Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Basco v. PAGCOR
G.R. No. 91649, May 14, 1991
FACTS:
On July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to regulate and
centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law. Petitioners
contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes and
legal fees, and that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy.
Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder, from paying any "tax of
any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether
National or Local."
ISSUE:
Whether or not a Local Government Unit (LGU) can tax an instrumentality of the National
Government.
RULING:
No, LGUs have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. A local government
does not have the inherent power to tax. The Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to
confer that power or the municipality cannot assume it. Its power to tax therefore must always
yield to a legislative act which is superior having passed upon by the state itself which has the
inherent power to tax.
Municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress, which can create and abolish municipal
corporations due to its general legislative powers. Congress, therefore, has the power of control over
Local governments. If Congress can grant the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for
exemptions or even take back the power. The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees"
is always subject to "limitations" which Congress may provide by law.
statutory prohibition on the imposition of any lien or holdback on their revenue shares, because such
withholding is "temporary in nature pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Coordination Committee of the emerging fiscal situation."
ISSUE:
Whether or not: (a) Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their expenditures by
25 percent; and (b) Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their internal
revenue allotments, are valid exercises of the President's power of general supervision over local
governments.
RULING:
Yes, Section 1 of AO 372 is a valid exercise of the Presidents power of general supervision over local
governments. The provision is merely an advisory to prevail upon local executives to recognize the
need for fiscal restraint in a period of economic difficulty While the wordings of Section 1 of AO 372
have a rather commanding tone, the directive to "identify and implement measures x x x that will
reduce total expenditures x x x by at least 25% of authorized regular appropriation" is merely
advisory in character, and does not constitute a mandatory or binding order that interferes with local
autonomy. No legal sanction may be imposed upon LGUs and their officials who do not follow such
advice.
Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is
the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no
less than the Constitution. The Local Government Code[ specifies further that the release shall be
made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter of the year and "shall not
be subject to any lien or holdback that may be imposed by the national government for whatever
purpose." As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a compulsory
meaning. The provision is, therefore, imperative.
Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1, 1998, of 10 percent of the
LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating
Committee of the emerging fiscal situation" in the country. Such withholding clearly contravenes the
Constitution and the law. Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means
"something held back or withheld, often temporarily." Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention
by the national government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.
In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory effected in times of national crisis,
Section 4 thereof has no color of validity at all.
Respondents contend that the assailed provisos and resolutions issued by the Oversight Committee
are not constitutionally infirm, alleging that the constitutional phrase "as determined by law" means
that there exists no limitation on the power of Congress to determine what is the "just share" of the
LGUs in the national taxes. In other words, Congress is the arbiter of what should be the "just share"
of the LGUs in the national taxes. They further theorize that Section 285 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 was not intended to be a fixed determination of their "just share" in the national taxes.
Congress may enact other laws, including appropriations laws such as the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and
2001, providing for a different sharing formula. Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991
was merely intended to be the "default share" of the LGUs to do away with the need to determine
annually by law their "just share." However, the LGUs have no vested right in a permanent or fixed
percentage as Congress may increase or decrease the "just share" of the LGUs in accordance with
what it believes is appropriate for their operation. There is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits
Congress from making such determination through the appropriations laws. If the provisions of a
particular statute, the GAA in this case, are within the constitutional power of the legislature to enact,
they should be sustained whether the courts agree or not in the wisdom of their enactment.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the assailed provisos contained in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001, and the OCD
resolutions infringe the Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
RULING:
Yes, the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions infringe the
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
The provisos violate the constitutional precept on local autonomy. The entire process involving the
distribution and release of the LGSEF is constitutionally impermissible. The LGSEF is part of the IRA or
"just share" of the LGUs in the national taxes. To subject its distribution and release to the vagaries of
the implementing rules and regulations, including the guidelines and mechanisms unilaterally
prescribed by the Oversight Committee from time to time, as sanctioned by the assailed provisos in
the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions, makes the release not automatic, a
flagrant violation of the constitutional and statutory mandate that the "just share" of the LGUs "shall
be automatically released to them." The LGUs are, thus, placed at the mercy of the Oversight
Committee.
Further, the assailed provisos in the GAAs of 1999, 2000 and 2001 and the OCD resolutions cannot
amend Section 285 of the Local Government Code of 1991. The contentions that the Constitution
does not specify that the "just share" of the LGUs shall only be determined by the Local Government
Code of 1991, and that it is within the power of Congress to enact other laws, including the GAAs, to
increase or decrease the "just share" of the LGUs, are untenable. The Local Government Code of
1991 is a substantive law. While it is conceded that Congress may amend any of the provisions
therein, it may not do so through appropriations laws or GAAs. Any amendment to the Local
Government Code of 1991 should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law, because
Congress cannot include in a general appropriation bill matters that should be more properly enacted
in a separate legislation.
Increasing or decreasing the IRA of the LGUs or modifying their percentage sharing therein, which are
fixed in the Local Government Code of 1991, are matters of general and substantive law. To permit
Congress to undertake these amendments through the GAAs would be to give Congress the
unbridled authority to unduly infringe the fiscal autonomy of the LGUs, and thus put the same in
jeopardy every year. This, the Court cannot sanction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a local government unit can, under the Local Government Code, impel a
condominium corporation to pay business taxes.
RULING:
No, condominium corporations are generally exempt from local business taxation under the Local
Government Code, irrespective of any local ordinance that seeks to declare otherwise.
Local tax on businesses is authorized under Section 143 of the Local Government Code. The word
"business" itself is defined under Section 131(d) of the Code as "trade or commercial activity
regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit."
It can be elicited from the Condominium Act that a condominium corporation is precluded by statute
from engaging in corporate activities other than the holding of the common areas, the administration
of the condominium project, and other acts necessary, incidental or convenient to the
accomplishment of such purposes. Neither the maintenance of livelihood, nor the procurement of
profit, fall within the scope of permissible corporate purposes of a condominium corporation under
the Condominium Act. Even though the Corporation is empowered to levy assessments or dues from
the unit owners, these amounts collected are not intended for the incurrence of profit by the
Corporation or its members, but to shoulder the multitude of necessary expenses that arise from the
maintenance of the Condominium Project
The City Treasurer nonetheless contends that the collection of these assessments and dues are "with
the end view of getting full appreciative living values" for the condominium units, and as a result,
profit is obtained once these units are sold at higher prices. The Court cites with approval the two
counterpoints raised by the Court of Appeals in rejecting this contention. First, if any profit is
obtained by the sale of the units, it accrues not to the corporation but to the unit owner. Second, if
the unit owner does obtain profit from the sale of the corporation, the owner is already required to
pay capital gains tax on the appreciated value of the condominium unit.
The Court shudders at the thought of upholding tax liability on the basis of the standard of "full
appreciative living values", a phrase that defies statutory explication, commonsensical meaning, the
English language, or even definition from Google. "Full appreciative living values" is nothing but
blather in search of meaning, and to impose a tax hinged on that standard is both arbitrary and
oppressive.
Again, whatever capacity the Corporation may have pursuant to its power to exercise acts of
ownership over personal and real property is limited by its stated corporate purposes, which are by
themselves further limited by the Condominium Act. A condominium corporation, while enjoying such
powers of ownership, is prohibited by law from transacting its properties for the purpose of gainful
profit.
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) operates the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Complex
in Paraaque City. As operator of the international airport, MIAA administers the land, improvements
and equipment within the NAIA Complex. The MIAA Charter transferred to MIAA approximately 600
hectares of land, including the runways and buildings (Airport Lands and Buildings) then under the
Bureau of Air Transportation. The MIAA Charter further provides that no portion of the land
transferred to MIAA shall be disposed of through sale or any other mode unless specifically approved
by the President of the Philippines. The Office of the Government Corporate Counsel issued Opinion
No. 061, in which it said that the Local Government Code of 1991 withdrew the exemption for real
estate tax granted to MIAA under Section 21 of the MIAA charter. Therefore, MIAA was held to be
delinquent in paying its taxes. The City of Paraaque levied upon the properties of MIAA, and posted
invitations for public biddings of MIAAs properties. The City of Paraaque averred that Section 193 of
the Local Government code expressly withdrew tax exemptions from government owned and
controlled corporations (GOCCs).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax under
existing laws.
RULING:
Yes, MIAA's Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local
governments. First, MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but
an instrumentality of the National Government and thus exempt from local taxation. MIAA is a
government instrumentality vested with corporate powers to perform efficiently its governmental
functions. MIAA is like any other government instrumentality; the only difference is that MIAA is
vested with corporate powers. Second, the real properties of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the
Philippines and thus exempt from real estate tax. Section 234(a) of the Local Government Code
exempts from real estate tax any "[r]eal property owned by the Republic of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the RTCs denial of Cebu Citys Omnibus Motion to Modify
Judgment and to be Allowed to Withdraw from the Expropriation Proceedings.
2. Whether or not the deposit of Cebu City with the Philippine Postal Bank, appropriated for a
different purpose by its Sangguniang Panglungsod, can be subject to garnishment as payment for
the expropriated lot covered by City Ordinance.
RULING:
1. No, the CA did not err in affirming the RTCs Order that the expropriation case had long been final
and executory. Consequently, both the Order of expropriation and the Order fixing just compensation
by the RTC can no longer be modified. In short, Cebu City cannot withdraw from the expropriation
proceedings. A final order sustaining the right to expropriate the property may be appealed by any
party aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall not prevent the court from determining the just
compensation to be paid.
Expropriation proceedings speak of two stages: (1) Determination of the authority of the plaintiff to
exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of its exercise; and (2) Determination of the
just compensation for the property.
An order by the trial court fixing just compensation does not affect a prior order of expropriation. As
applied to the case at bar, Cebu City can no longer ask for modification of the judgment, much less,
withdraw its complaint, after it failed to appeal even the first stage of the expropriation proceedings.
Cebu City is misguided to say that it should be allowed to withdraw its complaint as the just
compensation is too high, and the intended expropriation of the property is dependent on whether
Cebu City would have sufficient funds to pay for the same. It is well-settled in jurisprudence that the
determination of just compensation is a judicial prerogative.
2. No. While the claim of the Spouses Ortega against Cebu City is valid, the RTC cannot, by itself,
order the City Council of Cebu City to enact an appropriation ordinance in order to satisfy its
judgment. The proper remedy is to file a mandamus case against Cebu City in order to compel its
Sangguniang Panglungsod to enact an appropriation ordinance for the satisfaction of the claim. It is
a settled rule that government funds and properties may not be seized under writs of execution or
garnishment to satisfy judgments, based on obvious consideration of public policy.
While the Sangguniang Panglungsod of petitioner enacted Ordinance No. 1519 appropriating the sum
of P3,284,400 as just compensation, such ordinance cannot be considered as a source of authority
for the RTC to garnish Cebu Citys bank account with Philippine Postal Bank, which was already
appropriated for another purpose. Cebu Citys account with Philippine Postal Bank was not
specifically opened for the payment of just compensation nor was it specifically appropriated by
Ordinance No. 1519 for such purpose. Said account, therefore, is exempt from garnishment.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the CTA En Banc was correct in ruling that it did not have jurisdiction over the
case.
2. Whether or not the imposition of the fees in Ordinance No. 18 is ultra vires.
RULING:
1. Yes, the CTA En Banc correctly dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction. RA No. 1125, as
amended by RA No. 9282, created the Court of Tax Appeals which vests the CTA with the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over "decisions, orders or resolutions of the Regional Trial Courts in local tax
cases xxx." The question now is whether the trial court resolved a local tax case in order to fall
within the ambit of the CTAs appellate jurisdiction. This question, in turn, depends ultimately on
whether the fees imposed under Ordinance No. 18 are in fact taxes. The Court finds that such are
not taxes.
Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that "each local government unit shall have the
power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges xxx. Such taxes,
fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local government."
Consistent with this
constitutional mandate, the LGC grants the taxing powers to each local government unit. The LGC
defines the term "charges" as referring to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or
property, while the term "fee" means "a charge fixed by law or ordinance for the regulation or
inspection of a business or activity." Since the main purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate
certain construction activities of the identified special projects, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18
are primarily regulatory in nature, and not primarily revenue-raising. While the fees may contribute
to municipal revenues, this effect is merely incidental. Thus, the fees imposed are not taxes.
2. No, the imposition of the fees in Ordinance No. 18 is not ultra vires. SMART argues that the
Municipality exceeded its power to impose taxes and fees as provided the LGC. SMART maintains that
the mayors permit fees in Ordinance No. 18 (equivalent to 1% of the project cost) are not among
those expressly enumerated in the LGC. It has been established that the fees are not taxes.
Logically, the imposition does not appear in the enumeration of taxes under Section 143 of the LGC.
Moreover, even if the fees do not appear in Section 143 or in the LGC, the Municipality is empowered
to impose taxes, fees and charges, not specifically enumerated in the LGC or taxed under the Tax
Code or other applicable law.
The contention that the Municipality is encroaching on the regulatory powers of the National
Telecommunications Commission (NTC) is untenable. Ordinance No. 18 aims to regulate the "placing,
stringing, attaching, installing, repair and construction of all gas mains, electric, telegraph and
telephone wires, conduits, meters and other apparatus" within the Municipality. The fees are not
imposed to regulate the administrative, technical, financial, or marketing operations of
telecommunications entities; rather, to regulate the installation and maintenance of physical
structures, which is an exercise of the police power of the Municipality. Clearly, the Municipality does
not encroach on NTCs regulatory powers. The Court likewise rejects SMARTs contention that the
power to fix the fees for the issuance of development permits and locational clearances is exercised
by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB). Suffice it to state that the HLURB itself
recognizes the local government units power to collect fees related to land use and development.