Bengzon vs Senate Blue Ribbon Committee - A case digest

JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ET. AL. vs. SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE
Facts:
Senator Enrile asks the Senate to look into the matter of the alleged acquisition of the Lopa
Group of the properties of Kokoy Romualdez which is a subject of sequestration by the PCGG.
Senator Enrile citing probable violations of Republic Act No. 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Section 5.
The petitioners representing Ricardo Lopa who passed away prior the decision of the court issued
this petition for prohibition and an issuance a temporary restraining order and/or injuctive relief
enjoin the Blue Ribbon committee of compelling them to appear before them.
Issues:
Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of
legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private
transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and
(3) the inquiry violates their right to due process.
Ruling:
The Supreme court granted the petition. The committee investigation wanted by Senator Enrile is
not in aid of a legislation, therefore is violative of the separation of powers between the Senate
or Congress and that Judiciary. The pending civil case of the petitioners under Civil Case No. 0035
before the Sandiganbayan is where these issues by the Senate should be discussed.
Saying further that the power of the Senate and Congress to conduct investigation in aid of
legislation is not absolute or without limitation.

In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of Writ of Habeas Corpus of CAMILO L. SABIO
v.
HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, et al.G.R. Nos. 174340, 174318 and 174177, 17 October
2006,Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. (En Banc)
The Congress power of inquiry encompasses everything that concerns the administration of
existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed legislation. It even extends to government
agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to
regulate or even abolish. So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses will be respected by
the investigating committees, it is the duty of the former to cooperate with the latter in their
efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of
every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its
Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (SenateRes.
No. 455) directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by
thePhilippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications
SatelliteCorporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the
allegedimproprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors. The Senate
invitedPresidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) Chairman Camilo L. Sabio to be
theresource person in a public meeting that would deliberate on the issues presented in Senate
Res. No.455.Chairman Sabio, however, declined the invitation, invoking Section 4, paragraph (b)
of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:
No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any
judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.
Senator Richard J. Gordon issued a
subpoena ad testificandum
, requiring Chairman Sabio andthe four PCGG Commissioners to appear in the public hearing
scheduled on August 23, 2006 andtestify on what they know relative to the matters specified in
Senate Res. No. 455. Again, ChairmanSabio refused to appear. Another notice was sent to
Chairman Sabio requiring him to appear andtestify on the same subject matter set on September
6, 2006, but Chairman Sabio still did not comply.Eventually, Chairman Sabio and the PCGG
Commissioners were arrested for contempt of the Senateand brought to the Senate premises
where they were detained.Chairman Sabio filed the present petition for
habeas corpus
(G.R. No. 174340) and, together with the four PCGG Commissioners and the PCGGs nominees to
PHC, petition for
certiorari
andprohibition (G.R. No. 174318). They allege that the investigating committees concerned
disregardedSec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 without any justifiable reason, the inquiries conducted by the
said committeesare not in aid of legislation, the inquiries were conducted in the absence of duly

published SenateRules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, and the said
committees are not vested with the power of contempt. In G.R. No. 174177, another petition for
certiorari
and prohibition, PHCand its officers and directors contend that the said committees have no
jurisdiction over the subjectmatter stated in Senate Res. No. 455, the same inquiry is not in
accordance with the Senates Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, the
subpoenae issued by Senator Gordon are void for having been issued without authority, the
conduct of legislative inquiry pursuant to SenateRes. No. 455 constitutes undue encroachment
by the Senate into justiciable controversies over whichseveral courts and tribunals have already
acquired jurisdiction, and the subpoenae violated their rightsto privacy and against selfincrimination. The respondents countered that the issues raised in the petitions involve political
questionsover which the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction; that Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been
repealed by the Constitution; that the investigating committees are vested with contempt power;
that the SenatesRules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation have been duly
published; that they have not violated any civil right of the PHC officers and directors, such as
their right to privacy andright against self-incrimination; and that the inquiry does not constitute
undue encroachment intojusticiable controversies.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution;2.) Whether or
not the investigating committees are vested with contempt power;3.) Whether or not the rights
to privacy and against self-incrimination of the PHC officersand directors have been violated
HELD:
The petitions are DISMISSED.
Sec. 4(b) of E.O. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent with the
constitutional provisions on the Congress power of inquiry, the principle of public accountability,
the policy of full disclosure, and the

right of access to public information.

Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is inconsistent withthe
constitutional provisions on the Congress power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec. 21), the principle of
public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II, Sec. 28), and the right of
access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7). The Constitution is the highest law of the land and
allprovisions of laws against it are invalid no matter how noble their intentions may be. The
Congress power of inquiry encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing
laws as well as proposed or possibly needed legislation. It even extends to governmentagencies
created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress toregulate or
even abolish, to which class the PCGG belongs. Sec. 4(b) exempts the PCGG membersand staff
from the Congress power of inquiry. This can not be countenanced. Nowhere in theConstitution
is any provision granting such exemption.Sec. 4(b) places the PCGG members and staff beyond
the reach of courts, Congress andother administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public
accountability, it only institutionalizesirresponsibility and non-accountability. The conduct of
inquiries in aid of legislation is not only intended to benefit Congress butalso the citizenry. The

Constitution seeks to promote transparency in policy-making and in theoperations of the

government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them toexercise
effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens canparticipate in
public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their
effectiveimplementation. An informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper
functioning of any democracy. Sec. 4(b) limits or obstructs the power of Congress to secure from
PCGG members andstaff information and other data in aid of its power to legislate. Again, this
can not be countenanced.
The investigating committees are vested with contempt power
The 1987 Constitution, in Section 21 of its Article VI, recognizes the power of investigation,not
just of Congress, but also of any of its committees. Significantly, this constitutes a direct

RECENT JURISPRUDENCE POLITICAL LAW

conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms which
theHouses can take in order to effectively perform the investigative function are also available to
thecommittees, like the power of contempt. Otherwise, Sec. 21 of Art. VI would be meaningless.
The subject inquiry does not violate rights to privacy and against self-incrimination
In evaluating a claim for violation of the right to privacy, a court must determine whether
aperson has exhibited a reasonable expectation of privacy and, if so, whether that expectation
hasbeen violated by unreasonable government intrusion. The subject inquiry focuses on the
actscommitted by the PHC officers and directors in the discharge of their duties as such. The
latter haveno reasonable expectation of privacy over matters involving their offices in a
corporation where thegovernment has interest, which matters are of public concern and over
which the people have theright to information. Indeed, the right to privacy is not absolute where
there is an overriding compelling state interest. The alleged anomalies in the PHILCOMSAT, PHC
and POTC, ranging inmillions of pesos, and the conspiratorial participation of the PCGG and its
officials are compelling reasons for the Senate to exact vital information from the PHC officers
and directors, as well as fromChairman Sabio and his Commissioners to aid it in crafting the
necessary legislation to preventcorruption and formulate remedial measures and policy
determination regarding PCGGs efficacy. Anent the right against self-incrimination, this may be
invoked by the PHC officers anddirectors only when the incriminating question is being asked,
since they have no way of knowing inadvance the nature or effect of the questions to be asked of
them. That this right may possibly be violated or abused is no ground for denying the
investigating committees their power of inquiry.So long as the constitutional rights of witnesses,
like Chairman Sabio and hisCommissioners, will be respected by the investigating committees, it
is the duty of the former tocooperate with the latter in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for
intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to
subpoenae, to respect the dignity of theCongress and its Committees, and to testify fully with
respect to matters within the realm of properinvestigation.

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O.
464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege
and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the
Constitution, and for Other Purposes. Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being
unconstitutional. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of
officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government
Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police
(PNP). The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to
appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud
in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3
which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress.
ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
RULING: No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive privilege. The
doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information must, as a matter of necessity, be kept
confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to
disclose information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public
interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of
legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it
and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons therefor. By the mere
expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

Demetria v Alba G.R. No. 71977, February 27, 1987

FACTS: Petitioners filed as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the National
Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general interest
common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by the
outcome of the reliefs prayed for. The petitioners assail the constitutionality of the first paragraph of Sec.
44 of PD 1177 or the Budget Reform Decree of 1977 with a petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. The contents of PD 1177 particularly that of the first paragraph of section 44
extends the privilege of the president to discriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office
or agency of the Executive Department of any program, project or activity of any department, bureau or
office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi and fulfill the requisites for suing as taxpayers
and concerned citizens.
HELD: The petitioners comply with the legal standing both as concerned citizens and taxpayers. As
concerned citizens, the petitioners bring the suit in quest of law and justice. The issue cries out to be
solved as justice demands not only for the vindication of the outraged right but also for the guidance of the
bench and bar, and as a restraint upon the future. Furthermore, the petitioner has standing to sue as
taxpayer. In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack
the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also
taxpayers. They have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation
and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. The
Supreme Court granted the instant petition. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 was
also declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

GUDANI VS. SENGA

FACTS: On Sept. 22, 2005, Sen. Biazon invited several senior officers of the AFP, including Gen. Gudani, to appear at a public
hearing before the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security concerning the conduct of the 2004 elections wherein
allegations of massive cheating and the Hello Garci tapes emerged. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum,
prohibiting Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan and company from appearing before the Senate Committee without Presidential approval.
Nevertheless, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan testified before said Committee, prompting Gen. Senga to order them subjected to
General Court Martial proceedings for willfully violating an order of a superior officer. In the meantime, President Arroyo issued EO
464, which was subsequently declared unconstitutional.
ISSUES: Whether or not E.O. 464 which provides among others that no AFP personnel shall appear before any congressional or
senate hearing without her approval is constitutional? YES
W/N the case can be subject to judicial review?
HELD: Insofar as E.O. 464 compelled officials of the executive branch to seek prior presidential approval before appearing before
Congress, the notion of executive control also comes into consideration. The
impression is wrong. The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before appearing in Congress
pertains to wholly different and independent specie of presidential authoritythe commander-in-chief powers of the President. By
tradition and jurisprudence, the commander-in-chief powers of the President are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as
that which may attach to executive privilege or executive control. SC holds that the President has constitutional authority to do so, by
virtue of her power as commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is liable under
military justice. At the same time, we also hold that any chamber of Congress which seeks to appear before it a military officer against
the consent of the President has adequate remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress
summons to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so inclined, the President may be
commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the
land which the President has the duty to faithfully execute.
Again, let it be emphasized that the ability of the President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn
on executive privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commanderin-chief to control the actions and speech of members of the
armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.
The commander-in-chief provision in the Constitution is denominated as Section 18, Article VII, which begins with the simple
declaration that [t]he President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines. Outside explicit
constitutional limitations, such as those found in Section 5, Article XVI, the commander-in-chief clause vests on the President, as
commander-in-chief, absolute authority over the persons and actions of the members of the armed forces. Such authority includes the
ability of the President to restrict the travel, movement and speech of military officers, activities which may otherwise be sanctioned
under civilian law.
Judicial relief as remedy: The refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before Congress is not absolute.
Inasmuch as it is ill-advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-inchief, it is similarly detrimental for
the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this
petition, since petitioners testified anyway despite the presidential prohibition. The remedy lies with the courts. It may thus be
subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Courts certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. To avoid
conflict, Congress must indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person for that matter, the possible needed

statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes critical safeguards that proscribe the
legislative power of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or Houses duly published
rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted without duly published rules of
procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition
that obligates Congress to adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights. Courts are empowered, under the constitutional principle of
judicial review, to arbitrate disputes between the legislative and executive
branches of government on the proper constitutional parameters of power. By this and, if the courts so rule, the duty falls on the
shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the
President has earlier
disagreed with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature to testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply
with the final orders of the courts.

ALVAREZ vs GUINGONA, JR.252 SCRA 695; January 31, 1996Justice Hermosisimia, JR.
FACTS:
RA 7720 (An Act converting The Municipality of Santiago, Isabela into an IndependentComponent
City to be known as City of Santiago) was just recently passed by Congress and signed
byPresident into law. Petitioners assail the validity of this RA because it has not met the minimum
averageannual income required under Section 450 of the LGC of 1991, that for a municipality to
be convertedinto a component city, it must, among others, have an average annual income of at
least P20 Million for the last two consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices. Such income
must be duly certified by theDepartment of Finance.
Petitioners claim that Santiago could not qualify into a component city because its
annualaverage income for the last two consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices falls
below therequirement, Average Annual Income for 1991 and 1992 (excluding the IRA)
P13,109,560.47
However, based on the certification issued by the Bureau of Local Government Finance of
theDepartment of Finance indicated, Average Annual Income for 1991 and 1992 (including the
IRA) P 20,974,581.97 thus, has met the requirements.Petitioners insisted that the IRA or
Internal Revenue Allotments are not actually income buttransfers or budgetary aid from the
National Government only and that they fluctuate, increase ordecrease, depending on factors like
population, land and equal sharing, hence should be excluded.
ISSUE: Whether or not the IRA forms part in the computation of income of LGUs.
HELD:
YES.Section 306 (i): Income is defined as all revenues and receipts collected or received
formingthe gross accretions of funds of the LGU. Thus, IRAs are items of income because they
form part of thegross accretion of the funds of the LGU, The IRAS regularly and automatically
accrue to the local treasurywithout need of any further action on the part of the local
government unit. They constitute incomewhich the local government can invariably rely upon as
the source of much needed funds.Section 450 (c ): Average Annual Income shall include the
income accruing to the general fund,exclusive of special funds, transfers and non recurring
income. IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income. There is no basis to classify the same as
special fund of transfer, since IRAs have a technicaldefinition and meaning all its own as used in
the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes itdistinct from special funds of transfers

referred to when the Code speaks of funding support from thenational government, its
instrumentalities and government owned or controlled corporations.

A Primer on the ZTE Broadband Deal Controversy

studentstrike.blogspot.com
"...illegal, grossly disadvantageous to the government and unjustly burdensome to the Filipino people because of the ridiculous
overpricing of this project and the huge kickbacks anticipated by those who brokered this anomalous deal," - Joey De Venecia, Senate
Hearing on the ZTE deal
What is the ZTE broadband deal?
The Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment Limited (ZTE) National Broadband Network Deal is a highly controversial, $329 million
contract signed by the Philippine and Chinese governments, witnessed personally by President Arroyo, last April 2007 in China.
The NBN project was a proposal of the Dept of Transportations and Communications (DoTC), a plan which started way back in 2005,
aiming to establish a internet broadband connection to local government units and government agencies nationwide.
Contract was lost
DoTC Sec. Leandro Mendoza signed the contract which was later reported "lost." The National Bureau of Investigation suspected that it
was stolen. The DoTC then "reconstituted" the contract, which ZTE and Mendoza signed late May 2007.
Supreme Court TRO
The Supreme Court has already issued a Temporary Restraining Order on the implementation of the contract last Sept 11, acting on a
petition by Iloilo Vice Governor Rolex Suplico saying that the contract violated existing laws requiring proper bidding and transparency.
Why is the deal controversial? What is the involvement of First Gentleman Mike Arroyo and the Arroyo family?
Jose "Joey" De Venecia III, son of House Speaker Jose De Venecia Jr., which is a known ally of the administration, divulged his
knowledge of the huge overpricing and kickbacks involved in the deal in an affidavit, and afterwards, in a Senate inquiry. Joey De
Venecia is the owner of Amsterdam Holdings Inc. (AHI), which lost the bid for the NBN project to ZTE.
Among other things, his testimony and other reports divulge the following:
Project hugely overpriced
The project was overpriced by about $130M (P6 B) in its first proposal and the current contract for implementation by about $89M (P4
B), which will be loaned by the RP gov't to China with interest.
"Powerful person" Abalos was the broker

COMELEC Chairman Benjamin Abalos brokered the deal as he was "golfing buddies" with some ZTE officials, something he did not
deny. In return, he and "his cabal" was to get $130 M in kickback. Abalos also reportedly went to China several times, enjoying
escapades paid for by the ZTE officials. He admitted having several trips to China.
Former NEDA Director Romulo Neri, was also bribed P200M by Abalos to endorse the contract, causing the former to reverse his
earlier recommendations questioning the deal.
FGMA and gang terrorizes JDV3, tells him to "back off!"
As De Venecia further asserted on the merits of his proposal, he gets "terrorized" in a "reconciliatory" meeting by Abalos, Mendoza, four
other men and First Gentleman Mike Arroyo.
De Venecia said that FG Mike Arroyo, whom he initially called the "mystery man", approached him in this meeting, and with a finger that
was about two inches from his nose, told him to back off. Arroyo wanted De Venecia to leave the deal and stop meddling.
FGMA fled the country a day before the Senate hearing, raising suspicion that he was avoiding the scandal.
While JDV3 consistently asserts that the President had no hand in the deal, the Senate hearing established that President Arroyo knew
of the deal and its onerous character but did not stop it and instead pushed for its implementation.

Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994
Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods
and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen
the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its administration by amending
the NationalInternal Revenue Code. There are various suits challenging the
constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in
fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630.
There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the
Constitution.

Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) of the
Constitution

Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear
analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the
Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives. To insist that
a revenuestatute and not only the bill which initiated the legislative process culminating
in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to
deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose
amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for
filingrevenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private
bills and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the
theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be

expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the
Constitution prohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by the Senateas a body is withheld
pending receipt of the House bill.
The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on
separate days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings
were done on the same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No.
1630 as urgent. The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of
printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of
a bill by the President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing
and distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weight of legislative practice.
G.R. No. L-23326: PHILCONSA vs Jimenez (Gimenez)
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836 insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and
commutation of vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress).
The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of
Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision
constitutes "selfish class legislation" because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and
gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re
election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service
and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24
months. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are
concerned, is another attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.
The Sol-Gen counter argued alleging that The grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers
objected to by the petitioner does not constitute "forbidden compensation" within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave
benefits under the said Act is merely "in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member" and, therefore, is not
an indirect scheme to increase their salary.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3836 is constitutional.
HELD: Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution, which reads:
"The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided by law, receive an annual
compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive
only of travelling expenses to and from their respective district in the case of Members of the House of Representatives and to and from
their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall
take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving
such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall
each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos."
When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only
P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: "No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected subsequent to approval of such increase." In
other words, under the original constitutional provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its
members, no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly elected subsequent to
the approval of such increase.

The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term compensation "other emoluments". This is
the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the
purview of the term "other emoluments."
"Emolument" as "the profit arising from office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed
to the possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites."
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one
possessing any office.
Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, to take
effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963. Retirement were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting
the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase. Such
provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is hereby declared unconstitutional
by the SC.

Tio vs Videogram Regulatory Commission (G.R. No. 75697)

Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram
operators adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram
Regulatory Board with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National
Internal Revenue Code provided that:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be
collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an
annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall
be subject to sales tax.
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of
law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price
or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing
a reproduction of any motion picture or audiovisual program.
Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the
other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED,
That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the
Metropolitan Manila Commission.
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of
videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement
or variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such
unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty
percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractors specific, amusement
and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in
government revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales
and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby

depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million in taxes each year. The unregulated
activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie industry.
Issues: (1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.
(2) Whether or not the DECREE is constitutional.
Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the states police power. The levy of the 30%
tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video
industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual
property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an
objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential
Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to
protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its
enactment, considering the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the
moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed
video tapes containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses
in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that
the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayors
permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in business.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION vs. PRADO - A case digest
Direct Filing
Facts:
Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the Judiciary. Under
its Sec 35 as implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28.
The franking privelege of the Supreme Court, COA, RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other
government offices were withdrawn from them.
In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the methods adopted
prior it becoming a law.
Issues: WON RA 7354 is unconstitutional.

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a
law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its
final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and
nays entered in the Journal.

- Violative of the Equal protection clause

Ruling:
The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further
that it's adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not
required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover
every single detail of the measure.
However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. The
distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that
make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.

Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

RUFINO TAN V . R AMON DEL ROSARIO, 237 SCRA 324)

Topic: Taxation of general professional partnerships v. ordinary business partnerships Facts:
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA 7496, commonly known as the Simplified Net
Income TaxationScheme (SNIT).
Issue and Ruling:
1. W/N the SNIT applies to partners in general professional
partnerships. YES. There is no distinction in income tax liability between a person who practices
his profession alone orindividually and one who does it through a partnership (whether registered
or not) with others in the exercise of acommon profession. Under the present income tax system,
all individuals deriving income from any source whatsoever are treated in almost invariably the
same manner and under a common set of rules. Although the generalprofessional partnership is
exempt from the payment of taxes (but it still has an obligation to file an income tax
returnmainly for administration and data), the partners themselves are liable for the payment of
income tax in theirindividual capacity computed on their respective and distributive shares of
profits.
Notes:
Differences between general professional partnerships and ordinary business partnerships:a.
A general professional partnership, unlike an ordinary business partnership (which is treated as
acorporation for income tax purposes and so subject to the corporate income tax), is not itself an
incometaxpayer. The income tax is imposed not on the professional partnership, which is tax

exempt, but on thepartners themselves in their individual capacity computed on their distributive
shares of partnership profits. b.
Ordinary business partnerships, no matter how created or organized, are taxable partnerships.
Generalprofessional partnerships are exempt partnerships. Under the Tax Code on income
taxation, the generalprofessional partnership is deemed to be no more than a mere mechanism
or a flow-through entity in thegeneration of income by, and the ultimate distribution of such
income to, respectively, each of the individualpartners.

Tobias v. Abalos
FACTS:

Prior to Republic Act No., 7675 also known as An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong into a Highly
Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong, Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative
district. A plebiscite was held for the people of Mandaluyong whether or not they approved of the said conversion.
The plebiscite was only 14.41% of the said conversion. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted yes whereas 7, 911 voted
no.

ISSUE: Whether or not the ratification of RA7675 was unconstitutional citing Article VI, Sections 5(1), 4 and 26(1)

HELD/RULING: For the purposes of discussion, lets breakdown all of the claimed violations to the 1987 Constitution.

Section 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof.

The creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct from the
subject of its conversion. Moreover, a liberal construction of the one-title-one-subject rule has been liberally adopted
by the court as to not impede legislation (Lidasan v. Comelec).

Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of registered
national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.

The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
members, unless otherwise provided by law. The emphasis on the latter clause indicates that the number of the
House of Representatives may be increased, if mandated via a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in
congressional representation is not unconstitutional.

Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section.

The argument on the violation of the above provision is absurd since it was the Congress itself which drafted,
deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law.

The petition is thereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.