RULE 99: Adoption and Custody of

Minors
Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948,
June 27, 2006 (Special Proceedings Adoption:
Consent and Abandonment)

Facts: Diwata
Ramos
Landingin,
a
US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a
petition for the adoption of 3 minors,
natural children of Manuel Ramos, the
formers brother, and Amelia Ramos. She
alleged in her petition that when her
brother died, the children were left to their
paternal grandmother for their biological
mother went to Italy, re-married there and
now has 2 children by her second marriage
and no longer communicates from the time
she left up to the institution of the
adoption. After the paternal grandmother
passed away, the minors were being
supported by the petitioner and her
children abroad and gave their written
consent for their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a
Report recommending for the adoption and
narrated that Amelia, the biological mother
was consulted with the adoption plan and
after weighing the benefits of adoption to
her children, she voluntarily consented.
However, petitioner failed to present the
said social worker as witness and offer in
evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia
Ramos to the adoption. Petitioner also
failed
to
present
any
documentary
evidence to prove that Amelia assent to the
adoption.
Issue: WON a petition for adoption be
granted without the written consent of the
adoptees biological mother.
Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552,
provides that the consent of the biological
parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary
to the adoption. The written consent of the
legal guardian will suffice if the written
consent of the biological parents cannot be
obtained.
The general requirement of consent and
notice to the natural parents is intended to

protect the natural parental relationship

from
unwarranted
interference
by
interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to
safeguard the best interests of the child in
the manner of the proposed adoption.
The written consent of the biological
parents is indispensable for the validity of
the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural
right of a parent to his child requires that
his consent must be obtained before his
parental rights and duties may be
terminated and re-establish in adoptive
parents. In this case, petitioner failed to
submit the written consent of Amelia
Ramos to the adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect
and refusal to perform the filial and legal
obligations of love and support. Merely
permitting the child to remain for a time
undisturbed in the care of others is not
such abandonment. To dispense with the
requirements of consent, the abandonment
must be shown to have existed at the time
of adoption.
RULE 100: Rescission and Revocation
of Adoption
PARREO vs ARANZANSO
August 30, 1992
RULE 102: Habeas Corpus
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR
HABEAS CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO,
PN (MARINES) CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN
(MARINES) CAPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, PA
LT. SG JAMES LAYUG, PN CAPT. MILO
MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG ANTONIO
TRILLANES IV, PN HOMOBONO ADAZA, and
ROBERTO RAFAEL (ROEL) PULIDO
vs.
GEN. PEDRO CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO
ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO REYES, and SEC.
ROILO GOLEZ
G.R. No. 160792 August 25, 2005
FACTS: Early morning of 27 July 2003,
some 321 armed soldiers, led by the now
detained junior officers, entered and took
control of the Oakwood Premier Luxury
Apartments (Oakwood), an upscale

apartment complex, located in the business

district of Makati City. The soldiers
disarmed the security officers of Oakwood
and planted explosive devices in its
immediate surroundings. The junior officers
publicly renounced their support for the
administration
and
called
for
the
resignation of President Gloria MacapagalArroyo and several cabinet members.
Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the
soldiers voluntarily surrendered to the
authorities after several negotiations with
government emissaries. The soldiers later
defused the explosive devices they had
earlier planted. The soldiers then returned
to their barracks. On 31 July 2003, Gen.
Abaya, as the Chief of Staff of the AFP,
issued a directive to all the Major Service
Commanders to turn over custody of ten
junior officers to the ISAFP Detention
Center. The transfer took place while
military and civilian authorities were
investigating the soldiers involvement in
the Oakwood incident.
On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors
filed an Information for coup detat with the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
61, against the soldiers involved in the 27
July
2003
Oakwood
incident.
The
government prosecutors accused the
soldiers of coup detat as defined and
penalized under Article 134-A of the
Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as
amended. The case was docketed as
Criminal Case No. 03-2784. The trial court
later issued the Commitment Orders giving
custody of junior officers Lt. SG Antonio
Trillanes IV (Trillanes) and Capt. Gerardo
Gambala to the Commanding Officers of
ISAFP. On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya
issued a directive to all Major Service
Commanders to take into custody the
military personnel under their command
who took part in the Oakwood incident
except the detained junior officers who
were to remain under the custody of ISAFP.
Petitioners filed a petition for Habeas
Corpus before the CA, however the same
was denied. The Court of Appeals found the
petition bereft of merit. The appellate court

pointed out that the detainees are already

charged of coup detat before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati. Habeas corpus is
unavailing in this case as the detainees
confinement is under a valid indictment,
the legality of which the detainees and
petitioners do not even question.
ISSUE: WON the denial of the petition for
Habeas Corpus was valid
HELD: YES. For obvious reasons, the duty
to hear the petition for habeas corpus
necessarily includes the determination of
the propriety of the remedy. If a court finds
the alleged cause of the detention unlawful,
then it should issue the writ and release the
detainees. In the present case, after
hearing the case, the Court of Appeals
found that habeas corpus is inapplicable.
After actively participating in the hearing
before the Court of Appeals, petitioners are
estopped from claiming that the appellate
court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the
merits of their petition.
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that
the remedy of habeas corpus is not the
proper remedy to address the detainees
complaint against the regulations and
conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center.
The remedy of habeas corpus has one
objective: to inquire into the cause of
detention of a person. The purpose of the
writ is to determine whether a person is
being illegally deprived of his liberty.If the
inquiry reveals that the detention is illegal,
the court orders the release of the person.
If, however, the detention is proven lawful,
then the habeas corpus proceedings
terminate.
The use of habeas corpus is thus very
limited. It is not a writ of error. Neither can
it
substitute
for
an
appeal.
A mere allegation of a violation of ones
constitutional right is not sufficient. The
courts will extend the scope of the writ only
if any of the following circumstances is
present: (a) there is a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the unlawful
restraint of a person; (b) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c)

an excessive penalty is imposed and such

sentence is void as to the excess.

envelopes for inspection in the presence of

the detainees.

AS TO DENIAL OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL: The

scheduled visiting hours provide reasonable
access to the detainees, giving petitioners
sufficient time to confer with the detainees.
The detainees right to counsel is not
undermined by the scheduled visits. Even
in the hearings before the Senate and the
Feliciano Commission, petitioners were
given time to confer with the detainees, a
fact
that
petitioners
themselves admit.23 Thus, at no point were
the detainees denied their right to counsel.

RULE 103: Change of Name

AS TO INHUMANE PUNISHMENT: The

boarding of the iron grills is for the
furtherance of security within the ISAFP
Detention Center. This measure intends to
fortify the individual cells and to prevent
the detainees from passing on contraband
and weapons from one cell to another. The
boarded grills ensure security and prevent
disorder and crime within the facility. The
diminished illumination and ventilation are
but discomforts inherent in the fact of
detention,
and
do
not
constitute
punishments on the detainees.
The limitation on the detainees physical
contacts with visitors is a reasonable, nonpunitive
response
to
valid
security
concerns.
AS
TO
RIGHT
TO
PRIVACY
OF
COMMUNICATION: The letters alleged to
have been read by the ISAFP authorities
were not confidential letters between the
detainees and their lawyers. The petitioner
who received the letters from detainees
Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely
acting as the detainees personal courier
and not as their counsel when he received
the letters for mailing. In the present case,
since the letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and
their lawyers, the officials of the ISAFP
Detention Center could read the letters. If
the
letters
are
marked
confidential
communication between the detainees and
their lawyers, the detention officials should
not read the letters but only open the

Republic of the Philippines

vs.
Court of Appeals and Cynthia Vicencio
G.R. No. 88202 December 14, 1998
Facts : The petitioner was born at Capitol
Medical Center in Quezon City on January
19, 1971 to parents Pablo Castro Vicencio
and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres. On
January 10, 1927, after a marital
disagreement,
Vicencio
left
their
Meycauayan Bulacan conjugal property and
never returned nor gave support to his
family. Leabres found an ally in Ernesto Yu
who would later end up as her husband. On
June 29, 1976, Leabres filed a petition ,
known as Civil case number E-02009 with
the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
for the dissolution of her conjugal
partnership with Vicencio. In a decision
given by Hon Regina C. Ordoez Benitez
dated July 11, 1977, the petition was
granted. The petitioners mother filed
another petition in 1983 to drop the
surname of her husband therefrom and
this, known as Special Proclamation
8316346 was again approved in a decision
rendered by Hon. Emeterio C. Cui of Branch
XXV. Yet again, under Special Proclamation
number 84-22605, Leabres filed a petition
to declare Pablo Vicencio an absentee. Hon.
Corona Ibay- Somera decided in favour of
the petitioners mother on April 26, 1984.
The positive results of these petitions
paved the way for the marriage of the
petitioners mother and Ernesto Yu on April
15, 1986.
Evidence
was
established
that
the
petitioner had not remembered much her
real father, Pablo Vicencio, and that in his
absence, it was Ernesto Yu who had taken
Vicencios place. Although petitioner uses
the surname Vicencio in her school and
other related activities, she contends that
in such situations, confusion arose as to her

parentage leading to inquiries as to why

she is using Vicencio as surname ; causing
much embarrassment on her part. In two
occasions when she ran as a beauty
contestant for Lions Club Affair and Manila
Red Cross, her name was registered as
Cynthia L. Yu. His stepfather had given his
consent thereto upon prior consultation
with him.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) ,
having
participated
in
the
cross
examination of Cynthia Vicencio and her
witnesses, manifested opposition over the
petition. The court argued that there was
no valid cause for the denial of the petition
and that taking into account the fact that
the court cannot compel the stepfather of
the petitioner to consider adoption , failure
to observe the process should not be a
cause for disallowing petitioner to legally
change her name, in addition to the
opportunity of the respondent to improve
her personality and welfare under a socially
recognized surname, that of her stepfather.
On August 31, 1987, the Manila Regional
Trial Court Branch 52 granted private
respondent Cynthia Vicencios petition for
change of surname from Vicencio to Yu. The
same was affirmed by the decision of the
Court of Appeals dated April 28, 1989.
Issue : Whether or not the appellate court
made a mistake or violated standards in
affirming the decision of the trial court to
allow the change in private respondents
surname to that of her stepfathers
surname.
Decision : Recognized inter alia in
Republic vs. Hernandez, the following are
sufficient grounds to warrant a change in
name ; a) when the name is ridiculous,
dishonorable or extremely difficult to write
or pronounce , b) when the change is a
legal consequence of legitimation or
adoption , c. ) when the change will avoid
confusion , d) when one has continuously
used and been known since childhood by a
Filipino name and was unaware of an alien
parentage, e) when the change is based on
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to

erase sign of former alienage, in good faith

without prejudice to anybody and f) when
the surname causes embarrassment and
there is no showing that desired change of
name was far a fraudulent purpose or
would prejudice public interest.
Private respondent asserts that she falls
under one of the justifiable grounds,
specifically under avoidance of confusion
since she has been recognized by society
as the daughter of Ernesto Yu although she
admits to having used Vicencio in beauty
pagents and in her debut.
In the argument of the Solicitor General , it
argues that change in surname might give
rise to legal complications since her
stepfather has two other children with her
mother and such complications may affect
even the issue of inheritance should the
stepfather die.The OSG further argues that
change of name would be easy through
adoption which Ernesto Yu did not opt for.
The court contends that though confusion
may arise with regard to parentage , more
confusion with grave legal consequences
could arise if private respondent is to use
his stepfathers surname even if she is not
legally adopted by him. Legal constraints
lead
the
court
to
reject
private
respondents desire to use her step-fathers
surname and no assurance exists that the
end result would not be even more
detrimental to her person, as it may trigger
deeper inquiries regarding her parentage. It
is also noteworthy that as a result of
Republic Act 6809, the private respondent
although already 18 when the appellate
court rendered its decision , was still
considered a minor.
The court reversed and set aside the
appealed
decision
to
allow
private
respondents change of name from Vicencio
to Yu and granted the instant petition to
retain surname due to lack of legally
justifiable cause for allowing such change.

RULE 108: Cancellation

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES SILVERIO vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 174689, October 22, 2007

Facts: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio,

born and registered as a male, underwent
sex reassignment in Bangkok, Thailand, the
fact of which was certified here in the
Philippines by virtue of a medical certificate
issued by one Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz. He
then lived his life as a woman. On
November 26, 2002, Rommel filed a
petition for the change of his first name
and sex before the RTC of Manila. The court
having
underwent
the
jurisdictional
requirements, and
there
having no
opposition, the court proceeded with the
hearing where Rommel presented his
American Fiance as witness.
RTC gave due course to his petition, ruling
based on equity, that petitioners
misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is
not his own doing and should not be taken
against him and that no harm, injury or
prejudice will be caused to anybody if the
petition were to be granted. His name was
thus changed to Mely, and sex to female.
Republic filed a petition for certiorari in the
CA. The appellate court reversed the
decision of the RTC.
Petitioners claim / Issue:
Petitioner essentially claims that the
change of his name and sex in his birth
certificate is allowed under Articles 407 to
413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of
the Rules of Court and RA 9048.
Held: Petition is not meritorious.
Ratio decidendi:
1.)Change
of
Name,
primarily
Administrative in nature: Section
1 of RA 9048 provides in essence
that no entry in a civil register shall
be changed or corrected without a

judicial order, except for clerical or

typographical errors, which can be
changed by concerned city or
municipal civil registrar or consul
general. The jurisdiction therefore is
primarily lodged with these officers.
The intent and effect of the law is to
exclude the change of first name
from the coverage of Rules 103
(Change
of
Name)
and
108
(Cancellation or Correction of Entries
in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court,
until
and
unless
an
administrative petition for change of
name is first filed and subsequently
denied. In sum, the remedy and the
proceedings regulating change of
first
name
are
primarily
administrative in nature, not judicial.
Hence, the venue to which petitioner
filed is improper.

2.) Grounds for change of name: RA

9048 provides the grounds for which
change of first name may be
allowed: 1) petitioner finds the first
name or nickname to be ridiculous,
tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce; 2) The
new first name or nickname has
been habitually and continuously
used by the petitioner and he has
been publicly known by that first
name or nickname in the community;
or 3) The change will avoid
confusion.
From these grounds, it can be
gleaned that RA 9048 does not
sanction a change of first name on
the ground of sex reassignment.
Rather than avoiding confusion,
changing petitioners name for his
declared purpose may only create
grave complications. Before a person
can legally change his given name,
he
must
present
proper
or
reasonable cause or any compelling
reason justifying such change. In
addition, he must show that he will

be prejudiced by the use of his true

and official name. In this case, he
failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a
result of using his true and official
name.
3.)No Law Allows The Change of
Entry In The Birth Certificate As
To Sex On the Ground of Sex
Reassignment: By virtue of RA
9048, Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections
in entries in the civil register,
excluding
the
clerical
or
typographical error. Section 2 of RA
9048
provides
expressly
that
no correction must involve the
change of nationality, age, status
or sex of the petitioner.
The entries envisaged in Article 412
of the Civil Code and correctable
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
are those provided in Articles 407
and 408 of the Civil Code (*please
see the codal provisions). The acts,
events
or
factual
errors
contemplated under Article 407 of
the Civil Code include even those
that occur after birth. However, no
reasonable interpretation of the
provision can justify the conclusion
that it covers the correction on the
ground of sex reassignment.
4.)Purposes:
A. Correction - To correct simply
means "to make or set aright; to
remove the faults or error from"
while to change means "to
replace
something
with
something else of the same kind
or with something that serves as
a substitute." The birth certificate
of petitioner contained no error.
All entries therein, including those
corresponding to his first name
and sex, were all correct. No
correction is necessary.

B. Entry of Certain Acts under

Article 407 - Article 407 of the
Civil Code authorizes the entry in
the
civil
registry
of
certain acts (such
as
legitimations, acknowledgments
of
illegitimate
children
and
naturalization), events (such
as
births, marriages, naturalization
and
deaths)
and judicial
decrees (such
as
legal
separations,
annulments
of
marriage, declarations of nullity
of
marriages,
adoptions,
naturalization, loss or recovery of
citizenship,
civil
interdiction,
judicial determination of filiation
and changes of name). These
acts, events and judicial decrees
produce legal consequences that
touch upon the legal capacity,
status and nationality of a person.
Their
effects
are
expressly
sanctioned by the laws. In
contrast, sex reassignment is not
among those acts or events
mentioned in Article 407. Neither
is
it
recognized
nor
even
mentioned by any law, expressly
or impliedly.
5.) Status of a Person is permanent.
The status of a person in law
includes all his personal qualities and
relations, more or less permanent
in
nature,
not
ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such
as
his
being
legitimate
or
illegitimate, or his being married or
not.
The
comprehensive
term status include such matters
as the beginning and end of legal
personality, capacity to have rights
in general, family relations, and its
various aspects, such as birth,
legitimation, adoption, emancipation,
marriage, divorce, and sometimes
even
succession.
(emphasis
supplied)
For these reasons, while petitioner may
have succeeded in altering his body and

appearance through the intervention of

modern surgery, no law authorizes the
change of entry as to sex in the civil
registry for that reason. Thus, there is no

legal basis for his petition for the correction

or change of the entries in his birth
certificate.