Thomas Kits van Heyningen

Grand Strategy Seminar Professor Dong

December 18, 2014
Part 1: Presidential Advisor

When making policy decisions for todays world, an

understanding of history is integral knowledge. History has much to
teach about the strategic outcomes different policies lead to, and
provides insight into what is successful and what is unsuccessful. As a
presidential advisor, I would advocate for a focus on foreign policy,
development of infrastructure, addressing income inequality, and
security policy. In our readings throughout the course, there are an
abundance of relevant lessons that can be applied to the modern
worlds political climate to help guide our decision-making processes.
Addressing diplomacy and foreign policy, I would promote an
interventionist approach, as history has shown that firm and credible
commitment can deter the risk and severity of war. Using force in the
early stages of a potential conflictsometimes even preemptively
can save much of the blood, tears, and destruction that accompany
war. By comparing and contrasting the foreign policy approaches of
Rome and Sparta, we can see the benefits an interventionist approach
has in peace, stability, and prosperity. Roman interventionist policy was
instrumental in the growth and sustained success of the Roman
Empire. Rome used an aggressive, deterrence-driven policy for dissent
and had quick military mobilization to address rebellion. . Rome had

garrisons and permanently stationed troops in allied territories, taking

the responsibility upon themselves to maintain peace. If there were
ever any murmurs of rebellion, these troops would quickly report the
information up the ladder, and troops would be dispatched to
efficiently suppress the revolts before they could gain momentum.
Rome, like the United States today, had the military might to back up
their expectations, so dissenters undeniably knew what to expect when
choosing to act in aggressive or unacceptable ways. This policy led to
periods of unprecedented peace, and the spread of universal Roman
values that gave homogeneity to the region. This is similar to the
interventionist policy that US President Ronal Reagan advocated in the
1980s. Outlining his beliefs, he stated, US policy must have an
ideological thrust which clearly affirms the superiority of the US and
western values of individual dignity and freedom, a free press, free
trade unions, free enterprise, and political democracy (National
Security Decision, 1983).
The dangers of soft foreign policy are also apparent in the years
leading up to the Peloponnesian War. After Persia was out of the
picture, the Aegean was wide open to Athenian trade, serving as the
catalyst for the rise of Athens as a dominant power. As Athens began to
grow economically through trade, they set up defensive-minded
alliances with many of their coastal neighbors, forming the Delian
League. As Athens ambitions grew, they began to use the Delian

league as an instrument of oppression, forcing these allies to pay

tribute in exchange for the protection they received from Athens.
Sparta had a very conservative foreign policy at the time, and many
were weary of entering into a costly, bloody, and potentially disastrous
war with Athens. However, Spartas allies in the Peloponnesian League
pressured them into standing up to Athens oppressions of their own
allies in the Delian League, and Sparta reluctantly obliged. The long,
bloody Peloponnesian War was brutal to everyone involved, and
although Sparta came out ultimately victorious, the costs of the war
made this a very hollow victory. From a modern perspective, this
conflict has much to teach about the repercussions of foreign policy
strategy. In the years building up to the conflict, Spartas conservative
foreign policy and domestic concerns allowed them to overlook the
gradual acts of Athenian aggression that helped transform the Delian
League into what was essentially an Athenian Empire. As time wore on,
Athens had definitively filled the vacuum of power left vacant by the
absence of Persia, and Sparta had no choice but to appeal to the pleas
from their allies and declare war with Athens. In the absence of a
decisive decision after the onset of Athenian aggression and allowing
Athens to grow into an empire, full-scale war was inevitable.
Welfare policy and other ways to reduce income inequality would
be another policy that I would emphasize the importance of. On a
variety of levels, these issues have far-reaching ramifications that

pertain to the overall wellbeing of a country. From the standpoint of the

government, someone who is living in poverty and unemployment
represents a large burden on the institutions designed to sustain a
basic quality of life. In these circumstances they are unable to
contribute to society, and are not able to be utilized as resources. From
a Sun Tzu-ian perspective, this is a loss of a valuable asset. There are
roughly 46.5 million people living under the poverty line (2012 US
Census), the largest amount in US history. Instead of having the means
to contribute financially or in other ways to the country, those below
the poverty line receive welfare benefits to stay afloat, straining the
government on a financial and resource standpoint. I would not
advocate for any cuts to benefits or welfare, but push for job creation
in the low-income sector to get the unemployed back to work. Large
instances of income inequality can be an extremely dangerous thing,
as it divides and antagonizes the country against itself. As history has
proved again and again, a divided country is a weak country, and
income inequality is usually a major culprit in this regard. In Ancient
Sparta, this would prove to become a defining hindrance to their
potential as a state, influencing their military strategy and limiting
their capabilities. Sparta utilized a large underclass of subjugated
workers called helots to do all of societies undesirable tasks. Their
social status lied somewhere between low-class citizen and slave, and
they were exceptionally unsatisfied with their quality of life. Helots

represented a numerical majority over the perioikoi and upper classes,

and as a result were a source of danger to those of higher social status.
Relations were very tense between the two classes, and there was the
constant fear that rebellion could erupt at any moment. Class relations
were so tense that Spartan leadership feared that any long-term
absence of their army would lead to a helot rebellion, as the army was
needed to suppress and control the majority class. As a result of this
constraint, Spartas military strategy had to be fairly limited in scope,
and it could not utilize its impressive army for far-away ventures
without putting the homeland at huge risk. Spartas mighty army and
its command of the alliance gave the Spartans enormous power, but if
they used it against a strong enemy outside the Peloponnesus, they
ran the risk of a helot rebellion (Thucydides, 7). While it is unlikely
that domestic unrest in the U.S. progresses to the point of needing a
significant amount of military power to intervene, it is undeniable that
any amount of turmoil in the homeland hurts the power of the nation
as a whole.
In almost all facets of life, infrastructure is the backbone of the
economic, military, and security capabilities of our country. Having a
secure, efficient, and utilitarian system of infrastructure is essential for
success as a country, and I would advise an allocation of funding to
continue to develop these capabilities in the U.S. In Ancient Rome, it is
abundantly clear how a strong system of infrastructure gave the

Romans a competitive advantage in a multitude of industries. While

there are countless Roman technological advances that were pioneered
in Ancient Rome, the most significant infrastructural development was
the creation of reliable roadways. From an economic standpoint,
superior Roman roads were a major factor in the success of their
commercial trade. Lucrative commercial trade was the economic
backbone of the Roman Empire, and their longevity can certainly be
attributed to their investment in the infrastructure that enabled easy,
reliable trade. Roads were not only for trade, however, and they served
a significant military purpose. By having a well-established and reliable
system of roads, the Roman army could move very quickly, easily
mobilizing to wherever they were needed in the Empire. This enabled
them to use an aggressive, interventionist policy when dealing with
dissent and rebellion: another factor that undoubtedly contributed to
the success and longevity of the Empire.
Both domestic and abroad security policy is primarily dependent
on quality and actionable intelligence. Because of this, I would
recommend allocating a large percentage of defense funding to
programs and agencies that allow for the attainment and analysis of
intel. Having actionable intelligence is the most important asset a
military can have, as it allows for a preemptively effective use of
resources and the minimization of casualties. In the Punic Wars,
Carthage was able to expose the informational gap with Rome to gain

a definitive advantage on the battlefield, allowing them to contend and

defeat a much larger army in multiple battles. Rome was a formidable
military force in nearly every aspect but one: an intelligence capability
that was notably weak and underdeveloped. Unlike many of their peer
countries, they had no official intelligence service, spies, or cover
agents. There were no officers, generals, or high-ranking military
officials who were in charge of collecting and analyzing acquired
intelligence. Their loosely defined system of Roman intelligence
relied on questionable sources presenting their observations to the
Roman Senate, sometimes relying on those who had zero affiliation
with Rome or the Roman military at all. Because they had no
undercover reconnaissance in foreign territories, the majority of their
intelligence capabilities relied on the whims of those in the territories
where they were seeking information. If their priorities lined up, Rome
would sometimes receive quality intelligence, but if the foreign state
was unwilling to aid, they were clueless. Facing a formidable
commander in Hannibal in the fast-paced Punic War, these methods
would prove to be entirely inadequate at producing actionable
intelligence, and Rome was at a huge disadvantage as a result. The
most blatant failure of the Roman intelligence system was its failure to
discover Hannibals strategy of crossing the Alps before it was too late,
but there are countless other examples that point to lapses in strategic
intelligence negatively effecting the Roman war effort. Carthage had

reportedly been planning their invasion through the Alps for an

astounding 20 years, and it speaks to the inadequacy of the Roman
intelligence network that they were caught completely off guard when
the plan finally came to fruition. Many of the Celtic tribes that they
would have relied on for information on this front were secretly allied
with Hannibal, and provided no intel on this large-scale military
invasion. Rome gradually learned from its mistake, however, and
began to employ a more thorough military intelligence cycle in the
Second Punic War. The cycle consisted of naval raids for the sake of
intelligence gathering, interrogating prisoners to corroborate
information, and using this information to aid generals tasked with
seeking more information. This method was used to successfully give
Rome forewarning of Hasdrubal Barcas army, allowing Scipio to attack
Hasdrubal and send their army fleeing in another direction. The value
of intelligence for security purposes cannot be understated. For both
homeland security and the safety of our troops overseas, intelligence is
the most valuable asset in avoiding catastrophe. Ensuring that enough
funding is going to programs that obtain, analyze, and act on this
information would be a priority for me as a presidential advisor.
History is the most effective teacher, and should always be
looked to when analyzing an issue that demands a decision on policy.
For foreign policy, development of infrastructure, income inequality,

and security policy, there is ancient knowledge that we can use to help
guide our decisions in an informed and effective manner.
Part 2: Machiavellian Leadership

Bill Belichick, the legendary Head Coach of the New England

Patriots, has effectively used Machiavellian inspired tactics to lead the
Patriots to an unprecedented 14-year streak of dominance. In his 14
years of coaching the Patriots, he has won 3 Super Bowls, 5 AFC titles,
13 Divisional titles, and boasts an astounding overall record of 169-53.
This extended streak of dominance can be explained by an unorthodox
use of Machiavellian tactics to get the best out of his players,
sacrificing convention and loyalty for the betterment of the franchise.
In the Belichick era there has been only one constant: Hall-ofFame quarterback Tom Brady. On a year-to-year basis, the Patriots
undergo a multitude of personnel changes, never hesitating to part
ways with a player when Belichick decides it is in the best interest of
the team. This has led to countless shocking blockbuster trades and
free-agent lossesmost notably the departures of Wes Welker, Randy
Moss, Ty Law, Adam Vinatieri, Ty Warren, Richard Seymour, Mike
Vrabel, Willie McGinnest, Asante Samuel, and Lawyer Milloy. These
players were all fan-favorite Patriot legends, whose departures caused
huge outcries in Patriots Nation. Belichick, however, had no trouble
saying goodbye if he believed their departure would lead to an

outcome favorable for the team. Whether it was in a trade that yielded
draft picks or a free-agent negotiation where the player asked for a
little too much money, Belichick is cold and emotionless in his
personnel decision-making process. This is a classic Machiavellian
philosophy, as the ends (wins, playoff appearances) always justify the
means (betrayal of loyal players). As Machiavelli writes in Chapter 15
of The Prince, He who neglects what is done for what ought to be
done, sooner effects his ruin than his preservation.
Machiavelli argues that rulers should try their best to give off the
perception of virtue, but must also be willing to deliberately choose evil
when it will benefit the public good. The unfortunate controversy of
SpyGate is an example of Belichick taking this Machiavellian edict to
heart. In 2007, the Patriots were accused of stealing signals from videos of
the Jets practice tapes, and although this practice had only been illegal for less than 6
months after a change in rules, Belichick was caught, facing heavy sanctions as a result.
One of the most famous revelations from The Prince is the discussion pertaining
to being feared or loved as a ruler. The answer is that one would like to be both the one
and the other; but because it is difficult to combine them, it is far safer to be feared than
loved if you cannot be both (Chapter 17). Rulers who are loved act in ways that make
themselves vulnerable to being taken advantage of, and the ideal but hard-to-strike
combination is being both feared and loved simultaneously. By all accounts, Belichick
has achieved this over the course of his tenure as head coach of New England.
Players understand the strict and militant culture that Belichick instills,

and know that the hard work and effort they put in is for the greater
good. Where a lesser coach would be hated by his players for the same
demands, Belichick is able to strike the critical balance of
understanding and respect in the minds of his players. When a player
joins the Patriots, he has only two options: buy into the Patriot Way
the culture that Belichick demands of everyone on the team or find a
new job. This type of Machiavellian cruelty was on full display in the
treatment of NFL journeyman RB Jonas Gray between Weeks 12 and
13. Jonas Gray, one of Belichicks signature diamond-in-the-rough offseason finds, had the game of his life in Week 12 against the Colts.
Racking up 201 yards and 4 touchdowns, it was undoubtedly the
greatest statistical performance from a Patriots running back in the
history of the franchise. Heading into the Week 13 matchup against the
Lions, however, Gray accidentally slept through his alarm and showed
up late to Fridays practice. Belichick benched Gray for the entire game
in Week 13, and he has since been demoted to the second or even
third option in the past few weeks, having lost his job to the newlysigned RB LeGarrette Blount. There was no mercy, no understanding,
no second chances, and no special treatment for a player coming off a
great game. If youre late to practice on a Belichick team, you dont
play that week, and leave yourself vulnerable to someone else taking
your job, and thats exactly what happened to Jonas Gray.

Through Machiavellian tactics, Bill Belichick has enjoyed a wildly

successful coaching career through methods that are proven to get the
most out of his players. Through a carefully constructed persona, he
has struck the balance of being a coach that is both feared and loved
by his players. Through a willingness to act in an emotionless way, he
has been able to make the personnel decisions that have led to a
sustained 14-year streak of dominance. As the #1 seeded Patriots gear
up for another Super Bowl run under Coach Belichick in 2015, its hard
to argue that these tactics are ineffective.

Works Cited
Kagan, Donald. The Peloponnesian War. N.p.: Penguin Books, n.d. Print.
Machiavelli, Niccolo. The Prince. Trans. Peter Constantine. New York: Modern Library,
2008. Print.
Harsh Lessons: Roman Intelligence in the Hannibalistic War. Taylor & Francis, n.d. Web.
15 Dec. 2014.

<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/08850600490252704#.VJNhy3AD
bA>.
Polybius. The Rise of the Roman Empire. New York: Penguin Book, 1980. Print.
Reagan, Ronald. National Security Decision, 1983, Web, 1. 17 Dec.
2014 <http://www.breitbart.com/nationalsecurity/2011/02/06/nsdd-75---reagans-secret-strategy-fordefeating-the-soviet-union/>
Tzu, Sun. The Art of War. Trans. Samuel B. Griffith. New York: Oxford UP, 1963. Print.