OROLA V. Rural Bank of Pontevedra Inc.

Case
Facts:
Trinidad Laserna Orola died intestate. She was survived by her husband Emilio Orola and their six minor
children. The estate consisted of property located in Pontevedra, Capiz. Portions of the property were
devoted to the development and production of sugar. Emilio Orola was appointed guardian not only over the
persons of his minor children but also over their property. Emilio filed a petition with the RTC for the
settlement of the estate of his deceased spouse, Trinidad Laserna, and his appointment as administrator of
her estate. The RTC issued an order appointing Emilio Orola as administrator of the estate of his deceased
spouse.
As such administrator of the estate, Emilio took possession of the said parcels of land. He embarked on a
massive sugar production. However, in 1976 and 1977, there was a sudden collapse of the sugar industry.
Emilio Orola found it necessary to develop the swampy portion of the estate for the production of fish. To
finance the endeavor, he needed at least P600,000.00.
On September 11, 1980, Emilio Orola filed a motion in Sp. Proc. No. V-3639 for authority to negotiate a
P600,000.00 loan from the Central Bank of the Philippines for the full and complete development of the
fishpond portion of the estate, and to transfer the sugar account of the estate from the PNB to the Republic
Planters Bank (RPB). the court granted the motion of the administrator and authorized him to negotiate the
loan through the Rural Bank of Capiz (Rural Bank of Pontevedra, Capiz) and to transfer the sugar account of
the estate to the RPB in Roxas City. Emilio then filed an application with the Rural Bank for a financing loan
of P600,000.00.
Orola failed to pay the amortizations of the loans to the Rural Bank. This prompted the Rural Bank to file an
application with the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages
over the lots.
Josephine Orola and her siblings, Myrna, Angeline, Manuel, Antonio and Althea, filed a Complaint against the
Rural Bank, their father Emilio and the Ex-Officio Provincial Sheriff for the nullification of the Promissory
Notes and Real Estate Mortgages. They alleged that the real estate mortgage contracts were null and void
because the same were never submitted to and approved by the RTC. Moreover, they were hoodwinked by
their father into signing the contracts of lease and amended contracts of lease, promissory notes and deeds
of real estate mortgages as security for the P600,000.00 loan on the assurance that they would be benefited
therefrom; moreover, they did not receive the proceeds of the said loans. As such, the extrajudicial
foreclosure of the real estate mortgages and the sale of the property covered by the said deeds were null
and void.
In its answer to the complaint, Rural Bank averred that the RTC authorized and even approved the amended
contracts of sale executed by Antonio, Manuel and Josephine Orola and the defendant Emilio Orola. It
further averred that the plaintiffs had agreed to the execution of the mortgages of the property subject of
the said deeds, and conformed to the said amended contracts before the RTC in the intestate estate
proceedings approved the same; they were also notified of the balance of their account, and of the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgages, and the subsequent sale of the property covered by
the said mortgages at public auction after they refused to pay their account despite demands. As such, the
plaintiffs were estopped from assailing the real estate mortgages and the extrajudicial foreclosure thereof
and the sale of the lots covered by the said deeds at public auction.
The Rural Bank presented the Real Estate Mortgage in the Office of the Register of Deeds.

Issue : W/N the subject mortgages constituted over the real estate
properties are void for non compliance with the mandatory regulations of
Rule 89.
Held:

The subject mortgages are null and void.

Section 2, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court provides that, upon
application of the administrator and on written notice to the heirs,
the court may authorize the administrator to mortgage so much
as may be necessary of the real estate for the expenses of the
administrator, or if it clearly appears that such mortgage would
be beneficial to the persons interested.
However, respondent Orola failed to secure an order from
the intestate estate court authorizing him to mortgage the
subject lots and execute a real estate mortgage contract
in favor of respondent Rural Bank. What the intestate estate
court approved in its December 17, 1982 Order was the authority
incorporated in the amended contracts of lease respondent Orola
gave to petitioners Josephine, Manuel and Antonio Orola so that
the said lots could be mortgaged to the respondent Rural Bank as
security for the P600,000.00 loan under their respective names.
In fine, the intestate estate court authorized the
petitioners, not respondent Orola, to mortgage the said
lots to respondent Rural Bank. Moreover, under Section 7 of
Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, only the executor or administrator
of the estate may be authorized by the intestate estate court to
mortgage real estate belonging to the estate; hence, the order of
the estate court authorizing the petitioners to mortgage the realty
of the estate to the respondent Rural Bank is a nullity.
The respondents must have realized that the order of the
intestate estate court authorizing petitioners Manuel, Antonio and
Josephine Orola to mortgage the lots was void because
respondent Emilio Orola caused the real estate mortgage
contracts in favor of respondent Rural Bank to be executed by his
children, petitioners Josephine, Manuel and Antonio Orola, acting
as attorneys-in-fact of the administrator of the estate. However,
the estate court had not appointed petitioners Antonio, Josephine
and Manuel Orola as attorneys-in-fact of respondent Emilio Orola
empowered to execute the said contracts. Hence, they had no
authority to execute the said Real Estate Mortgage Contracts for
and in behalf of respondent Orola, in the latters capacity as
administrator of the estate.

Worse, respondent Orola failed to submit the real estate mortgage

contracts to the intestate estate court for its consideration and
approval. To give approval means to confirm, ratify, or to consent
to some act or thing done by another. Unless and until the said
contracts are approved by the intestate estate court, the same
cannot have any binding effect upon the estate; nor serve as
basis for any action against the estate and against the parcels of
land described in the said contracts belonging to it.

Landingin vs. Republic, GR No. 164948, June 27,

2006,
(Special Proceedings Adoption: Consent and Abandonment)
Facts: Diwata Ramos Landingin, a US citizen of Filipino parentage filed a
petition for the adoption of 3 minors, natural children of Manuel Ramos, the
formers brother, and Amelia Ramos. She alleged in her petition that when
her brother died, the children were left to their paternal grandmother for
their biological mother went to Italy, re-married there and now has 2 children
by her second marriage and no longer communicates from the time she left
up to the institution of the adoption. After the paternal grandmother passed
away, the minors were being supported by the petitioner and her children
abroad and gave their written consent for their adoption.
A Social Worker of the DSWD submitted a Report recommending for the
adoption and narrated that Amelia, the biological mother was consulted with
the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits of adoption to her children,
she voluntarily consented.
However, petitioner failed to present the said social worker as witness and
offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the adoption.
Petitioner also failed to present any documentary evidence to prove that
Amelia assent to the adoption.
Issue: WON a petition for adoption be granted without the written consent of
the adoptees biological mother.
Held: No. Section 9, par (b) of RA 8552, provides that the consent of the
biological parent(s) of the child, if known is necessary to the adoption. The
written consent of the legal guardian will suffice if the written consent of the
biological parents cannot be obtained.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is
intended to protect the natural parental relationship from unwarranted

interference by interlopers, and to insure the opportunity to safeguard the

best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
The written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity
of the decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child
requires that his consent must be obtained before his parental rights and
duties may be terminated and re-establish in adoptive parents. In this case,
petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption.
Moreover, abandonment means neglect and refusal to perform the filial and
legal obligations of love and support. Merely permitting the child to remain
for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not such abandonment. To
dispense with the requirements of consent, the abandonment must be shown
to have existed at the time of adoption.

ORMILLA V. DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS

This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus filed for and in
behalf of Rogelio Ormilla, Rogelio Rivera and Alfredo Navarro, praying for
their release from confinement on the ground that an excessive penalty was
imposed on them.
At the outset, we note that only Ormilla signed his conformity to the petition
while Rivera and Navarro failed to manifest their conformity or sign the
verification. Hence, the instant petition pertains only to petitioner Ormilla.
Petitioner, together with Rivera and Navarro, was convicted of two counts of
rape and sentenced to reclusion perpetua for each count. He is presently
confined at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa and has served
approximately 17 years of his sentence.
In the instant petition, Ormilla alleged that he should be released from
confinement by virtue of Republic Act No. 8353 (R.A. No. 8353), otherwise
known as The Anti-Rape Law of 1997. He claimed that under the new rape
law, the penalty for rape committed by two or more persons was
downgraded to prision mayor toreclusion temporal. Thus, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua imposed on him is excessive and should be modified in
accordance with R.A. No. 8353. He prayed that he be released so he could
apply for pardon or parole.

In their Comment, respondents, argued that petitioner is ineligible for

parole, because Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law prohibits its
application to persons convicted of offenses punished by life imprisonment.
ISSUE: Whether the writ may be granted in favor of petitioner.
HELD:
The petition lacks merit.
Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be availed of in cases of illegal
confinement by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled
thereto. In Feria v. Court of Appeals,the Court held that the writ may also be
issued where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been
a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person;
(b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive
penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.
None of the above circumstances is present in the instant case.
With the enactment of R.A. No. 8353, petitioner claims that the penalty
of reclusion perpetua has become excessive, as the new law now punishes
rape with prision mayor, citing Article 266-B.
Petitioners reliance on Article 266-B is misplaced. Note that the penalty
of prision mayor is imposed for rape committed under paragraph 2 of Article
266-A which is committed by any person who inserts his penis into another
persons mouth or anal orifice; or any instrument or object, into the genital
or anal orifice of another person. It bears stressing that petitioner, together
with Rivera and Navarro, was charged with and convicted of rape by having
carnal knowledge of a woman using force and intimidation under Article 335,
which is now embodied in paragraph 1 of Article 266-A.
It must be emphasized that the same penalties were imposed under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8353. It is
clear therefore that R.A. No. 8353 did not downgrade the applicable
penalties to petitioners case.
Considering that the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed and
that petitioner is confined under authority of law, the petition for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.