Notes and cases in political law 1

(volume ii, june 2008 edition for the september 2008 bar examinations)
(bill of rights)

Prepared by:
Atty. Larry d. Gacayan
professor of law
(political law review, constitutional law 1 & 2))
University of the cordilleras-bcf, baguio city
June 2008
Pre-bar reviewer
Crc review center
Baguio city branch, baguio city
Baguio power-haus bar review center
Baguio city
******************************************************
Chapter i
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE
(police power)
1. Define:
A. Police power---is the power vested in the legislature by the constitution to make, ordain,
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws for the good and welfare of the state
and its people. (ermita malate hotel vs. City mayor, july 31, 1967)
The basic purposes of police power are:
a. To promote the general welfare, comfort and convenience of the people; (association
of small landowners vs. Secretary, 175 scra 343; us vs. Toribio, 15 phil. 85
b. To promote and preserve public health; (villanueva vs. Castaneda, september 21, 1987;
decs vs. San diego, 180 scra 533 [nmat]; lorenzo vs. Director of health, 50 phil. 595
apprehend and confine lepers in a leprosarium)
Professional regulations commission vs. Arlene de guzman, et al.,
june 21, 2004
Police power/public health; the right to practice a
profession
Facts:
after the professional regulations commission (prc) released the names of successful examinees
in the medical licensure examination, the board of medicines observed that the grades of the 79 fatima
college of medicine successful examinees were unusually and exceptionally high in the two (2) most
difficult subjects of the exam, i.e., biochemistry and obstetrics and gynecology.
the board then issued resolution no. 19 withholding the registration as physicians of all the
examinees from fatima college of medicine. Compared with other examines from other schools, the
results of those from fatima were not only incredibly high but unusually clustered close to each other. The
nbi investigation found that the fatima examinees gained early access to the test questions.
on july 5, 1993, the respondents-examinees filed a petition for mandamus before the rtc of manila
to compel the prc to give them their licenses to practice medicine. Meanwhile on july 21, 1993, the board
of medicine issued resolution no. 21 charging the respondents of immorality, dishonest conduct, fraud and
deceit and recommended that the test results of the fatima examinees be nullified.
on december 19, 1994, the rtc of manila promulgated its decision ordering the prc to allow the
respondents to take the physicians oath and to register them as physicians. The same was appealed by
the prc to the court of appeals which sustained the rtc decision.
1

Exclusively for UC Bar Examinees and Students

hence, this petition.

Held:
it must be stressed that the power to regulate the practice of a profession or pursuit of an
occupation cannot be exercised by the state in an arbitrary, despotic or oppressive manner. However, the
regulating body has the right to grant or forbid such privilege in accordance with certain conditions.
but like all rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution, their exercise may be regulated
pursuant to the police power of the state to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety, and
general welfare of the people. As such, mandamus will not lie to compel the board of medicine to issue
licenses for the respondents to practice medicine.
ra 2382 which prescribes the requirements for admission to the practice of medicine, the
qualifications of the candidates for the board examination, the scope and conduct of the examinations, the
grounds for the denying of the issuance of a physicians license, or revoking a license that has been
issued. It is therefore clear that the examinee must prove that he has fully complied with all the conditions
and requirements imposed by law and the licensing authority to be granted the privilege to practice
medicine. In short, he shall have all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications. The petition is
therefore granted.
c. To promote and protect public safety; (agustin vs. Edu, 88 scra 195; taxicab operators
vs. Juinio, 119 scra 897 )
d. To maintain and safeguard peace and order; (guazon vs. De villa)
e. To protect public morals; (de la cruz vs. Paras, 123 scra 569; ermita malate hotel vs.
City mayor, july 31, 1967; jmm promotions vs. Ca, 260 scra 319; velasco vs. Villegas,
february 13, 1983)
f. To promote the economic security of the people. (ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 phil. 11155)
Not a valid exercise of police power:
a. City government of qc vs. Ericta, 122 scra 759; (6%)
b. Ynot vs. Iac, 148 scra 659; the director of animal industry or the chairman if the national
meat commission may dispose of the carabeef to charitable agencies as he may deem fit.
This is oppressive and unreasonable since the owner is denied due process of law and he is
given so much discretion as the law is not complete in itself nor is there a standard to guide
the official.
c. De la cruz vs. Paras, 123 scra 569
B. Power of eminent domain
3. Power of taxation
2. Differences and similarities
Didipio earth savers multi purpose association vs. Denr sec. Elisea
gozu, et al., 485 scra 586
Chico-nazario, j.
1. The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the state to condemn or to
take private property for public use upon payment of just compensation while
police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining
and regulating the use of liberty and property without compensation;
2. In the exercise of police power, enjoyment of a property is restricted because the
continued use thereof would be injurious to public welfare. In such case, there is
no compensable taking provided none of the property interests is appropriated
for the use or for the benefit of the public. Otherwise, there should be
compensable taking if it would result to public use.
3. Properties condemned under police power are usually noxious or intended for
noxious purpose; hence , no compensation shall be paid. Likewise, in the
exercise of police power, property rights of private individuals are subjected to
restraints and burdens in order to secure the general comfort, health and
prosperity of the state.
While the power of eminent domain often results in the appropriation of title to or possession of
property, it need not always be the case. Taking may include trespass without actual eviction of the owner,

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material impairment of the value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses for which the property
was intended such as the establishment of an easement.
As such, an imposition of burden over a private property through easement (by the government)
is considered taking; hence, payment of just compensation is required. The determination of just
compensation, however, is a judicial function (epza vs. Dulay, 149 scra 305) and initial determinations on
just compensation by the executive department and congress cannot prevail over the courts findings.
Finally, service contracts with foreign corporations is not prohibited under the 1987 philippine
constitution with foreign corporations or contractors would invest in and operate and manage extractive
enterprises, subject to the full control and supervision of the state; this time, however, safety measures
were put in place to prevent abuses of the past regime.
3. Limitations in the exercise of said powers
4. Tests for a valid exercise of police power
a. The interests of the public, not mere particular class, require the exercise of police
power; (lawful subject)
b. The means employed is reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive to individuals. (lawful means). In short, the end
does not justify the means.
5. Read:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.

Jmm promotions vs. Ca, 260 scra 319

Ermita-malate hotel vs. Mayor of manila, july 31, 1967;
Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 phil. 1155
Churchill vs. Rafferty, 32 phil. 580
People vs. Pomar, 46 phil. 447
Us vs. Toribio, 15 phil. 85
Velasco vs. Villegas, february 13, 1983
Iloilo ice & cold storage vs. Municipal council, 24 phil. 471
Agustin vs. Edu, 88 scra 195
Ynot vs. Iac, 148 scra 659
Restituto ynot vs. The itermediate appellate court, g.r. no.
74457,march 20, 1987
Cruz, j.
Facts:
1. On january, 13, 1984, ynot transported six carabaos by using a pumpboat from
masbate to iloilo. The six carabaos, were, however, confiscated by the police station
commander of baratoc nuevo, iloilo for alleged violation of executive order no. 626-a
which prohibits the inter-provincial transporting of carabaos and carabeefs which does
not comply with the provisions of executive no.626;
2. That section 1 of the said law provides that "henceforth, no carabaos regardless of
age, sex physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one
province to another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of the said law shall
be subjected to confiscation and forfeiture by the government to be distributed to
charitable institution and similar institutions as the chairman of the national meat
inspection commission may see fit in the case of the carabeef, and to deserving farmers
through the dispersal of the director of animal industry, in the case of carabaos;
3. Ynot filed a suit for recovery and the carabao were returned to him upon the issuance
of a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersede as bond in the amount of p12,000.00;
4. After trial of the case, the judge upheld the validity of the act of the police station
commander in confiscating the carabaos. Ynot was ordered to returned the carabaos but
since he could not do so, the court ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court
refused to rule on the constitutionality of the said executive order on the ground of lack of
authority to do so and also because of its presumed validity;
5. The petitioner appealed to the iac but the said court upheld the decision of the trial
court. Hence this petition for review on certiorari before the supreme court where ynot
claimed that the penalty of confiscation is invalid the same was imposed without

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according the owner the right to be heard before a competent and impartial tribunal as
guaranteed by due process.
Issues:
1.
May a lower court (like the mtc, rtc, of the court of appeals) declare a law
unconstitutional?
2. Is executive order no. 626-a constitutional?
sub-issues under this are:
a. Was it a valid police power measure?
b. Was there an undue delegation of legislative power?
Held:
1.
While the lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining
constitutional question, they are not prevented from resolving the same whenever
warranted, subject only to review by the supreme court. This is so because under section
5,[2(a)], art. Viii, of the 1987 constitution provides that the supreme court has the power
to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal" or certiorari as the rules of court
may provide, final judgements and orders of the lower courts in all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. This simply means that lower courts may declare
whether or not a law is constitutional.
2. In order that a measure or law may be justified under the police power of the
state, it must meet two tests:
a. The subject must be lawful; and
b. The means employed is lawful.
since the prohibition of the slaughtering of carabaos except where they are at least 7
years old when male and at least 11 years old when female is in furtherance of the public
interest since said carabaos are very useful to the work at the farm, it is conceded
That the executive order meets the first test---- it has lawful subject.
but does the law meets the second requisite or test which is lawful method?
executive order no. 626-a imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughtering of
carabaos but on thier movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex,
physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another." the reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose
sought to be achieved by the question measure is missing. We do not see how the
prohibition of the inter-provincial transport can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter
considering that they can be killed any where, with no less difficulty in one province than
in the other. Obviously, retaining a carabao in one province will not prevent their slaughter
there, any more than moving them to another province will make it easier to kill them
there.
the law is unconstitutional because it struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old
guarantee of elementary fair play.
since the executive order in question is a penal law, then violation thereof should
be pronounce not by the police but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the
authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the
accused.
also, there is no reasonable guidelines or bases of the director of animal industry
or the chairman of the national meat inspection commission in the disposition of the
carabaos or carabeef other than what "they may see fit" which is very dangerous and
could result to opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even graft and corruption.
the executive order is, therefore, invalid and unconstitutional and not a valid
police power measure because the method employed to conserve carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse is unduly oppressive. Due
process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to
be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment

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on the administrative authorities (like the police) of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment of judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separatiion of powers.
also, there is undue delegation of legislative power to the officers mentioned
therein (director of animal industry and head of the national meat commission) because
they were given unlimited discretion in the distribution of the property confiscated.
k.
l.

Taxicab operators vs. Bot, 119 scra 597

Bautista vs. Juinio, 127 scra 329
Mary concepcion-bautista vs. Alfredo juinio, et al, 127 scra 329
Fernando, c.j.
Facts:
1. On may 31, 1979, president marcos issued letter of instruction no. 869 prohibiting the
use of private motor vehicles with h (heavy vehicles) and eh (extra heavy vehicles) on
week-ends and holidays from 12:00 a.m. Saturday morning to 5:00 a.m. Monday
morning, or 1:00 a.m. Of the holiday to 5:00 a.m. Of the day after the holiday. Motor
vehicles of the following classifications are however, exempted:
1. S----service;
2. T----truck;
3. Dpl--diplomatic;
4. Cc---consular corps; and
5. Tc---tourist cars
2. On june 11, 1979, the then commissioner of land transportation, romeo edu issued
circular no. 39 imposing "the penalties of fine, confiscation of vehicle and cancellation of
registration on owners of the above-specified found violating such letter of instructions";
3. Bautista is questioning the constitutionality of the loi and the implementing circular on
the grounds that:
A. The banning of h and eh vehicles is unfair, discriminatory, and arbitrary and thus
contravenes the equal protection clause; and
b. The loi denies the owners of h and eh vehicles of due process, more
specifically of their right to use and enjoy their private property and of their freedom to
travel and hold family gatherings, reunions, outings on week-ends and holidays, while
those not included in the prohibition are enjoying unrestricted freedom;
c. The circular violates the prohibition against undue delegation of legislative
power because the loi does not impose the penalty of confiscation.
Held:
1. It must be pointed out that the loi was promulgated to solve the oil crisis which
was besetting the country at that time. It was therefore a valid police power measure to
ensures the country's economy as a result of spiralling fuel prices. In the interplay of
bautista's right to due process and the exercise of police power by the state, the latter
must be given leeway. The police power is intended to promote public health, public
morals, public safety and general welfare.
2. The petitioners' claim that their right to equal protection was violated is without
basis. This is so because there is a valid classification in this case. Definitely, heavy and
extra-heavy vehicles consume more gasoline that the other kinds of vehicles and it is but
proper to regulate the use of those which consumes more gasoline. If all the owner of h
and eh vehicles are treated in the same fashion, or whatever restrictions cast on some in
the group is held equally binding on the rest, there is no violation of the equal protection
clause.
3. The penalty of "impounding" the vehicle as embodied in circular no. 39 has
no statutory basis. Therefore, it is not valid being an "ultra vires".

m. Association of small landowners vs. Secretary of agrarian reform, 175 scra 343
n. Decs vs. San diego, 180 scra 533

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o. Villanueva vs. Castaneda, september 21, 1987
5-a. Not a valid exercise of police power
city government of quezon city vs. Ericta, 122 scra 759
Chapter iidue process
Section 1---no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied equal
protection of the laws.
Kinds of due process:

a. Substantive due process---requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the
person to life, liberty or property. In short, it is to determine whether it has a valid governmental
objective like for the interest of the public as against mere particular class.
b. Procedural due process---one which hears before it condemns as pointed out by daniel webster.
Due process is a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders
judgment only after trial (per daniel webster in the dartmouth college case)
1. Requisites of judicial due process.
a. Banco espanol vs. Palanca, 37 phil. 921
Requisites:
1. There must be an impartial court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and decide the
matter before it;
2. Jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the property
subject of the proceedings;
3. The defendant must be given the opportunity to be heard;
4. Judgment must be rendered only after lawful hearing.
A. Galman vs. Pamaran (the 1st case)
b. Imelda marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, october 6, 1998
Imelda r. Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, g.r. no. 126995, october 6, 1998
Purisima, j.
Facts:
1. On june 8, 1984, imelda marcos and jose dans, as chairman and vice chairman of
the light railway transit authority (lrta) entered into a lease contract with the philippine
general hospital foundation (pghfi) involving an lrta property in pasay city for
p102,760.00 per month for 25 years;
2. On june 27,1984, the pghfi subleased the said property for p734,000.00 per month to
the transnational construction corporation represented by one ignacio jumenez;
3. After petitioners husband was deposed as president of the philippines, she and
dans were charged of alleged violation of section 3 [g] of ra 3019, otherwise known
as the anti-graft and corrupt practices act before the sandiganbayan;
4. After trial , the first division of the sandiganbayan failed to comply with the legal
requirement that all the 3 justices must be unanimous in its decision because justice
garchitorena and justice jose balajadia voted for the conviction of both accused while
justice narciso atienza voted to acquit them;
5. Thereafter, justice garchitorena as presiding justice issued administrative order no.
288-93 constituting a special division of five and designating justices augusto
amores and cipriano del rosario;
6. On september 21, 1993, justice amores wrote justice garchitorena that he be given
15 days his manifestation. On the same date, however, justice garchitorena
dissolved the division of 5 allegedly because he and justice balajadia had agreed to
the opinion of justice del rosario;
7. On september 24, 1993, a decision was rendered convicting the petitioner and dans
of violation of sec. 3 [g] of ra 3019;
8. On june 29, 1998, the third division of the supreme court by a vote of 3-2 affirmed the
conviction of the petitioner but acquitted dans;

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9. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration and at the same time prayed that
her motion be heard by the supreme court en banc claiming that her right to due
process of law, both substantive and procedural, was violated:
a.

as a result of the fact that she was convicted as a result of the alleged
disparity of the rentals agreed upon with pghfi and the subsequent sub-lease
contract between pghfi and transnational construction corporation; and
b. The first division convicted her after justice garchitorena dissolved the
special division of 5 after a lunch in a quezon city restaurant where they
agreed to convict her in one case and acquit her in her other cases. The said
meeting was attended by another justice who is not a member of the first
division or the special division in violation of the rules of the sandiganbayan
which requires that sessions of the court shall be done only in its principal
office in manila and that only justices belonging to the division should join the
deliberations.
Held:
the petitioner is hereby acquitted.
1. The great disparity between the rental price of the lease agreement signed by the
petitioner (p102,760.00 per month) and the sub-lease rental (p734,000.00 per month)
does not necessarily render the monthly rate of p102,760.00 manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government in the absence of any evidence using rentals of
adjacent properties showing that the rentals in the property subject of the lease
agreement is indeed very low. No evidence whatsoever was presented by the
prosecution regarding the rental rate of adjacent properties.. As such, the prosecution
failed to prove the guilt of the petitioner reasonable doubt.
2. The court notes likewise the bias and prejudice of presiding justice garchitorena
against the petitioner as shown by his leading, misleading and baseless hypothetical
questions of said justice to ramon f. Cuervo, witness for the petitioner. Said justice asked
179 questions to the witness as against the prosecutor who cross-examined the witness
which was 73. Said number of questions could no longer be described as clarificatory
questions. Another ground therefore for the acquittal of the petitioner is that she was
denied impartial trial before the sandiganbayan. This is one reason why the case could
no longer be remanded to the sandiganbayan especially so that the other sandiganbayan
justices in the special division of 5 have retired. There is therefore no compelling reason
why the case should still be remanded to the lower court when all the evidence are
already with the supreme court.
(note: the vote was 9-5 for acquittal. Cj narvasa, justices regalado, davide, jr., romero,
and panganiban voted for conviction while justice vitug was the only justice who voted for
the return of the case to the sandiganbayan to allow the corrections of the perceived
irregularities in the proceedings below.)
c.
d.
e.
f.

Dbp vs. Ca, january 29, 1999

Matuguina vs. Ca, 263 scra 490
People vs. Ca, 262 scra 452
Javier vs. Comelec, 144 scra 194

javier vs. Comelec

g.r. no.l- 68379-812, september 22, 1986
Facts:
1.
The petitioner evelio javier and the private respondent arturo pacificador were
candidates in antique for the batasang pambansa election in may 1984;
2. Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of the elections and the canvass of the
election returns, javier went to the comelec to prevent the impending proclamation of his
rival;
3. On may 18, 1984, the second division of the comelec directed the provincial board of
canvassers to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning
candidate until further orders;

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4. On june 7, 1984, the same second division ordered the board to immediately convene
and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the petition filed by javier
with the comelec;
5. On certiorari with the s.c. the proclamation made by the board of canvasser was set
aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5 - day period of appeal,
which the petitioner seasonably made;
6.
On july 23, 1984 the second division itself proclaimed pacificador the elected
assemblyman of antique.
Issue:
was the second division of the comelec, authorized to promulgate its decision of july
23, 1984 proclaiming pacificador the winner in the election ?
Applicable provisions of the consitution:
the applicable provisions of the 1973 constitution are art. Xii-c, secs. 2 and 3, which
provide:
"section 2. Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of all members of the batasang pambansa and elective
provincial and city officials."
"section 3. The commission on elections may sit en banc or in three
divisions. All election casesa may be heard and decided by divisions except
contests involving members of the batasang pambansa, which shall be heard
and decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall
be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for decision."
Contentions of the parties:
Petitioner:
the proclamation made by the second division is invalid because all contests involving
members of the batasang pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the commission on
elections en banc.
Respondents:
only "contests" need to be heard and decided en banc, all other cases can be - in
fact, should be - filed with and decided only by any of the three divisions.
there is a difference between "contests" and "cases" and also a difference between
"pre-proclamation controversies" and "election protests". The pre-proclamation
controversy between the petitioner and the private respondent was not yet a contest at
the time and therefore could be validly heard by a mere division of the commission on
elections, consonant with sec. 3. The issue at that stage was still administrative and could
be resolved by a division.
Held:
A. The s.c. decided to resolve the case even if the batasang pambansa had already
been abolished by the aquino government, and even if javier had already died in the
meantime. This was because of its desire for this case to serve as a guidance for the
future. Thus it said: "the supreme court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions
but also the conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but
we must also give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when
we cannot grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer
possible according to law. But there are also times when although the dispute has
disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands
that we act, then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also
for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future."
B. The s.c. held on the main issue that in making the comelec the sole judge of all
contests involving the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the batasang
pambansa and elective provincial and city officials, the constitution intended to give it full

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authority to hear and decide these cases from beginning to end and on all matter related
thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the winners.
the decision rendered by the second division alone was therefore set aside as
violative of the constitution. The case should have been decided en banc.
C.
Pre-proclamation controversies became known and designated as such only
because of sec. 175 of the 1978 election code. The 1973 constitution could not have
therefore been intended to have divided contests between pre and post proclamation
when that constitution was written in 1973.
D. The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it
should receive the widest possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used in
the constitution should be interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973 constitution, the
term should be understood as referring to any matter involving the title or claim of title to
an elective office, made before or after the proclamation of the winner, whether or not the
contestant is claiming the office in dispute.
E. There was also a denial of due process. One of the members of the second division,
commissioner jose opinion was a law partner of pacificador. He denied the motion to
disqualify him from hearing the case. The court has repeatedly and consistently
demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of
due process. To bolster that requirement we have held that the judge must not only be
impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that
his decision will be just.
Feliciano and melencio-herrera, concurring:
all election contests involving members of the batasang pambansa must be decided
by the commission on elections en banc under secs. 2 and 3 of art. Xii-c of the 1973
constitution. These sections do not distinguish between "pre-proclamation" and "postproclamation" contests nor between "cases" and "contests".
g. Azul vs. Castro, 133 scra 271
h. Paderanga vs. Azura, 136 scra 266
i. David vs. Aquilizan, 94 scra 707
j. Lorenzana vs. Cayetano, 78 scra 485 (respondent was not a party to the ejectment
case) so to enforce the decision on her violates her right to due process of law
k. Zambales chromite mining vs. Ca, 94 scra 261
l. Anzaldo vs. Clave, 119 scra 353
m. Singson vs. Nlrc, 273 scra 258
n. Anzaldo vs. Clave, 119 scra 353
o. Mayor alonte vs. Judge savellano, 287 scra 245
Mayor bayani alonte vs. Judge savellano, 287 scra 245
Vitug, j.
Mayor alonte of binan, laguna was charged of rape before branch 25, rtc of
laguna. However, as a result of a petition for a transfer of venue filed by the prosecution
and granted by the sc, his case was transferred to rtc branch 53, manila, presided over
by the respondent judge.
After the petitioners arraignment, the prosecution submitted an affidavit of
desistance signed by the private complainant juvie-lyn punongbayan where she prayed
for the withdrawal of the case because she is no longer interested in pursuing the same
with no intention of re-filing the said case in the future.
Pending resolution of the said motion to withdraw, the petitioner filed a motion for
bail. The same was not resolved despite several motions filed by the petitioner to resolve
the same.
On december 17, 1997, counsel for the petitioner, atty. Philip sigfrid fortun,
received a notice from the respondent judge notifying him of the promulgation of the
decision in this case despite the fact that the prosecution and the defense have not
presented their evidence in court.

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On december 18, 1997, the respondent judge issued a decision convicting the
petitioner of rape and sentenced to suffer a penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner was denied his right to due process of law.
Held:
In order that an accused in a criminal proceedings is deemed to have been given
the right to due process of law, the following requisites must be complied with before a
decision is rendered:
1. The court or tribunal trying the case is clothed with jurisdiction to hear and
determine the matter before it;

2.

That jurisdiction was lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
3. That the accused is given the opportunity to be heard; and
4. That judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing (people vs. Dapitan, 197
scra 378)
The act of the respondent judge in rendering a decision without even giving the
petitioner the right to adduce evidence in his behalf is a gross violation of his right to due
process of law. The decision rendered is null and void for want of due process.
p. Dbp vs. Ca, january 29, 1999
2. Procedural due process before administrative bodies
a. Tibay vs. Cir, 69 phil. 635
requisites:
a.
b.
c.
d.

e.
f.

g.

The right to a hearing which includes the right to present evidence;

The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
The decision must have something to support itself;
The evidence must be substantial;
The decision must be based on the evidence presented during the hearing;
The tribunal or body must act on its own independent consideration of the law or
facts;
The board or body shall in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a
manner that the parties to the proceedings can know the various issues involved.

b. American tobacco vs. Director, 67 scra 287

c. Manila electric company vs. Nlrc, 263 scra 531
d. Delgado vs. Ca, november 10, 1986
if an accused was represented by a non-lawyer during the trial (though he thought
that he was a lawyer), his right to due process was violated and therefore entitled to a new
trial.
3. Procedural due process in disciplinary actions against students
Academic freedom; due process in disciplinary actions
involving students
De la salle university vs. Court of appeals, hon.wilfredo d. Reyes, in his capacity as presiding
judge of branch 36, regional trial court of manila, the commission on higher education, the
department of education culture and sports, alvin aguilar, james paul bungubung, richard
reverente and roberto valdes, jr., g.r. no. 127980, december 19, 2007
Reyes, r.t., j.:
The facts:

11
private respondents alvin aguilar, james paul bungubung, richard reverente and roberto valdes, jr.
Are members of tau gamma phi fraternity who were expelled by the de la salle university (dlsu) and
college of saint benilde (csb)2[1] joint discipline board because of their involvement in an offensive action
causing injuries to petitioner james yap and three other student members of domino lux fraternity.
on march 29, 1995, james yap was eating his dinner alone in manangs restaurant near la
salle, when he overheard two men bad-mouthing and apparently angry at domino lux. He ignored the
comments of the two. When he arrived at his boarding house, he mentioned the remarks to his two other
brods while watching television. These two brods had earlier finished eating their dinner at manangs.
Then, the three, together with four other persons went back to manangs and confronted the two who
were still in the restaurant. By admission of respondent bungubung in his testimony, one of the two was a
member of the tau gamma phi fraternity. There was no rumble or physical violence then.
After this incident, a meeting was conducted between the two heads of the fraternity through the
intercession of the student council. The tau gamma phi fraternity was asking for an apology. kailangan
ng apology in the words of respondent aguilar. But no apology was made.
On march 25, 1995, ten minutes before his next class at 6:00 p.m., james yap went out of the
campus using the engineering gate to buy candies across taft avenue. As he was about to re-cross taft
avenue, he heard heavy footsteps at his back. Eight to ten guys were running towards him. He panicked.
He did not know what to do. Then, respondent bungubung punched him in the head with something
heavy in his hands parang knuckles. Respondents reverente and lee were behind yap, punching him.
Respondents bungubung and valdes who were in front of him, were also punching him. As he was lying
on the street, respondent aguilar kicked him. People shouted; guards arrived; and the group of attackers
left. Yap could not recognize the other members of the group who attacked him. With respect to
respondent papio, mr. Yap said hindi ko nakita ang mukha niya, hindi ko nakita sumuntok siya. What
mr. Yap saw was a long haired guy also running with the group.
The mauling incidents were a result of a fraternity war. The victims, namely: petitioner james yap
and dennis pascual, ericson cano, and michael perez, are members of the domino lux fraternity, while
the alleged assailants, private respondents alvin aguilar, james paul bungubung, richard reverente and
roberto valdes, jr. Are members of tau gamma phi fraternity, a rival fraternity.
The next day, march 30, 1995, petitioner yap lodged a complaint 3[7] with the discipline board of
dlsu charging private respondents with direct assault. Similar complaints 4[8] were also filed by dennis
pascual and ericson cano against alvin lee and private respondents valdes and reverente. Thus, cases
entitled de la salle university and college of st. Benilde v. Alvin aguilar (ab-bsm/9152105), james paul
bungubung (ab-psm/9234403), robert r. Valdes, jr. (bs-bs-apm/9235086), alvin lee (edd/9462325), richard
reverente (ab-mgt/9153837) and malvin a. Papio (ab-mgt/9251227) were docketed as discipline case no.
9495-3-25121.
The director of the dlsu discipline office sent separate notices to private respondents aguilar,
bungubung and valdes, jr. And reverente informing them of the complaints and requiring them to answer.
Private respondents filed their respective answers. 5[9]
said notices issued by de la salle discipline board uniformly stated as follows:
Please be informed that a joint and expanded discipline board had been
constituted to hear and deliberate the charge against you for violation of ched order no. 4
arising from the written complaints of james yap, dennis c. Pascual, and ericson y. Cano.
You are directed to appear at the hearing of the board scheduled on april 19,
1995 at 9:00 a.m. At the bro. Connon hall for you and your witnesses to give testimony
and present evidence in your behalf. You may be assisted by a lawyer when you give
your testimony or those of your witnesses.
On or before april 18, 1995, you are further directed to provide the board,
through the discipline office, with a list of your witnesses as well as the sworn statement
of their proposed testimony.
Your failure to appear at the scheduled hearing or your failure to submit the list of
witnesses and the sworn statement of their proposed testimony will be considered a

2[1]
3[7]
4[8]
5[9]

College of Saint Benilde is an educational institution which is part of the De La Salle System.
Id. at 127.
Id. at 128-129.
Id. at 130-133.

12
waiver on your part to present evidence and as an admission of the principal act
complained of.
During the proceedings before the board on april 19 and 28, 1995, private respondents
interposed the common defense of alibi. No full-blown hearing was conducted nor the students allowed to
cross-examine the witnesses against them.
On may 3, 1995, the dlsu-csb joint discipline board issued a resolution 6[18] finding private
respondents guilty. They were meted the supreme penalty of automatic expulsion, 7[19] pursuant to ched
order no. 4.8[20] the dispositive part of the resolution reads:
Wherefore, considering all the foregoing, the board finds respondents alvin
aguilar (ab-bsm/9152105), james paul bungubung (ab-psm/9234403), alvin lee
(edd/94623250) and richard v. Reverente (ab-mgt/9153837) guilty of having violated ched
order no. 4 and thereby orders their automatic expulsion.
In the case of respondent malvin a. Papio (ab-mgt/9251227), the board acquits
him of the charge.
I ssue
were private respondents accorded due process of law because there was no full-blown
hearing nor were they allowed to cross-examine the witnesses against them?
H e l d:
Private respondents right to due process of law
was not violated.
In administrative cases, such as investigations of students found violating school discipline,
[t]here are withal minimum standards which must be met before to satisfy the demands of procedural due
process and these are: that (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them; (2) they shall have the right to answer the charges against them and with the
assistance if counsel, if desired;
(3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them; (4) they shall
have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by
the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the
case.9[66]
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he
cannot complain of deprivation of due process.10[67] notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative
due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be respected even in administrative
proceedings.11[68] the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. 12[69] so long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her
cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process. 13[70]
A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process it is
enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the
6[18]

Id. at 139-150.
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992), Sec. 77(c) provides that expulsion is an extreme penalty of
an erring pupil or student consisting of his exclusion from admission to any public or private school in the
Philippines and which requires the prior approval of the Secretary. The penalty may be imposed for acts or offenses
constituting gross misconduct, dishonesty, hazing, carrying deadly weapons, immorality, selling and/or possession of
prohibited drugs such as marijuana, drug dependency, drunkenness, hooliganism, vandalism, and other serious
school offenses such as assaulting a pupil or student or school personnel, instigating or leading illegal strikes or
similar concerned activities resulting in the stoppage of classes, preventing or threatening any pupil or student or
school personnel from entering the school premises or attending classes or discharging their duties, forging or
tampering with school records or school forms, and securing or using forged school records, forms and documents.
8[20]
Rollo, pp. 151-153.
9[66]
Guzman v. National University, G.R. No. L-68288, July 11, 1986, 142 SCRA 699, 706-707.
10[67]
Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219, May 28, 2004, 430 SCRA 353.
11[68]
Globe Telecom, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission, G.R. No. 143964, July 26, 2004, 435 SCRA
110.
12[69]
Valiao v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146621, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 543.
13[70]
Barza v. Dinglasan, Jr., G.R. No. 136350, October 25, 2004, 441 SCRA 277.
7[19]

13
controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based.14[71] to be heard
does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court one may also be heard through
pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process.15[72]
Private respondents were duly informed in writing of the charges against them by the dlsu-csb joint
discipline board through petitioner sales. They were given the opportunity to answer the charges against
them as they, in fact, submitted their respective answers. They were also informed of the evidence
presented against them as they attended all the hearings before the board. Moreover, private
respondents were given the right to adduce evidence on their behalf and they did. Lastly, the discipline
board considered all the pieces of evidence submitted to it by all the parties before rendering its resolution
in discipline case no. 9495-3-25121.
Private respondents cannot claim that they were denied due process when they were not allowed
to cross-examine the witnesses against them. This argument was already rejected in guzman v. National
university16[73] where this court held that x x x the imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance
of procedural due process. And it bears stressing that due process in disciplinary cases involving
students does not entail proceedings and hearings similar to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in courts of justice. The proceedings in student discipline cases may be summary; and cross
examination is not, x x x an essential part thereof.
Guzman vs. Nu, 142 scra 706

guzman vs. National university

g.r. no. L-68288, july 11, 1986
Facts:
petitioners who are students of the national university were barred from enrolment.
The school claims that their scholastic standing is poor and that they have been involved
in activities that have disrupted classes and had conducted mass actions without the
required permits.
Held:
A. It is apparent that despite the accusations of alleged violations hurled by the school
against the petitioners, the fact is that it had never conducted proceedings of any sort to
determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or participated "in activities
within the university premises, conducted without prior permit from school authorities, that
disturbed or disrupted classes therein".
also apparent is the omission of respondents to cite any duly published rule of theirs
by which students may be expelled or refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing.
B. Under the education act of 1982, students have the right "to freely choose their field
of study subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,
except in case of academic deficiency, or violation of disciplinary regulations."
the petitioner were denied of this right, and were being disciplined without due
process, in violation of the admonition in the manual of regulations for private schools
that "no penalty shall be imposed upon any student except for cause as defined in ***
(the) manuel and/or in the school rules and regulations as duly promulgated and only
after due investigation shall have been conducted. It has already been held in
berina vs. Philippine maritime institute, 117 scra 581, that it is illegal of a school to impose
sanctions on students without conducting due investigation.
C. Of course, all schools have the power to adopt and enforce its rules. In fact the
maintenance of good school discipline is a duty specifically enjoined on every private
school. The manual of regulations for private schools provides that:
"* * the school rules governing discipline and the corresponding sanctions therefor
must be clearly specified and defined in writing and made known to the students and/or
14[71]

Seastar Marine Services, Inc. v. Bul-an, Jr., G.R. No. 142609, November 25, 2004, 444 SCRA 140.
Batul v. Bayron, G.R. Nos. 157687 & 158959, February 26, 2004, 424 SCRA 26.
16[73]
Supra note 66, at 706.
15[72]

14
their parents or guardians. Schools shall have the authority and prerogative to
promulgate such rules and regulations as they may deem necessary from time to time
effective as of the date of their promulgation unless otherwise specified."
D.
The imposition of disciplinary sanctions requires observance of procedural due
process. Due process in disciplinary cases involving students :
a. Need not entail proceedings and hearing similar to those prescribed for actions and
proceedings in court of justice;
b. The proceedings may be summary;
c. Cross-examination is not an essential part thereof.
But the s.c. said that the following minimum standards must be met to satisfy the
demands of procedural due process:
1. The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
2. They shall have the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel;
3. They shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. They shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf;
5. The evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or
official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
a. Berina vs. Pmi, september 30, 1982
due process in the dismissal of employees
requisites of due process before the nlrc
1. Notice; and
2. Hearing
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.

Mgg marine services vs. Nlrc, 259 scra 664

Philippine savings bank vs. Nlrc, 261 scra 409
Raycor air control vs. Nlrc, 261 scra 589
Wallem maritime services vs. Nlrc, 263 scra 174
Samillano vs. Nlrc, 265 scra 788
Stolt-nielsen vs. Nlrc, 264 scra 307
Garcia vs. Nlrc, 264 scra 261

4. Effect of a motion for reconsideration to violation of the right to due process

a. Casuela vs. Office of the ombudsman, 276 scra 635
b. Cordenillo vs. Executive secretary, 276 scra 652
5. In administrative proceedings, does due process require that a party be assisted by counsel and
be able to cross-examine the witnesses?
lumiqued vs. Exenea, 282 scra 125
there is no law, whether the civil service act or the administrative code of 1987, which
provides that a respondent in an administrative case should be assisted by counsel in order that
the proceedings therein is considered valid. Not only, that, petitioner herein was given the
opportunity several times to engage the services of a lawyer to assist him but he confidently
informed the investigators that he could protect himself.
Administrative due process
Atty. Romeo erece vs. Lyn macalingay, et al., g.r. no. 166809, april
22, 2008

15

The facts:
Petitioner is the regional director of the commission on human rights (chr) region i, whose office is
located in san fernando city, la union. Respondent employees of the chr region i filed an affidavitcomplaint dated october 2, 1998 against petitioner alleging that he denied them the use of the office
vehicle assigned to petitioner, that petitioner still claimed transportation allowance even if he was using
the said vehicle, and that he certified that he did not use any government vehicle, when in fact he did, in
order to collect transportation allowance.
Respondent filed his answer denying the allegations against him.
After a fact-finding investigation, the csc proper in csc resolution no. 99-1360 dated july 1, 1999
charged petitioner with dishonesty and grave misconduct for using a government vehicle in spite of his
receipt of the monthly transportation allowance and for certifying that he did not use any government
vehicle, when in fact, he did, in order to receive the transportation allowance.
Pertinent portions of the formal charge read:
1.
That despite the regular receipt of erece of his monthly representation
and transportation allowance (rata) in the amount of p4,000.00, he still prioritizes himself
in the use of the office vehicle (tamaraw fx) in spite of the directive from the central office
that he cannot use the service vehicle for official purposes and at the same time receive
his transportation allowance;
2.
That erece did not comply with the directive of the central office
addressed to all regional human rights directors, as follows: to regularize your receipt of
the transportation allowance component of the rata to which you are entitled monthly, you
are hereby directed to immediately transfer to any of your staff, preferably one of your
lawyers, the memorandum receipt of the vehicle(s) now still in your name;
3.
That he certified in his monthly liquidation of his rata that he did not use
any government vehicle for the corresponding month, which is not true because he is the
regular user of the government vehicle issued to chr-region i.
The foregoing facts and circumstances indicate that government service has
been prejudiced by the acts of erece.
Wherefore, romeo l. Erece is hereby formally charged with dishonesty and grave
misconduct. Accordingly, he is given five (5) days from receipt hereof to submit his
answer under oath and affidavits of his witnesses, if any, to the civil service commissioncordillera administrative region (csc-car). On his answer, he should indicate whether he
elects a formal investigation or waives his right thereto. Any motion to dismiss, request
for clarification or bills of particulars shall not be entertained by the commission. Any of
these pleadings interposed by the respondent shall be considered as an answer and
shall be evaluated as such. Likewise, he is advised of his right to the assistance of
counsel of his choice.17[4]
After a formal investigation of the case, the csc issued resolution no. 020124, dated january 24.
2002, finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and
penalizing him with dismissal from the service.
Petitioner filed a petition for review of the csc resolution with the ca.
In the decision promulgated on january 7, 2005, the ca upheld the csc resolution, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the petition is denied and the assailed
resolutions of the civil service commission are hereby affirmed.18[5]
Hence, this petition.
I s s u e:
17[4]
18[5]

Id. at 35-36.
Id. at 34.

16
Petitioner raised the issue of violation of his right to due process because he was denied
the right to cross-examine the respondents on their affidavit-complaint.
H e l d:
Petitioner contends that he was denied due process as he was not afforded the right to crossexamine his accusers and their witnesses. He stated that at his instance, in order to prevent delay in the
disposition of the case, he was allowed to present evidence first to support the allegations in his counteraffidavit. After he rested his case, respondents did not present their evidence, but moved to submit their
position paper and formal offer of evidence, which motion was granted by the csc over his (petitioners)
objection. Respondents then submitted their position paper and formal offer of exhibits.
Petitioner submits that although he was allowed to present evidence first, it should not be
construed as a waiver of his right to cross-examine the complainants. Although the order of presentation
of evidence was not in conformity with the procedure, still petitioner should not be deemed to have lost his
right to cross-examine his accusers and their witnesses. This may be allowed only if he expressly waived
said right.
The court agrees with the ca that petitioner was not denied due process when he failed to crossexamine the complainants and their witnesses since he was given the opportunity to be heard and
present his evidence. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity
to explain ones side.19[6]
Velez v. De vera20[7] held:
Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with judicial process
for a trial in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter
of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they
rest upon different principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of
procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of
administrative character, the right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process
of law. The constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a
regularly established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be
had before the making of a determination if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal
before which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be
raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that due process requires. . . .
The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process.
Nor is an actual hearing always essential. . . . 21[8]
The dismissal of the petitioner from the government is valid.
Chapter iii - the equal
Protection clause
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
1. The scope of the equal protection clause, 95 scra

420

2. Equal protection of the law, 13 scra 266

3. Requisites for a valid classificationread:
1. People vs. Cayat, 68 phil. 12
a.
b.
c.
d.

There must be real and substantial distinctions;

It must be germane tot he purposes of the law;
It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
It must apply equally to all members of the same class.

2. Read again, association of small landowners vs. Sec. Of agrarian reform, july 14, 1989
4. Equal protection in general19[6]
20[7]
21[8]

Velez v. De Vera, A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006, 496 SCRA 345.
Id. at 387-388.
Emphasis supplied.

17

read:
1. P. Vs. Vera, 65 phil. 56
2. Tiu vs. Ca, 301 scra 278 (there is real and substantial distinction between business inside the
subic special economic zone and outside wherein those inside are exempt from other taxes as a
result of the policy of the government to accelerate the development of the portion of subic left by
the americans)
3. Melda marcos vs. Ca, 278 scra 843
4. Himagan vs. People, october 7, 1994
the fact that policemen charged with a criminal offense punishable by more than 6 years are to be
suspended during the entire duration of the case unlike other government employees is valid
since it rests on valid classification because policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law
which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them.
2-a gumabon vs. Director of prisons, 37 scra 420
2-b. Panfilo lacson vs. Sandiganbayan, january 20, 1999
2-b-1. Basco vs. Pagcor, may 14, 1991
no violation of the equal protection clause if congress would legalize cock-fighting and
horse racing since police power could regulate gambling.
3. Philippine judges association vs. Prado, november 11, 1993
there is no valid distinction for a law removing the franking privilege of the judiciary while leaving
the same to the executive and legislative despite the fact that there is considerable volume of mails
from the courts. Loss of revenue is not a valid ground unless it would be withdrawn to all government
offices.
Francisco tatad vs. The secretary of department of energy, g. R. No.
124360, november 5, 1997
Edcel lagman, joker arroyo, enrique garcia, wigberto tanada, flag
human rights foundation vs. Hon. Ruben torres, hon. Francisco
viray, petron, filipinas shell and caltex philippines, g.r. no. 127867,
november 5, 1997.
Puno, j.
These petitions challenge the constitutionality of republic act no. 8180 entitled an act
deregulating the downstream oil industry and for other purposes. Ra 8180 seeks to end 26
years of government regulation of the downstream oil industry.
The facts:
1. Prior to 1971, no government agency was regulating the oil industry. New players
were free to enter the oil market without any government interference. There were
four (4) refining companies at that time. Shell, caltex, bataan refining company and
filoil marketing and six (6) petroleum marketing companies: esso, filoil, caltex, getty,
mobil and shell;
2. In 1971, the country was driven to its knees by the crippling oil crisis and in order to
remedy the same, the oil industry commission act was enacted regulating the oil
industry ;
3. On november 9, 1973, then president marcos created the philippine national oil
corporation (pnoc) t break the control of the foreigners to the oil industry. It acquired
ownership of esso philippines and filoil and likewise bought controlling shares of the
bataan refining corporation. Pnoc then operated under the business name petron
corporation and for the first time, there was a filipino presence in the philippine oil
market;
4. In 1984, pres. Marcos through section 8 of pd 1956 created the oil price stabilization
fund (opsf) to cushion the effects of frequent changes in the price of oil caused by the
exchange rate adjustments or increase of the world market prices crude oil and
imported petroleum products;
5. By 1985, only three (3) oil companies were left operating in the country. These are:
caltex, filipinas shell and pnoc;

18
6. In may, 1987, pres. Corazon aquino signed executive order no. 172 creating the
energy reulatory board to regulate the business of importing, exporting, shipping,
transporting, processing, refining, marketing and distributing energy resources when
warranted and only when public necessity requires. The board was empowered to
fix and regulate the prices of petroleum products and other related merchandise;
7. In march, 1996, congress enacted ra 8180 deregulating the oil industry not later than
march, 1997. The law requires that the implementation of the regulation, shall as far
as practicable be made at a time when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products
in the world are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the
us dollar; is stable;
8. On february 8, 1997, executive order no. 372 was issued by president fidel ramos
implementing full deregulation on the ground that the opsf fund has been depleted;
9. The petitioners questioned the constitutionality of ra 8180 on the following grounds:
a. Section 5 of ra 8180 violates the equal protection clause of the
constitution;
b. The imposition of different tariff rates does not deregulate the oil
industry and even bars the entry of other players in the oil industry
but instead effectively protects the interest of the oil companies with
existing refineries. Thus, it runs counter to the objective of the law to
foster a truly competitive market; the inclusion of sec. 5 [b]
providing for tariff differential violates section 26 [1] of art. Vi of the
1987 constitution which requires every law to have only one subject
which should be expressed in the title thereof;
c. Section 15 of ra 8180 and eo no. 392 are unconstitutional for undue
delegation of legislative power to the president and the secretary of
energy;
d. Eo 392 implementing the full deregulation of the oil industry is
unconstitutional since it is arbitrary and unreasonable since it was
enacted due to the alleged depletion of the opsf fund, a condition
which is not found in ra no. 8180;
e. Section 15 of ra 8180 is unconstitutional for it allows the formation
of a de facto cartel among three existing oil companies in violation of
the constitution prohibiting against monopolies, combination in
restraint of trade and unfair competition.
The provisions of the law being questioned as unconstitutional are section 5 [b]
and section 15 which provide:
section 5 [b] any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with
the effectivity of this act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on
imported crude oil at the rate of 3% and imported refined petroleum
products at the rate of seven (7%) percent, except fuel oil and lpg, the
rate for which shall be the same; provided, that beginning on january 1,
2004, the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined petroleum products
shall be the same; provided, further, that this provision may be amended
only by an act of congress.
Xxx
section 15. Implementation of full deregulation. Pursuant to
section 5 [e] of ra 7638, the doe, upon approval of the president,
implement full deregulation of the downstream oil industry not later
than march, 1997. As far as practicable, the doe shall time the full
deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products
in the world market are declining and when the exchange rate of the
peso in relation to the us dollar is stable.
The issues are:
Procedural issues:
a. Whether or not the petitions raise justiciable controversy; and
b. Whether or not the petitioners have the standing to question the validity of the
subject law and executive order.
Substantive issues:

19
a. Whether or not section 5 of ra 8180 violates the one titleone subject requirement of
the constitution;
b. Whether or not section 5 of ra 8180 violates the equal protection clause of the
constitution;
c. Whether section 15 violates the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation of
legislative power;
d. Whether or not eo 392 is arbitrary and unreasonable; and
e. Whether or not ra 8180 violates the constitutional prohibition against monopolies,
combinations in restraint of trade and unfair competition.
Held:
1. Judicial power includes not only the duty of the courts to settle controversies
involving rights but also the duty to determine whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
agency or branch of the government. The courts, as guardians of the constitution,
have the inherent authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature
transcends the limit imposed by the fundamental law. When the statute violates the
constitution, it is not only the right of the judiciary to declare such act as
unconstitutional and void.
2. The question of locus standi must likewise fall . As held in kapatiran ng mga
naglilingkod sa pamahalaan ng pilipinas, inc. Vs. Tan, it was held that:
objections to taxpayers suit for lack of sufficient personality,
standing, or interest are , however, in the main procedural
matters. Considering the importance of the cases to the public,
and in keeping with the courts duty to determine whether or not
the other brancheds of government have kept themselves within
the limits of the constitution and the laws and that they have not
abuse the discretion given to them, the court has brushed aside
technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of these
petitions.
There is no disagreement on the part of the parties as to the far-reaching importance of
the validity of ra 8180. Thus, there is no good sense in being hyper-technical on the
standing of the petitioners for they pose issues which are significant to our people and
which deserve our forthright resolution.
3. It is contended that section 5[b[ of ra 8180 on tariff differentials violates the
constitutional prohibition requiring every law to have only one subject which should
be expressed in its title. We do not concur with this contention. As a policy, the court
has adopted a liberal construction of the one title---one subject rule. We have
consistently ruled that the title need not mirror, fully index or catalogue all contents
and minute details of a law. A law having a single general subject indicated in the title
may contain a number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of
carrying out the general subject. We hold that section 5 providing for tariff differential
is germane to the subject of ra 8180 which is the deregulation of the downstream oil
industry.
4. The contention that there is undue delegation of legislative power when it authorized
the president to determine when deregulation starts is without merit. The petitioners
claim that the phrases as far as practicable, decline of crude oil prices in the world
market and stability of the peso exchange rate to the us dollar are ambivalent,
unclear and inconcrete in meaning and could not therefore provide the determinate
or determinable standards which can guide the president in his decision to fully
deregulate the oil industry. The power of congress to delegate the execution of laws
has long been settled by this court in 1916 in the case of compania general de
tabacos de filipina vs. The board of public utility commissioners where it was held
that:
the true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law ,
which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and
conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised
under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter,
no valid objection can be made.

20
Two tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of the power to
execute laws does not involve the abdication of the power to make law itself. We delineated the
metes and bounds of these tests in easterm shipping lines vs. Poea, thus:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid
delegation of legislative power , viz: the completeness test and the
sufficiency of standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative
such that when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he will do is
enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries of the
delegates authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both
tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority
to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the
legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in our constitutional
landscape because such has become an inevitability in light of the increasing complexity
of the task of government. In fact, in hirabayashi vs. United states, the supreme court
through justice isagani cruz held that even if the law does not expressly pinpoint the
standard, the courts will bend backward to locate the same elsewhere in order to spare
the statute; if it can, from constitutional infirmity.
5. Eo no. 392 failed to follow faithfully the standards set by ra 8180 when it considered
the extraneous factor of depletion of the opsf fund. The misapplication of this extra
factor cannot be justified. The executive is bereft of any right to alter either by
addition or subtraction the standards set by ra 8180 for it has no power to make laws.
To cede to the executive the power to make laws would invite tyranny and to
transgress the separation of powers. The exercise of delegated power is given a
strict scrutiny by courts for the delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe
the terms of the agency.
6. Section 19 of article xii of the constitution provides:
the state shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when the public interests
so requires. No combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition
shall be allowed.
A monopoly is a privilege or peculiar advantage vested in one or more persons or companies,
consisting of the exclusive right or power to carry on a particular business or trade, manufacture
a particular article or control the sale or the whole market structure in which one or only a few
firms dominate the total sales of a product or service. On the other hand, a combination in
restraint of trade is an agreement or understanding between two or more persons, in the form of
contract, trust, pool, holding company, for the purpose of unduly restricting competition,
monopolizing trade and commerce in a certain commodity, controlling its production, distribution
and price or otherwise interfering with freedom of trade without statutory authority. Combination in
restraint of trade refers to means while monopoly refers to the end.
Respondents aver that the 4% tariff differential is designed to encourage new entrants to invest
in refineries. They stress that the inventory requirement is meant to guaranty continuous domestic
supply of petroleum and to discourage fly-by-night operators. They also claim that the prohibition
against predatory pricing is intended to protect prospective entrants.
The validity of the assailed provisions of ra 8180 has to be decided in the light of the letter and
spirit of section 19, art. Xii of the constitution. While the constitution embraced free enterprise as
an economic creed, it did not prohibit per se the operation of monopolies which can, however, be
regulated in the public interest. This distinct free enterprise system is dictated by the need to
achieve the goals of our national economy as defined under section 1, art. Xii of the constitution
which are: more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth; a sustained increase
in the amount of goods and services produced by the nation for all, especially the underprivileged
. It also calls for the state to protect filipino enterprises against unfair and trades practices.
The provisions on 4% tariff differential, predatory pricing and inventory requirement blocks the
entry of other players and give undue advantage to the 3 oil companies resulting to monopolies or
unfair competition. This is so because it would take billions for new players to construct refineries,
and to have big inventories. This would effectively prevent new players.

21
In the case at bar, it cannot be denied that our oil industry is operated and controlled by an
oligopoly (dominated by a handful of players) and a foreign oligopoly at that. As the dominant
players, shell, caltex & petron boast of existing refineries of various capacities. The tariff
differential of 4% works to their immense advantage. Yet, this is only one edge on tariff
differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It erects high
barriers to ne players. New players in order to equalize must build their refineries worth billions of
pesos. Those without refineries had to compete with a higher cost of 4%.they will be competing
on an uneven field.
The provision on inventory widens the advantage of petron, shell and caltex against prospective
new players. The three (3) could easily comply with the inventory requirement in view of their
numerous storage facilities. Prospective competitors again find compliance oft his requirement
difficult because of prohibitive cost in constructing new storage facilities. The net effect would be
to effectively prohibit the entrance of new players.
Now comes the prohibition on predatory pricing or selling or offering to sell any product at a price
unreasonably below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the detriment of the
competitors. According to hovenkamp:
the rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of
losses today that will give a firm monopoly profits in the
future. The monopoly profits will never materialize, however,
if the market is flooded with new entrants as soon as the
successful predator attempts to raise its price. Predatory
pricing will be profitable only if the market contains
significant barriers to new entry.
Coupled with the 4% tariff differential and the inventory requirement, the predatory pricing is a
significant barrier which discourage new players to enter the oil market thereby promoting unfair
competition, monopoly and restraint of trade which are prohibited by the constitution.
2-d.lacson vs. Sandiganbayan, january 20, 1999
3. Taxicab operators vs. Bot, september 30,l982
4. Bautista vs. Juinio,127 scra 329
5. Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 scra 392
6. Villegas vs. Hiu, 86 scra 270
7. Ceniza vs. Comelec, 95 scra 763
8. Unido vs. Comelec, 104 scra 38
9. Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111 scra 433(read also the dissenting opinion of justice makasiar
10. Sison vs. Ancheta, 130 scra 654
11. Citizens surety vs. Puno, 119 scra 216
12. Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 scra 30
13. Hawaiian-phil. Co. Vs. Asociacion, 151 scra 306
14. Ormoc sugar co. Vs. Ormoc city, 22 scra 603
15. Flores vs. Comelec, 184 scra 484
Chapter iv - the search
And seizure provision

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and
particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
Note: applicable provisions of the human security act/anti-terrorism law,
republic act no. 9372, approved on march 6, 2007 and effective on july
15, 2007 (this law shall be automatically suspended one (1) month
before and two (2) months after the holding of any election)
Sec. 18. Period of detention without judicial warrant of arrest.- the provisions of article
125 of the revised penal code, notwithstanding, any police or law enforcement personnel,
who, having been duly authorized in writing by the anti-terrorism council has taken

22
custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of
conspiracy to commit terrorism shall, without incurring any criminal liability for delay in the
delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities, deliver said charged or
suspected person to the proper judicial authority within a period of three (3) days counted
from the moment said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested,
detained, and taken into custody by the said police, or law enforcement personnel:
provided, that the arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under section 7 and examination of
bank deposits under section 27 pf this act.
the police or law enforcement personnel concerned shall, before detaining the
person suspected of the crime of terrorism, present him or her before any judge at the
latters residence or office nearest the place where the arrest took place at any time of
the day or night. It shall be the duty of the judge, among other things, to ascertain the
identity of the police or law enforcement personnel and the person or persons they have
arrested and presented before him or her, to inquire of them the reasons why they have
arrested the person and determine by questioning and personal observation whether or
not the subject has been subjected to any physical, moral or psychological torture by
whom and why. The judge shall then submit a written report of what he/she had observed
when the subject was brought before him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over the
case of the person thus arrested.
the judge shall forthwith submit his report within 3 calendar days from the time
the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office.
immediately after taking custody of a person charged with or suspected of the
crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the police or law enforcement
personnel shall notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension
or arrest; provided, that where the arrest is made during saturdays, sundays, holidays or
after office hours, the written notice shall be served at the residence of the judge nearest
the place where the accused was arrested. The penalty of 10 years and 1 day to 12 years
imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to
notify any judge as provided in the preceding paragraph.
section 19. Period of detention in the event of an actual or imminent terrorist
attack.- in the vent of an actual or imminent terrorist attack,, suspects may not be
detained for more than three days without the written approval of a municipal, city,
provincial or regional official of a human rights commission, or judge of the municipal,
regional trial court, the sandiganbayan or a justice of the court of appeals nearest the
place of arrest. If the arrest is made during saturdays, sundays or holidays, or after office
hours, the arresting police of law enforcement personnel shall bring the person thus
arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the place
where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said officials shall
be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned within five days after
the date of the detention of the persons concerned; provided, however, that within three
days after the detention the suspects whose connection with the terror attack or threat is
not established, shall be released immediately.
section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism---even if they have been granted bail because evidence
of guilt is not strongcan be:

Detained under house arrest;

Restricted from traveling; and/or
Prohibited from using any cellular phones, computers, or other means of communications
with people outside their residence.
Section 39. Seizure and sequestration.- the deposits and their outstanding balances, placements,
trust accounts, assets, and records in any bank or financial institution, moneys, businesses,
transportation and communication equipment, supplies and other implements, and property of
whatever kind and nature belonging:

To any person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to

commit terrorism;
To a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons;
To a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association or group
of persons,

23
-shall be seized, sequestered, and frozen in order to prevent their use, transfer or
conveyance for purposes that are inimical to the safety and security of the people or injurious
to the interest of the state.
The accused or suspect may withdraw such sums as are reasonably needed by his family
including the services of his counsel and his familys medical needs upon approval of the
court. He or she may also use any of his property that is under seizure or sequestration or
frozen because of his/her indictment as a terrorist upon permission of the court for any
legitimate reason.
Section 40. The seized, sequestered and frozen bank depositsshall be deemed property
held in trust by the bank or financial institution and that their use or disposition while the case
is pending shall be subject to the approval of the court before which the case or cases are
pending.
Section 41. If the person suspected as terrorist is acquitted after arraignment or his case
dismissed before his arraignment by a competent court, the seizureshall be lifted by the
investigating body or the competent court and restored to him without delay. The filing of an
appeal or motion for reconsideration shall not stay the release of said funds from seizure,
sequestration and freezing.
if convicted, said seized, sequestered and frozen assets shall automatically forfeited in
favor of the government.
requisites of a valid search warrant
read:
a. Essentials of a valid search warrant,145 scra

739

b. Validity of a search warrant and the admissibility of evidence obtained in

violation thereof.

c. The place to be searched as indicated in the warrant is controlling

people vs. Ca, 291 scra 400
Narvasa, cj
In applying for a search warrant, the police officers had in their mind the first four (4)
separate apartment units at the rear of abigail variety store in quezon city to be the subject of
their search. The same was not, however, what the judge who issued the warrant had in mind,
and was not what was ultimately described in the search warrant. As such, any evidence obtained
from the place searched which is different from that indicated in the search warrant is
inadmissible in evidence for any purpose and in any proceeding.
This is so because it is neither licit nor fair to allow police officers to search a place
different from that stated in the warrant on the claim that the place actually searched---although
not that specified in the search warrant---is exactly what they had in view when they applied for
the warrant and had demarcated in their supporting evidence. What is material in determining the
validity of a search is the place stated in the warrant itself, not what the applicants had in their
thoughts, or had represented in the proofs they submitted to the court issuing the warrant. As
such, it was not just a case of obvious typographical error, but a clear case of a search of a
place different from that clearly and without ambiguity identified in the search warrant.
Note: very important: where a search warrant is issued by one court and the criminal
action base don the results of the search is afterwards commenced in another court, it is not the
rule that a motion to quash the warrant (or to retrieve the things seized) may be filed only in the
issuing court---such a motion may be filed for the first time in either the issuing court or that in
which the criminal proceeding is pending.
d. Validity of a warrantless search and seizure as a result of an informers tip. Note the two (2)
conflicting decisions of the supreme court.
People vs. Aruta, 288 scra 626
On december 13, 1988, p/lt. Abello of the olongapo pnp was tipped off by an
informer that aling rosa would be arriving from baguio city the following day with a large
volume of marijuana. As a result of the tip, the policemen waited for a victory bus from

24
baguio city near the pnb olongapo, near rizal ave. When the accused got off, she was
pointed to by the informer. She was carrying a traveling bag at that time. She was not
acting suspiciously. She was arrested without a warrant.
The bag allegedly contained 8.5 kilos of marijuana. After trial, she was convicted
and imposed a penalty of life imprisonment.
Issue:
Whether or not the marijuana allegedly taken from the accused is admissible in
evidence.
Held:
warrantless search is allowed in the following instances:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Customs searches;
Searches of moving vehicle;
Seizure of evidence in plain view;
Consented searches;
Search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
Stop and frisk measures.

The above exceptions to the requirement of a search warrant, however, should

not become unbridled licenses for law enforcement officers to trample upon the
conditionally guaranteed and more fundamental right of persons against unreasonable
search and seizures. The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied
before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted. In order that the
information received by the police officers may be sufficient to be the basis of probable
cause, it must be based on reasonable ground of suspicion or belief a crime has been
committed or is about to be committed.
The marijuana obtained as a result of a warrantless search is inadmissible as
evidence for the following reasons:
a. The policemen had sufficient time to apply for a search warrant but they
failed to do so;

b.

The accused was not acting suspiciously;

The accuseds identity was previously ascertained so applying for a warrant
should have been easy;
d. The accused in this case was searched while innocently crossing a street
c.

Consequently, there was no legal basis for the police to effect a warrantless
search of the accuseds bag, there being no probable cause and the accuseds not
having been legally arrested. The arrest was made only after the accused was pointed to
by the informant at a time when she was not doing anything suspicious. The arresting
officers do not have personal knowledge that the accused was committing a crime at that
time.
since there was no valid warrantless arrest, it logically follows that the
subsequent search is similarly illegal, it being not incidental to a lawful arrest. This is so
because if a search is first undertaken, and an arrest effected based on the evidence
produced by the search, both such search and arrest would be unlawful, for being
contrary to law.
This case is similar tot he case of people vs. Aminnudin,
Encinada.

and people vs.

People vs. Montilla, 284 scra 703

on june 19, 1994, at about 2 p.m., spo1 talingting and spo1 clarin of the dasmarinas,
cavite pnp were informed by an informer that a drug courier would be arriving in barangay
salitran, dasmarinas, cavite, from baguio city, with an undetermined amount of marijuana. The
informer likewise informed them that he could recognize said person.
at about 4 in the morning of june 20, 1994, the appellant was arrested by the abovenamed police officers while alighting from a passenger jeepney near a waiting shed in salitran,

25
dasmarinas, cavite, upon being pointed to by the informer. The policemen recovered 28 kilos of
dried marijuana leaves. The arrest was without warrant.
the trial court convicted the appellant for transporting marijuana based on the testimonies
of the above-named police officers without presenting the alleged informer.
Issue:
was the warrantless arrest valid?
Held:
the accused claims that the warrantless search and seizure is illegal because the alleged
information was received by the police on june 19, 1994 and therefore, they could have applied
for a search warrant. The said contention is without merit considering that the information given
by the informer is too sketchy and not detailed enough for the obtention of the corresponding
arrest or search warrant. While there is indication that the informer knows the courier, the records
do not show that he knew his name. On bare information, the police could not have secured a
warrant from a judge.
furthermore, warrantless search is allowed in the following instances:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Customs searches;
Searches of moving vehicle;
Seizure of evidence in plain view;
Consented searches;
Search incidental to a lawful arrest; and
Stop and frisk measures.

Since the accused was arrested for transporting marijuana, the subsequent search on his
person is justified. An arresting officer has the right to validly search and seize from the offender
(1) dangerous weapons; and (2) those that may be used as proof of the commission of the
offense.
In the case at bar, upon being pointed to by the informer as the drug courier, the
policemen requested the accused to open and show them the contents of his bag and the
cartoon he was carrying and he voluntarily opened the same and upon cursory inspection, it was
found out that it contains marijuana. Hence the arrest.
The accused insists that it is normal for a person traveling with a bag and cartoon which
should not elicit the slightest suspicion that he was committing a crime. In short, there was no
probable cause for this policemen to think that he was committing a crime.
The said contention was considered without merit by the supreme court considering the
fact that he consented to the search as well as the fact that the informer was a reliable one who
had supplied similar information to the police in the past which proved positive.
(note: the sc held that the non-presentation of the informer does not affect the case for
the prosecution because he is not even the best witness. He is merely a corroborative witness to
the arresting officers. )
Justice panganiban:
To say that reliable tips from informers constitute probable cause for a warrantless
arrest or search is a dangerous precedent and places in great jeopardy the doctrines laid down in
many decisions made by this court. (people vs. Burgos, 144 scra 1; people vs. Aminnudin, 163
scra 402; people vs. Encinada, october 2, 1997; people vs. Mengote, 220 scra).
The case is similar to the case of people vs. Encimada where the appellant was searched
without a warrant while disembarking from a ship on the strength of a tip from an informer
received by the police the previous afternoon that the appellant would be transporting prohibited
drugs. The search yielded a plastic package containing marijuana. On appeal, the sc reversed
the decision of conviction and held that encinada did not manifest any suspicious behavior that
would necessarily and reasonably invite the attention of the police.
Eli lui, et al. Vs. Matillano, may 27, 2004

26
Right against unreasonable searches and seizures;
mission order does not authorize an illegal search.
Waiver of the right against an unreasonable search and
seizure.
in search of the allegedly missing amount of p45,000.00 owned by the employer, the residence of
a relative of the suspect was forcibly open by the authorities by kicking the kitchen door to gain entry into
the house. Thereafter, they confiscated different personal properties therein which were allegedly part of
those stolen from the employer. They were in possession of a mission order but later on claimed that the
owner of the house gave his consent to the warrantless search. Are the things admissible in evidence?
Can they be sued for damages as a result of the said warrantless search and seizure?
Held:
the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right which may be waived
expressly or impliedly. But a waiver by implication cannot be presumed. There must be clear and
convincing evidence of an actual intention to relinquish the right. There must be proof of the following:
a. That the right exists;
b. That the person involved had knowledge, either constructive or actual, of the existence of
said right;
c. That the said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.
Finally, the waiver must be made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently in order that the said is to
be valid.
the search was therefore held illegal and the members of the searching party held liable for
damages in accordance with the doctrine laid down in lim vs. Ponce de leon and mhp garments vs. Ca.
e. General or roving warrants
read:
1. Stonehill vs. Diokno,june 19,1967
Concepcion, c.j.
the petitioners are questioning the validity of a total of 42 search warrants issued
on different dates against them and the corporations in which they are officers, directing
the peace officer to search the persons above-named and/or the premises of their offices,
warehouses and to seize and take possession of the following personal property, to wit:
"books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, typewriters
and other documents or papers showing all business
transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements"
since they are the subject of the offense of violating the central bank laws, tariff
and customs laws, internal revenue code and the revised penal code.
the petitioners claim that the search warrants are void being violative of the
constitutional provision on search and seizure on the ground that:
A. The search warrants did not particularly describe the documents, books and
things to be seized;
B. Cash money not mentioned in the warrant were actually seized;
C. The warrants were issued to fish evidence in the deportation cases against
them;
D. The searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner;
E. The things seized were not delivered to the court to be disposed of in a
manner provided for by law.
Issue:

27

were the searches and seizures made in the offices and residences of the
petitioners valid?
a. As to the searches made on their offices, they could not question the same in
their personal capacities because the corporations have a personality separate and
distinct with its officers. An objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal
and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, the petitioners may not validly
object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their
individual capacity.
b. As to the documents seized in the residences of the petitioners, the same may
not be used in evidence against them because the warrants issued were in the nature of
a general warrant for failure to comply with the constitutional requirement that:
1. That no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in
the manner set forth in said provision; and
2. That the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
none of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants.
They were issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical persons therein
named had committed a violation of central bank laws, tariff and customs laws, internal
revenue code and revised penal code. In other words, no specific offense had been
alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense committed
were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judge who issued the
warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes
the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific omissions, violating a given
provision of our criminal laws.
2. Bache vs. Ruiz, 37 scra 823
3. Secretary vs. Marcos, 76 scra 301
4. Castro vs. Pabalan, april 30,l976
5. Asian surety vs. Herrera, 54 scra 312 (a search warrant for estafa, falsification, tax evasion and
insurance fraud is a general warrant and therefore not valid)
6. Collector vs. Villaluz, june 18,1976
7. Viduya vs. Verdiago, 73 scra 553
8. Dizon vs. Castro, april 12, 1985
9. People vs. Veloso, 48 phil. 169
10. Tambasen vs. People, july 14, 1995; people vs. Ca, 216 scra 101. a scatter-shot warrant is
a search warrant issued for more than one specific offense like one for estafa, robbery, theft
and qualified theft)
f. Define probable cause. Who determines probable cause?
a.Roberts vs. Ca, 254 scra 307
b.De los santos vs. Montesa, 247 scra 85
Vicente lim,sr. And mayor susana lim
Vs.hon. N. Felix (g.r. no. 99054-57)
En banc
gutierrez, jr. J.
Facts:
-------petitioners are suspects of the slaying of congressman moises espinosa, sr. And three of
his security escorts and the wounding of another. They were initially charged, with three others,
with the crime of multiple murder with frustrated murder. After conducting a preliminary
investigation, a warrant of arrest was issued on july 31, 1989. Bail was fixed at p200,000.

28
on september 22, 1989, fiscal alfane, designated to review the case, issued a resolution
affirming the finding of a prima facie case against the petitioners but ruled that a case of murder
for each of the killing of the four victims and a physical injuries case for inflicting gunshot wound
on the survivor be filled instead against the suspects. Thereafter, four separate informations to
that effect were filed with the rtc of masbate with no bail recommended.
on november 21, 1989, a motion for change of venue, filed by the petitioners was granted
by the sc. It ordered that the case may be transferred from the rtc of masbate to the rtc of makati.
petitioners then moved that another hearing ba conducted to determine if there really
exists a prima facie case against them in the light of documents showing recantations of some
witnesses in the preliminary investigation. They likewise filed a motion to order the transmittal of
initial records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the municipal judge of barsaga of
masbate. These motions were however denied by the court because the prosecution had
declared the existence of probable cause, informations were complete in form in substance , and
there was no defect on its face. Hence it found it just and proper to rely on the prosecutors
certification in each information.
Issue:
---------whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the
prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists?
held:
----1. The judge committed a grave abuse of discretion.
in the case of placer vs. Villanueva, the sc ruled that a judge may rely upon the fiscal's
certification of the existence of a probable cause and on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest. However, the certification does not bind the judge to come out with the warrant of arrest.
This decision interpreted the "search and seizure" provision of the 1973 constitution. Under this
provision, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a
warrant of order of arrest. If on the face of information, the judge finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witness to aid him
at arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. This has been the rule since
u.s vs. Ocampo and amarga vs. Abbas.
2. In the case of soliven vs. Makasiar, decided under the 1987 constitution, the court
noted that the addition of the word personally after the word determined and the deletion of the
grant of authority by the 1973 constitution to issue warrants to other respondent officers as to
may be authorized by law does not require the judge to personally examine the complainant and
his witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.what the
constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause. Following established doctrine and procedures, he
shall:
(1) personally evaluate the reports and the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of
arrest;
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
3.

The case of people vs. Honorable enrique b. Inting reiterates the following doctrines:

(1) the determination of probable cause is a function of the judge. It is not for the
provincial fiscal or prosecutor nor for the election supervisor to ascertain. Only the judge alone
makes this detemination.
(2) the preliminary inquiry made by the prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely
assist him to make the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what
the prosecutor's present to him. By itself, the prosecutor's certification of probable cause is
ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes, and all other
supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the
judge to make his determination.

29

(3) preliminary inquiry should be distinguished from the preliminary investigation

proper. While the former seeks to determine probable cause for the issuance of warrant of arrest,
the latter ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be released.
4. 4. In the case of castillo vs. Villaluz, the court ruled that judges of rtc no longer have
authority to conduct preliminary investigations: this authority was removed from them by the 1985
rules on criminal procedure, effective on january 1, 1985.
5.
In the present case, the respondent judge relies solely on the certification of the
prosecutor. Considering that all the records of the investigation are in masbate, he has not
personally determined the existence of probable cause. The determination was made by the
provincial prosecutor. The constitutional requirement had not been satisfied.
the records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the municipal court of masbate
and reviewed by the respondent fiscal were still in masbate when the respondent fiscal issued the
warrant of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for the respondent judge to make his
personal determination regarding the existence of probable cause from the issuance of warrant of
arrest as mandated by the constitution. He could not have possibly known what has transpired in
masbate as he had nothing but a certification. Although the judge does not have to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses (for the prosecutor can perform the same functions
as commissioner for taking of evidence) there should be a report and necessary documents
supporting the fiscal's bare certification. All of these should be before the judge.
1. Amarga vs. Abbas, 98 phil. 739
1-a. 20th century fox vs. Ca, 164 scra 655
1-b. Quintero vs. Nbi, 162 scra 467
1-c. The presidential anti-dollar salting task force vs. Ca, gr no. 83578, march 16,

1989

Soliven vs. Makasiar, 167 scra 393

the word personally after the word determined does not necessarily mean that the judge
should examine the complainant and his witnesses personally before issuing the search warrant or
warrant of arrest but the exclusive responsibility on the part of said judge to satisfy himself of the
existence of probable cause. As such, there is no need to examine the complainant and his witnesses
face to face. It is sufficient if the judge is convinced of the existence of probable cause upon reading the
affidavits or deposition of the complainant and his witnesses.
1-e. Pendon vs. Ca, nov. 16, 1990
1-f. P. Vs. Inting, july 25, 1990
1-g. Umil vs. Ramos, et al., july 9, 1990 with the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration in november, 1991
1-h. Paderanga vs. Drilon, april 19, 1991
2. Department of health vs. Sy chi siong,
inc., gr no. 85289, february 20, 1989
2-a. P. Vs. Villanueva, 110 scra 465
2-b. Placer vs. Villanueva, 126 scra 463 (only a judge has the power to determine probable insofar
as the issuance of a warrant of arrest is concerned)
3. Tolentino vs. Villaluz,july 27,1987
4. Cruz vs. Gatan, 74 scra 226
5. Olaes vs. P., 155 scra 486
7. Geronimo vs. Ramos, 136 scra 435
7.juan ponce enrile vs. Judge jaime salazar, et al., g.r.no. 92163,
june 5, 1990
Due process; right to bail; warrant of arrest
(note: this might be useful also in your criminal law)
Narvasa, j.
on february 27, 1990, senator juan ponce enrile was arrested by law enforcement
officers led by nbi director alfredo lim on the strength of a warrant of arrest issued by the
respondent judge, hon. Jaime salazar, regional trial court, branch 103, quezon city in
criminal case no. 90-10941. The warrant was issued on an information signed and filed
earlier in the day by senior state prosecutor aurelio trampe charging senator enrile, the
spouses rebecco and erlinda panlilio, and gregorio honasan with the crime of rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder allegedly committed during the period of the
failed coup attempt from november 29 to december 10, 1990. Senator enrile was taken to

30
and held overnight at the nbi headquarters on taft ave., manila, without bail, none having
been recommended in the information and none fixed in the warrant of arrest.
on february 28, 1990, petitioner through counsel filed a petition for habeas corpus
alleging that he was deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or having been:
a. Held to answer for a criminal offense which does not exist in the statute books;
b. Charged with a criminal offense in an information for which no complaint was
initially filed or preliminary investigation was conducted, hence, he was denied due
process;
c. Denied the right to bail; and
d. Arrested or detained on the strength of warrant issued without the judge who
issued it first having personally determined the existence of probable cause.
Held:
The parties' oral and written arguments presented the following options:
1. Abandon the hernandez doctrine and adopt the dissenting opinion of justice
montemayor that "rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes";
2. Hold hernandez doctrine applicable only to offenses committed in furtherance, or as
necessary means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to acts committed in the
course of a rebellion which also constitute common crimes of grave or less grave
character;
3. Maintain hernandez doctrine as applying to make rebellion absorb all other offenses
committed in its course, whether or not necessary to its commission or in furtherance
thereof.
1. On the first option, 11 justices voted against abandoning hernandez. Two members felt
that the doctrine should be re-examined. In view of the majority, the ruling remains good
law, its substantive and legal bases have withstood all subsequent challenges and no
new ones are presented here persuasive enough to warrant a complete reversal. This is
so because of the fact that the incumbent president (exercising legislative powers under
the 1986 freedom constitution) repealed pd no. 942 which added a new provision of the
revised penal code, particularly art. 142-a which sought to nullify if not repealed the
hernandez doctrine. In thus acting, the president in effect by legislative fiat reinstated the
hernandez as a binding doctrine with the effect of law. The court can do no less than
accord it the same recognition, absent any sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
2. On the second option, the supreme court was unanimous in voting to reject the same
though four justices believe that the arguments in support thereof is not entirely devoid of
merit.
3. With the rejection of the first two options, the hernandez doctrine remains a binding
doctrine operating to prohibit the complexing of rebellion with any other offense
committed on the occasion thereof, either as a means necessary to its commission or as
unintended effect of an activity that constitutes rebellion.
On the issues raised by the petitioner:
A. By a vote of 11-3, the court ruled that the information filed against the petitioner does
in fact charge an offense despite the objectionable phrasing that would complex rebellion
with murder and multiple frustrated murder, that indictment is to be read as charging
simple rebellion. The petitioner's contention that he was charged with a crime that does
not exist in the statute books, while technically correct so far as the court ruled that
rebellion may not be complexed with other offenses committed on the occasion thereof,
must therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of rhetoric. Read in the context of
hernandez, the information does indeed charge the petitioner with a crime defined and
punished by the revised penal code: simple rebellion.
B. Was the petitioner charged without a complaint having been initially filed and/or
preliminary investigation conducted? The record shows that a complaint for simple
rebellion against petitioner was filed by the nbi director and that based on the strength of

31
said complaint a preliminary investigation was conducted by the respondent prosecutors
culminating in the filing of the questioned information. There is nothing inherently irregular
or contrary to law in filing against a respondent an inductment for an offense different
from what is charged in the initiatory complaint, if warranted by the evidence developed
during the preliminary investigation.
C. The petitioner claims that the warrant issued is void because it was issued barely one
hour and twenty minutes after the case was raffled to the respondent judge which could
hardly gave him sufficient time to personally go over the voluminous records of the
preliminary investigation. Also, the petitioner claims that the respondent judge issued the
warrant for his arrest without first personally determining the existence of probable cause
by examining under oath or affirmation the complainant and his witnesses, in violation of
art. Iii, section 2, of the constitution. This court has already ruled that it is not unavoidable
duty of the judge to make such a personal examination, it being sufficient that he follows
established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting document
submitted by the prosecutor. Mereby because said respondent judge had what some
might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty , gives
no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that
single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed.
D. Petitioner also claims that he is denied of his constitutional right to bail. In the light of
the court's affirmation of hernandez as applicable to petitioner's case, and of the logical
and necessary corollary that the information against him should be considered as
charging only the crime of simple rebellion which is bailable before conviction, that must
now be accepted as a correct proposition.
Notes:
this might be useful also in your remedial law.
was a petition for habeas corpus before the supreme court the appropriate vehicle for
asserting a right to bail or vindicating its denial?
the supreme court held that the criminal case before the respondent judge is the
normal venue for invoking the petitioner's right to have provisional liberty pending trial
and judgment. The correct course was for the petitioner to invoke that jurisdiction by filing
a petition to be admitted to bail, claiming a right to bail per se or by reason of the
weakness of the evidence against him. Only after that remedy was denied by the trial
court should the review jurisdiction of the supreme court be invoked, and even then, not
without first applying to the court of appeals if appropriate relief was also available there.
even assuming that the petitioner's premise that the information charges a nonexistent crime would not excuse or justify his improper choice of remedies. Under either
hypothesis, the obvious recourse would have been a motion to quash brought in the
criminal action before the respondent judge.
g. Warrantless searches and seizures--when valid
or not. Is "operation kapkap" valid?
read:
People vs. Mengote, g.r. no. 87059, june, 1992, 210 scra 174
Warrantless search and
Seizure
Cruz, j.
Facts|
-----1. On august 8, 1987, the western police district received a telephone call from an
informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of juan luna and
north bay blvd., in tondo, manila;
2. When the surveilance team arrived therein, they saw the accused "looking from side to
side" and "holding his abdomen". They approched these persons and identified

32
themselves as policement that is why they tried to ran away because of the other
lawmen, they were unable to escape;
3. After their arrest, a .38 cal. Smith and wessor revolver was confiscated from the
accused and several days later, an information for violation of pd 1866 was filed against
him;
4. After trial, mengote was convicted of having violated pd 1866 and was sentenced to
suffer reclusion perpetua based on the alleged gun as the principal evidence. Hence this
automatic appeal.
Issue:
-----was there a valid warrantless search and seizure?
Held:
----there is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or
seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition
of article iii, section 3 [2], of the constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule
based on the justification given by justice learned hand that "only in case the
prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong will the wrong be repressed."
section 5, article 113 of the rules of court provides:
sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.- a peace officer or private person
may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a
penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from
one confinement to another.
X x x
we have carefully examined the wording of this rule and cannot see how we we
can agree with the prosecution.
par. (c) of section 5 is obviously inapplicable as mengote was not an escapee
from a penal institution when he was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to
determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either par. (a) or par. (b) of this section.
par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while
he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the
presence of the arresting officer.
these requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of
the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and
"holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was
apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or
at least being attempted by mengote in thie presence.
the solicitor general submits that the actual existence of an offense was not
necessary as long as mengote's acts created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the
arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed and
that accused-appellant had committed it". The question is, what offense? What offense
could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding
his abdomen" and in aplace not exactly forsaken.

33

these are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less
so, if at all. It might have been different if mengote had been apprehended at an unholy
hour and in a place where he had no reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in
the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street
shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with his companion.he was not skulking in
the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about his
being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.
on the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them
innoent, why hiseyes were darting from side to sideand he was holding his abdomen. If
they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests,
it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about.
Xxx
the case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting
officers' suspicion other than mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By
no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense
had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being
attempted in their presence.
this is similar to people vs. Amminuidin, 163 scra 402 where the court held that a
warrantless arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while he was
coming down the vessel, to all appearances no less innocent than the other
disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was actually committing or
attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not
even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution
incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.
par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have
also not been satisfied. Theprosecution has not shown that at the time of mengote's
arrest an offense had in fact been committed and that the arresting officers had personal
knowldge of facts indicating that mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay
information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to
bem
committed.
Xxx
in the landmark case of people vs. Burgos, 144 scra 1, this court declared:
under section 6(a) of rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personalknowledge
of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (sayo
vs. Chief of police, 80 phil. 859).
Xxx
in arrests without a warrant under section 6(b), however, it is not enough that
there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a
crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has
actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a
crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be
undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator..
this doctrine was affirmed in alih vs. Castro, 151 scra 279, thus:
if the arrest was made under rule 113, section 5, of the rules of court in
connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just
committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a
falsification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the revised rule 113,
section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the
ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of people vs. Burgos.
it would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and
searched just because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a
stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty
look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act is actually committing or

34
attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state
where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part ofthe arresting
officer may be justified in the name of security.
Xxx
the court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions
of the bill of rights, the prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it
happened, they allowed their over zealousness to get the better of them, resulting in
their disregard
of the requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered
inadmissible the evidence they had invalidly seized.
this should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the
very cause of the acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted, escaping the
clutches of the law, because, ironically enough, it has not been observed by those who
are supposed to enforce it.
When illegal arrest is deemed waived.
Warrantless arrest; no personal knowledge of the
arresting officer
People vs. Galvez, 355 scra 246
Mendoza, j.
the policeman arrested the accused-appellant on the basis solely of what reynaldo castro had
told him and not because he saw the accused-appellant commit the crime charged against him. Indeed,
the prosecution admitted that there was no warrant of arrest issued against accused-appellant when the
latter was taken into custody. Considering that the accused-appellant was not committing a crime at the
time he was arrested nor did the arresting officer have any personal knowledge of facts indicating that
accused-appellant committed a crime, his arrest without a warrant cannot be justified.
however, by entering a plea of not guilty during the arraignment, the accused-appellant waived
his right to raise the issue of illegality of his arrest. It is now settled that objection to a warrant of arrest or
the procedure by which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before
he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. The fact that the arrest was illegal does
not render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive the state of its right to convict the guilty when all
the facts point to the culpability of the accused.
g-1. Warrantless search and seizure by a private person. (valid since the constitutional
provision is not applicable to him; when it is not valid)
read:
1. People vs. Mendoza, 301 scra 66
Warrantless searches and seizures by private individuals
2. Silahis international hotel, inc. Vs. Rogelio soluta, et al., 482 scra
660
Carpio-morales, j.
the petitioner suspects that the respondents who are officers of the silahis international hotel
union were using the union office located inside the hotel in the sale or use of marijuana, dollar
smuggling, and prostitution. They arrived at the said conclusion through surveillance.
in the morning of january 11, 1988, while the respondent union officer was opening the union
office, security officers of the plaintiff entered the union office despite objections thereto by forcibly
opening the same. Once inside the union office they started to make searches which resulted in the
confiscation of a plastic bag of marijuana. An information for violation of the dangerous drugs act was
filed against the respondent before the rtc of manila which acquitted them on the ground that the search
conducted was illegal since it was warrantless and without consent by the respondents.
after their acquittal, the respondents filed a case for malicious prosecution against the petitioner
for violation of art. 32 of the civil code. After trial, the regional trial court held that petitioners are liable for
damages as a result of an illegal search. The same was affirmed by the court of appeals.

35

Issue:
whether the warrantless search conducted by the petitioners (private individual and corporation)
on the union office of the private respondents is valid.
Held:
the search is not valid and they are civilly liable under art. 32 of the civil code. The fact that the
union office is part of the hotel owned by the petitioners does not justify the warrantless search. The
alleged reports that the said union office is being used by the union officers for illegal activities does not
justify their acts of barging into the said office without the consent of the union officers and without a
search warrant. If indeed there was surveillance made, then they should have applied for a search
warrant.
the ruling in people vs. Andre marti is not applicable here because in marti, a
criminal case, the issue was whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of
ones constitutional rights may be invoked against the state. In other words, the issue in
marti is whether the evidence obtained by a private person acting in his private capacity
without the participation of the state, is admissible.
3. People of the philippines vs. Andre marti
G.r. no. 81561, january 18, 1991
Warrantless search and seizure
By a private person
Bidin, j.
Facts:
andre marti and his common-law wife, shirley reyes went to manila packaging
and export forwarders to send four (4) packages to zurich, switzerland. Anita reyes,
owner of the place (no relation to shirley), received said goods and asked if she could
examine and inspect it. Marti refused. However later, following standard operating
procedure, job reyes, co-owner and husband of anita opened the boxes for final
inspection, before delivering it to the bureau of customs and/or bureau of posts.
upon opening, a peculiar odor emanated from the box that was supposed to
contain gloves. Upon further perusal, he felt and saw a dried leaves inside the box. Job
reyes then brought samples to the nbi, he told them that the boxes to be shipped were
still in his office. In the presence of the nbi agents, reyes opened the box and discovered
that the odor came from the fact that the dried leaves were actually those of the
marijuana flowering tops.
two other boxes,marked as containing books and tabacalera cigars; also
revealed bricks or case-like marijuana leaves and dried marijuana leaves respectively.
marti was later invited by the nbi to shed light on the attempted shipment of the
dried leaves. Thereafter an information was filed against the appellant for violating ra
6425 or the dangerous drugs act. The special criminal court of manila convicted accused
marti of violating sec.21(b) of said ra.
Issues:
-----------1. Did the search conducted by a private person, violate accused's right against
unreasonable searches seizures and invocable against the state?
2. Was the evidence procured from the search admissible?
Held:
-------1. No, constitutional protection on search and seizure is imposable only against the state
and not to private persons.

36
since art. Iii,2 of the 1987 constitution is almost verbatim from the united states
constitution, the sc may consider us fed. Sc cases as likewise doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Hence, in us cases, the constitutional provision against unreasomable searches and
seizure was intended as a restraint upon the activities of the sovereign authority and not
intended against private persons. If a search was initiated by a private person the
provision does not apply since it only proscribes government action. This view is
supported by the deliberations by the 1986 constitutional commission.
in short, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be
extended to acts comitted by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion.
case at bar will show that it was job reyes` initiative that perpetrated the search.
He opened the packages and took the samples to nbi. All the nbi agents did was to
observe and look in plain sight. This did not convert it to a search as contemplated by the
constitution.
2. Yes, since the search was valid, the evidence from therein is admissible evidence.
art.iii [2], on the admissibility of evidence in violation of the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures, likewise applies only to the government and its
agencies and not to private persons.
(u.s. cases cited: burdeau v. Mcdowell (256 us 465 [1921], state v. Bryan (457 p
2d 661 [1968], walker v. State (429 s.w 2d 121 [1969]), barnes v. Us (373 f 2d 517
[1967]), chadwick v. State (329 sw 2d 135).
Valid warrantless search and seizure:
1. Search made incidental to a valid arrest
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

f.

Moreno vs. Ago chi, 12 phil. 439

People vs. Ang chun kit, 251 scra 660
People vs. Lua, 256 scra 539
People vs. Figueroa, 248 scra 679
Nolasco vs. Pano, 139 scra 541 (a search incidental to a valid arrest must be done at
the place where the accused is arrested. As such, if accused was arrested while
inside a jeepney, there is no valid search incidental to a valid arrest if she will be
brought to her residence and thereafter search the said place)
Espano vs. Ca, 288 scra 588 (if the accused was arrested in the street during a buybust operation, the search of his house nearby is not a valid search incidental to a
valid arrest)
People vs. Go, 354 scra 338

where the gun tucked in a persons waist is plainly visible to the police, no search warrant is
necessary and in the absence of any license for said firearm, he may be arrested at once as he is in
effect committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. No warrant is necessary in such a
situation, it being one of the recognized exceptions under the rules.
as a consequence of the accuseds valid warrantless arrest inside the nightclub, he may be
lawfully searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of
an offense, without a search warrant in accordance with section 12, rule 126. This is a valid search
incidental to a lawful arrest.
in fact, the subsequent discovery in his car which was parked in a distant place from where the
illegal possession of firearm was committed [after he requested that he will bring his car to the police
station after his warrantless arrest) , of a drug paraphernalia and shabu, cannot be said to have been
made during an illegal search. As such, the items do not fall under the exclusionary rule and the
unlicensed firearms, drug paraphernalia and the shabu, can be used as evidence against the accused.
2. Search of moving vehicles
a.
b.
(g.
c.
d.

Carrol vs. Us, 267 us 132

People vs. Lo ho wing, et al.
R. No. 88017) january 21, 1991
Mustang lumber vs. Ca, 257 scra 430
People vs. Cfi, 101 scra 86

37
e. People vs. Malmstedt198 scra 401
f.

People vs. Lo ho wing, 193 scra 122

Facts:
----------in july 1987, the special operations group of the cis received a tip from one of its
informers about an organized group engaged in importation of illegal drugs and
smuggling of contraband items. To infiltrate the crime syndicate, they recruited
confidential men and "deep penetration agents" under oplan sharon 887. One such agent
was reynaldo tia (the dicharged/accused). As an agent, he submitted regular reports of
undercover activities of suspected syndicates. Captain palmera, head of oplan sharon
887, in turned informed the dan
Gerous drugs board of tia's activities.
tia was introduced to his co-accused lim cheng huat by another agent named
george. Lim wanted a male travelling companion for his business trips abroad. Tia offered
his services and was hired by lim. Later, tia was introduced to peter lo (alias of
accused/appellant lo ho wing), the later turning out to be tia's intended companion.
appellant lo ho wing and tia left for hongkong on october 4, 1987. Tia telephoned
capt. Palmera that they would return to the philippines on october 6. From hongkong, the
two proceeded to guangzhou in mainland china. There, appeallant lo ho wing bought six
(6) cans of tea.tia saw these 6 bags when they were opened for examination. That
evening, they went to lo ho wing's room and he saw two other men with him. One was
fixing the tea bags, while the other was burning a substance on a piece of aluminum foil
using a lighter. Appellant lo ho wing joined the second man and sniffed the smoke emitted
by the burning substance. When tia asked lo ho wing what cargo they would bring to
manila, the latter replied that they would be bringing chinese drugs.
the next day en route to manila, customs examiners inspected the bags
containing the tin cans of tea. Since the bags were not closely examined, appellant lo ho
wing and tia were cleared. In manila, they were met by lim cheng huat. Appelant lo ho
wing and tia boarded a taxi from the airport and loaded their luggage in the taxi's
compartment. Lim cheng huat followed them in another taxi.
meamwhile, a team composed by capt. Palmera positioned themselves in
strategic areas around the airport. The cis men who first saw lo ho and tia followed them.
Along imelda avenue, the cis car overtook the taxi ridden by lo ho wing and tia , forcing
the taxi driver to stop his vehicle. The cis team asked the taxi driver to open the baggage
compartment. The cis team asked permission to search their luggage.
a tin can of tea was taken out of the compartment. Sgt. Cayabyab of the cis pried
the lid open and pressed it in the middle to pull out the contents. Crystalline white
powder resmbling crushed alum came out. Suspecting the crystalline powder to be a
dangerous drug, he had the three travelling bags opened for inspection. All the bags
threshed out a total of six tin cans. Tia and appellant were taken to the cis headquarters
for questioning. Meanwhile, the second taxi carrying lim cheng huat sped in attempt to
escape. However, they were later captured.
samples from the bag tested positive for metamphetamine. The three suspects
were indicted for violating art. Iii, sec.15 of the dangerous drug act. Appellant lo ho wing
and lim cheng huat were sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of
p25,000 each. Reynaldo tia was discharged as a state witness. The trial court gave full
credence to the testimonies of government agents since the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties were in their favor.
Issues:
---------1. Was the warrantless search valid?
2. Are the effects taken admissible as evidence?
Held:
-----

38
1. This is a case of search on a moving vehicle which is one of the well-known
exceptions to the valid warrantless search and seizure. To stilol get a search warrant from
a judge would allow the accused go scot-free.
2. Since the search and seizure are valid, the evidence obtained is admissible as
evidence in any proceeding.
3. Seizure of goods concealed to avoid duties/taxes (valid)
a.
b.
c.
d.

Papa vs. Mago, 22 scra 857

Pacis vs. Pamaran, 56 scra 16
Hizon vs. Ca, 265 scra 517
People vs. Que, 265 scra 721

4. Seize of evidence in plain view

a.
b.
c.
d.

Harris vs. Us, 390 us 234

People vs. Damaso, 212 scra 547
People vs. Veloso, 252 scra 135
People vs. Lesangin, 252 scra 213

5.
a.
b.
c.

When there is waiver of right or gives his consent;

De garcia vs. Locsin, 65 phil. 689
Lopez vs. Commissioner, 65 scra 336
People vs. Damaso, 212 scra (in order that there is a valid waiver to a warrantless search,
the waiver or consent should be given by the person affected, not just anybody. Example: the
landlady could not give a valid consent to the search of a room occupied by a tenant. Said
tenant himself should give the consent in order to be valid. The doctrine in lopez vs.
Commissioner to the effect that it could be given by any occupant of a hotel room being rented
by the respondent is deemed abandoned)
d. Veroy vs. Layague, 210 scra 97. (if the owner of the house allowed the policemen to enter
his house because they are searching for rebel soldiers but when inside the house, they
instead seized an unlicensed firearm, there is no consent to a warrantless search)
6. Stop and frisk.
a. People vs. Mengote, june, 1992
b. People vs. Posadas, 188 scra 288
c. Manalili vs. People, october 9, 1997. (the policemen saw several suspicious looking
men at dawn who ran when they went near them. As the policemen ran after them,
an unlicensed firearm was confiscated. The search is valid)
d. Malacat vs. Ca, 283 scra 159. (mere suspicions not sufficient to validate warrantless
arrest)
6. Eddie guazon, et al. Vs. Maj. Gen. Renato de villa, et al., gr no.
80508, january 30, 1990
Warrantless searches;
"zonings" and "saturation drives"
Section 17, art. Vii of the constitution
Gutierrez, jr., j.
Facts:
this is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit military and police
officers from conducting "areal target zonings" or "saturation drive" in metro manila
particularly in places where they suspect that the subversives are hiding. The 41
petitioners claim that the saturation drives conducted by the military is in violation of their
human rights because with no specific target house in mind, in the dead of the night or
early morning hours, police and military officers without any search warrant cordon an
area of more than one residence and sometimes the whole barangay. Most of them are in
civilian clothes and w/o nameplates or identification cards; that the raiders rudely rouse
residents from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their homes, shouting,
kicking their doors open (destroying some) and ordering the residents to come out; the
residents are herded like cows at the point of high powered guns, ordered to strip down
to their briefs and examined for tattoo marks; that while examination of the bodies of the
men are being conducted, the other military men conduct search and seizures to each

39
and every house without civilian witnesses from the neighbors; some victims complained
that their money and other valuables were lost as a result of these illegal operations.
the respondents claim that they have legal authority to conduct saturation drives under
art. Vii, sec. 17 of the constitution which provides:
the respondents would want to justify said military operation
constitutional provisions:

on the following

the president shall be the commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the
philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to
prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion x x x
Xxxx
The president shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices.
He shall ensure that the laws are faithfully executed.
Held:
there can be no question that under ordinary circumstances, the police action of the
nature described by the petitioners would be illegal and blatantly violative of the bill of
rights. If the military wants to flush out subversive and criminal elements, the same must
be consistent with the constitutional and statutory rights of the people. However, nowhere
in the constitution can we see a provision which prohibits the chief executive from
ordering the military to stop unabated criminality, rising lawlessness and alarming
communist activities. However, all police actions are governed by the limitations of the bill
of rights. The government cannot adopt the same reprehensible methods of authoritarian
systems both of the right and of the left. This is so because art. Iii, section 3 of the
constitution is very clear as explained in roan vs. Gonzales, 145 scra 687 and century fox
vs. Court of appeals, 164 scra 655. Also, it must be pointed out that police actions should
not be characterized by methods that offend one's sense of justice (rochin vs. California,
342 us 165).
the court believes it highly probable that some violations were actually committed. But
the remedy is not to stop all police actions, including the essential and legitimate ones. A
show of force is sometimes necessary as long as the rights of people are protected and
not violated. However, the remedy of the petitioners is not an original action for
prohibition since not one victim complains and not one violator is properly charged. It is
basically for the executive department and the trial courts. The problem is appropriate for
the commission of human rights.
the petition was therefore remanded to the regional trial courts of manila, malabon and
pasay city where the petitioners may present evidence supporting their allegations so that
the erring parties may be pinpointed and prosecuted. In the meantime, the acts violative
of human rights alleged by the petitioners as committed during the police actions are
enjoined until such time as permanent rules to govern such actions are promulgated.
********************
Cruz, padilla and sarmiento, jj. , dissenting
the ruling of the majority that the petitioners are not proper parties is a specious
pretext for inaction. We have held that technical objections may be brushed aside where
there are constitutional questions that must be met (rodriguez vs. Gella, 92 phil. 603;
tolentino vs. Comelec, 41 scra 702; philconsa vs. Jimenez, 65 scra 479; edu vs. Ericta,
35 scra 481; gonzales vs. Comelec, 27 scra 835; lagunzad vs. Ca, 154 scra 199;
demetria vs. Alba,148 scra 208). Lozada was in fact an aberration.
where liberty is involved, every person is a proper party even if he may not be directly
injured. Each of us has a duty to protect liberty and that alone makes him a proper party.
It is not only the owner of a burning house who has the right to call the firemen.
section 2, art. Iii of the constitution is very clear: unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for whatever purpose is prohibited.
saturation drives are not among the accepted instances when a search or an arrest
may be made without a warrant. They come under the concept of the fishing expeditions
stigmatized by law and doctrine x x x i submit that this court should instead categorically

40
and emphatically that these saturation drives are violative of human rights and individual
liberty and should be stopped immediately. While they may be allowed in the actual
theater of military operations against the insurgents, the court should also make it clear
that metro manila is not such a battleground.
7. In the matter of the petition for habeas corpus of roberto umil, rolando dural and renato villanueva.
Manolita umil and nicanor dural, felicitas sese vs. Fidel ramos, et al. And companion cases, g.r. no.
81567, july 9, 1990 (an npa may be arrested without warrant while sleeping or being treated in a hospital
because his being a communist rebel is a continuing crime)
H. If the judge finds that there's probable cause, must he issue a warrant of arrest
course? See the distinctions.

as a matter of

read:
1. Samulde vs. Salvani, september 26, 1988 (no because a warrant is issued in order to
have jurisdiction of the court over the person of an accused and to assure the court of his
presence whenever his case is called in court. As such, if the court believes that the
presence of the accused could be had even without a warrant of arrest, then he may not
issue said warrant. Note: this case involves a minor offense)
2. Gozo vs. Tac-an, 300 scra 265. If the offense committed is a serious one like that
obtaining in this case for murder, the judge must issue a warrant of arrest after
determining the existence of probable cause)
I. Searching questions
read:
Dr. Nemesio prudente vs. The hon. Executive judge abelardo m.
Dayrit, rtc 33, manila & people of the philippines, gr no. 82870,
december 14, 1989 (en banc)
Search and seizure; requirements/requisites of a valid search warrant; searching
questions
Padilla, j.
this is a petition to annul and set aside the order of respondent judge denying the
motion of the petitioner to quash search warrant no. 87-14 as well as its order denying
the petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Facts:
1. On october 31, 1987, p/major alladin dimagmaliw, chief of the intelligence special
action division (isad) of the western police district (wpd) filed with the regional trial court
of manila, branch 33, presided by the respondent judge, an application for the issuance
of a search warrant for violation of pd 1866 against the petitioner;
2. In his application for search warrant, p/major dimagmaliw alleged that:
"1. That he has been informed and has good and sufficient reasons to believe that
nemesio prudente who may be found at the polytechnic university of the philippines x x x
has in his control or possession firearms, explosives, hand grenades and ammunition
intended to be used as the means of committing an offense x x x;
"2. That the undersigned has verified the report and found it to be a fact x x x ".
in support of said application, p/lt. Florencio angeles executed a "deposition of witness
dated october 31, 1987 .
3. On november 1, 1987, a sunday and all saints day, the search warrant was enforced
by some 200 wpd operatives led by col. Edgar dula torre and major maganto;
4. On november 2, 1987, ricardo abando, a member of the searching team executed an
affidavit alleging that he found in the drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of dr.

41
Prudente's office a bulging brown envelope with three live fragmentation hand grenades
separately with old newspapers;
5. On november 6, 1987, the petitioner moved to quash the search warrant on the
grounds that:
A. The complainant's lone witness, lt. Angeles had no personal knowledge of the facts
which formed the basis for the issuance of the search warrant;
B. The examination of said witness was not in the form of searching questions and
answers;
C. The search warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly
describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific offense; and
D. The warrant was issued in violation of circular no. 19 of the supreme court in that the
complainant failed to allege that the issuance of the search warrant on a saturday was
urgent.
6. On march 9, 1986, the respondent judge denied the motion to quash and on april 20,
1988, the same judge denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. Hence this petition.
Issue:
was the search warrant issued by the respondent judge valid? Was there probable
cause?
Held:
a. For a valid search warrant to issue, there must be probable cause, which is to be
determined by the judge, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized. The probable cause must be in connection with
one specific offense and the judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally examine
in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, on facts personally known to them and
attach to the record their sworn statements together with any affidavits submitted.
the "probable cause" for a valid search warrant, has been defined "as such facts and
circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that
an offense has been committed, and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched". (quintero vs. Nbi, june 23, 1988). This
probable cause must be shown to be within the personal knowledge of the complainant
or the witnesses he may produce and not based on mere hearsay. (p. Vs. Sy juco, 64
phil. 667; alvarez vs. Cfi, 64 phil. 33; us vs. Addison, 28 phil. 566).
in his affidavit, major dimagmaliw declared that "he has been informed" that nemesio
prudente "has in his control and possession" the firearms and explosivees described
therein, and that he "has verified the report and found it to be a fact." on the other hand,
lt. Angeles declared that as a result of continuous surveillance for several days, they
"gathered informations from verified sources" that the holders of said firearms and
explosives are not licensed t possess them. It is clear from the foregoing that the
applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances
which became the basis for issuing the questioned search warrant, but acquired
knowledge thereof only through information from other sources or persons.
despite the fact that major dimagmaliw stated in his affidavit that "he verified the
information he had earlier received and found it to be a fact, yet there is nothing in the
record to show or indicate how and when said applicant verified the earlier information
acquired by him as to justify his conclusion. He might have clarified this point if there had
been searching questions and answers, but there were none. In fact, the records yield no
questions and answers, whether searching or not, vis-a-vis the said applicant.
in alvarez vs. Cfi, 64 phil. 33, it was held that the following test must be complied with
in an application for search warrant or in a supporting deposition based on personal
knowledge or not"the true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance of a search
warrant is whether it was drawn in a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and

42
the affiant be held liable for damage caused. The oath required must refer to the truth of
the facts within the personal knowledge of the applicant of a search warrant and/or his
witnesses, not of the facts merely reported by a person whom one considers to be
reliable."
tested by the above standards, the allegation of the witness, lt. Angeles, do not come
up to the level of facts based on his personal knowledge so much so that he cannot be
held liable for perjury for such allegations in causing the issuance of the questioned
search warrant.
besides, respondent judge did not take the deposition of the applicant as required by
the rules of court. As held in roan vs. Gonzales, 145 scra 694, "mere affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses are thus insufficient. The examining judge has to take the
depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and attach
them to the record."
B. There was also no searching questions asked by the respondent judge because as
shown by the record, his questions were too brief and short and did not examine the
complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers. On the
contrary, the questions asked were leading as they called for a simple "yes" or "no"
answer. As held in quintero vs. Nbi, june 23, 1988, "the questions propounded are not
sufficiently searching to establish probable cause. Asking of leading questions to the
deponent in an application for search warrant and conducting of examination in a general
manner would not satisfy the requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant."
the court avails of this decision to reiterate the strict requirements for determination of
probable cause in the valid issuance of a search warrant as enunciated in earlier cases.
True, this requirements are stringent but the purpose is to assure that the constitutional
right of the individual against unreasonable search and seizure shall remain both
meaningful and effective.
C. The rule is, that a description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with
the warrant can with reasonable effort ascertain and identify the place intended (p vs.
Veloso, 48 phil. 180). In the case at bar, the warrant described the place to be searched
as the premises of the pup, more particularly the offices of the department of science and
tactics as well as the office of the president, nemesio prudente.
there is also no violation of the "one specific offense" requirement considering that the
application for a search warrant explicitly described the offense: illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions under pd 1866.
D. Circular no. 19 of the supreme court merely provides for a guideline, departure from
which would not necessarily affect the validity of the search warrant provided the
constitutional requirements are complied with.
a. Hubert webb vs. De leon, 247 scra 650
Read also:
1. Alvarez vs. Cfi, 64 phil. 33 (when the applicant is basing his knowledge from an informant, the
same is not valid)
2. Luna vs. Plaza, 26 scra 313
3. De mulata vs. Irizari, 62 scra 210
4. Marinas vs. Siochi, 104 scra 423
5. Roan vs. Gonzales, 145 687
6. Mata vs. Bayona, 128 scra 388 (depositions of the applicants and witnesses should be attached
to the record of the case)
7. Corro vs. Lising, 137 scra 541
8. Nolasco vs pano, 147 scra 509
9. Burgos vs. Chief of staff, 133 scra 800
10. P. Vs. Burgos, september 14,1986
11. P. Vs. Aminnudin y ahni, july 6,1988
12. Ponsica vs. Ignalaga, july 31,1987 (when the statements in the affidavits of witnesses are mere
generalities, mere conclusions of law, and not positive statements of particular acts, the warrant is not
valid)
13. Aberca vs. Ver, april 15,1988
2. Panganiban vs. Cesar, 159 scra 599

43
3. Pendon vs. Ca, november 16, 1990. (when the questions asked to the applicant for a search
warrant was pre-typed, the same is not valid since there could have been no searching
questions)
J. Warrantless searches and seizures--when valid
or not.
read:
1. Ricardo valmonte vs. Gen renato de villa,
september 29, 1989

gr no. 83988,

Warrantless searches and seizures;

Validity of checkpoints
Padilla, j.
Facts:
1. On january 20, 1987, the national capital region district command (ncrdc) was
activated with the mission of conducting security operations within its area of
responsibility for the purpose of maintaining peace and order. As part of its duty to
maintain peace and order, the ncrdc installed checkpoints in various parts of valenzuela,
metro manila.
Petitioners claim that because of these checkpoints, the residents of valenzuela, mm are
worried of being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and
whimsical disposition of the military authorities manning the checkpoints considering that
their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups, especially
at night or dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order.
2. On july 9, 1988 at dawn, the apprehensions of the residents of valenzuela increased
because benjamin parpon, the supply officer of the municipality of valenzuela was
gunned down in cold blood by the military men manning the checkpoints for ignoring or
refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for continuing to speed off inspite of
several warning shots fired in the air.
Issue:
whether or not the existence of said checkpoints as well as the periodic searches and
seizures made by the military authorities without search warrant valid?
Held:
petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military
manning the checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se
illegal.
not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not
forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be
resolved according to the facts of each case.
where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle
which is parked on a public fair grounds (people vs. Case, 190 mw 289), or simply looks
into a vehicle (state vs. Gaina, 97 se 62), or flashes a light therein (rowland vs.
Commonwealth, 259 sw 33), these do not constitute unreasonable search.
the setting up of checkpoints in valenzuela, metro manila may be considered as
security measure to effectively maintain peace and order and to thwart plots to destabilize
the government. In this connection, the court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban
centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the
increased killings in cities of police and military men by npa's "sparrow units," not to
mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms.
between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public
welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however
reasonably conducted, the former shall prevail.

44
true, the manning of these checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the
men in uniform, in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible to abuse.
But , at the cost of occasional inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen,
the checkpoints during these abnormal times are part of the price we pay for an orderly
society and peaceful community.
finally, it must be emphasized that on july 17, 1988, the military checkpoints in metro
manila were temporarily lifted and a review and refinement of the rules in the conduct of
the police and military manning the checkpoints upon order of the ncrdc chief.
Cruz and sarmiento, jj., dissenting:
the bland declaration by the majority that individual rights must yield to the demands
of national security ignores the fact that the bill of rights was intended precisely to limit
the authority of the state even if asserted on the ground of national security.
Resolution on the motion for reconsideration, june 15, 1990
Very important:
the supreme court in its resolution of the motion for reconsideration dated 15 june,
1990, held that military and police checkpoints are not illegal as these measures to
protect the government and safeguards the lives of the people. The checkpoints are legal
as where the survival of the organized government is on the balance, or where the lives
and safety of the people are in grave peril. However, the supreme court held further that
the military officers manning the checkpoints may conduct visual search only, not bodily
search.
read also the resolution on the motion for reconsideration dated june 15, 1990, 185 scra
665
read also:
1-a. Rizal alih vs. Gen. Castro, june 23,1987
1-b. P s. Cendana, october 17, 1990
1-c. P. Vs. Castiller, august 6, 1990
1-d. P. Vs. Olaes, july 30, 1990
2. Papa vs. Mago, 22 scra 857
3. Roldan vs. Arca, 65 scra 336
4. P. Vs. Cfi, 101 scra 86
5. Pacis vs. Pamaran, 56 scra 16
6. Lopez vs. Commisioner, 65 scra 336
7. P vs. Cruz, 165 scra 135
8. Nolasco vs. Pano, 147 scra 509 & 139 scra
152
9. P vs. Claudio, 160 scra 646 (there is a valid warrantless search if a narcom officer arrests the
person who owns a bag which contains marijuana which he found out when he smelled the same. Here ,
there is a probable cause since he was personal knowledge due to his expertise on drugs)
11. People vs. Del rosario, july 10, 1994. (after the informant was given by the police the amount
of p100.00, he went to buy marijuana from the accused then return to the police headquarters
with said article. Thereafter, the policemen went to arrest the accused without warrant. The
arrest is not valid since it does not fall under section 5 rule 113)
likewise, after securing a search warrant authorizing the seizure of shabu and its
paraphernalia and instead, an unlicensed firearm was seized instead, said gun is inadmissible in
evidence.
K. May a non-judicial officer issue a warrant of arrest? (no)
read:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Harvey vs. Miriam defensor-santiago, june 26,1988

Moreno vs. Vivo, 20 scra 562
Lim vs. Ponce de leon, 66 scra 299
Hortencia salazar vs. Hon tomas achacoso, g.r. no. 81510, march 14, 1990 (en banc)
Presidential anti_dollar salting task force vs. Ca, march 16, 1989

L. Properties subject to seizure

read:

45

1. Sec. 2, rule 126,1985 rules on crimial procedure, as amended

2. Espano vs. Ca, 288 scra 558

M. Warrantless searches and arrests

read:
1. P. Vs. Bati, august 27, 1990
1-a. Manuel et al., vs. Judge tirso velasco, gr no. 84666, february 9, 1989
1-b. Garcia-padilla vs. Enrile,121 scra 47 &
137 scra 647
1-c. P. Vs. Maspil, jr., august 20, 1990 (compare with p. Vs. Aminnudin, july 6, 1988, supra)
1-d. Posadas vs. Ca, aug. 2, 1990
1-e. P. Vs. De la cruz
1-f. P. Vs. Ortiz, dec. 3, 1990
1-g. Rolito go vs. Ca, feb. 11, 1992
1-h. People vs. Mati, january 18, 1991
2. Morales vs. Ponce enrile, 121 scra 538
2-a. P vs. Burgos, 144 scra 1
2-b. People vs. De la cruz, 184 scra 416
2-c. Gatchalian vs. Board, may 31, 1991
2-d. People vs. Sucro, march 18, 1991
2-e. People vs. Solayao, 262 scra 255
2-f. People vs. Cuison, 256 scra 325
2-g. People vs. Damaso, 212 scra 547
2-h. Oposadas vs. Ca, 258 scra 188
2-i. People vs. Juatan, 260 scra 532 (buy-bust operation)
3. Sec. 6, rule 113, 1985 rules on criminal
procedure, as amended
N. Effect posting bail or entering a plea during the arraignment, if the arrest was illegal. (the alleged
illegality of the arrest is deemed waived upon posting of the bond by the accused)
People vs. Galvez, 355 scra 246
Mendoza, j.
the policeman arrested the accused-appellant on the basis solely of what reynaldo castro had
told him and not because he saw the accused-appellant commit the crime charged against him. Indeed,
the prosecution admitted that there was no warrant of arrest issued against accused-appellant when the
latter was taken into custody. Considering that the accused-appellant was not committing a crime at the
time he was arrested nor did the arresting officer have any personal knowledge of facts indicating that
accused-appellant committed a crime, his arrest without a warrant cannot be justified.
however, by entering a plea of not guilty during the arraignment, the accused-appellant waived
his right to raise the issue of illegality of his arrest. It is now settled that objection to a warrant of arrest or
the procedure by which a court acquires jurisdiction over the person of an accused must be made before
he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. The fact that the arrest was illegal does
not render the subsequent proceedings void and deprive the state of its right to convict the guilty when all
the facts point to the culpability of the accused.
read:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Callanta vs. Villanueva, 77 scra 377

People vs. Nazareno, 260 scra 256
Filoteo vs. Sandiganbayan, 263 scra 222
People vs. Nazareno, 260 scra 256
5. People vs. Lapura, 255 scra 85
6. People vs. Silan, 254 scra 491
O . Penalty for illegal arrest
read:
palon vs. Napolcom, may 28, 1989
P. Judicial pronouncements on illegally seized

evidence, 106 scra 336

46
Q. The exclusionary rule,155 scra 494
n. What is the status of a document obtained through subpoena?
read:
dianalan vs. Pros., office of the tanodbayan, nov. 27, 1990
R. Search warrant for pirated video tapes

1. Century fox vs. Ca, 164 scra 655 (the master copy of the allegedly pirated tape should be
presented before the judge in order to convince him of the existence of probable cause)
2. Columbia pictures vs. Ca, 261 scra 144
Latest cases on search and seizures
Uy vs. Bir, 344 scra 36
the following are the requisites of a valid search warrant:
1. The warrant must be issued upon probable cause;
2. The probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by applicant or any
other person;
3. In determining probable cause, the judge must examine under oath and affirmation the
complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
4. The warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or
things to be seized.
a description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with
reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in the
community. Search warrants are not issued on loose, vague or doubtful basis of fact, nor on mere
suspicion or belief. In this case, most of the items listed in the warrants fail to meet the test of particularity,
especially since the witness had furnished the judge photocopies of the documents sought to be seized.
The search warrant is separable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off without
destroying the whole warrant.
People vs. Valdez, 341 scra 25
the protection against unreasonable search and seizure covers
both innocent and guilty alike against any form of highhandedness of law
enforces.
the plain view doctrine, which may justify a search without
warrant, applies only where the police officer is not searching for
evidence agains the accused, but inadvertently comes across an
incriminating object.
just because the marijuana plants were found in an unfenced lot
does nor prevent the appellant from invoking the protection afforded by
the constitution. The right against unreasonable search and seizure is
the immunity of ones person, which includes his residence, papers and
other possessions. For a person to be immune against unreasonable
searches and seizures, he need not be in his home or office, within a
fenced yard or private place.
People vs. Baula, 344 scra 663
in case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional
guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is fundamental that to
constitute waiver, it must appear that the right exists; the persons
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the
existence of such right. The third condition did not exist in the instant
case. Neither was the search incidental to a valid warrantless arrest.
(people vs. Fifueroa, july 6, 2000) an alleged consent to a warrantless
search and seizure cannot be based merely on the presumption of
regularity in the performance of official duty. The presumption by itself,
cannot prevail against the constitutionally protected rights of an

47
individual, and zeal in the pursuit of criminals cannot ennoble the use of
arbitrary methods that the constitution itself abhors.

Chapter iv
The right to privacy
Section 3. The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or
order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding
section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Read:
read:
Note: applicable provisions of the human security act/anti-terrorism law,
republic act no. 9372, approved on march 6, 2007 and effective on july
15, 2007 (this law shall be automatically suspended one (1) month
before and two (2) months after the holding of any election)
Please observe the procedure in obtaining the the warrant [or order] of surveillance, not found in
the 1987 philippine constitution.
Surveillance of suspects and interception and
communications of suspects or charged of terrorism

recording

of

section 7. Surveillance of suspects and interception and recording of

communications. The provisions of ra 4200 (anti-wiretapping law) to the contrary
notwithstanding, a police or law enforcement official and the members of his team may,
upon a written order of the court of appeals, listen to, intercept and record, with the use of
any mode, form or kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or
intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways or means for
that purpose, any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or
written words between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization, association, or group of persons or of any person charged with or
suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism.
provided, that surveillance, interception and recording of communications
between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and
confidential business correspondence shall not be authorized.
section 8. Formal application for judicial authorization.- the written order of the
authorizing division of the court of appeals to track down, tap, listen, intercept, and record
communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words of
any person suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit
terrorism, shall only be granted by the authorizing division of the court of appeals upon an
ex-parte written application of a police or law enforcement official who has been duly
authorized in writing by the anti-terrorism council created in section 53 of this act to file
such ex-parte application, and upon examination under oath and affirmation of the
applicant and the witnesses who may produce to establish:

That there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of

facts and circumstances that the said crime of terrorism or conspiracy to
commit terrorism has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to
be committed;
That there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of
facts and circumstances that evidence which is essential to the conviction of
any charged or suspected person for, or to the solution or prevention of any
such crimes, will be obtained; and
That there is no other effective means readily available for acquiring such
evidence.

sec. 9. Classification and contents of the order of the court. The written order
granted by the authorizing division of the court of appeals as well as its order, if any, to
extend or renew the same, the original application of the applicant, including his

48
application to extend or renew, if any, and the written authorizations of the anti-terrorism
council shall be deemed and are hereby declared as classified information: provided, that
the person being surveilled or whose communications, letters, papers, messages,
conversations, discussions, spoken or written words and effects have been monitored,
listened to, bugged or recorded by law enforcement authorities has the right to be
informed of the acts done by the law enforcement authorities in the premises or to
challenge, if he or she intends to do so, the legality of the interference before the court of
appeals which issued said written order. The written order of the authorizing division of
the court of appeals shall specify the following:

The identity, such as name and address, if known, of the charged of

suspected persons whose communications, messages, conversations,
discussions, or spoken or written words are to be tracked down, tapped,
listened to, intercepted or recorded and, in case of radio, electronic, or
telephone (whether wireless or otherwise) communications, messages,
conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words, the electronic
transmission systems or the telephone numbers to be tracked down,
tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and their locations if the
person suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit
terrorism is not fully known, such person shall be subject to continuous
surveillance provided there is reasonable ground to do so;
The identity (name and address, and the police or law enforcement
organization) of the members of his team judicially authorized to track
down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record the communications,
messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words;
The offense or offenses committed, or being committed, or sought to be
prevented; and
The length of time which the authorization shall be used or carried out.

section. 10. Effective period of judicial authorization. Any authorization granted

by the authorizing division of the court of appealsshall only be effective for the length of
time specified in the written order of the authorizing division of the court of appeals, which
shall not exceed 30 days from the date of receipt of the written order of the authorizing
division of the court of appeals by the applicant police or law enforcement official.
the ca may extend or renew the said authorization for another non-extendible
period, which shall not exceed 30 days from the expiration of the original periodthe exparte application for renewal has been duly authorized by the anti-terrorism council in
writing.
if no case is filed within the 30-day period, the applicant police or law
enforcement official shall immediately notify the person subject of the surveillance,
interception, and recording of the termination of the said surveillance, interception and
recording. [penalty to be imposed on the police official who fails to inform the person
subject of surveillance of the termination of the surveillance, monitoring, interception and
recording shall be penalized to 10 years and 1 day to 12 years.
section 15. Evidentiary value of deposited materials. Any listened to, intercepted,
and recorded communications, messages, conversationswhich have been secured in
violation of the pertinent provisions of this act, shall absolutely not be admissible and
usable as evidence against anybody in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or
administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding, or hearing.
Judicial authorization to examine bank deposits, accounts,
records of suspected or charged terrorists

and

section 27. Judicial authorization required to examine bank deposits, accounts and records.
the justices of ca designated as special court to handle anti-terrorism cases after satisfying
themselves of the existence of probable cause in a hearing called for that purpose that:

A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit

terrorism;
Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons;
Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association or group
of persons, may authorize in writing any police or law enforcement officer and the
members of his team duly authorized in writing by the anti-terrorism council to:

49
1. Examine or cause the examination of, the deposits, placements, trust accounts,
assets, and records in a bank or financial institution; and
2. Gather or cause the gathering of any relevant information about such deposits,
placements, trust accounts, assets, and records from a bank or financial
institution. The bank or financial institution shall not refuse to allow such
examination or to provide the desired information, when so ordered by and
served with the written order of the court of appeals.
sec. 28. Application to examine deposits, accounts and records.
the written order of the ca authorizing the examination of bank deposits, placements, trust
accounts, assets and records:

A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit

terrorism;
Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons;
Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association or group
of persons, in a bank or financial institution-

-shall only be granted by the authorizing division of the ca upon an ex-parte application to that
effect of a police or law enforcement official who has been duly authorized by the anti-terrorism council to
file such ex-parte application and upon examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his
witnesses he may produce to establish the facts that will justify the need and urgency of examining and
freezing the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records:

Of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit

terrorism;
Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons;
Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association or group
of persons.

section 35. Evidentiary value of deposited bank materials.- any information, data, excerpts,
summaries, notes, memoranda, work sheets, reports or documents acquired from the examination of the
bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of:

A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit

terrorism;
Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization or group of persons;
Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association or group
of persons,

-which have been secured in violation of the provisions of this act, shall absolutely not be
admissible and usable as evidence against anybody in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding or hearing.
1. People vs. Cabalquinto, september 19, 2006, 502 scra 419
2. Zulueta vs. Ca, february 10, 1996
the wife forcibly opened the drawers at the clinic of her doctor-husband and took diaries, checks
and greeting cards of his alleged paramours. Thereafter, she used the same in their legal separation
case. Said documents are inadmissible in evidence. This is so because the intimacies of husband and
wife does not justify the breaking of cabinets to determine marital infidelity.
3. Ople vs. Torres, july 23, 1998
Puno, j.
Facts:
on december 12, 1996, then president fidel v. Ramos issued administrative order
no. 308 entitled adoption of a national computerized identification reference system.

50
the ao seeks to have all filipino citizens and foreign residents to have a
population reference number (prn) generated by the national statistics office (nso)
through the use of biometrics technology .
the ao was questioned by senator ople on the following grounds:
1. The establishment of the prn without any law is an unconstitutional
usurpation of the legislative powers of the congress of the philippines;
2. The appropriation of public funds for the implementation of the said ao is
unconstitutional since congress has the exclusive authority to appropriate
funds for such expenditure; and
3. The ao violates the citizens right to privacy protected by the bill of rights of
the constitution.
Held:
1. The ao establishes a system of identification that is all-encompassing in scope,
affects the life and liberty of every filipino citizens and foreign residents and therefore,
it is supposed to be a law passed by congress that implements it, not by an
administrative order issued by the president. Administrative power, which is
supposed to be exercised by the president, is concerned with the work of applying
policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper governmental organs. It
enables the president to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check
the official conduct of his agents. Prescinding from the foregoing precepts, ao 308
involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an administrative order.
An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the president which relates to
specific aspects in the administrative operation of the government. It must be in
harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and
carrying out the legislative policy. The subject of ao 308 therefore is beyond the
power of the president to issue and it is a usurpation of legislative power.
2. The ao likewise violates the right to privacy since its main purpose is to provide a
common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies
through the use of biometrics technology. Biometry is the science of the application of
statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis of a biological data. It
is the confirmation of an individuals identity through a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand
geometry or facial features. Through the prn, the government offices has the chance
of building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic linkage of
the files of every citizen. The data, however, may be gathered for gainful and useful
government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information
constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for some
of our authorities to resist.
Further, the ao does not even tells us in clear and unequivocal terms how these
informations gathered shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and
access the data and under what circumstances and for what purpose. These factors
are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information.
The computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information.
Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of informations. When the access
code of the control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder,
without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or
worse, manipulate the data stored within the system.
ao no. 308 is unconstitutional since it falls short of assuring that personal
information gathered about our people will be used only for specified purposes
thereby violating the citizens right to privacy.
Kilusang mayo uno vs. Executive secretary eduardo ermita, et al.,
april 19, 2006 & june 20, 2006
Bayan muna vs. Executive secretary eduardo ermita, et al., april 19,
2006 & june 20, 2006

Carpio, j.
President gloria macapagal-arroyo issued presidential proclamation no. 420 that mandates the adoption
of a unified, multi-purpose identification system by all government agencies in the executive department.

51
This is so despite the fact that the supreme court held in an en banc decision in 1998 ople vs. Executive
secretary ruben torres administrative order no. 308[national computerized identification reference system]
issued by then president fidel v. Ramos that the same is unconstitutional because a national id card
system requires legislation because it creates a new national data collection and card issuance system,
where none existed before. The supreme court likewise held that eo 308 as unconstitutional for it violates
the citizens right to privacy.
based on the ople ruling, the petitioners claimed that proclamation no. 420 is unconstitutional on
two (2) grounds:

a. Usurpation of legislative powers; and

b. It infringes on the citizens right to privacy
Held:
The said executive order no. 420 does not violate the citizens right to privacy since it does not
require all the citizens to be issued a national id as what happened in ao 308. Only those
dealing or employed with the said government entities who are required to provide the
required information for the issuance of the said id.
camilo l. Sabio vs. Gordon, g.r. no. 174340, october 17, 2006, 504
scra 704
Sandoval-gutierrez, j.
The facts:

On february 20, 2006, senator miriam defensor santiago introduced philippine senate resolution
no. 455 (senate res. No. 455), 22[4] directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses
incurred by the philippines overseas telecommunications corporation (potc), philippine communications
satellite corporation (philcomsat), and philcomsat holdings corporation (phc) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective board of directors.

On may 8, 2006, chief of staff rio c. Inocencio, under the authority of senator richard j. Gordon,
wrote chairman camilo l. Sabio of the pcgg, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the
resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the committee on government corporations
and public enterprises and committee on public services. The purpose of the public meeting was to
deliberate on senate res. No. 455.23[6]

on may 9, 2006, chairman sabio and other commissioners of the pcgg declined the invitation because of
prior commitment.24[7] at the same time, they invoked section 4(b) of
e.o. no. 1 earlier quoted.

On september 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., major general balajadia arrested chairman sabio
in his office at irc building, no. 82 edsa, mandaluyong city and brought him to the senate premises where
he was detained.

Hence, chairman sabio filed with the supreme court a petition for habeas corpus against the
senate committee on government corporations and public enterprises and committee on public services,
their chairmen, senators richard gordon and joker p. Arroyo and members.

I s s u e s:

22[4]
23[6]
24[7]

Annex E of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.

Annex F of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.
Annex G of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.

52
is the investigation conducted on the petitioners violative of their right to privacy?

H e l d:

The claim of immunity is without merit.

Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. 25[46] within these zones, any form of
intrusion is impermissible unless excused by law and in accordance with customary legal process. The
meticulous regard we accord to these zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to privacy is
a constitutional right and the right most valued by civilized men,26[47] but also from our adherence to the
universal declaration of human rights which mandates that, no one shall be subjected to arbitrary
interference with his privacy and everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such
interference or attacks.27[48]
Our bill of rights, enshrined in article iii of the constitution, provides at least two guarantees that
explicitly create zones of privacy. It highlights a persons right to be let alone or the right to determine
what, how much, to whom and when information about himself shall be disclosed.28[49]
section 2
guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. Section 3
renders inviolable the privacy of communication and correspondence and further cautions that
any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any
purpose in any proceeding.

In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine whether a person
has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated
by unreasonable government intrusion. 29[50] applying this determination to these cases, the important
inquiries are: first, did the directors and officers of philcomsat holdings corporation exhibit a reasonable
expectation of privacy?; and second, did the government violate such expectation?

The answers are in the negative. Petitioners were invited in the senates public hearing to
deliberate on senate res. No. 455, particularly on the anomalous losses incurred by the philippine
overseas telecommunications corporation (potc), philippine communications satellite corporation
(philcomsat), and philcomsat holdings corporations (phc) due to the alleged improprieties in the
operations by their respective board of directors. Obviously, the inquiry focus on petitioners acts
committed in the discharge of their duties as officers and directors of the said corporations, particularly
philcomsat holdings corporation. Consequently, they have no reasonable expectation of privacy
over matters involving their offices in a corporation where the government has interest. Certainly,
such matters are of public concern and over which the people have the right to information.

This goes to show that the right to privacy is not absolute where there is an overriding
compelling state interest. In morfe v. Mutuc,30[51] the court, in line with whalen v. Roe,31[52] employed the
rational basis relationship test when it held that there was no infringement of the individuals right to
25[46]

Marquez v. Desierto, G.R. No. 135882, June 27, 2001, 359 SCRA 772.

26[47]

See Morfe v. Mutuc No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424.

27

[48]

28

[49]

29

[50]

30[51]

Supra.

31[52]

429 U.S. 589 (1977).

Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See also Article 17 (1) and (2) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
Constitutional and Legal Systems of ASEAN Countries, Sison, Academy of ASEAN Law and
Jurisprudence, 1990, at 221, citing I.R. Cortes, The Constitutional Foundations of Privacy, 7 (1970).
Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P 2d 590 (1974). See
Katz v. United states (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 350-352, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576; People v. Krivda
(1971) 5 Cal. 3d 357, 364, 96 Cal. Rptr. 62, 486 P. 2d 1262; 8 Cal. 3d 623-624,105 Cal. Rptr. 521, 504 P. 2d
457. INSERT Herreras Handbook on Arrest, Search and Seizure.

53
privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, i.e., to curtail and minimize the
opportunities for official corruption, maintain a standard of honesty in public service, and promote morality
in public administration.32[53] in valmonte v. Belmonte,33[54] the court remarked that as public figures, the
members of the former batasang pambansa enjoy a more limited right to privacy as compared to
ordinary individuals, and their actions are subject to closer scrutiny. Taking this into consideration, the
court ruled that the right of the people to access information on matters of public concern prevails over the
right to privacy of financial transactions.

Under the present circumstances, the alleged anomalies in the philcomsat, phc and potc, ranging
in millions of pesos, and the conspiratorial participation of the pcgg and its officials are compelling
reasons for the senate to exact vital information from the directors and officers of philcomsat holdings
corporations, as well as from chairman sabio and his commissioners to aid it in crafting the necessary
legislation to prevent corruption and formulate remedial measures and policy determination regarding
pcggs efficacy. There being no reasonable expectation of privacy on the part of those directors and
officers over the subject covered by senate res. No. 455, it follows that their right to privacy has not been
violated by respondent senate committees.

Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like chairman
sabio and his commissioners, will be respected by respondent senate committees, it their duty to
cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The
unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the congress
and its committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.
in fine, pcgg chairman camilo sabio and commissioners ricardo abcede, narciso nario, nicasio
conti, and tereso javier; and manuel andal and julio jalandoni, pcggs nominees to philcomsat holdings
corporation, as well as its directors and officers, must comply with the subpoenae ad testificandum
issued by respondent senate committees directing them to appear and testify in public hearings
relative to senate resolution no. 455.

Chapter v - freedom of speech,

Press, expression, etc.

Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech,

of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably
to assemble and petition the government for the redress of their
grievances.
Note: applicable provisions of the human security act/anti-terrorism law,
republic act no. 9372, approved on march 6, 2007 and effective on july
15, 2007 (this law shall be automatically suspended one (1) month
before and two (2) months after the holding of any election)
section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism---even if they have been granted bail because evidence
of guilt is not strongcan be:

Detained under house arrest;

Restricted from traveling; and/or
Prohibited from using any cellular phones, computers, or other means of communications
with people outside their residence.

1. Rule on criticisms against acts of public officers

read:
1. Espuelas vs. People, 90 phil. 524

32[53]

Justice Puno, Lecture on Legislative Inquiry and Right to Privacy, p. 60.

33[54]

170 SCRA 256 (1989)

54
2. Us vs. Bustos, 37 phil. 731 (a public official should not be onion-skinned with reference to
comments upon his official acts. The interest of the government and the society demands full
discussion of public affairs)
3. P. Vs. Perez, 45 phil. 599
4. Mercado vs. Cfi, 116 scra 93
2. Freedom of the press, in general
read:
Baguio midland courier & cecille afable vs. Court of appeals &
ramon labo, jr., 444 scra 28 [november 25, 2004]
Freedom of expression; the public has the right to be
informed on the mental, moral and physical fitness of
candidates for public office.
Facts:
1. In the january 3, 1988 issue of the baguio midland courier (bmc), cecille afable, the editor-inchief, in her column in and out of baguio made the following comments:
of all the candidates for mayor of baguio city), labo has the most imponderables
about him. People would ask: can he read and write? Why is he always talking about
his japanese father-in-law? Is he really a japanes senator or a barrio kapitan? Is it true
that he will send p18m aid to baguio? Somebody wanted to put an advertisement of labo
in the midland courier but was refused because he has not yet paid his account of the
last time he was a candidate for congress. We will accept all advertisements for him if he
pays his old account first.
2. In the same column, cecille afable wrote the following comments in her january 10, 1988 column
at the courier:
i heard that the dumpty in the egg is campaigning for cortes. Not fair. Some real
doctors are also busy campaigning against labo because he has not also paid their
medical services with them. Since he is donating millions he should also settle his small
debts like the reportedly insignificant amount of p27,000 only. If he wins, several teachers
were signifying to resign and leave baguio forever, and pangasinan will be the francaliqua of baguio.
3. As a result of the above articles, ramon labor, jr. Filed a complaint for damages before the
regional trial court of baguio city as he claimed said articles were libelous. He likewise filed a
separate criminal complaint before the office of the city prosecutor of baguio but was dismissed;
4. Labo claimed that the said articles were tainted with malice because he was allegedly described
as dumpty in the egg or one who is a failure in his business which is false because he is a
very successful businessman or to mean zero or a big lie; that he is a balasubas due to his
alleged failure to pay his medical expenses;
5. The petitioners, however, were able to prove that labo has an unpaid obligation to the courier in
the amount of p27,415.00 for the ads placed by his campaigners for the 1984 batasang
pambansa elections;
6. The regional trial court, branch 6, baguio city, in its decision dated june 14, 1990 dismissed labos
complaint for damages on the ground that the article of petitioner afable was privileged and
constituted fair comment on matters of public interest as it dealt with the integrity, reputation and
honesty of private respondent labo who was a candidate for mayor of baguio city;
7. On january 7, 1992, the court of appeals reversed the rtc decision and ordered the petitioners to
pay ramon labo, jr. Damages in the total amount of p350,000.00 after concluding that the
dumpty in the egg refers to no one but labo himself.
Hence, the petition to the supreme court.
Issues:
2. Was labo the dumpty in the egg described in the questioned article/
3. Were the articles subject of the case libelous or privileged/

55

Held:
1. The court of appeals is wrong when it held that labo is the dumpty in the egg in the questioned
article. This is so because the article stated that the dumpty in the egg is campaigning for
cortes, another candidate for mayor and opponent of labo himself. It is unbelievable that labo
campaigned for his opponent and against himself. Although such gracious attitude on the part of
labo would have been commendable, it is contrary to common human experience. As pointed out
by the petitioners, had he done that, it is doubtful whether he could have won as city mayor of
baguio in the 1988 elections, which he actually did. In line with the doctrine in borjal vs. Ca, 310
scra 1, that it is also not sufficient that the offended party recognized himself as the person
attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at least a 3 rd person could identify him as the
object of the libelous publication, the case should be dismissed since labo utterly failed to
dispose of this responsibility.
2. Labo claims that the petitioners could not invoke public interest to justify the publication since he
was not yet a public official at that time. This argument is without merit since he was already a
candidate for city mayor of baguio. As such, the article is still within the mantle of protection
guaranteed by the freedom of expression provided in the constitution since it is the publics right
to be informed of the mental, moral and physical fitness of candidates for public office. This was
recognized as early as the case of us vs. Sedano, 14 phil. 338 [1909] and the case of new york
times vs. Sullivan, 376 u.s. 254 where the us supreme court held:
it is of the utmost consequence that the people
should discuss the character and qualifications of candidates for
their suffrages. The importance to the state and to society of
such discussions is so vast, and the advantages derived so
great, that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience of
private persons whose conduct may be involved, and occasional
injury to the reputations of individuals must yield to the public
welfare, although at times such injury may be great. The public
benefit from publicity is so great and the chance of injury to
private character so small, that such discussion must be
privileged.
clearly, the questioned articles constitute fair comment on a matter of
public interest as it dealt with the character of the private respondent who was running for
the top elective post in baguio city at that time.
2. Pablito v. Sanidad vs. Comelec,
g.r. no. 90878, january 29, 1990
Freedom of expression and of the press
(note: unanimous en banc decision)
Medialdea, j.
Facts:
1. On october 23, 1989, ra 6766, entitled "an act providing for an organic act for the
cordillera autonomous region" was enacted into law;
2. Pursuant to said law, the city of baguio and provinces of benguet, abra, mt. Province,
ifugao and kalinga-apayao, all comprising the autonomous region shall take part in a
plebiscite originally scheduled for december 27, 1989 but was reset to january 30, 1990
specifically for the ratification or rejection of the said act;
3. By virtue of the 1987 constitution and the omnibus election code (bp 881), the comelec
issued comelec resolution no. 2167, section 19 of which provides:
"section 19. Prohibition on columnist, commentators or announcers.- during the
plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media
columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or
television time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues."
4. On november 20, 1989, petitioner pablito v. Sanidad who is a columnist ("overview")
for the baguio midland courier, a weekly newspaper circulated in the city of baguio and
the cordilleras, filed a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction against the comelec to enjoin the latter

56
from enforcing section 19 of resolution no. 2167. Petitioner claims that the said provision
is violative of his constitutional freedom of expression and of the press and it also
constitutes a prior restraint because it imposes subsequent punishment for those who
violate the same;
5. On november 28, 1989, the supreme court issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondent from enforcing section 19 of resolution no. 2167;
6. On january 9, 1990, comelec through the solicitor general filed its comment and moved
for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that section 19 of resolution no. 2167 does
not absolutely bar the petitioner from expressing his views because under section 90 and
92 of bp 881, he may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through
the comelec space and airtime.
Held:
what is granted by art. Ix-c of the constitution to the comelec is the power to supervise
and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or other grants issued for the
operation of transportation or other public utilities to the end that equal opportunity, time
and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates are insured. The evil sought to be
prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give
undue advantage to a candidate in terms of advertising time and space. This is also the
reason why a columnist, commentator or announcer is required to take a leave of
absence from his work during the campaign period if he is a candidate.
however, neither article ix-c of the constitution nor section 11(b), 2nd par. Of ra 6646
can be construed to mean that the comelec has also been granted the right to supervise
and regulate the exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression
during the plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression
during the plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact,
there are no candidates in a plebiscite.
while it is true that the petitioner is not absolutely barred from campaigning for or
against the organic act, said fact does not cure the constitutional infirmity of section 19,
comelec resolution no. 2167. This is so because it is still a restriction on his choice of the
forum where he may express his view.
plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to
be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better
served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The
people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by
restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.
accordingly, section 19 of comelec resolution no. 2167 is hereby declared
unconstitutional.
Read also:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

In re: ramon tulfo,march 19, 199

in re: atty. Emil jurado, july 12, 1990
Burgos vs. Chief of staff, 133 scra 800
Corro vs. Lising, 137 scra 448
Babst vs. Nib, 132 scra 316
Elizalde vs. Gutierrez,76 scra 448 (in order that any news item relating to a judicial proceeding
will not be actionable, the same must be [a] a true and fair report of the actual proceedings; [b]
must be done in good faith; and [c] no comments nor remarks shall be made by the writer}
policarpio vs. Manila times, 5 scra 148
Lopez vs. Ca, 34 scra 116
New york times vs. Sullivan,376 u.s.254
liwayway publishing vs. Pcgg, april 15,l988

3. Freedom of expression in general

read:
1. Randy david vs. Arroyo, may 3, 2006, 489 scra 160;
2. Adiong vs. Comelec, march 31, 1992 (putting of decals and stickers in ones car is
within the protected freedom of expression)

57
3. National press club vs. Comelec, march 5, 1992. Real also the dissenting and separate
opinions of the justices. (preventing campaigns through radio, tv and newspapers is
valid in order to even the playing field between rich and poor candidates)
4. Zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, gr no. 7960-707 &
zaldivar vs. Gonzales, gr no.
80578, february
1, 1989
5. Eastern broadcasting vs. Dans,137 scra 628
6. Newsweek vs. Iac, 142 scra 171
7. kapisanan vs. Camara shoes, 11 scra 477
8. In re: atty. Tipon, 79 scra 372
9. Lacsa vs. Iac, may 23,1988
10. Kapunan vs. De villa, december 6, 1988
4. Not within the protection of the freedom of

expression clause of the constitution

1. Obscenity; test of
read:
a. P. Vs. Kottinger, 45 phil. 352
b. P vs. Go pin, august 8, 1955
Tests:
a. Whether the average person applying to contemporary community standards would
find the work appeals to prurient interest;
b. Whether the work depicts or describes a patently offensive sexual conduct;
c. Whether the work as a whole lacks serious literary , artistic, political or scientific value.
c. Miller vs. California, 37 l. Ed. 2d 419
d. Ginsberg vs. New york,390 u.s. 629
e. Pita vs. Ca, 178 scra 362 (a city mayor may not order the warrantless seizure of magazines
which he believes to be obscene; otherwise, he will become the complainant, prosecutor and judge at the
same time. He should obtain a search warrant from a judge)
2. Libel or slander; test ofread:
a. Lopez and manila times cases, supra
b. Quisumbing vs. Lopez, 96 phil. 510
3. Cases undersub-judice
read:
a. P. Vs. Alarcon, 69 phil. 265
5. Freedom of assembly and to petition the government

for redress of grievances

Gesite et al. Vs. Court of appeals, 444 scra 51

Freedom of public school teachers to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for redress of
grievances; right of public school teachers to form union.
the petitioners admitted that they participated in concerted mass actions in metro manila from
september to the first half of october, 1990 which temporarily disrupted classes in metro manila but they
claimed that they were not on strike. They claimed that they were merely exercising their constitutional
right to peaceably assemble and petition the government for redress of their grievances. Thus, they may
not be penalized administratively.
Held:
the issue of whether or not the mass action launched by the public school teachers during the
period from september up to the 1 st half of october, 1990 was a strike or not has been decided in the case
of manila public school teachers association vs. Laguio, 200 scra 323 where it was held that these mass
actions were to all intents and purposes a strike; they constituted a concerted and unauthorized stoppage
of, or absence from, work which it was the teachers duty to perform, undertaken for essentially economic
reasons.

58

it is undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners purpose was to realize
their demands by withholding their services. The fact that the conventional term strike was not used by
the striking employees to describe their common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance
of the situation, and not its appearance, will be deemed controlling.
despite the constitutional right to form associations under the constitution, employees in the
public service may not engage in strikes, mass leaves, walkouts and other forms of mass actions that will
lead to temporary stoppage or disruption of public service. The right of government employees to
organize is limited to the formations of unions or associations only, without including the right to strike.
(bangalisan vs. Ca, 276 scra 619)
the petitioners are not therefore entitled to their salaries during their suspension because the
general proposition is that a public official is not entitled to any compensation if he had not rendered any
service.

Bayan, karapatan, kilusang magbubukid ng pilipinas (kmp), and

gabriela vs. Eduardo ermita, in his capacity as executive secretary,
manila city mayor lito atienza, chief of the philippine national police, gen.
Arturo m. Lomibao, ncrpo chief maj. Gen. Vidal querol, and western
police district chief gen. Pedro bulaong, g.r. no. 169848, may, 2006
Azcuna, j.:
The facts:
Petitioners come in three groups.
the first petitioners, bayan, et al., in g.r. no. 169838, allege that they are citizens and taxpayers of
the philippines and that their rights as organizations and individuals were violated when the rally they
participated in on october 6, 2005 was violently dispersed by policemen implementing batas pambansa
(b.p.) no. 880.
the second group consists of 26 individual petitioners, jess del prado, et al., in g.r. no. 169848,
who allege that they were injured, arrested and detained when a peaceful mass action they held on
september 26, 2005 was preempted and violently dispersed by the police. They further assert that on
october 5, 2005, a group they participated in marched to malacaang to protest issuances of the palace
which, they claim, put the country under an undeclared martial rule, and the protest was likewise
dispersed violently and many among them were arrested and suffered injuries.
the third group, kilusang mayo uno (kmu), et al., petitioners in g.r. no. 169881, allege that they
conduct peaceful mass actions and that their rights as organizations and those of their individual
members as citizens, specifically the right to peaceful assembly, are affected by batas pambansa no. 880
and the policy of calibrated preemptive response (cpr) being followed to implement it.
kmu, et al., claim that on october 4, 2005, a rally kmu co-sponsored was to be conducted at the
mendiola bridge but police blocked them along c.m. recto and lepanto streets and forcibly dispersed
them, causing injuries to several of their members. They further allege that on october 6, 2005, a multisectoral rally which kmu also co-sponsored was scheduled to proceed along espaa avenue in front of
the university of santo tomas and going towards mendiola bridge. Police officers blocked them along
morayta street and prevented them from proceeding further. They were then forcibly dispersed, causing
injuries on one of them. Three other rallyists were arrested.
all petitioners assail batas pambansa no. 880, some of them in toto and others only sections 4, 5,
6, 12, 13(a), and 14(a), as well as the policy of cpr. They seek to stop violent dispersals of rallies under
the no permit, no rally policy and the cpr policy recently announced.
b.p. no. 880, the public assembly act of 1985, provides:
Batas pambansa blg. 880
An act ensuring the free exercise by the people of their right
peaceably to assemble and petition the government [and] for other
purposes
Be it enacted by the batasang pambansa in session assembled:
section 1. Title . this act shall be known as the public assembly act of 1985.

59

sec. 2. Declaration of policy. the constitutional right of the people peaceably to

assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances is essential and vital to
the strength and stability of the state. To this end, the state shall ensure the free exercise
of such right without prejudice to the rights of others to life, liberty and equal protection of
the law.
sec. 3. Definition of terms. for purposes of this act:
(b)
public place shall include any highway, boulevard, avenue, road, street,
bridge or other thoroughfare, park, plaza square, and/or any open space of public
ownership where the people are allowed access.
(c)
maximum tolerance means the highest degree of restraint that the
military, police and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a public
assembly or in the dispersal of the same.
sec. 4. Permit when required and when not required.-- a written permit shall be
required for any person or persons to organize and hold a public assembly in a public
place. However, no permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done or made
in a freedom park duly established by law or ordinance or in private property, in which
case only the consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession is required,
or in the campus of a government-owned and operated educational institution which shall
be subject to the rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political meetings or
rallies held during any election campaign period as provided for by law are not covered
by this act.
sec. 5. Application requirements.-- all applications for a permit shall comply with
the following guidelines:
1.
The applications shall be in writing and shall include the names of the
leaders or organizers; the purpose of such public assembly; the date, time and duration
thereof, and place or streets to be used for the intended activity; and the probable
number of persons participating, the transport and the public address systems to be
used.
2.
The application shall incorporate the duty and responsibility of applicant
under section 8 hereof.
3.
The application shall be filed with the office of the mayor of the city or
municipality in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to be held, at least five (5)
working days before the scheduled public assembly.
4.
Upon receipt of the application, which must be duly acknowledged in
writing, the office of the city or municipal mayor shall cause the same to immediately be
posted at a conspicuous place in the city or municipal building.
Sec. 6. Action to be taken on the application.
1.
It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue
or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the public assembly
will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience,
public morals or public health.
2.
The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application
within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing which, the
permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in
his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit, said application shall be posted by
the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have
been filed.
3.
If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall immediately
inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.
4.
The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the applica[nt]
within twenty-four hours.

60
5.
If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or
modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision in an
appropriate court of law.
6.
In case suit is brought before the metropolitan trial court, the municipal
trial court, the municipal circuit trial court, the regional trial court, or the intermediate
appellate court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight
(48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond and record on appeal shall be
required. A decision granting such permit or modifying if in terms satisfactory to the
applicant shall be immediately executory.
7.
All cases filed in court under this section shall be decided within twentyfour (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately endorsed
to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
8.

In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the supreme court.

cpr, on the other hand, is a policy set forth in a press release by malacaang dated september
21, 2005, shown in annex a to the petition in g.r. no. 169848, thus:
Malacaang
Manila, philippines

official
news

Release no. 2

september 21, 2005

Statement of executive secretary eduardo ermita

On unlawful mass actions

in view of intelligence reports pointing to credible plans of anti-government
groups to inflame the political situation, sow disorder and incite people against the duty
constituted authorities, we have instructed the pnp as well as the local government units
to strictly enforce a no permit, no rally policy, disperse groups that run afoul of this
standard and arrest all persons violating the laws of the land as well as ordinances on the
proper conduct of mass actions and demonstrations.
the rule of calibrated preemptive response is now in force, in lieu of
maximum tolerance. The authorities will not stand aside while those with ill intent
are herding a witting or unwitting mass of people and inciting them into actions
that are inimical to public order, and the peace of mind of the national community.
unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. The majority of law-abiding citizens
have the right to be protected by a vigilant and proactive government.
we appeal to the detractors of the government to engage in lawful and peaceful
conduct befitting of a democratic society.
the presidents call for unity and reconciliation stands, based on the rule of law.
petitioners bayan, et al., contend that batas pambansa no. 880 is clearly a violation of the
constitution and the international covenant on civil and political rights and other human rights treaties of
which the philippines is a signatory.
they argue that b.p. no. 880 requires a permit before one can stage a public assembly regardless
of the presence or absence of a clear and present danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and is thus
repugnant to the freedom of expression clause as the time and place of a public assembly form part of the
message for which the expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not content-neutral as it does not apply to
mass actions in support of the government. The words lawful cause, opinion, protesting or
influencing suggest the exposition of some cause not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase
maximum tolerance shows that the law applies to assemblies against the government because they are
being tolerated. As a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
furthermore, the law delegates powers to the mayor without providing clear standards. The two
standards stated in the laws (clear and present danger and imminent and grave danger) are inconsistent.
Regarding the cpr policy, it is void for being an ultra vires act that alters the standard of maximum
tolerance set forth in b.p. no. 880, aside from being void for being vague and for lack of publication.

61

finally, petitioners kmu, et al., argue that the constitution sets no limits on the right to assembly
and therefore b.p. no. 880 cannot put the prior requirement of securing a permit. And even assuming that
the legislature can set limits to this right, the limits provided are unreasonable: first, allowing the mayor to
deny the permit on clear and convincing evidence of a clear and present danger is too comprehensive.
Second, the five-day requirement to apply for a permit is too long as certain events require instant public
assembly, otherwise interest on the issue would possibly wane.
as to the cpr policy, they argue that it is preemptive, that the government takes action even before
the rallyists can perform their act, and that no law, ordinance or executive order supports the policy.
Furthermore, it contravenes the maximum tolerance policy of b.p. no. 880 and violates the constitution as
it causes a chilling effect on the exercise by the people of the right to peaceably assemble.
I s s u e s:
4.

On the constitutionality of batas pambansa no. 880, specifically sections 4, 5, 6,

12 13(a) and 14(a) thereof, and republic act no. 7160:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

5.

Are these content-neutral or content-based regulations?

Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or vagueness?
Do they constitute prior restraint?
Are they undue delegations of powers to mayors?
Do they violate international human rights treaties and the universal
declaration of human rights?

On the constitutionality and legality of the policy of calibrated preemptive

response (cpr):
1.
2.
3.

Is the policy void on its face or due to vagueness?

Is it void for lack of publication?
Is the policy of cpr void as applied to the rallies of september 26 and
october 4, 5 and 6, 2005?

H e l d:
Petitioners standing cannot be seriously challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in peaceful
assembly and exercise the right of petition, as guaranteed by the constitution, is directly affected by b.p.
no. 880 which requires a permit for all who would publicly assemble in the nations streets and parks.
They have, in fact, purposely engaged in public assemblies without the required permits to press their
claim that no such permit can be validly required without violating the constitutional guarantee.
Respondents, on the other hand, have challenged such action as contrary to law and dispersed the public
assemblies held without the permit.
Section 4 of article iii of the constitution provides:
Sec. 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression,
or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble and petition for redress of
grievances is, together with freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that enjoys
primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For these rights constitute the very basis of a functional
democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be meaningless and unprotected. As stated in
jacinto v. Ca, the court, as early as the onset of this century, in u.s. v. Apurado already upheld the right to
assembly and petition, as follows:
There is no question as to the petitioners rights to peaceful assembly to petition
the government for a redress of grievances and, for that matter, to organize or form
associations for purposes not contrary to law, as well as to engage in peaceful concerted
activities. These rights are guaranteed by no less than the constitution, particularly
sections 4 and 8 of the bill of rights, section 2(5) of article ix, and section 3 of article xiii.
Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed pronouncements defending and promoting the
peoples exercise of these rights. As early as the onset of this century, this court in u.s.
vs. Apurado, already upheld the right to assembly and petition and even went as far as to
acknowledge:
it is rather to be expected that more or less disorder will mark the public
assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or imaginary, because

62
on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and the
greater, the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a rule will be
the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible followers. But if the
prosecution be permitted to seize upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by
individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious
and tumultuous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition
for redress of grievances would expose all those who took part therein to the severest
and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not
happen to be pleasing to the prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct
occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished
therefor, but the utmost discretion must be exercised in drawing the line between
disorderly and seditious conduct and between an essentially peaceable assembly and a
tumultuous uprising.
Again, in primicias v. Fugoso, the court likewise sustained the primacy of freedom of speech and
to assembly and petition over comfort and convenience in the use of streets and parks.
Next, however, it must be remembered that the right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute.
primicias, this court said:
The right to freedom of speech, and to peacefully assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people
recognized and guaranteed by the constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a
settled principle growing out of the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise
of those rights is not absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community
or society. The power to regulate the exercise of such and other constitutional rights is
termed the sovereign police power, which is the power to prescribe regulations, to
promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety, and general welfare
of the people. This sovereign police power is exercised by the government through its
legislative branch by the enactment of laws regulating those and other constitutional and
civil rights, and it may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as towns, municipalities
and cities by authorizing their legislative bodies called municipal and city councils enact
ordinances for purpose
Reyes v. Bagatsing further expounded on the right and its limits, as follows:
1.
It is thus clear that the court is called upon to protect the exercise of the
cognate rights to free speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the denial of a permit.
The constitution is quite explicit: no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances. Free speech, like free press, may be identified
with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public concern without
censorship or punishment.
There is to be then no previous restraint on the
communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for
sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that [the state] has a right to prevent. Freedom of
assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and
discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to be accorded the utmost
deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as
is the case with freedom of expression, of a clear and present danger of a substantive
evil that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 constitution, justice
malcolm had occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican
institutions and complements the right of free speech. To paraphrase the opinion of
justice rutledge, speaking for the majority of the american supreme court in thomas v.
Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to freedom of speech and of
the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and to petition the government for redress of grievances. All these rights, while
not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed
on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the
challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the exercise
of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger,
of a character both grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals,
public health, or any other legitimate public interest.
2.
Nowhere is the rationale that underlies the freedom of expression and
peaceable assembly better expressed than in this excerpt from an opinion of justice
frankfurter: it must never be forgotten, however, that the bill of rights was the child of the

In

63
enlightenment. Back of the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power of an appeal to
reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to avert
force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication that the
guaranty of free speech was given a generous scope. But utterance in a context of
violence can lose its significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an
instrument of force. Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by the constitution.
What was rightfully stressed is the abandonment of reason, the utterance, whether verbal
or printed, being in a context of violence. It must always be remembered that this right
likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their
views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion. For if the peaceful means of
communication cannot be availed of, resort to non-peaceful means may be the only
alternative. Nor is this the sole reason for the expression of dissent. It means more than
just the right to be heard of the person who feels aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with
things as they are. Its value may lie in the fact that there may be something worth
hearing from the dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas. There are, of
course, well-defined limits. What is guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not
advocate disorder in the name of protest, much less preach rebellion under the cloak of
dissent. The constitution frowns on disorder or tumult attending a rally or assembly.
Resort to force is ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided. The utmost calm
though is not required. As pointed out in an early philippine case, penned in 1907 to be
precise, united states v. Apurado: it is rather to be expected that more or less disorder
will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against grievances whether real or
imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of
excitement, and the greater the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less
perfect, as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the leaders over their irresponsible
followers. It bears repeating that for the constitutional right to be invoked, riotous
conduct, injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be avoided. To give free rein to
ones destructive urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a mockery of the high
estate occupied by intellectual liberty in our scheme of values.
there can be no legal objection, absent the existence of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil, on the choice of luneta as the place where the peace rally
would start. The philippines is committed to the view expressed in the plurality opinion, of
1939 vintage of, justice roberts in hague v. Cio: whenever the title of streets and parks
may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out
of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between
citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places has,
from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of
citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the united states to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions may be regulated in the interest of all; it is
not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort
and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but must not, in the
guise of respondents, be abridged or denied. The above excerpt was quoted with
approval in primicias v. Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was implicit in municipality
of cavite v. Rojas, a 1915 decision, where this court categorically affirmed that plazas or
parks and streets are outside the commerce of man and thus nullified a contract that
leased plaza soledad of plaintiff-municipality. Reference was made to such plaza being
a promenade for public use, which certainly is not the only purpose that it could serve.
To repeat, there can be no valid reason why a permit should not be granted for the
proposed march and rally starting from a public park that is the luneta.
4.
Neither can there be any valid objection to the use of the streets to the
gates of the us embassy, hardly two blocks away at the roxas boulevard. Primicias v.
Fugoso has resolved any lurking doubt on the matter. In holding that the then mayor
fugoso of the city of manila should grant a permit for a public meeting at plaza miranda in
quiapo, this court categorically declared: our conclusion finds support in the decision in
the case of willis cox v. State of new hampshire, 312 u.s., 569. In that case, the statute of
new hampshire p.l. chap. 145, section 2, providing that no parade or procession upon
any ground abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a special license therefor shall
first be obtained from the selectmen of the town or from licensing committee, was
construed by the supreme court of new hampshire as not conferring upon the licensing
board unfettered discretion to refuse to grant the license, and held valid. And the
supreme court of the united states, in its decision (1941) penned by chief justice hughes
affirming the judgment of the state supreme court, held that a statute requiring persons
using the public streets for a parade or procession to procure a special license therefor
from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of assembly
or of freedom of speech and press, where, as the statute is construed by the state courts,
the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration

64
of the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a view to conserving the
public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper policing, and are not
invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, * * *. nor should the point
made by chief justice hughes in a subsequent portion of the opinion be ignored: civil
liberties, as guaranteed by the constitution, imply the existence of an organized society
maintaining public order without which liberty itself would be lost in the excesses of
unrestricted abuses. The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to
assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never
been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of
safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend. The control of travel on
the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of social need.
Where a restriction of the use of highways in that relation is designed to promote the
public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted
exercise of some civil right which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection.
Xxx
6.
X x x the principle under american doctrines was given utterance by chief
justice hughes in these words: the question, if the rights of free speech and peaceable
assembly are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held
but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but whether their utterances
transcend the bounds of the freedom of speech which the constitution protects. There
could be danger to public peace and safety if such a gathering were marked by
turbulence. That would deprive it of its peaceful character. It is true that the licensing
official, here respondent mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a
permit would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence
requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what
may probably occur, given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption
especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is that the
permit must be for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the
language of justice roberts, speaking for the american supreme court, is not to be
abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.
Xxx
8.
By way of a summary. The applicants for a permit to hold an assembly
should inform the licensing authority of the date, the public place where and the time
when it will take place. If it were a private place, only the consent of the owner or the one
entitled to its legal possession is required. Such application should be filed well ahead in
time to enable the public official concerned to appraise whether there may be valid
objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public place. It is an
indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger
test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is of the view that there is such an
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the
matter. Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to
them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper
judicial authority. Free speech and peaceable assembly, along with the other intellectual
freedoms, are highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be too
strongly stressed that on the judiciary, -- even more so than on the other departments
rests the grave and delicate responsibility of assuring respect for and deference to such
preferred rights. No verbal formula, no sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense with
what has been so felicitiously termed by justice holmes as the sovereign prerogative of
judgment. Nonetheless, the presumption must be to incline the weight of the scales of
justice on the side of such rights, enjoying as they do precedence and primacy. X x x.
b.p. no. 880 was enacted after this court rendered its decision in reyes.
the provisions of b.p. no. 880 practically codify the ruling in reyes:
reyes v. Bagatsing
(g.r. no. L-65366, november 9, 1983,
125 scra 553, 569)
8. By way of a summary. The applicants for
a permit to hold an assembly should inform the

b.p. no. 880

Sec. 4. Permit when required and when

not required.-- a written permit shall be

65
licensing authority of the date, the public place
where and the time when it will take place. If it
were a private place, only the consent of the
owner or the one entitled to its legal possession
is required. Such application should be filed well
ahead in time to enable the public official
concerned to appraise whether there may be
valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its
grant but at another public place. It is an
indispensable condition to such refusal or
modification that the clear and present danger
test be the standard for the decision reached. If
he is of the view that there is such an imminent
and grave danger of a substantive evil, the
applicants must be heard on the matter.
Thereafter, his decision, whether favorable or
adverse, must be transmitted to them at the
earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can
have recourse to the proper judicial authority.

required for any person or persons to

organize and hold a public assembly in a
public place. However, no permit shall be
required if the public assembly shall be done
or made in a freedom park duly established
by law or ordinance or in private property, in
which case only the consent of the owner or
the one entitled to its legal possession is
required, or in the campus of a governmentowned and operated educational institution
which shall be subject to the rules and
regulations of said educational institution.
Political meetings or rallies held during any
election campaign period as provided for by
law are not covered by this act.
Sec. 5. Application requirements.-- all
applications for a permit shall comply with the
following guidelines:
(a) the applications shall be in writing and
shall include the names of the leaders or
organizers; the purpose of such public
assembly; the date, time and duration thereof,
and place or streets to be used for the
intended activity; and the probable number of
persons participating, the transport and the
public address systems to be used.
(b) the application shall incorporate the
duty and responsibility of applicant under
section 8 hereof.
(c) the application shall be filed with the
office of the mayor of the city or municipality
in whose jurisdiction the intended activity is to
be held, at least five (5) working days before
the scheduled public assembly.
(d) upon receipt of the application, which
must be duly acknowledged in writing, the
office of the city or municipal mayor shall
cause the same to immediately be posted at a
conspicuous place in the city or municipal
building.
Sec. 6.
Action to be taken on the
application.
(a) it shall be the duty of the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a
permit unless there is clear and convincing
evidence that the public assembly will create
a clear and present danger to public order,
public safety, public convenience, public
morals or public health.
(b) the mayor or any official acting in his
behalf shall act on the application within two
(2) working days from the date the application
was filed, failing which, the permit shall be
deemed granted. Should for any reason the
mayor or any official acting in his behalf
refuse to accept the application for a permit,
said application shall be posted by the
applicant on the premises of the office of the
mayor and shall be deemed to have been
filed.
(c) if the mayor is of the view that there is
imminent and grave danger of a substantive
evil warranting the denial or modification of
the permit, he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) the action on the permit shall be in

66
writing and served on the applica[nt] within
twenty-four hours.
(e) if the mayor or any official acting in his
behalf denies the application or modifies the
terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may
contest the decision in an appropriate court of
law.
(f) in case suit is brought before the
metropolitan trial court, the municipal trial
court, the municipal circuit trial court, the
regional trial court, or the intermediate
appellate court, its decisions may be
appealed to the appropriate court within fortyeight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No
appeal bond and record on appeal shall be
required. A decision granting such permit or
modifying it in terms satisfactory to the
applicant shall be immediately executory.
(g) all cases filed in court under this section
shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours
from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder
shall be immediately endorsed to the
executive judge for disposition or, in his
absence, to the next in rank.
(h) in all cases, any decision may be
appealed to the supreme court.
(i) telegraphic appeals to be followed by
formal appeals are hereby allowed.

it is very clear, therefore, that b.p. no. 880 is not an absolute ban of public assemblies but a
restriction that simply regulates the time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted
to in osmea v. Comelec,34 where the court referred to it as a content-neutral regulation of the time,
place, and manner of holding public assemblies.35
a fair and impartial reading of b.p. no. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of public
assemblies36 that would use public places. The reference to lawful cause does not make it contentbased because assemblies really have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be peaceable
and entitled to protection. Neither are the words opinion, protesting and influencing in the definition
of public assembly content based, since they can refer to any subject. The words petitioning the
government for redress of grievances come from the wording of the constitution, so its use cannot be
avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection and benefit of all rallyists and is independent of
the content of the expressions in the rally.
Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health. This is a recognized exception to
the exercise of the right even under the universal declaration of human rights and the international
covenant on civil and political rights.
neither is the law overbroad. It regulates the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly and
petition only to the extent needed to avoid a clear and present danger of the substantive evils congress
has the right to prevent.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the content of the speech is not relevant to the
regulation.
as to the delegation of powers to the mayor, the law provides a precise and sufficient standard
the clear and present danger test stated in sec. 6(a). The reference to imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil in sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing and is not an inconsistent standard. As
34
35
36

G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998, 288 SCRA 447.

Ibid, p. 478.
Except picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and employees
resulting from a labor dispute, which are governed by the Labor Code and other labor laws;
political meeting or rallies held during any election campaign period, which are governed by
the Election Code and other election related laws; and public assemblies in the campus of a
government-owned and operated educational institution, which shall be subject to the rules
and regulations of said educational institution. (Sec. 3[a] and Sec. 4 of B.P. No. 880).

67
to whether respondent mayor has the same power independently under republic act no. 7160 37 is thus not
necessary to resolve in these proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties in their arguments.
Finally, for those who cannot wait, section 15 of the law provides for an alternative forum through
the creation of freedom parks where no prior permit is needed for peaceful assembly and petition at any
time:
Sec. 15. Freedom parks. every city and municipality in the country shall within
six months after the effectivity of this act establish or designate at least one suitable
freedom park or mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as practicable, shall
be centrally located within the poblacion where demonstrations and meetings may be
held at any time without the need of any prior permit.
in the cities and municipalities of metropolitan manila, the respective mayors
shall establish the freedom parks within the period of six months from the effectivity this
act.
2
The court now comes to the matter of the cpr. As stated earlier, the solicitor general has
conceded that the use of the term should now be discontinued, since it does not mean anything other
than the maximum tolerance policy set forth in b.p. no. 880. This is stated in the affidavit of respondent
executive secretary eduardo ermita, submitted by the solicitor general, thus:
The truth of the matter is the policy of calibrated preemptive response is in
consonance with the legal definition of maximum tolerance under section 3 (c) of b.p.
blg. 880, which is the highest degree of restraint that the military, police and other
peacekeeping authorities shall observe during a public assembly or in the dispersal of the
same. Unfortunately, however, the phrase maximum tolerance has acquired a different
meaning over the years. Many have taken it to mean inaction on the part of law
enforcers even in the face of mayhem and serious threats to public order. More so, other
felt that they need not bother secure a permit when holding rallies thinking this would be
tolerated. Clearly, the popular connotation of maximum tolerance has departed from
its real essence under b.p. blg. 880.
It should be emphasized that the policy of maximum tolerance is provided under
the same law which requires all pubic assemblies to have a permit, which allows the
dispersal of rallies without a permit, and which recognizes certain instances when water
cannons may be used. This could only mean that maximum tolerance is not in conflict
with a no permit, no rally policy or with the dispersal and use of water cannons under
certain circumstances for indeed, the maximum amount of tolerance required is
dependent on how peaceful or unruly a mass action is. Our law enforcers should
calibrate their response based on the circumstances on the ground with the view to
preempting the outbreak of violence.
Thus, when i stated that calibrated preemptive response is being enforced in lieu
of maximum tolerance i clearly was not referring to its legal definition but to the distorted
and much abused definition that it has now acquired. I only wanted to disabuse the
minds of the public from the notion that law enforcers would shirk their responsibility of
keeping the peace even when confronted with dangerously threatening behavior. I
wanted to send a message that we would no longer be lax in enforcing the law but would
henceforth follow it to the letter. Thus i said, we have instructed the pnp as well as the
local government units to strictly enforce a no permit, no rally policy . . . Arrest all persons
violating the laws of the land . . . Unlawful mass actions will be dispersed. None of these
is at loggerheads with the letter and spirit of batas pambansa blg. 880. It is thus absurd
for complainants to even claim that i ordered my co-respondents to violate any law.
37

The Local Government Code. Specifically, Section 16 stating the general welfare
clause, thus:
SEC. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers
expressly granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary,
appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare.
Within their respective territorial
jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support among other things, the
preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the
people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and selfreliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace
and order, and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.

68
In sum, this court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the fundamental rights of our people,
especially freedom of expression and freedom of assembly. For this reason, the so-called
calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck
down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses our people and is used by some
police agents to justify abuses. On the other hand, b.p. no. 880 cannot be condemned as
unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of
public places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from being insidious,
maximum tolerance is for the benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the
mayors of the power to issue rally permits is valid because it is subject to the constitutionallysound clear and present danger standard.
Wherefore, the petitions are granted in part, and calibrated preemptive response (cpr), insofar as it
would purport to differ from or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is null and void and respondents are
enjoined to refrain from using it and to strictly observe the requirements of maximum tolerance.
read:
1. Right of assembly..31 scra 734 and 742
2. Evangelista vs. Earnshaw, 57 phil 255
3. Primicias vs. Fuguso, 80 phil. 71
4. De la cruz vs. Ela, 99 phil. 346
5. Navarro vs. Villegas, 31 scra 731
6. Philippine blooming mills case,51 scra 189
7. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, 125 scra 553;see
guidelines
8. Ruiz vs. Gordon, 126 scra 233
9. Villar vs. Tip, 135 scra 705
10. Malabanan vs. Ramento, 129 scra 359
11. Carpio vs. Guevara, 106 scra 685
12. Nestle' phils. Vs. Sanchez, 154 scra 542
13. Arreza vs. Araneta university foundation, 137
scra 94
6. Freedom from prior restraint
read:
1. Gonzales vs. Kalaw katigbak, 137 scra 717
2. New york times vs. U.s., 403 u.s. 713 (any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this
court bearing a heavy presumption against its validity)
3. Near vs. Minnesota, 283 u.s. 697
4. Times film vs. City of chicago, 365 u.s. 43
5. Freedman vs. Maryland, 380 u.s. 51
8. Clear and present danger and dangerous tendency rule (whether the words used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that the state has the right to prevent)
7-a. Dangerous tendency rule (if the words uttered create a dangerous tendency which the state
has the right to prevent, then such words are punishable)
read:
1. Cabansag vs. Fernandez, 102 phil. 152
2. Read again the reyes and ruiz cases, supra
3. Read again zaldivar vs. Sandiganbayan, gr no.
80578, february 1, 1989

7960-707& zaldivar vs. Gonzales, gr no.

8. The balancing-of-interest test (when a particular conduct is regulated in the interest of the
public order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgment of speech,
the duty of the courts is to determine which of the 2 conflicting interests demand greater
protection under the circumstances presented.)
read:
Ayer production vs. Judge capulong, juan ponce enrile, et al., 160 scra 861
Read also:
1. Lagunzad vs. Gonzales, 92 scra 476
2. Gitlow vs. New york, 268 u.s. 652, including

the criticism on this test by justice holmes

69
3. See also zaldivar case above
Chapter vi - the non-establishment
Of religion clause
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting the establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
Estrada vs. Soledad escritor, 492 scra 1 (resolution of the motion
for reconsideration), 408 scra 1
Puno, j.
respondent is the court interpreter of rtc branch 253, las pinas city. Complainant requested for an
investigation of respondent for living with a man not her husband while she was still legally married and
having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Estrada believes that escritor is committing a grossly
immoral act which tarnishes the image of the judiciary, thus she should not be allowed to remain
employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.
respondent admitted she started living with luciano quilapio, jr. More than 20 years ago when her
husband was still alive but living with another woman. She likewise admitted having a son with quilapio
but denies any liability for alleged grossly immoral conduct because:

She is a member of the jehovahs witnesses and the watch tower society;
That the conjugal arrangement was in conformity with their religious beliefs;
That the conjugal arrangement with quilapio has the approval of her congregation.

Escritor likewise claimed that she had executed a declaration of pledging faithfulness in
accordance with her religion which allows members of the jehovahs witnesses who have been
abandoned by their spouses to enter into marital relations. The declaration thus makes the
resulting union moral and binding within the congregation all over the world except in countries
where divorce is allowed.
Held:
escritors conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for
exemption from the law based on her fundamental right to religion. The court recognizes that
state interests must be upheld in order that freedoms---including religious freedom---may be
enjoyed. In the area of religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the stateinterest sought to be upheld
must be so compelling that its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect
the freedom. In the absence of a showing that the state interest exists, man must be allowed to
subscribe to the infinite.
escritor was therefore held not administratively liable for grossly immoral conduct.
Freedom of religion
-

Any specific system of belief, worship or conduct, often involving a code of ethics and
philosophy.
A profession of faith to an active power that binds and elevates man to his creator.

The existence of a divine being is not necessarily inherent in religion; the buddhists espouses
a way of life without reference to an omnipotent god.
strong fences make good neighbors. The idea is to delineate the boundaries between two
institutions and prevent encroachments by one against the other.
the doctrine cuts both ways. It is not only the state that is
prohibited from interfering in purely ecclesiastical affairs; the church is
likewise barred from meddling in purely secular matters.
Non-stablishment clause:

70
it simply means that the state cannot set up a church; nor pass
laws which aids one religion; aid all religion, or prefer one religion over
another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain away from
church against his will; or force him to profess a belief or disbelief; that
the state cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any
religious organization or group and vice versa (everson vs. Board of
education, 330 us 1)
this clause seeks to protect:
Voluntarism---must come into existence through the voluntary support of
its members;
Insulation from political processgrowth through voluntary support of its
members will not take place if there is intervention from the state.
there will be no violation of the non-establishment clause if:
The statute has a secular legislative purpose;
Its principal or primary effect is one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion; and
It does not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.
(lemon vs. Kurtzman, 403 us 602)
The government is neutral and while protecting all, it prefers none and
disparages none. all here applies both to the believer and the nonbeliever. Freedom of religion includes freedom from religion; the right to
worhip includes the right not to worship.
School prayer case (engel vs. Vitale, 370 us 421)
it is unconstitutional for a school to require the students to recite
a prayer composed by the board of regents at the starts of the days
class. it is no part of the business of government to compose official
prayers for any group of the american people.
School district of abington vs. Schempp, 374 us 203
it is unconstitutional for a law to require that at least 10 verses
from the holy bible be read daily without comment because the same
constitute a religious exercise which violates the non-establishment
clause.
Board of education vs. Allen, 392 us 236
a law requiring the board of education to lend textbooks free of charge to all students from grades
7-12 of parochial school. This is constitutional since it is not the parochial school which gets the benefits
but the parents.
Everson vs. Board of education, 330 us 1
the law authorizing reimbursement of transportation expenses of school children going to and
from parochial schools is not violative of the non-establishment clause because it will be the parents who
get benefits, not the parochial school.
Right to religious profession and worship has two aspects:
a. Freedom to believe; and
b. Freedom to act.
In the first, such freedom is absolute. He may indulge in his own theories about life and death;
worship any god he chooses, or none at all. He may not be punished even if he cannot prove what he
believes.
In the second, if the individual externalizes what he believes, his freedom to do so becomes
subject to the authority of the state. This is so because religious freedom can be exercised only with due
regard to the rights of others. Example: go forth and multiply---cannot marry several times just to comply.

71
People vs. Lagman & zosa, 38 o.g. 1676
avoiding military duties based on religious grounds is not allowed in the philippines because of
section 4, article iithe state is the protector of the people and it is the prime duty of the people to
defend the state and in the fulfillment of this duty, the state may call all citizens to render military or civil
service.
In re summers, 325 us 561
the act of the illinois supreme court denying admission to the bar because of his refusal to take in
good faith an oath to support the constitution of the state of illinois which requires mandatory service in
the military in times of war was reversed by the us supreme court stating that this constitutes a violation of
the 1st amendment which guarantees religious freedom.
1. Religious freedom in relation to impairment of
scra 445

contracts and the right to join associations,36

2. Read:
1. Aglipay vs. Ruiz, 64 phil. 201
2. Garces vs. Estenzo, 104 scra 510
3. Ink vs. Gironella, 106 scra 1
4. American bible society vs. City of manila, 101
5. Gerona vs. Sec. Of education, 106 phil. 11
6. Pamil vs. Teleron, november 20, 1978
7. Victoriano vs. Elizalde rope, 59 scra 54
7. German vs. Barangan, 135 scra 514

phil. 398

Roel ebralinag, et al vs. The division superintendent of schools of

cebu, march 1, 1993

Grino--aquino, j.
Facts:
-----1. The petitioners are high school and grade schools students enrolled in the different
public schools of the province of cebu and who belong to the religious group known as
the jehovah's witnesses;
2. That they rrefused to take part in the flag ceremony which includes playing by a band
or singing the philippine national anthem, saluting the philippine flag and reciting the
patriotic pledge because they considered the flag as an image and they should not
worship it except god;
3. That because of their refusal to perform the foregoing acts as required by ra 1265 of
july 11, 1955 and by department order no. 8 dated july 21, 1955 of the decs making the
flag ceremony compulsory in all educational institutions, they were expelled by the
respondent school authorities.
Hence this petition.
Issue:
-----may the petitioners be expelled for refusing to salute the flag, recite the patriotic
pledge or sing the national anthem in order to follow their religious beliefs?
Held:
the same issue was raised in gerona vs. Secretary of education, 106 phil. 2
(1959) and balbuna vs. Secretary of education, 110 phil. 150 (1960) where the sc held
that:
the flag is not an image but a symbol of the republic of the philippines, an
emblem of national sovereignty, of national unity and cohesion and of freedom and liberty

72
which it and the constitution guarantee and protect. Under a system of complete
separation of church and state in the government, the flag is utterly devoid of any
religious significance.
the law, ra 1265 was likewise incorporated in executive order no. 297, september
21, 1988.
our task is extremely difficult for the 30-year old decision of this court in gerona
upholding the salute law and approving the expulsion of students who refuse to obey it, is
not lightly to be trifled with.
the idea that one may be compelled to salute the flag, sing the national anthem,
and recite the patriotic pledge, during flag ceremony on pain of being dismissed from
one's job or be expelled in school, is alien to the conscience of the present generation of
filipinos who cut their teeth on the bill of rights which guarantees their rights to free
speech and the free exercise of religious profession and worship (section 5, art. Iii, 1987
constitution).
religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priority
and the amplest protection among human rights, for it involves the relationship of man
and his creator (chief justice fernando's separate opinion in german vs. Barangan, 135
scra 530).
the right to religious profession has a two-fold aspect, vis., freedom to believe
and freedom to act on one's belief. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined
within the realm of the thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
the sole justification for a prior restraint or limitation on the exercise of religious
freedom (according the former chief justice teehankee in his dissenting opinion in german
vs. Baranagan) is the existence of a grave and present danger of a character both grave
and imminent, of a serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health or any other
legitimate public interest, that the state has the right and duty to presvent. Absent such a
threat to public safety, the expulsion of the petitioners from the schools is not justified
since they are not doing anything that could warrant their expulsion since during flag
ceremonies, they just quietly stand at attention to show their respect for the rights of
others who choose to participate in the solemn proceedings.
in victoriano vs. Elizalde rope workers union, 59 scra 54, we upheld the
exemption of the members of the iglesia ni kristo from the coverage of the closed-shop
agreement between the labor union and the company because it would violate the
teaching of their church not to join any labor group.
we hold that a similar exemption may be accorded to the jehovah's witnesses
with regard to the observance of the flag ceremony out of respect to their religious
beliefs, however "bizarre" those beliefs may seem to others
chapter vii - the constitutional
Right to travel
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired
except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public
health, as may be provided by law.
Note: the applicable provision of the human security act on the right to
travel
section 26 provides that persons who have been charged with terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism---even if they have been granted bail because evidence
of guilt is not strongcan be:

Detained under house arrest;

Restricted from traveling; and/or
Prohibited from using any cellular phones, computers, or other means of communications
with people outside their residence.

73
Upon application of the prosecutor, the suspects right to travel shall be limited to the
municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national
security and public safety. Travel outside of said municipality or city, without the authorization
of the court, shall be deemed a violation of the terms and conditions of the bail which shall
then be forfeited as provided in the rules of court.
these restrictions shall be terminated upon acquittal of the accused; or the dismissal of
the case filed against him; or earlier upon the discretion of the court or upon motion of the
prosecutor.
1. The constitutional as well as human right to travel,

129 scra

2. Read:
Ferdinand marcos, et al. Vs. Hon. Raul manglapus, et al., g.r. no.
88211, september 15, 1989 and the resolution of the motion for
reconsideration dated october 27, 1989
Right to travel; liberty of abode
And "right to return"
En banc
Cortes, j.
this is a petition for mandamus and prohibition asking the supreme court to order the
respondents to issue travel documents to the petitioners and to enjoin the implementation
of the president's decision to bar their return to the philippines.
the case for the petitioners is founded on the assertion that their right to return to the
philippines is guaranteed by the following provisions of the constitution:
section 1. No person shall be deprived of life liberty or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws.
section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed
by law shall not be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health, as may be provided by law.
the petitioners contend that the president has no power to impair the liberty of abode
of the marcoses because only the courts may do so "within the limits prescribed by law".
Nor may the president impair the right to travel because no law has authorized her to do
so.
also, the petitioners claim that under international law, particularly the universal
declaration of humjan rights guaranteed the right of the marcoses to return to the
philippines. Thus:
Art. 13 (1) everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the
borders of each state.
(2) everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country.
likewise, under the international covenant on civil and political rights, which had been
ratified by the philippines, provides:
art. 12
4) no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.
the respondents argue that the issue in this case involves a political question which is
therefore beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Furthermore, they argue that the right of the
state to national security prevails over individual rights, citing section 4, art. Ii of the 1987
philippine constitution.
Issue:

74
Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted in the constitution, the president
may prohibit the marcoses from returning to the philippines.
the sub-issues, which could help in the determination of the main issue, are:
1. Does the president have the power to bar the marcoses to return to the philippines?
A. Is this a political question?
2. Assuming that the president has the power to bar former pres. Marcos
and his family from returning to the philippines, in the interest of national
security, public safety or public health, has the president made a finding
that the return of the petitioners to the philippines is a clear and present
danger to national security, public welfare or public health. And if she has
made that finding, have the requirements of due process been complied
with in making such finding? Has there been prior notice to the
petitioners?
Held:
it must be emphasized that the individual right involved in this case is not the right to
travel from the philippines to other countries or within the philippines. These are what the
right to travel connote. Essentially, the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct
right under international law, independent from, though related to the right to travel.
Thus, even the universal declaration of human rights and the international covenant on
civil and political rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the
territory of the state, the right to leave a country and the right to enter one's country as
separate and distinct rights.
the right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed by
the bill of rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is
our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered as a generally
accepted principle of international law, under our constitution, is part of the law of the
land.
to the president, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the
common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power
involved is the president's residual power to protect the general welfare of the
people.
the court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not
besieged by the insurgency, separatist movement in mindanao, rightist conspiracies to
grab power, etc. With these before her, the president cannot be said to have acted
arbitrarily, capriciously and whimsically.
lastly, the issue involved in the case at bar is not political in nature since under section
1, art. Viii of the constitution, judicial power now includes the duty to "determine whether
or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the government."
Note:
the main opinion was concurred in by 7 justices (cj fernan, narvasa, melencio-herrera,
gancayco, grino-aquino, medialdea and regalado) or a total of 8 justices in voting in favor
of dismissing the petition. Seven justices filed separate dissenting opinions (gutierrez, jr.,
cruz, paras, feliciano, padilla, bidin and sarmiento).
***********************
Gutierrez, jr., j., dissenting.
with all due respect for the majority in the court that the main issue in this case is not
one of power but one on rights. If he comes home, the government has the power to
arrest and punish him but does it have the power to deny him his right to come home and
die among familiar surroundings? X x x the government has more than ample powers
under existing laws to deal with a person who transgresses the peace and imperils public
safety. But the denial of travel papers is not one of those powers because the bill of rights

75
say so. There is no law prescribing exile in foreign land as the penalty for hurting the
nation.
. The fears expressed by its representatives were based on mere conjectures of political
and economic destabilization without any single piece of concrete evidence to back up
their apprehensions.
amazingly, however, the majority has come to the conclusion that there exist "factual
bases for the president's decision" to bar marcos's return. That is not my recollection of
the impressions of the court after the hearing.
2. Silverio vs. Ca, april 8, 1991
Read also:
1. Caunca vs. Salazar, 82 phil. 851
2. Kwong vs. Pcgg, december 7,l987
3. Manotoc vs. Ca, 142 scra 149
1. Petitioner ricardo manotoc, jr. Has 6 criminal cases for estafa pending against him. In
said cases he was admitted to bail with the fgu insurance corporation as surety.
he is also involved in a case pending before the securities and exchange commission.
2.
The sec requested the commissioner on immigration not to clear petitioner for
departure pending disposition of the case involving him. The same was granted by the
commissioner.
3. Petitioner subsequently filed before the trial courts a motion entitled "motion for
permission to leave the country" stating as ground therefor his desire to go to the united
states, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities".
4. The motion was denied by the lower courts and the matter was elevated to the court
of appeals which also denied the same. Petitioner brings the matter to the s.c. claiming
his constitutional right to travel and also contending that having been admitted to bail as a
matter of right, neither the courts which granted him bail nor the sec would have
jurisdiction over his liberty.
Held:
petition denied.
A.
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever
the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel.
B.
"x x x the result of the obligation assumed by appellee to hold the accused
amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower court, was to prohibit the
accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the philippines, because, otherwise, said orders
and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which
they issued does not extend beyond that of the philippines they would have no binding
force outside of said jurisdiction."(people vs. Uy tuising, 61 phil. 404 (l935)
C. To allow the petitioner to leave the philippines without sufficient reason would place
him beyond the reach of the courts.
D. Petitioner cites the court of appeals case of people vs. Shepherd (c.a.-g.r. no. 23505r, feb. 13, 1980) as authority for his claim that he could travel. The s.c. held however that
said case is not squarely on all fours with the case at bar. Unlike the shepherd case,
petitioner has failed to satisfy the courts of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof,
as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed travel.
E. It may thus be inferred that the fact that a criminal case is pending against an
accused does not automatically bar him from travelling abroad. He must however
convince the courts of the urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, and that his
sureties are willing to undertake the responsibility of allowing him to travel.
4. Villavicencio vs. Lukban, 39 phil. 778

76
5. Roan vs. Gonzales, supra.
6. Salonga vs. Hermoso, 97 scra 121
7. Read also the ferdinand marcos cases of august

& october, 1989

chapter viii - the constitutional

Right to information
Section 7. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records
shall be afforded the citizen subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law.
1. Read:
right to privacy; right to information on matters of public
concern;
camilo l. Sabio vs. Gordon, g.r. no. 174340, october 17, 2006, 504
scra 704
Sandoval-gutierrez, j.
The facts:

On february 20, 2006, senator miriam defensor santiago introduced philippine senate resolution
no. 455 (senate res. No. 455), 38[4] directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses
incurred by the philippines overseas telecommunications corporation (potc), philippine communications
satellite corporation (philcomsat), and philcomsat holdings corporation (phc) due to the alleged
improprieties in their operations by their respective board of directors.
The pertinent portions of the
resolution read:

Whereas, in the last quarter of 2005, the representation and entertainment

expense of the phc skyrocketed to p4.3 million, as compared to the previous years mere
p106 thousand;
Whereas, some board members established wholly owned phc subsidiary called
telecommunications center, inc. (tci), where phc funds are allegedly siphoned; in 18
months, over p73 million had been allegedly advanced to tci without any accountability
report given to phc and philcomsat;
Whereas, the philippine star, in its 12 february 2002 issue reported that the
executive committee of philcomsat has precipitately released p265 million and granted
p125 million loan to a relative of an executive committee member; to date there have
been no payments given, subjecting the company to an estimated interest income loss of
p11.25 million in 2004;
Wherefore, be it resolved that the proper senate committee shall conduct an
inquiry in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by the philippine
overseas telecommunications corporation (potc), philippine communications
satellite corporation (philcomsat), and philcomsat holdings corporations (phc) due
to the alleged improprieties in the operations by their respective board of
directors.
On may 8, 2006, chief of staff rio c. Inocencio, under the authority of senator richard j. Gordon,
wrote chairman camilo l. Sabio of the pcgg, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the
resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the committee on government corporations
and public enterprises and committee on public services. The purpose of the public meeting was to
deliberate on senate res. No. 455.39[6]

on may 9, 2006, chairman sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment. 40[7] at the same
time, he invoked section 4(b) of
e.o. no. 1 earlier quoted.
38[4]
39[6]

Annex E of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.

Annex F of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.

77
On september 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., major general balajadia arrested chairman sabio
in his office at irc building, no. 82 edsa, mandaluyong city and brought him to the senate premises where
he was detained.

Hence, chairman sabio filed with the supreme court a petition for habeas corpus against the
senate committee on government corporations and public enterprises and committee on public services,
their chairmen, senators richard gordon and joker p. Arroyo and members. The case was docketed as
g.r. no. 174340.

I s s u e s:

is the refusal of the petitioners to testify in congress by virtue of eo no. 1, section 4 [b] violates
the constitutional provision on information on matters of public concern?

H e l d:

yes.

section 4(b) of e.o. no.1 which was invoked by the petitioners in support of their refusal to testify
in the senate limits the power of legislative inquiry by exempting all pcgg members or staff from testifying
in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding, thus:

No member or staff of the commission shall be required to

testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or
administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official
cognizance.

Such provision of eo no. 1 is unconstitutional because

ensuring the peoples access to information on matters of public

it violates the constitutional provision

1-a. Bantay republic act vs. Comelec, may 4, 2007, 523 scra 1
the petitioner requested the comelec to publish the individual nominees of all the
party-list groups in order that they will be guided on what party-list group shall be supported
by them. The comelec held that under the party-list act, such list of nominees is confidential
and should not be published.
Held:
the comelec should publish the list of nominees of all the party-list groups. This is
in accordance with the right to information on matters of public concern which shall be
accorded to every citizen.
2. Valmonte vs. Belmonte, gr no. 74930, february 13, 1989 in relation to the right to privacy
Cortes, j.
Facts:
1. On june 4, 1986, petitioner valmonte wrote the respondent asking the latter to furnish
him copies of former members of the batasang pambansa who were able to secure a
"clean loan" from the gsis prior to the february 7, 1986 elections;
40[7]

Annex G of the Petition in G.R. No. 174318.

78

2. On june 17, 1986, respondent through counsel refused to give the petitioner a list of
said lawmakers who obtained "clean loans" from the gsis on the ground that there is a
confidential relationship between the gsis and its borrowers and it would be proper for
them to preserve the same;
3. On july 19, 1986, the petitioners filed this instant petition.
Issues:
1. Whether or not the case should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies?
2. Whether or not the petitioners are entitled to the documents sought in accordance
with their constitutional right to information?
Held:
1. It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that before a party can be allowed to resort to the
courts, he is expected to have exhausted all means of administrative redress available
under the law.
In the case at bar, the decision of the general manager of the gsis is
appealable/reviewable by the gsis board of trustees. Petitioners did not ask the board of
trustees to review the decision of the respondent.
however, the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not applicable when
only questions of law is involved. (pascual vs. Provincial board, 106 phil. 466; aguilar vs.
Valencia, 40 scra 210; malabanan vs. Ramento, 129 scra 359.
this is not the first time that the court is confronted with a case involving the right to
information. In tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 scra 27, we upheld the citizen's right to information
as well as in legaspi vs. Csc, 150 scra 530 and ordered the government officers involved
to act as prayed for by the petitioners. The pertinent provision of the constitution is
section 7, art. Iii which provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized.
Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions x x x shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided for by law.
the postulate of public office is a public trust as institutionalized in the constitution
(sec. 1, art. Xi) to protect the people from abuse of governmental power, would certainly
be empty words if access to information of public concern is denied except under
limitations prescribed by law.
petitioners are members of the media. As such, they have both the right to gather and
the obligation to check the accuracy of the information they disseminate x x x
the right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and
expression. But this is not to say that the right to information is merely an adjunct of and
therefore restricted in application by the exercise of the freedom of speech and of the
press. Far from it. The right to information goes hand in hand with the constitutional
policies of "full public disclosure" and "honesty in the public service".
yet, like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. It is
subject to limitations provided for by law and the people's right to information is limited to
"matters of public concern". Similarly, the state's policy of full disclosure is limited to
"transactions involving public interest" and subject to "reasonable conditions prescribed
by law."
the information sought to be obtained by the petitioners affect public interest since the
gsis is the trustee of contributions from the government and its employees. The funds of
the gsis assume a public character and that its obligations are guaranteed by the
government.
the petitioners are entitled to access to documents sought subject to reasonable
regulations that the respondent may impose relating to manner and hours of examination,

79
to the end that damage or loss of the records may be avoided, that undue interference
with the duties of the custodian of the records may be prevented and that the right of
other persons entitled to inspect the records may be insured [legaspi vs. Csc, supra;
subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 phil. 383]
he petitioners, however, are not entitled to be furnished copies of list of alleged
members of the batasang pambansa who were able to secure clean loans through the
intercessions of pres. Marcos and the first lady. This is so because access to public
records does not include the right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists,
abstracts, summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of
public concern.
the respondent is therefore ordered to allow petitioners access to documents and
records evidencing loans granted to members of the batasang pambansa, as petitioners
may specify, subject to reasonable rules and regulations as the gsis may deem
necessary.
Senate of the philippines, represented by senate president franklin
drilon, et al., vs. Exec. Sec. Eduardo ermita, et al., g.r. no. 16977,
april 20, 2006

Carpio morales, j.:

The facts:
in the exercise of its legislative power, the senate of the philippines, through its various senate
committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those
employed in government owned and controlled corporations, the armed forces of the philippines (afp),
and the philippine national police (pnp).
On september 21 to 23, 2005, the committee of the senate as a whole issued invitations to
various officials of the executive department for them to appear on september 29, 2005 as resource
speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the north luzon railways corporation with the china
national machinery and equipment group (hereinafter north rail project). The public hearing was sparked
by a privilege speech of senator juan ponce enrile urging the senate to investigate the alleged overpricing
and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the north rail project.
On september 28, 2005, the president of the philippines issued e.o. 464, ensuring observance of
the principle of separation of powers, adherence to the rule on executive privilege and respect for the
rights of public officials appearing in legislative inquiries in aid of legislation under the constitution, and for
other purposes, which, pursuant to section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient provisions of
the order are as follows:

Section 1. Appearance by heads of departments before congress. in accordance with

article vi, section 22 of the constitution and to implement the constitutional provisions on
the separation of powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of
departments of the executive branch of the government shall secure the consent
of the president prior to appearing before either house of congress.
When the security of the state or the public interest so requires and the president so
states in writing, the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
Section. 2. Nature, scope and coverage of executive privilege.
(a) nature and scope. - the rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is
fundamental to the operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under
the constitution (almonte vs. Vasquez, g.r. no. 95367, 23 may 1995). Further, republic act
no. 6713 or the code of conduct and ethical standards for public officials and employees
provides that public officials and employees shall not use or divulge confidential or
classified information officially known to them by reason of their office and not made
available to the public to prejudice the public interest.
(b) who are covered. the following are covered by this executive order:

80
1. Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the
department heads are covered by the executive privilege;
2. Generals and flag officers of the armed forces of the philippines and such
other officers who in the judgment of the chief of staff are covered by the
executive privilege;
3. Philippine national police (pnp) officers with rank of chief superintendent
or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the chief of the
pnp are covered by the executive privilege;
4. Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the national
security adviser are covered by the executive privilege; and
5. Such other officers as may be determined by the president.

i s s u e s:
1. Whether e.o. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public concern;
and
h e l d:
e.o 464 likewise violates the constitutional provision on the right to information on matters of
public concern. There are clear distinctions between the right of congress to information which underlies
the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. For one, the
demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information does not have the
same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by congress. Neither does the right to
information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials. These powers belong
only to congress and not to an individual citizen.
to the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however,
any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations
necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is
presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which
they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before congress opinions which they can
then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means
allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds valmonte v. Belmonte:
It is in the interest of the state that the channels for free political discussion be
maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the
peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the
citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the
participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information
relating thereto can such bear fruit.41 (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of e.o. 464 is,
therefore, in the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of inquiry.
1-a. Legaspi vs. Csc, 150 scra 530
1-b. Brilliantes vs. Chang, aug. 14, 1990
1-c. Canlas vs. Vazquez, july 3, 1990
1-d. Aquino-sarmiento vs. Manuel morato, november 13, 1991
2. Tanada vs. Tuvera, 146 scra 44
3. Baldoza vs. Dimaano, 71 scra 14
4. Lantaco vs. Lllamas, 108 scra 502
5. Subido vs. Ozaeta, 80 phil. 383
chapter ix - the constitutional
Right to form and join associations
Section 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the
public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, societies
for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.
1. Freedom of association, 100 scra 100
2. The fundamental right of self-organization,108 scra
41

G.R. No. 74930, February 13, 1989, 170 SCRA 256.

390

81

3. The right of self-organization of managerial

employees,47 scra 434

4. Read:
1. In re: atty. Edillon, 84 scra 554
2. Tarnate vs. Noriel, 100 scra 93
3. Samahan ng manggagawa vs. Noriel, 108 scra 381
4. Villar vs. Inciong, april 20,l983
5. P. Vs. Ferrer, 48 scra 382
6. P. Vs. Ferrer, 56 scra 793 (read the dissenting
opinion of justice fernando in both cases)
Chapter x - the power
Of eminent domain
Section 9. Private property shall not be taken for public use without
just compensation
1. The inherent power of eminent domain,93 scra 663
2. Who may exercise it? How about a barangay? Yes provided there is an approval of the president.
read:
1. Barangay matictic vs. Elbinias, 148 scra 83
2. Procedure for the exercise of said power; extent
of payment to be made before writ of possession
shall be issued in favor of the government.
value of property expropriated for national projects;
writ of possession when it shall be issued by the court;
when rule 67 of the rules of court and when ra 8974 shall
apply; full payment of just compensation before
government takes over.
Republic of the philippines vs. Judge gingoyon, 478 scra 474
Tinga, j.
Facts:
In 2003, the supreme court held in agan vs. Piatco, 402 scra 612 that the concession agreement
for the build operate transfer arrangement of the ninoy aquino international airport passenger terminal ii
between the philippine government and the philippine international air terminals co., inc. (piatco) as well
as the amendments thereto is void for being contrary to law and public policy. On motion for
reconsideration (420 scra 420), the supreme court held that:
this court, however, is not unmindful of the reality that the
structures comprising the naia ipt iii facility are almost complete and that
funds have been spent by piatco in their construction. For the
government to take over the said facility, it has to compensate
respondent piatco as builder of the said structures. The
compensation must be just and in accordance with law and equity
for the government can not unjustly enrich itself at the expense of
piatco and its investors.
on december 21, 2004, the government filed a complaint for expropriation with the rtc of pasay
city seeking a writ of possession authorizing to take immediate possession and control over naia 3
facilities and deposited the amount of p3.0b in cash with land bank of the philippines representing the
assessed value of the terminals assessed value for taxation purposes.
on the same day, judge gingoyon issued an order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to
the government to take or enter upon the possession of the naia 3 facilities. It held that it is the
ministerial duty of the government to issue writ of possession upon deposit of the assessed value of the
property subject of expropriation.

82
however, on january 4, 2005, judge gingoyon issued another order supplementing the december
21, 2004 order. It pointed out that the earlier orderas to the amount to be deposited by the government
was based on section 2, rule 67 when what should be applicable is ra 8974 and therefore ordered that
the amount of us$62,343,175.77 be released to piatco instead of the amount in the december 21, 2004
order.
on january 7, 2005, judge gingoyon issued another order directing the appointment of three (3)
commissioners to determine just compensation for the naia 3 complex.
both orders were questioned by the government as having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
Issues:
1. What law is applicable in this expropriation case: rule 67 of the rules of court or
8974?
2. If ra 8974 will be used, may the court used the provision of rule 67 on the 3
commissioners to determine just compensation.
ra

Held:
1.
Application of rule 67 would violate the agan doctrine which provides that for the government to take
over the said naia 3 facility, it has to compensate respondent piatco as builder of the said structures. If
section 2, rule 67 will be applied, piatco would be enjoined from receiving the just compensation even if
the government takes over the naia 3 facility. It is sufficient that the government deposits the amount
equal to the assessed value of the facilities. It would violate the proscription in the agan decision that the
government must pay first the just compensation before taking over the facilities.
So when shall rule 67 be used in expropriation cases and when shall ra 8974 be used?
In all national government projects or national infrastructure projects, like those covered by
the build-operate-transfer, ra 8974 shall be followed. The rest, rule 67 shall apply.
Differences between the two laws on expropriation:
a. Under rule 67, the government merely deposits the assessed value of the property subject of
expropriation and can have a writ of possession over the same while under ra 8974, the scheme
of immediate payment (100%) shall be followed.
b. Under rule 67, there can be writ of possession even if the owner of the property has not received
a single centavo while under ra 8974, as in this case, writ of possession may not be issued in
favor of the government until actual receipt by piatco of the proferred value of just compensation.
Upon issuance of the writ in favor of the government, however, it could already exercise acts of
ownership over the naia 3 facilities.
the just compensation to be paid by the government shall be determined within 60 days from the
finality of the decision based on section 4, ra 8974.
2
rule 67 on the appointment of three (3) commissioners to determine just compensation may be
used since ra 8974 does not provide for such procedure.

Just compensation; amount to be deposited in court

before a writ of possession may be issued by the court in
favor of the government; when to apply rule 67 and
when to apply ra no. 8974; who owns the interest of the
initial amount deposited for the purpose of issuing writ of
possession
Republic of the philippines vs. Holy trinity realty development
corporation, g.r. no. 172410, april 14, 2008
The facts:

83
On 29 december 2000, petitioner republic of the philippines, represented by the toll regulatory
board (trb), filed with the rtc a consolidated complaint for expropriation against landowners whose
properties would be affected by the construction, rehabilitation and expansion of the north luzon
expressway. The suit was docketed as civil case no. 869-m-2000 and raffled to branch 85, malolos,
bulacan. Respondent holy trinity realty and development corporation (htrdc) was one of the affected
landowners.
On 18 march 2002, trb filed an urgent ex-parte motion for the issuance of a writ of possession,
manifesting that it deposited a sufficient amount to cover the payment of 100% of the zonal value of the
affected properties, in the total amount of p28,406,700.00, with the land bank of the philippines, south
harbor branch (lbp-south harbor), an authorized government depository. Trb maintained that since it had
already complied with the provisions of section 4 of republic act no. 8974 42[5] in relation to section 2 of rule
67 of the rules of court, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial on the part of the rtc.
The rtc issued, on 19 march 2002, an order for the issuance of a writ of possession.
On 3 march 2003, htrdc filed with the rtc a motion to withdraw deposit, praying that the
respondent or its duly authorized representative be allowed to withdraw the amount of p22,968,000.00,
out of trbs advance deposit of p28,406,700.00 with lbp-south harbor, including the interest which
accrued thereon.
Thereafter, the rtc allowed the release of the principal amount together with the interest to the
respondent but on motion for reconsideration of the trb, it disallowed the withdrawal of the interest
reasoning out that the said issue will be included in the second stage of expropriation, that is, the
determination of just compensation.
The private respondent elevated the issue to the court of appeals which ruled that the respondent
is entitled to the interest by way of accession.
Hence, this petition of the government before the supreme court.
I s s u e:
who has the right over the interest of the amount deposited representing the zonal value of the
property sought to be expropriated? The expropriator or the landowner?
Held:
the petition is without merit.
The trb claims that there are two stages 43[11] in expropriation proceedings, the determination of the
authority to exercise eminent domain and the determination of just compensation. The trb argues that it is
only during the second stage when the court will appoint commissioners and determine claims for
entitlement to interest, citing land bank of the philippines v. Wycoco44[12] and national power corporation v.
Angas.45[13]
The trb further points out that the expropriation account with lbp-south harbor is not in the name
of htrdc, but of dpwh. Thus, the said expropriation account includes the compensation for the other
landowners named defendants in civil case no. 869-m-2000, and does not exclusively belong to
respondent.
The said argument is without merit because it failed to distinguish between the expropriation
procedures under republic act no. 8974 and rule 67 of the rules of court. Republic act no. 8974 and rule
67 of the rules of court speak of different procedures, with the former specifically governing expropriation
proceedings for national government infrastructure projects. Thus, in republic v. Gingoyon,46[14] we held:
There are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures
under rep. Act no. 8974 and rule 67. Under the statute, the government is required to
make immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing of the complaint to
be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in rule 67, the government is required
only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary. Moreover,
rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the
42
43
44
45
46

84
property for purposes of taxation, unlike rep. Act no. 8974 which provides, as the relevant
standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax
declaration or the current relevant zonal valuation of the bureau of internal revenue (bir),
whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structures using the
replacement cost method.
Xxxx
Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised
by the government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline
through which the state may expropriate private property. For example, section 19 of the
local government code governs as to the exercise by local government units of the power
of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance. And then there is rep. Act no. 8974,
which covers expropriation proceedings intended for national government infrastructure
projects.
Rep. Act no. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to
the property owner than rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national
government expropriates property for national government infrastructure projects. Thus,
if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than national
infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in
rule 67 continues to apply.
There is no question that the proceedings in this case deal with the expropriation of properties
intended for a national government infrastructure project. Therefore, the rtc correctly applied the
procedure laid out in republic act no. 8974, by requiring the deposit of the amount equivalent to 100% of
the zonal value of the properties sought to be expropriated before the issuance of a writ of possession in
favor of the republic.
The controversy, though, arises not from the amount of the deposit, but as to the ownership of the
interest that had since accrued on the deposited amount.
Whether the court of appeals was correct in holding that the interest earned by the deposited
amount in the expropriation account would accrue to hrtdc by virtue of accession, hinges on the
determination of who actually owns the deposited amount, since, under article 440 of the civil code, the
right of accession is conferred by ownership of the principal property:
Art. 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything
which is produced thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or
artificially.
The principal property in the case at bar is part of the deposited amount in the expropriation
account of dpwh which pertains particularly to htrdc. Such amount, determined to be p22,968,000.00 of
the p28,406,700.00 total deposit, was already ordered by the rtc to be released to htrdc or its authorized
representative. The court of appeals further recognized that the deposit of the amount was already
deemed a constructive delivery thereof to htrdc:
When the [herein petitioner] trb deposited the money as advance payment for the
expropriated property with an authorized government depositary bank for purposes of
obtaining a writ of possession, it is deemed to be a constructive delivery of the amount
corresponding to the 100% zonal valuation of the expropriated property. Since [htrdc] is
entitled thereto and undisputably the owner of the principal amount deposited by [herein
petitioner] trb, conversely, the interest yield, as accession, in a bank deposit should
likewise pertain to the owner of the money deposited. 47[15]
Since the court of appeals found that the htrdc is the owner of the deposited amount, then the
latter should also be entitled to the interest which accrued thereon.
The deposit was made in order to comply with section 4 of republic act no. 8974, which requires
nothing less than the immediate payment of 100% of the value of the property, based on the current zonal
valuation of the bir, to the property owner. Thus, going back to our ruling in republic v. Gingoyon48[16]:

47
48

85
It is the plain intent of rep. Act no. 8974 to supersede the system
of deposit under rule 67 with the scheme of immediate payment in
cases involving national government infrastructure projects.
The critical factor in the different modes of effecting delivery which gives legal effect to the act is
the actual intention to deliver on the part of the party making such delivery. 49[17] the intention of the trb in
depositing such amount through dpwh was clearly to comply with the requirement of immediate payment
in republic act no. 8974, so that it could already secure a writ of possession over the properties subject of
the expropriation and commence implementation of the project. In fact, trb did not object to htrdcs motion
to withdraw deposit with the rtc, for as long as htrdc shows (1) that the property is free from any lien or
encumbrance and (2) that respondent is the absolute owner thereof. 50[18]
a close scrutiny of trbs arguments would further reveal that it does not directly challenge the
court of appeals determinative pronouncement that the interest earned by the amount deposited in the
expropriation account accrues to htrdc by virtue of accession. Trb only asserts that htrdc is entitled only
to an amount equivalent to the zonal value of the expropriated property, nothing more and nothing less.
We agree in trbs statement since it is exactly how the amount of the immediate payment shall be
determined in accordance with section 4 of republic act no. 8974, i.e., an amount equivalent to 100% of
the zonal value of the expropriated properties. However, trb already complied therewith by depositing the
required amount in the expropriation account of dpwh with lbp-south harbor. By depositing the said
amount, trb is already considered to have paid the same to htrdc, and htrdc became the owner thereof.
The amount earned interest after the deposit; hence, the interest should pertain to the owner of the
principal who is already determined as htrdc. The interest is paid by lbp-south harbor on the deposit, and
the trb cannot claim that it paid an amount more than what it is required to do so by law.
Since the respondent is the owner of p22,968,000.00, it is entitled by right of accession to the
interest that had accrued to the said amount only.
We are not persuaded by trbs citation of national power corporation v. Angas and land bank of
the philippines v. Wycoco, in support of its argument that the issue on interest is merely part and parcel of
the determination of just compensation which should be determined in the second stage of the
proceedings only. We find that neither case is applicable herein.
The issue in angas is whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just
compensation for expropriated lands, the applicable law is article 2209 of the civil code which prescribes
a 6% legal interest rate, or central bank circular no. 416 which fixed the legal rate at 12% per annum. We
ruled in angas that since the kind of interest involved therein is interest by way of damages for delay in
the payment thereof, and not as earnings from loans or forbearances of money, article 2209 of the civil
code prescribing the 6% interest shall apply. In wycoco, on the other hand, we clarified that interests in
the form of damages cannot be applied where there is prompt and valid payment of just compensation.
The case at bar, however, does not involve interest as damages for delay in payment of just
compensation. It concerns interest earned by the amount deposited in the expropriation account.
Under section 4 of republic act no. 8974, the implementing agency of the government pays just
compensation twice: (1) immediately upon the filing of the complaint, where the amount to be paid is
100% of the value of the property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the bir (initial payment);
and (2) when the decision of the court in the determination of just compensation becomes final and
executory, where the implementing agency shall pay the owner the difference between the amount
already paid and the just compensation as determined by the court (final payment).51[19]
As a final note, trb does not object to htrdcs withdrawal of the amount of p22,968,000.00 from the
expropriation account, provided that it is able to show (1) that the property is free from any lien or
encumbrance and (2) that it is the absolute owner thereof. 52[21] the said conditions do not put in abeyance
the constructive delivery of the said amount to htrdc pending the latters compliance therewith. Article
118753[22] of the civil code provides that the effects of a conditional obligation to give, once the condition
has been fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the obligation. Hence, when htrdc
complied with the given conditions, as determined by the rtc in its order 54[23] dated 21 april 2003, the
effects of the constructive delivery retroacted to the actual date of the deposit of the amount in the
expropriation account of dpwh.
49
50
51
52
53
54

86

Biglang-awa vs. Judge bacalla, 354 scra 562

pursuant to section 2, rule 67 of the 1997 rules of civil procedure and the doctrine laid
down in the robern development case, the only requisites for the immediate entry by the
government in expropriation cases are:
a. The filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance; and
b. The making of a deposit equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to
expropriation.
The owners of the expropriated land are entitled to legal interest on the compensation eventually
adjudged from the date the condemnor takes possession of the land until the full compensation is
paid to them or deposited in court.
new requisites before immediate possession or writ of possession may be issued in
expropriation cases:
1. Complaint sufficient in form and substance; and
2. Payment of 15% of the market value as appearing in the latest tax declaration.
The city of iloilo vs. Judge legaspi, rtc 22, iloilo city, 444 scra 269
Requisites before the expropriator is allowed immediate
entry on the property subject of expropriation if the
expropriator is a local government unit.
the expropriator may immediately enter the property subject of expropriation proceedings if the
following requisites are present:
1. The complaint for expropriation filed in court is sufficient in form and
substance; and
2. The expropriator must deposit the amount equivalent to 15% of the fair
market value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax
declaration.
Gabatin vs. Land bank of the philippines, 444 scra 176
what is the basis of the just compensation for expropriation proceedings in connection with the
agrarian reform program of the government.
Held:
the taking of private lands under the agrarian reform program of the government partakes of the
nature of an expropriation proceedings. As such, in computing the just compensation, it is the value
of the land at the time of the taking, not at the time of the rendition of the judgment, which should
be taken into consideration.
Bank of the philippine islands vs. Court of appeals, 441 scra 637
Just compensation in expropriation cases; value of
the property when?
just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by
the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. Market value is that sum of
money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell,
would agree on as a price to be given and received therefore.
the just compensation is determined as of the date of taking of the property or the filing of the
complaint for expropriation, whichever comes first.
4. Basis of just compensation
read:

87
a. Npc vs. Jocson, february 25, 1992
a-1. Ansaldo vs. Tantuico, aug. 3, 1990
b. Mun. Of makati vs. Ca, oct. 1, 1990
c. Reublic vs. Iac, 185 scra 572
d. Mun. Of talisay vs. Ramirez, 183 scra 528
e. Npc vs. Ca, 129 scra 665
f. Maddumba vs. Gsis, 182 scra 281
read also:
1. Meaning of just compensation in eminent domain

proceedings, 29 scra 868

Basis of just compensation (exceptional case)

Berkenkotter, inc. Vs. Court of appeals
And republic of the philippines
December 14, 1992
Cruz, j.
Facts:
-----1. On june 18, 1982, vicente viray, then president of apolinario apacible school of
fisheries, a government institution in nasugbu, batangas, sent the petitioner a written offer
to buy the property of the latter with an area of 10,640 square meters for its 5-year
expansion program;
2. That the petitioner expressed willingness to sell at p50.00 per square meter in its reply;
3. Viray then requested the office of the provincial assessor of the province of batangas
to appraise the land and the latter fixed its market value at p32.00 per square meter;
4. Viray then wrote the petitioner and expressed willingness to buy the latter's property at
p32.00 per square meter. The petitioner, however, stuck to its original valuation. Later on,
it said that its property had in fact appreciated to as much as p100.00 per square meter;
5. On october 28, 1983, the republic of the philippines filed a complaint for the
expropriation of the petitioner's property and invoked the assessment made by the
provincial appraisal committee of the provincial assessor of batangas in the amount of
p32.00. The government likewise sought immediate possession of the property upon
deposit of 10% of the total assessment in accordance with pd 48;
6. Berkenkotter originally questioned the purpose of the expropriation but later
abandoned this objection and concentrated only on what it called the "underappraisal" of
the subject land;
7. The rtc then appointed a panel of commissioners in accordance with rule 67, ection 5,
of the rules of court, to determine the just compensation to be paid for the land;
8. On september 23, 1985, the panel of commissioners submitted its report to the trial
court and pegged the market value at p85.00 per square meter;
9. The republic of the philippines objected and pointed to three (3) contracts of sale
executed by the petitioner in 1985 whereby it sold three (3) tracts of land similar in
topography and adjacent to the property in question for the unit price of only p19.18 per
square meter;
10. The court directed the commissioners to convene anew and to receive additional
evidence. However, in its second report dated april 1, 1987, the panel reiterated its
original recommendation of p85.00/sq. M. Or a total of p904,400.00 for the entire area
sought to be expropriated. The trial court acting on this recommendation rendered
judgment requiring the republic to pay the petitioner the amount of p904,400.00 for the
entire area sought to be expropriated;
11. The government appealed the trial court's decision to the court of appeals which
rendered a decision reversing the lower court's decision and declaring that the fair market
value which should be the basis in computing the amount to be paid by the government

88
to the petitioner shall be p19.18, the market value according set by the petitioner if we
follow the three (3) deeds of sale it executed in favor of three (3) different individuals;
12. The petitioner was therefore constrained to file this instant petition claiming that the
court of appeals erred in holding that p19.18 per square meter should be the basis of
the computation for the just compensation of its property because:
A. Viray even offered the amount of p32.00 per squaremeter as the fair market
value;
B. That p32.00 per square meter was the appraised value made by the office
of the provincial assessor of batangas; and
C. The complaint itself prays that the market value be pegged at p32.00 per
square meter.
Issue:
-----what should be the basis in the computation of the just compensation:
p32.00/sq. M. In
accorance with the
appraisal of
the provincial assessor;
p100.00/sq.m. as claimed by the owner; p85.00/sq. M. As recommended by the board
of commissioners appointed by the court to evaluate the same, or p19.18 per square
meter which was the selling price in an adjacent lot sold by the petitioner to three
private individuals.
Held.
----the basis in the computation of just compensation shall be p19.18 per square
meter or the price which the petitioner sold its other lots to other individuals.
this is so because there is no showing that the petitioner had any special reason
for granting each of the individual vendees the extraordinary discount amounting to as
much as 75% of its claimed real value of the land. To all appearances, they were
ordinary buyers who bought the land for their own private purposes only and not for
the public purpose invoked by the government.
the petitioner's claim that the value as appearing in the deeds of sale in the
three other parcels is not a reliable index of just compensation "because owners usually
undervalue the selling price of the property to lower the expenses they would have to pay
for capital gains tax and documentary stamps tax" is practically an admission that it did
not indicate the actual consideration in the three transactions where it was made to
appear that the price per square meter was only p19.18. If this was the purpose of the
petitioner when it executed the 3 deeds of sale, then it is surely hoist now by its own
petard. And rightly so, for it cannot be allowed to profit from its own deception and claim
that the subject property should be assessed at the higher rate it clandestinely agreed
upon with the buyers.
the court is disappointed that the petitioner should demand a higher price from
the republic, which needs the land for a public purpose, when it was willing to accept less
from the three individual buyers who had only their private interests to serve.
the fact that the petitioner sold the 3 other parcels of land at p19.18 per square
meter which are admittedly of the same topography as that subject of this case, it
impliedly admitted that the price for the latter should be the same as the former. This rule
of consistency is best expressed in the familiar saying, surely not unknown to the
petitioner, that what is sauce for the goose is also sauce for the gander.
just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the proerty sought
to be expropriated (association of small landowners vs. Secretary of agrarian reform, 175
scra 378). The measure is not the taker's gain but the owner's loss. He compensation, to
be just, must be fair not only to the owner but also to the taker.
to determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the market
value of the property, to which should be added the consequential benefits which may
arise from the expropriation.

89
the market value of the property is the price that may be agreed upon by the
parties willing but not compelled to enter into a contract of sale.
among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market value are:
1. Cost of acquisition;
2. The current value of like proerties;
3. Its actual or potential uses;
4. Particular case of lands;
5. Their size, shape, location; and
6. The tax declarations thereon.
finally, note that as held in the case of republic vs. Santos, 141 scra 30, the
market value as recommended by the board of commissioners appointed by the court
were at best only advisory and persuasive and by no means final or binding.
2. Nha vs. Reyes, 123 scra 245
3. Manotok vs. Ca, may 21,1987
4. Epza vs. Dulay, april 29,l987
5. Lagunzad vs. Ca, 154 scra 199
when it is considered for "public use":
6. Sumulong vs. Guererro, 154 scra 461
7. Republic vs. Ca, 154 scra 428
8.cosculluela vs. Ca, 164 scra 393
5. Requisite of "taking" in eminent domain cases
read:
1. Rep. Vs. Castellvi, 58 scra 336
Requisites of taking:
a. The expropriator must enter the property;
b. The entrance must not be for just a momentary period;
c. The entry must be under warrant of color or title;
d. The property must be devoted for public use; and
e. The owner must be ousted from beneficial use of his land.
2. Ignacio vs. Guererro, 150 scra 369
3. Garcia vs. Ca, 102 scra 597
6. Not a valid exercise of eminent domain
read:
1. City of manila vs. Chinese community, 40
phil. 349 ( a private property which is devoted to
public use may not be expropriated for another public purpose.)
2. De knecht vs. Bautista, 100 scra 660
Republic of the philippines vs. Cristina de knecht and the court of
appeals, g.r. no. 87335, february 12, 1989
Expropriation
Gancayco, j.
Facts:
1. On february 20, 1979, the rep. Of the philippines initiated an expropriation proceedings against the
owners of the houses standing along fernando rein-del pan streets, among them cristina de knecht
together with concepcion cabarrus, and some other fifteen defendants in civil case no. 7001-p;
2. In june, 1979, the republic of the philippines prayed for the issuance of a writ of possession of the
property to be expropriated on the ground that it had already deposited with the pnb 10% of the amount of
compensation stated in the complaint; that on june 14, 1979, the lower court issued a writ of possession
authorizing the republic to enter into the properties condemned and created a committee to determine just
compensation;

90

3. On july 16, 1979, de knecht went to the supreme court on a petition for certiorari and prohibition
directed against the june 14, 1979 order of the lower court;
4. On october 30, 1980, the supreme court rendered its decision granting the petition for certiorari and
prohibition and directing that the order of the respondent judge dated june 14, 1979 be set aside and the
respondent judge is permanently enjoined from taking any further action on civil case no. 7001-p;
5. On august 8, 1981, the defendants in civil case no. 7001- moved for the dismissal of said case since
the decision of the supreme court is already final;
6. On september 2, 1983, the republic moved for the dismissal of the case due to the encatment of bp
340 expropriating the same properties for the same purpose. On the same date, the court dismissed the
case. The defendants moved for a reconsideration which the court denied;
7. De knecht appealed the order dismissing the case to the court of appeals who on december 28, 1988
issued its decision setting aside the order appealed from and dismissing the expropriation proceedings
before the lower court on the ground that the choice of the above-mentioned streets as the line through
which the edsa should be extended is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval;
8. The republic of the philippines filed a petition for review with the supreme court.
Issue:
whether or not the legislature could still pass a law expropriating the lots of the private respondents
despite the existence of a final decision of the supreme court which held that choice of their lot to be used
as an extension of edsa is arbitrary?
Held:
it is true that there is already a final decision of the supreme court to the effect that the choice of the
fernando rein-del pan streets is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. However, it is equally
true that the constitution and our laws may expropriate private properties after the payment of just
compensation. When on february 17, 1983, the batasang pambansa passed bp 340 expropriating the
same properties for the same purpose, it appears that the same was based on supervening events that
occurred after the decision of the sc in de knecht vs. Bautista in 1980. The social impact factor which
persuaded the court to consider this extension has disappeared because of the fact that the residents of
the area have been relocated and duly compensated and only de knecht now is left while her property is
only about 5% of the area to be expropriated. The republic could continue it expropriation proceedings
considering the supervening events after the decision was rendered.
bp bilang 340 therefore effectively superseded the aforesaid final and executory decision of the
supreme court. X x x the court agrees in the wisdom and necessity of enacting bp 340. Thus the anterior
decision of this court must yield to this subsequent legislative fiat.
************************
Cruz, j., concurring
supervening events have changed the factual basis of the sc's decision to justify the subsequent
enactment of the statute. If we are sustaining the legislation, it is not because we concede that the
lawmakers can nullify the findings of the court in the exercise of its discretion. It is simply because we
ourselves have found that under the changed situation, the present expropriation is no longer arbitrary.
i must add that this decision is not a reversal of the original de knecht case, which was decided under
a different set of facts.
3. Republic of the philippines vs. Cristina de knecht and the court of appeals, g.r. no. 87335, february
12, 1989
3-a. Limitations of the power of expropriation, 3

scra 706

7. When shall we base the computation of the value of the property expropriated: at the time of taking or
at the time of the institution of the expropriation proceedings?
8. Eminent domain cases, in general
read:

91

1. City of baguio vs. Nawasa, 106 phil. 144

2. Garcia vs. Ca, 102 scra 620
3. Municipality of daet vs. Ca, 93 scra 503
4. Salas vs. Jarencio, 46 scra 734
5. Arce vs. Genito, feb. 27, 1976
6. Guido vs. Rpa, 84 phil. 847
7. Rep. Vs. Baylosis, 96 phil. 461
8. Mataas na lupa vs. Dimayuga, 130 scra 30
9. San diego vs. Valdellon, 80 scra 305
10. Haguisan vs. Emilia, 131 scra 517
11. Heirs of ardona vs. Reyes, 125 scra 220
12. Commissioner vs. Burgos, march 31,1980
13. Republic vs. Juan, 92 scra 29
chapter xi - the non-impairment clause
Section 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be
passed.
1. Read:
1. Kabiling, et al., vs. Nha, december 18,l987
2. Clements vs. Nolting, 42 phil. 702
3. Co vs. Pnb, 114 scra 842
4. Lozano vs. Martinez,146 scra 323
5. Rutter vs. Esteban,93 phil. 68
6. Ilusorio vs. Car, 17 scra 25
7. Ortigas vs. Feati bank, 94 scra 533
8. Ganzon vs. Insierto, 123 scra 713
9. Del rosario vs. De los santos, march 21, 1968
10. Abella vs. Nlrc, 152 scra 140
11. Pvbeu vs. Pvb, 189 scra 14
Chapter xii - rights during
Custodial investigation
rights of a person under custodial detention for one suspected or arrested as a terrorist.
Note: applicable provisions of the human security act/anti-terrorism law,
republic act no. 9372, approved on march 6, 2007 and effective on july
15, 2007 (this law shall be automatically suspended one (1) month
before and two (2) months after the holding of any election)
section 21. Rights of a person under custodial detention.- the moment a person charged
with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism is
apprehended or arrested and detained, he shall forthwith be informed by the arresting police or
law enforcement officers to whose custody the person concerned is brought, of his or her right:
1. To be informed of the nature and cause of his arrest, to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person
cannot afford the services of counsel of his or her choice, the police or law
enforcement officers concerned shall immediately contact the free legal
assistance unit of the ibp or the public attorneys office (pao). It shall be the duty
of the free legal assistance unit of the ibp or the paos thus contacted to
immediately visit the person detained and provide him with legal assistance.
These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of the
counsel of choice;
2. Informed of the cause or causes of his detention in the presence of his legal
counsel;
3. Allowed to communicate freely with his legal counsel and to confer with them at
any time without restriction;
4. Allowed to communicate freely and privately without restrictions with the
members of his family or with his nearest relatives and be visited by them; and
5. Allowed freely to avail of the services of a physician or physicians of choice.
section 23. Requirement for an official custodial logbook and its contents.- the police or
other law enforcement custodial unit in whose care and control the person charged with or

92
suspected of the crime of terroriam or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism has been
placed under custodial arrest and detention shall keep a securely and orderly maintained official
logbook, which is hereby declared as public document and opened and made available for
inspection and scrutiny of the lawyer or lawyers of the person under custody or any member of
his family or relative by consanguinity within the fourth civil degree or his physician at any time of
the day without any form of restriction. The logbook shall contain a clear and concise record of:
1. Name, description, and address of the detained person;
2. Date and exact time of his initial admission for custodial arrest and detention;
3. The name and address of the physician/s who examined him physically and
medically;
4. The state of his health and his physical condition a the time of his initial
admission for custodial detention;
5. The date and time of each removal of the detained person from his cell for
interrogation or for any purpose;
6. The date and time of his return to his cell;
7. Name and address of the physician who examined him physically and medically;
8. Summary of the physical and medical findings after each interrogation;
9. Names and addresses of the members of his family and relatives;
10. Names and addresses of the persons who visited him;
11. Date and time of such visits;
12. Date and time when the detained person requested to communicate or confer
with his lawyer;
13. the date and time of visits by his legal counsel and the date and time of
departure; and
14. All other important events bearing on all relevant details regarding the treatment
of the detained person while under custodial arrest or detention.
section 24. No torture or coercion in investigation and interrogation. No threat,
intimidation, or coercion, and no act which will inflict any form of physical pain or torment, or
mental, moral, or psychological pressure on the detained person which shall vitiate his free will
shall be employed in his investigation and interrogation; otherwise, the evidence obtained from
said detained person shall be in its entirety, absolutely not admissible and usable as evidence
in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative, or administrative investigation, inquiry, proceeding or
hearing.
1. The summary of the rights of an accused during custodial investigation (from the time of arrest)
people vs. Mahinay, february 1, 1999
Rights of the accused during custodial investigation; obligations of the arresting officers and
investigators during and after arrest; effect of non-compliance by the investigators
The people of the philippines vs.
february 1, 1999

Mahinay, g.r. no. 122485,

En banc
Per curiam:
considering the heavy penalty of death and in order to ensure that evidence
against an accused were obtained through lawful means, the court, as guardian of the
rights of the people, lays down the procedure, guidelines, and duties which the arresting,
detaining, inviting or investigating officer or his companions must observe at the time of
making the arrest and again at and during the time of the custodial investigation or
interrogation in accordance with the constitution, jurisprudence and republic act no. 7438.
It is high time to educate our law enforcement agencies who neglect either by ignorance
or indifference the so-called miranda rights which had become insufficient and which the
court must update in the light of new legal developments.
1. The person arrested, detained, invited or under custodial investigation must be
informed in a language known to and understood by him of the reason for the arrest
and he must be shown a copy of the warrant of arrest, if any; every other warnings,
information or communication must be in a language known to and understood by
said person;
2. He must be warned that he has the right to remain silent and that any statement he
makes may be used as evidence against him;

93

3. He must be informed that he has the right to be assisted at all times and have the
presence of an independent and competent lawyer, preferably of his own choice;
4. He must be informed that if he has no lawyer or cannot afford the services of a
lawyer, one will be provided for him; and that a lawyer may also be engaged by any
person in his behalf, or may be appointed by the court upon petition of the person
arrested or one acting in his behalf;
5. That whether or not the person arrested has a lawyer, , he must be informed that no
custodial investigation in any form shall be conducted except in the presence of his
counsel or after a valid waiver has been made;
6. The person arrested must be informed that, at any time, he has the right to
communicate or confer by the most expedient means---telephone, radio, letter or
messenger---with his lawyer (either retained or appointed), any member of his
immediate family; or any medical doctor, priest or minister chosen by him or by any
one from his immediate family or by his counsel, or be visited by/confer with duly
accredited national or international non-governmental organization. It shall be the
responsibility of the officer to ensure that this is accomplished;
7. He must be informed that he has the right to waive any of said rights provided it is
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently and ensure that he understood the
same;
8. In addition, if the person arrested waives his right to a lawyer, he must be informed
that it must be done in writing and in the presence of counsel, otherwise, he must be
warned that the waiver is void even if he insist on his waiver and chooses to speak;
9. That the person arrested must be informed that he may indicate in any manner at
any time or state of the process that he does not wish to be questioned with the
warning that once he makes such indication, the police may not interrogate him if the
same had not yet commenced, or the interrogation has begun;
10. The person arrested must be informed that his initial waiver of his right to remain
silent, the right to counsel or any of his rights does not bar him from invoking it at any
other time during the process, regardless of whether he may have answered some
questions or volunteered some information or statements;
11. He must be informed that any statement or evidence, as the case may be, obtained
in violation of any of the foregoing, whether inculpatory or exculpatory, in whole or in
part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.
(note: any violation of the foregoing rights of the accused shall entitle him to sue for damages
against the arresting or investigating officers in accordance with ra7438, not to mention the
possible criminal liability of said persons under existing laws).
Latest cases on the rights of a person during custodial investigation
Rights during custodial investigation; when custodial
investigation is deemed to have started; right to be
informed of the nature and cause of accusation against
him.
The people of the philippines vs. Jose ting lan uy, jr., et al., 475 scra
248

Ynares-santiago, j.
Facts:
for allegedly diverting and collecting funds of the national power corporation intended for the
purchase of us dollars from the united coconut planters bank (ucpb), the accused-appellants were
charged of malversation through falsification of commercial documents as defined and penalized under
arts. 217 and 171 [8] in relation to article 48 of the revised penal code. After trial, all accused were
convicted by the sandiganbayan.

94

while the information charged the accused of willful and intentional commission of the acts
complained of while the decision found the accused guilty of inexcusable negligence.
accused ochoa interposed an appeal and claimed that his conviction was based on his alleged
sworn statement and the transcript of stenographic notes of a supposed interview with an npc personnel
and the report of the nbi. He maintains that he signed the sworn statement while confined a the philippine
heart center and upon assurance that it would not be used against him. He was not assisted by counsel
nor he was apprised of his constitutional rights when he executed the affidavit. He likewise claimed that
his constitutional rights to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against and due process
were violated.
Held:

1. Even if the information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through
negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves that mode of commission of
the offense. (diaz vs. Sandiganbayan, 302 scra 118). This was the doctrine laid down in the case
of samson vs. Court of appeals, 103 phil. 277.

2. The claim that his affidavit is inadmissible in evidence in accordance with section 12 [1] of the bill
of rights is not tenable. The investigation under said provision refers to custodial investigation
where a suspect has already been taken into police custody and that the investigating officers
begin to ask questions to elicit information and confessions or admissions from the suspect.
Succinctly stated, custodial investigation refers to the critical pre-trial stage when the
investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a
particular person as a suspect (people vs. Duenas, jr., 426 scra 666). Clearly, therefore, the
rights enumerated by the accused are not available before government investigators enter the
picture. The protective mantle of section 12, article iii does not apply to administrative
investigations (people vs. Judge ayson, 175 scra 216); confession to a private individual (kimpo
vs. Ca, 232 scra 53); verbal admission made to a radio announcer who was not a part of the
investigation (people vs. Ordono, 334 scra 673); or even to a mayor approached as a personal
confidante and not in his official capacity (people vs. Zuela, 323 scra 589). In fact, even a
videotaped interview where the accused willingly admit his guilt in the presence of newsmen is
not covered by the said provision though the trial courts were warned by the supreme court to
take extreme caution in admitting similar confessions because of the distinct possibility that the
police, with the connivance of unscrupulous media practitioners, may attempt to legitimize
coerced extrajudicial confessions and place them beyond the exclusionary rule by having an
accused admit an offense on television (people vs. Endino, 353 scra 307).
Clearly, the confession of the accused was obtained during an administrative investigation by npc
and therefore, the same was not covered by section 12, art. Iii of the constitution.
People vs. Figueroa, 335 scra 349
Under art. Iii, section 12 [1] of the constitution, a suspect in custodial investigation must
be:
1. Informed of his right to remain silent;
2. Warned that anything he says can be and will be used against him;
3. Told that he has the right to counsel, and that if he is indigent, a lawyer will be
appointed to represent him.
In this case, accused-appellant was given no more than a perfunctory recitation of his
rights, signifying nothing more than a feigned compliance with the constitutional
requirements. (people vs. Samolde, july 31, 2000)
it is always incumbent on the prosecution to prove at the trial that, prior to incustody questioning, the confessant was informed of his constitutional rights. The
presumption of regularity of official acts does not prevail over the constitutional
presumption of innocence. Hence, in the absence of proof that the arresting officers
complied with the above constitutional safeguards, extrajudicial statements, whether
inculpatory or exculpatory, made during the custodial investigation, are inadmissible not
only against the declarant but with more so against 3 rd persons. This is so even if such
statements are gospel truth and voluntarily given.
such statements are useless except as evidence against the very police
authorities who violated the suspects rights.

95
People vs. Bariquit, 341 scra 600
When custodial investigation is deemed to have started.
the protection under section 12 , art. Iii of the constitution begins when a person
is taken into custody for investigation of his possible participation in the commission of a
crime, or from the time he is singled out as a suspect in the commission of the crime,
although not yet in custody.
custodial investigation begins when it is no longer a general inquiry into an
unsolved crime but starts to focus on a particular person as a suspect, i.e., when the
police investigator starts i9nterrogating or exacting confession from the suspect in
connection with an alleged offense.
the place of interrogation is not determinative of the existence or absence of
custodial investigation but the tone and manner of questioning by the police authorities.
Thus, there was custodial investigation when the police authorities, upon their arrest of
some of the accused, immediately asked them regarding their participation in the
commission of the crime , even while they were still walking along the highway on their
way to the police station. This is line with the provisions of ra 7438 which makes it
applicable even when a person is merely invited for questioning.
People vs. Dano, g.r. no. 117690, 339 scra 515, sept. 1, 2000; people vs. Mayorga,
g.r. no. 135405, 346 scra 458, november 29, 2000.
however, spontaneous statements voluntarily given, as where appellant orally
admitted killing the victim before the barangay captain (who is neither a police officer nor
a law enforcement agent), do not fall under custodial investigation. Such admission, even
without the assistance of a lawyer, does not violate appellants constitutional rights and
therefore admissible in evidence.
People vs. Dano, g.r. no. 117690, 339 scra 515, sept. 1, 2000; people vs. Samolde,
g.r. no. 128551, 336 scra 632, jul. 31, 2000.
to be admissible in evidence, an extrajudicial confession must be: (i) voluntary; (ii) made
with the assistance of competent and independent counsel; (iii) express; and (iv) in
writing.
A suspects confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when taken without the assistance
of counsel, without a valid waiver of such assistance, regardless of the absence of
coercion or the fact that it had been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even
if appellants confession were gospel truth.
2. Guidelines for police investigation
read:
1.escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 us 478
2. Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 us 436
3. P. Vs. Duero, 104 scra 379
2-a. Duties of the police or arresting officers
read:
1. P. Vs. Matos-viduya, sept. 11, 1990
1-a. P vs. Nicandro, 141 scra 289
2. P vs. Duhan, 142 scra 100
3. P vs. Caguioa, 95 scra 2
4. P vs. Ramos, 122 scra 312
3. To be informed of the right to remain silent; cases
read:

in particular

96
1. Constitutional right to remain silent,104 scra
391
1-a. People vs. Marcos jimenez, dec. 10, 1991
Extrajudicial confession; counsel of choice
Right to counsel during custodial investigation; while
making an extrajudicial confession
People vs. Patungan, 354 scra 413
the accused was under coercive and uncounselled custodial investigation by the police without a
lawyer for 2 and a half days . Then, he was brought to the ibp office where a lawyer would assist him in
his extrajudicial confession.
we are inclined to believe that when he was brought to the ibp office, his body and his will were in
no position to raise any objection much less to complaint to the ibp lawyer about what he has gone
through. In fact, the ibp lawyer was working on an appeal in another case while the extrajudicial
confession was being taken.
the mere presence of a lawyer is not sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement of
assistance of counsel. Assistance of counsel must be effective, vigilant and independent. A lawyer who
could just hear the investigation going on while working on another case hardly satisfies the minimum
requirements of effective assistance of counsel. Not only was the accused subjected to custodial
investigation without counsel, he was likewise denied effective assistance of counsel during the taking of
his extra-judicial confession.
People v. Jimenez
G.r.no. 82604. December 10, 1991
Narvasa, j.:
Facts:
----------on august 13, 1985, police authorities, acting upon a report, came upon the corpse of pelagio
jimenez below a cliff near a balite tree. The police investigators learned that marcos, the son of the
deceased pelagio jimenez told his mother that his father had not come home the previous night: that the
search for the deceased, who was living separately from them, commmenced a day earlier but it was not
until the morning of the following day, august 13, 1985, that deceased pelagio was finally found dead.
They also learned from the persons they interviewed of circumstances that drew their suspicion to the
son, marcos and robert, such as; the bathing at the artisian well "as if washing away stains of blood";the
deceased's violent quarrels with his children and occasions that he had been boxed and hit by his
children. The police had invited the deceased's widow and her sons for questioning about the killing.
Adraft of the confession was prepared by the investigating officer but marcos was not able to sign the
same due to the absence of the judge before whom it is suppoed to be sworn and signed. Marcos agreed
to come back and sign his statement, but upon his return, he, assisted by a former judge whose presence
was requested by the police authorities, refused to sign his statement. Subsequently, an information for
parricide was filed against the widow and her sons, marcos, robert, and wilkins. In an order dated july 21,
1986, the trial court absolved the widow and wilkins of any participation in the filling for lack of proof. On
december 12. 1986, the trial court found marcos and robert guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of parricide, noting that the unsigned confession is admissible in evidence inasmuch as evidence aliunde
corroborated such confession. Both accused contest such ruling. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
---------is the extrajudicial confession of marcos admissible in evidence?
Held:
--------no. Decision reversed.
section 12 (1), article iii of the 1987 constitution declares that a person being investigated by the
police as a suspect in an offense has the right, among others, (1) to have a competent and independent
counsel of his own choice and if he cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one;
and that (2) said right cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

97

the lawyer who assists the suspect under custodial interrogation should be of the latter's own
choice, not one foisted on him by the police investigators or other parties. In this case, the former judge
whose assistance was requested by the police was evidently not of marcos jimenez' own choice; she was
the police officers' own choice; she did not ask marcos if was is willing to have her represent him. This is
not the mode of solicitation of legal assistance contemplated by the constitution.
furthermore, the former judge was not present when marcos was being interrogated by the police.
While she asked him if he had voluntarily given the statements contained in the typewritten document,
this is far from being substantial compliance with the constitutional duty of police investigators during
custodial interrogation.
the typewritten confession is unsigned and was in fact expressly rejected by marcos. Hence, the
supposed waiver made therein of his constitutional right to counsel of his own choice.
neither can the confession prejudice his co-accused, his brother robert, not only because it was
obtained in violation of the constitution but also because of the principle of res inter alios acta.
the interrogation of marcos jimenez having been conducted without the assistance of counsel,
and no valid waiver of such right to counsel have been made, not only the confession but also any
admissible obtained in the course therof are inadmissible against him or his co accused. In view of the
inadmissibility in evidence of the confession, the rest of the evidence of the prosecution is inadequate to
overcome the presumption of innocence raised by the fundamental law in favor of both the accused.
Extrajudicial confession without the assistance of
counsel, inadmissible as evidence; exception
People vs. Panfilo cabiles, 284 scra 199; people vs. Tan, 286 scra 207
Melo, j.
even if the confession of the accused speaks the truth, if it was made without the assistance of
counsel, it is inadmissible in evidence regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it was voluntarily
given.
in order that a confession is admissible, the following requisites must be present:
a. The confession must be voluntary;
b. The confession must be made with the assistance of a competent and independent counsel;

c.

The confession must be express; and

d. The confession must be in writing.
the above requirements, however, are not applicable when the suspect makes an spontaneous
statement, not elicited through questioning by the authorities, but given in an ordinary manner whereby
the accused orally admitted having committed the crime. This was the decision of the supreme court in
the case of people vs. Andan, march 3, 1997 when the accused made a voluntary and verbal confession
to the municipal mayor that he committed the crime imputed to him. As such, his uncounselled
confession is admissible in evidence.
People vs. Obrero, 332 scra 190
Mendoza, j.
there are two (2) kinds of involuntary or coerced confessions under art. Iii, section 12 of the
constitution. These are:

a. Confession which are the product of third degree methods such as torture, force, violence,
threat, intimidation; and
b. Those which are given without the benefit of miranda warnings.
There is no compliance of the constitutional requirement of competent and independent counsel
to assist an accused during custodial investigation when the accused was assisted by the station
commander of the wpd, atty. De los reyes, while being investigated by other policemen of the same police
station because the interest of the police is naturally adverse to the accused. In fact, the sc in the case of
people vs. Januario, 267 scra 608 held that a lawyer applying for a position in the nbi could not validly
assist an accused being investigated then by the nbi.

98
1-b. P. Vs. Aspili, november 21, 1990
1-c. People vs. Judge ayson, 175 scra 216
1-d. P. Vs. Pinlac, 165 scra 675
1-e. People vs. Loveria, 187 scra 47
1-f. Gamboa vs. Judge cruz, 162 scra 675
2. P. Vs. Galit, 135 scra 465
3. P vs. Alegre, 94 scra 109
4. Draculan vs. Donato, 85 scra 266
5. P. Vs. Borromeo, june 29,l983
6. P vs. Camalog, gr no. 77116, january 31, 1989
(including the duty of police officers in
connection with said right)
7. P vs. Cui, jr., 162 scra 220
3-a. How about if the accused gives an spontaneous statement before he could be advised of his right to
remain silent?
read:
aballe vs. People, 183 scra 196
3-b. When shall the constitutional rights of the
police line-up?

accused as mentioned above demandable? During

read:
1. P vs. Usman hassan, 157 scra 261
2. Gamboa vs. Judge cruz, 162 scra 642
3. De la torre vs. Ca, 294 scra 196
4. People vs. Hatton
4. The right to counsel; waiver of the right to counsel/exceptions/requisites
People vs. Jerez, 285 scra 393
A lawyer provided by the investigators to the accused during the custodial investigation is
deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection against the formers appointment
during the course of the investigation and the accused thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his
statement before the swearing officer.
(note: in the case of people vs. Juanerio, february 7, 1997, the sc held that a lawyer who was at
the nbi office applying for a position therein and who was appointed as counsel for a suspect being then
investigated by the nbi could not be considered as the competent and independent counsel referred to in
the constitution especially so that later on, said lawyer was appointed by the nbi as one of its agents.)
read also:
1. The right to counsel, 57 scra 481
1-a. P vs. Nolasco, 163 scra 623
1-b. P vs. Hernandez, 162 scra 422
1-c. P. Vs. Ampo-an, july 4, 1990
1-d. P. Vs. Saludar, july 31, 1990
1-e. P. Vs. Kidagan, august 20, 1990
1-f. Estacio vs. Sandiganbayan, 183 scra 12
1-g. P. Vs. Buenaflor, 181 scra 225
2. P vs. Tampus, 96 scra 624
3. P vs. Taylaran, 108 scra 373
4. P vs. Tawat, 129 scra 431
5. P vs. Marcos, 147 scra 204 (note that this
decision is widely criticized by
6. P vs. Ladrera, 150 scra 113
7. P. Nulla, 153 scra 471
8. P vs. Marquez, 153 scra 700
9. P vs. Olvis, 154 scra 513
10. P vs. Caguioa, january 17, 1980
ll. P vs. Pecardal, 145 scra 624
12. P vs. Lasac, 148 scra 624
13. P vs. Pena, 80 scra 589
14. P vs. Jara, 144 scra 516

constitutionalists)

99
how about if the lawyer who assisted him during custodial investigation is a public attorney who
was not chosen by the accused himself but given to him free of charge?
read:
p. Vs. Alegria, september 28, 1990
could the fiscal also represent the accused during custodial investigation to satisfy the
requirement of the constitution that the accused is assisted by counsel?
read:
p. Vs. Matos-viduaya, september 11, 1990
5. Right to remain silent and to counsel and the right
to be informed of such rights; cases in
general/when does these rights demandable? Effect of its non-observance by the investigator
read:
1. P vs. Albofera, 152 scra 123
1-a. P vs. Lasanas, 152 scra 27
1-b. P vs. Olvis, 154 scra 513
1-c. P vs. Capitin, 165 scra 47
1-a. Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 scra 642
1-b. P vs. Hizon, 163 scra 760
1-c. P vs. Velasco, 110 scra 319
2. Diokno vs. Enrile, 110 scra 140
3. Morales vs. Ponce enrile, 121 scra 538
4. P vs. Rojas, january 8, l987
5. P vs. Santiago, january 7,1987
6. P vs. Decierdo, 149 scra 496
5-a. Is the right to counsel indispensable in non-criminal proceedings?
read:
1. Nera vs. Auditor genral, 164 scra 1
6. Presumptions on extrajudicial confessions(that official acts were regularly performed as against the
presumption against waiver of constitutional rights)
read:
1. P vs. Duero, 104 scra 379
2. P vs. Jara, 144 scra 516
3. P vs. Abano, 145 scra 555
4. P vs. Tolentino, 145 scra 597
5. P vs. Salig, 133 scra 59
6. P vs. Cruz, 133 scra 426
7. P vs. Prudente,, 133 scra 651
8 p vs. Trinidad, 162 scra 714, when the
7. Who can object to the admissibility of an

presumption of regularity does not apply

extrajudicial confession?

read:
1. Stonehill vs. Diokno, supra
2. P vs. Jara, 144 scra 576
3. P. Vs. Loveria, july 2, 1990
8. Inadmissible as evidence
a. The doctrine of the "fruit of the poisoned

tree"

People vs. Rolando felixminia y camacho

Gr no. 125333, march 20, 2002
En banc

100

Facts:
1. In the morning of september 19, 1995, accused-appellant and his cousin, ronnie garcia were
drinking gin in a canteen in urdaneta, pangasinan;
2. At around 10 a.m. Of the same day, rosita mangunay saw both persons walking along
ambrosio st., in the poblacion and noticed that they smelled liquor when they greeted her;
3. In the early afternoon of the same day, accused-appellant and his cousin went to look for 6year old maria lourdes galinato, also known as tisay and found her playing inside a jeepney
and took her;
4. At around 2:45 p.m. Of the same day, mangunay again saw the accused-appellant walking
along ambrosio st., carrying tisay who was crying and struggling. She claimed that she clearly
saw the accused-appellant since they were walking towards each other coming from opposite
directions;
5. Before 3 to 4 p.m., prosecution witness natividad bernardo, saw accused-appellant pass their
house carrying a child who looked about 5-6 years old.
6. At about the same time, witness leah magno saw the accused-appellant carrying a child was
seen heading towards the wooded area in the macalong river;
7. By 5 p.m. To 6:30 p.m. Of that same day, magno saw accused-appellant walking alone to
town coming from the direction of the macalong river;
8. Meanwhile, the parents of tisay were frantically searching for their child and when their
search proved futile, they reported the matter to the barangay captain and to the police;
9. Upon receipt of the information that the child was last seen with the accused-appellant, the
police together with the barangay captains of camantiles and bayaoas, urdaneta, pangasinan,
proceeded to the house of the accused-appellant;
10. as they approached the house, the accused-appellant jumped out of the window carrying a
black bag. The police authorities gave chase and finally caught him after twenty (20)
exhausting hours;
11. After his arrest, accused-appellant was brought to the urdaneta police station where he
admitted that he raped, killed and buried maria lourdes near the macalong river in barangay
san vicente, urdaneta, pangasinan, while under investigation without the assistance of a
lawyer. Indeed, the body of tisay was found in the place which he described during his
custodial investigation.
12. After trial, the trial court (rtc 45 presided over by judge joven costales) rendered a judgment of
conviction and imposing the penalty of death to the accused-appellant. The court admitted as
evidence the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant and used the same as one of
the grounds in support of the judgment of conviction.
1. I s s u e s
1. Is the extrajudicial confession of the accused appellant admissible in evidence?
2. Whether the lower court erred in convicting in convicting the accused-appellant?
Held:
1
the alleged extrajudicial confession of the accused while under custodial investigation and without
the assistance of counsel is inadmissible in evidence despite the fact that he was allegedly appraised of
his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel.
this is so because under the 1987 constitution, the said rights could not be waived except in the
presence of counsel. As such, in accordance with the doctrine of the fruit of the poisoned tree, the same
is inadmissible in evidence.

101
any information or admission given by a person while in custody which may appear harmless or
innocuous at the time without the competent assistance or an independent counsel should be struck
down as inadmissible.
2
though the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant is inadmissible as evidence, his
conviction by the trial court is correct. This is so because [1] the compromising circumstances were duly
proven which were consistent with each other and which lead with moral certainty to the conclusion that
he was guilty of the crime charged; and [2] the totality of such circumstances eliminated beyond doubt the
possibility of his innocence. In people vs. Mahinay, it was held that conviction may be had on
circumstantial evidence provided the following requisites are present: [a] there is more than one
circumstance; [b] the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and [c] the combination of
all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
the evidence in this case are more than sufficient to prove the accused-appellants beyond
reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence is not a weaker form of evidence vis--vis direct evidence and
cases have recognized that circumstantial evidence in its weight and probative force, may surpass direct
evidence in its effect upon the supreme court.
(note: the indemnification for the death of a person in a rape with homicide cases was increased
from p50,000.00 to p125,000.00. The said indemnity shall also be applicable where the death
penalty is authorized by applicable amendatory laws))
b. The exclusionary rule, 145 scra 700
read:
1. P vs. Burgos, 144 scra 516
2. P vs. Alcaraz,136 scra 74
3. Does it also include the confession of a

witness, not the accused?

read:
1. P vs. Bombesa, 162 scra 402
2. P. Vs. Yutuc, july 26, 1990
9. Sec. 12(2)
read:
1. Dizon vs. Gen. Eduardo, may 3,1988
2. P vs. Eligino, august 11,1988
3. Contado vs. Tan, april 15, 1988
10. Extrajudicial confession; when admissible or

inadmissible

read:
1. The admissibility of an extrajudicial
2. Admissibility of an extrajudicial

confession in a criminal prosecution,142 scra 110

confession,135

3. Inadmissibility of an admission obtained by

4. Confession as evidence against the accused, 96
Read:
5. P vs. Camalog, january 31, 1989
5-a. P vs. Capulong, 160 scra 533
5-b. P vs. Lagahan, december 8, 1988
5-c. P vs. Dino, 160 scra 197
5-d. P vs. Caramonte, 94 scra 150
5-e. P vs. Enciso, 160 scra 728
5-d. P vs. Abano, 145 scra 565
5-e. P vs. Quizon, 142 scra 362
5-f. P vs. Olvis, 154 scra 513

scra 419 and 10 scra 520

force, 114 scra 234
scra 637

102
5-g. P vs. Robles, 104 scra 450
5-h. P vs. Eligino, 164 scra 260
5-i. P vs. Abejero, may 17,l980
5-j. P. Vs. Bagano, 181 scra 34
5-k. P. Vs. Estevan, 186 scra 184
5-l. P. Vs. Ramos, 186 scra 184
5-m. P. Vs. Flores, 186 scra 303
5-n. P. Vs. Jungco, 186 scra 714
5-o. P. Vs. Arsenio, 184 scra 205
6. P vs. Villanueva, 128 scra 488
7. P vs. Dejaresco, 129 scra 576
8. P vs. Tuvera, 130 scra 169
9. P vs. Maternal, 130 scra 625
10. P vs. Nilos, 127 scra 207
11. P vs. Sanchez, 132 scra 103
12. P vs. Pizarro, 131 scra 418
13. P vs. Sabilano, 132 scra 83
14. P vs. Veloso, 148 scra 60
15. Magtoto vs. Manguera, 63 scra 4
16. P vs. Gapasin, 145 scra 178
17. P vs. Palo, 147 scra 178
18. P. Vs. De jesus, 145 scra 521
19. P vs. Pia, 145 scra 581
20. P vs. Encipiado, 146 scra 478
21. P vs. Canumay, 130 scra 301
22. P vs. Marino, 130 scra 595
23. P vs. Natipravat, 145 scra 483
24. P vs. Cruz, 133 scra 426--when confession is
valid
25. P. Vs. De la cruz, 183 scra 763---when confession is inadmissible but accused is still liable
11. Evidence of lack of cvoluntariness
read:
1. P vs. Jara, 144 scra 516
2. P vs. Abayon, 114 scra 197
12. Is the testimony of the arresting officer on the

alleged oral confession of the accused admissible?

read:
1. P vs. Dy, 158 scra 111
*******************************************************
Chapter xiii - the constitutional right to bail
*******************************************************
1. The right to bail, 104 scra 372
2. Bail, 81 scra 188
Kinds of bail; when not applicable.
Recognizance/bail for a convict
Atty. Juliana adalim-white vs. Judge arnulfo bugtas, rtc 2 borongan,
samar, 475 scra 175
Austria-martinez, j.
Facts:
manuel bagaporo, jr. Was convicted of frustrated murder and was sentenced four years
and two months to eight years and one day of imprisonment. He started serving his sentence and
subsequently, he filed an application for release on recognizance. In support of his application,
the provincial jail warden issued a certification that bagaoporo has been confined at the provincial

103
jail since february 9, 1996 and is already entitled to parole. Another certification was issued by
the supervising parole and probation officer showing that bagaporo applied for parole in lieu of
the dojs maagang paglaya program.
by virtue of the above certifications, respondent judge ordered the release of bagaporo
upon recognizance of the provincial jail warden of eastern samar. He likewise justified the same
based on the rule that bail is discretionary upon conviction by the rtc of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Held:
respondent judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law for ordering the release of
bagaporo pending the approval of his application for parole and before the completion of the
minimum period of the sentence imposed upon him.
it is patently erroneous to release a convict on recognizance. Section 24, rule 114
provides that there shall no bail for a convict after final judgment. The only exception is when the
convict applies for probation before he commences to serve his sentence and that the offense
and the penalty for the offense is within the purview of the probation law.
sections 5 and 16 of rule 114 of the rules of court (on the different kinds of bail) applies
only to an accused undergoing preventive imprisonment during trial or on appeal. They
do not apply to a person convicted by final jusgment and already serving sentence.
judge bugtas was therefore fined p40,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and sternly
warned that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
3. Read:
******************************************************
excessive bail:
1. De la camara vs. Enage, 41 scra 1
*****************************************************
1-a. Pestano vs. Judge velasco, july 3, 1990
******************************************************
waiver of the right to bail:
1-b. P. Vs. Donato, june 5, 1991
*****************************************************
2. Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 scra 38
3. Marcos vs. Cruz, 67 and 70 phil.
4. Villasenor vs. Abano, 21 scra 312
5. P vs. Iac, january 10,1987, 147 scra 219
6. Manotoc vs. Ca, may 30,1986
7. Garcia vs. Domingo, 52 scra 143
8. P vs. San diego, 26 scra 522
4. See section 10, rule 114, 1985 rules on criminal
procedure

a. Procedure when prosecutor does not object to the petition for bail in capital offenses:
people vs. Agbayani, 284 scra 315
Bail in extradition cases.
United states vs. Judge purugganan & mark jumenez
November, 2002
a person facing extradition proceedings is not entitled to bail even if the crime he was charged of
in a foreign country is bailable. This is so because the constitutional provision on the right to bail under
art. Iii of the 1987 constitution applies only to criminal cases, not in extradition proceedings.
*********************************
Right to notice and hearing before the issuance of a
warrant of arrest in extradition case

104

Eduardo rodriguez vs. The presiding judge, rtc 17, manila, 483 scra
290
Quisumbing, j.
in secretary of justice vs. Judge lantion, 322 scra 160 (the mark jimenez case) , the supreme
court on a 9-6 vote held that the extraditee is entitled to notice and hearing even when a request for
extradition by another country is still being evaluated. However, on motion for reconsideration in the same
case, in a 9-6 decision, the supreme court held that the prospective extraditee is not entitled to notice and
hearing while his case is still under evaluation because this would defeat the purpose of the arrest
warrant since it could give warning that respondents would be arrested and even encourage them to flee
but entitled to notice and hearing if the case is already filed in court.
it is a different matter if at first, the extraditee was allowed bail. The cancellation of his bail bond
may be made only after notice and hearing. Otherwise, his right to due process of law will be violated.
(note: in the case of us vs. Judge purugganan, 389 scra 623), the supreme court held that the
extraditee is not entitled to post a bond even if the crime he was charged of abroad is a bailable offense.
This is so because of the possibility of flight.)
***************************************************
Chapter xiv - due process
In criminal proceedings
**************************************************
1. In general:
1. P vs. Terrobias, 103 scra 321
3. Presumption of innocence prevails over the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duties of the police authorities and presumption of innocence resulting in acquittal as a
result on conflicting and inconsistent testimonies of the prosecutions witnesses:
Junie mallillin y. Lopez,
april 30, 2008

vs. People, g.r. no. 172953 ,

The facts:
on the strength of a warrant of search and seizure issued by the rtc of sorsogon city, branch 52, a
team of five police officers raided the residence of petitioner in barangay tugos, sorsogon city on 4
february 2003. The team was headed by p/insp. Catalino bolanos (bolanos), with po3 roberto esternon
(esternon), spo1 pedro docot, spo1 danilo lasala and spo2 romeo gallinera (gallinera) as members. The
searchconducted in the presence of barangay kagawad delfin licup as well as petitioner himself, his
wife sheila and his mother, normaallegedly yielded two (2) plastic sachets of shabu and five (5) empty
plastic sachets containing residual morsels of the said substance.
Accordingly, petitioner was charged with violation of section 11, article ii of republic act no. 9165,
otherwise known as the comprehensive dangerous drugs act of 2002.
That on or about the 4th day of february 2003, at about 8:45 in the morning in
barangay tugos, sorsogon city, philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control two
(2) plastic sachets of methamphetamine hydrochloride [or] shabu with an aggregate
weight of 0.0743 gram, and four empty sachets containing shabu residue, without
having been previously authorized by law to possess the same.
Contrary to law.
Petitioner entered a negative plea. At the ensuing trial, the prosecution presented bolanos,
arroyo and esternon as witnesses.
Taking the witness stand, bolanos, the leader of the raiding team, testified on the circumstances
surrounding the search as follows: that he and his men were allowed entry into the house by petitioner
after the latter was shown the search warrant; that upon entering the premises, he ordered esternon and

105
barangay kagawad licup, whose assistance had previously been requested in executing the warrant, to
conduct the search; that the rest of the police team positioned themselves outside the house to make
sure that nobody flees; that he was observing the conduct of the search from about a meter away; that
the search conducted inside the bedroom of petitioner yielded five empty plastic sachets with suspected
shabu residue contained in a denim bag and kept in one of the cabinets, and two plastic sachets
containing shabu which fell off from one of the pillows searched by esternona discovery that was made
in the presence of petitioner.55[10] on cross examination, bolanos admitted that during the search, he was
explaining its progress to petitioners mother, norma, but that at the same time his eyes were fixed on the
search being conducted by esternon.
Esternon testified that the denim bag containing the empty plastic sachets was found behind the
door of the bedroom and not inside the cabinet; that he then found the two filled sachets under a pillow on
the bed and forthwith called on gallinera to have the items recorded and marked. 56[12] on cross, he
admitted that it was he alone who conducted the search because bolanos was standing behind him in the
living room portion of the house and that petitioner handed to him the things to be searched, which
included the pillow in which the two sachets of shabu were kept;57[13] that he brought the seized items to
the balogo police station for a true inventory, then to the trial court 58[14] and thereafter to the laboratory.59
[15]

Supt. Lorlie arroyo (arroyo), the forensic chemist who administered the examination on the seized
items, was presented as an expert witness to identify the items submitted to the laboratory. She revealed
that the two filled sachets were positive of shabu and that of the five empty sachets, four were positive of
containing residue of the same substance.60[16] she further admitted that all seven sachets were delivered
to the laboratory by esternon in the afternoon of the same day that the warrant was executed except that
it was not she but rather a certain mrs. Ofelia garcia who received the items from esternon at the
laboratory .]
The evidence for the defense focused on the irregularity of the search and seizure conducted by
the police operatives. Petitioner testified that esternon began the search of the bedroom with licup and
petitioner himself inside. However, it was momentarily interrupted when one of the police officers declared
to bolanos that petitioners wife, sheila, was tucking something inside her underwear. Forthwith, a lady
officer arrived to conduct the search of sheilas body inside the same bedroom. At that point, everyone
except esternon was asked to step out of the room. So, it was in his presence that sheila was
searched by the lady officer. Petitioner was then asked by a police officer to buy cigarettes at a
nearby store and when he returned from the errand, he was told that nothing was found on sheilas
body.61[18] sheila was ordered to transfer to the other bedroom together with her children.
Petitioner asserted that on his return from the errand, he was summoned by esternon to the
bedroom and once inside, the officer closed the door and asked him to lift the mattress on the bed. And
as he was doing as told, esternon stopped him and ordered him to lift the portion of the headboard. In that
instant, esternon showed him sachet of shabu which according to him came from a pillow on the bed. 62
[20]
petitioners account in its entirety was corroborated in its material respects by norma, barangay
kagawad licup and sheila in their testimonies. Norma and sheila positively declared that petitioner was not
in the house for the entire duration of the search because at one point he was sent by esternon to the
store to buy cigarettes while sheila was being searched by the lady officer. Licup for his part testified on
the circumstances surrounding the discovery of the plastic sachets. He recounted that after the five
55
[10]

TSN, 22 April 2003, pp. 6-9.

[12]

TSN, 23 July 2003, pp. 6-7, 10.

56

57[13]

Id. at 16-17.

58[14]

TSN, 23 July 2003, pp. 13-15.

59[15]

Id. at 9.

60
[16]

TSN, 28 May 2003, p. 14. The results of the chemical analysis are embodied in Chemistry Report No.
D-037-03. See records, p. 18.
61
[18]

TSN, 2 December 2003, pp. 6-10.

62[20]

Id. at 11-12.

106
empty sachets were found, he went out of the bedroom and into the living room and after about three
minutes, esternon, who was left inside the bedroom, exclaimed that he had just found two filled sachets. ]
On 20 june 2004 the trial court rendered its decision declaring petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged. Petitioner was condemned to prison for twelve years (12) and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years and to pay a fine of p300,000.00. The trial court reasoned that the fact that shabu
was found in the house of petitioner was prima facie evidence of petitioners animus possidendi sufficient
to convict him of the charge inasmuch as things which a person possesses or over which he exercises
acts of ownership are presumptively owned by him. It also noted petitioners failure to ascribe ill motives
to the police officers to fabricate charges against him.
Hence, this appeal.
Held:
Prosecutions for illegal possession of prohibited drugs necessitates that the elemental act of
possession of a prohibited substance be established with moral certainty, together with the fact that the
same is not authorized by law. The dangerous drug itself constitutes the very corpus delicti of the offense
and the fact of its existence is vital to a judgment of conviction. Essential therefore in these cases is that
the identity of the prohibited drug be established beyond doubt . Be that as it may, the mere fact of
unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the moral certainty required to
sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that the substance illegally
possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must also be established
with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt. The chain of custody
requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of
the evidence are removed.
As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of
an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the
proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every person who touched
the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it
while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to
ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in
the chain to have possession of the same.
Indeed, the likelihood of tampering, loss or mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest when the
exhibit is small and is one that has physical characteristics fungible in nature and similar in form to
substances familiar to people in their daily lives. 63[41] graham vs. State64[42] positively acknowledged this
danger. In that case where a substance later analyzed as heroinwas handled by two police officers
prior to examination who however did not testify in court on the condition and whereabouts of the exhibit
at the time it was in their possessionwas excluded from the prosecution evidence, the court pointing out
that the white powder seized could have been indeed heroin or it could have been sugar or baking
powder. It ruled that unless the state can show by records or testimony, the continuous whereabouts of
the exhibit at least between the time it came into the possession of police officers until it was tested in the
laboratory to determine its composition, testimony of the state as to the laboratorys findings is
inadmissible.65[43]
A unique characteristic of narcotic substances is that they are not readily identifiable as in fact
they are subject to scientific analysis to determine their composition and nature. The court cannot
reluctantly close its eyes to the likelihood, or at least the possibility, that at any of the links in the chain of
custody over the same there could have been tampering, alteration or substitution of substances from
other casesby accident or otherwisein which similar evidence was seized or in which similar evidence
was submitted for laboratory testing. Hence, in authenticating the same, a standard more stringent than
that applied to cases involving objects which are readily identifiable must be applied, a more exacting
standard that entails a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness if only to render it
improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been contaminated or
tampered with.
A mere fleeting glance at the records readily raises significant doubts as to the identity of the
sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner. Of the people who came into direct contact with the
seized objects, only esternon and arroyo testified for the specific purpose of establishing the identity of
63[41]

Graham v. State, 255 N.E2d 652, 655.

64[42]

Graham v. State, 255 N.E2d 652.

65
[43]

Graham v. State, 255 N.E2d 652, 655.

107
the evidence. Gallinera, to whom esternon supposedly handed over the confiscated sachets for recording
and marking, as well as garcia, the person to whom esternon directly handed over the seized items for
chemical analysis at the crime laboratory, were not presented in court to establish the circumstances
under which they handled the subject items. Any reasonable mind might then ask the question: are the
sachets of shabu allegedly seized from petitioner the very same objects laboratory tested and offered in
court as evidence?
The prosecutions evidence is incomplete to provide an affirmative answer. Considering that it
was gallinera who recorded and marked the seized items, his testimony in court is crucial to affirm
whether the exhibits were the same items handed over to him by esternon at the place of seizure and
acknowledge the initials marked thereon as his own. The same is true of garcia who could have, but
nevertheless failed, to testify on the circumstances under which she received the items from esternon,
what she did with them during the time they were in her possession until before she delivered the same to
arroyo for analysis.
Given the foregoing deviations of police officer esternon from the standard and normal procedure
in the implementation of the warrant and in taking post-seizure custody of the evidence, the blind reliance
by the trial court and the court of appeals on the presumption of regularity in the conduct of police duty is
manifestly misplaced. The presumption of regularity is merely just thata mere presumption disputable
by contrary proof and which when challenged by the evidence cannot be regarded as binding truth. 66[52]
suffice it to say that this presumption cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that
prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 67[53] in the present case the lack of
conclusive identification of the illegal drugs allegedly seized from petitioner, coupled with the irregularity in
the manner by which the same were placed under police custody before offered in court, strongly militates
a finding of guilt.
In our constitutional system, basic and elementary is the presupposition that the burden of
proving the guilt of an accused lies on the prosecution which must rely on the strength of its own evidence
and not on the weakness of the defense. The rule is invariable whatever may be the reputation of the
accused, for the law presumes his innocence unless and until the contrary is shown. 68[54] in dubio pro reo.
When moral certainty as to culpability hangs in the balance, acquittal on reasonable doubt inevitably
becomes a matter of right.
Presumption of innocence leads to the accuseds acquittal
due to inconsistent testimonies of prosecutions
witnesses
Ely agustin vs. People of the philippines, g.r. no. 158788, april 30, 2008
Facts:
On october 1, 1995, at 7:20 in the evening, armed men robbed the house of spouses george and rosemarie gante in
barangay pug-os, cabugao, ilocos sur, forcibly taking with them several valuables, including cash amounting to
p600,000.00.69[3] forthwith, the spouses reported the matter to the police, who, in turn, immediately applied for a search
warrant with the municipal trial court (mtc) of cabugao, ilocos sur.70[4] the mtc issued search warrant no. 5-95,71[5]
directing a search of the items stolen from the victims, as well as the firearms used by the perpetrators. One of the
target premises was the residence of petitioner, named as one of the several suspects in the crime.
On october 6, 1995, armed with the warrant, policemen searched the premises of petitioner's house located in sitio
padual, barangay pug-os, cabugao, ilocos sur. The search resulted in the recovery of a firearm and ammunitions
which had no license nor authority to possess such weapon, and, consequently, the filing of a criminal case, docketed
as criminal case no. 1651-k, for violation of p.d. no. 1866 or illegal possession of firearms, against petitioner before the
rtc.
thereafter, trial ensued. The prosecution presented eight witnesses namely: (1) p/insp. Anselmo baldovino72[7]
(p/insp. Baldovino), a police investigator and the applicant for the search warrant; (2) rosemarie gante (gante), the
66[52]

People v. Ambrosio, G.R. No. 135378, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 312, 318 citing People v. Tan, 382
SCRA 419 (2002).
67[53]
People v. Ambrosio, G.R. No. 135378, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 312, 318 citing People v. Tan, 382
SCRA 419 (2002).
68
[54]

69
70
71
72

People v. Laxa, id.

108
victim of the robbery and private complainant; (3) ignacio yabes (yabes), a municipal local government operations
officer of the department of interior and local government who was the civilian witness to the search; (4) p/supt.
Bonifacio abian73[8] (p/supt. Abian), deputy provincial director of the philippine national police and part of the search
team; (5) spo4 marino peneyra (spo4 peneyra); (6) spo1 franklin cabaya (spo1 cabaya); (7) spo1 james jara (spo1
jara); and (8) spo2 florentino renon (spo2 renon).
the prosecution's case centered mainly on evidence that during the enforcement of the search warrant
against petitioner, a .38 caliber revolver firearm was found in the latter's house. 74[9] in particular, spo1 cabaya testified
that while poking at a closed rattan cabinet near the door, he saw a firearm on the lower shelf. 75[10] the gun is a .38
caliber revolver76[11] with five live ammunitions,77[12] which he immediately turned over to his superior, p/insp. Baldovino.78
[13]

petitioner anchored his defense on denial and frame-up. The petitioner and his wife lorna assert that
petitioner does not own a gun.79[14] lorna testified that she saw a military man planting the gun.80[15]
After trial, the rtc rendered its decision81[16] dated july 7, 1999, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt.
petitioner filed an appeal with the ca, which rendered the assailed decision 82[18] dated january 22, 2003,
affirming with modification the decision of the trial court, thus:
wherefore, except for the modification reducing and changing the maximum of the prison
term imposed to five (5) years four (4) months and twenty (20) days, the appealed decision is
otherwise affirmed.
hence, the instant petition for review, on the principal ground that the ca gravely erred in finding that the guilt of
petitioner has been proven beyond reasonable doubt; and more specifically, in giving weight and credence to the
testimonies of the police officers who searched the house of the petitioner which are replete with material and
irreconcilable contradictions and in giving spo1 cabaya the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty despite
the claim of lorna that the .38 caliber revolver was planted.
petitioner insists that the trial court and the ca committed reversible error in giving little credence to his defense
that the firearm found in his residence was planted by the policemen. He also alleges material inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the policemen as witnesses for the prosecution, which amounted to failure by the prosecution to prove
his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Held:
the petition has merit.
the paramount issue in the present case is whether the prosecution established the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt; and in the determination thereof, a factual issue, that is, whether a gun was found in the house of
petitioner, must necessarily be resolved.
it is a well-entrenched rule that appeal in criminal cases opens the whole case wide open for review.83[20]
in convicting petitioner, the rtc relied heavily on the testimony of spo1 cabaya, who testified that he discovered
the subject firearm in a closed cabinet inside the former's house. The trial court brushed aside petitioner's defense of
denial and protestations of frame-up. The rtc justified giving full credence to cabaya's testimony on the principles that
the latter is presumed to have performed his official duties regularly; that he had no ill motive to frame-up petitioner; and
that his affirmative testimony is stronger than petitioner's negative testimony.84[21]
weighing these findings of the lower courts against the petitioner's claim that the prosecution failed to prove its
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84

109
case beyond reasonable doubt due to the material inconsistencies in the testimonies of its witnesses, the court finds,
after a meticulous examination of the records that the lower courts, indeed, committed a reversible error in finding
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime he was charged with. The rtc and the ca have overlooked
certain facts and circumstances that would have interjected serious apprehensions absolutely impairing the credibility
of the witnesses for the prosecution.
the conflicting testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as to who actually entered the house and conducted
the search, who discovered the gun, and who witnessed the discovery are material matters because they relate
directly to a fact in issue; in the present case, whether a gun has been found in the house of petitioner; or to a fact to
which, by the process of logic, an inference may be made as to the existence or non-existence of a fact in issue.85[24] as
held in united states v. Estraa,86[25] a material matter is the main fact which is the subject of inquiry or any
circumstance which tends to prove that fact or any fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or
strengthen the testimony relative to the subject of inquiry or which legitimately affects the credit of any
witness who testifies.
the evidence of prosecution is severely weakened by several contradictions in the testimonies of its
witnesses. Especially damaged is the credibility of spo1 cabaya, none of whose declarations on material points jibes
with those of the other prosecution witnesses. In the face of the vehement and consistent protestations of frame-up by
petitioner and his wife, the trial court and the ca erred in overlooking or misappreciating these inconsistencies. The
inconsistencies are material as they delve into the very bottom of the question of whether or not spo1 cabaya really
found a firearm in the house of petitioner.
spo1 cabaya testified that he entered the house with four other policemen, among whom were spo1 jara,
spo4 peneyra, spo3 bernabe ocado (spo3 ocado) and another one whose name he does not remember. 87[26] while
searching, he discovered the firearm in the kitchen, inside a closed cabinet near the door.88[27] he said that spo1 jara
was standing right behind him, at a distance of just one meter, when he (cabaya) saw the firearm; 89[28] and that he
picked up the gun, held it and showed it to spo1 jara.90[29] he asserted that spo2 renon was not one of those who went
inside the house.91[30]
However, spo1 jara, the best witness who could have corroborated spo1 cabaya's testimony, related a
different story as to the circumstances of the firearm's discovery. Spo1 jara testified that he merely conducted
perimeter security during the search and did not enter or participate in searching the house. 92[32] spo1 jara testified that
he remained outside the house throughout the search, and when spo1 cabaya shouted and showed a gun, he was
seven to eight meters away from him.93[33] he could not see the inside of the house and could see cabaya only from his
chest up.94[34] he did not see the firearm at the place where it was found, but saw it only when cabaya raised his arm to
show the gun, which was a revolver.95[35] he is certain that he was not with cabaya at the time the latter
discovered the firearm.96[36] he further testified that spo3 ocado, who, according to spo1 cabaya was one of those
near him when he (cabaya) discovered the firearm, stayed outside and did not enter or search the house.97[37]
p/insp. Baldovino testified that only spo2 renon conducted the search and entered the house together with
spo1 cabaya,98[38] directly contradicting spo1 cabaya's testimony that he, together with spo1 jara, spo4 peneyra, spo3
ocado, and another one whose name he cannot recall, were inside the house when he discovered the gun 99[39] and
that spo2 renon did not enter the house of petitioner.100[40]
The testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses further muddled the prosecution evidence with more
inconsistencies as to matters material to the determination of whether a gun had in fact been found in the house of
petitioner. Spo4 peneyra testified that yabes stayed outside of the during the search; 101[59] whereas spo1 jara testified
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101

110
that yabes was inside, at the sala, but the latter saw the gun only when spo1 cabaya raised it.102[60]
although the court has held that frame-up is inherently one of the weakest defenses,103[61] as it is both easily concocted and difficult
in the present case, the lower courts seriously erred in ignoring the weakness of the prosecution's evidence and its failure to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond
reasonable doubt. The rule requiring a claim of frame-up to be supported by clear and convincing evidence105[63] was never intended to shift to the accused the burden of
proof in a criminal case.
As the court held in people of the philippines v. Ambih:106[64]
to prove,104[62]

[w]hile the lone defense of the accused that he was the victim of a frame-up is easily fabricated, this
claim assumes importance when faced with the rather shaky nature of the prosecution evidence. It is
well to remember that the prosecution must rely, not on the weakness of the defense evidence, but
rather on its own proof which must be strong enough to convince this court that the prisoner in the
dock deserves to be punished. The constitutional presumption is that the accused is innocent
even if his defense is weak as long as the prosecution is not strong enough to convict
him.107[65] (emphasis supplied)
in people of the philippines v. Gonzales,108[66] the court held that where there was material and unexplained
inconsistency between the testimonies of two principal prosecution witnesses relating not to inconsequential details but
to the alleged transaction itself which is subject of the case, the inherent improbable character of the testimony given by
one of the two principal prosecution witnesses had the effect of vitiating the testimony given by the other principal
prosecution witness.109[67] the court ruled that it cannot just discard the improbable testimony of one officer and adopt
the testimony of the other that is more plausible.110[68] in such a situation, both testimonies lose their probative value.
The court further held:
Why should two (2) police officers give two (2) contradictory descriptions of the same sale
transaction, which allegedly took place before their very eyes, on the same physical location and on
the same occasion? We must conclude that a reasonable doubt was generated as to whether or not
the "buy-bust" operation ever took place.111[69]
In the present case, to repeat, the glaring contradictory testimonies of the prosecution witnesses generate
serious doubt as to whether a firearm was really found in the house of petitioner. The prosecution utterly failed to
discharge its burden of proving that petitioner is guilty of illegal possession of firearms beyond reasonable doubt. The
constitutional presumption of innocence of petitioner has not been demolished and therefore petitioner should be
acquitted of the crime he was with.
read also:
p. Vs. Bernardino, january 28, 1991
1-a. P vs. Flores, 165 scra 71
1-b. Aguirre vs. P., 155 scra 337
1-c. P. Vs. Guinto, 184 scra 287
1-d. P. Vs. Solis, 182 scra 182
1-e. P. Vs. Capilitan, 182 scra 313
2. Alonso vs. Iac, 151 scra 552
3. P vs. Lopez, 74 scra 205
4. P vs. Quiason, 78 scra 513
5. P vs. Jose, 37 scra 450
6. P vs. Poblador, 76 scra 634
7. Dumlao vs. Comelec, 95 scra 392
3. Presumption of innocence in general and in the order of trial
People vs. De los santos, 355 scra 415
People vs. Saturno, 355 scra 578
what is the equipoise rule?
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

111
A. If the evidence in a criminal case is evenly balanced, the constitutional presumption
of innocence tilts the scale of justice in favor of the accused and he should be
acquitted from the crime charged.
Where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations
one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent
with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and is not
sufficient to support a conviction.
read:
1. Alejandro vs. Pepito, 96 scra 322
4. Sacay vs. Sandiganbayan, july 10,l986
sacay vs. Sandiganbayan
g.r. no. L-66497-98,july 10, 1986
Facts:
1. At the initial hearing, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses was interrupted when the accused,
through counsel, admitted that he shot the deceased but claimed that it was done in self-defense and
fulfillment of duty. The prosecution then moved that the reverse procedure be adopted in view of the
admission that the accused shot the deceased. No objection was interposed by the accused or his
counsel.
2. On appeal with the s.c. after he was convicted the accused later claims that there was a violation of
the order of trial provided for in sec. 3, rule 119 of the rules of court. He also cites the case of alejandro
vs. Pepito, 96 scra 322, wherein the s.c. ruled that : "it behooved the respondent judge to have followed
the sequence of trial set forth x x x the form of a trial is also a matter of public order and interest; the
orderly course of procedure requires that the prosecution should go forward and present all of its proof in
the first instance."
held:
the case of alejandro vs. Pepito is not applicable inasmuch as the accused in the case at bar did not
object to the procedure followed. In fact in the said alejandro case, the court also stated:
"it is true that in the case of u.s. vs. Gaoiran, 17 phil. 404 (l910), relied upon by the prosecution
and the trial court, the defense has produced its proofs before the prosecution presented its case, and it
was held that no substantial rights of the accused were prejudiced. There is one radical difference,
however, since in that case no objection was entered in the court below to the procedure followed in the
presentation of proof. In this case, the change in the order of trial made by respondent judge was
promptly and timely objected to by the defense."
in fact it should be noted that under the newly adopted 1985 rules of criminal procedure (sec. 3e), rule
119)the said procedure is now expressly sanctioned. Thus:
"however, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but
interposes a lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly."
3.sec. 3(3), rule 119 , 1985 rules on criminal
4. Other cases read:
1. P vs. Opida, june 13,1986
2. P vs. Tempongko, october 2,1986
3. P vs. Drammayo, 42 scra 59
4. P vs. Fernando, 145 scra 151
5. P vs. Tolentino, 145 scra 597
6. Castillo vs. Filtex, september 30,1983
7. Dumlao vs. Comelec, supra
5. Right to counsel-during trial
1. Reason behind the requirement

procedure , as amended.

112
2. Obligation of the judge to an accused who

appears in court without a lawyer to assist him

read:
1. P vs. Holgado,85 phil. 752
2. Delgado vs. Ca, 145 scra 357
3. P vs. Cuison, 193 phil. 296
5-a. The right to be heard by himself and counsel during trial
John hilario vs. People of the philippines, g.r. no. 161070, april 14, 2008
The facts:
petitioner, together with one gilbert alijid (alijid), was charged with two counts112[3] of murder in the regional trial
court (rtc), branch 76, quezon city to which petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty.
during trial, atty. Raul rivera of the public attorney's office (pao), counsel of alijid, took over representing
petitioner in view of the death of the latter's counsel.
On december 5, 2001, the rtc rendered its decision 113[4] finding petitioner and his co-accused alijid guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and sentencing them to suffer imprisonment of eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in each count.
on may 10, 2002, petitioner, this time unassisted by counsel, filed with the rtc a petition for relief 114[5] from the
decision dated december 5, 2001 together with an affidavit of merit. In his petition, petitioner contended that at the time
of the promulgation of the judgment, he was already confined at quezon city jail and was directed to be committed to
the national penitentiary in muntinlupa; that he had no way of personally filing the notice of appeal thus he instructed his
lawyer to file it on his behalf; that he had no choice but to repose his full trust and confidence to his lawyer; that he had
instructed his lawyer to file the necessary motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal; that on may 2, 2002, he was
already incarcerated at the new bilibid prisons, muntinlupa city and learned from the grapevine of his impending
transfer to the iwahig penal colony, palawan; that believing that the notice of appeal filed by his counsel prevented the
decision dated december 5, 2001 from becoming final to warrant his transfer, he instructed his representative to get a
copy of the notice of appeal from the rtc; that no notice of appeal was filed by his lawyer in defiance of his clear
instructions; and that the rtc decision showed that it was received by his counsel on february 1, 2002 and yet the
counsel did not inform him of any action taken thereon.
I s s u e:
whether or not the delay in appealing the instant case due to the defiance or failure of the
petitioner's counsel de oficio to seasonably file a notice of appeal, constitutes excusable negligence
to entitle the undersigned detention prisoner/ petitioner to pursue his appeal?
whether or not pro hac vice, the mere invocation of justice warrants the review of a final and
executory judgment?
Held:
petitioner contends that the negligence of his counsel de oficio cannot be binding on him for the latter's
defiance of his instruction to appeal automatically breaks the fiduciary relationship between counsel-client and cannot
be against the client who was prejudiced; that this breach of trust cannot easily be concocted in this situation
considering that it was a counsel de oficio, a lawyer from pao, who broke the fiduciary relationship; that the assailed ca
resolutions both harped on technicalities to uphold the dismissal by the rtc of his petition for relief; that reliance on
technicalities to the prejudice of petitioner who is serving 14 years imprisonment for a crime he did not commit is an
affront to the policy promulgated by this court that dismissal purely on technical grounds is frowned upon especially if it
will result to unfairness; and that it would have been for the best interest of justice for the ca to have directed the
petitioner to complete the records instead of dismissing the petition outright.
in his comment, the osg argues that the mere invocation of justice does not warrant the review of an appeal
from a final and executory judgment; that perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by law
is not only mandatory but jurisdictional and failure to perfect the appeal renders the judgment sought to be reviewed
final and not appealable; and that petitioner's appeal after the finality of judgment of conviction is an exercise in futility,
thus the rtc properly dismissed petitioner's petition for relief from judgment. The osg further claims that notice to
counsel is notice to clients and failure of counsel to notify his client of an adverse judgment would not constitute
excusable negligence and therefore binding on the client.
112

[3]

113

[4]

114

[5]

Docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-00-91647-48.

Penned by Judge Monina A. Zenarosa, rollo, pp. 36-52.
Id. at 53-60.

113

we grant the petition.

a litigant who is not a lawyer is not expected to know the rules of procedure. In fact, even the most
experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure.115[12] we have held in a civil case that to demand as much
from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal system into an intimidating
monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his property rights not because he has no right to the property but
because he does not know how to establish such right.116[13] this finds application specially if the liberty of a person is at
stake. As we held in telan v. Court of appeals:
The right to counsel in civil cases exists just as forcefully as in criminal cases, specially so
when as a consequence, life, liberty, or property is subjected to restraint or in danger of loss.
In criminal cases, the right of an accused person to be assisted by a member of the
bar is immutable. Otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process. Thus, even if
the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused
afforded the opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel.
Xxxx
Even the most experienced lawyers get tangled in the web of procedure. The demand as
much from ordinary citizens whose only compelle intrare is their sense of right would turn the legal
system into an intimidating monstrosity where an individual may be stripped of his property rights not
because he has no right to the property but because he does not know how to establish such right.
The right to counsel is absolute and may be invoked at all times. More so, in the case of an
on-going litigation, it is a right that must be exercised at every step of the way, with the lawyer
faithfully keeping his client company.
No arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that the
right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the
pursuit of the appeal.117[14] (emphasis supplied)
to repeat the ruling in telan, no arrangement or interpretation of law could be as absurd as the position that
the right to counsel exists only in the trial courts and that thereafter, the right ceases in the pursuit of the appeal.118[15] it is
even more important to note that petitioner was not assisted by counsel when he filed his petition for relief from
judgment with the rtc.
It cannot be overstressed therefore, that in criminal cases, as held in telan, the right of an accused person to
be assisted by a member of the bar is immutable; otherwise, there would be a grave denial of due process.
cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for ventilation of their causes and
defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural imperfections. In that way, the ends of justice would be served
better.119[16]
while as a general rule, the failure of petitioner to file his motion for reconsideration within the 15-day
reglementary period fixed by law rendered the resolution final and executory, we have on some occasions relaxed this
rule. Thus, in barnes v. Padilla120[17] we held:
However, this court has relaxed this rule in order to serve substantial justice considering (a)
matters of life, liberty, honor or property, (b) the existence of special or compelling circumstances, (c)
the merits of the case, (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party
favored by the suspension of the rules, (e) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory, and (f) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.
invariably, rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed to facilitate the
attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to
frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Even the rules of court
reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and
compelling as to alter even that which this court itself had already declared to be final.
In de guzman v. Sandiganbayan, this court, speaking through the late justice ricardo j.
115

[12]

116

[13]

117[14]
118

[15]

119

[16]

120

[17]

See Telan v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 95026, October 4, 1991, 202 SCRA 534, 541.
Id.
Id. at 540-541.
Id. at 541.
Garcia v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., supra note 11, at 781.
G.R. No. 160753, September 30, 2004, 439 SCRA 675.

114
Francisco, had occasion to state:
The rules of court was conceived and promulgated to set forth guidelines
in the dispensation of justice but not to bind and chain the hand that dispenses it,
for otherwise, courts will be mere slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of
judicial discretion. That is precisely why courts in rendering justice have always
been, as they ought to be guided by the norm that when on the balance,
technicalities take a backseat against substantive rights, and not the other way
around. Truly then, technicalities, in the appropriate language of justice makalintal,
"should give way to the realities of the situation.
Indeed, the emerging trend in the rulings of this court is to afford every party litigant the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.121[18]
moreover, in basco v. Court of appeals,122[19] we also held:
nonetheless, procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent
application of the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former
must yield to the latter. Recognizing this, section 2, rule 1 of the rules of court specifically provides
that:
Section 2.
Construction. these rules shall be liberally construed in order to
promote their object and to assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action and proceeding.123[20]
Rules of procedure are mere tools designed to expedite the decision or resolution of cases and other matters
pending in court. A strict and rigid application of rules that would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than
promote substantial justice must be avoided.124[21]
Even if the judgment had become final and executory, it may still be recalled, and the accused afforded the
opportunity to be heard by himself and counsel. 125[22] however, instead of remanding the case to the ca for a decision
on the merits, we opt to resolve the same so as not to further delay the final disposition of this case.
in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to appeal in the manner prescribed by
law. The importance and real purpose of the remedy of appeal has been emphasized in castro v. Court of appeals126[27]
where we ruled that an appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and trial courts are advised to proceed with
caution so as not to deprive a party of the right to appeal and instructed that every party-litigant should be afforded the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his cause, freed from the constraints of technicalities. While
this right is statutory, once it is granted by law, however, its suppression would be a violation of due process,
a right guaranteed by the constitution. Thus, the importance of finding out whether petitioner's loss of the right to
appeal was due to the pao lawyer's negligence and not at all attributed to petitioner.
People vs. Nadera, jr., 324 scra 490
Mendoza, j.
The cavalier attitude of atty. Manolo brotonel of the pao cannot go unnoticed. It is discernible in
[a] his refusal to cross-examine oleby nadera (the complainant for rape); [b] the manner in which he
conducted maricris naderas cross-examination; and [c] his failure not only to present evidence for the
accused but to inform the accused of his right to do so, if he desires. Only the faithful performance by
counsel of his duty towards his client can give meaning and substance to the accuseds right to due
process and to be presumed innocent until proven otherwise. Hence, a lawyers duty, especially that of a
defense counsel, must not be taken lightly. It must be performed with all the zeal and vigor at his
command to protect and safeguard the accuseds fundamental rights.

121

[18]

122

[19]

123[20]
124
125

126

Id. at 686-687.
392 Phil. 251 (2000).
Id. at 266.
[21]
Cusi-Hernandez v. Spouses Diaz, 390 Phil. 1245, 1252 (2000).
[22]
Telan v. Court of Appeals, supra note 12, at 540-541; People of the Philippines v. Holgado, 85
Phil. 752, 756-757 (1950); Flores v. Judge Ruiz, 179 Phil. 351, 355 (1979); Delgado v. Court of Appeals,
229 Phil. 362, 366 (1986).

115
it may be so that the defense counsel really found olebys testimony to be believable.
Nonetheless, he had the bounden duty to scrutinize private complainants testimony to ensure that the
accuseds constitutional right to confront and examine the witnesses against him was not rendered for
naught. It bears pointing out that in rape cases, it is often the words of the complainant against the
accused, the two being the only persons present during the commission of the crime. This is so because
the complainants testimony cannot be accepted with precipitate credulity without denying the accuseds
constitutional right to be presumed innocent. This is where cross-examination becomes essential to test
the credibility of the witnesses, expose falsehoods or half-truths, uncover the truth which rehearsed direct
examination testimonies may successfully suppress, and demonstrate inconsistencies in substantial
matters which create reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused and thus give substance to the
constitutional right of the accused to confront the witnesses against him. For unless proven otherwise to
be guilty beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is presumed innocent.
(note: for your legal & judicial ethics)
atty. Brotonel as counsel de oficio, had the duty to defend his client and protect his rights, no
matter how guilty or evil he perceives accused-appellant to be. The performance of this duty was all the
more imperative because the life of the accused-appellant hangs in the balance. His duty was no less
because he was counsel de oficio.
the decision of the rtc convicting the accused is set aside and the case is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this decision.
read:
1. P vs. Dischoso, 96 scra 957
2. Read also:
people vs. Yambot, g.r. no. 120350, 343 scra 20, oct. 30, 2000; people vs. Banihit,
g.r. no. 132045, 339 scra 86, aug. 25, 2000.
Right to be heard by himself and counsel and to present evidence for his defense.
In this case, the non-appearance of counsel for the accused on the scheduled hearing
was not construed as waiver by the accused of his right to present evidence for his
defense. Denial of due process can be successfully invoked where no valid waiver of
rights had been made as in this case.
In another case, the accused-appellant validly waived his right to present evidence. This
is in consonance with the doctrine that everyone has a right to waive the advantage of a
law or rule made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private
capacity, if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public
right, and without detriment to the community at large.
6. The right to be present during trial
read:
1. Aquino vs. Military commission, 63 scra 546
2. P vs. Judge, 125 scra 269
3. Waiver of the defendant's presence in a
criminal prosecution,77 scra 430
7. The right to a speedy trial
Jaime bernat vs. Sandiganbayan, may 20, 2004
Right to speedy disposition of case.
Facts:
1. On august 14, 1991, the petitioner and several others were charged of violation of section 3
[e] of ra 3019, otherwise known as the anti-graft and corrupt practices act;
2. On august 23, 1994 after the presentation of the parties evidence, the case was deemed
submitted for decision before the 2nd division;
3. Thereafter, the case was unloaded to the newly created 5 th division, particularly to justice
godofredo legaspi and later re-assigned to justice ma. Cristina cortez-estrada upon her
assumption of office on november 3, 1998.

116
4. In the early part of 2002 while justice estrada was writing the decision of the case, she found
out that the november 26, 1993 transcript of stenographic notes, which was the crossexamination of the petitioner, was missing so she called the parties for a conference on
april 19, 2002 to discuss the matter.
5. Instead of attending the conference, petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the case based on the
alleged violation of his right to speedy trial. The court denied the same as well as the
subsequent motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
was there violation of the petitioners right to a speedy disposition of his case when the same was
not decided for almost 8 years from the time it was deemed submitted for decision?
Held:
no. The right is violated only if the proceedings were attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays. The determination of whether the delays are of said nature is relative and cannot be
based on mere mathematical reckoning of time. Particular regard to the facts and circumstances of the
case. As held in the case of de la pena vs. Sandiganbayan, certain factors shall be considered and
balanced to determine if there is delay, as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Length of the delay;

Reasons for the delay;
Assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
Prejudiced caused by the delay.

There is no violation of the right to speedy disposition of his case because petitioner failed to assert his
constitutional right to a speedy disposition of his case. During the 8-year period prior to april 19, 2002,
petitioner did not complain about the long delay in deciding his case.
a. Read admin. Circular no. 4 of the supreme
b. Department of justice circular no. 27, dated
c. When shall this right starts
read:
1. P vs. Orsal, 113 scra 226
d. To what proceedings is this right available
read:
1. Caballero vs. Alfonso, 153 scra 153
e. In general
read:
1. The right to speedy trial, 28 scra 601
2. Conde vs. Rivera, 59 phil. 650
3. Ventura vs. People, nov. 6,1976
4. Martin vs. Ver, july 25, 1983
5. Bermisa vs. Ca, 92 scra
6. Luneta vs. Mil. Com., 102 scra 56
7. P vs. Baladjay, 113 scra 284
8. P vs. Araula, 111 scra 598
9. Regaspi vs. Castillo, 69 scra 160
10. Acevedo vs. Sarmiento, 36 scra 247
11. Nepumuceno vs. Secretary,108 scra 658
12. Tatad vs. Sb, 159 scra 70
13. P vs. Cfi of rizal, 161 scra 249
14. P vs. Laya, 161 scra 327
15. Salcedovs. Mendoza, 88 scra 811
16. Duterte vs. Sandiganbayan, 289 scra 721
18. Angchangco vs. Ombudsman, 269 scra 301

court dated september 22, 1988

september 16, 1988

117
Sumbang vs. Gen. Court martial, g.r. no. 140188, 337 scra 227, aug. 3, 2000; blanco
vs. Sandiganbayan, g.r. nos. 136757 58, 346 scra 108, nov. 27, 2000; solar team
entertainment, inc. Hon. How, g.r. no. 140863, 338 scra 51, aug. 22, 2000.
Speedy disposition of cases.
(i) the determination of whether an accused had been denied the right to speedy trial
depends on the surrounding circumstances of each case. Although it took about 8 years
before the trial of this case was resumed, such delay did not amount to violation of
petitioners right to speedy trial considering that such delay was not by attributable to the
prosecution.
Factors to consider in determining whether or not such right has been violated:
1. Length of delay,
2. Reasons for such delay, and
3. assertion or failure to assert such rights by the accused and the prejudice
caused by the delay.
(ii) speedy trial act of 1998. The authority of the secretary of justice to review resolutions
of his subordinates even after an information has already been filed in court does not
present an irreconcilable conflict with the 30-day period prescribed in sec. 7 of the
speedy trial act of 1998.
8. The right to an impartial trial
read:
1. P vs. Opida, june 13,1986
1-a. P vs. Tuazon, 159 scra 317
2. Olaguer vs. Chief of staff, may 22, 1987
3. Mateo, jr. Vs. Villaluz,90 scra 16
4. P vs. Sendaydiego, 81 scra 120
5. Dimacuha vs. Concepcion, 117 scra 630
9. Right to a public trial
read:
1. Garcia vs. Domingo, july 25,1973
2. P vs. Tampus, march 28,1980
9. The right to be informed of the nature and cause of

accusation.

The people of the philippines vs. Jerry nazareno, g.r. no. 167756,
april 8, 2008
The facts:
On march 17, 1999, appellant jerry nazareno was indicted for violation of article 266-a of the
revised penal code in criminal case no. 2638 for the alleged rape of bbb, his daughter. The information
reads:
that sometime and between january 1992 up to december 06, 1998, in
barangay codon, municipality of san andres, province of catanduanes, philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused by means of
force, violence and intimidation did then and there willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and
repeatedly made sexual intercourse with his daughter bbb at the age of 7 through 14
years old against her will.
contrary to law.127[17]
On may 3, 1999, another information docketed as criminal case no. 2650, for the rape of aaa,
another daughter, was levelled against appellant. The information is worded thus:

127[17]

Rollo, p. 21.

118
that from sometime in january 1990 up to december 1998 in barangay codon,
municipality of san andres, catanduanes, and within the jurisdiction of the honorable
court, the said accused, being the father of the complainant, did then and there willfully,
feloniously and criminally repeatedly had sexual intercourse with her daughter aaa, then
five years old up to the time when she was 15-years-old against her will.
contrary to law.128[18]
after trial , the accused was found guilty of qualified rape in both cases. He appealed his
conviction to the court of appeals in accordance with the people vs. Mateo doctrine but the court of
appeals affirmed the rtc decision. Hence, this petition before the supreme court.
i s s u e:
is the constitutional right of the petitioner to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him violated since the information failed to specify with certainty the approximate date of the
commission of the offenses for rape which is a fatal defect.
H e l d:
the argument is specious. An information is intended to inform an accused of the accusations
against him in order that he could adequately prepare his defense. Verily, an accused cannot be
convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. Thus, to ensure that
the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him is not violated, the information should state the name of the accused; the designation given to the
offense by the statute; a statement of the acts or omissions so complained of as constituting the offense;
the name of the offended party; the approximate time and date of the commission of the offense; and the
place where the offense has been committed. 129[27] further, it must embody the essential elements of the
crime charged by setting forth the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on the culpability and
liability of the accused, so that he can properly prepare for and undertake his defense. 130[28]
However, it is not necessary for the information to allege the date and time of the commission of
the crime with exactitude unless time is an essential ingredient of the offense. 131[29] in people v.
Bugayong,132[30] the court held that when the time given in the information is not the essence of the
offense, the time need not be proven as alleged; and that the complaint will be sustained if the proof
shows that the offense was committed at any time within the period of the statute of limitations and before
the commencement of the action.
In people v. Gianan,133[31] the court ruled that the time of the commission of rape is not an element
of the said crime as it is defined in article 335 of the revised penal code. The gravamen of the crime is
the fact of carnal knowledge under any of the circumstances enumerated therein, i.e.: (1) by using force
or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the
woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. In accordance with rule 110, section 11 of the 2000
rules of criminal procedure, as long as it alleges that the offense was committed at any time as near to
the actual date at which the offense was committed, an information is sufficient.
The doctrine was reiterated with greater firmness in people v. Salalima134[32] and in people v.
Lizada.

135[33]

in the case under review, the information in criminal case no. 2638 alleged that the rape of bbb
transpired sometime and between january 1992 up to december 6, 1998 in barangay codon, municipality
of san andres, province of catanduanes. In criminal case no. 2650, the information averred that from
sometime in january 1990 up to december 1998 in barangay codon, municipality of san andres, province
of catanduanes, aaa was raped by appellant. To the mind of the court, the recitals in the informations

128[18]

Records, Vol. II, p. 18.

People v. Quitlong, 354 Phil. 372, 388 (1998), citing Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), Rule 110, Secs. 6
and 8.
130[28]
Id.
131[29]
People v. Santos, 390 Phil. 150, 161 (2000); Rules of Criminal Procedure (2000), Rule 110, Sec. 11 reads:
Sec. 11. Date of commission of the offense. It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information
the precise date the offense was committed except when it is a material ingredient of the offense. The offense
may be alleged to have been committed on a date as near as possible to the actual date of its commission.
132[30]
G.R. No. 126518, December 2, 1998, 299 SCRA 528.
133[31]
G.R. Nos. 135288-93, September 15, 2000, 340 SCRA 477.
134[32]
G.R. Nos. 137969-71, August 15, 2001, 363 SCRA 192.
135[33]
G.R. Nos. 143468-71, January 24, 2003, 396 SCRA 62.
129[27]

119
sufficiently comply with the constitutional requirement that the accused be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
in people v. Garcia,136[34] the court upheld a conviction for ten counts of rape based on an
information which alleged that the accused committed multiple rapes from november 1990 up to july 21,
1994. In people v. Espejon,137[35] the court found the appellant liable for rape under an information
charging that he perpetrated the offense sometime in the year 1982 and dates subsequent thereto and
sometime in the year 1995 and subsequent thereto.
in the case under review, the information in criminal case no. 2638 alleged that the rape of bbb
transpired sometime and between january 1992 up to december 6, 1998 in barangay codon, municipality
of san andres, province of catanduanes. In criminal case no. 2650, the information averred that from
sometime in january 1990 up to december 1998 in barangay codon, municipality of san andres, province
of catanduanes, aaa was raped by appellant. To the mind of the court, the recitals in the informations
sufficiently comply with the constitutional requirement that the accused be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
Indeed, this court has ruled that allegations that rapes were committed before and until october
15, 1994,138[36] sometime in the year 1991 and the days thereafter, 139[37] and on or about and sometime
in the year 1988140[38] constitute sufficient compliance with rule 110, section 11 of the 2000 rules of
criminal procedure.
more than that, the court notes that the matter of particularity of the dates in the information is
being raised for the first time on appeal. The rule is well-entrenched in this jurisdiction that objections as
to matter of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. 141[39]
appellant failed to raise the issue of defective informations before the trial court. He could have moved to
quash the informations or at least for a bill of particulars. He did not. Clearly, he slumbered on his rights
and awakened too late.
too, appellant did not object to the presentation of the evidence for the people contending that the
offenses were committed sometime and between january 1992 up to december 6, 1998 for criminal
case no. 2632 and sometime in january 1990, up to december 1998 in criminal case no. 2650. On the
contrary, appellant actively participated in the trial, offering denial and alibi as his defenses. Simply put,
he cannot now be heard to complain that he was unable to defend himself in view of the vagueness of the
recitals in the informations.
read:
1. Sales vs. Ca, 164 scra 717
1-a. P vs. Crisologo, 150 scra 653
1-b. P vs. Corral, 157 scra 678
1-c. P vs. Resavaga, 159 scra 426
1-d. Formilleza vs. Sb, 159 scra
2. P vs. Labado, 98 scra 730
3. Ko bu lin vs. Ca, 118 scra 573
4. P. Vs. Cabale, 185 scra 140
5. People vs. Regala, april 27, 1982
11. The right to meet witnesses face to face or the

right of confrontation

read:
1. P. Vs. Talingdan, nov. 9, 1990
1-a. P vs. Villaluz, october 20, 1983
2. P vs. Valero, 112 scra 661
3. P vs. Bundalian, 117 scra 718
4. Talino vs. Sandiganbayan, march 16,1987
5. P vs. Seneris, 99 scra 92
6. Ortigas, jr. Vs. Lufthansa, 64 scra 610
7. Toledo vs. People, 20 scra 54
8. P vs. Bardaje, 99 scra 388
136[34]

G.R. No. 120093, November 6, 1997, 281 SCRA 463.

G.R. No. 134767, February 20, 2002, 377 SCRA 412.
138[36]
People v. Bugayong, supra note 30.
139[37]
People v. Magbanua, G.R. No. 128888, December 3, 1999, 319 SCRA 719.
140[38]
People v. Santos, G.R. Nos. 131103 & 143472, June 29, 2000, 334 SCRA 655.
141[39]
People v. Razonable, 386 Phil. 771, 780 (2000).
137[35]

120
9. P vs. Santos, 139 scra 383
10. Soliman vs. Sandiganbayan, 145 scra 640
11. P vs. Lacuna, 87 scra 364
12. P vs. Clores, 100 scra 227
13. Carredo vs. People, 183 scra 273
14. Fulgado vs. Ca, 182 scra 81
12. Trial in absentia
read:
1. Borja vs. Mendoza, 77 scra 420
2. Nolasco vs. Enrile, 139 scra 502
3. P vs. Salas, 143 scra 163; note the purpose
of this provision)
4. P vs. Judge prieto, july 21,1978
5. Gimenez vs. Nazareno, 160 scra 1
6. Carredo vs. People, 183 scra 273
13. Right to secure witnesses and production of

evidence.

read:
1. Cavili vs. Hon. Florendo, 154 scra 610
2. Fajardo vs. Garcia, 98 scra 514
14. Duty of the judge to the accused before trial
People vs. Agbayani, 284 scra 315
******************************************************
Chapter xv - habeas corpus
*******************************************************
Read:
1in the matter of the petition for habeas corpus of
1989 and august & october, 1989.

ferdinand marcos, etc, gr no. 88079, may 18,

1-a. Harvey vs. Santiago, supra

2. Cruz vs. Juan ponce enrile, april 15,1988
3. Abadilla vs. Fidel ramos, december 1,1987
********************************************************
Chapter xvi - the right
Against self-incrimination
********************************************************
1. Self-incrimination, 24 scra 692
2. Read
1. Chavez vs. Ca, 24 scra 663
2. Galman vs. Pamaran, 138 scra 294, read
3. Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 phil. 62
4. Beltran vs. Samson, 50 phil. 570
5. Bagadiong vs. Gonzales, 94 scra 906
6. Baseco vs. Pcgg, supra
7. Isabela sugar vs. Macadaeg, 98 phil. 995
8. Fernando vs. Maglanoc, 95 phil. 431
9. Us vs. Tang teng, 23 phil. 145
10. P vs. Otadora, 86 phil. 244
11. P vs. Olvis, 154 scra 513
12. P vs. Boholst-amadore, 152 scra 263

including the concurring and dissenting opinions

121
13. P vs. Rosas, 148 scra 464
14. P vs. Ruallo, 152 scra 635
15. P vs. Policarpio, 158 scra 85( compare with
the rosas & boholst cases)
16. P vs. Lumayok, 139 scra 1
17. Cabal vs. Kapunan, jr. December 29, 1962
People vs. Banihit, g.r. no. 132045, 339 scra 86, aug. 25, 2000; people vs.
Continente, g.r. nos. 100801- 02, 339 scra 1, aug. 25, 2000.
the essence of this right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion or the giving
of evidence against oneself through a testimonial act. Hence, an accused may be
compelled to submit to physical examination and have a substance taken from his body
for medical determination as to whether he was suffering from a disease that was
contracted by his victim without violating this right.
********************************************************
Chapter xvii - the right against
Involuntary servitude
********************************************************
1. Read:
1. Aclaracion vs. Gatmaitan, 64 scra 131
2. Caunca vs. Salazar, supra
********************************************************
Chapter xviii - right against
Cruel and unusual
punishment
********************************************************
A. Is the death penalty already abolished by the

1987 constitution?

read:
1. P vs. Gavarra, 155 scra 327
2. P vs. Masangkay, 155 scra 113
3. P vs. Atencio, 156 scra 242
4. P vs. Intino, september 26, 1988
5. People vs. Munoz, 170 scra 107
B. Is death as a penalty a cruel or unuasual

punishment?

read:
1. P vs. Estoista, 93 phil. 647
2. P vs. Villanueva,, 128 scra 488
3. Veniegas vs. People, 115 scra 79
4. P vs. Camano, 115 scra 688
2. On the death penalty whether it was abolished or not
read:
a. P vs. Idnay, 164 scra 358
********************************************************
Chapter xix - right against
Non-imprisonment for debt
********************************************************
1. Read:
1. Lozano vs. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323
2. Ajeno vs. Incierto, 71 scra 166

122

*********************************************************
Chapter xx - the right
Against double jeopardy
********************************************************
1. Requisites present before this right can be invoked
People vs. Almario, 355 scra 1
there is double jeopardy when there is:
[1] valid indictment;
[2] before a competent court;
[3] after arraignment;
[4] when a valid plea has been entered; and
[5] when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
if the dismissal is through the instance of the accused or with his express
consent, there is no double jeopardy. However, this rule admits of two (2) exceptions:
1) The motion to dismiss is based on insufficiency of evidence; and
2) The motion to dismiss is based on the denial of the accuseds right to
speedy trial.
It must be pointed out, however, that in people vs. Tampal, 244 scra 202 and people vs.
Leviste, 255 scra 238, the sc reversed the dismissal of the criminal case by the trial court based on
speedy trial since the same was not predicated on the clear right of the accused to speedy trial. It is
only when there is a clear violation of the accuseds right to speedy trial that the dismissal results in
double jeopardy.
3. Double jeopardy, 102 scra 44 and 12 scra 561
4. When the act is punished by both a law and an ordinance:
People vs. Relova, 148 scra 292
if the accused was charged of theft of electricity based on the city ordinance of batangas and
not based on the revised penal code and later on the case is dismissed by the judge due to the fact that
the crime has prescribed, the government can no longer charge the accused of the same crime under the
revised penal code since double jeopardy has set in.
read:
1. P vs. Duero, 104 scra 379
2. Cudia vs. Ca, 284 scra 173
3. Cuison vs. Ca, 289 scra 159
2. P vs. Jara, 144 scra 516
3. P vs. Abano, 145 scra 555
4. P vs. Tolentino, 145 scra 597
5. P vs. Salig, 133 scra 59
6. P vs. Cruz, 133 scra 426
7. P vs. Prudente,, 133 scra 651
8 p vs. Trinidad, 162 scra 714, when the
2. P vs. City court,154 scra 175
3. Galman vs. Pamaran, 144 scra 43
4. P vs. Molero, 144 scra 397
5. P vs. Quibate, 131 scra 81
6. P vs. Obania, june 29,1968
7. Dionaldo vs. Dacuycuy, 108 scra 736
8. P vs. Judge hernando, 108 scra 121
9. Esmena vs. Judge pogoy, 102 scra 861
10. Mazo vs. Mun. Court, 113 scra 217
11. Andres vs. Cacdac, 113 scra 217
12. Buerano vs. Ca, 115 scra 82
13. P vs. Militante, 117 scra 910
14. P vs. Fuentebella, 100 scra 672

presumption of regularity does7, 1966

123
15. Lazaro vs. P, 112 scra 430
16. Flores vs. Enrile, 115 scra 236
17. Bernarte vs. Sec. ,116 scra 43
18. Ko bu lin vs. Ca, 118 scra 573
19. P vs. Duran, 1075 scra 979
20. P vs. Cuevo, 104 scra 312
21. Jimenez vs. Military commission, 102 scra 39
22. P vs. Liwanag, 73 scra 473
23. P vs. Araula, january 30, 1982
24. P vs. Baladjay, march 30, 1982
25. P vs. City court of silay, 74 scra 247
28. P vs. Pilpa, 79 scra 81
29. P vs. Gloria, december 29, 1977
30. P vs. Galano, 75 scra 193
31. Tacas vs. Cariasco, 72 scra 527
32. P vs. Ledesma, 73 scra 77
33. P vs. Consulta, 70 scra 277
34. P vs. Inting, 70 scra 289
35. De guzman vs. Escalona, 97 scra 619
36. P vs. Pablo, 98 scra 289
37. Cruz vs. Enrile, 160 scra 700
38. Tangan vs. P, 155 scra 435
39. P vs. Quezada, 160 scra 516
40. Canizano vs. P, 159 scra 599
41. Bustamante vs. Maceren, 48 scra 144
there is no double jeopardy in this case:

people vs. Molero

g.r no. L-67842, september 24, 1986
Facts:
1. Molero was charged for having raped his daughter. The original complaint was dated
march 22, 1977, the complainant charged molero of having raped her on the "13th day of
february 1976".
2. Molero was arraigned and pleaded "not guilty";
3. During the trial, the complainant testified that she was raped by her father on february
5, 1976 and not february 13, 1976 as alleged in the complaint;
4. The fiscal filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint. The motion was granted
but was subsequently reconsidered. The lower court in its order dismissed the original
complaint, but ordered the fiscal to cause the filing of a new complaint charging the
proper offense of rape committed on or before february 5, 1976;
5. A new complaint was therefore filed dated march 30, 1978
6. Molero claims that the new complaint places him in double jeopardy.
Held:
There is no double jeopardy.
A.
Dismissal of the first case contemplated by the rule against double jeopardy
presupposes a definite and unconditional dismissal which terminates the case.(jaca vs.
Blanco, 86 phil. 452; people vs. Manlapas, 5 scra 883; people vs. Mogol, 131 scra
296) and "for dismissal to be a bar under the jeopardy clause of the constitution, it
must have the effect of acquittal.(people vs. Agoncillo, 40 scra 579);
B. It is quite clear that the order of the trial court dismissal the original complaint was
without prejudice to the filing of a new complaint and/or information charging molero with
the proper offense. The said dismissal did not therefore amount to an acquittal.
C. In fact there was no need for the trial court to have adopted such a cumbersome
procedure. It could have merely ordered an amendment of the complaint. Sec. 12, rule

124
119 of the revised rules of court applies when there is a mistake in charging the proper
offense, but not when an honest error of a few days is sought to be corrected and the
change does not affect the rights of the accused.
D. The precise time of the commission of the crime is not an essential element of the
offense of rape. The amendment of the complaint changing the date of the commission of
the crime of rape from february 13, 1976 to february 5, 1976 , a difference of 8 days was
only a matter of form under the facts of this case and did not prejudice the rights of the
accused.
E. The reliance of the accused on the case of people vs. Opemia, 98 phil. 698 is not
well-taken. In the said case the proposed amendment was the changing of the date
of the commission of the crime from june 18, 1952 to july 1947, or a difference of 5
years. The s.c. held that the amendment that would change the date of the
commission of the offense from 1947 to 1952 is certainly not a matter of form.
F. The dismissal of the first complaint did not amount to the appellant's acquittal. In
effect, the order of dismissal does not constitute a proper basis for a claim of double
jeopardy. (people vs. Bocar, 138 scra 166)

5. May the government appeal a judgment of acquittal or

for the increase of the penalty imposed?

People vs. Hon. Velasco, g.r. no. 127444, 340 scra 207, sept. 13, 2000.
Double jeopardy. Evolution of doctrine. Appeal by the government from verdicts of
acquittal.
As mandated by the constitution, statutes and cognate jurisprudence, an acquittal is final
and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court
of a judgment of acquittal brought before the supreme court on certiorari cannot be had
unless there is a finding of mistrial, as in galman vs. Sandiganbayan.
read:
1. Central bank of the philippines vs. Ca, gr no.
1-a. P vs. Montemayor, january 30, 1969, 26 scra
2. P vs. Ruiz,81 scra 455
3. Us vs. Yam tung way, 21 phil. 67
4. P vs. Ang ho kio, 95 phil. 475

41859, march 8, 1989

687

6. The "supervening fact doctrine."

read:
1. 76 scra 469
2. P vs. Tarok, 73 phil. 260
3. P vs. Villasis, 46 o.g. 268
4. Melo vs. People, 85 phil. 766
5. P vs. Buling, 107 phil. 712
5-a. P vs. Adil, 76 scra 462
5-b. P. Vs. Tac-an, 182 scra 601
6. P vs. City court of manila, 121 scra 637
7. Read also sec. 7, rule 117, 1985 rules on

criminal procedure

*******************************************************
Chapter xxi
Right against ex-post facto law,
Bill of attainer, etc.
*******************************************************
read:
1. Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111 scra 433
2-lacson vs. Sandiganbayan, january 20, 1999

125

Panfilo m. Lacson vs. The executive secretary, the sandiganbayan,

et al.
Romeo acop & francisco zubia, jr., petitioners-intervenors
G.r. no. 128096, january 20, 1999
the petitioner seeks to stop the sandiganbayan from trying the multiple murder case against him
and 26 other police officers for the death of 11 kuratong baleleng members in the early morning of may
18, 1995 at commonwealth avenue, quezon city. The police officers claimed that it was a shoot-out
between them and the kuratong baleleng members while spo2 eduardo de los reyes claimed it was a
summary execution or rub-out.
the preliminary investigation conducted by the deputy ombudsman for military affairs resulted in
the dismissal of the cases after finding that the incident was a legitimate police operation. However, the
review board led by deputy ombudsman francisco villa resulted in the filing of multiple murder cases
against the petitioner and his companion where he was indicted as a principal.
upon motion by the petitioner and his co-police officers with leave from the sandiganbayan, a
motion for reconsideration was filed with the office of the ombudsman who amended the 11 informations
on march 1, 1996 charging the petitioner , romeo acop and francisco zubia, jr., as mere accessories.
on march 5-6,1996, the accused questioned the jurisdiction of the sandiganbayan over the 11
criminal cases since under republic act no. 7975, particularly section 2, paragraphs [a] and [c], the said
court has jurisdiction only if one or more of the principal accused has a rank of brigadier general (chief
superintendent) or higher and since the highest pnp officer charged as a principal accused is merely chief
inspector, the regional trial court of quezon city has jurisdiction to try and decide the same.
on may 8, 1996, the sandiganbayan issued a resolution transferring the case to the rtc of quezon
city which has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the cases under ra 7975. On may 17, 1996, the
office of the special prosecutor moved for a reconsideration and insisted that the cases should remain
with the sandiganbayan which was opposed by the petitioner and his co-accused.
while the motions for reconsideration were pending before the sandiganbayan, congress passed
into law republic act no. 8249 which was approved by the president on february 5, 1997 entitled an act
further defining the jurisdiction of the sandiganbayan, amending for this purpose pd 1606, as amended,
providing funds therefor which deleted the word principal in section 2, paragraphs [a] and [c] of ra 7975
thereby giving jurisdiction to the sandiganbayan criminal cases involving police generals like the
petitioners even though they are not charged as principals but merely accessories or accomplices. The
new law further provides that it shall be applicable to all cases which are pending in court before the
passage of the same provided trial has not begun at the time of its approval.
on march 5, 1997, the sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration
of the office of the special prosecutor and ruled that it stands pat in its resolution dated may 8, 1996
ordering the transfer of the 11 criminal cases to the rtc of quezon city. On the same day, however, the
sandiganbayan issued an addendum to its march 5, 1997 resolution where it that with the passage of ra
8249, the court admitted the amended informations in these cases and by the unanimous vote of 4 with
1 neither concurring nor dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the cases.
the petitioner questioned the said resolution of the sandiganbayan to the supreme court on the
following grounds:
1. Their right to due process of law and equal protection of the law was violated as a result of
the application of the new law by which restored to the sandiganbayan jurisdiction over their
cases especially so that the sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for 9 months the resolution of
the pending incident involving the transfer of these cases to the rtc of quezon city and waited
for the passage of the law to overtake such resolution and thereby rendering their vested
rights under the old sandiganbayan law moot;
2. The retroactive application of the new law violates their constitutional right against ex-post
facto law;
3. The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid innocuous provisions in
sections 4 and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old sandiganbayan law
thereby violating the one title one subject requirement of section 26 [1] article vi of the
constitution.
The petitioners-intervenors claimed that while the law (sections 4 and 7) innocuously appears to
have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the sandiganbayan, it is in fact a class legislation and an ex-post

126
facto law statute intended specifically to apply to all the accused in the kuratong baleleng case pending
before the sandiganbayan. Finally, if their case will be tried by the sandiganbayan, they will be deprived of
their two-tiered appeal to the sandiganbayan which they acquire under ra 7975 before recourse to the
supreme court could be made.
Held:
1. The contention that the law violates petitioners right to due process and equal protection of the law is
too shallow to deserve merit. It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the
equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements, namely:

a. It must rest on real and substantial distinctions;

b. It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
c. Must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
d. Must apply equally to all members of the same classAll of which are present in this case.
the classification between those pending cases involving concerned public officials whose trial
has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the
sandiganbayan jurisdiction under ra 8249, as against those whose cases where trial has already started
as of the approval of the law rests on substantial distinction that makes real differences. In the 1 st
instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter the parties have already
submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented documents. Since it is within the
power of congress to define the jurisdiction of the courts, it can be reasonably anticipated that an
alteration of that jurisdiction necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to provide for a remedy
in the form of a transitory provision. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in the
sandiganbayan but also in any court. It just happened that the kuratong baleleng cases are one of those
affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial has already begun are not affected by the
transitory provision under section 7 of the new law (ra 8249).
2. The petitioners argument that the retroactive application of the new law to the kuratong baleleng
cases constitutes an ex post facto law for they are deprived of their right to due process as they can
no longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under ra 7975 is without
merit.
in order that a law is an ex post facto law, the same must be one
a. Which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was
innocent when committed, and punishes such action;
b. Which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed;
c. Which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed;
d. Which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than
the law required a the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the
defendant;
e. Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of
a person to his disadvantage;
f. That which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies but in effect imposes a
penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;
g. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of amnesty (kay villegas kami, 35 scra 429; mejia vs. Pamaran, 160
scra 457; tan vs. Barrios, 190 scra 686; people vs. Sandiganbayan, 211 scra
241).
Ex post facto law prohibits the retrospectivity of penal laws. Ra 8249 is not a penal law. It is a
substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character.
The other contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under ra 7975 has
been diluted by the enactment of ra 8249 is incorrect. The same contention had been rejected by the
court several times in the cases of rodriguez vs. Sandiganbayan, 205 phil. 567; alviar vs. Sandiganbayan,
137 scra 63; nunez vs. Sandiganbayan, 111 scra 433; de guzman vs. People, december 15, 1982
considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by
law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition
against ex post facto laws. Moreover, the new law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial.

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3. The contention that the new sandiganbayan law violates the one title-one subject provision of the
constitution is without merit. The petitioners claim that the new does not define the jurisdiction of the
sandiganbayan but expands the same. But even assuming that that is true, the expansion of the
jurisdiction, does not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary
consequence of the amendments. The requirement that every bill must only have one subject
expressed in the title is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in this case, to include
subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. The congress, in
employing the word define in the title of the law, acted within its power since section 2, article viii of
the constitution itself empowers the legislative body to define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction
of various courts.
(note: though the supreme court rejected all the above arguments raised by the petitioner and the
intervenors who are against the trial of their cases with the sandiganbayan and prefer to have
their cases be tried and decided by the rtc of quezon city, they got what they want in the end
because it was held that the 11 criminal informations failed to alleged that they committed the
crimes in relation to their public office which is a jurisdictional requirement in order that the same
be tried by the sandiganbayan.
finally, sometime in may, 1999, the quezon city rtc to whom the said cases were raffled
dismissed the 11 murder cases as a result of the retraction made by the eyewitnesses. The same
was revived by the doj in april, 2001. The same was returned to the qc rtc to determine if the 2year provisional rule under the 2000 rules on criminal procedure is applicable)
2.a. Kay villegas kami, 35 scra 429
3. Sevilleja vs. Comelec, 107 scra 141
4. P vs. Ferrer, 46 & 56 scra
5. Tan vs. Barrios, october 18, 1990
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Chapter xxii-citizenship
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1. Effect of naturalization in another country
read:
a. Ramon labo, jr. Vs. Comelec, july 3, 1992
a.-1 ramon labo jr. Vs. Comelec, gr no. 86564,

august 1, 1989

Ramon labo, jr. Vs. The commission on elections and

lardizabal, g.r. no. 86564, august 1, 1989

luis

Citizenship; renunciation of; who takes the place of a disqualified winner in an election; res judicata
Unanimous en banc decision
(note: this is also important in your remedial law)
Cruz, j.
Facts:
1. The petitioner was proclaimed mayor-elect of the city of baguio on january 20, 1988;
2. On january 26, 1988, the private respondent filed a quo warranto case against the petitioner but no
filing fee was paid;
3. On february 10, 1988 or 21 days after the petitioner was proclaimed, the private respondent paid the
filing fee of p300.00;
4. Since the filing fee was paid beyond the reglementary period, the petitioner claims that the petition was
late because the payment of the filing fee is essential to the timeliness of an appeal, citing manchester vs.
Ca, 149 scra 562;

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5. The private respondent claimed he filed the petition on time because when he first filed the same, it
was treated by the comelec as a pre-proclamation controversy which needs no filing fee. When the
comelec treated it as a quo warranto case on february 8, 1988, he immediately paid the filing fee on said
date. Hence, the filing fee was paid on time.
Issues:
1. Was the petition for quo warranto filed on time?
2. Since the case was merely for determination on whether or not the petition was filed on time or not,
may the supreme court determine whether petitioner ramon labor, jr. Is qualified for the office of the city
mayor of baguio or not?
3. Since the petitioner won in the election and turned out to be not qualified for said position, who shall
take his place as the city mayor?
Held:
1. The petition was filed on time since the filing fee was paid immediately when the comelec treated the
same as a quo warranto and not a pre-proclamation controversy. However, even assuming that the filing
fee was paid late, the same was not traceable to the private respondent's fault or neglect. What is
important is that the filing fee was paid.
2. Normally, the case should end here as the sole issue raised by the petitioner is the timeliness of the
quo warranto proceedings against him. However, as his citizenship is the subject matter of the
proceeding, and considering the necessity for an early resolution of that more important question clearly
and urgently affecting the public interest, we shall directly address it now in this same action against him.
(del castillo vs. Jaymalin, 112 scra 629; alger electric vs. Ca, 135 scra 37; beautifont vs. Ca, january 29,
1988; sotto vs. Samson, 5 scra 733; republic vs. Paredes, 108 phil. 57; lianga lumber co. Vs. Lianga
timber co. , 76 scra 197; erico vs. Heirs of chigas, 98 scra 575; francisco vs. City of davao, 12 scra 628;
valencia vs. Mabilangan, 105 phil. 162; fernandez vs. Garcia, 92 phil. 592; li shiu liat vs. Republic, 21
scra 1039; samal vs. Ca, 99 phil. 30; us vs. Giminez, 34 phil. 74; tejones vs. Gironella, 159 scra 100 and
lianga bay logging vs. Ca, 157 scra 357).
in addition thereto, since the petitioner claims that the respondent comelec has prejudged the case
against him because it adopted the private respondent's comment which repeatedly asserted that he is
not a filipino citizen, with more reason that the supreme court shall now decide the case with finality
instead of returning the same to the comelec.
3. There are two administrative decisions involving the citizenship of the petitioner. On may 12, 1982, the
comelec held that he is a filipino citizen while on september 13, 1988, the commission on immigration and
deportation held that he is not a citizen of the philippines.
in a statement by the australian consul in the philippines, it was found out that ramon labo, jr. Was
granted australian citizenship by sydney on july 28, 1976.
however, labo claims that the petition to disqualify him because of his citizenship is already barred by
res judicata because of the earlier ruling of the comelec that he is a filipino citizen. It must be pointed out
that res judicata does not apply to questions involving citizenship (soria vs. Commissioner, 37 scra 213;
lee vs. Commissioner, 42 scra 561; sia reyes vs. Deportation board, 122 scra 478).
labo also claims that his naturalization in australia was annulled since it was found out that his
marriage to an australian was bigamous. This is without merit since even assuming it to be true, the same
did not automatically vest him philippine citizenship which could be reacquired only by: a) a direct act of
congress; b) by naturalization; and c) by repatriation. Since none of these is present to show that he was
able to reacquire philippine citizenship, labo is not considered a filipino citizen. As such, he is not even
qualified to be a voter under the constitution, much less as a candidate for the position of mayor in the
city of baguio.
labo claims further that the "futile" technicality should not frustrate the will of the electorate in
baguio city who elected him by a "resonant and thunderous majority. Again, this is without basis because
to be more accurate, he won by just over 2,100 votes. But even assuming further that he was elected
unanimously, the same voters of baguio city could not change the requirements of the constitution and the
local government code. The electorate had no power to permit a foreigner owing his total allegiance to the
queen of australia or at the least a stateless person to preside over them as the city mayor of baguio.
Only citizens of the philippines have that privilege. The probability that many of those who voted for him
may have done so in the belief that he was qualified only strengthens the conclusion that the results of
the elections cannot nullify the qualifications for the office now held by him.

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3. Who shall take the place of the petitioner then as the city mayor of baguio? Is the private respondent
entitled to it? He cannot for the simple reason that he obtained only the second highest number of votes
in the election and therefore, he was obviously not the choice of the people of baguio city.
it is true that in santos vs. Comelec, 137 scra 740 , the supreme court held that in cases like this, the
second placer shall take the place of the disqualified candidate since the latter was considered as noncandidate and all that he received are considered stray votes. The second placer, in effect, won by
default. Said decision was supported by 8 members of the court, three dissented, two reserved their votes
and one on leave. Re-examining said decision, the same shall be reversed in favor of the earlier case of
geronimo vs. Comelec, 136 scra 435, which is the more logical and democratic rule first announced in the
1912 case of topacio vs. Paredes, 23 phil. 238, and was supported by ten (10) members of the court
without any dissent. The vice mayor of the city of baguio shall be entitled to become the city mayor
instead of the private respondent.
b. Frivaldo vs. Comelec, june 23, 1989
c. Board of commissioners vs. De la rosa and william gatchalian, may 31, 1991
d. Aznar vs. Comelec, 185 scra 703
1-a. Effect of naturalization of wife and minor

children

read:
1. Burca vs. Republic,51 scra 248
2. Reyes vs. Deportation board,may 30,1983
2. Effect on the citizenship of an alien woman married

to a filipino citizen

read:
1. Moy ya lim vs. Comm. On immigration, 41 scra
3. Effect on the citizenship of a filipino woman on her
read:
1. Rep. Vs. Tandayag, 117 scra 637
4. Procedure for repatriation
read:
1. P vs. Avengoza, 119 scra 1
5. Cancellation of certificate of naturalization
read:
1. Schneider vs. Rusk, 377 us 163
2. Republic vs. Cokeng, 23 scra 559
3. Republic vs. Cokeng, 34 scra 668
4. Chan teck lao vs. Republic, 55 scra 1
5. Rep. Vs. Guy, 115 scra 244
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marriage to an alien.