sphere for the mode of significationforart we
wish to identifywithinrepresentation.
So-called 'natural signs,' including the iconographic, set a
theoreticallimit to semiology,as Derrida notes: "We must then
conclude that only the signs called natural,those that Hegel and
Saussure call "symbols,"escape semiology as grammatology.But
they fall a fortiorioutside the field of linguisticsas the region of
p. 45). The trace,however,is
general semiology"(Of Grammatology,

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not restrictedin the same way,for"theseoppositionshave meaning

p. 47). But
only afterthe possibilityof the trace" (Of Grammatology,
what we question here is whethermeaning in the mimeticsignifier
in art answersto the Derridean formulaof "The absence of another
here and now,of anothertranscendentalpresent,of anotherorigin
of the world appearing as such, presenting itselfas irreducible
absence withinthe presence of the trace . . ." (p. 47). That is to say,
we question the idea that it signifiesa transcendentalobject.
If we accept the positionthatthe world is not a manifestationof
but rathera
its noumenal being presentto us as transcendentality,
structuresfromwhichitis not separable, then
productof signifying
the question of how these structurescame into existence offers
This is an old objectionto the semiological
considerabledifficulties.
viewof language whichwe revivenow, lookingback in particularto
Benedetto Croce, who argued that language should be conceived
because "the sign,
not as a sign,but "an image whichis significant,"
wherewithman agrees withman, presupposes language; and when
it persistsin explaining language by signs, it is obliged to have
recourse to God, as giver of the firstsigns-that is, to presuppose
language in another way,by consigningit to the unknowable."7
We adopt the view thateven though representationalart such as
portraituremay appear to refer to an object, it is precisely the
object to whicha similarworkwhichwas not artwould be referring
that the work of art occludes. It introducesan element that does
not yet belong to what, withinthe metaphysicsof presence, is regarded as the transcendentalworld,or the world as constitutedby
pre-existentstructures"by which man agrees with man." That
which is representedin art was not in the world prior to it; it was
neitheran object, nor was it even in the knowledge of the artist.
There was nothingknowableprecedingitbeyond the activityof the
artistby which it came into being. It can, however,become a reference to an intersubjectiveworld conceived as transcendentifit is
re-read (we will argue 'mis-read') as informative.That is to say if,
forexample, the conventionsof a paintingare interpretedas giving
the 'correct'version of the way the transcendentworld manifests
itselfas presence to the eye, it will no longer simplyocclude the
object,but installits meaning in the role of object. Though it may
produce a change in the consistencywithwhichwe see the world,it
will have become a transparentreference,that is, an informative
representation of it, restoring priorityto the apparent object.
Then, and only then,does it fallsecurelyinto the demesne of what

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MARCUSBULLOCK

Derrida says of the trace,the token by which an entityis thought:

"The tracemustbe thoughtbeforethe entity.But the movementof
the trace is necessarily occulted, it produces itself as selfoccultation"(p. 47). This leads verysimplyto the suggestionthat
what deconstructiondeconstructsis not the work of art, but only
the informativetext.In otherswords,we are arguing thatthe representationalforce of a work of art as such is not towardsa transcendental object.
III
A distinctionbetween these two, the informativeand aesthetic
artifact,whichis not ill-foundedon vulgar metaphysics,but offers
genuine power in determiningreadings-that is, a text-immanent
distinction-has hitherto proved elusive. The argument of this
paper is that the deconstructiveanalysis of textualityhas in fact
broughtsuch a concept to bay,even thoughit remainsitselfcaught
in the negativedialecticof metaphysicsand signifyingsystems,and
is therefore unable to proceed to the kill. While it is an acceptable though not a novel idea, and certainlyalwaystimely,that
the notionsof world and experience are produced to us by signification,it is also true thatthe conceptionof the trace as propagated
in deconstructivecriticismis neithera revelationnor a discovery,
but a veil conjuringup the effectof simplicitybefore the complexityof the activityithides. That contemporarycriticismshould make
a pause on the apparentlysafe ground of this simplicityis natural
and understandableas a refuge fromthe chaos and frustrationof
past failures.But it is onlya pause, a hesitation,a refuge.
Before the complexitiesof differenttextsand differentkindsof
texts,the contractedprocedure of deconstructivereading reveals
itselfas impotence.It has made the philosophicalexchange of purityin place of power, remainingin a condition of suspension ("In
the deconstructionof the arche, one does not make a choice" [Of
p. 62]), in order to withdrawfromthe self-deception
Grammatology,
of presence, the fall into metaphysics.This fearfulparalysisis not
necessaryfor the rigorousclaritydeconstructiontakes for its goal.
There seems to be everyprobabilitythatthereis a richarmatureof
criteria which will provide adequacy in critical reading without
passage throughthe banned fieldsof metaphysics.And whetherit
is so or not, the necessitythat such quarry should be pursued is
absolutelyundeniable. It is intolerablethatliteraryconcern should

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939

maintainthisretreat,surrenderingthe force to determinea good

workfroma greator a mediocreone, or among interpretationstell
a wise froma foolishversion,or distinguishadmissiblefrominadmissiblecriteria.What is urged here is the idea that such divisions
lie in characteristicsof the systemsof signification,may be identifiedin theirspecificfunctionsand evaluated according to them,
and that such a position followsdirectlyfrom the correctjudgementsof deconstructionism.If the notionof world is produced out
of signification,
and not vice versa,thisalso entailsthe quite simple
possibilitythat other modalities, previously defined against the
naive idea of world,such as fictivenessand representation,are also
produced as such out of language, and this can be made determithe initial Derridean argunate by extending and differentiating
ment. That being so, the disastrous failures of previous critical
theoriesmay be circumvented.
Startingfromthe primitivepositionof the separation of the informativefrom the artistictext as practised by vulgar parlance
withinvulgar metaphysics,traditionalapproaches to criticismhave
proved astonishinglyinconclusive when supporting theoretically
the generally positive valorizationof art and literatureto which
they subscribe,and which is held to in most cultures. That the
problems are implicit in this treacherous startingpoint can be
shownbyexaminingthreefamiliarvariationswhichI termhere the
sacred, the subtractive,and the additive.
A good illustrationof the firstis offeredby Paul Valery. Delimiting non-poetic discourse in "Au sujet du Cimetiere Marin," he
writes: "L'essence de la prose est de perir-c'est 'a dire d'etre
'comprise'-c'est 'a dire, d'etre dissoute, detruite sans retour, entierementremplacee par l'image ou par l'impulsionqu'elle signifie
selon la conventiondu langage. Car la prose sous-entendtoujours
l'univers de l'experience et des actes-univers dans lequel-ou
grace auquel-nos perceptionset nos actions ou emotions doivent
finalement se correspondre ou se repondre d'une seule
maniere-uniformement.L'universpratique se reduit'a un ensemble de buts."8The complement of this is the non-paraphrasable,
non-transparentuse of language as an artisticmedium: "Les pensees enoncees ou suggerees par un textede poeme ne sont pas du
tout l'objet unique et capital du discours-mais les moyens qui
concourent egalementavec les sons, les cadences, le nombre et les
ornements,a provoquer, a soutenirune certainetensionou exaltation,a engendreren nous un monde-ou une moded'existence-tout
harmonique."9This presentsliteratureas a sortof divineintoxicant

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MARCUSBULLOCK

withvirtuallyno intersubjectivedimension at all: "Mes vers ont le

sens qu'on leur prete. Celui que je leur donne ne s'ajuste qu'a' moi,
et n'est opposable 'a personne."'10
The second view,the subtractive,is particularlywell exemplified
by Erich Auerbach, whose conception of literatureis as a formof
discourse whose singular attainmentis to advance closer to the
qualities of reality than ordinary language. He comments on a
passage fromMadame Bovary,"This ordering of the psychological
situationdoes not, to be sure, derive fromstandardsfromwithout,
but fromwithinthe materialof the situationitself.It is the typeof
ordering which must be employed if the situation itselfis to be
translatedinto language withoutadmixture."1 Such a quality of
writing,what he calls "objective seriousness," makes the fictive
more real, more true, than the discourse of everydaycontingency
by its abilityto purge itselfof subjective intrusions.The theory
posits an adequacy, whose origin is not thematized,between language and "world"whichthe artiststrivesto quicken,exploringthe
resources of grammar to substantiatean ideal transparency,enclosing and manifestingreality"withoutadmixture."
Althoughthe formerof these approaches does set artoutside the
naive presence of the world, it does so in a way which rests on a
pure negativity.It attemptsto cast no lighton the "universde buts,"
nor consider the extentto whichcommon ground in the language
used for expression interrelatesthe two spheres. Such a theoryis
clearly not applicable to a representationalfunctionfor art. The
Auerbach viewdoes not separate such a functionfromthe ordinary
referentialuse of language, and thisnot only restson an uncritical
concept of 'the real,' but leaves untouched the question of how that
thatis to
is to re-appear in the expressivemedium. The difficulty,
say, lies in the veryword 'mimesis,'for if there is to be any true
consistencyin its application to visual and literaryart forms,there
has to be some gesture towards explaining how a painting and a
novel are both performancesof the same process.
The third theory,the additive, depends on the relationshipof
formto content.It claims,in plain terms,thatthereare qualities in
the featuresof particularliterarygenres whichbringa 'plus' to the
paraphrasable sense. A common varianttaughtto schoolchildrenis
thatcharactersof form,balance, harmony,stress,tensionand resolution elevate or develop 'literal' meanings-the old idea of
rhetoricaladornment and enhancement. This has a tendency to
gravitatetowards the opinion of Valery. A more interestingand
radical version is propounded by Ms. Barbara Herrnstein Smith

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who, in her book PoeticClosure,does make a real attemptto confrontthe issue of representationand mimesis.
Accepting that language cannot resemble the seen world as a
painting may, she restrictsliterarylanguage to the imitationof
what it does resemble, namely "ordinary"language. Her thesis is
thatliteratureconsistsof "a-historical"utteranceswhichendeavour
to represent "historical" ones, i.e. those conditioned (at least
hypothetically)by the time and circumstancesof a real context.
Though this reduction has the contemporaryappeal of resolute
pessimism,the problems it seeks to evade reassertthemselvesalmostat once. She says,"Language, in poetry,is used mimetically.It
mimeticmanner to suggest as
is used moreover in a characteristic
veryhistoricalcontextwhichit
that
necessary)
(or
possible
vividlyas
the
poem represents. .. a totalact
is,
in
That
does not factpossess.
of speech."12 Which is to say that literatureis visualized here as
being articulated across two stages of signification,one representational,and the other referential.The poem proper, then,
considered as a sign, is to efface itselfbefore a double absence in
order to recovera meaning in full presence. Moreover,the poetic
function(i.e. mimetic) is restrictedsolely to the recoveryof the
absentcontext,which"the poem mustcarry. . . on itsown back" (p.
18).
The passages which attemptto illustratethis in Ms. Herrnstein
Smith'sbook are evidentlymisargued,forshe claims that Herrick's
"Upon a child that dyed," and Shakespeare's sonnet 129 ("Th'expense of spiritin a wasteof shame is lust/inaction . . .") respectively
"represent"an epitaph and a sermon. That is, theymake recoverable those original texts as theywould have appeared in context.
Since both genres mayoccur as historicaldiscoursein writtenform,
a hypotheticaloriginal would surely be more recoverable if reported intactratherthan transmutedinto poetry.The latteris not a
sermon whose identityis secured by being recast in sonnet form,
but rather the reverse, a sonnet in which certain features of a
sermon (or similar admonitorydiscourse) appear in a condition
alienated fromthatcontext.And it is worthadding thatshe herself
notes thisalienatingeffectof formwhen she says that "one of the
mostsignificanteffectsof meter(or, more broadly,of principlesof
formal structure)is simplyto informthe reader that he is being
confrontedby poetryand not by somethingelse . . . the constant
presence of meter in the poem continues to maintain a clear distinctionbetween poetic and non-poeticdiscourse" (p. 24).
As long as she remains focussed on the signifiedobject in this

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MARCUSBULLOCK

way,her reasoning also failson a furthercount. In common with

mostthinkingbased on speech-acttheory,she leaves literaturewith
purely secondary status, dependent on the natural illocutionary
utterance and unable to exceed it in meaning. Even if formal
structuredid open up a full transparencyand make a historical
utterancerecoverable"withitscontexton itsback," thatwould not
be an adequate functionfor a literarywork. We do not ask that a
van Gogh paintingof a fieldin Provence should render the place so
that it is "just like being there." Whatever we do ask of it, we demand no less froma literarytext.
Auerbach points out that the world described by Flaubert is
banal and worthless, "charged with misunderstanding, vanity,
futility,
falsehood,and stupidhatred" (Mimesis,p. 489). Yet thereis
value and fascinationin its representation."But what the world
would reallybe, the world of the 'intelligent,'Flaubert never tells
us; in his book the world consists of pure stupiditywhich completelymissestrue reality,so thatthe lattershould properlynot be
discovered in it at all; yet it is there; it is in the author's language
whichunmasksthe stupidityby pure statement;language then has
criteriafor stupidityand thus also has a part of that realityof the
'intelligent'which otherwisenever appears in the book" (p. 489).
Objections have already been raised to terms like "pure statement," "true reality"and the implied realityand finalityof the
"world of the 'intelligent,'" but withinthisis a correctperception,
foritis indeed not the presence of the transmittedrealitywhichthe
work of art produces, but "a world viewed"13in its character of
view,of act, not of object. That is to say, as indissoluble fromthe
consciousnesswhich creates it. Its meaning, therefore,has no part
of a hypothesizedtranscendentalityawaiting perception, but the
work,the visibletext,is the manifestportionof an act of consciousness whose contentis accessible,in a quite characteristicsense,byits
recognitionas such, or its "re-enactment,"in Collingwood's term,
by another consciousness.
The division between an informativeand artistictext now becomes the distinctionbetween the mode in which a purported
transcendent presence "by which man agrees with man" is
mediated,and thatin whichconsciousnessmediatesitself.That this
should be so can, congruentwiththe precedingarguments,onlybe
rendered as the functionof the medium, and as immanentto the
characteristicsof expression in it. In examining the nature and
tenure of thisdemarcationagainst the phenomena of signification
in all systems,the role and portent of literaturerelative to lan-

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943

guage, and the conditionof the possibilityof each, will necessarily

undergo a complete reconsideration.

IV
In our progress around this issue, we now come upon our own
tracks,forwe returnto the question, adumbrated at the outset,of
the way in whichmimesisis set apart fromboth artisticrepresentation and referencewithinan arbitrarycode. Certainly,it is indisputable that not all that is mimeticis art. There is a mimeticelement in informative illustrations, architectural and technical
drawings,maps and diagrams,which varies frompredominantto
partial in the significationof the objects, but they are generically
exteriorto art. What differentiatesa map from an aerial photograph showingthe same place at the same scale is the admixtureof
arbitraryand schematiccomponents to increase the degree of information.The photograph, though more mimetic,is not necessarilycloser to art by thattoken. In the case of maps and technical
drawingswe can identifygrammarsof referenceby which the significanceof what is seen depends on a separate code.
Yet even in the most uncurtailed optical correlation,the most
thoroughgoingof 'natural' signs, we find that as long as we are
object,the rule governingitsmeaning
presentedwithan informative
is transparency,and the principle on which it is constructed is
equivalent to a 'grammar.'
In his essay on the Renaissance developmentof linear perspecofSight,WilliamM. IvinsJr.indicatesthat
tive,On theRationalization
a
optical relationshipbetweena picture
purely
the establishmentof
and its object has had a historicalsigificancein fieldsfar removed
fromart. "From being an avenue of sensuous awareness for what
people, lacking adequate symbols and adequate grammars and
techniquesfortheiruse, regarded as 'secondaryqualities,'sighthas
today become the principleavenue of the sensual awareness upon
which our systematicthought about nature is based."14 Scientific
descriptionand classification,as well as technology,required "symbols, repeatable in invariant form, for representationof visual
awarenesses,and a grammarof perspectivewhichmade it possible
to establishlogical relationsnot only withinthe systemof symbols,
but between the systemand the formsand locationsof the objects
ofSight,p. 13). Opticality,though
thatit symbolizes"(Rationalization
rooted firmlyin what we consider 'nature,'becomes a grammatical
principlewhen it opens itselfup to use as something"wherewith

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MARCUSBULLOCK

man agrees with man" in the universe of purposes. Its referentis

placed in the intersubjectiverealm, effacingitselfas a relation to
what the world 'reallylooks like,' to what it 'reallyis.' (And therefore,becoming transparent,it "is necessarilyocculted, it produces
p. 47]).
itselfas self-occultation"[Of Grammatology,
This absolute or invariable logical relation is only an artificial
construct,part of Westernculture,however. It guarantees "iterability,"a public language in whichimages are made and interpreted
and repeated. For a number of reasons, such as the exclusion of
movementand the technicalimpossibilityof reproducing natural
light-valueratios, it can never be a complete equivalent to what
even a theoreticaleye sees, a "mechanical copy of a retinalimage,"
while in realityany act of vision is accompanied by the appurteTo the extentthata painting
nance of a fullindividualsubjectivity.
frees itselfof non-optical semiological elements, and extends in
significancebeyond the iterableopticalityof a grammaticalrelation
to itsobject,we can say it representsan 'act of seeing.' If it makes no
to invalidatedivergentrepclaim to iterability,
to intersubjectivity,
resentations,to aver a formof correctness,a privilegein relationto
the object, but only to bear appropriatenessto an act of vision of
the author, then clearlyit does not signifya transcendentalobject
in the same way a grammaticalrepresentationdoes.
What then is the structureof the work of art's relationshipwith
the portrayedobject? Rudolf Arnheim,in his workapplyinggestalt
theoryto thistopic in painting,describesitas arisingby a process in
which the artist"reads off" a configurationof lines, spaces, tones,
forces,densities,and tensionsfromthe perceptualobject,and finds
an "isomorphic"configurationin his workingmedium. The factors
determiningthe configurationin eithercase will not ordinarilybe
pure opticality,nor the plastic limitationsof the physicalmedium
used. Cezanne interpretedthe perceptual object in termsof simple
three-dimensional geometric solids, whereas van Gogh saw
dynamic lines and curves, for example. This demanded in each
case a differentway of handling paint and the brush.
Arnheimstatesthat"the formelement,whichis so prominentin
highlyabstractart,is indispensableand exactlyof the same kind in
any naturalisticrepresentationthat deserves the name of art. On
the other hand ... perceptual observation contributes even to
highly stylizedwork. When a South Sea islander paints the sea
moved by the wind as a rectanglestripedwithoblique parallel lines,
essentials of the model's visual structure are rendered in a

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945

simplified,but entirelyun '-symbolic'manner. Albrecht Direr's

highlynaturalisticstudiesof a hand, a face,a bird's wing are works
of art onlybecause the innumerablestrokesand shapes formwellorganized, even though complex, patterns, thus presenting an
abstractionthat interpretsthe subject. The two types of representationare nothingbut the extremeends of a scale thatallows all
possible stylesof art to be arranged in a sequence leading from
pure geometricalform through all degrees of abstractnessto extreme realism."115But we note a distinctionwhich he does not
specify,namelythatthe South Sea islanderdoes not need to make an
observationof his own for his formalized representation.He repeats a formula,an observationmade at the beginningof the artistic period in which he works. For that particular act he is a
craftsman16and not an artistperse. At the same time,manyaspects
of Direr's workmaybe identifiableas schematicrepetitions,drawn
from learned traditionor derived from others' innovations,and
thereforecraftelementsby the same criterion.
Art,when true to its essence, is 'original' in that it establishesa
relationshipbetween medium and meaning which is not prefigured in any code. On the other hand it alwaysfunctionsin relation
to a code whichit both exceeds and then extends. Its place is at the
fringeof a grammar,a public, learned and repeatable systemof
referencewhich makes perceptionspossible withinthe uniformity
of purposes. As we noted, a painting by an artistopens up possibilitiesforderivativeworkwhichis not art,but craft,the application of principlesof reference to which the unique and original
interpretationof artisticsensoryawarenesses is constantlyassimilated. The symbiosisbetween artistand grammar is a necessary
part of both. The artistcannot functionin a vacuum,but only from
the basis of firmlyconstitutedground, a genre, a tradition,a culture. And every element of these, in turn, originated with the
assimilationof an act by which the inchoate darknessof raw senseaffectsis transmutedinto the light of meaning, of patterns,constantsand structures.
A work of art,then,stands in relationto 'ordinary'or grammatical referenceas potentialto act. The latteris thereforedependent
on the priorestablishmentof thispotential,and it followsin consequence thatthe charge of "parasitism"made againstliteraryuses of
language whichaffrontedDerrida in his paper on Austin ("Signature, Event, Context," GlyphI [1977], 172-97) may be made still
more dubious than in his misunderstandingof it. Our argument

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MARCUSBULLOCK

here implies that the situationis in fact reversed. The historyof

as a code, proceeds by its conlanguage, or any grammaticality,
tinuous expansion in potential,and the events of this history,including the theoreticalorigin as the firsthistoricalevent, all bear
the structureof worksof art.17
The interestand importanceattached to art of all kinds has no
primaryrelationto the significanceof the portrayedobject-is not
informativeor communicative-but only to the expansion it brings
to our capacityto perceive and make meaning in the world, which
is to say, to create or expand the world altogetheras an entityfor
human consciousness.
V
The determinationof an artisticutteranceas opposed to a 'natural' one, or the distinctionbetween an aestheticand an informative text,can be expressed with regard to the use of language by
separatingits functioninto the phases of 'medium' and 'code.' To
work fromthis position,we say that a medium is defined here as
thatby whichexperience is manifestto us as subjects,and a code is
defined as thatbywhichwe perceiveit as membersof a community
of competent users. Where this touches on representation,the
formerexperience is called appearances, the latteris the world. A
code is the systemby virtueof which a term is a sign; a medium
providesthe locus foran image whichis significant.The termsin a
code are instituted,their force is theircomprehension withinthe
body of the system,which must distinguishmore or less absolutely
between its membership and alien entities.A medium is always
explicitlybecoming, and exclusion is only a 'not yet'-a task outstandingratherthan a violation.
That an immanentl8theoryof reading is possible on this basis
now stands veryclose to demonstration.The characteristicmovement of literaturewhich is to be identifiedand rendered open to
public discourse in criticismis the broaching of thatcode/medium
perimeter. The reader must observe the way that language, in
order to become the medium of representation,adequate to the
content of experienced subjectivity,must move across the line,
And the firststep in proalienatingitselffromtranscendentality.
ducing a criticaltheoryout of thiscriterionis to show thatin a full
work of art this negative is accompanied by a positive,a realignment in a positive mode where characteristicmeanings arise with
sufficientstabilityand accessibilityto justifyuse of the word.

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947

The question of alienationof language bythe particularformsof

literaturehas already been raised by the quotation from Barbara
HerrnsteinSmith. The base-line of this idea is set out clearly for
examination by the exercise, repeated in several recent critical
works,of takingan 'ordinary'prose passage and printingitwiththe
typographic conventions of poetry. Examples occur in E. D.
Jean Cohen,20 and in Ms.
Hirsch's Validityin Interpretation,'9
HerrnsteinSmith'sown book On theMarginsofDiscourse.2'We cite
one fromthe last in full:
AlbertMolesworth,
Eighty-seven
yearsold,
Ownerof thenation'slargest
And mostprosperouspotatofarm,
Died yesterday
At hishomein Idaho.
He left
no
survivors.
There should be general agreement,albeit grudging in certain
quarters,thatthere is a surplus of portentwhich thistextacquires
that it would not have had in its intended place and functionas a
minornewspaperitem.Nor is thissimplya question of extra care in
reading. A newspaper reader anxious to glean any hint of information about the marketin arable land or potatoes mightweigh
each word minutely.Nor, in all probability,is it simplythat one
'reads into' the textthings'thatare not there'because one is duped
about the nature of the writing.If it appeared without further
indicationin a volume of verse by a well known poet, thismightbe
arguable. But armed with full knowledge that it is 'only' an indifferentnewspaperarticle,even ifone attemptsto resist,a discernible
resonance or atmosphere assertsitselfwhich it would be pointless
to disregard.It would be prudentto deferthe intrusionof the term
'meaning,' however.
We would suggest that the kind of featuresto which we tend to
referin order to account forthisatmosphereare in factthe points
where thispassage fallsshortof meaning and fallsshortof becoming poetry.One notes sequences of sounds which have a rhythmic
identity,a certaincoherence in the repetitionsof vowels or consonants,the poignantisolationof the finalthree'lines,'or the mutual
reflectionof the name "Molesworth"and the image of potatoes as
undergroundwealth,etc. etc. Yet the temptationto exaggerate the

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948

significanceof these phenomena should be resisted. These are

qualitiesof the words, but not meanings.
As Valery indicates in his account of prose, qualities which lie
outside the intentionare made invisiblein the comprehension of
ordinary language. The rule-governed process by which the
meaning is construeddeterminesthatthe presence of the arbitrary
sign be repressed as negligible. In the disruption of standard
linearityabove, thatprocess is arrested.The installationof a factor
withoutgrammaticalcontentoverthrowsthe hierarchyof the code,
and the ban fades which held the language user spellbound and
blind to the medium's fullcharacteristic.All thathas been achieved
in the cited example, however, is that the repressive activityof
public, rule-governedlanguage use has been suspended, and the
arbitraryand extraneous features of that text now obtrude. But
theyare onlyarbitraryand extraneous. They have not been drawn
into the coherence which a perceptual act alone can give them.
Meaning is to be distinguishedfrom pleasing uniformitiesand
correspondencessuch as may occur by chance, or by principlesof
simple causalityin a natural object. It lies outside the Kantian noohneZweck.But at the same time,
tion of beauty as Zweckmdfligkeit
we are interestedin a dimension which goes beyond intentionin
the prosaic sense. Wittgenstein,in his obsession with fixing lanon thispoint:
writesinterestingly
guage as a rule-governedactivity,
Suppose someonesaid: everyfamiliarword,in a book forexample
withitin our minds,a 'corona'of lightly
actuallycarriesan atmosphere
indicateduses.-Justas ifeach figurein a paintingweresurroundedby
delicateshadowydrawingsof scenes,as it werein anotherdimension,
and in themwe sawthefiguresin different
contexts.-Onlyletus take
thisassumptionseriously!-Thenwe see thatit is not adequateto explain intention.

Forifitis likethis,ifthepossibleusesof a worddo floatbeforeus in

as we sayor hear it-this simplygoes forus. But we comhalf-shades
municatewithotherpeople withoutknowingif theyhave thisexperi-

ence too.

(Investigations,p. 181e)

But the question of what we ever know about other people's experience is always present in language, as Wittgensteinrecognizes.
What we observe if a person uses the words 'red' and 'green' correctly,is thathe knows the rules of thatlanguage game, whereas a
colour-blindperson apparentlydoes not. We do not knowwhat the
experience of each is, only that,in the formercase, it agrees with
our own to a degree functionallyadequate forthe contingenciesof
the ordinary public sphere. Yet there are uses of colour not re-

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949

stricted or determined in this way. Consider for example the

opening of Nietzsche's poem Venedig:
An der Bruckestand
Jungstich in braunerNacht.22
We do notjudge fromthis that all competentusers of the German language would have arrivedat the same word forthatnight,
as theymightfor a particularwooden table top. On the contrary,
one suspects that Nietzsche was the only one. The poet, it seems,
has exceeded the grammarof thatword, and broken the rule. Yet
thereis no doubt thathe has made a meaning available. The night
is not simplyan absence of daylight,registeredin 'black' or 'dark,'
but responded to as a particularconjuration of inner feeling. Its
visiblequalityis not appealed to as such. "Braun" is not used in the
capacity of colour nearly so much as for that special dimension
Wittgensteinmistrusts,the "corona" of inner evocations. The importance it has for the whole poem can be seen as the text continues:
FernherkamGesang:
goldnerTropfenquoll's
fberdie zitternde
Flacheweg.
Gondeln,Lichter,Musikin die Dammerunghinaus...
trunkenschwamm's
MeineSeele,ein Saitenspiel,
sangsich,unsichtbar
beruhrt,
heimlichein Gondellieddazu,
zitternd
vorbunterSeligkeit.
-Horte jemand ihrzu?23
The objectivesituationdescribed, though a littlemore interesting perhaps than the passing of Albert Molesworth,is not equivalent to the meaning of this poem. The lights,water and music of
Venice are communicated grammaticallyas part of the intersubthatthe speaker was there,sang
jective realm. So is the information
along silentlyand trembledwithdelight.Any romantically-minded
touristcould writea verse to his fiancee on the back of a postcard
saying much the same about himself.But at the centre of it is a
perceptionmade by Nietzschewhichis unique to him and the act of
writingit. This is only therehistorically,
however,not as any kind of
intrinsicpresence in the verbal artefact.It is not iterablenor accessible in fullto anyone,includingthe author at a separate time.And
it
althoughitis said to be the core or originof the poem historically,
is not the meaning either.

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MARCUSBULLOCK

The concept of meaning can only implyaccess, but we must ask

what is made accessible by combining the words "braun" and
"Nacht," or by associating that combination with the remaining
configurationof the text. What we do not claim for that is the
interiorstateof FriedrichNietzsche,but the expansion of our own
interiority.The original perception which constitutedthe writing
of the poem has drawn on the capacities latent in the signifying
systemto realize itselffor the poet in his verbal structure.What
interiorevent from
each reading does is to construea complementary
it,and each of these events,even for the same reader on separate
occasions, mustbe theoreticallyunique. At the same time,thisinfinitelyextended familyof readings engendered by a single text is
not haphazard. There is a characteristicprocedure of generationat
its heart.
VI
A word is not mimeticlike a picture,whichshares in the perceptual characterof its subject matter(exhibitsa 'structuralisomorphism' with it). It is the signal of homologous perceptions,and the
signal alone. A painting of a brown table will most typicallyuse
brown pigment,whereas the word 'brown' used to describe it has
no colour. It is simplythe tokenor markof a resemblancebetween
the optical sensation and all others we have learned to enclose in
thatformof unity.But the dominationof the sensationby the code
is not complete. It is alive in the subjectiveconsciousnessinasmuch
as it is capable of registeringcorrespondences which lie outside
those prefiguredin the rules of the game. The pointsof excess are
whatwe call metaphors.(That is to say,true metaphorsas opposed
to the ossified condition into which it may settle through the institutionof an agreed functionfor it in the systemof differences
defined by grammar.) But there is also an equally vitalmomentin
akin to that
the functioningof a word whose forceis systematically
of metaphor but does not detach itselffrom the code by direct
controversion.It lies logicallywithinthe bounds of 'conventional'
meaning, but this does not exhaust it in the configurationof the
text.It is to be read past that point,past the limitationsof the sign
as pure differencewhose significanceis determined as a logical
functionin the word-gameof grammar.
This is the procedure which yields the meaning of Nietzsche's
imagery even where it is not metaphoric in the same sense as
"braune Nacht," i.e., a unique presentation,but eitherdrawingon

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951

the common coin of romantic phrases (e.g., "meine Seele, ein

Saitenspiel") or completely conformable to conventional usage
("uiberdie zitterndeFlache weg"). The instances of conventional
poetic formulaeare interestingin thisregard because theyhave to
be broughtback fromthe moribundstatetowardswhichtheytend
with continued use, for they cannot be thrown against familiar
expectation the way "braun" is. The commonplaces "goldene
Tropfen" and "trunken schwamm's" describing the song are so
close to public propertythat returningtheir meaning to a valid
poetic impact demands a strategywhere the reader is induced to
break away from the conventional lead-trace to which he is harnessed,just as much as withordinaryusages.
This strategy,and the degree of determinatemeaning recoverable in the resultingtext may be set out as the principles of an
alternateword-game,theoperationsof writingand reading in what
we defined as language in its modalityof medium.
The old structuralisttraditionof arbitrarinessof the sign, and
meaning as differencewithina pure systemof differencesis radically excluded here. Words are revealed in this phase of their
workingas essences. The creation of expressions like Nietzsche's
"braune Nacht" necessarilyrenders an available meaning,because
they reflectperceptual connections in the quality of words as essences. The word in thismodality,to quote Benedetto Croce again,
figures"as an image which is significant-thatis, a sign in itself,
and thereforecoloured, sounding, singing,articulate"(Essenceof
p. 52). Like the forms,tones and textures used by the
Aesthetic,
painter,they may be combined according to their immanent potentialto realize correspondances which do not, as Wittgenstein's
objection would suggest,'go only for us,' but in principle for all
users of the language.
A combinationnot made by an act of perceptionin the linguistic
medium, e.g., arrived at by chance or a failed attemptat expression,does not qualifyand is in theorydistinguishablefromone that
does. At the same time a failure of reading is possible in each
situation-a meaning may be claimed where only its absence has
been found (a corruptionof consciousness),or an activeconnection
not realized. The statusof these failuresis preciselyequivalent to
those in otherart-forms.Lyinga priorioutside logic,theycannot be
overcome logically,any more than failure to recognize the duckrabbitimage in one or both of its references.The task of criticism
consists in the same process as that by which one would secure
reading of that image-the enumeration of contributingfeatures

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MARCUSBULLOCK

and the introductionof context. But the criterionof truthin the

completedact, as in the act of the work'sinception,is in itsinteriority.'old based on value-the value implicitin the being of interiorityitself,which is to pursue, maintain,and expand its own existence.
The object of thisalternativelanguage-game is ultimatelynot to
produce agreement,but to navigatea course betweentwo dangers.
On the one side is the Scyllaof ordinaryusage, the realm of dead
and shipwreckedmetaphors like 'black mood' and 'sweet sound'
whichhave been drawn intothe code, givenlogical standing.These
meanings are now public, part of the world, alienated from their
historicalorigin, where they were subjective and unique. On the
other side is the Charybdisof privateand inaccessibleassociation,
knowable only to the speaker, and veiled even to him outside the
momentof its utterance.This would be the condition of H6lderlin'slate poetry,when the continuityof his experiencesand identity
had collapsed. The special situation of breakdown is obviously
highlycomplex, but one can venture a generaljudgement in this
sense on a poem such as "Hdhere Menschheit":
Den Menschenistder Sinnins Inneregegeben,
das BeBrewdhlen,
DaB sie als anerkannt
Es giltals Ziel,es istdas wahreLeben,
des LebensJahrezdhlen.24
Von dem sichgeistiger
Although,in the contextof the poet's other work,this is by no
means withoutinterest,one is also aware thatthe innerconditionof
is not expressed in
the utterance,the fulldimensionof interiority,
the linguisticstructure.Its aura of melancholyis thatof the verbal
husk of an illumination.The conditionof madness itselfis explicit
here, because one would not in principledoubt thattherewas such
a companion to the writing.Yet it was not realized as a full conscious entityin the expressive medium, and that failureis the failure of consciousness itself,the incapacityto build a continuityof
inner experience which constitutesthe personalityof the individual. The writeraccordinglysigns his work"Scardanelli" during
this period and dates it apparentlyat random across several centuries,into the past and the future. It proceeds from a stranger,
lost in obscurity,into whom Holderlin himselfcan gain no insight.
which
The madness of Hdlderlin is the darknessof an interiority
cannot reach itself,even from moment to moment. The comprehension of literatureis the light of culture and history,the
continuitywhich fillsout temporality.It prepares the possibilities

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of interiorityelaborated in the enclosure of one mind and time,

and guaranteed as illuminationof another.
University
ofOregon(Eugene)

NOTES
1 Johann GottliebFichte,Sdmmtliche
Werke,J. G. Fichte,ed. (Berlin: Verlag von
Veit und Comp, 1845), Bd. I, p. 434.
"What kind of a philosophya man will choose depends, therefore,on what
kind of a person he is, fora philosophicalsystemis not a lifelesshousehold
object which one can put down or take up just as we please...."
2 Closing the discussionappended to his "Structure,Sign, and Play,"in The Struced. R. Macksey & E. Donato (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
turalistControversy,
UniversityPress, 1975), Derrida says: "Now I don't knowwhat perceptionis and
I don't believe thatanythinglike perceptionexists. [A] perceptionis preciselya
concept,a concept of an intuitionor of a given originatingfromthe thingitself,
presentitselfin its meaning,independentlyfromlanguage, fromthe systemof
reference.... whateverstrikesat the metaphysicsof whichI have spoken strikes
also at the veryconcept of perception" (p. 272).
Investigations.
Untersuchungen/Philosophical
3 Ludwig Wittgenstein,Philosophische
Englishtexttranslatedby G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: Macmillan Company,
1953), p. 194.
4 R. G. Collingwood, The Principlesof Art, (London: Oxford UniversityPress,
1938), p. 245.
5 The questions surroundingabstractionwould be reasonablyregarded as more
complex and extensivethan representation,and thereforeare avoided here. At
the same time, we recognize that an understanding of representationmust
necessarilybe incompletewithoutthisdimension.The relationshipsuggested is
far fromunusual in art theory,forexample Rudolf Arnheimsays: "Two opposite pointsof departure are needed; on the one side the stimulusmaterialof the
object, and on the other, form,the indispensable preconditionof visual understanding. Perceivingas well as representinga thing means findingformin its
structure.The patternsof 'nonobjective' art, if considered from the point of
view of the world of natural things,are extremelyabstract.They reduce the
representationof realityto a visual equivalent of the universal physical and
psychologicalforcesthatunderlie nature and life and of theirinterplay.In this
way theyexpress harmonyand disharmony,dominance and coordination,conmovementand rest,equilibriumand disequilibriumand so
trastand similarity,
forth.From the opposite point of view,however,thatis, fromthe pointof view
of form, the basic nonobjective patterns are not abstract.They are the very
elements of visual comprehension,the building-stonesof the composition the
artistcreates in order to represent the structureof the world in the way his
ofArt,(Berkeley: Univertemperamentmakes him see it." Towardsa Psychology
sityof California Press, 1966), p. 39.
trans. Gayatri ChakravortySpivak (Balti6 Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology,
more: Johns Hopkins UniversityPress, 1977), pp. 46-47.
7 Benedetto Croce, The Essence of Aesthetic,trans. Douglas Ainslie (London:
Heinemann, 1921), pp. 52-53.

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8 Paul Valery,VarietiIII, (Paris: Gallimard, 1936), p. 61. "The essence of prose is

to perish-that is to say, be 'comprehended'-that is to say, to be dissolved,
destroyedbeyond recall, entirelyreplaced by the image or the motivewhich it
signifiesaccording to linguisticconvention. For prose always implies the universe of experience and acts-the universe in which, or thanksto which-our
perceptionsand our actionsor emotionsmustultimatelycorrespondto or reflect
one another in the same way-uniformly.The practicaluniversecan be reduced
to a collectionof purposes."
9 "Au sujet du Cimetikre Marin," op. cit. p. 63. "The thoughts expressed or
suggested by a poetic textare in no way the sole and pre-eminentobjects of its
discourse-but meanswhichmerge equally withthe sounds, cadences, metreand
ornamentsto stimulateand sustaina certaintensionor exaltation,to elicitin us a
world-or modeofexistence-whichis completelyharmonious."
10 "Commentairede Charmes,"op. cit.,p. 74. "My poems have the meaning which
is ascribed to them. That which I give them is appropriate only for me, and
cannot be used to contradictanyone else."
11 Erich Auerbach, Mimesis,trans.Willard R. Trask (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1955), p. 485.
12 Barbara HerrnsteinSmith,PoeticClosure(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press,
1968), p. 17.
13 StanleyCavell discussescinema as an art formin the lightof thisidea in his book
The WorldViewed(New York: Viking, 1971).
14 William M. Ivins Jr.,On theRationalizationof Sight,2nd ed. (1928), (rpt. New
York: Da Capo Press, 1973), p. 13.
ofArt(Berkeley: Universityof California
15 Rudolf Arnheim,Towarda Psychology
Press, 1966), p. 39.
16 This indicatescraftin the sense defined by R. G. Collingwood in hisPrinciplesof
Art.
17 It would appear that there are several historiesof a language in addition to
expansion directlytraceable to literaryintroductions,from major shiftsof the
"Grimm's Law" type, to refinementsof logical significanceby philosophical
critique,or coinages made to name new developmentsin the materialor institutionalfields.Nevertheless,it is altogetherpossiblethata 'literary'aspect could be
found to play a role even here, though this would involve some considerable
discussion to establishclearly.
reading ... that search for the
p. 160: .. . transcendent
18 See Of Grammatology,
signifiedwhich we here put in question, not to annul it, but to understand it
withina systemto which such a reading is blind."
(New Haven: Yale UniversityPress, 1967),
in Interpretation
19 E. D. Hirsch,Validity
p. 95.
du langagepoitique(Paris: Flammarion, 1966), p. 76.
20 Jean Cohen, Structure
21 Barbara HerrnsteinSmith,On theMarginsofDiscourse(Chicago: Universityof
Chicago Press, 1978), p. 67.
WerkeBd. VIII (Leipzig: Alfred Kroner, 1919), p. 360.
22 Nietzsche's

23

"On the bridge I stood

Justa brieftime past in a brown night.
From far offcame singing:
In golden drops it welled
Across the tremblingsurface.
Gondolas, lights,musicDrunkenlyit swam out into the dusk ...

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M L N

955

My soul, a lyre,
Invisiblymoved, sang itself
In secrecyan accompanyinggondolier tune,
Trembling in the fullcolours of bliss.
-Was there anyone who listened?"
Werke,Bd. II (Stuttgart:W. Kohlhammer: 1951),
24 FriedrichHdlderlin,Sdmtliche
p. 290:
"Higher Humanity"
Meaning to men is inwardlygiven,
That theyshould know and choose the best,
It is the goal, it is true living,
In which the mindfulcount life'syears.

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