(1)(a)

BELGIAN OVERSEAS CHARTERING AND SHIPPING N.V. and JARDINE DAVIES TRANSPORT
SERVICES, INC., v. PHILIPPINE FIRST INSURANCE CO., INC., | G.R. No. 143133 | June 5, 2002
Proof of the delivery of goods in good order to a common carrier and of their arrival in bad order at their destination
constitutes prima facie fault or negligence on the part of the carrier. If no adequate explanation is given as to how the
loss, the destruction or the deterioration of the goods happened, the carrier shall be held liable therefor.
Facts: On June 13, 1990, CMC Trading A.G. shipped on board the M/V 'Anangel Sky' at Hamburg, Germany 242
coils of various Prime Cold Rolled Steel sheets for transportation to Manila consigned to the Philippine Steel Trading
Corporation. On July 28, 1990, M/V Anangel Sky arrived at the port of Manila and, within the subsequent days,
discharged the subject cargo. Four (4) coils were found to be in bad order. Finding the four (4) coils in their damaged
state to be unfit for the intended purpose, the consignee Philippine Steel Trading Corporation declared the same as
total loss.
Petitioners refused to submit to the consignee's claim. Consequently, respondent paid the consignee and was
subrogated to the latter's rights. Subsequently, respondent instituted this complaint for recovery of the amount paid by
them, to the consignee as insured.
Petitioners imputed that the damage and/or loss was due to pre-shipment damage. In addition thereto, they argued
that their liability, if there be any, should not exceed the limitations of liability provided for in the bill of lading and other
pertinent laws. Finally, they averred that, in any event, they exercised due diligence and foresight required by law to
prevent any damage/loss to said shipment.
RTC dismissed the Complaint because respondent had failed to prove its claims. In reversing the trial court, the CA
ruled that petitioners were liable for the loss or the damage of the goods shipped, because they had failed to
overcome the presumption of negligence imposed on common carriers.
Issue #1: Whether or not a notation in the bill of lading at the time of loading is sufficient to show pre-shipment
damage and to exempt herein defendants from liability.
Held: NO. Mere proof of delivery of the goods in good order to a common carrier and of their arrival in bad order at
their destination constitutes a prima facie case of fault or negligence against the carrier. If no adequate
explanation is given as to how the deterioration, the loss or the destruction of the goods happened, the transporter
shall be held responsible. Petitioners failed to rebut the prima facie presumption of negligence in the case at bar.
True, the words "metal envelopes rust stained and slightly dented" were noted on the Bill of Lading; however, there
is no showing that petitioners exercised due diligence to forestall or lessen the loss. Having failed to discharge
the burden of proving that they have exercised the extraordinary diligence required by law, petitioners cannot
escape liability for the damage to the four coils.
Issue #2: Whether or not the consignee/plaintiff filed the required notice of loss within the time required by law.
Held: YES. Pursuant to Section 3, paragraph 6 of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), a failure to file a
notice of claim within three days will not bar recovery if it is nonetheless filed within one year. This one-year
prescriptive period also applies to the shipper, the consignee, the insurer of the goods or any legal holder of the
bill of lading. In the present case, the cargo was discharged on July 31, 1990, while the Complaint was filed by
respondent on July 25, 1991, within the one-year prescriptive period.
Issue #3: Whether or not the "PACKAGE LIMITATION" of liability under Section 4 (5) of COGSA is applicable.
Held: YES. In the case before us, there was no stipulation in the Bill of Lading limiting the carrier's liability. Neither did
the shipper declare a higher valuation of the goods to be shipped. This fact notwithstanding, the insertion of the
words "L/C No. 90/02447 cannot be the basis for petitioners' liability.
A notation in the Bill of Lading which indicated the amount of the Letter of Credit obtained by the shipper for the
importation of steel sheets did not effect a declaration of the value of the goods as required by the bill. In the light of
the foregoing, petitioners' liability should be computed based on US$500 per package and not on the per metric
ton price declared in the Letter of Credit.

(c) WALLEM PHILIPPINES SHIPPING, INC., v. S.R. FARMS, INC | G.R. No. 161849 | July 9, 2010
Facts: On March 25, 1992, Continental Enterprises, Ltd. loaded on board the vessel M/V Hui Yang, a shipment of
Indian Soya Bean Meal weighing 1,100 metric tons, for transportation and delivery from India to Manila, with SR
Farms as consignee. The vessel is owned and operated by Conti-Feed, with petitioner Wallem as its ship agent.
On April 11, 1992, the said vessel, M/V Hui Yang arrived at the port of Manila and was discharged and transferred
into the custody of the receiving barges. Upon checking the cargo, a shortage in the shipment of 80.467 metric tons
was found. Wallem then filed a Complaint for damages against Conti-Feed and on June 7, 1993, S.R. Farms filed an
Amended Complaint impleading Wallem as defendant.
Wallem denied the allegations of respondent claiming, among others, that S.R. Farms claim is already barred by
laches and/or prescription. RTC dismissed the petition. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC. Hence, this
petition.
Issue: Whether or not the claim against Wallem was timely filed.
Held: NO. Under Section 3 (6) of the COGSA, notice of loss or damages must be filed within three days of
delivery. Admittedly, respondent did not comply with this provision. Under the same provision, however, a failure to
file a notice of claim within three days will not bar recovery if a suit is nonetheless filed within one year from
delivery of the goods or from the date when the goods should have been delivered.
There is no dispute that the vessel carrying the shipment arrived at the Port of Manila on April 11, 1992 and that the
cargo was completely discharged therefrom on April 15, 1992. However, S.R. Farm erred in arguing that the
complaint for damages, insofar as the Wallem is concerned, was filed on March 11, 1993.
In the instant case, Wallem was only impleaded in the amended Complaint of June 7, 1993, or one (1) year, one
(1) month and twenty-three (23) days from April 15, 1992, the date when the subject cargo was fully unloaded
from the vessel. The filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date of the filing of the original; the statute
of limitation runs until the submission of the amendment. Hence, reckoned from April 15, 1992, the one-year
prescriptive period had already lapsed.

(2)(b) PAL v. SAVILLO | 557 SCRA 66 | July 4, 2008

Facts:

Savillo was a judge of the RTC of Iloilo. He was invited to participate in the 1993 ASEAN Seniors Annual Golf
Tournament in Jakarta Indonesia. So, in order to take part in such event, he purchased a ticket from PAL with
the following itinerary: Manila-Singapore-Jakarta-Singapore-Manila.
PAL would take them from Manila to Signapore, while Singapore Airlines would take them from Singapore to
Jakarta.
When they arrived in Singapore, Singapore Airlines rejected the tickets of Savillo because they were not
endorsed by PAL. It was explained that if Singapore Airlines honoured the tickets without PALS endorsement,
PAL would not pay Singapore Airlines for their passage.
Savillo demanded compensation from both PAL and Singapore Airlines, but his efforts were futile. He then sued
PAL after 3 years, demanding moral damages.
PAL , in its MTD, claimed that the cause of action has already prescribed invoking the Warsaw Convention
(providing for a 2 year prescriptive period). Both RTC and CA ruled against PAL.

Issues: Whether the NCC or the Warsaw Convention is applicable. Whether action has action prescribed?
Held: NCC. Therefore the action has not yet prescribed for the prescription period is 4 years.
If cause of action claims moral damages, not covered by Warsaw Convention. Article 19 of the Warsaw
Convention provides for liability on the part of a carrier for damages occasioned by delay in the transportation by air
of passengers, baggage or goods. Article 24 excludes other remedies by further providing that (1) in the cases
covered by articles 18 and 19, any action for damages, however founded, can only be brought subject to the
conditions and limits set out in this convention. Therefore, a claim covered by the Warsaw Convention can no longer
be recovered under local law, if the statue of limitations of two years has elapsed.
Nevertheless, this Court notes that jurisprudence in the Philippines and the United States also recognizes that the
Warsaw Convention does not exclusively regulate the relationship between passenger and carrier on an
international flight.
In U.S. v. Uy, this Court distinguished between the (1) damage to the passengers baggage and (2) humiliation he
suffered at the hands of the airlines employees. The First cause of action was covered by the Warsaw Convention
which prescribes in two years, while the second was covered by the provisions of the Civil Code on torts, which
prescribes in four years.
In Mahaney v. Air France (US case), the court therein ruled that if the plaintiff were to claim damages based solely on
the delay she experienced- for instance, the costs of renting a van, which she had to arrange on her own as a
consequence of the delay the complaint would be barred by the twoyear statute of limitations. However, where the
plaintiff alleged that the airlines subjected her to unjust discrimination or undue or unreasonable preference or
disadvantage, an act punishable under the US law, then the plaintiff may claim purely nominal compensatory
damages for humiliation and hurt feelings, which are not provided for by the Warsaw Convention.
In the Petition at bar, Savillos Complaint alleged that both PAL and Singapore Airlines were guilty of gross
negligence, which resulted in his being subjected to humiliation, embarrassment, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
fear and distress therefore this case is not covered by the Warsaw Convention.
When the negligence happened before the performance of the contract of carriage, not covered by the
Warsaw Convention. Also, this case is comparable to Lathigra v. British Airways. In that case, it was held that the
airlines negligent act of reconfirming the passengers reservation days before departure and failing to inform the
latter that the flight had already been discontinued is not among the acts covered by the Warsaw Convention, since
the alleged negligence did not occur during the performance of the contract of carriage but, rather, days before the
scheduled flight.
In the case at hand, Singapore Airlines barred Savillo from boarding the Singapore Airlines flight because PAL
allegedly failed to endorse the tickets of private respondent and his companions, despite PALs assurances to Savillo
that Singapore Airlines had already confirmed their passage. While this fact still needs to heard and established by
adequate proof before the RTC, an action based on these allegations will not fall under the Warsaw Convention,
since the purported negligence on the party of PAL did not occur during the performance of the contract of carriage
but days before the scheduled flight. Thus, the present action cannot be dismissed based on the Statue of Limitations
provided under Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention.