Professional Documents
Culture Documents
08
12
March
--------------------------------------------------Question
1--------------------------------------------------Boston Beer, in response to consumers preference changes to more flavorful
and bitter tasting brews, was founded in 1894. Boston Beer implements a
quality at any cost strategy with a strong emphasis on product differentiation
and implementing quality ingredients into its products. For instance, Boston
Beer was the first company to employ a stamped freshness date on its bottles
and ingredients are imported from around the world. Additionally, Boston Beer
relies heavily on contract brewing to gain competitive advantages. Boston
Beers contract brewing strategy results in lower overhead and transportation
costs, as well as greater manufacturing flexibility. The expenses Boston Beer
saves through contract brewing allows for an increased marketing budget and
intensive sales force, which is greatly important for differentiating products in a
saturated market. Boston Beers strategy appears to be paying off; from 1990 to
1995, its geometric average sales growth and gross margin were 40.4% and
54.4%, respectively. However, Boston Beer is less efficient that some of its
competitors; its operating margin of 6.7% is nearly four times lower than
Redhook Ale Brewing Companybut its margin is greater than Petes Brewing
Company.
--------------------------------------------------Question
2--------------------------------------------------Benefits of an IPO
Access to public capital markets will provide Boston Beer with a continual
source of equity funds to expand sales while maintaining a low leverage
ratio.
The IPO will provide an exit strategy for the companys current investors.
The publicity from the IPO offering will benefit the company with
marketing and sales, particularly in new markets where they do not
currently have brand recognition.
Disadvantages of an IPO
The company will face underwriting costs associated with the IPO.
A failed IPO could be costly both in financial assets and in firm reputation.
Incorporating the company may have negative tax implications for the
current owners.
Current shareholders who do not exit during the IPO will face severe
dilution.
Conclusion
3-5
(Exhibit
that net sales as of September 30, 1995 represent 75% of expected year-end
revenue. Because the firms IPO will most likely have a more positive impact on
Q4 sales than this estimate projects, if anything, the prices generated by our
models are underestimated, not overestimated.
Cost of Debt:
outstanding debt carrying interest rates upwards of 11.5%. Based upon the
firms low target leverage of 5%, low degree of operating leverage, and
favorable credit history and financial outlook, the model assumes a cost of debt
in line with AAA corporate debt at 7.02%. This estimate seems reasonable and
fairly flat yield curve. Due to the relatively short forecast period and the shortterm risk characteristics of this industry, the model uses the six-month rate as
the risk free rate in calculating the cost of equity.
1995 Net Working Capital Requirement:
change in NWC over 1996, the model assumes 1995s year-end NWC is
composed of the existing September 30, 1995 balance plus 10% of fourth
quarter net sales due to the firms recapitalization strategy.
CAPX:
be very similar to, if not exactly the same as, its book value.
--------------------------------------------------Question
6--------------------------------------------------The underwriting prospectus for the IPO suggests a share price of $12.50 per
share, which is the starting point for analyzing the different scenarios. In order
to determine the scenario that was most realistic, we attempted to rule out the
ones that were not and a summary of our analysis is found in Exhibit 4.
(1)
The offering
presents information about almost 1.5 million shares offered in the IPO from
current stockholders. It is unlikely that management are willing to offer shares at
$12.50 if the fair market value really is $29 per share, thus weakening the belief
in the second scenario.
(2)
We also used industry growth trends to compare the expected sales of BBC
each scenario. The results allowed us to rule out the third scenario because the
sales forecasted in 2000 are less than half of what we would expect with
conservative assumptions of the craft industry growth. The other two scenarios
were fairly close to the expected revenues in 2000.
(4)
The second scenario was ruled out when analyzing the growth trends of
BBC in recent years. BBC has already undergone rapid growth and we expect
that high growth phase to taper off sooner rather than later. Ten more years of
high growth is unreasonable and unrealistic.
Lastly, the second scenario can be ruled out again when looking at
revenues projected for 2006. If the craft brewing industry grew to ten percent of
the total domestic beer market by 2006, which is an aggressive assumption,
then BBC would have to double its current percentage of market share in the
craft industry. We also find that assumption fairly unreasonable due to the
competitive nature of the craft industry now and into the future.
Conclusion
Scenario 1s price of $12.19 seems most realistic due to the consensus of the
above methodologies. Its implied, intrinsic PE ratio is in line with growth
sentiments in the market; information asymmetry in equity markets implies that
the firm would make an offering at a price that accurately reflects firm value
given insider information (the closest being scenario 1s estimated price);
analyst estimates of industry growth and BBCs market share are close to
scenario 1s projected revenue trends; finally, scenario 1s growth trends
accurately reflect BBCs slow decline from high-growth to maturity. In
conclusion, scenario 1 seems most likely.
Exhibit 1
Exhibit 2
Exhibit 3: Scenario 1
Exhibit 3: Scenario 2
Exhibit 3: Scenario 3
Exhibit 4