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The Elements of Justice

4/24/2006
By David Schmidtz
Book Review
Reviewed by John Thrasher
Cambridge University
Press
2006

Page Count: 254

Paperback

Robert Nozick wrote that there is room for words on subjects

other than last words. David Schmidtz, philosophy professor at
the University of Arizona, has just produced a great work of
words other than last words. The book is Elements of Justice,
and considering that it deals with one of the oldest and thorniest
philosophical issues, that of justice, it is not surprising that
Schmidtz shies away from last words on the topic. One
shouldnt mistake the lack of last words for a lack of
seriousness or insight, though. Rather, it is just this appreciation
of the philosophical problems that leads Schmidtz to adopt this
method. Taking justice seriously may mean that we cant create
a formula or strict system of justice that will answer all the

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a formula or strict system of justice that will answer all the

relevant questions and put all disputes to rest.

Elements of Justice is an investigation, not a manual, and the joy

of reading the book is the joy of exploring new horizons with an
experienced guide. Schmidtzs prose is light and approachable,
even for the non-specialist, and reading Elements of Justice feels
more like having a conversation with a very intelligent and thoughtful friend than dutifully
reading a systematizing treatise. Schmidtz has many of the same philosophical virtues of
Nozick without some of the vices. They both write books that are fun to read while
addressing topics in ways that are rarely ponderous and seem willing to take risks in their
work that many would be unwilling, or unable, to take. Whereas Nozick can sometimes be
verbose and overreaching (see Philosophical Explanations) Schmidtz is economical, saying
more on some pages than most people will say in a book.
Buy here

In Elements of Justice, Schmidtz develops a pluralistic theory of justice that tries to show
how four basic elements fit together in a coherent theory. A pluralistic theory is inevitably
less elegant and impressive than a monistic theory of justice might be. Wouldnt it be
simpler if Schmidtz just gave us some method to determine whether an act is just or unjust?
Wouldnt it be simpler if there were just one complete standard of justice?
Schmidtz suggests that a periodic table with only one element would be simpler, but
wouldnt lead to good science. Things may look complex because they are complex. The
desire to have a simple, elegant solution to a problem does not guarantee that such a solution
exists. According to Schmidtz, theories, including theories of justice, are maps and no map
represents the only reasonable way of seeing the terrain. He argues that most theories tend
to be global, that is they try to answer all of the relevant questions. Theories do not need to
answer every question to be useful, however. They just need to get you where you need to
go. Schmidtz develops a theory that will hopefully get us where we want to go, namely to a
free and prosperous society that respects persons as separate and active agents.
Elements of Justice is a short book that is pregnant with ideas. At its best, this work points
the way toward the proper method of philosophy. All too often, outsiders and philosophers
themselves see analytic philosophy as a game. Schmidtz writes, If we could get past
philosophy to win, analytic philosophy would be a process of formulating generalizations
for context that admit of further refinement. Philosophy is about creating general
principles, not rulebooks. As Schmidtz states, Moral wisdom is less like knowing answers
to test questions and more like simply being aware that the test has begun. Philosophers
help shine a light on the important issues and principles--they try to make us aware of what
is at issue and what is at stake. Sometimes just being aware of the landscape is an important
part of getting where you need to go. The best map in the world wont help you if you arent
aware of your position on it.
With the idea of a theory as a map in mind, Schmidtz analyzes four areas, what he calls
elements, which together constitute justice. These elements are equality, desert,
reciprocity, and need. Each is important, and each taken as the whole of justice would not
only create an incomplete view of justice, it might even lead to a system of injustice. For
instance, if equality is considered the whole of justice, that is, if we create a system of
justice as equality we are bound to forget our other commitments and try to create equality
at the cost of all other things, including justice conceived more generally. As Schmidtz
claims, equality along one dimension entails inequality along other. Political equality
before the law may be, in some sense, incompatible with equality of economic outcome.
Whose equality are we to prefer? What type of equality? According to Schmidtz, we care
about equality, but we also care about desert, reciprocity, and need. An understanding of
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about equality, but we also care about desert, reciprocity, and need. An understanding of
each of these elements or principles informs our understanding of the other principles and
may check their excesses. For Schmidtz, we need all four principles to arrive at a robust
theory of justice.
Many in the classical liberal tradition are often wary of treating equality as an essential
element of justice. Schmidtz argues, though, that it is a mistake to be wary of equality,
rightly conceived. Equality rightly conceived is a political rather than a metaphysical
notion. One of the most important and notable ideas to come out of the classical liberal
tradition is, in fact, this notion of political equality. We notice that people are not the same;
we notice that they are not equal in any physical or intellectual sense, but we also recognize
that this inequality should have no bearing on how people ought to be treated as citizens.
In some sense then, political equality is necessary because of metaphysical inequality. As
Schmidtz rightly states, societys purpose is not to measure relative performance but to be a
good place to live. We need political equality to ensure that, in a world of metaphysical
inequality, we will not be arbitrarily oppressed and so that all people have a real chance to
live well, as free and responsible individuals.
Trying to go from an idea of political equality or equality of opportunity to an idea of
metaphysical equality or equality of shares inevitably runs into problems. Most notions of
equality of shares conceive of society or of the economy as a zero-sum game, that is, a game
where if someone wins another loses. Schmidtz argues forcefully, and I think successfully,
that this model of society is mistaken. Again, equality is important to a correct
understanding of justice, but equality must be checked and informed by notions of desert,
reciprocity, and need.
Notions of desert have, at least since Rawls, probably been underappreciated in
contemporary liberal theories of justice. The idea that no one deserves their place in society,
that no one deserves their natural endowments and, hence, that no one deserves most or all
of the success or failure underlies many contemporary versions of philosophical liberalism.
Schmidtz boldly responds that, the most prominent contemporary versions of philosophical
liberalism are mistaken. According to Schmidtz, desert is important and it plays a central
role in everyday moral life, and for good reason.
What does it mean to say that someone deserves their success? Does it mean that we have
to claim that they were responsible for every element of their success to be rightly deserving
of that success? Schmidtz argues that this is ultimately not what we mean when we talk
about deserving. The typical philosophical notion of desert is a historical notion that looks
to see if past actions justify present rewards. Schmidtz turns this notion on its head by
arguing that we can deserve things not on the basis of what we have done, but on the basis of
what we will do. Desert can be a forward looking notion as well as a backward looking one.
We can deserve opportunities, even opportunities that we receive as a result of luck, by not
wasting themby giving them their due.... This is the sense in which we can deserve a
chance; we deserve it in the sense that we are making a promise when we accept the chance
or opportunity to make ourselves worthy of it after the fact. In this sense, desert is
balancing the scales by doing justice to an opportunity.
This is not the only sense of desert that is relevant, Schmidtz claims:
What I call deserving a chance is not the whole of desert.
Desert is not the whole of justice. Justice is not the whole of
morality. This part of a larger theory tells us to treat opportunities
as challenges and to respect those who meet their own challenges
in fitting ways, but this part does not answer all questions.
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in fitting ways, but this part does not answer all questions.
Desert is important because it respects our status as separate and active agents, that is,
persons who have the ability to make choices and to be responsible for those choices. In this
way, desert must be an important element of justice. Schmidtz has contributed mightily to a
proper understanding of desert in this work and if someone stops reading after the section on
desert they will still gain something.
As with desert, reciprocity is often seen as suspect in some liberal conceptions of justice.
Some theorists worry about ideas of reciprocity not lining up properly with notions of
cooperation. The idea is that if we think reciprocity is important, we are apt to think that
repaying favors is an important aspect of justice and because of this, we may see
benevolence as a type of exchange that fulfills a debt. Schmidtz argues, however, that it is
somewhat unimportant whether notions of reciprocity endorse cooperation, because they
tend to induce cooperation. As Schmidtz writes, When people reciprocate, they teach
people around them to cooperate. In the process, they not only respect justice, but foster it.
Schmidtzs presentation of reciprocity is an important contribution to the literature that will
hopefully widen the debate on the topic.
The final element of Schmidtzs theory of justice is need. Schmidtz argues that needclaims are among justices irreducible primary elements and that need, not unlike the other
three elements, is important in clarifying and informing an understanding of the other
elements of justice. This is one of the more interesting and wide ranging sections of the
book and I cant hope to do justice to it here, but Schmidtz basically argues that what people
need is to be treated like human beings. That is, we need to take rights and the separateness
of persons seriously to really give people what they need. Schmidtz argues that if we dont
do this, we dont get justice....
In this sense, what we need and what we want are related. We need to be treated as human
beings in the sense that we need to take individual rights seriously, but we also want to live
in a prosperous and free society. Schmidtz, throughout this work, argues that by respecting
the elements of justice, we also ensure the creation of a better, more prosperous society. If
justice is a neighborhood, by respecting justice, we make that neighborhood a better place to
live. This should not be too surprising because as Schmidtz argues justice is a functional
response to an evolving problem. The problem is, how do we live together in peace,
freedom, and prosperity? The solution is justice.
Ultimately, Elements of Justice is an important work of philosophy not only because it points
us in the right direction to understand justice, but because it makes us look at the underlying
structure of justice differently. Like all great works of philosophy, it makes us step back and
look at the problem with fresh eyes. It takes an old question, what is justice? and shows it
to us in a way that makes us reconsider our old notions. Schmidtz challenges us to start
thinking again. By using his method to look at fundamental notions of justice, we are not
able to fall back on pat responses or to retreat to Rawls and Nozick to answer all of our
questions. We are forced to confront justice on its own terms.
Elements of Justice may not be the last word on justice, but it is a good place to start trying
to reproach questions of justice.

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