Angola constructing a conflict management system 1989-97

- in Zimbabwe a postcolonial conflict management system was

in place from independence, but angola didnt have that
- After coup in Portugal in 1974 there was an attempt to
negotiate between 3 nationalist movements in angola,
resulting in the alvor accord. Didnt work.
- While some sort of agreement was reached after Portuguese
led mediation efforts in 1992, UNITA didnt accept outcome of
1992 election and started war again.
- In 97 Dos Santos dissolved cabinet and installed a new
government that COOPTER UNITA ministers
- This chapter looks at conflict management via third parties
and how a conflict management system was effectively
constructed
- Angolan independence 1975 what was a nationalist struggle
against colonial powers became an intra/interstate conflict
- Three distinct movements with different ethnic roots MPLA,
FNLA and UNITA they joined together to overthrow colonial
rule. FNLA was anti-marxist, so got the support of the US (as
with mobutu in zaire)
- MPLA was Marxist and had the support of Russia, was
committed to a one party state and not to power sharing,
thanks.
- In the years leading to independence none of the nationalist
groups really achieved any successes against the Portuguese,
too much fighting amongst themselves.
- With indepdendencen the only thing the groups had in
common, anti-colonialism, disappeared
- Alvor agreement in 1975 represented a sort of truce between
the three and a govt made up of the three movements elite
power sharing regime
- Also created joint Angolan defence force, but eventually each
movement had armies bigger than the Angolan one a
problem.
- Each held essentialist perceptions about the other, fuelled by
arms shipments from overseas
- Transitional govt collapsed and UNITA decalred war against the
MPLA
- Portuguese left them to fight it out
- MPLA was supported by CUBA and USSR and UNITA by SA and
the US
- MPLA declared itself in charge on nov 11 and by feb 1976
began to claim widespread legitimacy
- UNITA mounted sustained guerrilla attacks, South Africa
started to attack in 1981 inflicting heavy damage
- In 1983 luanda regime attempted to ease conflict via cease
fire, US was quick to respond to these signals

Initial attempts at compromise failed because US SoS Crocker

tried to link namibias independence to withdrawal of Cuban
troops from angola.
In 1984 a settlement was reached, not comprehensive but
represented a reciprocal understanding between the two
sides. It failed because the US wasnt willing to set deadlines
or enforce agreements

Military climax and Stalemate

- SA and Cuba & Angolan govt could either fight on or seek a
political settlement, both sides thought they could win why
negotiate?
- In 1987 cuba launched a huge effensive that damaged
pretorias dominance of southern angola, this marked the point
where costs outweighed the benefits, so peace bcame a more
viable option. BATTLE OF CUITO CUANAVALE
- Cuito cuanavale created war weariness on both sides, so the
Angolan govt accepted linking Cuban withdrawal to Namibia
independence. But they ruled out compromise with UNITA
- Four preconditions for MPLA: withdrawal of SA troops,
cessation of SA aggression, respect for ANGOLA sovereignty
and Namibian independence
- In 1988 US met with angola/cuba and SA in Geneva, parallel
encounters. SA was reluctant, it wanted cuba out asap but
US and USSR were able to coax both sides into pragmatism.
Finally all sides agreed on a general set of guidelines. Then
things turned to practical issues rate of Cuban withdrawal.
Angolans wanted slow withdrawal while SA wanted 90% out in
first year eventually 2/3rds ofcuban forces, it was agreed,
would leave in first year.
- These treaties were, all things considered, a raging success.
Some things were left out though, UNITA mainly US still
supported them and MPLA still hated them. Essentialist
perceptions still held!
Intrastate mediation construction of internal conflict management
system!
- both sides MPLA and UNITA hated each other and refused to
communicate spiral of violence
- Mobutu of Zaire intervened, of course, in an attempt to
improve his regional image. To this effect he mediated
negotiations.
- Things between MPLA and UNITA softened in 1989 through
local mediation.
- But though peace agreements were drafted, the Angolan govt
made few concessions to UNITAs demands for power sharing.
UNITA wanted elections and a reinstatement of the ALVOR
agreement

1989 gbadolite peace process in zaire, Mobutu threatened

both dos santos and Savimbi.
Both US and USSR combined negative and positive incentives
to move the Gbadolite process non-recognition and military
aid for Angolan govt and unita respectively.
What gbadolite represented was the ability of African nations
to instigate
But nothing at the talks were written down so both sides
came away with very very different understandings of what
had taken place
Cease fire was agreed but never really took hold, more
meetings were held culminating in one helf in Harare in
august 1989.
Savimbi wasnt invited, a feature of future negotiations
Dos santos under incredible pressure not to compromise with
UNITA (because of personal antagonisms etc)
Dos santos realized that things had stalled and negotiations
were really the only way forward, so called on Portugal to help
with the process from mid 1990 onwards.
During this time both the US and USSR gave support with
military assistance to their respective teams. US maintained
aid to encourage Luanda to negotiate
So US and Soviets both had considerable leverage in the final
negotiations leading up to internal settlement
Both the ussr and US sponsored a meeting of opposite sides in
Washington, they hammered out the WASHINGTON CONCEPT
PAPERS, basic framework for negotiations sessions that
followed
After cease fire, free and fair elections were the order of
business
Both great powers would stop giving lethal support to either
side, international monitoring force would help in the
formation of a national army and ensuring its neutrality
Both great powers were heavily engaged at this point, gave
impetus to the bicesse accords signed on 31 may 1991 where
both sides agreed to cease fire and election dates
Implementing the bicesse accords proved tough, the UN force
size was insufficient to deal with the scale of problems. There
were human rights abuses, stockpiling of weapons, holding
political prisoners etc. Barely anything happened in regards to
the demobilization of the army or its unification
Election was sort of free and fair but both sides were pissed.
Savimbi lost and accused dos santos of electoral fraud. New
fighting began, UNITA was determined to play the ethnic card
specifically claiming that the ovimbundu were 100 percent
behind him.
It was a little dumb to design a winner takes all election
instead of a power sharing agreement

Things descended into chaos rapidly, with UNITA taking over

70% of the country quickly not Luanda or oil producing
Cabinda though and savimbi was rapidly isolated
internationally, forcing him to reconsider his negotiating
stance in 1994.
November 1994 the Lusaka accords were signed MAIN
INCENTIVE PRESSURES ON SAVIMBI TO SIGN: military
capabilities of Angolan govt forces, pressure applied from
external actors, changing military balance was the most
meaningful bid however
Other noncoercive strategies were at play here: government
GAINED LEGITIMACY OVER THE COUNTRY AS A WHOLE
through its willingness to negotiate. Protocols comprised of
insurance incentives that reassured UNITA. This arrangement
was at last premised on a power-sharing arrangement, it gave
UNIT enough to keep within govt orbit but not enough to give
it power bases so it would seek to redivide the country
Pressures from the UN (resolution in march 94) singled out
UNITA as the sole entity responsible for the resumption of the
civil war in ANGOLA
Mugabe and Mandela encouraged Savimbi to comply
Notable changes were evident in the UN approach between
the Bicesse accords and the Lusaka ones, the UN angola
verification mission three was determined to deploy 7000
peacekeepeers to oversea the protocol
Implementing the agreement was still a little bit bumpy and
only possible because of the sustained effort of the UN
Its difficult to secure peace after a civil war, and one of the
hardest things is enabling the two sides to experience joint
problem solving, to test perceptions of each others intentions
and reduce the risks of reneging.
This is especially evident in the demobilization of troops
creates a security dilemma.
Eventually savimbi acquiesced and demobilized troops after
much cajoling from int. monitors
Three lessons: incentives for external mediators changed
(from interventionist to disengagement), secondly the role of
mediators keeping the dialogue going, thirdly the use of
incentives caused Savimbi to back down.