Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 88210 January 23, 1991
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, FRANKLIN M. DRILON, and PHILIPPINE AIRLINES
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (PALEA), respondents.
Ricardo V. Puno, Jr., Caesar R. Dulay, Solon, R. Garcia, Rene B. Gorospe & Bienvenido T. Jamoralinz, Jr. for
petitioner.
E.N.A. Cruz, Entero & Associates for PALEA.
In issue in this case is the authority of the Secretary of Labor to order the petitioner Philippine Airlines, Inc. to
reinstate officers and members of the union who participated in an illegal strike and to desist from taking any
disciplinary or retaliatory action against them.
The 1986-1989 Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the Philippine Airlines (PAL) and the
Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) provided for pay increases for various categories of
employees in Section 1, Article V entitled "PAY SCALE." Besides the pay increases, the CBA also provided for
the formation of a PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel
(f) . . . to undertake the study, review, correction, updating, complete overhaul, reclassification or re-grouping of positions as may be required of the payscale and position
classification to evolve updated payscales as soon as possible. (p. 76, Rollo.)
and that
(iii) . . . the Payscale Panel shall exert all reasonable efforts to complete its studies so as to
evolve new updated payscale and position classification by January 01, 1988, (p.
76, Rollo.)
As agreed by the parties, the PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel was formed in due time and went to work. By July,
1988, the Job Evaluation Committee of the panel had finished the reconciliation and initial evaluation of
positions in all departments within PAL.
In November, 1988, the PALEA members of the panel proposed the amount of PHP 3,349 as the minimum
salary entry level for the lowest job classification (Job Grade 1), while the PAL panel members proposed PHP
2,310 and a PHP 200 across-the-board increase for employees who could not avail of the payscale
adjustments. The panel conferences continued but there was no meeting of minds. PALEA would not accept
less than the amount it proposed, while the PAL panel members alleged that they had no authority to offer
more.
PALEA accused PAL of bargaining in bad faith.
On December 29, 1988, PALEA filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) a notice of
strike on account of: (1) bargaining deadlock; and (2) unfair labor practice by bargaining in bad faith.
On January 3, 1989, PAL filed with the NCMB a motion to dismiss PALEA's notice of strike for being premature
as the issues raised were not strikeable since there still existed a PAL-PALEA CBA which would not yet expire
until September 30, 1989 or with nine (9) more months to run.
During the conciliation meeting, the following evolved as the real issues:
1. determination of the minimum entry rate
2. wage adjustment due to payscale study

3. retroactive pay as a consequence of the upgraded payscale or goodwill bonus. (p.

38, Rollo.)
On January 6, 1989, Attorney Jesus C. Sebastian, NCMB-NCR Executive Conciliator/Mediator, advised
PALEA president, George Pulido, that the issues raised in the notice of strike were "appropriate only
for preventive mediation," hence, not valid grounds for a lawful strike. However, when subsequently a
representative of NCMB supervised the conduct of PALEA'S strike vote, PAL's counsel was baffled for it was
inconsistent with the NCMB order treating the strike notice as preventive mediation case No. PM-01-007-89.
PAL's counsel sought clarification from NCMB'S Sebastian. He assured PAL that the NCMB representatives
could not certify the strike vote.
On January 12, 1989, PALEA submitted the strike vote results to the NCMB. The next day, January 13, 1989,
PAL petitioned Secretary of Labor Franklin Drilon to immediately assume jurisdiction over the dispute in order
to avert the impending strike. The reasons for PAL's petition were, as stated by the Secretary himself:
The Philippine Airlines, Inc. is a corporation where the government has substantial equity
holding. It is engaged in an industry imbued with national interest. It is the flag carrier of the
Republic of the Philippines. Being the sole airline that services domestic routes, a
prolonged work stoppage will push back the national economic recovery program of the
government and consequently result to enormous damage to the economy of the country.
Hundreds of thousands of people directly and indirectly dependent on the continued
operations of the firm including the huge work force of the company will likewise be
prejudiced. The viability of the firm will also be endangered. These considerations have in
the past guided this Office in consistently exercising its powers under Article 263(g) of the
Labor Code, as amended, in handling labor disputes in the Company. The current situation
is no exception to this rule. This Office is of the view that the present work stoppage at
Philippine Airlines, Inc. will adversely affect the national interest. Thus, this Office hereby
assumes jurisdiction over the instant dispute. (pp. 38-39, Rollo.)
Inexplicably, the Secretary failed to act promptly on PAL's petition for his assumption of jurisdiction.
Seven (7) days passed with no reaction from Secretary Drilon. On January 20, 1989, PALEA declared a strike
paralyzing PAL's entire operations the next day, January 21, 1989, and resulting in serious inconvenience to
thousands of passengers who were stranded in 43 airports throughout the country, and the loss of millions of
pesos in unearned revenue for PAL. Late in the day, at 7:50 P.M., Secretary Drilon issued an order assuming
jurisdiction over the labor dispute which had already exploded into a full-blown strike, ordering the strikers to
lift their pickets and return to work, directing management to accept all returning employees, and resolving the
issues subject of the strike, by awarding the following monetary benefits to the strikers, while prohibiting the
company from taking retaliatory action against them:
. . . to resolve the impasse between the herein parties, this Office finds the following award
just and reasonable:
1. As far as the issue of minimum entry level is concerned, the company is directed to
adjust the same to P2,500.00 from its present level effective January 1, 1989.
2. The company is ordered to grant the amount of P3.3 million per month to cover acrossthe-board increases of covered regular employees subject to the distribution of the union
as embodied in their proposed scheme but in no instance should the lowest adjustment be
less than P300.00. In line with this, the scheme proposed by the union and submitted to
NCMB on January 20,1989 is herein adopted.
It is understood, however, that in items 1 and 2 above, the amount which is higher should
be granted.
3. A goodwill bonus in the amount of P3,000.00 to be paid in four equal pay period
installments beginning February 15 and up to March 31, 1989 is hereby awarded. (p.
39, Rollo.)
Declaring the strike valid, the Secretary stated:
Except for the fact that the Union's notice of strike was treated as a preventive mediation
case (at the instance of NCMB), it should be noted that the Union complied with all the
requirements for a valid strike. It observed the cooling-off periods required and submitted
the necessary strike vote. If ever there is any ground to discipline the Union officers for
non-compliance with the law, it would be based on the "non-filing" of the strike notice,

which "non-filing" was a consequence of the NCMB'S efforts to create the appropriate
atmosphere to resolve the dispute by treating the notice of strike as a preventive mediation
case. Otherwise put, the strike would have been legal in all respects had not the NCMB, in
its good faith effort to settle the dispute, treated the notice of strike as a case for preventive
mediation. Under these circumstances, and in the interest of industrial peace and the
promotion of the concept of preventive mediation, the parties are directed to desist from
committing any retaliatory act as a result of the work stoppage. The UNION, however, is
hereby warned that in the future this office will not tolerate such conduct and will apply the
full force of the law. (pp. 3-4, Rollo.)
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. The Secretary denied it in a minute resolution on May 8, 1989
or three months later.
In this petition for review, PAL avers that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused his discretion amounting to
excess or lack of jurisdiction:
1. in ruling on the legality of the strike;
2. in directing PAL to desist from taking retaliatory action against the officers and members of the Union
responsible for the illegal strike; and
3. in failing to seasonably exercise his authority to avert the illegal strike and protect the rights and interests of
PAL whose business is affected with public interest.
Under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, the Labor Secretary's authority to resolve a labor dispute within 30 days
from the date of assumption of jurisdiction, encompasses only the issues in the dispute, not the legality or
illegality of any strike that may have been resorted to in the meantine (Binamira vs. Ogan-Occena, 148 SCRA
677, 685 [1987]). Indeed, as found by the Labor Secretary in his Order of January 21, 1989, the only issues
involved in the dispute were:
1. determination of the minimum entry rate
2. wage adjustment due to payscale study
3. retroactive pay as a consequence of the upgraded payscale or goodwill bonus.
The legality or illegality of the strike was not submitted to the Secretary of Labor for resolution.
The jurisdiction to decide the legality of strikes and lock-outs is vested in Labor Arbiters, not in the Secretary of
Labor. Art. 217, par. a, subpar. 5 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.
(a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and
decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the case by the parties for
decision, the following cases involving all workers, whether agricultural or non- agricultural.
xxx xxx xxx
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this code, including questions involving
the legality of strikes and lock-outs. (Emphasis supplied.)
In ruling on the legality of the PALEA strike, the Secretary of Labor acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction.
There is merit in PAL's contention that the Labor Secretary erred in declaring the strike valid and in prohibiting
PAL from taking retaliatory or disciplinary action against the strikers for the damages suffered by the Airline as
a result of the illegal work stoppage.
PALEA's strike on January 20, 1989 was illegal for three (3) reasons:
1. It was premature for there was an existing CBA which still had nine (9) months to
run, i.e., up to September 30, 1989. The law expressly provides that neither party to a

collective bargaining agreement shall terminate nor modify such agreement during its
lifetime. While either party can serve a written notice to terminate or modify the agreement
at least sixty (60) days prior to its expiration date (known as the "freedom period") it shall
nevertheless be the duty of both parties to keep the status quo and to continue in full force
and effect the terms and conditions of the existing agreement during the freedom period
and/or until a new agreement is reached by them (Art. 253, Labor Code).
2. It violated the no-strike provision of the CBA, to wit:
The Association agrees that there shall be no strikes, walk outs,
stoppage, or slowdown of work, or any other form of interference with
any of the operations of the Company during the period between the
signing of the Agreement up to September 30, 1989. (Emphasis
supplied, p-118, Rollo.)
3. The NCMB had declared the notice of strike as "appropriate for preventive mediation."
The effect of that declaration (which PALEA did not ask to be reconsidered or set aside)
was to drop the case from the docket of notice of strikes, as provided in Rule 41 of the
NCMB Rules, as if there was no notice of strike. During the pendency of preventive
mediation proceedings no strike could be legally declared. The Secretary must have
thought so too, that is why he failed to act, for a period of seven (7) days, on PAL's petition
for him to assume jurisdiction over the labor dispute. The strike which the union mounted,
while preventive mediation proceedings were ongoing, was aptly described by the
petitioner as "an ambush" (p. 2, Rollo).
Since the strike was illegal, the company has a right to take disciplinary action against the union officers who
participated in it, and against any union members who committed illegal acts during the strike, Art. 264 of the
Labor Code provides:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities.. . .
xxx xxx xxx
Any worker whose employment has been terminated as a consequence of an unlawful
lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement with full back wages. Any union officer who
knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly
participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost
his employment status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall
not constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement
had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained PAL from taking disciplinary action against
its guilty employees, for, under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, all that the Secretary may enjoin is the holding of
the strike, but not the company's right to take action against union officers who participated in the illegal strike
and committed illegal acts. The prohibition which the Secretary issued to PAL constitutes an unlawful
deprivation of property and denial of due process for it prevents PAL from seeking redress for the huge
property losses that it suffered as a result of the union's illegal mass action.
The Secretary may have realized that he was partly to blame for PAL's damages because of his failure to act
promptly and use his authority to avert the illegal strike under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code.
Nevertheless, the Secretary's delay does not excuse the reckless and irresponsible action of the union in
declaring the illegal strike. The liability of the union for that is primary and exclusive.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is granted. The orders dated January 21, 1989 and May 8, 1989 of
the Secretary of Labor in NCMB NCR Case No. PM-01-007-89 are set aside and nullified insofar as the said
orders declare valid the PALEA strike of January 20-21, 1989 and restrain the petitioner from taking
appropriate legal action against PALEA's officers who led the illegal strike, and any union members who may
have committed illegal acts during said strike. The monetary benefits awarded to the union in the said orders
are, however, affirmed. Costs against respondent PALEA.

G.R. No. L-49983 April 20, 1992

FEDERATION OF FREE WORKERS, GERARDO ROSANA, FE DIVINA, PATRICIO MIRANDA, ARTURO
GUEVARRA, PURIFICACION CABRERA, ANGELINA GAVIOLA, TITO MARQUEZ, ELPIDIO ORINION,
DELIA ABUEG, TERESITA GARCIA, ELENA PADILLA, DOLORES DAILEG, CRESCELIA YBAES,
ELENA ORTILLA, MARIETA SALONGA, RODOLFO LABARINTO, AURELIA SAN JUAN AND LOURDES
LUNA, petitioners, vs.
HON. AMADO G. INCIONG AND ARIS (PHILIPPINES), INC., respondents.
This petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction seeks to annul and set
aside two decisions issued by the respondent Amado G. Inciong, Deputy Minister of Labor and Employment in
Re: Illegal Strike Staged by Federation of Free Workers at Aris Philippines and docketed as AJML-009-78,
entitled "Aris (Philippines) Inc., v. Federation of Free Workers, Gerardo Rosana, et al." The decision dated
April 11, 1978 declared the illegality of the strike; ordered all striking employees except the union officers to
return to work within twenty four (24) hours from the receipt of the order; revoked the previous order dated
April 2, 1978; granted the application for clearance to place all union officers under preventive suspension and
placed the administration of the union and the collective bargaining agreement directly under the Federation of
Free Workers. The second assailed decision dated January 29, 1979 granted the application for clearance to
terminate the services of eighteen (18) union officers and members of the FFW local union.
Petitioner Federation of Free Workers (FFW) is a legitimate labor organization duly registered with the Ministry
of Labor while petitioners Gerardo Rosana, Fe Divina, Patricio Miranda, Arturo Guevarra, Purificacion
Cabrera, Angelina Gaviola, Tito Marquez, Elpidio Orinion, Delia Abueg, Teresita Garcia, Elena Padilla, Dolores
Daileg, Crescelia Ybaes, Elena Ortilla, Marietta Salonga, Rodolfo Labarinto and Aurelio San Juan are union
officers of the FFW local union and Lourdes Luna is a member of the union at private respondent Aris
(Philippines), Incorporated. Private respondent Aris (Philippines), Incorporated (company) is a duly Organized
domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of leather gloves exclusively for export.
On September 17, 1977, a certification election was held in private respondent company under the supervision
of the Bureau of Labor Relations. Petitioner FFW garnered the highest number of votes and was subsequently
declared the authorized bargaining representative.
Consequently, private respondent company and petitioner FFW executed a memorandum of agreement on
February 3, 1978 wherein (a) the company recognized FFW as the bargaining representative of the rank and
file employees in the bargaining unit as of February 1, 1978; (b) the company and FFW shall negotiate for a
new collective bargaining agreement, but in the meantime FFW will continue to administer the then existing
CBA which expired on December 31, 1977 until a new CBA is executed; and (c) FFW will be entitled to all
union dues starting February 1, 1978. The same hold-over CBA contained a "no strike no lockout clause."
Pursuant to the aforementioned memorandum of agreement, the company and FFW met on February 7, 13,
15, 22 and 25, 1978 to negotiate for a new CBA that would govern the terms and conditions of employment of
the rank and file employees in the company. However, the parties failed to reach any agreement and a
deadlock ensued.
On February 28, 1978, the FFW through its president, petitioner Gerardo Rosana filed with the MOLE (now
DOLE) a notice of strike.
The company and FFW met on March 7, 13, 27 and 29, 1978 at the Bureau of Labor Relations for conciliation
upon summons by Director Carmelo Noriel. However, the parties still failed to reach any accord, so on March
29, 1978, FFW requested respondent Amado G. Inciong (then Acting Secretary) to assume jurisdiction over
the labor dispute and undertake to terminate the case within two weeks (see Rollo, p. 19).
On April 1, 1978, after the required thirty (30) days notice, the FFW staged a strike on all the three (3) plants of
the company (see Rollo, pp. 19-20).
The private respondent company having been classified as a vital industry pursuant to Letter of Instruction No.
368 and thus protected by Presidential Decree No. 823, as amended, against any strike, the respondent
Deputy Minister assumed jurisdiction over the dispute.
A marathon conference was held on April 2, 1978 between the company and FFW in Camp Crame with the
active mediation of respondent Inciong and Brig. Gen. Prospero Olivas.

During the conference, an order dated April 2, 1978 was issued by respondent Inciong directing the company
to give a wage increase of P3.00 for three years and to give one day additional vacation and one day
additional sick leave each and ordered the strikers to immediately return to work (see Rollo, pp. 32-33).
Notwithstanding the FFW's commitment to abide by the aforesaid order of April 2, 1978, the strikers not only
failed to lift the picket lines and return to work but intensified further the barricades.
On April 4, 1978, the company filed with the Secretary of Labor an urgent motion to declare the strike illegal
and to revoke the order of April 2. 1978 at the same time it applied for clearance to terminate the employment
of the illegal strikers with the Regional Office of the Department of Labor and Employment for violation of
Presidential Decree No. 823, as amended and General Order No. 5.
In the meantime, the illegal strikers were placed under preventive suspension,
The respondent Deputy Minister rendered a decision on April 11, 1978, to wit:
Based on the foregoing and by virtue of the powers of the Secretary of Labor under PD 823
as amended, and in order to serve as a warning to all other who violate or disregard the
law and the authorities duly empowered to enforce it, the following are hereby ordered;
1. The strike and the strike activities undertaken by the union are hereby declared illegal;
2. All striking employees except the union officers are hereby ordered to return to work within 24 hours from
the receipt of this order by the parties. The company may hire new employees to replace those employees
who fail to report for work without any valid reason within the prescribed period.
3. The Order of 2 April 1978 is hereby revoke(d). Instead, the last position of management under pressure
from the government and the strikers in the amount of P2.25 is hereby adopted, but alloted (sic) as follows:
(a) P1.00 for the first eighteen (18) months; and
(b) P1.25 for the second eighteen (18) months.
The P1.00 increase is retroactive to January 1, 1978, but the new 3-year collective bargaining agreement shall
be effective upon signing. In addition, the company shall give one additional vacation and sick leave each. All
other provisions of the collective agreement which expired in December 1977 are deemed retained for
incorporation into the new CBA.
4. Clearance is hereby granted to the company to place all union officers under preventive suspension.
However, the individual accountability of the union officers and members for the illegal strike and other illegal
activities of the union shall be the subject of further hearing by the Secretary of Labor. Atty. Virgilio Sy of the
Bureau of Labor Relations is hereby designated as hearing officer and he shall submit this report and
recommendation to the Secretary of Labor within 20 working days from start of hearing.
5. Pending determination of the accountability of the union officers, the administration of the union and the
collective bargaining agreement is hereby placed directly under the Federation of Free Workers (FFW).
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 23-25)
On the same date, the company and FFW, through the mediation of respondent Inciong entered into a
memorandum of agreement to end their dispute and the strike.
Pursuant to the aforementioned memorandum of agreement, the company and FFW executed a CBA on April
12, 1978 before respondent Inciong.
Anent the application for clearance to terminate the employment of the illegal strikers, the respondent Deputy
Minister rendered a decision on January 29, 1979 granting or approving the application for clearance to
terminate, the dispositive portion of which provides as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the application for clearance to terminate the
services of Gerardo Rosana, Fe Divina, Patricio Miranda, Arturo Guevarra, Purificacion
Cabrera, Angelina Gaviola, Tito Marquez, Elpidio Orinion, Delia Abueg, Teresita Garcia,

Elena Padilla, Dolores Daileg, Crescelia Ybaes, Elena Ortilla, Marietta Salonga, Rodolfo
Labarinto, Aurelio San Juan and Lourdes Luna is hereby granted and/or approved.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 30-31)
Hence, this present petition.This Court in a resolution dated March 30, 1979 issued a temporary restraining
order enjoining respondents from enforcing or executing the order dated April 11, 1978 and the decision dated
January 29, 1979 (see Rollo, pp. 44-45).
Petitioners stress that the respondent's order dated April 2, 1978 had become final and executory and
therefore his subsequent decision dated April 11, 1978 could not legally revoke the said final order.
The law invoked by the petitioners is section 10 of Presidential Decree No 823 as amended, to wit:
Sec. 10. Where a labor dispute has not been resolved by the Regional Offices, the Bureau of Labor Relations,
the National Labor Relation, Commission and the voluntary arbitrators within the reglementary period, the
Secretary of Labor is hereby authorized to assume jurisdiction over and summarily decide such dispute which
poses an emergency or is critical to the national interest as determined by him on advise and recommendation
of the Undersecretary of Labor, the Chairman of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Director of
the Bureau of Labor Relations. Where the Labor Dispute Involves A Notice Of Strike Or Lockout, the secretary
of Labor May, At Any Time, Assume Jurisdiction And Summarily Decide It. The decision of the Secretary of
Labor shall be final and executory unless stayed by the President of the Philippines. (Rollo, pp. 13-14)
In sum, petitioners insist that respondent Deputy Minister gravely abused his discretion and acted in total lack
or in excess of his jurisdiction when he issued his decisions dated April 11, 1978 and January 29, 1979.
On the contrary, private respondent company emphasizes that the fact that the order dated April 2, 1978
declared on its face that the awards given therein are the "final and complete resolution of the issues" in the
case does not mean that the said order may no longer be revoked or modified by the Minister (now Secretary)
of Labor. It notes that the aforequoted phrase simply means that all the issues raised by the collective
bargaining deadlock between the parties are already resolved and completely settled but did not make the
order final and executory as of the date of issuance. Hence, the respondent Deputy Minister has the authority
to modify and/or revoke his former order.
Furthermore, private respondent maintains that petitioners' failure to seasonably move for reconsideration or
appeal the decision dated April 11, 1978 made it final and therefore may no longer be reviewed by the
Supreme Court. It also underscores the fact that the petitioners are already estopped from questioning the
assailed decisions because the parties already executed a memorandum of agreement on April 11, 1978 and
subsequently, a collective bargaining agreement on April 12, 1958.
In conformity with the private respondent's stand, the respondent Deputy Minister through the Solicitor
General argues that since the order dated April 2, 1978 was not appealed to the Office of the President, it is
still well within the power of. the respondent Deputy Minister to reconsider and revoke the same (see Rollo, p.
128).
Furthermore, the Solicitor General stresses that the remedy of appeal was not pursued by the petitioners but
instead they allowed the decision dated April 11, 1978 to lapse into finality, hence, they cannot now contest the
correctness of the said decision through a petition for certiorari eleven (11) months after its promulgation
(seeRollo, p. 127).
The pivotal issue therefore, is whether or not the respondent Deputy Minister gravely abused his discretion
when he revoked his former order dated April 2, 1978.
After a careful review of the records of this case, the Court finds the petition devoid of merit and holds that the
respondent Deputy Minister did not gravely abuse his discretion when he revoked his previous order dated
April 2, 1978 and subsequently issued his decisions dated April 11, 1978 and January 29, 1979.
The order dated April 2, 1978 of the Minister of Labor never assumed finality by the very own acts of petitioner
union who broke its commitment to lift the strike when it resumed its blockades on the plant gates, erected
tents, posted new placards and circulated new leaflets, The narration of the incidents of the controversy by the
Deputy Minister of Labor in his decision dated April 11, 1978 shows that he even made a commitment to
recommend affirmation by the Office of the President of his April 2 order and to ask management not to raise
the illegality of the strike before the Department of Labor if only petitioner union would accept the same upon
the opening of working hours on the following Monday, April 4. He renewed this commitment on April 4, 1978
when the union officials promised before General Prospero Olivas at Camp Crame and Mayor Joseph Estrada

to dismantle their pickets and return to work immediately. However, petitioner union again backed out and
continued their massive picketing. This Court is perplexed why petitioner union would now have the temerity to
claim that said order of April 2, 1978 had attained finality.
Besides, it is very clear that the remedy of petitioners against the decision dated April 11, 1978 revoking his
previous order dated April 2. 1978 is appeal to the Office of the President.
While the special civil action of certiorari may be availed of in the alternative situation where an appeal would
not constitute a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, this is on the theoretical assumption that the right to
appeal is still available in the case. If, however, the remedy by appeal had already been lost and the loss was
occasioned by petitioner's own neglect or error in the choice of remedies, certiorari cannot lie is a substitute or
a tool to shield the petitioner from the adverse consequences of such neglect or error. The two remedies are
mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive (Manila Electric Company v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
88396, July 4, 1990, 187 SCRA 200, 205).
Applying this fundamental principle to the case at bar, it is readily evident that the petitioners had ample
opportunity to appeal the decision of the respondent Deputy Minister revoking his previous order dated April 2,
1978. The remedy of appeal to the Office of the President was not pursued by the petitioners. They
nevertheless deliberately allowed the period for appeal to pass without interposing one. Worse, despite the
then availability of the remaining period for appeal, the petitioners allowed the decision to lapse into finality.
Hence, they cannot now contest the legality of the decision through the present petition for certiorari.
It is noteworthy that the present petition hardly assailed the correctness of the decision dated January 29,
1979 despite petitioners supplemental petition seeking the reinstatement of the individual petitioners with full
backwages and without loss of seniority.
The respondent Deputy Minister already declared the strike staged by the union illegal in his decision dated
April 11, 1978, the pertinent portion of which provides:
It should be noted that the strike and the strike activities undertaken by the union were
patently illegal. First, the employer is engaged in a vital industry and, therefore, protected
by PD 823 as amended from strikes and lockouts. Second, the Secretary of Labor had
already assumed jurisdiction over the dispute and therefore, the parties are enjoined
against strikes and lockouts. Third, the parties themselves have voluntarily agreed to
maintain the status quo while waiting for the summary decision of the Secretary of Labor.
Moreover, even if the strike were not illegal per se, the strike activities staged by the union,
especially the establishment of massive human barricades at all entrances to the company
and the use of coercive methods to keep company officials aid other personnel out, were
definitely illegal. (Rollo, p. 20)
We already ruled in the case of Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc. (G.R. Nos. 88710-13,
December 19, 1990, 192 SCRA 396, 411) that "[a] strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the
Secretary of Labor of an assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal,
pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code its amended (Zamboanga Wood Products,
Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. 82088, October 13, 1969; 178 SCRA 482). The Union officers and members, as a result,
are deemed to have lost their employment status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act."
Unrebutted evidence shows that the individual petitioners actively participated in the illegal strike staged by the
union (see Rollo, pp. 27-26, 30). Hence, the termination of the services of the individual petitioners is justified.
All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the assailed decisions of the respondent Deputy Minister
are not tainted with arbitrariness that would amount to grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction and
therefore, We find no reason to disturb the same.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decisions of the Deputy Minister of Labor
dated April 11, 1978 and January 29, 1979 are hereby AFFIRMED. The temporary restraining order issued by
this Court on March 30, 1979 is hereby LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-82088 October 13, 1989

ZAMBOANGA WOOD PRODUCTS, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR, DIONISIO
ESTIOCA and THE STRIKERS, respondents.
Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako and Ramon C. Fernandez for petitioner.
Jose C. Espinas for private respondents.

GRINO-AQUINO, J.:
This is the seventh petition to come before this Court involving the parties herein, and the fifth by the herein
employer, Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. (the "Company" for short).
Dionisio Estioca was first hired by the petitioner in May 1977 as a clerk in its personnel department. In 1980,
he rose to become a personnel aide. On July 1, 1981, he became the Personnel Supervisor, a supervisory
and/or managerial position, next in rank to the Personnel Manager.
On March 5, 1982, the National Federation of Labor (NFL) of which Estioca was president, filed a petition for
direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the monthly-salaried employees
(90 more or less) of the Company "composed of administrative and supervisory personnel which is an
appropriate bargaining" unit (See petition in G.R. No. 67343).
Over the Company's opposition, the Med Arbiter on August 23, 1982, directly certified the NFL as the sole and
exclusive bargaining representative of all the monthly-salaried employees of the Company. The Company
appealed but it was dismissed by the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). It filed a petition forcertiorari in the
Supreme Court (G.R. No. 67343). The petition was dismissed for lack of merit on July 16, 1984.
On or about April 2, 1982, Estioca posted an announcement on the bulletin board of the employees' coffee
shop criticizing the Company for having earmarked the sum of P250,000 for the inter-department athletic
tournament (which he called "a farce and baloony") to be held that year, instead of using the money to pay the
employees' claims for living allowance. He urged the employees to boycott the sports event. The
announcement authored by him, reads:
TO ALL ZMEU MEMBERS:
GEORGE HAS VERBALLY APPROVED THE RELEASE OF P250,000.00 FOR THE
INTER-DEPARTMENT ATHLETICS FOR THIS YEAR ALONE. THE MOST SUDDEN
DECISION FOR THAT AMOUNT IS VERY, VERY MUCH SURPRISING ON THE PART OF
MANAGEMENT EVER SINCE.
THIS IS ENTIRELY A PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH TO DIVERT THE MINDS AND THE
ATTENTIONS OF THE EMPLOYEES WHO ARE CLAIMING FOR THEIR RIGHTS.
REMEMBER, OUR CLAIMS FOR DIFFERENTIAL OF OUR LIVING ALLOWANCE HAS
BEEN DENIED BY MANAGEMENT. THEN, WHY SPEND THE P250,000.00 FOR
ATHLETICS? GIVE US OUR LIVING ALLOWANCE FIRST BEFORE ANY ADDITIONAL
BENEFITS, THIS IS OUR MONEY.
I AM APPEALING TO ALL OFFICERS AND MEMBERS OF ZMEU TO WITHDRAW YOUR
PARTICIPATION IN THE ATHLETICS BEING ORGANIZED BY MANAGEMENT. THIS IS A
FARCE AND BALOONY I WANT YOU TO SEE ME IF YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEM WITH
THE ANNOUNCEMENT.
PRESIDENT

4/19/82 (p. 6, Rollo)

It turned out that Estioca's figures were incorrect for the athletic meet budget was P54,000 only.
On April 17, 1982, the employees filed a claim for their living allowance before the Labor Arbiter (NLRC Case
No. 0178-82).
On April 26,1982, Attorney Alberto De la Rosa, resident manager of the Company (whose main office is in
Makati, Metro Manila), wrote a letter to Estioca asking him to show cause why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him for:
a) Spreading false rumors regarding the so called P250,000.00 budget for athletics during
this interdepartment games;
b) For agitating employees to fight against management's plan and programs of athletic
activities which are good for the employees and company; and
c) For using company materials and equipment for personal and private use/purpose
without authority. (p. 7, Rollo.)
Estioca received the letter on April 26, 1982. He answered it on April 27, 1982. On April 30, 1982, he was
notified that the Company was terminating his service as personnel supervisor for loss of trust and confidence
in him. The termination was duly reported by the Company to the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE).
On May 3,1982, the respondent NFL, on behalf of the monthly-paid employees, filed with the Regional
Director of the MOLE in Zamboanga City, a notice of strike against the Company for the following grounds:
a. Illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, President of Zambowood Employees Local,
National Federation of Labor on April 30, 1982, on account of union activities;
b. Unfair labor practice, particularly union busting;
c. Non-payment of living allowances;
d. Employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper permit, contrary
to law. (p. 8, Rollo.)
The Company opposed the notice of strike because the grounds stated in the notice were not valid grounds for
a strike, the procedural rules for declaring a strike were not followed and the NFL, had no personality to file the
notice because its petition for certification as the collective bargaining agent of the monthly-salaried
employees was still pending resolution. (The Company's petition for review [G.R. No. 67343] of the BLR's
decision certifying the NFL as bargaining agent of the employees was dismissed by the Supreme Court on
July 16, 1984).
On May 23, 1982, the respondents struck.
On May 25, 1982, the Company issued a written order to the striking employees to return to work immediately
or be dismissed, but they paid no heed.
On May 27,1982, the Company asked the Minister of Labor to certify the controversy for arbitration.
On May 28, 1982, Estioca filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC's Arbitration Branch. It was
docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-IX-0216-2.
As the strike continued, the company sent letters of termination on June 17, 1982 to the strikers, dismissing
them for serious misconduct, willful disobedience, and abandonment. The Company sent a termination report
to the MOLE Regional Director in Zamboanga City, and asked that the employees' notice of strike be
dismissed for having become moot and academic.
On July 9, 1982, the Company filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City a complaint against the
striking employees for damages arising from the unlawful obstruction of its premises and asked the court to
issue an injunction against them. The strikers filed a petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court (G.R. No.
61236) alleging lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance over the dispute. On January 31, 1984, We

granted the writ ofcertiorari and permanently enjoined the Court of First Instance from taking further action in
the case. The Company refiled its action for damages in the Regional Office of the MOLE in Zamboanga City
on May 2,1984.
On August 18,1982, the Minister of Labor certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration
(Certified Case No. 0309). The pertinent portion of the certification reads as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the labor dispute at Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc.,
is hereby certified to the National Labor Relations Commission for compulsory arbitration
pursuant to Art. 264(6) of the Labor Code of the Philippines. In line with this certification, all
striking workers including those terminated by the company, must return to work
immediately and Management shall accept all returning workers under the same terms and
conditions prevailing previous to the work stoppage. The assistance of the military and
police authorities is requested for the effective and orderly implementation of this order.
The NLRC is given thirty (30) days from receipt hereof to terminate proceedings. (p. 12,
Rollo.)
In obedience to the Secretary's order, the strikers tried to return to work on August 19, 1982, but were rebuffed
by the Company.
Backtracking from its earlier request for compulsory arbitration, the Company filed a motion for reconsideration
of the Minister's order on the pretext that there was nothing more to arbitrate because the strikers had been
dismissed. When its motion for reconsideration was denied, the Company brought the matter up to this Court
on a petition for certiorari (G.R. No. 62893). The petition was dismissed on June 6, 1988.
On the other hand, the strikers filed a petition for mandamus in this Court (G.R. No. 64183) to compel the
Company to take them back. On September 15, 1988, this Court granted their petition. The dispositive portion
of its decision provided:
WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamus is granted. Public respondents are hereby
ordered to implement their return-to-work order, and private respondent must respect the
right of the eighty-one petitioners to resume their respective positions as of the time the
strike was called. The question as to the backwages and their seniority rights will be
determined in the compulsory arbitration proceeding. This decision is immediately
executory. (p. 13, Rollo.)
Pursuant thereto the NLRC on September 27, 1988, ordered the Company to readmit the striking employees
including those who had been dismissed. The Company alleged that the positions of the dismissed strikers
had been filled up. On November 18, 1988, fifteen (15) "replacements" filed a petition for injunction in the
NLRC, in Certified Case No. 0306, to enjoin the ertswhile strikers from returning to their jobs.
Adopting the report of Commissioner Gabriel Gatchalian who was commissioned to hear the case and its
incidents, the NLRC promulgated a decision on June 5,1984, denying the temporary employees' petition for
injunction, upholding the legality of the strike, ordering the reinstatement of the workers and Estioca, finding
the company guilty of contempt, and ordering it to pay a fine of P10,000. The dispositive portion of the
decision provided:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby entered as follows:
1. The respondent is declared guilty of unfair labor practice and is ordered to reinstate all
the striking workers including Dionisio Estioca to their former positions without loss of
seniority and with full backwages from the date they first presented themselves to return to
work on 19 August 1982 until their actual reinstatement; respondent is likewise ordered to
cease and desist from further committing the unfair labor practice acts on plaintiffs;
2. The petition for injunction filed by the fifteen (15) replacements hired after 19 August
1982 is denied and they are instead ordered to vacate their positions in favor of the
returning strikers entitled thereto; and
3. The respondent is declared guilty of contempt and is ordered to pay a fine of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000) to this Commission payable within ten (10) days from receipt of
the Decision." (p.59, Rollo.)

Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, the Company filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in
the Supreme Court (G.R. No. 68028) protesting that the decision of the NLRC was rendered without due
notice and hearing, hence, in violation of its right to due process.
In the meantime, Estioca's complaint for illegal dismissal (RAB- IX-0216-2) had also reached the Supreme
Court (G.R. No. 68429) as the Executive Labor Arbiter and the NLRC ordered his reinstatement as personnel
supervisor with backwages from April 30, 1982, up to his reinstatement (Annex A, pp. 36-37, Rollo).
The Supreme Court consolidated G.R. No. 68028 and G.R. No. 68429, and on October 29,1985, it required
the NLRC to hold a formal hearing in Certified Case No. 0309 and NLRC Case No. RAB-IX-0216-2 to
determine the legality of the strike and the dismissal of Estioca and other incidental questions.
Complying with that directive, the NLRC held hearings where evidence were presented by both sides. On
November 6, 1987, the NLRC reiterated its earlier decision dated June 5, 1985 Annex A, pp. 35-40, Rollo).
For the fifth time, the Company is before Us seeking relief from the NLRC's decisions. Its petition for certiorari
(G.R. No. 82088) alleges that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in holding that the dismissal of Estioca
was illegal; that the company committed unfair labor practice; that the strike on May 23, 1982 was lawful, and
that hence, the Company should reinstate the strikers including Estioca.
Complying with Our resolution ordering the respondents to comment on the petition, the private respondents
filed a comment. The Solicitor General filed no comment for the public respondent failed to comply with Our
order to send the records of the case to him.
After carefully considering the pleadings of both parties, We are not persuaded to grant the petition.
The petitioner's allegation that Estioca's position as personnel supervisor was managerial in nature was not
denied by Estioca. As next-in-rank to the personnel manager, he performed, in the latter's absence, the duties
and functions of that position. He was authorized to sign and approve sick leaves and vacation leaves of the
employees, to hire employees (Exhs. 12 and 14), discipline them, give them assignments, and prepare their
work schedules, special trips, and operations. He had no less than 17 employees under his direct supervision
(Exh. 22).
In view of Estioca's managerial position, the Company contends that its loss of trust and confidence in him
was a lawful cause for his dismissal. It argues that Estioca's act of posting a scathing and hostile
announcement in the Company's cafeteria, falsely denouncing the Company for its supposed extravagance
and fomenting discontent and resentment among the employees on account of the Company's supposed
indifference to their claim for increased living allowance, were acts of disloyalty to the management. Although
Estioca later apologized for his "intemperate language" and "impetuous action," which he admitted
exceeded "the bounds of tolerable dissent which management has the right to reprove or correct," and
expressed regret for "the difficult situation that I have created for the management" (Exh. 23, p. 19, Rollo), the
company was not appeased.
Was his dismissal justified?
Art. 245 of the Labor Code provides that "managerial employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any
labor organization." Estioca is, therefore, disqualified to head a union of the rank and file employees.
However, RA 6715 which took effect on March 21, 1989 (15 days after its publication in the "Philippines Daily
Inquirer") provides that although "supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor
organization of the rank and file employees," they may, however, "join, assist or form separate labor
organization of their own."
In the NFL's petition for direct certification as the bargaining representative of the monthly-salaried employees
of the Company, it was expressly alleged that said organization is "composed of administrative and
supervisory personnel." Consequently, Estioca's leadership of that union was not unlawful as it was not
inconsistent with his position as personnel supervisor of the Company. However, his act of posting a bellicose
announcement critical of the Company and based on false or erroneous information, was undoubtedly
prejudicial to the Company. The Company's reaction was understandable but too harsh in view of Estioca's
subsequent apology for his action. We, therefore, agree with the public respondent that Estioca's dismissal
from the service was illegal.
The other issue that addresses itself to this Court is whether the strike was illegal. The NLRC held that the
strike was not illegal:

Verily, the test of strike legality are its purpose, the means of execution and compliance
with legal requirements. From the evidence it appears that a notice of strike was filed by
petitioner on May 3, 1 982 and that a strike vote was taken whereby 79 voted yes while 3
voted no and forthwith reported the same to the Department seven days before the strike
commenced on May 23, 1982. Hence, Art. 264 of the Labor Code was complied with. The
ground of the strike is stated in the strike notice which charges unfair labor practice on the
part of respondent by way of union busting in addition to Estioca's dismissal for union
activities. The chronology of events disclose that on March 5, 1982, the union of monthly
paid employees filed a petition for certification election with the Bureau of Labor Relations.
After the filing of the same, as testified to by Estioca, which was not rebutted by respondent
Celso Abastillas and Lilio Navarro, Comptroller and Production Manager, respectively
called the employees on separate occasions sometime in April 1982 and asked them to
withdraw their membership from the union. Respondent also dismissed Dionisio Estioca,
union president, on April 30, 1982, (pp. 37-38, Rollo.)
The petitioner alleges that the strike was illegal because long before the union filed the notice of strike the
employees' claim for living allowance had already been filed in the Regional Arbitration Branch No. IV as
NLRC Case No. RAB-IX-01 78-82 (p. 21, Rollo). Said claim could no longer be invoked as a ground for the
declaration of a strike in view of Art. 265 of the Labor Code as amended, which provides:
ART. 265. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES.- x x x.
It shall likewise be unlawful to declare a strike or lockout after assumption of jurisdiction by
the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of the dispute to
compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases involving the grounds
for the strike or lockout.
The rationale of this prohibition, is that once jurisdiction over the dispute has been properly acquired by
competent authority, that jurisdiction should not be interfered with by the application of the coercive processes
of a strike.
We hold, however, that the illegal dismissal of Estioca and the Company's union-busting efforts were legal
grounds for the strike.
In fact, the Company did not deny the charge of union busting levelled by the respondents. The NLRC found
that
..., as testified to by Estioca, which was not rebutted by respondent, Celso Abastillas and
Lilio Navarro, Comptroller and Production Manager, respectively, called the employees on
separate occasions sometime in April 1982 and asked them to withdraw their membership
from the union. (p. 38, Rollo.)
Union busting, or interference with the formation of a union, constitutes an unfair labor practice (Art 248,
subpar. 4, Labor Code), hence a valid ground for the declaration of a strike.
The Company's refusal to accept the striking workers when they returned to work as directed in the Labor
Secretary's return-to-work order dated August 18, 1982, was unjustified. For that reason, the Company is
liable to pay the workers backwages. However, in view of the admission in the private respondents' comment
that in August 1984 the 81 striking workers were readmitted by the Company (p. 65, Rollo), they are entitled to
backwages for the period when they presented themselves for work until they were accepted by the Company
in August 1984.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. The decision of the National Labor Relations
Commission in Certified Case No. 0309 is affirmed with modification by ordering the petitioner Zamboanga
Wood Products, Inc. to reinstate the strikers, including Dionisio Estioca, to their former positions without loss
of seniority rights and with backwages from August 19,1982 when they offered to report for work, up to August
1984 when they were readmitted by the Company. With respect to Estioca, his backwages shall not exceed a
period of three (3) years from April 30, 1982. The fine of P10,000 imposed on the petitioner for its delay in
complying with the Secretary's return-to-work order, is affirmed. Costs against the petitioner.

G.R. No. L-31195 June 5, 1973

PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYMENT ORGANIZATION, NICANOR TOLENTINO, FLORENCIO,
PADRIGANO RUFINO, ROXAS MARIANO DE LEON, ASENCION PACIENTE, BONIFACIO VACUNA,
BENJAMIN PAGCU and RODULFO MUNSOD, petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. and COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
L.S. Osorio & P.B. Castillo and J.C. Espinas & Associates for petitioners.
Demetrio B. Salem & Associates for private respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:
The petitioner Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization (hereinafter referred to as PBMEO) is a
legitimate labor union composed of the employees of the respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., and
petitioners Nicanor Tolentino, Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente,
Bonifacio Vacuna, Benjamin Pagcu and Rodulfo Munsod are officers and members of the petitioner Union.
Petitioners claim that on March 1, 1969, they decided to stage a mass demonstration at Malacaang on March
4, 1969, in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig police, to be participated in by the workers in the first
shift (from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M.) as well as those in the regular second and third shifts (from 7 A.M. to 4 P.M. and
from 8 A.M. to 5 P.M., respectively); and that they informed the respondent Company of their proposed
demonstration.
The questioned order dated September 15, 1969, of Associate Judge Joaquin M. Salvador of the respondent
Court reproduced the following stipulation of facts of the parties parties
3. That on March 2, 1969 complainant company learned of the projected mass
demonstration at Malacaang in protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig Police
Department to be participated by the first shift (6:00 AM-2:00 PM) workers as well as those
working in the regular shifts (7:00 A.M. to 4:00 PM and 8:00 AM to 5:00 PM) in the morning
of March 4, 1969;
4. That a meeting was called by the Company on March 3, 1969 at about 11:00 A.M. at the
Company's canteen, and those present were: for the Company: (1) Mr. Arthur L. Ang (2)
Atty. S. de Leon, Jr., (3) and all department and section heads. For the PBMEO (1)
Florencio Padrigano, (2) Rufino Roxas, (3) Mariano de Leon, (4) Asencion Paciente, (5)
Bonifacio Vacuna and (6) Benjamin Pagcu.
5. That the Company asked the union panel to confirm or deny said projected mass
demonstration at Malacaang on March 4, 1969. PBMEO thru Benjamin Pagcu who acted
as spokesman of the union panel, confirmed the planned demonstration and stated that the
demonstration or rally cannot be cancelled because it has already been agreed upon in the
meeting. Pagcu explained further that the demonstration has nothing to do with the
Company because the union has no quarrel or dispute with Management;
6. That Management, thru Atty. C.S. de Leon, Company personnel manager, informed
PBMEO that the demonstration is an inalienable right of the union guaranteed by the
Constitution but emphasized, however, that any demonstration for that matter should not
unduly prejudice the normal operation of the Company. For which reason, the Company,
thru Atty. C.S. de Leon warned the PBMEO representatives that workers who belong to the
first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly , the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail
to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such
failure is a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal
strike;
7. That at about 5:00 P.M. on March 3, 1969, another meeting was convoked Company
represented by Atty. C.S. de Leon, Jr. The Union panel was composed of: Nicanor
Tolentino, Rodolfo Munsod, Benjamin Pagcu and Florencio Padrigano. In this afternoon

meeting of March 3, 1969, Company reiterated and appealed to the PBMEO

representatives that while all workers may join the Malacaang demonstration, the workers
for the first and regular shift of March 4, 1969 should be excused from joining the
demonstration and should report for work; and thus utilize the workers in the 2nd and 3rd
shifts in order not to violate the provisions of the CBA, particularly Article XXIV: NO
LOCKOUT NO STRIKE'. All those who will not follow this warning of the Company shall
be dismiss; De Leon reiterated the Company's warning that the officers shall be primarily
liable being the organizers of the mass demonstration. The union panel countered that it
was rather too late to change their plans inasmuch as the Malacaang demonstration will
be held the following morning; and
8. That a certain Mr. Wilfredo Ariston, adviser of PBMEO sent a cablegram to the Company
which was received 9:50 A.M., March 4, 1969, the contents of which are as follows:
'REITERATING REQUEST EXCUSE DAY SHIFT EMPLOYEES JOINING
DEMONSTRATION MARCH 4, 1969.' (Pars. 3-8, Annex "F", pp. 42-43, rec.)
Because the petitioners and their members numbering about 400 proceeded with the demonstration despite
the pleas of the respondent Company that the first shift workers should not be required to participate in the
demonstration and that the workers in the second and third shifts should be utilized for the demonstration from
6 A.M. to 2 P.M. on March 4, 1969, respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4,
1969, with the respondent Court, a charge against petitioners and other employees who composed the first
shift, charging them with a "violation of Section 4(a)-6 in relation to Sections 13 and 14, as well as Section 15,
all of Republic Act No. 875, and of the CBA providing for 'No Strike and No Lockout.' " (Annex "A", pp. 19-20,
rec.). The charge was accompanied by the joint affidavit of Arthur L. Ang and Cesareo de Leon, Jr. (Annex "B",
pp. 21-24, rec.). Thereafter, a corresponding complaint was filed, dated April 18, 1969, by Acting Chief
Prosecutor Antonio T. Tirona and Acting Prosecutor Linda P. Ilagan (Annex "C", pp. 25-30, rec.)
In their answer, dated May 9, 1969, herein petitioners claim that they did not violate the existing CBA because
they gave the respondent Company prior notice of the mass demonstration on March 4, 1969; that the said
mass demonstration was a valid exercise of their constitutional freedom of speech against the alleged abuses
of some Pasig policemen; and that their mass demonstration was not a declaration of strike because it was
not directed against the respondent firm (Annex "D", pp. 31-34, rec.)
After considering the aforementioned stipulation of facts submitted by the parties, Judge Joaquin M. Salvador,
in an order dated September 15, 1969, found herein petitioner PBMEO guilty of bargaining in bad faith and
herein petitioners Florencio Padrigano, Rufino Roxas, Mariano de Leon, Asencion Paciente, Bonifacio Vacuna,
Benjamin Pagcu, Nicanor Tolentino and Rodulfo Munsod as directly responsible for perpetrating the said unfair
labor practice and were, as a consequence, considered to have lost their status as employees of the
respondent Company (Annex "F", pp. 42-56, rec.)
Herein petitioners claim that they received on September 23, 1969, the aforesaid order (p. 11, rec.); and that
they filed on September 29, 1969, because September 28, 1969 fell on Sunday (p. 59, rec.), a motion for
reconsideration of said order dated September 15, 1969, on the ground that it is contrary to law and the
evidence, as well as asked for ten (10) days within which to file their arguments pursuant to Sections 15, 16
and 17 of the Rules of the CIR, as amended (Annex "G", pp. 57-60, rec. )
In its opposition dated October 7, 1969, filed on October 11, 1969 (p. 63, rec.), respondent Company averred
that herein petitioners received on September 22, 1969, the order dated September 17 (should be September
15), 1969; that under Section 15 of the amended Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, herein petitioners
had five (5) days from September 22, 1969 or until September 27, 1969, within which to file their motion for
reconsideration; and that because their motion for reconsideration was two (2) days late, it should be
accordingly dismissed, invoking Bien vs. Castillo, 1 which held among others, that a motion for

extension of the five-day period for the filing of a motion for reconsideration should be filed
before the said five-day period elapses (Annex "M", pp. 61-64, rec.).
Subsequently, herein petitioners filed on October 14, 1969 their written arguments dated October 11, 1969, in
support of their motion for reconsideration (Annex "I", pp. 65-73, rec.).
In a resolution dated October 9, 1969, the respondent en banc dismissed the motion for reconsideration of
herein petitioners for being pro forma as it was filed beyond the reglementary period prescribed by its Rules
(Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.), which herein petitioners received on October 28, 196 (pp. 12 & 76, rec.).
At the bottom of the notice of the order dated October 9, 1969, which was released on October 24, 1969 and
addressed to the counsels of the parties (pp. 75-76, rec.), appear the requirements of Sections 15, 16 and 17,
as amended, of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations, that a motion for reconsideration shall be filed
within five (5) days from receipt of its decision or order and that an appeal from the decision, resolution or
order of the C.I.R., sitting en banc, shall be perfected within ten (10) days from receipt thereof (p. 76, rec.).

On October 31, 1969, herein petitioners filed with the respondent court a petition for relief from the order dated
October 9, 1969, on the ground that their failure to file their motion for reconsideration on time was due to
excusable negligence and honest mistake committed by the president of the petitioner Union and of the office
clerk of their counsel, attaching thereto the affidavits of the said president and clerk (Annexes "K", "K-1" and
"K-2", rec.).
Without waiting for any resolution on their petition for relief from the order dated October 9, 1969, herein
petitioners filed on November 3, 1969, with the Supreme Court, a notice of appeal (Annex "L", pp. 88-89, rec.).
I
There is need of briefly restating basic concepts and principles which underlie the issues posed by the case at
bar.
(1) In a democracy, the preservation and enhancement of the dignity and worth of the human personality is the
central core as well as the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The inviolable character of man as an
individual must be "protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of
his person." 2
(2) The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve the ideals of liberty, equality and security "against the assaults of
opportunism, the expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of small encroachments, and the scorn and
derision of those who have no patience with general principles." 3
In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to withdraw "certain
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials, and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. One's rights to life, liberty and
property, to free speech, or free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may
not be submitted to a vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections." 4 Laski proclaimed that "the

happiness of the individual, not the well-being of the State, was the criterion by which its
behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its power, set the limits to the authority it was
entitled to exercise." 5
(3) The freedoms of expression and of assembly as well as the right to petition are included among the
immunities reserved by the sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas
that we abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish; or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the
minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the majority who refuse to listen. 6 And as Justice Douglas

cogently stresses it, the liberties of one are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are not
safe unless the liberties of all are protected. 7
(4) The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights
essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment. Thru these
freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their
suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The
citizen is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for
redress and protection as well as for the imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and
employees.
(5) While the Bill of Rights also protects property rights, the primacy of human rights over property rights is
recognized. 8 Because these freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well as supremely

precious in our society" and the "threat of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as
potently as the actual application of sanctions," they "need breathing space to survive,"
permitting government regulation only "with narrow specificity." 9
Property and property rights can be lost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights
are extinguished by the passage of time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of
government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of majorities, of the
influential and powerful, and of oligarchs political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as
they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and political institutions; 10 and such priority

"gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."

11

The superiority of these freedoms over property rights is underscored by the fact that a mere reasonable or
rational relation between the means employed by the law and its object or purpose that the law is neither

arbitrary nor discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to validate a law which restricts or impairs property
rights. 12 On the other hand, a constitutional or valid infringement of human rights requires a

more stringent criterion, namely existence of a grave and immediate danger of a substantive
evil which the State has the right to prevent. So it has been stressed in the main opinion of
Mr. Justice Fernando in Gonzales vs. Comelec and reiterated by the writer of the opinion
inImbong vs. Ferrer. 13 It should be added that Mr. Justice Barredo in Gonzales vs.
Comelec, supra, like Justices Douglas, Black and Goldberg in N.Y. Times Co. vs.
Sullivan, 14 believes that the freedoms of speech and of the press as well as of peaceful
assembly and of petition for redress of grievances are absolute when directed against public
officials or "when exercised in relation to our right to choose the men and women by whom we
shall be governed," 15 even as Mr. Justice Castro relies on the balancing-of-interests
test. 16 Chief Justice Vinson is partial to the improbable danger rule formulated by Chief Judge
Learned Hand, viz. whether the gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability, justifies
such invasion of free expression as is necessary to avoid the danger. 17
II
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after opining that the mass demonstration was not a declaration
of strike, concluded that by their "concerted act and the occurrence temporary stoppage of work," herein
petitioners are guilty bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the collective bargaining agreement with
private respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., inc.. Set against and tested by foregoing principles
governing a democratic society, such conclusion cannot be sustained. The demonstration held petitioners on
March 4, 1969 before Malacaang was against alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, not against their
employer, herein private respondent firm, said demonstrate was purely and completely an exercise of their
freedom expression in general and of their right of assembly and petition for redress of grievances in particular
before appropriate governmental agency, the Chief Executive, again the police officers of the municipality of
Pasig. They exercise their civil and political rights for their mutual aid protection from what they believe were
police excesses. As matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private respondent firm to protect herein petitioner
Union and its members fro the harassment of local police officers. It was to the interest herein private
respondent firm to rally to the defense of, and take up the cudgels for, its employees, so that they can report to
work free from harassment, vexation or peril and as consequence perform more efficiently their respective
tasks enhance its productivity as well as profits. Herein respondent employer did not even offer to intercede for
its employees with the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at the expenses of its workers? Was it also
intimidated by the local police or did it encourage the local police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to
defend its own employees all the more weakened the position of its laborers the alleged oppressive police who
might have been all the more emboldened thereby subject its lowly employees to further indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of expression well as their right of assembly and of petition against
alleged persecution of local officialdom, the employees and laborers of herein private respondent firm were
fighting for their very survival, utilizing only the weapons afforded them by the Constitution the
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human rights. The pretension of their employer that it would suffer loss
or damage by reason of the absence of its employees from 6 o'clock in the morning to 2 o'clock in the
afternoon, is a plea for the preservation merely of their property rights. Such apprehended loss or damage
would not spell the difference between the life and death of the firm or its owners or its management. The
employees' pathetic situation was a stark reality abused, harassment and persecuted as they believed they
were by the peace officers of the municipality. As above intimated, the condition in which the employees found
themselves vis-a-vis the local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally affected their right to individual
existence as well as that of their families. Material loss can be repaired or adequately compensated. The
debasement of the human being broken in morale and brutalized in spirit-can never be fully evaluated in
monetary terms. The wounds fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to his dying day, even as he cries in
anguish for retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, the primacy of human rights freedom of expression, of peaceful assembly and of
petition for redress of grievances over property rights has been sustained. 18 Emphatic reiteration of

this basic tenet as a coveted boon at once the shield and armor of the dignity and worth of
the human personality, the all-consuming ideal of our enlightened civilization becomes Our
duty, if freedom and social justice have any meaning at all for him who toils so that capital can
produce economic goods that can generate happiness for all. To regard the demonstration
against police officers, not against the employer, as evidence of bad faith in collective
bargaining and hence a violation of the collective bargaining agreement and a cause for the
dismissal from employment of the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly the compass of
the collective bargaining agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting speech" and therefore
inflicts a moral as well as mortal wound on the constitutional guarantees of free expression, of
peaceful assembly and of petition. 19

The collective bargaining agreement which fixes the working shifts of the employees, according to the
respondent Court Industrial Relations, in effect imposes on the workers the "duty ... to observe regular working
hours." The strain construction of the Court of Industrial Relations that a stipulated working shifts deny the
workers the right to stage mass demonstration against police abuses during working hours, constitutes a
virtual tyranny over the mind and life the workers and deserves severe condemnation. Renunciation of the
freedom should not be predicated on such a slender ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally enjoined by
any court, such an injunction would be trenching upon the freedom expression of the workers, even if it legally
appears to be illegal picketing or strike. 20 The respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the case at

bar concedes that the mass demonstration was not a declaration of a strike "as the same not
rooted in any industrial dispute although there is concerted act and the occurrence of a
temporary stoppage work." (Annex "F", p. 45, rec.).
The respondent firm claims that there was no need for all its employees to participate in the demonstration
and that they suggested to the Union that only the first and regular shift from 6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for
work in order that loss or damage to the firm will be averted. This stand failed appreciate the sine qua non of
an effective demonstration especially by a labor union, namely the complete unity of the Union members as
well as their total presence at the demonstration site in order to generate the maximum sympathy for the
validity of their cause but also immediately action on the part of the corresponding government agencies with
jurisdiction over the issues they raised against the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects of freedom of
expression. 21 If demonstrators are reduced by one-third, then by that much the circulation of the

issues raised by the demonstration is diminished. The more the participants, the more
persons can be apprised of the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of one-third of
their members will be regarded as a substantial indication of disunity in their ranks which will
enervate their position and abet continued alleged police persecution. At any rate, the Union
notified the company two days in advance of their projected demonstration and the company
could have made arrangements to counteract or prevent whatever losses it might sustain by
reason of the absence of its workers for one day, especially in this case when the Union
requested it to excuse only the day-shift employees who will join the demonstration on March
4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated in their telegram received by the company at 9:50
in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There
was a lack of human understanding or compassion on the part of the firm in rejecting the
request of the Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in order to carry out its mass
demonstration. And to regard as a ground for dismissal the mass demonstration held against
the Pasig police, not against the company, is gross vindictiveness on the part of the employer,
which is as unchristian as it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on the part of the
respondent firm to permit all its employees and workers to join the mass demonstration against alleged police
abuses and the subsequent separation of the eight (8) petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on the freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and freedom petition for redress
of grievances, the respondent firm committed an unfair labor practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of Republic Act No.
8 guarantees to the employees the right "to engage in concert activities for ... mutual aid or protection"; while
Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice for an employer interfere with, restrain or coerce employees
in the exercise their rights guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass demonstration staged by the workers of the respondent firm
on March 4, 1969, was for their mutual aid and protection against alleged police abuses, denial of which was
interference with or restraint on the right of the employees to engage in such common action to better shield
themselves against such alleged police indignities. The insistence on the part of the respondent firm that the
workers for the morning and regular shift should not participate in the mass demonstration, under pain of
dismissal, was as heretofore stated, "a potent means of inhibiting speech." 22
Such a concerted action for their mutual help and protection deserves at least equal protection as the
concerted action of employees in giving publicity to a letter complaint charging bank president with immorality,
nepotism, favoritism an discrimination in the appointment and promotion of ban employees. 23 We further

ruled in the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for the employees to come within the
protective mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) on Republic Act No. 875, "it is not
necessary that union activity be involved or that collective bargaining be contemplated," as
long as the concerted activity is for the furtherance of their interests. 24

As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts embodied in the questioned order of respondent Court dated
September 15, 1969, the company, "while expressly acknowledging, that the demonstration is an inalienable
right of the Union guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless emphasized that "any demonstration for that
matter should not unduly prejudice the normal operation of the company" and "warned the PBMEO
representatives that workers who belong to the first and regular shifts, who without previous leave of absence
approved by the Company, particularly the officers present who are the organizers of the demonstration, who
shall fail to report for work the following morning (March 4, 1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is a
violation of the existing CBA and, therefore, would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III, petitioner's brief).
Such threat of dismissal tended to coerce the employees from joining the mass demonstration. However, the
issues that the employees raised against the local police, were more important to them because they had the
courage to proceed with the demonstration, despite such threat of dismissal. The most that could happen to
them was to lose a day's wage by reason of their absence from work on the day of the demonstration. One
day's pay means much to a laborer, more especially if he has a family to support. Yet, they were willing to
forego their one-day salary hoping that their demonstration would bring about the desired relief from police
abuses. But management was adamant in refusing to recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of free
speech, free assembly and the right to petition for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did not find it necessary to demand from the workers proof of the
truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on them by the local police, it thereby concedes that the evidence of such
abuses should properly be submitted to the corresponding authorities having jurisdiction over their complaint
and to whom such complaint may be referred by the President of the Philippines for proper investigation and
action with a view to disciplining the local police officers involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of Industrial Relations found that the demonstration "paralyzed
to a large extent the operations of the complainant company," the respondent Court of Industrial Relations did
not make any finding as to the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This significant circumstance can
only mean that the firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not present evidence as to whether it lost
expected profits for failure to comply with purchase orders on that day; or that penalties were exacted from it
by customers whose orders could not be filled that day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders were
cancelled by the customers by reason of its failure to deliver the materials ordered; or that its own equipment
or materials or products were damaged due to absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the contrary, the
company saved a sizable amount in the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost of fuel, water and
electric consumption that day. Such savings could have amply compensated for unrealized profits or damages
it might have sustained by reason of the absence of its workers for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional guarantees of free speech and assembly as well as the right to petition
for redress of grievances of the employees, the dismissal of the eight (8) leaders of the workers for proceeding
with the demonstration and consequently being absent from work, constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly employees. Section 5 of Article II of the Constitution imposes
upon the State "the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all of the
people," which guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution
that "the State shall afford protection to labor ...". Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an agency of the
State is under obligation at all times to give meaning and substance to these constitutional guarantees in favor
of the working man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards would be merely a lot of "meaningless
constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to effect the
policy of the law "to eliminate the causes of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting the exercise by
employees of their right to self-organization for the purpose of collective bargaining and for the promotion of
their moral, social and economic well-being." It is most unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent Court of
Industrial Relations, the very governmental agency designed therefor, failed to implement this policy and failed
to keep faith with its avowed mission its raison d'etre as ordained and directed by the Constitution.
V
It has been likewise established that a violation of a constitutional right divests the court of jurisdiction; and as
a consequence its judgment is null and void and confers no rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at
the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be obtained through habeas corpus proceedings even long after
the finality of the judgment. Thus, habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release of an individual, who is
convicted by final judgment through a forced confession, which violated his constitutional right against selfincrimination; 25 or who is denied the right to present evidence in his defense as a deprivation of

his liberty without due process of law, 26 even after the accused has already served sentence
for twenty-two years. 27
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations and private firm trenched upon these constitutional
immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord preference to such rights and aggravated the inhumanity to
which the aggrieved workers claimed they had been subjected by the municipal police. Having violated these

basic human rights of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations ousted itself of jurisdiction and the
questioned orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity. Recognition and protection of such freedoms are
imperative on all public offices including the courts 28 as well as private citizens and corporations, the

exercise and enjoyment of which must not be nullified by mere procedural rule promulgated
by the Court Industrial Relations exercising a purely delegate legislative power, when even a
law enacted by Congress must yield to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human rights.
There is no time limit to the exercise of the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not
exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the printing of one article or the staging of one
demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to be invoked and exercised when exigent and
expedient whenever there are errors to be rectified, abuses to be denounced, inhumanities to
be condemned. Otherwise these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be vitiated by rule on
procedure prescribing the period for appeal. The battle then would be reduced to a race for
time. And in such a contest between an employer and its laborer, the latter eventually loses
because he cannot employ the best an dedicated counsel who can defend his interest with
the required diligence and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial resources with which to pay for
competent legal services. 28-a
VI
The Court of Industrial Relations rule prescribes that motion for reconsideration of its order or writ should filed
within five (5) days from notice thereof and that the arguments in support of said motion shall be filed within
ten (10) days from the date of filing of such motion for reconsideration (Sec. 16). As above intimated, these
rules of procedure were promulgated by the Court of Industrial Relations pursuant to a legislative delegation. 29
The motion for reconsideration was filed on September 29, 1969, or seven (7) days from notice on September
22, 1969 of the order dated September 15, 1969 or two (2) days late. Petitioners claim that they could have
filed it on September 28, 1969, but it was a Sunday.
Does the mere fact that the motion for reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat the rights of the
petitioning employees? Or more directly and concretely, does the inadvertent omission to comply with a mere
Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule governing the period for filing a motion for reconsideration or
appeal in labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The
answer should be obvious in the light of the aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the foregoing rules of
the Court of Industrial Relations over basic human rights sheltered by the Constitution, is not only incompatible
with the basic tenet of constitutional government that the Constitution is superior to any statute or subordinate
rules and regulations, but also does violence to natural reason and logic. The dominance and superiority of the
constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of Industrial Relations procedural rule of necessity should be
affirmed. Such a Court of Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case does not implement or reinforce or
strengthen the constitutional rights affected,' but instead constrict the same to the point of nullifying the
enjoyment thereof by the petitioning employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations rule, promulgated as it was
pursuant to a mere legislative delegation, is unreasonable and therefore is beyond the authority granted by the
Constitution and the law. A period of five (5) days within which to file a motion for reconsideration is too short,
especially for the aggrieved workers, who usually do not have the ready funds to meet the necessary
expenses therefor. In case of the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of fifteen (15) days has
been fixed for the filing of the motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10, Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec.
1, Rule 56, Revised Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the motion for reconsideration could have been
only one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday. This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the
Court of Industrial are concerned.
It should be stressed here that the motion for reconsideration dated September 27, 1969, is based on the
ground that the order sought to be reconsidered "is not in accordance with law, evidence and facts adduced
during the hearing," and likewise prays for an extension of ten (10) days within which to file arguments
pursuant to Sections 15, 16 and 17 of the Rules of the Court of Industrial Relations (Annex "G", pp. 57-60,
rec.); although the arguments were actually filed by the herein petitioners on October 14, 1969 (Annex "I", pp.
70-73, rec.), long after the 10-day period required for the filing of such supporting arguments counted from the
filing of the motion for reconsideration. Herein petitioners received only on October 28, 1969 the resolution
dated October 9, 1969 dismissing the motion for reconsideration for being pro forma since it was filed beyond
the reglementary period (Annex "J", pp. 74-75, rec.)
It is true that We ruled in several cases that where a motion to reconsider is filed out of time, or where the
arguments in suppf such motion are filed beyond the 10 day reglementary period provided for by the Court of
Industrial Relations rules, the order or decision subject of 29-a reconsideration becomes final and

unappealable. But in all these cases, the constitutional rights of free expression, free
assembly and petition were not involved.

It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of action and defenses presently available must be specifically
raised in the complaint or answer; so that any cause of action or defense not raised in such pleadings, is
deemed waived. However, a constitutional issue can be raised any time, even for the first time on appeal, if it
appears that the determination of the constitutional issue is necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis
mota of the case without the resolution of which no final and complete determination of the dispute can be
made. 30 It is thus seen that a procedural rule of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way

to a constitutional right. In the instant case, the procedural rule of the Court of Industrial
Relations, a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the constitutional rights invoked by
herein petitioners even before the institution of the unfair labor practice charged against them
and in their defense to the said charge.
In the case at bar, enforcement of the basic human freedoms sheltered no less by the organic law, is a most
compelling reason to deny application of a Court of Industrial Relations rule which impinges on such human
rights.30-a
It is an accepted principle that the Supreme Court has the inherent power to "suspend its own rules or to
except a particular case from its operation, whenever the purposes of justice require." 30-b Mr. Justice

Barredo in his concurring opinion in Estrada vs. Sto. Domingo. 30-c reiterated this principle and
added that
Under this authority, this Court is enabled to cove with all situations without concerning
itself about procedural niceties that do not square with the need to do justice, in any case,
without further loss of time, provided that the right of the parties to a full day in court is not
substantially impaired. Thus, this Court may treat an appeal as a certiorari and vice-versa.
In other words, when all the material facts are spread in the records before Us, and all the
parties have been duly heard, it matters little that the error of the court a quo is of judgment
or of jurisdiction. We can then and there render the appropriate judgment. Is within the
contemplation of this doctrine that as it is perfectly legal and within the power of this Court
to strike down in an appeal acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or committed with grave
abuse of discretion, it cannot be beyond the admit of its authority, in appropriate cases, to
reverse in a certain proceed in any error of judgment of a court a quo which cannot be
exactly categorized as a flaw of jurisdiction. If there can be any doubt, which I do not
entertain, on whether or not the errors this Court has found in the decision of the Court of
Appeals are short of being jurisdiction nullities or excesses, this Court would still be on firm
legal grounds should it choose to reverse said decision here and now even if such errors
can be considered as mere mistakes of judgment or only as faults in the exercise of
jurisdiction, so as to avoid the unnecessary return of this case to the lower court for the
sole purpose of pursuing the ordinary course of an appeal. (Emphasis supplied). 30-d
Insistence on the application of the questioned Court industrial Relations rule in this particular case at bar
would an unreasoning adherence to "Procedural niceties" which denies justice to the herein laborers, whose
basic human freedoms, including the right to survive, must be according supremacy over the property rights of
their employer firm which has been given a full hearing on this case, especially when, as in the case at bar, no
actual material damage has be demonstrated as having been inflicted on its property rights.
If We can disregard our own rules when justice requires it, obedience to the Constitution renders more
imperative the suspension of a Court of Industrial Relations rule that clash with the human rights sanctioned
and shielded with resolution concern by the specific guarantees outlined in the organic law. It should be
stressed that the application in the instant case Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules relied upon
by herein respondent firm is unreasonable and therefore such application becomes unconstitutional as it
subverts the human rights of petitioning labor union and workers in the light of the peculiar facts and
circumstances revealed by the record.
The suspension of the application of Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with reference to the
case at is also authorized by Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, the C.I.R. charter, which enjoins the
Court of Industrial Relations to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without
regard to technicalities or legal forms ..."
On several occasions, We emphasized this doctrine which was re-stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, speaking for
the Court, in the 1970 case of Kapisanan, etc. vs. Hamilton, etc., et. al., 30-e thus:
As to the point that the evidence being offered by the petitioners in the motion for new trial
is not "newly discovered," as such term is understood in the rules of procedure for the
ordinary courts, We hold that such criterion is not binding upon the Court of Industrial
Relations. Under Section 20 of Commonwealth Act No. 103, 'The Court of Industrial
Relations shall adopt its, rules or procedure and shall have such other powers as generally

pertain to a court of justice: Provided, however, That in the hearing, investigation and
determination of any question or controversy and in exercising any duties and power under
this Act, the Court shall act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the
case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical
rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and
equitable.' By this provision the industrial court is disengaged from the rigidity of the
technicalities applicable to ordinary courts. Said court is not even restricted to the specific
relief demanded by the parties but may issue such orders as may be deemed necessary or
expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or dispelling any doubts that may give rise
to future disputes. (Ang Tibay v. C.I.R., G.R. No. 46496, Feb. 17, 1940; Manila Trading &
Supply Co. v. Phil. Labor, 71 Phil. 124.) For these reasons, We believe that this provision is
ample enough to have enabled the respondent court to consider whether or not its previous
ruling that petitioners constitute a minority was founded on fact, without regard to the
technical meaning of newly discovered evidence. ... (Alonso v. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315; Chua
Kiong v. Whitaker, 46 Phil. 578). (emphasis supplied.)
To apply Section 15 of the Court of Industrial Relations rules with "pedantic rigor" in the instant case is to rule
in effect that the poor workers, who can ill-afford an alert competent lawyer, can no longer seek the sanctuary
of human freedoms secured to them by the fundamental law, simply because their counsel erroneously
believing that he received a copy of the decision on September 23, 1969, instead of September 22, 1969 filed his motion for reconsideration September 29, 1969, which practically is only one day late considering that
September 28, 1969 was a Sunday.
Many a time, this Court deviated from procedure technicalities when they ceased to be instruments of justice,
for the attainment of which such rules have been devised. Summarizing the jurisprudence on this score, Mr.
Justice Fernando, speaking for a unanimous Court in Palma vs. Oreta, 30-f Stated:
As was so aptly expressed by Justice Moreland in Alonso v. Villamor (16 Phil. 315 [1910].
The Villamor decision was cited with approval in Register of Deeds v. Phil. Nat. Bank, 84
Phil. 600 [1949]; Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156 [1958] and Uy v. Uy, 14243,
June 30, 1961, 2 SCRA 675.), decided as far back as 1910, "technicality. when it deserts
its proper-office as an aid to justice and becomes its great hindrance and chief enemy,
deserves scant consideration from courts." (Ibid., p, 322.) To that norm, this Court has
remained committed. The late Justice Recto in Blanco v. Bernabe, (63 Phil. 124 [1936])
was of a similar mind. For him the interpretation of procedural rule should never "sacrifice
the ends justice." While "procedural laws are no other than technicalities" view them in their
entirety, 'they were adopted not as ends themselves for the compliance with which courts
have organized and function, but as means conducive to the realization the administration
of the law and of justice (Ibid., p.,128). We have remained steadfastly opposed, in the
highly rhetorical language Justice Felix, to "a sacrifice of substantial rights of a litigant in
altar of sophisticated technicalities with impairment of the sacred principles of justice."
(Potenciano v. Court of Appeals, 104 Phil. 156, 161 [1958]). As succinctly put by Justice
Makalintal, they "should give way to the realities of the situation." (Urbayan v. Caltex, L15379, Aug. 31, 1962, 5 SCRA 1016, 1019). In the latest decision in point promulgated in
1968, (Udan v. Amon, (1968, 23 SCRA citing McEntee v. Manotok, L-14968, Oct. 27, 1961,
3 SCRA 272.) Justice Zaldivar was partial to an earlier formulation of Justice Labrador that
rules of procedure "are not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense"; but are intended
"to help secure substantial justice." (Ibid., p. 843) ... 30-g
Even if the questioned Court of Industrial Relations orders and rule were to be given effect, the dismissal or
termination of the employment of the petitioning eight (8) leaders of the Union is harsh for a one-day absence
from work. The respondent Court itself recognized the severity of such a sanction when it did not include the
dismissal of the other 393 employees who are members of the same Union and who participated in the
demonstration against the Pasig police. As a matter of fact, upon the intercession of the Secretary of Labor,
the Union members who are not officers, were not dismissed and only the Union itself and its thirteen (13)
officers were specifically named as respondents in the unfair labor practice charge filed against them by the
firm (pp. 16-20, respondent's Brief; Annexes "A", "B" and "C", pp. 20-30, rec.). Counsel for respondent firm
insinuates that not all the 400 or so employee participated in the demonstration, for which reason only the
Union and its thirteen (13) officers were specifically named in the unfair labor practice charge (p. 20,
respondent's brief). If that were so, then many, if not all, of the morning and regular shifts reported for work on
March 4, 1969 and that, as a consequence, the firm continued in operation that day and did not sustain any
damage.
The appropriate penalty if it deserves any penalty at all should have been simply to charge said one-day
absence against their vacation or sick leave. But to dismiss the eight (8) leaders of the petitioner Union is a
most cruel penalty, since as aforestated the Union leaders depend on their wages for their daily sustenance as
well as that of their respective families aside from the fact that it is a lethal blow to unionism, while at the same
time strengthening the oppressive hand of the petty tyrants in the localities.

Mr. Justice Douglas articulated this pointed reminder:

The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who consciously seek to
destroy our system of Government, but from men of goodwill good men who allow their
proper concerns to blind them to the fact that what they propose to accomplish involves an
impairment of liberty.
... The Motives of these men are often commendable. What we must remember, however,
is thatpreservation of liberties does not depend on motives. A suppression of liberty has the
same effect whether the suppress or be a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection
against misguided zeal is a constant alertness of the infractions of the guarantees of
liberty contained in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the demands of the
moment makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle over the Bill of Rights is a
never ending one.
... The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
... In short, the Liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
... But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel secure
because we belong to a group that is important and respected, we must recognize that our
Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less fortunate that we in all honor and good
conscience must be observe. 31
The case at bar is worse.
Management has shown not only lack of good-will or good intention, but a complete lack of sympathetic
understanding of the plight of its laborers who claim that they are being subjected to indignities by the local
police, It was more expedient for the firm to conserve its income or profits than to assist its employees in their
fight for their freedoms and security against alleged petty tyrannies of local police officers. This is sheer
opportunism. Such opportunism and expediency resorted to by the respondent company assaulted the
immunities and welfare of its employees. It was pure and implement selfishness, if not greed.
Of happy relevance is the 1967 case of Republic Savings Bank vs. C.I.R., 32 where the petitioner Bank

dismissed eight (8) employees for having written and published "a patently libelous letter ... to
the Bank president demanding his resignation on the grounds of immorality, nepotism in the
appointment and favoritism as well as discrimination in the promotion of bank employees."
Therein, thru Mr. Justice Castro, We ruled:
It will avail the Bank none to gloat over this admission of the respondents. Assuming that
the latter acted in their individual capacities when they wrote the letter-charge they were
nonetheless protected for they were engaged in concerted activity, in the exercise of their
right of self organization that includes concerted activity for mutual aid and protection,
(Section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act ...) This is the view of some members of this Court.
For, as has been aptly stated, the joining in protests or demands, even by a small group of
employees, if in furtherance of their interests as such, is a concerted activity protected by
the Industrial Peace Act. It is not necessary that union activity be involved or that collective
bargaining be contemplated. (Annot., 6 A.L.R. 2d 416 [1949]).
xxx xxx xxx
Instead of stifling criticism, the Bank should have allowed the respondents to air their
grievances.
xxx xxx xxx
The Bank defends its action by invoking its right to discipline for what it calls the
respondents' libel in giving undue publicity to their letter-charge. To be sure, the right of
self-organization of employees is not unlimited (Republic Aviation Corp. vs. NLRB 324 U.S.
793 [1945]), as the right of the employer to discharge for cause (Philippine Education Co. v.
Union of Phil. Educ. Employees, L-13773, April 29, 1960) is undenied. The Industrial Peace
Act does not touch the normal exercise of the right of the employer to select his employees
or to discharge them. It is directed solely against the abuse of that right by interfering with
the countervailing right of self organization (Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB 313 U.S. 177
[1941])...

xxx xxx xxx

In the final sum and substance, this Court is in unanimity that the Bank's conduct, identified
as an interference with the employees' right of self-organization or as a retaliatory
action, and/or as a refusal to bargain collectively, constituted an unfair labor practice within
the meaning and intendment of section 4(a) of the Industrial Peace Act. (Emphasis
supplied.) 33
If free expression was accorded recognition and protection to fortify labor unionism in the Republic Savings
case, supra, where the complaint assailed the morality and integrity of the bank president no less, such
recognition and protection for free speech, free assembly and right to petition are rendered all the more
justifiable and more imperative in the case at bar, where the mass demonstration was not against the
company nor any of its officers.
WHEREFORE, judgement is hereby rendered:
(1) setting aside as null and void the orders of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations dated September
15 and October 9, 1969; and
(2) directing the re instatement of the herein eight (8) petitioners, with full back pay from the date of their
separation from the service until re instated, minus one day's pay and whatever earnings they might have
realized from other sources during their separation from the service.
With costs against private respondent Philippine Blooming Company, Inc.
Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando and Esguerra, JJ., concur.