Manila Bay To Leviste

G.R. No.
110015 July 11, 1995

MANILA
BAY
CLUB
CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, MODESTA SABENIANO and MIRIAM SABENIANO,
JUDITH SABENIANO, JOY DENNIS SABENIANO, et. al., respondents.
FRANCISCO, J.:
A ten-year lease contract, commencing on March 4, 1988 and set to expire on March 4,
1998, over the subject building situated at 1408 Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City was
executed by and between the private respondents Sabenianos as owners-lessors, and
petitioner Manila Bay Club Corporation as lessee. 1
The lease agreement, however, was short-lived because private respondents, in a letter
dated May 28, 1990, unilaterally terminated the lease with the request that petitioner
vacate the leased premises and peacefully surrender its possession, on the following
grounds:
with his creditors, then and in any of such above cases, this lease contract shall
become automatically terminated and cancelled and the said premises shall be
peacefully vacated by the LESSEE for the LESSOR to hold and enjoy henceforth
as if these presents have not been made and it shall be lawful for the LESSOR or
any person duly authorized in his behalf, without any formal notice or demand to
enter into and upon said leased premises or any part thereof without prejudice on
the part of the LESSOR to exercise all rights on the contract of lease and those
given by law. And upon such cancellation of the contract, the LESSEE hereby
grants to the LESSOR the legal right to enter and take possession of the leased
premises as though the term of the lease contract has expired.
Feeling aggrieved by the premature termination of the lease, petitioner on June 8, 1990
filed a complaint with the Makati Regional Trial Court for "Specific Performance with Prayer
for Preliminary Injunction and Damages" against private respondents, alleging in
substance that private respondents' unilateral cancellation of the lease contract was
arbitrary and capricious, for petitioner did not violate any of its provisions. Petitioner thus
prayed that private respondents be ordered to desist from further harassing petitioner,
honor the lease contract, and to pay exemplary damages, professional fee and costs. 3
On the other hand, private respondents in their answer claimed that petitioner: 1) failed to
pay monthly rentals as they fell due, in violation of paragraph 2;
xxx xxx xxx
Monthly Rental
1. Failure on the part of the LESSEE until this very late date, to insure the leased
building which is a violation of the requirement of paragraph 22 of the
CONTRACT OF LEASE and highly prejudicial to the interest of the LESSOR;
2. The rate of the monthly rental shall be Thirty Five Thousand Pesos
(P35,000.00), with an annual acceleration rate of Five (5) percent for the
succeeding three (3) years, and Seven (7) percent for the remaining four (4)
years which shall be paid in advance by the LESSEE to the LESSOR every
fourth (4th) day of every month effective immediately upon the signing of this
Contract of Lease without the necessity of demand. Overdue monthly rentals
shall earn interest at the rate of five (5) percent per month. Continuous nonpayment of rent for a period of three (3) months shall be understood as an
automatic cancellation of the lease agreement without prejudice to the LESSEE
to redeem such non-payment subject to a corresponding penalty charges and
surcharge as provided for in this agreement.
2. For unpaid accumulated rentals in arrears, amounting to the appreciable sum

of P151,575.57 and failure on your part as LESSEE to issue all the postdated
checks agreed upon in the original and amended contract, dated March 15,
1988;
3. For failure on the part of the LESSEE to pay the fees, taxes and other
assessments on the improvements as required by paragraph 16 of the Contract
of Lease, which is also prejudicial to the owner-lessor. 2
2) used the leased premises for gambling and prostitution, prohibited under paragraph 8;
Private respondents invoked the "Special Clause" of the lease contract as found in
paragraph 19 thereof to justify their action. It reads:
19. If the rental herein stipulated or any part thereof at any time, shall be in
arrears or unpaid, or if the tenant shall at any time fail or neglect to perform or
comply with any of the covenants, conditions, agreements or restrictions
stipulated or if the tenants shall become bankrupt or insolvent or shall compound
8. The LESSEE hereby expressly agrees and warrants that he shall use the
premises exclusively for the following purposes: restaurant, catering, gym,
recreation, and other services which are not contrary to public laws, morals and
that which is legal, and lawful. Such purposes as gambling and prostitution or
any other practices of similar nature is strictly prohibited., and
EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE
3) failed to secure an insurance policy on the leased premises for the benefit of private
respondents as lessors, as provided for in paragraph 22;
Effectivity of this Lease.
xxx xxx xxx
22. The building must be insured and the insurance premium must be for the
account of the LESSEE. The appraised value of the present status of the building
by the insurance company shall be the amount of insurance of which the
beneficiary shall be for the benefit of the LESSOR. The appraised value of the
improvements or renovation made by the insurance company shall accrue to the
benefit of the LESSEE.
By reason of these violations, specifically that pertaining to paragraph 22, private
respondents argued that the lease contract was deemed terminated and cancelled
pursuant to the "Special Clause" in paragraph 19 providing for automatic termination and
cancellation, thereby entitling private respondents to take the possession of the leased
premises.
The trial court held that petitioner was not in default nor in arrears in payment of rentals to
private respondents, and that evidence is wanting to prove that the leased premises were
being used by petitioner for gambling and prostitution activities. However, the trial court
found that petitioner violated the "insurance clause" (paragraph 22) of the contract. It
declared that:
. . . , the evidence shows and the plaintiff (petitioner) even admitted in its
memorandum, that it failed to secure an appraisal of the leased building in its
original condition or at the time of the execution of the contract for the purpose of
insuring the same for the benefit of the defendants (private respondents).
While it is true as pointed out by the plaintiff, that it has insured the leased
building in question from the very inception of the lease contract, the Court notes
that the beneficiary of said insurance policies was the Manila Bay Club
Corporation and not the defendants-lessor as agreed upon in the contract. (See
paragraph 22, Contract of Lease, Exhibits "A", "K" and "L") Although nothing had
happened on the insured building, the fact of the matter is that the defendants
who owned the building were unnecessarily exposed to the insurable risk during
the period of the insurance policies referred to, and that in case of loss the
defendants would not have collected the proceeds of the insurance.
Plaintiff, also argued that it had insured the subject building with the Fortune
Assurance and Indemnity Corporation for the period of June 15, 1990 to June 15,
1991 with the defendant as the beneficiary (Exhibit "J-1"). Examination of said
insurance policy (Exhibit "J") however, shows that it was dated June 1, 1990 or
after the defendant Modesta R. Sabeniano had written the plaintiff on May 28,
1990 (Exhibit "C") informing the latter that their contract was considered
terminated (under paragraph 19 of their lease contract) by reason of violation of
the terms thereof.
Consequently, the trial court in its decision dated October 17, 1991 4 dismissed the
complaint, declared the lease contract terminated as of May 28, 1990, and ordered
petitioner to immediately return possession of the leased premises to private respondents
and pay monthly rentals of P250,000.00 commencing on May 28, 1990 with 10%
interest per annum, P20,000.00 attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Petitioner appealed to respondent Court of Appeals which, in its now-assailed decision
dated March 25, 1993 5affirmed with modification the lower court's decision. The decretal
portion provides:
WHEREFORE, with the following modifications:
(a) deleting the ten (10%) per cent interest per annum on the monthly rental or
P250,000.00; and
(b) deleting the award of P20,000.00 attorney's fees,
the decision is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise denied in a Resolution dated May 7,
1993. 6 Hence, this petition for review on certiorari with petitioner assigning the following
errors, to wit:
I
IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITIONER HAD VIOLATED PARAGRAPH 22 OF
THE CONTRACT OF LEASE DATED MARCH 4, 1988, ANNEX "D" HEREOF,
AND THAT AS A CONSEQUENCE, THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WERE
JUSTIFIED IN RESCINDING THE SAID CONTRACT OF LEASE, THE
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN THAT IT DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY PROBABLY
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW, THE PETITIONER NOT HAVING COMMITTED
ANY VIOLATION WHATSOEVER OF THE CONTRACT OF LEASE.
II
IN SUSTAINING RESCISSION ON ACCOUNT OF THE PETITIONER'S

ALLEGED VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 22 OF THE CONTRACT OF LEASE
DATED MARCH 4, 1988, ANNEX "D" HEREOF, ASSUMING, WITHOUT
ADMITTING THAT THE PETITIONER HAD VIOLATED PARAGRAPH 22 OF
THE SAID CONTRACT, THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THAT IT DECIDED A QUESTION IN A WAY
PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW, THE PETITIONER'S VIOLATION, IF
ANY, HAVING BEEN SLIGHT OR CASUAL TO PRECLUDE RESCISSION.
III
IN GRANTING DAMAGES, THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THAT THERE IS NO BASIS FOR THE
AWARD OF DAMAGES.
attributable to defendants who did not provide plaintiff-appellant with the

appraised value of the building.
We reject plaintiff-appellant's proposition. Under the factual features of this case,
for the fire insurance policy for the period of June 15, 1988 to June 15, 1989, in
the amount of P5,000,000.00, the assured was only the Manila Bay Club
Corporation, plaintiff-appellant herein (Exhibit "K"). In the same vein, in the fire
insurance policy for June 15, 1989 to June 15, 1990 in the sum of
P5,000,000.00, the assured was plaintiff-appellant Manila Bay Club Corporation
and no other else (Exhibit "L").
Clearly, from the inception of the contract of lease on March 4, 1990, or for two
years, plaintiff-appellant already violated paragraph 22 of the contract that the
building must be insured and the insurance premium must be for the account of
the lessors. In fact, in its letter of May 21, 1990, plaintiff-appellant admitted that:
IV
IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONER'S APPEAL, WHICH WAS MERITORIOUS,
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE
ERROR. 7
The first assigned error touches on the issue of whether or not petitioner violated the
"insurance clause" (paragraph 22) of the lease contract. With an outright dismissal of the
petition in mind, private respondents argue that the question is purely factual no longer
reviewable by, and thus binding on the Court. Respondent Court of Appeals' findings, as
quoted hereunder, essentially affirming those made by the trial court that petitioner
committed a breach of the "insurance clause", should therefore be upheld and left
undisturbed.
Assailing the trial court's rationalization, appellant contends that while the lease
contract did call for the building to be insured, it was incumbent upon the lessors,
the defendants herein, to provide the plaintiff with the appraised value of the
building to be insured. But no such appraised value was furnished plaintiff
appellee from the execution of the contract in March 1988 up to the time the case
reached the court. Nonetheless, according to plaintiff-appellant, the building was
insured for P2,500,000.00 from the period June 15, 1988 to June 15, 1989; and
for the period from June 15, 1989 to June 15, 1990 plaintiff-appellant obtained
insurance for the building in the amount of P2,500,000.00 (the sum of
P1,250,000.00 for defendants-lessors, and P1,250,000.00 for plaintiff-lessee).
And for the period from June 15, 1990 to June 15, 1991, plaintiff-appellant
continued the insurance on the building for P2,500,000.00, with one-half thereof
payable to defendants-lessors. Thus, according to plaintiff-appellant it had
substantially complied with par. 22 of the lease contract and if there was any
delay in the allocation of the amount of the insurance policy, such delay was
We are still working out with an Insurance Company for

segregating the coverage for issuance of policy
purposes, . . . . (par. III, Exhibit "F"; also Exhibit "3").
It will be noted that plaintiff-appellant filed the instant case on June 8, 1990
against defendants-appellants for specific performance. At the time this action
was instituted, plaintiff-appellant had not yet segregated the coverage of the
insurance for the benefit of defendants-lessors. The fire insurance policy for
P1,250,000.00 payable to defendants-lessors (Exhibit "J") became effective only
on June 15, 1990 when the case was already being litigated in the court below.
Consequently, We find no fault or error by the trial court when it ruled that
plaintiff-appellant violated the lease contract for failure to secure insurance policy
on the leased premises for the benefit of the defendants-lessors. Moreover, Mr.
Danilo Aquino, a witness for plaintiff-appellant admitted that there was a violation
of paragraph 22 of the lease contract, to wit:
COURT: Can you show to the Court, which
particular insurance policy that complies
with that particular paragraph?
WITNESS: The Fortune Insurance Policy,
June 15, 1988, 1989, that was the
insurance policy we get . . .
ATTY. VILLANUEVA: So you are referring
to Exhibit "K"?
WITNESS: However, we were not able to

make the necessary endorsement and we
were able to make it of the latest insurance
policy upon receiving the notice from the
lessor that they are demanding the
Corporation to secure the necessary fire
insurance policy.
COURT: Repeat, it should be exclusively
for the benefit of the lessor, did you or did
you not comply with that?
WITNESS: We were not able to comply
with that, Your Honor.
ATTY. VILLANUEVA: Now, under Exhibit
"K", which pertains to insurance policy
which you took for the year 1988 to 1989,
there was no mention about the
compliance of this provision, am I correct?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
ATTY. VILLANUEVA: Same thing with the
insurance policy for 1989 to 1990, there
was no compliance of that specific
provision, am I correct?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
ATTY. VILLANUEVA: Now, were the
lessors conveying that that is a ground for
termination that was the time you secured
an insurance policy with the corresponding
endorsement in favor of the lessor, am I
correct?
WITNESS: There was an appraiser, sir.

COURT: Prior to the renovation?
WITNESS: Yes, Your Honor.
ATTY. VILLANUEVA: What was the
appraised value of the lessor's property
according to your appraisal now?
WITNESS: One Million Sixty Four
Thousand Four Hundred Pesos Only
(P1,064,400.00), sir. (TSN, pp. 34-38,
March 5, 1991).
Plaintiff-appellant further argues that it was the obligation of defendants-lessors
to provide plaintiff-appellant with the appraised value of the building for insurance
purpose.
We are not persuaded by this argument, paragraph 22 of the contract of lease is
clear and explicit. This provision calls for the appraised value of the present
status of the building by the insurance company which shall be the amount of the
insurance. Nowhere in paragraph 22 of the lease contract is there stipulated that
defendants-lessors should furnish the plaintiff-appellant with the appraised value
of the building to be insured. The appraisal of the building is a task devolving
upon the insurance company. It is basic and fundamental that if the terms of the
contract are plain and readily understandable, there can be no room for
interpretation. (Republic vs. Sandigan, 203 SCRA 310). When the terms of a
contract leaves no doubt as to the intention of the parties, the literal meaning of
the stipulations shall control. (Honrado, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 326;
Papa vs. Alonzo, 198 SCRA 564). . . . .
Petitioner on the other hand strongly maintains that it is a question of law reviewable and
reversible by the Court.
On this particular point, we agree with petitioner. What a question of law or a question of
fact is has been consistently defined by the Court in this wise:
WITNESS: Yes, sir.

ATTY. VILLANUEVA: But, was there any
appraisal that you make to determine the
value of the building then existing without
the renovation?
For a question to be one of law it must involve no examination of the probative

value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. And the
distinction is well-known: There is a question of law in a given case when the
doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts; there is
a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or the falsehood of
alleged facts. 8
Here, petitioner has made it very clear that it is not disputing respondent Court of Appeals'
and the trial court's findings vis-a-vis its failure to designate private respondents as
beneficiaries in the insurance policies it procured on the leased building at the inception of
the lease contract. And from the arguments raised herein by petitioner, this Court is indeed
not called upon to reexamine and appreciate anew any evidence presented below, (e.g.,
the insurance policies, other documents and oral testimony, etc.), and thereafter arrive at a
contrary finding. What petitioner is challenging is solely the respondent Court of Appeals'
conclusion drawn from these undisputed facts,i.e., that petitioner's omission to designate
private respondents as beneficiaries constituted a breach of paragraph 22 of the lease
contract. This Court in the early case of "Cunanan vs. Lazatin" (74 Phil. 719) has ruled
that:
There is no question of fact here because the facts are admittedly proven.
Whether or not the conclusion drawn by the Court of Appeals from those facts is
correct, is a question of law which this Court is authorized to pass upon.
"Dauan vs. Sec. of Agriculture and Natural Resources" (19 SCRA 223) likewise held that:
. . . it is a rule now settled that the conclusion drawn from the facts is a
conclusion of law which the courts may review.
And in the relatively recent case of "Binalay vs. Manalo" (195 SCRA 374 [1991]), the Court,
speaking thru Justice Feliciano, reiterated the rule:
Jurisprudence is likewise settled that the Court of Appeals is the final arbiter of
questions of fact. But whether a conclusion drawn from such findings of fact is
correct, is a question of law cognizable by this Court.
However, while a review of the case is in order, we are not inclined to reverse.
By insisting that it is not disputing facts, petitioner in effect bound itself to ALL factual
findings made by respondent Court of Appeals. This necessarily includes the testimony of
petitioner's own witness, Mr. Danilo Aquino, declaring that petitioner indeed failed to
comply with paragraph 22 of the contract requiring that private respondents be made
beneficiaries of the insurance policies to be procured over the leased building, and that
petitioner is well-aware that non-compliance is a ground for termination. We quote again
that particular testimony:
COURT: Can you show to the Court, which particular
insurance policy that complies with that particular paragraph?
WITNESS: The Fortune Insurance Policy, June 15, 1988,
1989, that was the insurance policy we get . . .
ATTY. VILLANUEVA: So you are referring to Exhibit "K"?

WITNESS: However, we were not able to make the necessary
endorsement and we were able to make it of the latest
insurance policy upon receiving the notice from the lessor that
they are demanding the Corporation to secure the necessary
fire insurance policy.
COURT: Repeat, it should be exclusively for the benefit of the
lessor, did you or did you not comply with that?
WITNESS: We were not able to comply with that, Your Honor.
ATTY. VILLANUEVA: Now, under Exhibit "K", which pertains
to insurance policy which you took for the year 1988 to 1989,
there was no mention about the compliance of this provision,
am I correct?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
ATTY. VILLANUEVA: Same thing with the insurance policy for
1989 to 1990, there was no compliance of that specific
provision, am I correct?
WITNESS: Yes, sir.
ATTY. VILLANUEVA: Now, were the lessors conveying that
that is a ground for termination that was the time you secured
an insurance policy with the corresponding endorsement in
favor of the lessor, am I correct?
WITNESS: Yes, sir. (Emphasis supplied)
Mr. Aquino's testimony is clearly a judicial admission against petitioner's own interest which
estops petitioner from contending that its incipient failure to procure insurance for the
benefit of private respondents does not constitute a violation of the lease contract,
specifically the "insurance clause" (paragraph 22). This is so because under Section 4,
Rule 129 of the Rules of Court;
An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings
in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted
only by showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such
admission was made.
And that factual finding is as binding on this Court as it is on petitioner, for well-settled is
the general rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court
of Appeals is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law; findings of fact of the latter are
conclusive. 9
A: Chairman of the Manila Bay and the person whom I get in

contact with Sir.
In assailing its imputed violation of the lease contract, petitioner now argues that from a
reading of paragraph 22 which provides that:
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And he is a signatory to the contract?
Q: And this Atty. Rivera that you mentioned in the course of

your cross examination before the contract was made.
22. The building must be insured and the insurance premium must be for the
account of the LESSEE. The appraised value of the present status of the building
by the insurance company shall be the amount of insurance of which the
beneficiary shall be for the benefit of the LESSOR. The appraised value of the
improvement or renovation made by the insurance company shall accrue to the
benefit of the LESSEE.,
A: He was introduced by Mr. Efren Lim as the lawyer of

Manila Bay Sir, before the contract was made.
Q: What contract are you referring to?
nowhere is it expressly stated that the duty to procure the insurance on the leased building
for private respondents' benefit devolves exclusively upon petitioner, thus intimating that
private respondents should likewise be faulted for not having obtained the insurance
themselves. Petitioner claims an ambiguity in the contract exists.
Petitioner's argument fails to impress. First, the express admission made by petitioner's
witness Mr. Danilo Aquino as to its non-compliance with the "insurance clause" (paragraph
22) of the lease contract conclusively presupposes petitioner's full-awareness that such
contractual duty rests on its shoulders. Second, to the May 17, 1990 letter of one of private
respondents, Modesta Sabeniano, reminding petitioner of its repeated failure to deliver to
private respondents the Original Policy of the leased building as per the lease
contract, 10 petitioner replied, in its letter dated May 21, 1990, 11 that it is "still working out
with our Insurance Company for segregating the coverage for issuance of policy
purposes." The tenor of petitioner's reply equally indicates, though not as categorical as
the admission, acknowledgment of a responsibility on its part to insure the leased building.
For if it were otherwise, in the face of private respondents' repeated demands on petitioner
to secure the insurance, petitioner should have explained to private respondents that it is
not solely duty-bound to insure the leased building and that private respondents might as
well secure the insurance themselves. But petitioner did not, and instead immediately
secured insurance policies for 1988-89 and 1989-90 with petitioner as beneficiary and not
private respondents. And third, petitioner cannot successfully argue that the lease contract
is a contract of adhesion solely prepared by private respondents and for which reason the
ambiguity should be resolved against the latter. Private respondent Modesta Sabeniano
testified that petitioner's lawyer, one Atty. Rivera, participated in the preparation of the
lease contract.
REDIRECT EXAMINATION BY ATTY. VILLANUEVA
Q: Mrs. Sabeniano, who is this Efren Lim you mentioned in
your cross examination?
A: Lease contract. He made the preparation, my son is

Romwell . . .
Q: Are you talking about the last proposal, lease contract,
Exhibit
"H-1"?
A: The old contract. This was his proposal. He suggested I
have to draft a contract for them to counter.
xxx xxx xxx
(T.S.N., April 25,1991, pp. 56-57) 12
It becomes clear that the lease contract was, as claimed by private respondents, indeed
the "product of mutual agreement between the parties", and not a "take it or leave it"
proposition adhered to helplessly by petitioner. Private respondent Modesta Sabeniano's
testimony being a factual matter should be taken on its face value, for, to emphasize once
again, petitioner is precluded from disputing facts. For these reasons, the purported
ambiguity is resolved, unfortunately against petitioner.
Petitioner likewise argues that despite its failure to endorse the first two (2) fire insurance
policies to private respondents, the latter are nonetheless amply protected since the
insurance proceeds are deemed to be held "in trust" for private respondents. This issue of
"trust" was, as aptly pointed out by private respondents, never raised before the trial court.
Consequently, it cannot be raised before this Court, for no question will be entertained on
appeal unless it has been raised in the court below. 13 If this issue was ever raised,
petitioner did so only in its Motion for Reconsideration 14 of respondent Court of Appeals'
decision, the effect of which is as if it was never duly raised in that court at all. In "Delos
Santos vs. Reyes (205 SCRA. 487), the issue of estoppel was not raised by petitioner
Delos Santos in the Brief he submitted before the Court of Appeals. It was thus held that
petitioner Delos Santos cannot raise it for the first time in a petition for review before the
Supreme Court.
Coming now to the second assignment of error, petitioner essentially contends that private
respondents cannot unilaterally rescind the lease contract because its purported violation
of the "insurance clause" (paragraph 22) was merely slight or casual.
We do not agree with petitioner. Under paragraph 19 of the lease contract, the lessee's
(petitioner) failure or neglect to perform or comply with any of the covenants, conditions,
agreements or restrictions stipulated shall result in the automatic termination and
cancellation of the lease. It can be fairly judged from the tenor of paragraph 19 that the
parties intended mandatory compliance with all the provisions of the contract. Among such
provisions requiring strict observance is the "insurance clause" (paragraph 22) which
expressly provides that "the building must be insured and the insurance premium must be
for the account of the LESSEE. . . . . (emphasis supplied). Thus, upon petitioner's failure to
comply with the mandatory requirement of paragraph 22, private respondents were wellwithin their right to rescind the lease contract by express grant of paragraph 19. Certainly,
there is nothing wrong if the parties to the lease contract agreed on certain mandatory
provisions concerning their respective rights and obligations, such as the procurement of
the insurance and the rescission clause. For it is well to recall that contracts are respected
as the law between the contracting parties, and they may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may want to include. As long as such agreements
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public order they shall have
the force of law between them.15
In this connection, none can be added to the respondent Court of Appeals' correct
observation why petitioner's omission to designate private respondents as beneficiaries in
the insurance policies it secured over the leased building is not merely a slight or casual
breach, but a substantial one allowing private respondents to rescind the lease contract.
Petitioner in its third assignment of error assails the P250,000.00 monthly rental adjudged
against it by the trial court and as affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals, claiming that
there was no basis for such finding.
Again, we disagree. In reaching that amount, the trial court took into consideration the
following factors: 1) prevailing rates in the vicinity; 2) location of the property; 3) use of the
property; 4) inflation rate; and 5) the testimony of private respondent Modesta Sabeniano
that she was offered by a Japanese-Filipino investor a monthly rental of P400,000.00 for
the leased premises then occupied by petitioner. 17 Petitioner for its part should have
presented its controverting evidence below to support what it believes to be the fair rental
value of the leased building since the burden of proof to show that the rental demanded is
unconscionable or exorbitant rests upon the lessee. 18 But petitioner failed to do so. Hence,
the valuation made by the trial court, as affirmed by respondent Court of Appeals, stands.
It is worth stressing at this juncture that the trial court had the authority to fix the
reasonable value for the continued use and occupancy of the leased premises after the
termination of the lease contract, and that it was not bound by the stipulated rental in the
contract of lease since it is equally settled that upon termination or expiration of the
contract of lease, the rental stipulated therein may no longer be the reasonable value for
the use and occupation of the premises as a result or by reason of the change or rise in
values. 19 Moreover, the trial court can take judicial notice of the general increase in rentals
of real estate specially of business establishments 20 like the leased building owned by
private respondents.
The crux of the petition having been disposed of, petitioner's last assignment of error
requires no further discussion.
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is hereby DENIED, and the challenged
decision of respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Paragraph 22 of the lease contract demands that plaintiff-appellant must insure

the building subject of the lease with defendants-lessors as beneficiaries thereof.
For two years, the insurance policies taken on the properties were in the name of
plaintiff-appellant, as the beneficiary. Had the building suffered damages either
by fire or other calamities during the existence of the insurance coverage from
1988 to 1989, the favored party would indeed be plaintiff-appellant. While the
insurance coverage will work injustice to defendants-lessors, it would unjustly
enrich the plaintiff-appellant. Certainly under such milieu, the defendants-lessors
would be left in the open, holding an empty bag. To Our mind, therefore, nonfulfillment of the stipulations in paragraph 22 of the lease contract is not a mere
casual or slight breach but a substantial one that goes into the very core of the
contract of lease, next in priority to the payment of the agreed rentals. 16
G.R. No. 137873
April 20, 2001
D.
M.
CONSUNJI,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J. JUEGO, respondents.
INC., petitioner,
KAPUNAN, J.:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M.

Consunji, Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.
4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.

5. P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a
report dated November 25, 1990, stating that:
x x x. [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro
Manila where he was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending
physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around 2:15 p.m. of the same date.
Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A.
Juego together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their
work as carpenter[s] at the elevator core of the 14 th floor of the Tower D,
Renaissance Tower Building on board a [p]latform made of channel beam (steel)
measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid plywood flooring and cable
wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain block, when
suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block
with the [p]latform, got loose xxx causing the whole [p]latform assembly and the
victim to fall down to the basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the building
under construction thereby crushing the victim of death, save his two (2)
companions who luckily jumped out for safety.
It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform
he was then on board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform
was due to the removal or getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to
the connecting points of the chain block and [p]latform but without a safety lock.1
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juegos widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig a complaint for damages against the deceaseds employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The
employer raised, among other defenses, the widows prior availment of the benefits from
the State Insurance Fund.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The dispositive
portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff,
as follows:
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.
2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.
3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juegos earning capacity.
SO ORDERED.2
On appeal by D. M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the
RTC in toto.
D. M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE

REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED
NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR[sic] IS APPLICABLE TO
PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER
IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL
CODE, AND
THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT
IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE
CIVIL CODE.3
Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and, therefore,
inadmissible. The CA ruled otherwise. It held that said report, being an entry in official
records, is an exception to the hearsay rule.
The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of
his personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception. 4 A witness,
therefore, may not testify as what he merely learned from others either because he was
told or read or heard the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what he has learned.5 This is known as the hearsay rule.
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes
hearsay as evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements.6
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions,
sources of error and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion
of a witness, may be best brought to light and exposed by the test of crossexamiantion.7 The hearsay rule, therefore, excludes evidence that cannot be tested by
cross-examination.8
The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule, 9 among which are entries in official
records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides:
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the
performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in
the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law areprima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated.
In Africa, et al. vs. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., et al.,10 this Court, citing the work of Chief Justice
Moran, enumerated the requisites for admissibility under the above rule:
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially
enjoined by law to do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by
such other person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by
him stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends that the
last requisite is not present.
The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also testified
before the trial court. InRodriguez vs. Court of Appeals,11 which involved a Fire
Investigation Report, the officer who signed the fire report also testified before the trial
court. This Court held that the report was inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth
of the statements contained in the report but admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the
testimony of the officer who executed the report.
x x x. Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was available for
cross-examination, the portions of the report which were of his personal
knowledge or which consisted of his perceptions and conclusions were not
hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the summary of the statements of the
parties based on their sworn statements (which were annexed to the Report) as
well as the latter, having been included in the first purpose of the offer [as part of
the testimony of Major Enriquez], may then be considered as independently
relevant statements which were gathered in the course of the investigation and
may thus be admitted as such, but not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It
has been said that:
"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it
has been made is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply, but the
statement may be shown. Evidence as to the making of such statement
is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a
fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such
a fact."
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his
Report and made himself available for cross-examination by the adverse party,
the Report, insofar as it proved that certain utterances were made (but not their
truth), was effectively removed from the ambit of the aforementioned Section 44
of Rule 130. Properly understood, this section does away with the testimony in
open court of the officer who made the official record, considers the matter as an
exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official record
admissible in evidence as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The
underlying reasons for this exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness,
as explained in Antillon v. Barcelon.
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed;
the occasions in which the officials would be summoned from his
ordinary duties to declare as a witness are numberless. The public
officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in which
testimony is not needed from official sources. Were there no exception
for official statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting the
greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering
deposition before an officer. The work of administration of government
and the interest of the public having business with officials would alike
suffer in consequence. For these reasons, and for many others, a
certain verity is accorded such documents, which is not extended to
private documents. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1631).
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it
presumes they will discharge their several trusts with accuracy and
fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge of their duty
may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a
degree of caution as to the nature and circumstances of each case may
appear to require.
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not
presented to testify on his report. In that case the applicability of Section 44 of
Rule 143 would have been ripe for determination, and this Court would have
agreed with the Court of Appeals that said report was inadmissible since the
aforementioned third requisite was not satisfied. The statements given by the
sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as "official information,"
there being no showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty to give the
statements for record.
Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of
the statements contained therein but is admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the
testimony of PO3 Villanueva.
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanuevas testimony which were of his
personal knowledge suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator
10
crash. PO3 Villanueva had seen Juegos remains at the morgue, 12 making the latters
death beyond dispute. PO3 Villanueva also conducted an ocular inspection of the
premises of the building the day after the incident 13 and saw the platform for himself. 14 He
observed that the platform was crushed15 and that it was totally damaged.16 PO3
Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to bring the chain block to the police
headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain was detached from the lifting
machine, without any pin or bolt.17
What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanuevas testimony that the cause
of the fall of the platform was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed
that such portion of the testimony is mere opinion. Subject to certain exceptions, 18 the
opinion of a witness is generally not admissible.19
Petitioners contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa
loquitur by the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that
the mere fall of the elevator was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality
was negligent. As a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquituris peculiar to the law
of negligence which recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without
direct proof and furnishes a substitute for specific proof of negligence. 20
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere
happening of an accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or
presumption that it was due to negligence on defendants part, under the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally, the thing or transaction speaks for
itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality speaks for itself, the
facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a
presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the
defendant, or some other person who is charged with negligence.
x x x where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury
complained of was under the control or management of the defendant, and that
the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as in the ordinary course of things
would not happen if those who had its control or management used proper care,
there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated, reasonable evidence, in the
absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from or was
caused by the defendants want of care.21
One of the theoretical based for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence
is absent or not available.22
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant
in charge of the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of
the accident or has the best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has
no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general

terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of the accident in order to
establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon
the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is
practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which
a plaintiff, without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows
or should know the cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant
in respect of the matter of which the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur
doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of necessity, in that it proceeds on the
theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the doctrine is applicable, it
is within the power of the defendant to show that there was no negligence on his
part, and direct proof of defendants negligence is beyond plaintiffs power.
Accordingly, some court add to the three prerequisites for the application of the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine to apply, it must appear that the injured party had no knowledge or
means of knowledge as to the cause of the accident, or that the party to be
charged with negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity for explanation of
the accident.23
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:
There is no dispute that appellees husband fell down from the 14 th floor of a
building to the basement while he was working with appellants construction
project, resulting to his death. The construction site is within the exclusive control
and management of appellant. It has a safety engineer, a project superintendent,
a carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control of the situation
therein. The circumstances of any accident that would occur therein are
peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the other
hand, the appellee is not in a position to know what caused the accident. Res
ipsa loquitur is a rule of necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not
readily available, provided the following requisites are present: (1) the accident
was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent; (2)
the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the exclusive
control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must
not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured. x x x.
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while
performing work in a construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the
first requisite for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As
explained earlier, the construction site with all its paraphernalia and human
resources that likely caused the injury is under the exclusive control and
management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also present. No
contributory negligence was attributed to the appellees deceased husband[;]
11
thus[,] the last requisite is also present. All the requisites for the application of the
rule of res ipsa loquitur are present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference
of appellants negligence arises. x x x.24
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa
loquitur, but argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise
since it "proved that it exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondents
husband."
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits
provided under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the
deceaseds employer damages under the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Labor Code states:
Article 173. Extent of liability. Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the
State Insurance Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other
liabilities of the employer to the employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise
entitled to receive damages on behalf of the employee or his dependents. The
payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as
provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic Act
Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six
hundred ten, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four
as amended, and other laws whose benefits are administered by the System or
by other agencies of the government.
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier,
the defendants negligence is presumed or inferred 25 when the plaintiff establishes the
requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie
case of all the elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to explain. 26 The presumption
or inference may be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate
circumstances disputable presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may
outweigh the inference.27 It is not for the defendant to explain or prove its defense to
prevent the presumption or inference from arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due
care, comes into play only after the circumstances for the application of the doctrine has
been established.1wphi1.nt
The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmens Compensation
Act, provided that:
In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed
before the police investigator as evidence of its due care. According to Fabros sworn
statement, the company enacted rules and regulations for the safety and security of its
workers. Moreover, the leadman and the bodegero inspect the chain block before allowing
its use.
Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and remedies granted by

this Act to an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to
compensation shall exclude all other rights and remedies accruing to the
employee, his personal representatives, dependents or nearest of kin against the
employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury x x x.
It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabros sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in
arguing that private respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioners
employees, also assails the same statement for being hearsay.
Whether Section 5 of the Workmens Compensation Act allowed recovery under said Act
as well as under the Civil Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court
finally settled the matter in Floresca vs.Philex Mining Corporation,30 which involved a cavein resulting in the death of the employees of the Philex Mining Corporation. Alleging that
the mining corporation, in violation of government rules and regulations, failed to take the
required precautions for the protection of the employees, the heirs of the deceased
employees filed a complaint against Philex Mining in the Court of First Instance (CFI).
Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The
heirs sought relief from this Court.
Petitioner is correct. Fabros sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are
inadmissible as evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the
witness stand to testify thereon. 28 The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based not
only on the lack of opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the
affiant, but also on the commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by
the affiant himself but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiants
statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by the one writing
them.29 Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said statement as proof of its due care any more
than private respondent can use it to prove the cause of her husbands death. Regrettably,
petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut the inference or presumption of
negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to establish any defense
relating to the incident.
Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of the
Court En Banc,31 following the rule in Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the
affirmative.
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs
in case of death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing
themselves of the workers right under the Workmens Compensation Act and
suing in the regular courts under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual,
moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the negligence or fault of
12
the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both

actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmens
Compensation Act and sue in addition for damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaa vs. Cebu Autobus Company,
32 SCRA 442, ruled thatan injured worker has a choice of either to recover from
the employer the fixed amounts set by the Workmens Compensation Act or to
prosecute an ordinary civil action against the tortfeasor for higher damages but
he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously. [Underscoring
supplied.]
Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed with their
suit under the Civil Code despite having availed of the benefits provided under the
Workmens Compensation Act. The Court reasoned:
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to
dismiss dated May 14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the
deceased employees, namely Emerito Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza,
Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted notices and claims for compensation to the
Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them have been
paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs
decided that they be paid in installments x x x. Such allegation was admitted by
herein petitioners in their opposition to the motion to dismiss dated may 27, 1968
x x x in the lower court, but they set up the defense that the claims were filed
under the Workmens Compensation Act before they learned of the official report
of the committee created to investigate the accident which established the
criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was
forwarded by the Director of Mines to then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a
letter dated October 19, 1967 only x x x.
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the
Workmens Compensation Act, such my not preclude them from bringing an
action before the regular court because they became cognizant of the fact that
Philex has been remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners
only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been aware of
said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its
negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmens
Compensation Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation.
The choice of the first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact,
which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case should
therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings. However,
should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the
payments made under the Workmens Compensation Act should be deducted
from the damages that may be decreed in their favor. [Underscoring supplied.]
The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated
in Ysmael Maritime Corporation vs. Avelino,32 Vda. De Severo vs. FelicianoGo,33 and Marcopper Mining Corp. vs. Abeleda.34 In the last case, the Court again
recognized that a claimant who had been paid under the Act could still sue under the Civil
Code. The Court said:
In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in
the course of their employment could be filed only under the Workmens
Compensation Law, to the exclusion of all further claims under other laws. In
Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in favor of the new rule that the claimants
may invoke either the Workmens Compensation Act or the provisions of the Civil
Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will exclude the
other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will
preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is
where a claimant who has already been paid under the Workmens
Compensation Act may still sue for damages under the Civil Code on the basis of
supervening facts or developments occurring after he opted for the first remedy.
(Underscoring supplied.)
Here, the CA held that private respondents case came under the exception because
private respondent was unaware of petitioners negligence when she filed her claim for
death benefits from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil complaint
for damages after she received a copy of the police investigation report and the
Prosecutors Memorandum dismissing the criminal complaint against petitioners
personnel. While stating that there was no negligence attributable to the respondents in the
complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the Memorandum that, "if at all," the "case
is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the exception in Floresca:
x x x We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged negligence of
appellant as early as November 25, 1990, the date of the police investigators
report. The appellee merely executed her sworn statement before the police
investigator concerning her personal circumstances, her relation to the victim,
and her knowledge of the accident. She did not file the complaint for "Simple
Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against appellants employees. It was the
investigator who recommended the filing of said case and his supervisor referred
the same to the prosecutors office. This is a standard operating procedure for
police investigators which appellee may not have even known. This may explain
why no complainant is mentioned in the preliminary statement of the public
prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6, 1991, to wit: "Respondent
Ferdinand Fabro x x x are being charged by complainant of "Simple Negligence
Resulting to Homicide." It is also possible that the appellee did not have a chance
to appear before the public prosecutor as can be inferred from the following
statement in said memorandum: "Respondents who were notified pursuant to
Law waived their rights to present controverting evidence," thus there was no
reason for the public prosecutor to summon the appellee. Hence, notice of
appellants negligence cannot be imputed on appellee before she applied for
13
death benefits under ECC or before she received the first payment therefrom.
Her using the police investigation report to support her complaint filed on May 9,
1991 may just be an afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991
Memorandum of the Prosecutors Office dismissing the criminal complaint for
insufficiency of evidence, stating therein that: "The death of the victim is not
attributable to any negligence on the part of the respondents. If at all and as
shown by the records this case is civil in nature." (Underscoring supplied.)
Considering the foregoing, We are more inclined to believe appellees allegation
that she learned about appellants negligence only after she applied for and
received the benefits under ECC. This is a mistake of fact that will make this case
fall under the exception held in the Floresca ruling.35
The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but of her
rights as well:
x x x. Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary
school for her educational attainment; that she did not know what damages could
be recovered from the death of her husband; and that she did not know that she
may also recover more from the Civil Code than from the ECC. x x x.36
Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed to
allege in her complaint that her application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were
attended by ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being an issue submitted during the trial, the
trial court had no authority to hear or adjudicate that issue."
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the facts
because as early as November 28, 1990, private respondent was the complainant in a
criminal complaint for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against petitioners
employees. On February 6, 1991, two months before the filing of the action in the lower
court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a resolution finding that, although there was insufficient
evidence against petitioners employees, the case was "civil in nature." These purportedly
show that prior to her receipt of death benefits from the ECC on January 2, 1991 and every
month thereafter, private respondent also knew of the two choices of remedies available to
her and yet she chose to claim and receive the benefits from the ECC.
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent
remedies, the election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the
elected remedy, in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as
a bar.37 Equitable in nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate
possible unfairness to both parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold
people responsible for their choices. The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any
recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a double redress for a single wrong. 38
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election.
Hence, the rule in Florescathat a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under
the Labor Code and prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The
claimant, by his choice of one remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.39
[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its
rights, but chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party
claiming a waiver that the person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the
time knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of the partys rights or of
all material facts upon which they depended. Where one lacks knowledge of a
right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a material
fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under
a mistake or misapprehension of fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a
right exists and has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent
decision.
Waiver requires a knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right
waived, with an awareness of its consequences. That a waiver is made
knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the record or by the evidence. 40
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the
exception in Floresca.
It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioners contentions.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to
allege in her complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous
for petitioner to burden private respondent with raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary,
it is the defendant who ought to plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its
Answer;41 otherwise, the defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now
contend that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the issue when petitioner itself pleaded
waiver in the proceedings before the trial court.
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her
husbands death and the rights pertaining to a choice of remedies?
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this
case, the "fact" that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of
petitioners employees, of which private respondent purportedly learned only after the
prosecutor issued a resolution stating that there may be civil liability. InFloresca, it was
the negligence of the mining corporation and its violation of government rules and
regulations. Negligence, or violation of government rules and regulations, for that matter,
however, is not a fact, but aconclusion of law, over which only the courts have the final say.
14
Such a conclusion binds no one until the courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore,
that the principle that ignorance or mistake of fact nullifies a waiver has been misapplied
in Floresca and in the case at bar.
SO ORDERED.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the
elevator crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits
from the ECC. The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after
the accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on November
27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her
when the claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that
she was not aware of her rights.
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law
excuses no one from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws or the Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code),
private respondent cannot claim ignorance of this Courts ruling inFloresca allowing a
choice of remedies.
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and
prohibitory laws.42 This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which,
notwithstanding a persons ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the
laws. The rule in Floresca allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither
mandatory nor prohibitory. Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.
Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not
indicate the total amount private respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it
appears from Exhibit "K"43 that she received P3,581.85 as initial payment representing the
accrued pension from November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly pension,
according to the same Exhibit "K," was P596.97 and present total monthly pension was
P716.40. Whether the total amount she will eventually receive from the ECC is less than
the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages awarded by the trial court is subject to
speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court for such determination. Should the
trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC, payments already received by
private respondent under the Labor Code shall be deducted from the trial court' award of
damages. Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims to prevent double
compensation.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to
determine whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should
the award decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments
already made to private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted
therefrom. In all other respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
15
From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived and on 25 February
1998 was born at the Central Luzon Doctors Hospital, Tarlac City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and Jinky home after delivery.
Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor
Joannes needs recognizing the child as his.
G.R. No. 171713
December 17, 2007
ESTATE
OF
ROGELIO
G.
ONG, petitioner,
vs.
Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky C.
Diaz, respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
assailing (1) the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and (2) the
Resolution2 of the same court dated 1 March 2006 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 70125.
A Complaint3 for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by
minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz
(Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City. In
her Complaint, Jinky prayed that judgment be rendered:
(a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz as his daughter.
(b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly support of P20,000.00 pendente lite
and thereafter to fix monthly support.
(c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees in the sum of P100,000.00.
(d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief as maybe just and equitable in the
premises.4
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac City, she and Rogelio got
acquainted. This developed into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was
already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil wedding solemnized on 19
February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court Judge Panfilo V. Valdez. 5
From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and lived together at
Fairlane Subdivision, and later at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor
Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.
Rogelio, despite Jinkys remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to
give support for the child and to acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the
heretofore adverted complaint.
After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the latter failed to file any responsive
pleading despite repeated motions for extension, prompting the trial court to declare him in
default in its Order dated 7 April 1999. Rogelios Answer with Counterclaim and Special and
Affirmative Defenses was received by the trial court only on 15 April 1999. Jinky was allowed to
present her evidence ex parte on the basis of which the trial court on 23 April 1999 rendered a
decision granting the reliefs prayed for in the complaint.
In its Decision6 dated 23 April 1999, the RTC held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff as his natural child;
2. Ordering defendant to provide plaintiff with a monthly support of P10,000.00 and
further
3. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00
and the cost of the suit.
On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default and a motion for
reconsideration seeking the courts understanding, as he was then in a quandary on what to do
to find a solution to a very difficult problem of his life.7
On 29 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with prayer that the decision of the trial
court dated 23 April 1999 be vacated and the case be considered for trial de novo pursuant to
the provisions of Section 6, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.8
On 16 June 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting Rogelios Motion for New Trial:
WHEREFORE, finding defendants motion for new trial to be impressed with merit, the
same is hereby granted.
16
The Order of this court declaring defendant in default and the decision is this court
dated April 23, 1999 are hereby set aside but the evidence adduced shall remain in
record, subject to cross-examination by defendant at the appropriate stage of the
proceedings.
In the meantime defendants answer is hereby admitted, subject to the right of plaintiff
to file a reply and/or answer to defendants counterclaim within the period fixed by the
Rules of Court.
Acting on plaintiffs application for support pendente lite which this court finds to be
warranted, defendant is hereby ordered to pay to plaintiff immediately the sum
of P2,000.00 a month from January 15, 1999 to May 1999 as support pendente lite in
arrears and the amount of P4,000.00 every month thereafter as regular support
pendente lite during the pendency of this case.9
The RTC finally held:
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the defendant is the father of the
plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had a relationship with another man
before she met the defendant, there is no evidence that she also had sexual relations
with other men on or about the conception of Joanne Rodjin. Joanne Rodjin was her
second child (see Exh. "A"), so her first child, a certain Nicole (according to defendant)
must have a different father or may be the son of Hasegawa K[u]tsuo.
The defendant admitted having been the one who shouldered the hospital bills
representing the expenses in connection with the birth of plaintiff. It is an evidence of
admission that he is the real father of plaintiff. Defendant also admitted that even
when he stopped going out with Jinky, he and Jinky used to go to motels even after
1996. Defendant also admitted that on some instances, he still used to see Jinky after
the birth of Joanne Rodjin. Defendant was even the one who fetched Jinky after she
gave birth to Joanne.
On the strength of this evidence, the Court finds that Joanne Rodjin is the child of
Jinky and defendant Rogelio Ong and it is but just that the latter should support
plaintiff.10
On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision and disposed:
Since it was duly established that plaintiffs mother Jinky Diaz was married at the time
of the birth of Joanne Rodjin Diaz, the law presumes that Joanne is a legitimate child
of the spouses Hasegawa Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family Code). The child
is still presumed legitimate even if the mother may have declared against her
legitimacy (Article 167, Ibid).
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the

illegitimate child of defendant Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky Diaz. The Order of this
Court awarding support pendente lite dated June 15, 1999, is hereby affirmed and that
the support should continue until Joanne Rodjin Diaz shall have reached majority
age.11
The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds provided for
in Article 166 of the same Code. Paragraph 1 of the said Article provides that there
must be physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with the wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days following the birth of the child because of
Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for lack of merit in an Order of the
trial court dated 19 January 2001. 12 From the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Rogelio
appealed to the Court of Appeals. After all the responsive pleadings had been filed, the case
was submitted for decision and ordered re-raffled to another Justice for study and report as early
as 12 July 2002.13
a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his

wife;
b) husband and wife were living separately in such a way that sexual
intercourse was not possible;
c) serious illness of the husband which prevented sexual intercourse.
It was established by evidence that the husband is a Japanese national and that he
was living outside of the country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he comes home
only once a year. Both evidence of the parties proved that the husband was outside
the country and no evidence was shown that he ever arrived in the country in the year
1997 preceding the birth of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals, Rogelios counsel filed a
manifestation informing the Court that Rogelio died on 21 February 2005; hence, a Notice of
Substitution was filed by said counsel praying that Rogelio be substituted in the case by the
Estate of Rogelio Ong,14 which motion was accordingly granted by the Court of Appeals.15
In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of Appeals held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present appeal is hereby GRANTED. The
appealed Decision dated December 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac,
Tarlac, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 8799 is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the court a quo for the issuance of an order directing the parties to
make arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of
plaintiff minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, upon consultation and in coordination with
laboratories and experts on the field of DNA analysis.
17
No pronouncement as to costs.16
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution dated 1 March 2006.
In disposing as it did, the Court of Appeals justified its Decision as follows:
In this case, records showed that the late defendant-appellant Rogelio G. Ong, in the
early stage of the proceedings volunteered and suggested that he and plaintiffs
mother submit themselves to a DNA or blood testing to settle the issue of paternity, as
a sign of good faith. However, the trial court did not consider resorting to this modern
scientific procedure notwithstanding the repeated denials of defendant that he is the
biological father of the plaintiff even as he admitted having actual sexual relations with
plaintiffs mother. We believe that DNA paternity testing, as current jurisprudence
affirms, would be the most reliable and effective method of settling the present
paternity dispute. Considering, however, the untimely demise of defendant-appellant
during the pendency of this appeal, the trial court, in consultation with out laboratories
and experts on the field of DNA analysis, can possibly avail of such procedure with
whatever remaining DNA samples from the deceased defendant alleged to be the
putative father of plaintiff minor whose illegitimate filiations is the subject of this action
for support.17
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues for resolution:
case to the trial court for DNA testing analysis, by dismissing the complaint of minor Joanne for
compulsory recognition, and by declaring the minor as the legitimate child of Jinky and
Hasegawa Katsuo.19
From among the issues presented for our disposition, this Court finds it prudent to concentrate
its attention on the third one, the propriety of the appellate courts decision remanding the case
to the trial court for the conduct of DNA testing. Considering that a definitive result of the DNA
testing will decisively lay to rest the issue of the filiation of minor Joanne, we see no reason to
resolve the first two issues raised by the petitioner as they will be rendered moot by the result of
the DNA testing.
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of filiation of minor Joanne for
purposes of support in favor of the said minor.
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal
right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or
inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father
is the biological father of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses,
presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and child. 20
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. 21 As a
guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family
Code provides:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT
DISMISS RESPONDENTS COMPLAINT FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION
DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE
THAT ROGELIO G. ONG WAS HER FATHER.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DID NOT
DECLARE RESPONDENT AS THE LEGITIMATE CHILD OF JINKY C. DIAZ AND
HER JAPANESE HUSBAND, CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENT FAILED TO
REBUT THE PRESUMPTION OF HER LEGITIMACY.
Article 167. The children shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have
declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of legitimacy. We
explained the rationale of this rule in the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals22:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but
is based on the broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the
mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring
from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not conclusive and consequently, may be
overthrown by evidence to the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code 23 provides:
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT REMANDED THE
CASE TO THE COURT A QUO FOR DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT
IS NO LONGER FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF ROGELIO G. ONG.18
Petitioner prays that the present petition be given due course and the Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated November 23, 2005 be modified, by setting aside the judgment remanding the
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the celebration
of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its dissolution or the
separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husbands having access to his wife within the first one hundred
and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the child.
18
This physical impossibility may be caused:
or her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen, samples from buccal swabs, saliva, or
other body parts.
1) By the impotence of the husband;

2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that access
was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.24
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
The chemical structure of DNA has four bases. They are known as A (Adenine), G
(guanine), C (cystosine) and T (thymine). The order in which the four bases appear in
an individuals DNA determines his or her physical make up. And since DNA is a
double stranded molecule, it is composed of two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A and
G-C or C-G. These are called "genes."
Every gene has a certain number of the above base pairs distributed in a particular
sequence. This gives a person his or her genetic code. Somewhere in the DNA
framework, nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are known as "polymorphic
loci," which are the areas analyzed in DNA typing (profiling, tests, fingerprinting). In
other words, DNA typing simply means determining the "polymorphic loci."
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied about by the
parties to the present petition. But with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the
availability of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether
Rogelio is the biological father of the minor, through DNA testing.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all
human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence,
a persons DNA profile can determine his identity.25
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a biological sample obtained from an
individual is examined. The DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the
individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is unique for each person, except for
identical twins.
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It
is exclusive to an individual (except in the rare occurrence of identical twins that share
a single, fertilized egg), and DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being a component of
every cell in the human body, the DNA of an individuals blood is the very DNA in his
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a

molecular biologist may proceed to analyze it in several ways. There are five (5)
techniques to conduct DNA typing. They are: the RFLP (restriction fragment length
polymorphism); "reverse dot blot" or HLA DQ a/Pm loci which was used in 287 cases
that were admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of November 1994; DNA
process; VNTR (variable number tandem repeats); and the most recent which is
known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain reaction) based STR (short tandem repeats)
method which, as of 1996, was availed of by most forensic laboratories in the world.
PCR is the process of replicating or copying DNA in an evidence sample a million
times through repeated cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA polymerize
enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes measurements in 13 separate places and can
match two (2) samples with a reported theoretical error rate of less than one (1) in a
trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA typing, "matches" are determined. To illustrate,
when DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a suspect in a criminal case, the
evidence collected from the crime scene is compared with the "known" print. If a
substantial amount of the identifying features are the same, the DNA or fingerprint is
deemed to be a match. But then, even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is
different, it is deemed not to have come from the suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA show variations between people. In
each of these regions, a person possesses two genetic types called "allele," one
inherited from each parent. In [a] paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a
number of these variable regions in an individual to produce a DNA profile. Comparing
next the DNA profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to determine which half of
the childs DNA was inherited from the mother. The other half must have been
inherited from the biological father. The alleged fathers profile is then examined to
ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his profile, which match the paternal types
in the child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of the child, the man is excluded
as the father. If the DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the father.26
In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is provided:
19
SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Rule, the following terms shall be
defined as follows:
xxxx
(c) "DNA evidence" constitutes the totality of the DNA profiles, results and other
genetic information directly generated from DNA testing of biological samples;
(d) "DNA profile" means genetic information derived from DNA testing of a biological
sample obtained from a person, which biological sample is clearly identifiable as
originating from that person;
(e) "DNA testing" means verified and credible scientific methods which include the
extraction of DNA from biological samples, the generation of DNA profiles and the
comparison of the information obtained from the DNA testing of biological samples for
the purpose of determining, with reasonable certainty, whether or not the DNA
obtained from two or more distinct biological samples originates from the same person
(direct identification) or if the biological samples originate from related persons
(kinship analysis); and
(f) "Probability of Parentage" means the numerical estimate for the likelihood of
parentage of a putative parent compared with the probability of a random match of two
unrelated individuals in a given population.
Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis, the resolution thereof may
provide the definitive key to the resolution of the issue of support for minor Joanne. Our
articulation in Agustin v. Court of Appeals27 is particularly relevant, thus:
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous decade.
In Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals (336 Phil. 741, 270 SCRA 1), promulgated in 1997, we
cautioned against the use of DNA because "DNA, being a relatively new science,
(had) not as yet been accorded official recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still
have to be resolved by such conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating
acts,verbal and written, by the putative father."
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of
parentage, as enunciated inTijing v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 125901, 8 March
2001, 354 SCRA 17]:
x x x Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we
adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now
the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage
testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute
(UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on
the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from
the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the
alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course,

being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still
open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should
not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said,
that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained
in aid of situations presented, since to reject said results is to deny
progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in
Philippine jurisprudence came in 2002 with out en banc decision in People v.
Vallejo [G.R. No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192] where the rape and murder
victims DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused were admitted in
evidence. We reasoned that "the purpose of DNA testing (was) to ascertain whether
an association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The
samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes to establish their
profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson [G.R. No. 125938, 4 April 2003, 400 SCRA 584], we
acquitted the accused charged with rape for lack of evidence because "doubts
persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense
(had) been perpetrated but who (were) the perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or
other scientific evidence to still our doubts."
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC [G.R. Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824, 3
March 2004, 424 SCRA 277], where the Court en banc was faced with the issue of
filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily
establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any
physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive
match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing v. Court of Appeals, this
Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing...
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar [G.R. No. 150224, 19
May 2004, 428 SCRA 504], we affirmed the conviction of the accused for
rape with homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA test
results. x x x.
Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court, petitioner questions the
appropriateness of the order by the Court of Appeals directing the remand of the case to the
RTC for DNA testing given that petitioner has already died. Petitioner argues that a remand of
the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our
mind, the alleged impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA
testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioners argument is without basis especially as the New
Rules on DNA Evidence28 allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon
application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, thus:
20
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate court may, at any time,
either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the
matter in litigation, order a DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and
notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing
now requested; or (ii) was previously subjected to DNA testing, but the results may
require confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is
relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially
affecting the accuracy or integrity of the DNA testing.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
to receive and act on the matter in controversy, the Supreme Court is not a trier of
facts and does not, in the course of daily routine, conduct hearings. Hence, it would be
more appropriate that the case be remanded to the RTC for reception of evidence in
appropriate hearings, with due notice to the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of Appeals32:
x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who
choose to deny their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology
finally provides a much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny.
We have long believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as
much in the past. This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally
evolved into a dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore
take this opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means
of determining paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and its Resolution dated 1 March 2006 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
As defined above, the term "biological sample" means any organic material originating from a
persons body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This
includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones.29
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated above as may
be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the
impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of
DNA testing.
And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. In People v.
Umanito,30 citing Tecson v. Commission on Elections,31 this Court held:
The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections [G.R. No. 161434, 3 March
2004, 424 SCRA 277] likewise reiterated the acceptance of DNA testing in our
jurisdiction in this wise: "[i]n case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines
genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical
residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to."
It is obvious to the Court that the determination of whether appellant is the father of
AAAs child, which may be accomplished through DNA testing, is material to the fair
and correct adjudication of the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules, the courts
are authorized, after due hearing and notice, motu proprio to order a DNA testing.
However, while this Court retains jurisdiction over the case at bar, capacitated as it is
21
G.R. No. 173870
April 25, 2012
OSCAR
DEL
CARMEN,
JR., Petitioner,
vs.
GERONIMO BACOY, Guardian and representing the children, namely: MARY
MARJORIE B. MONSALUD, ERIC B. MONSALUD, METZIE ANN B. MONSALUD,
KAREEN B. MONSALUD, LEONARDO B. MONSALUD, JR., and CRISTINA B.
MONSALUD, Respondents.
DECISION
22
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
court a carnapping case against Allan and his companions docketed as Criminal Case No.
93-10380.12 The case was, however, dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.13
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari,1 the registered owner of a motor vehicle
challenges the Decision2 dated July 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 67764 which held him liable for damages to the heirs of the victims who were run over
by the said vehicle.
Factual Antecedents
At dawn on New Years Day of 1993, Emilia Bacoy Monsalud (Emilia), along with her
spouse Leonardo Monsalud, Sr. and their daughter Glenda Monsalud, were on their way
home from a Christmas party they attended in Poblacion, Sominot, Zamboanga Del Sur.
Upon reaching Purok Paglaom in Sominot, they were run over by a Fuso passenger jeep
bearing plate number UV-PEK-600 that was being driven by Allan Maglasang (Allan). The
jeep was registered in the name of petitioner Oscar del Carmen, Jr. (Oscar Jr.) and used
as a public utility vehicle plying the Molave, Zamboanga del Sur to Sominot, Zamboanga
del Sur and vice versa route.
3
Because of the unfortunate incident, Criminal Case No. 93-10347 for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Multiple Homicide was filed against Allan before the Regional
Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23. In a Decision dated March 13,
1997, said court declared Allan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. 4
During the pendency of said criminal case, Emilias father, Geronimo Bacoy (Geronimo), in
behalf of the six minor children5 of the Monsaluds, filed Civil Case No. 96-20219, 6 an
independent civil action for damages based onculpa aquiliana. Aside from Allan, also
impleaded therein were his alleged employers, namely, the spouses Oscar del Carmen, Sr.
(Oscar Sr.) and Norma del Carmen (Spouses del Carmen) and the registered owner of the
jeep, their son Oscar Jr. Geronimo prayed for the reimbursement of funeral and burial
expenses, as well as the award of attorneys fees, moral and exemplary damages resulting
from the death of the three victims, and loss of net income earnings of Emilia who was
employed as a public school teacher at the time of her death. 7
Defendants refused to assume civil liability for the victims deaths. Oscar Sr. averred that
the Monsaluds have no cause of action against them because he and his wife do not own
the jeep and that they were never the employers of Allan. 8 For his part, Oscar Jr. claimed
to be a victim himself. He alleged that Allan and his friends 9stole his jeep while it was
parked beside his drivers rented house to take it for a joyride. Both he and a vehicle
mechanic testified that the subject jeep can easily be started by mere pushing sans the
ignition key. The vehicles engine shall then run but without any headlights on. 10 And
implying that this was the manner by which the vehicle was illegally taken, Oscar Jr.
submitted as part of his documentary evidence the statements 11 of Jemar Alarcon (Jemar)
and Benjamin Andujar (Benjamin). The two, who were with Allan in the jeep at the time of
the accident, declared before the investigating officer that during said time, the vehicles
headlights were off. Because of this allegation, Oscar Jr. even filed before the same trial
Oscar Jr. clarified that Allan was his jeep conductor and that it was the latters brother,
Rodrigo Maglasang (Rodrigo), who was employed as the driver.14 In any event, Allans
employment as conductor was already severed before the mishap occurred on January 1,
1993 since he served as such conductor only from the first week of December until
December 14, 1992.15 In support of this, Oscar Jr. presented as witnesses Faustino
Sismundo (Faustino) and Cresencio "Junior" Baobao (Cresencio). Faustino, a resident of
Molave, testified that when he boarded the jeep heading to Sominot on December 31,
1992, it was Cresencio who was the conductor. He also believed that Crecencio started to
work as such at around December 15 or 16, 1992. 16 Cresencio, for his part, testified that
he worked as Oscar Jr.s conductor from December 15, 1992 to January 1, 1993 and that
Rodrigo was his driver.17 He stated that upon learning that the jeep figured in an accident,
he never bothered to verify the news. Instead, he went to Midsalip to work there as a
conductor for his brothers vehicle, thereby terminating his employment with Oscar Jr.18
Oscar Jr. likewise testified that it was routinary that after a days trip, the jeep would be
parked beside Rodrigos rented house19 for the next early-morning operation.
Geronimo, on the other hand, averred that Allan was still Oscar Jr.s employee subsequent
to December 14, 1992. To prove this, he presented as witnesses Saturnino Jumawan
(Saturnino) and Jose Navarro (Jose). Saturnino testified that he would pay his fare to Allan
every time he would board the jeep in going to Molave and that the last time he rode the
subject vehicle was on December 23, 1992. He also claimed that immediately before
January 1, 1993, Rodrigo and Allan used to park the jeep at the yard of his house. 20 Jose
likewise attested that Allan was still the jeep conductor during the said period as he had
ridden the jeep many times in mid-December of 1992.21
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision22 dated April 17, 2000, the RTC exculpated the spouses del Carmen from
civil liability for insufficiency of evidence. However, their son Oscar Jr. was held civilly liable
in a subsidiary capacity. The RTC anchored its ruling primarily on the principle of res ipsa
loquitur, i.e., that a presumption of negligence on the part of a defendant may be inferred if
the thing that caused an injury is shown to be under his management and that in the
ordinary course of things, the accident would not have happened had there been an
exercise of care. Said court ratiocinated that Oscar Jr., as the registered owner of the jeep,
managed and controlled the same through his driver Rodrigo, in whose house the jeep
was usually parked. Since both Oscar Jr. and Rodrigo were well aware that the jeep could
easily be started by a mere push even without the ignition key, they should have taken the
necessary precaution to prevent the vehicle from being used by unauthorized persons like
Allan. The RTC thus concluded that such lack of proper precaution, due care and foresight
constitute negligence making the registered owner of the vehicle civilly liable for the
damage caused by the same.
23
The RTC disposed of the case as follows:

Wherefore, judgment is hereby entered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants
Allan Maglasang and Oscar del Carmen, Jr. ordering
1. Defendant ALLAN MAGLASANG to pay the plaintiffs, and in case of
insolvency, for defendant OSCAR DEL CARMEN, JR., to pay the plaintiffs, the
following sums:
a. P73,112.00 for their funeral and burial expenses;
b. P1,000,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Emilia
Monsalud;
c. P250,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Leonardo
Monsalud, Sr.;
d. P250,000.00 moral damages for the death of the late Glenda
Monsalud;
e. P40, 000.00, for exemplary damages;
f. P20,000.00 attorneys fees; and
g. The cost of this proceedings.
2. The dismissal of the complaint as against the spouses OSCAR DEL CARMEN
SR. and NORMA DEL CARMEN.
SO ORDERED.23
Oscar Jr. moved for reconsideration 24 contending that the provision on vicarious liability of
the employer under Article 2180 of the Civil Code25 requires the existence of employeremployee relationship and that the employee was acting within the scope of his
employment when the tort occurred. He stressed that even assuming that Allan was his
employee, he was hired not as a driver but as a conductor. Hence, Allan acted beyond the
scope of his employment when he drove the jeep.
Oscar Jr. also stressed that the fact that the jeep was running without its headlights on at
the time of the accident indubitably shows that the same was stolen. He further alleged
that the jeep could not have been taken by only one person. As Rodrigo declared in
Criminal Case No. 93-10380 (carnapping case), based on his experience, the jeep cannot
be pushed by only one person but by at least five people in order for it to start. This was
due to the vehicles mass and the deep canal which separates the parking area from the
curved road that was obstructed by a house.26
Setting aside its earlier decision, the lower court in its Order 27 dated June 21, 2000 granted
the Motion for Reconsideration and absolved Oscar Jr. from civil liability. It cited Article 103
of the Revised Penal Code which provides that for an employer to be subsidiarily liable for
the criminal acts of his employee, the latter should have committed the same in the
discharge of his duties. The court agreed with Oscar Jr. that this condition is wanting in
Allans case as he was not acting in the discharge of his duties as a conductor when he
drove the jeep.
The court also declared the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable since the property
owner cannot be made responsible for the damages caused by his property by reason of
the criminal acts of another. It then adjudged that only Allan should bear the consequences
of his criminal acts. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION is granted, and defendant OSCAR DEL CARMEN JR. is hereby
absolved from all civil liability arising from the felonious acts of convicted accused ALLAN
MAGLASANG.
IT IS SO ORDERED.28
Geronimo appealed.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its July 11, 2006 Decision,29 the CA granted the appeal.
In resolving the case, the CA first determined the preliminary issue of whether there was
an employer-employee relationship between Oscar Jr. and Allan at the time of the
accident. It ruled in the affirmative and gave more credence to the testimonies of
Geronimos witnesses than to those of Oscar Jr.s witnesses, Faustino and Cresencio. The
CA ratiocinated that unlike the witness presented by Geronimo, Faustino never resided in
Poblacion and thus has limited knowledge of the place. His testimony was also unreliable
considering that he only rode the subject jeep twice 30 during the last two weeks of
December 1992. As regards Cresencios testimony, the appellate court found it puzzling
why he appeared to have acted uninterested upon learning that the jeep was the subject of
an accident when it was his bread and butter. Said court likewise considered questionable
Oscar Jr.s asseveration that Cresencio replaced Allan as conductor when Cresencio
testified that he replaced a certain Sumagang Jr.31
24
With regard to the main issue, the CA adjudged Oscar Jr. liable to the heirs of the victims
based on the principle that the registered owner of a vehicle is directly and primarily
responsible for the injuries or death of third parties caused by the operation of such
vehicle. It disbelieved Oscar Jr.s defense that the jeep was stolen not only because the
carnapping case filed against Allan and his companions was dismissed but also because,
given the circumstances, Oscar Jr. is deemed to have given Allan the implied permission to
use the subject vehicle. To support its conclusion, the CA cited the following
circumstances: siblings Rodrigo and Allan were both employees assigned to the said jeep;
after a days work, said vehicle would be parked just beside Rodrigos house where Allan
also lived; the jeep could easily be started even without the use of an ignition key; the said
parking area was not fenced or secured to prevent the unauthorized use of the vehicle
which can be started even without the ignition key.
The dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Order
dated 21 June 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (Branch 23), Molave, Zamboanga del Sur,
in Civil Case No. 96-20,219 is SET ASIDE and a new one is hereby entered. OSCAR DEL
CARMEN, Jr. and ALLAN MAGLASANG are held primarily liable, jointly and severally, to
pay plaintiffs-appellants:
1. Civil indemnity for the death of Emilia Bacoy Monsalud, Leonardo Monsalud
Sr., and Glenda Monsalud in the amount of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
each or for the total amount of One hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00);
1. x x x basing its conclusions and findings on speculations, surmises and

conjectures; misapprehension of facts which are in conflict with the findings of
the trial court;
2. x x x declaring a question of substance not in accord with law and with the
applicable decisions of the Supreme Court;
3. x x x departing from the regular course of the judicial proceedings in the
disposition of the appeal and [in going] beyond the issues of the case. 33
Oscar Jr. points out that the CA failed to consider the RTCs ruling in its June 21, 2000
Order which was in accord with Article 2180 of the Civil Code, i.e., that the tort committed
by an employee should have been done within the scope of his assigned tasks for an
employer to be held liable under culpa aquiliana. However, the CA never touched upon this
matter even if it was glaring that Allans driving the subject vehicle was not within the scope
of his previous employment as conductor. Moreover, Oscar Jr. insists that his jeep was
stolen and stresses that the liability of a registered owner of a vehicle as to third persons,
as well as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, should not apply to him. He asserts that
although Allan and his companions were not found to have committed the crime of
carnapping beyond reasonable doubt, it was nevertheless established that the jeep was
illicitly taken by them from a well secured area. This is considering that the vehicle was
running without its headlights on at the time of the accident, a proof that it was started
without the ignition key.
Our Ruling
2. Temperate damages in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand Pesos

(P25,000.00) each for the death of Emilia Monsalud, Leonardo Monsalud Sr., and
Glenda Monsalud (collectively the Monsaluds) or for the total amount of Seventyfive thousand pesos (P75,000.00);
Petitioners own evidence casts doubt on his claim that his jeep was stolen by Allan and
his alleged cohorts. Negligence is presumed under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
3. Moral damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) each for
the death of the Monsaluds or for a total amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P150,000.00);
Oscar Jr.s core defense to release him from responsibility for the death of the Monsaluds
is that his jeep was stolen. He highlights that the unauthorized taking of the jeep from the
parking area was indeed carried out by the clandestine and concerted efforts of Allan and
his five companions, notwithstanding the obstacles surrounding the parking area and the
weight of the jeep.
4. Exemplary damages of Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00).

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED. 32
Issues
As a result of the adverse judgment, Oscar Jr. filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari
alleging that the CA erred in:
Notably, the carnapping case filed against Allan and his group was already dismissed by
the RTC for insufficiency of evidence. But even in this civil case and as correctly concluded
by the CA, the evidentiary standard of preponderance of evidence required was likewise
not met to support Oscar Jr.s claim that his jeep was unlawfully taken.
Two of Allans co-accused in the carnapping case, Jemar and Benjamin, declared before
the police that when Allan invited them to ride with him, he was already driving the jeep:
04. Q- On that night, on or about 11:30 oclock on December 31, 1992, where
were you?
25
A- I went to the disco near [the] Public Market[,] Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur.
05. Q- While you were in disco place, do you know if there was an incident [that]
happened?
A- No sir but when I was in the disco place, at about 3:30 at dawn more or less[,]
January 1, 1993, Allan Maglasang arrived driving the jeep and he invited me to
ride together with Benjamin Andujar, Dioscoro Sol, Arniel Rezada and Joven
Orot.34
xxxx
04. Q- On that night, on or about 9:00 oclock in the evening more or less on
December 31, 1992, where were you?
A- I went to the disco at [the] Public Market[,] Sominot, Zamboanga del Sur.
05. Q- While you were in the disco place, do you know if there was an incident
[that] happened?
A- No, sir, but when I was in the disco place, at about 3:30 at dawn more or
less[,] January 1, 1993, Allan Maglasang arrive[d] driving the jeep and he invited
me to ride together with Jemar Alarcon, Dioscoro Sol, Arniel Rizada and Joven
Orot.35
There were six accused in the carnapping case. If Jemar and Benjamin were fetched by
Allan who was driving the jeep, this would mean that only three men pushed the jeep
contrary to Rodrigos testimony in Criminal Case No. 93-10380 that it has to be pushed by
at least five people so that it could start without the ignition key.
On direct examination,36 Oscar Jr. was asked as to what Rodrigo, his driver who had
informed him about the accident on January 1, 1993 at around 7:00 a.m., turned over to
him after the incident, viz:
Q: When Rodrigo Maglasang, your driver informed you about the accident, what
did he carry with him if any and turned over to you?
Assuming arguendo that Allan stole the jeep by having the same pushed by a group, the
ignition key should then be with Rodrigo as he was entrusted with the jeeps possession.
Thus, at the time Rodrigo faced his employer hours after the incident, it is reasonable to
expect that the driver should have also returned the key to the operator together with the
Official Receipt and Certificate of Registration. Notably, Rodrigo did not do so and instead,
the key was allegedly handed over to the police for reasons unexplained and not available
from the records. Interestingly, Oscar Jr. never presented Rodrigo as his witness. Neither
was he able to attest on cross-examination that Allan really stole the jeep by pushing or
that the key was handed over to him by Rodrigo:
Q: On December 31, 1992, you did not know that it was Rodrigo Maglasang who
gave the key to Allan Maglasang. Is that correct?
A: I was not there. So, I do not know but he had an affidavit to show that he
turned it over to the police.
Q: What I was asking you is that, [o]n the night of December 31, 1992, when it
was driven by Allan Maglasang, you did not know that the key was voluntarily
given by Rodrigo Maglasang to Allan Maglasang?
A: I was not there.
Q: So, you could not testify on that, is that correct?
A: Yes Sir, I was not there.38
Furthermore, Oscar Jr. acknowledged the dismissal of the carnapping case, thus:
Q: Now, there was a case filed against Allan Maglasang and [his] x x x coaccused x x x [n]amely: Benjamin Andojar, Dioscoro Sol, Joven Orot, [Jemar
Azarcon] and [Arniel] Rizada, for carnapping. Is that correct?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: That case was filed by you because you alleged that on December 31, 1992,
your jeep was carnapped by Allan Maglasang and his co-accused, the said
mentioned, is that correct?
A: The OR (Official Receipt) and the CR (Certificate of Registration) Sir.

A: Yes Sir.
Q: How about the key of the vehicle?
Q: You testified on the case in Aurora, is that correct?
A: It was not turned over, Sir.37
A: Yes, Sir.
26
Q: And you could well remember that this representation is the counsel of the coaccused of Allan Maglasang, is that correct?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: And that case for carnapping was dismissed, is that correct?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: Even the case of Allan Maglasang, was also dismissed, is that correct
along with proof of the accident, enough of the attending circumstances to invoke the
doctrine, create an inference or presumption of negligence and thereby place on the
defendant the burden of proving that there was no negligence on his part." 42 The doctrine
is based partly on "the theory that the defendant in charge of the instrumentality which
causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the best opportunity of
ascertaining it while the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and is therefore compelled to
allege negligence in general terms."43
The requisites of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as established by jurisprudence are as
follows:
A: Yes Sir.
1) the accident is of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent;
Q: Because there was no sufficient evidence to establish that the jeep was
carnapped, is that correct?
2) the cause of the injury was under the exclusive control of the person in charge
and
A: Yes Sir.39
3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or
contribution on the part of the person injured.44
While Oscar Jr. highlights that the headlights were not on to support his claim that his jeep
was stolen, this circumstance by itself will not prove that it really was stolen. The reason
why the headlights were not on at the time of the accident was not sufficiently established
during the trial. Besides, the fact that the headlights were not on cannot be exclusively
attributed to the lack of ignition key in starting the jeep as there may be other possibilities
such as electrical problems, broken headlights, or that they were simply turned off.
Hence, sans the testimony of witnesses and other relevant evidence to support the
defense of unauthorized taking, we cannot subscribe to Oscar Jr.s claim that his jeep was
stolen. The evidence on record brings forth more questions than clear-cut answers.
Oscar Jr. alleges that the presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur
(literally, the thing speaks for itself) should not have been applied because he was vigilant
in securing his vehicle. He claims that the jeep was parked in a well secured area not
remote to the watchful senses of its driver Rodrigo.
Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, "[w]here the thing that caused the injury complained
of is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants; and the
accident, in the ordinary course of things, would not happen if those who had management
or control used proper care, it affords reasonable evidence in the absence of a sufficient,
reasonable and logical explanation by defendant that the accident arose from or was
caused by the defendants want of care."40 Res ipsa loquitur is "merely evidentiary, a mode
of proof, or a mere procedural convenience, since it furnishes a substitute for, and relieves
a plaintiff of, the burden of producing a specific proof of negligence." 41 It "recognizes that
parties may establish prima facie negligence without direct proof, thus, it allows the
principle to substitute for specific proof of negligence. It permits the plaintiff to present
The above requisites are all present in this case. First, no person just walking along the
road would suddenly be sideswiped and run over by an on-rushing vehicle unless the one
in charge of the said vehicle had been negligent. Second, the jeep which caused the injury
was under the exclusive control of Oscar Jr. as its owner. When Oscar Jr. entrusted the
ignition key to Rodrigo, he had the power to instruct him with regard to the specific
restrictions of the jeeps use, including who or who may not drive it. As he is aware that the
jeep may run without the ignition key, he also has the responsibility to park it safely and
securely and to instruct his driver Rodrigo to observe the same precaution. Lastly, there
was no showing that the death of the victims was due to any voluntary action or
contribution on their part.
The aforementioned requisites having been met, there now arises a presumption of
negligence against Oscar Jr. which he could have overcome by evidence that he exercised
due care and diligence in preventing strangers from using his jeep. Unfortunately, he failed
to do so.
What this Court instead finds worthy of credence is the CAs conclusion that Oscar Jr. gave
his implied permission for Allan to use the jeep. This is in view of Oscar Jr.s failure to
provide solid proof that he ensured that the parking area is well secured and that he had
expressly imposed restrictions as to the use of the jeep when he entrusted the same to his
driver Rodrigo. As fittingly inferred by the CA, the jeep could have been endorsed to Allan
by his brother Rodrigo since as already mentioned, Oscar Jr. did not give Rodrigo any
specific and strict instructions on matters regarding its use. Rodrigo therefore is deemed to
have been given the absolute discretion as to the vehicles operation, including the
discretion to allow his brother Allan to use it.
27
The operator on record of a vehicle is primarily responsible to third persons for the deaths
or injuries consequent to its operation, regardless of whether the employee drove the
registered owners vehicle in connection with his employment.
awarded shall be imposed, computed from the time the judgment of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 23, Molave, Zamboanga del Sur is rendered on April 17, 2000 and twelve
percent (12%) per annum on such amount upon finality of this Decision until the payment
thereof.
Without disputing the factual finding of the CA that Allan was still his
SO ORDERED.
employee at the time of the accident, a finding which we see no reason to disturb, Oscar
Jr. contends that Allan drove the jeep in his private capacity and thus, an employers
vicarious liability for the employees fault under Article 2180 of the Civil Code cannot apply
to him.
The contention is no longer novel. In Aguilar Sr. v. Commercial Savings Bank, 45 the car of
therein respondent bank caused the death of Conrado Aguilar, Jr. while being driven by its
assistant vice president. Despite Article 2180, we still held the bank liable for damages for
the accident as said provision should defer to the settled doctrine concerning accidents
involving registered motor vehicles, i.e., that the registered owner of any vehicle, even if
not used for public service, would primarily be responsible to the public or to third persons
for injuries caused the latter while the vehicle was being driven on the highways or
streets.46 We have already ratiocinated that:
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident
happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways,
responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances
are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to
pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with
very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or
prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the
interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on
public highways.47
Absent the circumstance of unauthorized use 48 or that the subject vehicle was
stolen49 which are valid defenses available to a registered owner, Oscar Jr. cannot escape
liability for quasi-delict resulting from his jeeps use.1wphi1
All told and considering that the amounts of damages awarded are in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence, the Court concurs with the findings of the CA and sustains the
awards made. In addition, pursuant to Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals,50 an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the amounts awarded shall be
imposed, computed from the time the judgment of the RTC is rendered on April 17, 2000
and twelve percent (12%) per annum on such amount upon finality of this Decision until the
payment thereof.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
July 11, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67764 is hereby AFFIRMED with
further MODIFICATION that an interest of six percent (6%) per annum on the amounts
28
heart of the controversy is whether petitioner Sabili had complied with the one-year residency
requirement for local elective officials.
When petitioner filed his COC1 for mayor of Lipa City for the 2010 elections, he stated therein
that he had been a resident of the city for two (2) years and eight (8) months. Prior to the 2010
elections, he had been twice elected (in 1995 and in 1998) as Provincial Board Member
representing the 4th District of Batangas. During the 2007 elections, petitioner ran for the
position of Representative of the 4th District of Batangas, but lost. The 4th District of Batangas
includes Lipa City.2 However, it is undisputed that when petitioner filed his COC during the 2007
elections, he and his family were then staying at his ancestral home in Barangay (Brgy.) Sico,
San Juan, Batangas.
Private respondent Florencio Librea (private respondent) filed a "Petition to Deny Due Course
and to Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and to Disqualify a Candidate for Possessing Some
Grounds for Disqualification"3 against him before the COMELEC, docketed as SPA No. 09-047
(DC). Citing Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code, 4 private
respondent alleged that petitioner made material misrepresentations of fact in the latters COC
and likewise failed to comply with the one-year residency requirement under Section 39 of the
Local Government Code. 5 Allegedly, petitioner falsely declared under oath in his COC that he
had already been a resident of Lipa City for two years and eight months prior to the scheduled
10 May 2010 local elections.
In support of his allegation, private respondent presented the following:
1. Petitioners COC for the 2010 elections filed on 1 December 20096
2. 2009 Tax Declarations for a house and lot (TCT Nos. 173355, 173356 and buildings
thereon) in Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City registered under the name of Bernadette
Palomares, petitioners common-law wife7
G.R. No. 193261
April 24, 2012
MEYNARDO
SABILI, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and FLORENCIO LIBREA, Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to annul the Resolutions in SPA No. 09-047 (DC) dated 26 January 2010 and 17 August
2010 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which denied due course to and canceled
the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner Meynardo Sabili (petitioner) for the position of
Mayor of Lipa City for the May 2010 elections. At the
3. Lipa City Assessor Certification of Property Holdings of properties under the name
of Bernadette Palomares8
4. Affidavit executed by private respondent Florencio Librea9
5. Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by Eladio de Torres10
6. Voter Certification on petitioner issued by COMELEC Election Officer Juan D.
Aguila, Jr.11
7. 1997 Voter Registration Record of petitioner12
8. National Statistics Office (NSO) Advisory on Marriages regarding petitioner13
9. Lipa City Assessor Certificate of No Improvement on Block 2, Lot 3, Brgy. Lood,
Lipa City registered in the name of petitioner14
29
10. NSO Certificate of No Marriage of Bernadette Palomares15

11. Lipa City Assessor Certificate of No Improvement on Block 2, Lot 5, Brgy. Lood,
Lipa City registered in the name of petitioner16
12. Lipa City Permits and Licensing Office Certification that petitioner has no business
therein17
13. Apparent printout of a Facebook webpage of petitioners daughter, Mey
Bernadette Sabili18
14. Department of Education (DepEd) Lipa City Division Certification that the names
Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili and Francis Meynard Sabili (petitioners
son) do not appear on its list of graduates19
6. Certificate of Appreciation issued to petitioner by the parish of Sto. Nino of

Pinagtong-ulan30
7. Designation of petitioner in the Advisory Body (AB) of Pinagtong-ulan, San
Jose/Lipa City Chapter of Guardians Brotherhood, Inc.31
8. COMELEC Voter Certification on petitioner issued by Election Officer Juan Aguila,
Jr.32
9. COMELEC Application for Transfer/Transfer with Reactivation dated 6 June 2009
signed by Election Officer Juan Aguila, Jr.33
10. Petitioners Income Tax Return for 200734
11. Official Receipt for petitioners income tax payment for 200735
15. Certification from the Office of the Election Officer of Lipa City that Bernadette
Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili and Francis Meynard Sabili do not appear in its list
of voters20
16. Affidavit executed by Violeta Fernandez21
17. Affidavit executed by Rodrigo Macasaet22
18. Affidavit Executed by Pablo Lorzano23
19. Petitioners 2007 COC for Member of House of Representative24
For ease of later discussion, private respondents evidence shall be grouped as follows: (1)
Certificates regarding ownership of real property; (2) petitioners Voter Registration and
Certification (common exhibits of the parties); (3) petitioners COCs in previous elections; (3)
Certifications regarding petitioners family members; and (4) Affidavits of Lipa City residents.
On the other hand, petitioner presented the following evidence to establish the fact of his
residence in Lipa City:
12. Petitioners Income Tax Return for 200836

13. Official Receipt for petitioners income tax payment for 200837
14. Birth Certificate of Mey Bernadette Sabili38
15. Affidavit executed by Jacinto Cornejo, Sr.39
16. Joint Affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents, including past and
incumbent Pinagtong-ulan officials.40
For ease of later discussion, petitioners evidence shall be grouped as follows: (1) his Income
Tax Returns and corresponding Official Receipts for the years 2007 and 2008; (2) Certification
from the barangay captain of Pinagtong-ulan; (3) Affidavit of his common-law wife, Bernadette
Palomares; and (4) Affidavits from a previous property owner, neighbors, Certificate of
Appreciation from the barangay parish and Memorandum from the local chapter of Guardians
Brotherhood, Inc.
The COMELEC Ruling
1. Affidavit executed by Bernadette Palomares25

2. Birth Certificate of Francis Meynard Sabili26
3. Affidavit of Leonila Suarez (Suarez)27
4. Certification of Residency issued by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain, Dominador
Honrade28
In its Resolution dated 26 January 2010,41 the COMELEC Second Division granted the Petition
of private respondent, declared petitioner as disqualified from seeking the mayoralty post in Lipa
City, and canceled his Certificate of Candidacy for his not being a resident of Lipa City and for
his failure to meet the statutory one-year residency requirement under the law.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the 26 January 2010 Resolution of the COMELEC,
during the pendency of which the 10 May 2010 local elections were held. The next day, he was
proclaimed the duly elected mayor of Lipa City after garnering the highest number of votes cast
5. Affidavit executed by Rosalinda Macasaet29
30
for the said position. He accordingly filed a Manifestation 42with the COMELEC en banc to reflect
this fact.
In its Resolution dated 17 August 2010,43 the COMELEC en banc denied the Motion for
Reconsideration of petitioner. Although he was able to receive his copy of the Resolution, no
prior notice setting the date of promulgation of the said Resolution was received by him.
Meanwhile, Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 8696 (Rules on Disqualification Cases Filed
in Connection with the May 10, 2012 Automated National and Local Elections) requires the
parties to be notified in advance of the date of the promulgation of the Resolution.
Petitioner argues that the assailed 17 August 2010 COMELEC Resolution, which denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, is null and void. The Resolution was allegedly not
promulgated in accordance with the COMELECs own Rules of Procedure and, hence, violated
petitioners right to due process of law.
The rules governing the Petition for Cancellation of COC in this case is COMELEC Resolution
No. 8696 (Rules on Disqualification of Cases Filed in Connection with the May 10, 2010
Automated National and Local Elections), which was promulgated on 11 November 2009.
Sections 6 and 7 thereof provide as follows:
SEC. 6. Promulgation. The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a

Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in advance
upon the parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax, or thru the
fastest means of communication.
SEC. 6. Promulgation. - The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a

Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served in advance
upon the parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax or thru the
fastest means of communication.
Hence, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition (Petition for Certiorari with Extremely Urgent
Application for the Issuance of a Status Quo Order and for the Conduct of a Special Raffle of this
Case) under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking the annulment of the
26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 Resolutions of the COMELEC. Petitioner attached to his
Petition a Certificate of Canvass of Votes and proclamation of Winning Candidates for Lipa City
Mayor and Vice-Mayor issued by the City/Municipal Board of Canvassers, 44 as well as a copy of
his Oath of Office.45 He also attached to his Petition another Certification of Residency 46 issued
by Pinagtong-ulan Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade and sworn to before a notary public.
SEC. 7. Motion for Reconsideration. - A motion to reconsider a Decision, Resolution, Order or

Ruling of a Division shall be filed within three (3) days from the promulgation thereof. Such
motion, if not pro-forma, suspends the execution for implementation of the Decision, Resolution,
Order or Ruling.
On 7 September 2010, this Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order 47 requiring the parties to
observe the status quo prevailing before the issuance of the assailed COMELEC Resolutions.
Thereafter, the parties filed their responsive pleadings.
The Clerk of the Commission shall calendar the Motion for Reconsideration for the resolution of
the Commission en banc within three (3) days from the certification thereof.
Issues
The following are the issues for resolution:
1. Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to
promulgate its Resolution dated 17 August 2010 in accordance with its own Rules of
Procedure; and
2. Whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili
failed to prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective
officials.
The Courts Ruling
1. On whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it failed to promulgate
its Resolution dated 17 August 2010 in accordance with its own Rules of Procedure
Within twenty-four (24) hours from the filing thereof, the Clerk of the Commission shall notify the
Presiding Commissioner. The latter shall within two (2) days thereafter certify the case to the
Commission en banc.
However, the COMELEC Order dated 4 May 2010 48 suspended Section 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8696 by ordering that "all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission
for immediate promulgation" in view of "the proximity of the Automated National and Local
Elections and lack of material time." The Order states:
ORDER
Considering the proximity of the Automated National and Local Elections and lack of material
time, the Commission hereby suspends Sec. 6 of Resolution No. 8696 promulgated on
November 11, 2009, which reads:
Sec. 6. Promulgation. The promulgation of a Decision or Resolution of the Commission or a
Division shall be made on a date previously fixed, notice of which shall be served upon the
parties or their attorneys personally, or by registered mail, telegram, fax or thru the fastest
means of communication."
Let all resolutions be delivered to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation.
SO ORDERED.
31
Petitioner claims that he did not receive notice of the said suspension of Section 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8696. Thus, his right to due process was still violated. On the other hand, the
COMELEC claims that it has the power to suspend its own rules of procedure and invokes
Section 6, Article IX-A of the Constitution, which gives it the power "to promulgate its own rules
concerning pleadings and practice before it or before any of its offices."
The fact that petitioners were not served notice in advance of the promulgation of the decision in
the election protest cases, in Our view, does not constitute reversible error or a reason sufficient
enough to compel and warrant the setting aside of the judgment rendered by the Comelec.
Petitioners anchor their argument on an alleged denial to them (sic) due process to the deviation
by the Comelec from its own made rules. However, the essence of due process is that, the
parties in the case were afforded an opportunity to be heard.
We agree with the COMELEC on this issue.

In Lindo v. Commission on Elections, 49 petitioner claimed that there was no valid promulgation of
a Decision in an election protest case when a copy thereof was merely furnished the parties,
instead of first notifying the parties of a set date for the promulgation thereof, in accordance with
Section 20 of Rule 35 of the COMELECs own Rules of Procedure, as follows:
Sec. 20. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. The decision of the court shall be
promulgated on a date set by it of which due notice must be given the parties. It shall become
final five (5) days after promulgation. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.
Rejecting petitioners argument, we held therein that the additional rule requiring notice to the
parties prior to promulgation of a decision is not part of the process of promulgation. Since lack
of such notice does not prejudice the rights of the parties, noncompliance with this rule is a
procedural lapse that does not vitiate the validity of the decision. Thus:
This contention is untenable. Promulgation is the process by which a decision is published,
officially announced, made known to the public or delivered to the clerk of court for filing,
coupled with notice to the parties or their counsel (Neria v. Commissioner of Immigration, L24800, May 27, 1968, 23 SCRA 812). It is the delivery of a court decision to the clerk of court for
filing and publication (Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 433). It is the filing of the signed decision
with the clerk of court (Sumbing v. Davide, G.R. Nos. 86850-51, July 20, 1989, En Banc Minute
Resolution). The additional requirement imposed by the COMELEC rules of notice in advance of
promulgation is not part of the process of promulgation. Hence, We do not agree with
petitioners contention that there was no promulgation of the trial court's decision. The trial court
did not deny that it had officially made the decision public. From the recital of facts of both
parties, copies of the decision were sent to petitioner's counsel of record and petitioners (sic)
himself. Another copy was sent to private respondent.
What was wanting and what the petitioner apparently objected to was not the promulgation of
the decision but the failure of the trial court to serve notice in advance of the promulgation of its
decision as required by the COMELEC rules. The failure to serve such notice in advance of the
promulgation may be considered a procedural lapse on the part of the trial court which did not
prejudice the rights of the parties and did not vitiate the validity of the decision of the trial court
nor (sic) of the promulgation of said decision.
Moreover, quoting Pimping v. COMELEC, 50 citing Macabingkil v. Yatco,51 we further held in the
same case that failure to receive advance notice of the promulgation of a decision is not
sufficient to set aside the COMELECs judgment, as long as the parties have been afforded an
opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered, viz:
In the present case, we read from the COMELEC Order that the exigencies attendant to the
holding of the countrys first automated national elections had necessitated that the COMELEC
suspend the rule on notice prior to promulgation, and that it instead direct the delivery of all
resolutions to the Clerk of the Commission for immediate promulgation. Notably, we see no
prejudice to the parties caused thereby. The COMELECs Order did not affect the right of the
parties to due process. They were still furnished a copy of the COMELEC Decision and were
able to reckon the period for perfecting an appeal. In fact, petitioner was able to timely lodge a
Petition with this Court.
Clearly, the COMELEC validly exercised its constitutionally granted power to make its own rules
of procedure when it issued the 4 May 2010 Order suspending Section 6 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8696. Consequently, the second assailed Resolution of the COMELEC cannot be
set aside on the ground of COMELECs failure to issue to petitioner a notice setting the date of
the promulgation thereof.
2. On whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that Sabili failed to
prove compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials
As a general rule, the Court does not ordinarily review the COMELECs appreciation and
evaluation of evidence. However, exceptions thereto have been established, including when the
COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence become so grossly unreasonable as to
turn into an error of jurisdiction. In these instances, the Court is compelled by its bounden
constitutional duty to intervene and correct the COMELEC's error.52
In Mitra v. Commission on Elections, (G.R. No. 191938, 2 July 2010), we explained that the
COMELECs use of wrong or irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint
its action with grave abuse of discretion As a concept, "grave abuse of discretion" defies exact definition; generally, it refers to
"capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction;" the abuse
of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility. Mere
abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave. We have held, too, that the use of wrong or
irrelevant considerations in deciding an issue is sufficient to taint a decision-maker's action with
grave abuse of discretion.
Closely related with the limited focus of the present petition is the condition, under Section 5,
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, that findings of fact of the COMELEC, supported by substantial
32
evidence, shall be final and non-reviewable. Substantial evidence is that degree of evidence that
a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion.
The ruling on private respondents evidence

We begin with an evaluation of the COMELECs appreciation of private respondents evidence.
In light of our limited authority to review findings of fact, we do not ordinarily review in a certiorari
case the COMELEC's appreciation and evaluation of evidence. Any misstep by the COMELEC
in this regard generally involves an error of judgment, not of jurisdiction.
In exceptional cases, however, when the COMELEC's action on the appreciation and evaluation
of evidence oversteps the limits of its discretion to the point of being grossly unreasonable, the
Court is not only obliged, but has the constitutional duty to intervene. When grave abuse of
discretion is present, resulting errors arising from the grave abuse mutate from error of judgment
to one of jurisdiction.
Before us, petitioner has alleged and shown the COMELECs use of wrong or irrelevant
considerations in deciding the issue of whether petitioner made a material misrepresentation of
his residency qualification in his COC as to order its cancellation. Among others, petitioner
pointed to the COMELECs inordinate emphasis on the issue of property ownership of
petitioners declared residence in Lipa City, its inconsistent stance regarding Palomaress
relationship to the Pinagtong-ulan property, and its failure to consider in the first instance the
certification of residence issued by the barangay captain of Pinagtong-ulan. Petitioner bewails
that the COMELEC required "more" evidence to show the change in his residence,
notwithstanding the various pieces of evidence he presented and the fact that under the law, the
quantum of evidence required in these cases is merely substantial evidence and not clear and
convincing evidence. Petitioner further ascribes grave abuse of discretion in the COMELECs
brushing aside of the fact that he has been filing his ITR in Lipa City (where he indicates that he
is a resident of Pinagtong-ulan) on the mere expedient that the law allows the filing of the ITR
not only in the place of legal residence but, alternately, in his place of business. Petitioner notes
that private respondents own evidence shows that petitioner has no business in Lipa City,
leaving only his residence therein as basis for filing his ITR therein.
Hence, in resolving the issue of whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in ruling
that petitioner had not sufficiently shown that he had resided in Lipa City for at least one year
prior to the May 2010 elections, we examine the evidence adduced by the parties and the
COMELECs appreciation thereof.
In the present case, the parties are in agreement that the domicile of origin of Sabili was Brgy.
Sico, San Juan, Batangas. He claims that he abandoned his domicile of origin and established
his domicile of choice in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, thereby making him qualified to run for
Lipa City mayor. On the other hand, respondent COMELEC held that no such change in
domicile or residence took place and, hence, the entry in his Certificate of Candidacy showing
that he was a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City constituted a misrepresentation that
disqualified him from running for Lipa City mayor.
To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place must be coupled with
conduct indicative of the intention to make it one's fixed and permanent place of abode. 53 As in
all administrative cases, the quantum of proof necessary in election cases is substantial
evidence, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind will accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.54
a) Petitioners Voter Certification, Registration and COCs in previous elections

Petitioners Voter Certification is a common exhibit of the parties. It states, among others, that
petitioner is a resident of Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City, Batangas; that he had been a resident of
Lipa City for two (2) years and three (3) months; and that he was so registered on 31 October
2009. The information therein was "certified correct" by COMELEC Election Officer Juan B.
Aguila, Jr.
Private respondent presented this document as proof that petitioner misrepresented that he is a
resident of Lipa City. On the other hand, the latter presented this document as proof of his
residency.
The COMELEC correctly ruled that the Voter Certification issued by the COMELEC Election
Officer, Atty. Juan B. Aguila, Jr., was not conclusive proof that petitioner had been a resident of
Lipa City since April 2007. It noted that Aguila is not the competent public officer to certify the
veracity of this claim, particularly because petitioners COMELEC registration was approved only
in October 2009.
The Voter Registration Record of petitioner accomplished on 21 June 1997 showing that he was
a resident of Sico, San Juan, Batangas, as well as his various COCs dated 21 June 1997 and
March 2007 indicating the same thing, were no longer discussed by the COMELEC and rightly
so. These pieces of evidence showing that he was a resident of Sico, San Juan, Batangas on
the said dates are irrelevant as, prior to April 2007, petitioner was admittedly a resident of Sico,
San Juan Batangas. Rather, the relevant time period for consideration is that from April 2007
onwards, after petitioners alleged change of domicile.
b) Certificates regarding ownership of real property
The various certificates and tax declarations adduced by private respondent showed that the
Lipa property was solely registered in the name of petitioners common-law wife, Bernadette
Palomares. In discussing the import of this document, the COMELEC reasoned that, being a
"seasoned politician," he should have registered the Lipa property (which he claimed to have
purchased with his personal funds) in his own name. Such action "would have offered positive
proof of intent to change actual residence" from San Juan, Batangas to Lipa City, considering
that he had previously declared his ancestral home in San Juan, Batangas as his domicile.
Since Palomares and petitioner are common-law spouses not capacitated to marry each other,
the property relation between them is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code, 55 where only
the parties actual contributions are recognized. Hence, petitioner cannot prove ownership of a
property and residence in Lipa City through the registered ownership of the common-law wife of
the property in Lipa City.
On the other hand, petitioner bewails the inordinate emphasis that the COMELEC bestowed
upon the question of whether the Lipa property could be considered as his residence, for the
33
reason that it was not registered in his name. He stresses that the issue should be residence,
not property ownership.
in his name, petitioner is unable to show the existence of real and substantial reason for his stay
in Lipa City.
It is true that property ownership is not among the qualifications required of candidates for local
election.56Rather, it is a candidates residence in a locality through actual residence in whatever
capacity. Indeed, we sustained the COMELEC when it considered as evidence tending to
establish a candidates domicile of choice the mere lease (rather than ownership) of an
apartment by a candidate in the same province where he ran for the position of governor.57 In the
more recent case of Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 58 we reversed the COMELEC ruling that
a candidates sparsely furnished, leased room on the mezzanine of a feedmill could not be
considered as his residence for the purpose of complying with the residency requirement of
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.59
As to the Dissents first assertion, it must be stressed that the children, like the wife, do not
dictate the family domicile. Even in the context of marriage, the family domicile is jointly decided
by both husband and wife.61 In addition, we note that the transfer to Lipa City occurred in 2007,
when petitioners children were already well into college and could very well have chosen to
study elsewhere than in Lipa City.
The Dissent claims that the registration of the property in Palomaress name does not prove
petitioners residence as it merely showed "donative intent" without the necessary formalities or
payment of taxes.
However, whatever the nature of the transaction might be, this point is immaterial for the
purpose of ascertaining petitioners residence. We have long held that it is not required that a
candidate should have his own house in order to establish his residence or domicile in a place. It
is enough that he should live in the locality, even in a rented house or that of a friend or
relative.60 What is of central concern then is that petitioner identified and established a place in
Lipa City where he intended to live in and return to for an indefinite period of time.
Hence, while the COMELEC correctly ruled that, of itself, Palomares ownership of the Lipa
property does not prove that she or and in view of their common-law relations, petitioner
resides in Lipa City, nevertheless, the existence of a house and lot apparently owned by
petitioners common-law wife, with whom he has been living for over two decades, makes
plausible petitioners allegation of bodily presence and intent to reside in the area.
c) Certifications regarding the family members of petitioner
Private respondent presented a Certification from the DepEd, Lipa City Division, indicating that
the names Bernadette Palomares, Mey Bernadette Sabili (petitioners daughter) and Francis
Meynard Sabili (petitioners son) do not appear on the list of graduates of Lipa City. Private
respondent also presented a Certification from the Office of the Election Officer of Lipa City that
the names of these family members of petitioner do not appear in its list of voters.
As the issue at hand is petitioners residence, and not the educational or voting record of his
family, the COMELEC properly did not consider these pieces of evidence in arriving at its
Resolution.
The Dissent nevertheless asserts that because his children do not attend educational institutions
in Lipa and are not registered voters therein, and because petitioner does not maintain a
business therein nor has property
Also, it is petitioners domicile which is at issue, and not that of his children. But even assuming
that it was petitioner himself (rather than his children) who attended educational institutions or
who registered as a voter in a place other than Lipa City, we have held that "absence from
residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the
place where one is elected, does not constitute loss of residence." 62 In fact, Section 117 of the
Omnibus Election Code provides that transfer of residence to any other place by reason of one's
"occupation; profession; employment in private and public service; educational activities; work in
military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the constabulary or national
police force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law" is
not deemed as loss of residence.
As to the Dissents second assertion, petitioner apparently does not maintain a business in Lipa
City. However, apart from the Pinagtong-ulan property which both Suarez (the previous property
owner) and Palomares swear was purchased with petitioners own funds, the records also
indicate that there are two other lots in Lipa City, particularly in Barangay Lodlod, Lipa
City63 which are registered jointly in the name of petitioner and Palomares. In fact, it was private
respondent who presented the Lipa City Assessors Certificate to this effect. Even assuming that
this Court were to disregard the two Lodlod lots, it is well-established that property ownership
(and similarly, business interest) in the locality where one intends to run for local elective post is
not requirement of the Constitution.64
More importantly, we have gone so far as to rule that there is nothing "wrong in an individual
changing residences so he could run for an elective post, for as long as he is able to prove with
reasonable certainty that he has
effected a change of residence for election law purposes for the period required by law."65
d) Affidavits of Lipa City residents
Private respondent also presented the affidavits of Violeta Fernandez 66 and Rodrigo
Macasaet,67 who were also residents of Pinagtong-ulan. Both stated that petitioner did not reside
in Pinagtong-ulan, as they had "rarely seen" him in the area. Meanwhile, Pablo Lorzano, 68 in his
Affidavit, attested that although the Lipa property was sometimes used for gatherings, he did
"not recall having seen" petitioner in their barangay. On the other hand, private respondent 69 and
Eladio de Torres,70 both residents of Brgy. Calamias, reasoned that petitioner was not a resident
of Lipa City because he has no work or family there.
34
The COMELEC did not discuss these Affidavits in its assailed Resolution. It was correct in doing
so, particularly considering that these Affidavits were duly controverted by those presented by
petitioner.
Moreover, even assuming the truth of the allegation in the Affidavits that petitioner was "rarely
seen" in the area, this does not preclude the possibility of his residence therein. In Fernandez v.
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 71 we held that the averments of certain barangay
health workers that they failed to see a particular candidate whenever they made rounds of the
locality of which he was supposed to be a resident is of no moment. It is possible that the
candidate was out of the house to attend to his own business at the time. The law does not
require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill
the residency requirement.
The ruling on petitioners evidence
b) Certification from the Barangay Captain of Pinagtong-ulan

The COMELEC did not consider in the first instance the Certification issued by Pinagtong-ulan
Barangay Captain Dominador Honrade74 (Honrade) that petitioner had been residing in Brgy
Pinagtong-ulan since 2007. When this oversight was raised as an issue in petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration, the COMELEC brushed it aside on the ground that the said Certification was
not sworn to before a notary public and, hence, "cannot be relied on." Subsequently, petitioner
presented another, substantially identical, Certification from the said Pinagtong-ulan Barangay
Captain, save for the fact that it had now been sworn to before a notary public.
We disagree with the COMELECs treatment of the Barangay Captains Certification and find the
same tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
Even without being sworn to before a notary public, Honrades Certification would not only be
admissible in evidence, but would also be entitled to due consideration.
We now evaluate how the COMELEC appreciated petitioners evidence:

Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court provides:
a) Petitioners Income Tax Returns for 2007 and 2008
The Income Tax Returns of petitioner presented below showed that petitioner had been paying
his Income Tax (2007 and 2008) to the Revenue District Office of Lipa City. In waving aside his
Income Tax Returns, the COMELEC held that these were not indications of residence since
Section 51(B) of the National Internal Revenue Code does not only state that it shall be filed in a
persons legal residence, but that it may alternatively be filed in a persons principal place of
business.
In particular, Section 51(B) of the National Internal Revenue Code72 provides that the Income
Tax Return shall be filed either in the place where a person resides or where his principal place
of business is located. However, private respondents own evidence a Certification from the
City Permits and Licensing Office of Lipa City showed that there was no business registered in
the City under petitioners name.
SEC. 44. Entries in official records.Entries in official records made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law, are prima facieevidence of the facts therein stated.
In Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Lianga Bay and Community Multi-purpose
Cooperative, Inc.,75 we explained that the following three (3) requisites must concur for entries in
official records to be admissible in evidence:
(a) The entry was made by a public officer, or by another person specially enjoined by
law to do so;
(b) It was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
Thus, COMELEC failed to appreciate that precisely because an individual income tax return may
only be filed either in the legal residence OR the principal place of business, as prescribed under
the law, the fact that Sabili was filing his Income Tax Returns in Lipa City notwithstanding that he
had no business therein showed that he had actively elected to establish his residence in that
city.
(c) The public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts stated by
him, which facts must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.
The Dissent claims that since the jurisdiction of RDO Lipa City includes both San Juan and Lipa
City, petitioners filing of his ITR therein can also support an intent to remain in San Juan,
Batangas - petitioners domicile of origin.
As to the first requisite, the Barangay Secretary is required by the Local Government Code to
"keep an updated record of all inhabitants of the barangay." 76 Regarding the second requisite,
we have explicitly recognized in Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 77 that "it is the business of a
punong barangay to know who the residents are in his own barangay." Anent the third requisite,
the Barangay Captains exercise of powers and duties78 concomitant to his position requires him
to be privy to these records kept by the Barangay Secretary.
However, a simple perusal of the Income Tax Returns and Revenue Official Receipts for 2007
and 2008 shows that petitioner invariably declares his residence to be Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City,
rather than San Juan, Batangas. 73 Hence, while petitioner may be submitting his income tax
return in the same RDO, the declaration therein is unmistakable. Petitioner considers Lipa City
to be his domicile.
Accordingly, there is basis in faulting the COMELEC for its failure to consider Honrades
Certification on the sole ground that it was initially not notarized.
35
Meanwhile, the Dissent opines that the sworn affidavit of the barangay chair of Pinagtong-ulan
that petitioner is a resident of Lipa City does not help petitioners case because it was not shown
that the term "resident" as used therein carries the same meaning as domicile, that is, not
merely bodily presence but also, animus manendi or intent to return. This Court has ruled
otherwise.
In Mitra v. Commission on Elections,79 the declaration of Aborlans punong barangay that
petitioner resides in his barangay was taken to have the same meaning as domicile, inasmuch
as the said declaration was made in the face of the Courts recognition that Mitra "might not
have stayed in Aborlan nor in Palawan for most of 2008 and 2009 because his office and
activities as a Representative were in Manila."
Assuming that the barangay captains certification only pertains to petitioners bodily presence in
Pinagtong-ulan, still, the COMELEC cannot deny the strength of this evidence in establishing
petitioners bodily presence in Pinagtong-ulan since 2007.
c) Affidavit of petitioners common law wife
To substantiate his claim of change of domicile, petitioner also presented the affidavit of
Palomares, wherein the latter swore that she and petitioner began residing in Lipa City in 2007,
and that the funds used to purchase the Lipa property were petitioners personal funds. The
COMELEC ruled that the Affidavit was self-serving for having been executed by petitioners
common-law wife. Also, despite the presentation by petitioner of other Affidavits stating that he
and Palomares had lived in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan since 2007, the latters Affidavit was rejected
by the COMELEC for having no independent collaboration.
Petitioner faults the COMELECs stand, which it claims to be inconsistent. He argues that since
the property regime between him and Palomares is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code
(based on the parties actual contribution) as the COMELEC stressed, then Palomaress Affidavit
expressly stating that petitioners money alone had been used to purchase the Lipa property
(notwithstanding that it was registered in her name) was not self-serving, but was in fact, a
declaration against interest.
Petitioners argument that Palomaress affidavit was a "declaration against interest" is, strictly
speaking, inaccurate and irrelevant. A declaration against interest, under the Rules of Civil
Procedure, refers to a "declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify against the
interest of a declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far
contrary to declarants own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have made
the declaration unless he believed it to be true." 80 A declaration against interest is an exception
to the hearsay rule.81 As such, it pertains only to the admissibility of, not the weight accorded to,
testimonial evidence.82
Nevertheless, we see the logic in petitioners claim that the COMELEC had committed grave
abuse of discretion in being inconsistent in its stand regarding Palomares, particularly regarding
her assertion that the Lipa property had been purchased solely with petitioners money. If the
COMELEC accepts the registration of the Lipa property in her name to be accurate, her affidavit
disavowing ownership thereof in favor of petitioner was far from self-serving as it ran counter to
her (and her childrens) property interest.
The Dissent states that it was not unreasonable for the COMELEC to believe that Palomares
may have committed misrepresentations in her affidavit considering that she had perjured
herself as an informant on the birth certificates of her children with respect to the supposed date
and place of her marriage to petitioner. However, this was not the reason propounded by the
COMELEC when it rejected Palomares affidavit.
Moreover, it is notable that Palomares assertion in her affidavit that she and petitioner have
been living in the Pinagtong-ulan property since April 2007 is corroborated by other evidence,
including the affidavits of Pinagtong-ulan barangay officials and neighbors.
d) Affidavits from a previous property owner, neighbors, certificate from parish and designation
from socio-civic organization
The Affidavit issued by Leonila Suarez83 (erstwhile owner of the Lipa house and lot) states that in
April 2007, after she received the down payment for the Lipa property and signed an agreement
that petitioner would settle her bank obligations in connection with the said transaction, he and
Palomares actually started residing at Pinagtong-ulan. The COMELEC brushed this Affidavit
aside as one that "merely narrates the circumstances surrounding the sale of the property and
mentions in passing that Sabili and Palomares lived in Pinagtong-ulan since April 2007 up to the
present."84
We disagree with the COMELECs appreciation of the Suarez Affidavit. Since she was its owner,
transactions for the purchase of the Lipa property was within her personal knowledge. Ordinarily,
this includes the arrangement regarding who shall pay for the property and when, if ever, it shall
be occupied by the buyers. We thus consider that her statements impact positively on
petitioners claim of residence.
The Dissent on the other hand argues that the claim that petitioner started living in the Lipa
house and lot in April 2007 is made dubious by the fact that (1) there might not be enough time
to effect an actual and physical change in residence a month before the May 2007 elections
when petitioner ran for representative of the 4th District of Batangas; and (2) the Deed of
Absolute Sale was notarized, and the subsequent transfer of ownership in the tax declaration
was made, only in August 2008.
Before further discussing this, it is pertinent to point out that these were not the reasons
adduced by the COMELEC in the assailed Resolutions. Assuming that the above reasons were
the unuttered considerations of the COMELEC in coming up with its conclusions, such
reasoning still exhibits grave abuse of discretion.
As to the Dissents first argument, it must be remembered that a transfer of domicile/residence
need not be completed in one single instance. Thus, in Mitra v. Commission on
Elections,85 where the evidence showed that in 2008, petitioner Mitra had leased a small room at
Maligaya Feedmills located in Aborlan and, in 2009 purchased in the same locality a lot where
he began constructing his house, we recognized that petitioner "transferred by incremental
36
process to Aborlan beginning 2008 and concluded his transfer in early 2009" and thus, he
transferred his residence from Puerto Princesa City to Aborlan within the period required by law.
We cannot treat the transfer to the Pinagtong-ulan house any less than we did Mitras transfer to
the Maligaya Feedmills room.1wphi1
Moreover, the Joint Affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents, including former and
incumbent barangay officials, attests that petitioner had begun living in the Pinagtong-ulan
house and lot before the May 2007 elections such that it was where his coordinators for the May
2007 elections went to meet him.86 Jacinto Cornejo Sr., the contractor who renovated the
Pinagtong-ulan house when it was bought by petitioner, also swore that petitioner and his family
began living therein even while it was being renovated. 87 Another Affidavit petitioner adduced
was that of Rosalinda Macasaet, a resident of Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, 88 who stated that she also
sold a lot she owned in favor of petitioner and Palomares. The latter bought her lot since it was
adjacent to the Lipa house and lot they had earlier acquired. Macasaet also swore that the
couple had actually resided in the house located in Pinagtong-ulan since April 2007, and that
she knew this because her own house was very near the couples own. Macasaets Affidavit is a
positive assertion of petitioners actual physical presence in Brgy. Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City.
While private respondent had adduced affidavits of two Pinagtong-ulan residents (that of Violeta
Fernandez89 and Rodrigo Macasaet)90 attesting that petitioner could not be a resident of
Pinagtong-ulan as he was "rarely seen" in the area, these affidavits were controverted by the
Joint affidavit of twenty-one (21) Pinagtong-ulan residents who plainly accused the two of lying.
Meanwhile, the affidavits of private respondent 91 and Eladio de Torres92 stating that petitioner is
not a resident of Lipa City because he has no work or family there is hardly worthy of credence
since both are residents of Barangay Calamias, which is, and private respondent does not
contest this, about 15 kilometers from Pinagtong-ulan.
As to the Dissents second argument, the fact that the notarization of the deed of absolute sale
of the property was made months after April 2007 does not negate petitioners claim that he
started residing therein in April 2007. It is clear from the Affidavit of the propertys seller, Leonila
Suarez, that it was not yet fully paid in April 2007, so it was understandable that a deed of
absolute sale was not executed at the time. Thus:
That initially, the contract to sell was entered into by and between Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo Asa
Sabili and Bernadette Palomares and myself, but eventually the spouses changed their mind,
and after the couple settled all my loan obligations to the bank, they requested me to put the
name of Ms. Bernadette P. Palomares instead of Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo Asa Sabili and
Bernadette Palomares in the absolute deed of sale;
That it was Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili who came to my former residence at Barangay Pinagtongulan sometime in the month of April 2007. At that time, Mr. Meynardo Asa Sabili was still running
for Representative (Congressman) in the 4th District of Batangas;
That after payment of the down payment and signing of an agreement that Mr. Meynardo Asa
Sabili will be the one to settle my bank obligations, Mr. & Mrs. Meynardo A. Sabili and
Bernadette Palomares had an actual transfer of their residence at Barangay Pinagtong-ulan,
Lipa City;
That they started living and residing in Pinagtong-ulan in the month of April, 2007 up to this point
in time; xxx93
As to the rest of the documents presented by petitioner, the COMELEC held that the
Memorandum issued by the Guardians Brotherhood Inc. San Jose/Lipa City Chapter merely
declares the designation of petitioner in the organization, without any showing that residence in
the locality was a requirement for that designation. Meanwhile, the Certificate of Appreciation
was nothing more than an acknowledgment of petitioners material and financial support, and
not an indication of residence.
We agree that considered separately, the Guardians Brotherhood Memorandum and the
Pinagtong-ulan Parish Certificate of Appreciation do not establish petitioners residence in
Pinagtong-ulan, Lipa City. Nevertheless, coupled with the fact that petitioner had twice been
elected as Provincial Board Member representing the Fourth District of Batangas, which
encompasses Lipa City, petitioners involvement in the religious life of the community, as
attested to by the certificate of appreciation issued to him by the Pinagtong-ulan parish for his
"material and financial support" as President of the Barangay Fiesta Committee in 2009, as well
as his assumption of a leadership role in the socio-civic sphere of the locality as a member of
the advisory body of the Pinagtong-ulan, San Jose/Lipa City Chapter of the Guardians
Brotherhood Inc. , manifests a significant level of knowledge of and sensitivity to the needs of
the said community. Such, after all, is the rationale for the residency requirement in our elections
laws, to wit:
The Constitution and the law requires residence as a qualification for seeking and holding
elective public office, in order to give candidates the opportunity to be familiar with the needs,
difficulties, aspirations, potentials for growth and all matters vital to the welfare of their
constituencies; likewise, it enables the electorate to evaluate the office seekers qualifications
and fitness for the job they aspire for xxx. 94
Considering all of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that while separately, each evidence
presented by petitioner might fail to convincingly show the fact of his residence at Pinagtongulan since 2007, collectively, these pieces of evidence tend to sufficiently establish the said fact.
Petitioners actual physical presence in Lipa City is established not only by the presence of a
place (Pinagtong-ulan house and lot) he can actually live in, but also the affidavits of various
persons in Pinagtong-ulan, and the Certification of its barangay captain. Petitioners substantial
and real interest in establishing his domicile of choice in Lipa City is also sufficiently shown not
only by the acquisition of additional property in the area and the transfer of his voter registration,
but also his participation in the communitys socio-civic and religious life, as well as his
declaration in his ITR that he is a resident thereof.
We therefore rule that petitioner has been able to adduce substantial evidence to demonstrate
compliance with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials under the law.
In view of this Courts finding that petitioner has not misrepresented his residence at Pinagtongulan and the duration thereof, there is no need to further discuss whether there was material and
deliberate misrepresentation of the residency qualification in his COC.1wphi1
37
As a final note, we do not lose sight of the fact that Lipa City voters manifested their own
judgment regarding the qualifications of petitioner when they voted for him, notwithstanding that
the issue of his residency qualification had been raised prior to the elections. Petitioner has
garnered the highest number of votes (55,268 votes as opposed to the 48,825 votes in favor of
his opponent, Oscar Gozos)95 legally cast for the position of Mayor of Lipa City and has
consequently been proclaimed duly elected municipal Mayor of Lipa City during the last May
2010 elections96
In this regard, we reiterate our ruling in Frivaldo v. Commission on Elections97 that "(t)o
successfully challenge a winning candidate's qualifications, the petitioner must clearly
demonstrate that the ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles
that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people, would
ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that
our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote."
Similarly, in Japzon v. Commission on Elections,98 we concluded that "when the evidence of the
alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak or
inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by
upholding the victor's right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. For the
purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters."
In sum, we grant the Petition not only because petitioner sufficiently established his compliance
with the one-year residency requirement for local elective officials under the law. We also
recognize that "(a)bove and beyond all, the determination of the true will of the electorate should
be paramount. It is their voice, not ours or of anyone else, that must prevail. This, in essence, is
the democracy we continue to hold sacred."99
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The assailed COMELEC
Resolutions dated 26 January 2010 and 17 August 2010 in Florencio Librea v. Meynardo A.
Sabili [SPA No. 09-047(DC)] are ANNULLED. Private respondents Petition to cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy of Meynardo A. Sabili is DENIED. The Status Quo Ante Order issued by
this Court on 7 September 2010 is MADE PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 131421
November 18, 2002
GERONIMO
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DADO, petitioner,
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 26, 1997
decision of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. CR No. 16886, which affirmed the decision 2 dated
April 22, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of Sultan Kudarat, Branch 19, in Criminal Case No.
2056, finding petitioner Geronimo Dado and his co-accused Francisco Eraso guilty of the crime
of homicide.
In an Information dated August 24, 1993, petitioner Geronimo Dado and accused Francisco
Eraso were charged with murder allegedly committed as follows:
That in the evening of May 25, 1992, at Sitio Paitan, Barangay Sagasa, Municipality of
Esperanza, Province of Sultan Kudarat, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, armed with firearms, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and
treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and shot one
SILVESTRE BALINAS with the use of the afore-mentioned weapons, thereby inflicting gunshot
wounds upon the latter which caused his instantaneous death.
38
CONTRARY TO LAW, particularly Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, with
the aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength.3
three, copper colored, embedded in blasted substance almost on the pelvic floor.
Hematoma noted along the penile area.
Upon arraignment on September 22, 1992, petitioner and his co-accused pleaded not
guilty.4 Trial thereafter followed.
No other injuries noted.9
The antecedent facts as narrated by prosecution witnesses Alfredo Balinas 5 and Rufo Alga6 are
as follows: On the night of May 25, 1992, the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed
three teams to intercept cattle rustlers from Barangay Laguinding, Sultan Kudarat. The team,
composed of petitioner SPO4 Geromino Dado and CAFGU members Francisco Eraso, Alfredo
Balinas, and Rufo Alga, waited behind a large dike at Sitio Paitan, Sultan Kudarat. Alfredo
Balinas and Rufo Alga, who were both armed with M14 armalite rifles, positioned themselves
between petitioner, who was armed with a caliber .45 pistol, and accused Francisco Eraso, who
was carrying an M16 armalite rifle. They were all facing southwards in a half-kneeling position
and were about 2 arms length away from each other. At around 11:00 of the same evening, the
team saw somebody approaching at a distance of 50 meters. Though it was a moonless night,
they noticed that he was half-naked. When he was about 5 meters away from the team, Alfredo
Balinas noticed that Francisco Eraso, who was on his right side, was making some movements.
Balinas told Eraso to wait, but before Balinas could beam his flash light, Eraso fired his M16
armalite rifle at the approaching man. Immediately thereafter, petitioner, who was on the left side
of Rufo Alga, fired a single shot from his .45 caliber pistol. The victim shouted, "Tay Dolfo, ako
ini," ("Tay Dolfo, [this is] me") 7 as he fell on the ground. The victim turned out to be Silvestre
"Butsoy" Balinas, the nephew of Alfredo Balinas and not the cattle rustler the team were ordered
to intercept. Repentant of what he did, accused Eraso embraced Alfredo Balinas saying, "Pare,
this was not intentionally done and this was merely an accident."8
Silvestre Balinas died as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained. The post-mortem
examination conducted on his cadaver by Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor, yielded the following results:
Gunshot wounds located at:
1. (Point of Entry) - at right outer lateral arm with a diameter of 0.25 cm coursing
tangentially and exiting at the right inner arm, about 4 cm below the elbow, 2.5 cm by
3cm in diameter (Point of Exit).
No powder burns noted.
2. (Point of Entry) 2.5 by 9.5 cm in diameter at upper mid-inner thigh, about 5 cm
from the ischial spine. Exposed were the damaged muscles, blood vessels and the
surrounding tissues along the femoral triangle. The wound coursed upwards toward
the pelvic area through the inguinal canal with blast injuries noted [at] the urinary
bladder prostate gland, urethra, part of the ureter, the mid-pelvic bone (symphysis
pubis), and the surrounding vessels and tissues of the pelvis. Marked bleeding was
noted along the injured pelvic area. Three (3) pieces of irregularly shaped metallic
slugs were recovered from the body; one, silvery colored, along the iliac spine almost
glued to the bone; two, copper colored, embedded in the urinary bladder substance;
Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor testified that the fatal wound that caused the death of the
victim was the one inflicted on the mid-inner thigh. The bullet pierced through and
injured the organs in the pelvic region where she found three irregularly shaped
metallic fragments. Dr. Antenor added that the position of the victim at that time of the
shooting was higher than the assailant considering that the trajectory of the bullets
was upwards. She added that the wound on the victims right outer lateral arm alone,
would not bring about death, unless not immediately treated.10
Upon examination by NBI Ballistician Elmer Nelson D. Piedad, the three metallic fragments
recovered from the fatal wound of the victim turned out to be fragments of a 5.56 mm jacketed
bullet, thus:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION:
xxxxxxxxx
1. Evidence marked "SB-1" is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56mm jacketed bullet and
was fired through the barrel of a caliber 5.56mm firearms.
2. Evidence marked "SB-2" and "SB-3" could be parts of the lead core of evidence copper
jacketed marked "SB-1".
x x x x x x x x x.11
On cross-examination, he declared that he is not sure whether the 2 other metallic fragments
(marked as exhibit "SB-2" and "SB-3") recovered from the fatal wound of the victim are indeed
parts of "SB-1" which is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet.12
For his part, petitioner testified that on the night of the incident, he was armed with a .45 caliber
pistol. He claimed that while waiting for the cattle rustlers, he and his team positioned
themselves beneath a big hole from which a big tree had been uprooted. He was facing
eastward while his companions, CAFGU members, Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo
Alga, were facing southwards. When he heard rapid gun bursts, he thought they were being
fired upon by their enemies, thus, he immediately fired a single shot eastward. It was only when
accused Eraso embraced and asked forgiveness from Alfredo Balinas, that he realized
somebody was shot.13
On cross-examination however, he admitted that he knew the rapid gun burst which he thought
to be from their enemies came from 2 meters behind him. He explained that his arm was then
broken making it difficult for him to move. Thus, when he heard the gun burst, he did not turn to
face the source thereof and instead fired his .45 caliber pistol in front of him. He declared that
39
his purpose in firing his .45 caliber pistol opposite the source of the rapid gun burst was to
demoralize their enemy.14
On April 22, 1994, the trial court convicted petitioner and accused Eraso of the crime of
homicide. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused, SPO4
Geronimo Dado and Francisco Eraso, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
HOMICIDE.
ACCORDINGLY, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the
accused, SPO4 Geronimo Dado and Francisco Eraso, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment, ranging from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum,
to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion temporal, as
maximum; to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the late Silvestre Balinas, Jr.:
a) the amount of P3,000.00 as actual damages which was duly established in relation
to the expenses incurred for the complete funeral services given to the deceased
victim;
b) the amount of P15,000.00, as moral damages;
c) the amount of P10,000.00, as exemplary damages;
A reading, however, of the information filed against petitioner will readily show that the
prosecution failed to allege the circumstance of conspiracy. Pertinent portion of the information
states: " x x x the said accused, armed with firearms, with intent to kill, with evident
premeditation and treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack,
assault and shot one SILVESTRE BALINAS with the use of the afore-mentioned weapons,
thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the latter which caused his instantaneous death. x x x"
Undoubtedly, the information does not satisfy the requirement that conspiracy must be conveyed
in "appropriate language."20 The words "conspired," "confederated," or the phrase "acting in
concert" or "in conspiracy," or their synonyms or derivatives do not appear in the indictment. The
language used by the prosecution in charging the petitioner and his co-accused contains no
reference to conspiracy which must be alleged, not merely inferred from the information. Absent
particular statements in the accusatory portion of the charge sheet concerning any definitive act
constituting conspiracy, the same cannot be considered against the petitioner who must perforce
be held accountable only for his own acts or omissions. 21 In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To ensure
that the due process rights of an accused are observed, every indictment must embody the
essential elements of the crime charged with reasonable particularity as to the name of the
accused, the time and place of commission of the offense, and the circumstances thereof.22
Moreover, even if conspiracy was sufficiently alleged in the information, the same cannot be
considered against the petitioner. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Although the
agreement need not be directly proven, circumstantial evidence of such agreement must
nonetheless be convincingly shown. Indeed, like the offense itself, conspiracy must be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, it has been held that neither joint nor simultaneous action is per
se sufficient proof of conspiracy.23
d) the amount of P50,000.00, as indemnity for death; and to pay the costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.15
The aforesaid judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on June 26, 1997.16
A petition for review17 was filed by accused Francisco Eraso but the same was denied in a
Resolution dated February 11, 1998,18 which became final and executory on March 30,
1998.19 Hence, as regards Francisco Eraso, the decision of the Court of Appeals finding him
guilty of homicide has become final.
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed the instant petition contending that the trial court and the
Court of Appeals erred: (1) in ruling that he acted in conspiracy with accused Francisco Eraso;
and (2) in finding him guilty of homicide on the basis of the evidence presented by the
prosecution.
In convicting the petitioner, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that conspiracy
attended the commission of the crime. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner and accused
Eraso conspired in killing the deceased, thus, it is no longer necessary to establish who caused
the fatal wound inasmuch as conspiracy makes the act of one conspirator the act of all.
In the case at bar, petitioner and accused Erasos seemingly concerted and almost simultaneous
acts were more of a spontaneous reaction rather than the result of a common plan to kill the
victim. Simultaneity alone would not be enough to demonstrate the concurrence of will or the
unity of action and purpose that could be the basis for collective responsibility of two or more
individuals particularly if, as in the case at bar, the incident occurred at the spur of the moment.
In conspiracy, there should be a conscious design to perpetrate the offense. 24
Thus, petitioner can only be held responsible for the acts or omissions which can be proved to
have been committed by him personally. In other words, his criminal accountability, if any, should
be determined on an individual rather than on a collective basis. Petitioner could not be made to
answer for the acts done by his co-accused, Franciso Eraso, unless it be shown that he
participated directly and personally in the commission of those acts. It becomes important
therefore to determine whether petitioner inflicted the fatal wound that directly caused the death
of the victim.
The trial court found that a .45 caliber bullet will create a bigger entrance wound as compared to
a 5.56 mm. bullet which is of a lower caliber. It concluded that the wound on the inner thigh of
the victim must have been caused by a .45 caliber bullet because said wound had a bigger
entrance than the wound sustained by the victim on the right outer lateral arm. 25 However, this
conclusion is entirely devoid of basis because no evidence was presented to substantiate said
conclusions. What is decisive is the result of the Ballistic Examination conducted by NBI
40
Ballistician Elmer D. Piedad, on the 3 metallic fragments recovered from the fatal wound of the
victim. Piedad found that one of said fragments, marked "SB-1," "is a part of a copper jacket of a
caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet and was fired through the barrel of a caliber 5.56 mm.
firearm,"26 and not a part of a .45 caliber bullet.27Pertinent portion of his testimony, reads:
ATTY. MONTEFERIO:
Q: You have presented before this Honorable Court [a] piece of paper marked "A1". This refer to the very same Exhibit "A-1"?
A: We are not in the composition but we are on a caliber (sic).

Q: With that answer, it may be possible that this Exhibit "2", SB -1, SB-2 and SB-3,
could be bullet from a caliber .45, M-14 or M-16?
A: It could not be possible. SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and the lead
core evidenced (sic)marked SB-2 and SB-3 could be parts of the copper jacket
evidenced (sic) marked SB-1.29
xxxxxxxxx
A: Yes, sir.
xxxxxxxxx
Q: Please tell us, how did you arrive in your findings that SB-1 is part of a copper
jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet; how did you arrive?
A: In a copper jacket[ed] bullet, there is always [a] copper jacket, that is upper part of
the bullet, sir.
Q: How did you arrive at the conclusion that this is part of a copper jacket of 5.56
mm.?
Q: Look at your Certification and in Exhibit "3-A", in page 2 under the column,
"Findings and Conclusions" and I quote: "Evidenced (sic) marked SB-2 and SB-3
could be parts of the lead core of evidenced (sic)copper jacket marked [as] SB-1. My
question, you said could be part of copper jacket marked SB-1, are you telling the
Court, you are sure that this Exhibits "SB-2" and "SB-3" [are] not part of a copper . .
. jacket marked as SB-1?
A: It could be parts or it could not be parts.
Q: You are in doubt that this is really part of SB-1?
A: It could be part, I am doubting.
A: I carefully examined SB-1 in my report to a copper jacket[ed] bullet fired from [a]
5.56 mm., and I found out that the lands and grooves of the evidenced (sic) copper
jacket marked SB-1 is riflings of the standard 5.56 mm., they have the same lands and
grooves.
Q: Did you utilize instruments in order to determine?
A: A bullet comparison microscope.28
COURT:
Q: If it could not be parts of the lead core of the copper jacket of 5.56 mm. caliber
ammunition, would you say that the same would be part of the lead core of the copper
jacket of a different caliber or ammunition?
xxxxxxxxx
A: The copper jacket is parts (sic) of the caliber 5.56 and the lead core could be parts.
We cannot evidently conclude. It could be parts of copper jacket evidenced marked
SB-1.
ATTY. PASOK:
There is no basis.
xxxxxxxxx
COURT:
Q: Mr. witness, being a ballistic expert, you know the composition of the bullet of [a] .
45 caliber and that of [an] armalite?
Q: You are saying that practically, any ammunition has copper jacket?
A: Copper jacket.
A: The caliber 5.56 mm. there is copper jacket (sic) but something in caliber .38
copper jacket, rubber putted and lead (sic).
Q: The composition on the content of the lead of .45 caliber and that of armalite?
Q: How about .45 firearm?
41
A: The caliber .45, they are copper jacketed bullet or copper putted (sic) or lead.
Q: What is the distinction of copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and copper jacket of .45
caliber?
Q: The same thing with 5.56 mm.?

A: Yes. All jacketed, 5.56 are all jacketed.
COURT:
A: They have the same (sic), but in my findings, I compared that to a caliber 5.56 mm.
copper jacket fired from armalite under a microscope, the lands and grooves of the
copper jacket and the standard bullet fired from 5.56., they are the same in width.
Q: Did you compare riflings of .45 caliber from the specimen marked SB-1?
Q: That is the reason why you said that your findings and conclusion that the
evidenced (sic) marked as SB-2 and SB-3 could be possibly parts of the lead core or
the evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked as SB-1?
A: No need to compare because the caliber .45 lands and grooves is too wide, the
lands and grooves of .45 caliber is very wide.
A: Could be, Your Honor.
They are not the same.
COURT:
Q: How about the lands and grooves of a caliber 5.56 mm. compared to a .45 caliber?
Cross for the prosecution.
A: The caliber 5.56 mm. is smaller but on a caliber .45 are very wide.30
FISCAL DE PERALTA:
xxxxxxxxx
Q: A caliber .45 bullet has copper jacket, is that correct?
A: Some caliber .45 has copper jacket, some copper putted (sic), some lead.
Q: If a caliber .45 bullet has copper jacket, then why is it that in your findings in Exhibit
"2", particularly SB-1, you made it appear that this is part of a copper jacket of 5.56
mm. and not from a .45 caliber?
A: It is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm., sir.
Q: Why did you specifically state that SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm?
A: Because it is only a part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm because it is only a part.
COURT:
Q: But you said it could be a part?
A: It is a part, Your Honor.
FISCAL DE PERALTA:
The doubt entertained by NBI Ballistician Elmer D. Piedad, as to whether the 2 other metallic
fragments (marked as exhibit "SB-2" and "SB-3") are indeed parts of the lead core of the "SB-1",
which is part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet, must be resolved in favor
of petitioner; that is, said metallic fragments cannot be presumed to be particles of a .45 caliber
bullet fired from the .45 caliber pistol of petitioner. Under equipoise rule, where the evidence on
an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the
party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if, as in the present
case, the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of
which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for
then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a
conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime
charged is found lacking.31
Evidently, the prosecution failed to prove that the metallic fragments found in the fatal wound of
the victim are particles of a .45 caliber bullet that emanated from the .45 caliber pistol fired by
petitioner. For this reason, the Court cannot in good conscience affirm his conviction for the
crime of homicide.
In the same vein, petitioner cannot be held responsible for the wound inflicted on the victims
right outer lateral arm for the same reason that there is no evidence proving beyond moral
certainty that said wound was caused by the bullet fired from petitioners .45 caliber pistol.
Nevertheless, petitioner is not completely without liability. The Court sustains the finding of the
trial court that petitioner fired his .45 caliber pistol towards the victim. From the attendant
circumstances, it appears that there is no evidence tending to prove that petitioner had animus
interficendi or intent to kill the victim. Note that the prosecution witnesses did not see whether
petitioner aimed to kill the victim.32 Intent to kill cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact
that the use of firearms is dangerous to life. 33 Animus interficendi must be established with the
42
same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of
intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such intent
beyond reasonable doubt.34
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held liable for the
crime of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code. 35 The elements
of this crime are: (1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person; and (2)
that the offender has no intention to kill that person. 36 Though the information charged the
petitioner with murder, he could be validly convicted of illegal discharge of firearm, an offense
which is necessarily included in the crime of unlawful killing of a person. Under Rule 120,
Section 4, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, when there is a variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the
offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or the offense charged which is
included in the offense proved.
Pursuant to Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code, illegal discharge of firearm is punishable with
prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods There being no modifying
circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner should be sentenced to
suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum to two (2) years and eleven
(11) months of prision correccional, as maximum.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the June 26, 1997 decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 16886, affirming the conviction of petitioner for the crime of homicide is SET
ASIDE and petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.
A new decision is entered finding petitioner Geronimo Dado guilty of the crime of illegal
discharge of firearm and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of
arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and eleven (11) months of prision correccional, as
maximum.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 111206-08 October 6, 1995

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR., accused-appellant.
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
PUNO, J.:
Three (3) separate Informations were filed against accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr. for the
shooting of Roland John Chapman, Jussi Olavi Leino and Maureen Hultman. Initially, he was
charged with: MURDER for the killing of ROLAND CHAPMAN, and two (2) FRUSTRATED
MURDER for the shooting and wounding of JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN. When
Hultman died on October 17, 1991, during the course of the trial, the Information for Frustrated
Murder against accused was amended to MURDER. 1
The Information for murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4605 thus reads:
That on or about the 13th day of July, 1991, in the Municipality of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a handgun, with intent
to kill and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with and
shoot with the said handgun Roland John Chapman who war hit in the
chest, thereby inflicting mortal wounds which directly caused the death of
said Roland John Chapman.
Contrary to law. 2
The Amended Information for Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4606 reads:
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said Claudio Teehankee, Jr. y Javier, armed with a handgun, with
intent to kill and evident premeditation, and by means of treachery, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot with
the said handgun Maureen Navarro Hultman who was hit in the head,
thereby inflicting moral wounds which directly caused the death of the said
Maureen Hultman.
CONTRARY TO LAW. 3
Finally, the Information for Frustrated Murder in Criminal Case No. 91-4607 reads:
Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, while armed with a handgun, with intent to kill,
treachery and evident premeditation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one Jussi Olavi Leino on the head,
thereby inflicting gunshot wounds, which ordinarily would have caused the
death of said Jussi Olavi Leino, thereby performing all the acts of execution
which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of cause or causes independent
of his will, that is, due to the timely and able medical assistance rendered to
said Jussi Olavi Leino which prevented his death.
Contrary to law. 4
43
In the two (2) Informations for frustrated murder initially filed against accused, bail was set at
twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) each. No bail was recommended for the murder of Roland
John Chapman. A petition for bail was thus filed by accused. Hearing was set on August 9, 1991,
while his arraignment was scheduled on August 14, 1991.
At the hearing of the petition for bail on August 9, 1991, the prosecution manifested that it would
present the surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on the killing of Chapman and on the
circumstances resulting to the wounding of the witness himself and Hultman. Defense counsel
Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez objected on the ground that the incident pending that day was hearing of
the evidence on the petition for bail relative to the murder charge for the killing of Chapman only.
He opined that Leino's testimony on the frustrated murder charges with respect to the wounding
of Leino and Hultman would be irrelevant. 5
Private prosecutor, Atty. Rogelio Vinluan, countered that time would be wasted if the testimony of
Leino would be limited to the killing of Chapman considering that the crimes for which accused
were charged involved only one continuing incident. He pleaded that Leino should be allowed to
testify on all three (3) charges to obviate delay and the inconvenience of recalling him later to
prove the two (2) frustrated murder charges. 6
By way of accommodation, the defense suggested that if the prosecution wanted to present
Leino to testify on all three (3) charges, it should wait until after the arraignment of accused on
August 14, 1991. The defense pointed out that if accused did not file a petition for bail, the
prosecution would still have to wait until after accused had been arraigned before it could
present Leino. 7
The private prosecutor agreed to defer the hearing on the petition for bail until after arraignment
of accused on the condition that there shall be trial on the merits and, at the same time, hearing
on the petition for bail. The defense counsel acceded. 8
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the three (3) charges. The prosecution then
started to adduce evidence relative to all three (3) cases. No objection was made by the
defense. 9
A replay of the facts will show that on July 12, 1991, Jussi Olavi Leino invited Roland Chapman,
Maureen Hultman and other friends for a party at his house in Forbes Park, Makati. The party
started at about 8:30 p.m. and ended at past midnight. They then proceeded to Roxy's, a pub
where students of International School hang out. 10 After an hour, they transferred to Vintage,
another pub in Makati, where they stayed until past 3:00 a.m. of July 13, 1991. Their group
returned to Roxy's to pick up a friend of Maureen, then went back to Leino's house to eat. 11
After a while, Maureen requested Leino to take her home at Campanilla Street, Dasmarias
Village, Makati. Chapman tagged along. 12 When they entered the village, Maureen asked Leino
to stop along Mahogany Street, about a block away from her house in Campanilla Street. She
wanted to walk the rest of the way for she did not like to create too much noise in going back to
her house. She did not want her parents to know that she was going home that late. Leino
offered to walk with her while Chapman stayed in the car and listened to the radio. 13
Leino and Maureen started walking on the sidewalk along Mahogany Street. When they reached
the corner of Caballero and Mahogany Streets, a light-colored Mitsubishi box-type Lancer car,
driven by accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr., came up from behind them and stopped on the
middle of the road. Accused alighted from his car, approached them, and asked: "Who are you?
(Show me your) I.D." Leino thought accused only wanted to check their identities. He reached
into his pocket, took out his plastic wallet, and handed to accused his Asian Development Bank
(ADB) I.D. 14 Accused did not bother to look at his I.D. as he just grabbed Leino's wallet and
pocketed it. 15
Chapman saw the incident. All of a sudden, he manifested from behind Leino and inquired what
was going on. He stepped down on the sidewalk and asked accused: "Why are you bothering
us?" Accused pushed Chapman, dug into his shirt, pulled out a gun and fired at him. Chapman
felt his upper body, staggered for a moment, and asked: "Why did you shoot me?" Chapman
crumpled on the sidewalk. Leino knelt beside Chapman to assist him but accused ordered him
to get up and leave Chapman alone. 16
Accused then turned his ire on Leino. He pointed gun at him and asked: "Do you want a
trouble?" Leino said "no" and took a step backward. The shooting initially shocked Maureen.
When she came to her senses, she became hysterical and started screaming for help. She
repeatedly shouted: "Oh, my God, he's got a gun. He's gonna kill us. Will somebody help us?"
All the while, accused was pointing his gun to and from Leino to Maureen, warning the latter to
shut up. Accused ordered Leino to sit down on the sidewalk. Leino obeyed and made no attempt
to move away. Accused stood 2-3 meters away from him. He knew he could not run far without
being shot by accused.
Maureen continued to be hysterical. She could not stay still. She strayed to the side of accused's
car. Accused tried but failed to grab her. Maureen circled around accused's car, trying to put
some distance between them. The short chase lasted for a minute or two. Eventually, accused
caught Maureen and repeatedly enjoined her to shut up and sit down beside Leino. 17
Maureen finally sat beside Leino on the sidewalk. Two (2) meters away and directly in front of
them stood accused. 18 For a moment, accused turned his back from the two. He faced them
again and shot Leino. Leino was hit on the upper jaw, fell backwards on the sidewalk, but did not
lose consciousness. Leino heard another shot and saw Maureen fall beside him. He lifted his
head to see what was happening and saw accused return to his car and drive away. 19
Leino struggled to his knees and shouted for help. He noticed at least three (3) people looking
on and standing outside their houses along Caballero Street. 20 The three were: DOMINGO
FLORECE, a private security guard hired by Stephen Roxas to secure his residence at #1357
Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, Makati; 21 VICENTE MANGUBAT, a stay-in driver of
Margarita Canto, residing at #1352 Caballero Street, corner Mahogany Street, Dasmarias
Village; 22 and AGRIPINO CADENAS, a private security guard assigned at the house of Rey
Dempsey, located at #1351 Caballero Street, corner Mahogany Street, Dasmarias Village. 23
Security guards Florece and Cadenas were then on duty at the house of their employer, while
driver Mangubat was in his quarters, preparing to return to his own house. These three (3)
eyewitnesses heard the first gunshot while at their respective posts.
Upon hearing the first shot, Florece went out to Caballero Street to see what was happening,
while Mangubat and Cadenas peeped over the fence of their employer's house and looked out
to Caballero Street. Each saw a man (Chapman) sprawled on the ground, another man (Leino)
sitting on the sidewalk, a third man standing up ad holding a gun and a woman (Hultman). They
saw the gunman shoot Leino and Hultman and flee aboard his Lancer car. However, because of
Florece's distance from the scene of the crime, 24 he was not able to discern the face of the
gunman. He saw the control numbers of the gunman's car as 566. He described the gateway car
as a box-type Lancer, its color somewhat white ("medyo maputi"). 25 Cadenas noticed in full the
plate number of the getaway car and gave it as PDW 566. He described the car as silver
metallic gray. 26 Both Cadenas and Mangubat saw the gunman's face. They had a good look at
him. Cadenas was then a mere four (4) meters away from the gunman's car, 27 while Mangubat
was about twenty (20) meters away from the scene of the crime. 28 The three confirmed that the
corner of Caballero and Mahogany Streets where the shooting took place was adequately
illuminated by a Meralco lamppost at the time of the incident. 29
After the gunman sped away, Mangubat ran outside his employer's house and went near the
scene of the crime. He noticed security guard Florece along Caballero Street. A man on a bike
passed by and Mangubat requested him to report the shooting incident to the security officers of
Dasmarias Village. 30 Meanwhile, Florece returned to his post and narrated to his employer,
Mrs. Helen Roxas, what he saw. Mrs. Roxas repaired to the crime scene while Florece noted the
incident in his logbook (Exhibit "B"). He also jotted down the license plate control number of the
gunman's car as 566. 31
The security guards of Dasmarias Village came after a few minutes. They rushed Leino and
Maureen to the Makati Medical Center for treatment. 32
The Makati police and agents of the NBI also came. Patrolman JAMES BALDADO of the Makati
police, together with SPO3 ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, investigated the incident. 33 Their initial
investigation disclosed that the gunman's car was a box-type Mitsubishi Lancer with plate control
number 566. They checked the list of vehicles registered with the village Homeowners'
Association and were able to track down two (2) Lancer cars bearing plate control number 566.
One was registered in the name of JOSE MONTAO of 1823 Santan Street, Dasmarias
Village, with plate number PKX 566, and another was traced to accused CLAUDIO
TEEHANKEE, JR., of 1339 Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, with plate number PDW 566.
SALVADOR RANIN, Chief of the Special Operations Group (SOG) of the NBI, was also tasked
by then NBI Director Alfredo Lim 34 to head a team to investigate the shooting. Ranin's team
immediately proceeded to the house of Jose Montao 35 where they found ahead of them the
44
Makati police and operatives of the Constabulary Highway Patrol. Ranin tried to verify from Mrs.
Montao whether the white Lancer car registered in the name of Mr. Montao and bearing plate
number 566 was the gunman's car. Mrs. Montao denied and declared they had already sold the
car to Saldaa Enterprises. She averred the car was being used by one Ben Conti, a comptroller
in said company, who resides in Cubao, Quezon City. Mrs. Montao called up her husband and
informed him about the investigation. She also called up Conti and asked him to bring the car to
the house. 36
Jose Montao came around noon. Conti followed with white Lancer car. Ranin brought them to
the NBI office for investigation, together with Lancer car. At the NBI Ranin inquired from Montao
the whereabouts of his car on July 12 and 13, 1991. Montao informed him that the car was at
the residence of his employee, Ben Conti, at E. Rodriguez Street, Cubao, Quezon City, the night
of July 12, 1991. In the morning of July 13, 1991, Conti drove the car to their office at Saldaa
Enterprises. Conti confirmed this information. Ranin received the same confirmation from two (2)
NBI agents who made a countercheck of the allegation. Upon Ranin's request, Montao left his
car at the NBI parking lot pending identification by possible witnesses. 37
On July 14, 1991, a team of NBI agents conducted an on-the-spot investigation and
neighborhood inquiry of the shooting incident. They interviewed Domingo Florece and asked him
to report to their office the next day for further investigation. 38 They also interviewed Agripino
Cadenas who was reluctant to divulge any information and even denied having witnessed the
incident. Sensing his reluctance, they returned to Cadenas' post at Dasmarias Village that night
and served him a subpoena, inviting him to appear at the NBI office for investigation the next
day. 39 The NBI agents also talked with Armenia Asliami, an Egyptian national residing at #1350
Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, near the scene of the crime. Asliami informed the agents
that the gunman's car was not white but light gray. A foreign national, Asliami was afraid and
refused to give a statement about the incident. The agents exerted every effort to convince
Asliami to cooperate, assuring her of their protection. Ranin even asked a representative of the
Egyptian embassy to coax Asliami to cooperate. They failed. 40
On July 15, 1991, Florece and Cadenas appeared at the NBI office as summoned. Florece
readily executed a sworn statement. 41 Cadenas, however, continued to feign ignorance and
bridled his knowledge of the incident. He was lengthily interviewed. At around 2:00 p.m., the NBI
agents informed SOG Chief Ranin that Cadenas was still withholding information from them.
Ranin talked to Cadenas in his office. Cadenas confided to Ranin his fear to get involved in the
case. He was apprehensive that the gunman would harass or harm him or his family. After Ranin
assured him of NBI protection, Cadenas relented. 42
The next day, July 16, 1991, Cadenas gave a full disclosure to Ranin. He described the
gunman's car as a box-type Lancer with plate number PDW 566. He was brought to the NBI
parking lot where Montao's white Lancer car was parked to identify the gunman's car. Ranin
asked Cadenas if Montao's was the gunman's car. Cadenas replied that its color was different.
Ranin directed him to look around the cars in the parking lot and to point the color that most
resembled the color of the gunman's car. He pointed to a light gray car. Ranin told him that the
color of the car he pointed to was not white but light gray. 43
Ranin then asked Cadenas if he could identify the gunman. Cadenas replied in the affirmative.
Ranin led Cadenas to his office and showed him ten (10) pictures of different men (Exhibits "CC1" to "CC-10) taken from the NBI files. One of the pictures belonged to accused Claudio
Teehankee, Jr. Cadenas studied the pictures, picked accused's picture (Exhibit "CC-7"), and
identified him as the gunman. Cadenas wrote his name and the date at the back of said picture.
Atty. Alex Tenerife of the NBI then took down Cadenas' statement. 44
Ranin sent his agents and the witnesses to the Makati Regional Trial Court to apply for a search
warrant. After a searching examination of the witnesses, Judge Rebecca Salvador issued a
search warrant (Exhibit "RR"), authorizing the NBI to search and seize the silver metallic gray,
1983 Mitsubishi Lancer car owned by accused, bearing plate number PDW 566. Ranin and his
agents drove to accused's house at #1339 Caballero Street, Dasmarias Village, to implement
the warrant. 45
At accused's house, Ranin informed Mrs. Pilar Teehankee, mother of accused, of their search
warrant. Ranin also told Mrs. Teehankee that they had orders from Director Lim to invite accused
to the NBI office for investigation. Mrs. Teehankee informed them that accused was not in the
house at that time. She excused herself, went to the kitchen and called up someone on the
phone. 46
In the meantime, Ranin and his men slipped to the Teehankee garage and secured accused's
car. After a while, Mrs. Teehankee joined them. Ranin asked her for the car keys but she told him
that the keys were with accused. Upon Ranin's request, Mrs. Teehankee got in touch with
accused on the phone. Ranin conversed with accused and invited him to the NBI for
investigation. Accused assured Ranin that he would report to the NBI later that day. The agents
then towed the car of accused to the NBI office. 47
At around 9:00 p.m., accused's brother, Raul Teehankee, arrived at the NBI office and waited for
accused. Accused came, escorted by three (3) Makati policemen, after an hour. He informed
them that he just came from the Makati police station where he was also investigated. He told
Lim that he was given a statement to the Makati police and was brought to the PC Crime
Laboratory for paraffin test. 48
Accused's NBI investigation started. Lim asked accused of the whereabouts of his Lancer car at
the time of the shooting. Accused claimed that his car was involved in an accident a few weeks
back and was no longer functioning. The car had been parked in his mother's house at
Dasmarias Village since then. Due to the lateness of the evening, the group decided to
continue the investigation the following day. 49
The next day, July 17, 1991, after breakfast at the Manila Hotel, Lim pressed accused on what
really happened at Dasmarias Village. Accused said he did not see anything. Lim apprised
accused that he would be confronted with some eyewitnesses. Accused sank into silence. 50
Lim directed Ranin to prepare a lineup at his office. Accused was requested to join the lineup
composed of seven (7) men and he acceded. Cadenas was called from an adjoining room 51 and
Ranin asked him to identify the gunman from the lineup. Forthwith, Cadenas pointed to
accused. 52 Accused merely stared at Cadenas. 53
On the same day, then Asst. Director Epimaco Velasco, Ranin and two (2) other agents brought
accused to Forbes Park for further identification by the surviving victim, Jussi Leino. Leino has
just been discharged from the hospital the day before. Since Leino's parents were worried about
his safety, they requested the NBI to conduct the identification of the gunman in Forbes Park
where the Leinos also reside. The NBI agreed. 54
House security agents from the U.S. embassy fetched Leino at his house and escorted him and
his father to a vacant house in Forbes Park, along Narra Avenue. After a couple of minutes,
Leino was brought out of the house and placed in a car with slightly tinted windows. The car was
parked about five (5) meters away from the house. Inside the car with Leino was his father, NBISOG Chief Salvador Ranin and a driver. Leino was instructed to look at the men who would be
coming out of the house and identify the gunman from the lineup. 55
A group of five to six men (including accused) then came out of the unoccupied house, into the
street, in a line-up. Leino noticed that one of them was wearing sunglasses. Since Leino could
not yet speak at that time due to the extensive injury on his tongue, he wrote down on a piece of
paper a request for one of the men in the lineup to remove his sunglasses. Leino handed this
written request to his father. The men in the lineup were herded back inside the house. After a
couple of minutes, they again stepped out and none was wearing sunglasses. From the lineup,
Leino identified accused as the gunman. 56
The agents brought back accused to the NBI. They prepared and referred the cases of murder
and double frustrated murder against accused to the Department of Justice for appropriate
action. At the inquest, Fiscal Dennis Villa-Ignacio did not recommend bail insofar as the murder
charge was concerned. Hence, accused was detained at the NBI. 57
The shooting incident was also investigated by the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado went to see
security guard Vicente Mangubat at his post, at the residence of his employer in Dasmarias
Village. Baldado interviewed Mangubat and invited him to the Makati police station where his
statement (Exhibit "D") was taken. 58
The next day, July 16, 1991, at about 8:30 a.m., Pat. Baldado fetched Mangubat from his house
and brought him to the Makati police station. At the station, Baldado told him to wait for a man
who would be coming and see if the person was the gunman. Mangubat was posted at the top
of the stairs at the second floor of the station. 59
After a couple of hours, accused, came with Makati police Major Lovete. He ascended the stairs,
passed by Mangubat and proceeded to Major Lovete's office at the second floor. While accused
45
was going up the stairs, Pat. Baldado inquired from Mangubat if accused was the gunman.
Mangubat initially declined to identify accused, saying that he wanted to see the man again to be
sure. He also confided to Pat. Baldado that he was nervous and afraid for accused was
accompanied by a police Major. When accused came out from Major Lovete's office, Pat.
Baldado again asked Mangubat if accused was the gunman. Mangubat nodded his head in
response. 60 Accused, together with Major Lovete and Pat. Baldado, boarded a Mercedes Benz
and left. Mangubat was brought back to his post at Dasmarias Village by other Makati
policemen. 61
Two (2) days later, Pat. Baldado visited Mangubat at his employer's house and asked him again
if accused was really the gunman. Once more, Mangubat answered in the affirmative. Pat.
Baldado told Mangubat that he would no longer ask him to sign a statement which he (Baldado)
earlier prepared (Exhibit "HHH"). 62 Baldado then left. 63
In the afternoon of July 23, 1991, Mangubat was also questioned by the NBI agents. Director
Lim asked Mangubat if he could recognize the gunman. Mangubat said he could. Mangubat was
shown twelve (12) pictures (Exhibits "E" to "E-11) of different men and was asked to identify the
gun gunman from them. He chose one picture (Exhibit "E-10"), that of accused, and identified
him as the gunman. Mangubat's statement was taken. He was asked to return to the NBI the
next day to make a personal identification. 64
When Mangubat returned, a lineup was prepared in Lim's office in the presence of the media. At
that time, accused's counsels, Attys. Jimenez and Malvar, were at the office of then Asst.
Director Epimaco Velasco protesting to the submission of accused to identification. They pointed
out that since the cases against accused had already been filed in court and they have secured
a court order for the transfer of accused to the Makati municipal jail, any identification of accused
should be made in the courtroom. Asst. Director Velasco insisted on the identification as it was
part of their on-going investigation. Eventually, accused's counsels acquiesced but requested
that identification be made without the presence of the media. Velasco turned them down and
explained that if accused is not identified n the lineup, the media coverage would favor
accused. 65
All that time, accused was at the SOG office. He refused to join the lineup at Lim's office and
remained seated. Ranin was compelled to bring to the SOG office the men composing the lineup
and he asked them to go near accused. Ranin then told Mangubat to go in the office. Mangubat
pointed to accused as the gunman.
With the identification of accused by Mangubat, the NBI wrote finis to its investigation. 66
JUSSI LEINO, the surviving victim, suffered the following injuries:
FINDINGS:
= Abrasion, 0.5 cm., temporal area, left.
= Wound, gunshot, entrance, circular in shape, 1.0 cm.
in diameter, located at the upper lip, mouth, along the
medial line, directed backwards and downwards,
fracturing the maxillary bone and central and lateral
incisors, both sides, to the buccal cavity then lacerating
the tongue with fragments of the bullet lodged in the
right palatine, tongue and tonsillar region.
SKULL
CHEST
FOR
RIBS
X-RAY
#353322
July 13, 1991
No demonstrable evidence of fracture. Note of
radioopaque foreign body (bullet fragments) along the
superior alveolar border on the right. No remarkable
findings.
CT SCAN #43992 July 13, 1991
Small hyperdensities presumably bullet and bone
fragments in the right palatine, tongue and tonsillar
regions with associated soft tissue swelling.
Anterior maxillary bone comminuted fracture.
Temporal lobe contusions with small hematomata on the right side.
Minimal subarachnoid hemorrhage.
Intact bone calvarium.

xxx xxx xxx 67
Dr. Pedro Solis, testified that the bullet entered the left temple of Leino. After entering Leino's
head, it fractured his upper jaw and his front teeth. Some of the bullet fragments pierced his
palette and tongue. Brain scanning revealed contusions on the temporal lobe and hemorrhage
on the covering of the brain. Physical deformity resulted as a consequence of the gunshot
wound because of the fractured upper jaw and the loss of the front teeth. Sutures were
performed on the upper portion of his tongue. Nonetheless, Leino's injuries on the tongue
caused him difficulty in speaking. 68
Dr. Solis also testified as to the relative position of Leino and the gunman. He opined that the
muzzle of the gun, like in the case of Maureen, must have been at a higher level than the
victim's head. He concluded that the gun must have been pointed above Leino's head
considering the acuteness and downward trajectory of the bullet. 69
Dr. Leovigildo C. Isabela, a neuro-surgeon at the Makati Medical Center, operated on
MAUREEN HULTMAN. He testified that when he first saw Maureen, she was unconscious and
her face was bloodied all over. Maureen had a bullet hole on the left side of the forehead, above
the eyebrow. Brain tissues were oozing out of her nostrils and on the left side of the forehead
where the bullet entered. 70
They brought Maureen to the x-ray room for examination of her skull. She was also given a CT
scan. The examination revealed that she suffered injuries on the skull and brain. There were
several splintered bullets in her brain and the major portion of the bullet, after it fragmented, was
lodged beneath her right jaw. 71
Maureen was rushed to the operating room for surgery. Dr. Isabela led a team who operated on
her brain to arrest the bleeding inside her head, remove devitalized brain tissues and retrieve
the splintered bullets embedded in her brain. Due to the extensive swelling of Maureen's brain
and her very unstable condition, he failed to patch the destroyed undersurface covering of her
brain. 72 After the surgery, Maureen's vital signs continued to function but she remained
unconscious. She was wheeled to the ICU for further observation.
Two (2) weeks later, brain tissues and fluid continue to flow out of Maureen's nostrils due to the
unpatched undersurface covering of her brain, leaving the swollen portion of her brain exposed.
A second surgery was made on July 30, 1991 to repair Maureen's brain covering. He used
the fascia lata of Maureen's right thigh to replace the destroyed covering of the brain.
Nonetheless, Maureen remained unconscious. The trickle of brain tissues through her nose was
lessened but Maureen developed infection as a result of the destruction of her brain covering.
Maureen developed brain abscess because of the infection. She underwent a third operation to
remove brain abscess and all possible focus of infection. 73
Testifying on the extensive injuries suffered by Maureen Hultman, Dr. Solis explained that
Maureen was shot at the left side of the forehead. The bullet entry was at 1.5 cm. above the
eyebrow. Upon entering the forehead, the bullet fragmented into pieces and went from the left to
the right side of the temple, fracturing the frontal bone of the skull. The bullet eventually settled
behind the right jaw of Maureen. 74
The wound inflicted on Maureen was mortal for it hit one of the most vital parts of the body, the
brain. When Maureen was subjected to CT scan, they discovered hemorrhage in her brain. After
the bullet hit her head, it caused hemorrhagic lesion on the ventricles of the brain and the
second covering of the brain. 75
The bullet also injured Maureen's eye sockets. There was swelling underneath the forehead
brought about by edema in the area. Scanning also showed that Maureen's right jaw was
affected by the fragmented bullet. The whole interior portion of her nose was also swollen. 76
A team of doctors operated on Maureen's brain. They tried to control the internal bleeding and
remove the splintered bullets, small bone fragments and dead tissues. The main bullet was
recovered behind Maureen's right jaw. There was also an acute downward trajectory of the
bullet. Hence, it was opined that Maureen was shot while she was seated. 77
With each passing day, Maureen's condition deteriorated. Even if Maureen survived, she would
have led a vegetating life and she would have needed assistance in the execution of normal and
ordinary routines. 78 She would have been completely blind on the left eye and there was
possibility she would have also lost her vision on the right eye. All her senses would have been
46
modified and the same would have affected her motor functions. There was practically no
possibility for Maureen to return to normal. 79
Maureen did not survive her ordeal. After ninety-seven (97) days of confinement in the hospital,
she ceased to be a breathing soul on October 17, 1991.
For his exculpation, accused relied on the defense of denial and alibi. Accused claimed that on
said date and time, he was not anywhere near the scene of the crime. He alleged that he was
then in his house at #53 San Juan, Barrio Kapitolyo, Pasig. He slept at around 1:00 a.m. on July
13, 1991 and woke up at around 8:00 or 9:00 a.m. that same morning. Accused avowed his two
(2) maids could attest to his presence in his house that fateful day. 80
Accused averred that he only came to know the three (3) victims in the Dasmarias shooting
when he read the newspaper reports about it. He denied knowing prosecution eyewitnesses
Agripino Cadenas and Vicente Mangubat before they identified him as the gunman. 81
Accused admitted ownership of a box-type, silver metallic gray Mitsubishi Lancer, with plate
number PDW 566. He, however, claimed that said car ceased to be in good running condition
after its involvement in an accident in February 1991. Since May 1991 until the day of the
shooting, his Lancer car had been parked in the garage of his mother's house in Dasmarias
Village. He has not used this car since then. Accused, however, conceded that although the car
was not in good running condition, it could still be used. 82
Accused said that on July 16, 1991, he went to the Makati police station at around 5:00 p.m.
upon invitation of Chief of Police Remy Macaspac and Major Lovete who wanted to ask him
about the ownership of the Lancer car parked in his mother's house. He readily gave a
statement to the Makati police denying complicity in the crime. He submitted himself to a paraffin
test. He was accompanied by the Makati police to the Crime Laboratory in Camp Crame and
was tested negative for gunpowder nitrates. 83 After the test, he asked the Makati policemen to
accompany him to the NBI for he had earlier committed to his mother that he would present
himself to Director Lim. 84
He arrived at Director Lim's office at about 9:30 to 10:00 p.m. He furnished Lim with the
statement he earlier gave to the Makati police. Thereafter, Lim detained him at the NBI against
his will. 85
The following day, July 17, 1991, Lim and his agents brought him to the Manila Hotel for
breakfast. When they returned to the NBI, he was asked to proceed to Lim's office. On his way,
he saw a lineup formed inside Lim's office. The NBI agents forced him to join the lineup and
placed him in the number seven (7) slot. He observed that the man who was to identify him was
already in the room. As soon as he walked up to the lineup, Cadenas identified him as the
gunman. 86
A second identification was made on the same day at a house in Forbes Park. The NBI agents
brought him to Forbes Park but he never saw Jussi Leino who allegedly identified him as the
gunman in a lineup. 87
A third identification was conducted on July 24, 1991. He was then seated at the office of Ranin
for he refused to join another lineup. Despite his protest, the NBI agents insisted on the conduct
of the identification and ordered a group of men to line up alongside him. While thus seated, he
was identified by Mangubat as the gunman. He complained that he was not assisted by counsel
at any stage of said investigation. 88
The defense also presented CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE III, son of accused Claudio Teehankee, Jr.
He testified that from May 1989 to February 1991, he had been using his father's Lancer car
bearing plate number PDW 566 in going to school. 89
In February 1991, while driving his father's Lancer car, he accidentally hit a bicycle driver and
two (2) trucks parked at the side of the road. The accident resulted in the death of the bicycle
driver and damage to his father's car, 90 especially on its body. The timing of the engine became
a little off and the car was hard to start. They had the car repaired at Reliable Shop located in
Banawe Street, Quezon city. After a month, he brought the car to the residence of his
grandmother, Pilar Teehankee, at Dasmarias Village, Makati. He personally started the car's
engine and drove it to Makati from the shop in Quezon City. He did not bring the car to their
house in Pasig for it was still scheduled for further repairs and they preferred to have the repair
done in a shop in Makati. Teehankee III claimed that from that time on, he was prohibited by his
father from using the car because of his careless driving. He kept the keys to the car and since
he was busy in school, no further repair on said car had been made. 91
Accused also imputed the commission of the crimes at bar to Anders Hultman, adoptive father of
deceased victim Maureen Hultman. He capitalized on a newspaper report that the gunman may
have been an overprotective father. This theory was formed when an eyewitness allegedly
overheard Maureen pleading to the gunman: "Huwag Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." The defense
presented Anders Hultman as a hostile witness.
ANDERS HULTMAN, testified that he is a Swedish national. He and Vivian Hultman were
married in the Philippines in 1981. Vivian had two (2) children by her previous marriage, one of
whom was Maureen. He legally adopted Vivian's two (2) daughters in 1991. He and Vivian had
three (3) children of their own. 92
The defense confronted Anders with one of the angles of the crime in the initial stage of the
investigation, i.e., that Maureen was overhead pleading to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy. Huwag,
Daddy." Anders explained that Maureen could not have uttered those words for Maureen never
spoke Tagalog. He also said that all his children call him "Papa," not "Daddy." 93
On July 12, 1991, he and Vivian permitted Maureen to have a night out but instructed her to be
home by 2:00 a.m. Maureen just received her first salary in her first job and she wanted to
celebrate with friends. At the time of the shooting, he and his wife were sleeping in their house.
He woke up at around 5:15 a.m. of July 13, 1991 when a security guard came to their house and
informed them about the killings. 94
Anders admitted he had been vocal about the VIP treatment accorded to accused at the Makati
municipal jail. On several occasions, he checked on accused in jail and discovered that accused
was not in his cell. The jail guards even covered up accused's whereabouts. His complaint was
investigated by the Congressional Committee on Crime Prevention, headed by Congressman
Concepcion. 95
The defense also presented two (2) Makati policemen, PAT. JAMES F. BALDADO and SPO3
ALBERTO FERNANDEZ, who investigated the shooting.
Pat. Baldado testified that in the course of his investigation, he learned from Mr. Jose Montao
that he sold his white Lancer car, with plate number PKX 566, to Saldaa Lending Investors in
February 1991. This car was assigned to Ben Conti, Operations Manager of said company and
was in the residence of Conti at the time of the shooting. The other witnesses he interviewed
confirmed that Montao's white Lancer car was not in the vicinity of Montao's residence at the
time of the incident. 96
SPO3 Fernandez testified that he interviewed security guard Vicente Mangubat. Mangubat saw
the gunman and the get-away car but could not give the central letters of the car's license plate.
Fernandez went to one of the houses at the corner of Mahogany and Caballero Streets and
asked the maid therein if he could use the phone. After placing a call, the maid told him that he
saw the gunman and heard one of the victims say: "Daddy, don't shoot. Don't, don't." Fernandez
tried to get the maid's name but the latter refused. The defense did not present this maid in court
nor asked the court to subpoena her to testify. Neither was the alleged statement of the maid
included in the Progress Report (Exhibit "13") prepared by the Makati police investigators. 97
SPO3 Fernandez saw Mangubat the next time on July 16, 1991 when he and Baldado fetched
the latter at Dasmarias Village for identification of the gunman at the Makati police station.
At the police station, Fernandez and Baldado posted Mangubat at the lobby. After a few minutes,
accused and company arrived. When accused passed by them, they instructed Mangubat to
look around and see if he could identify the gunman. Mangubat failed to identify accused.
Mangubat told Fernandez that the gunman was younger and shorter than accused. 98
SPO3 Fernandez also took the statement of security guard Domingo Florece (Exhibit "MM"). It
was signed by Florece in his presence. In said statement, Florece described the gunman's car
as "medyo puti" (somewhat white). 99
ELIZABETH AYONON, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified on the paraffin
test she conducted on July 17, 1991 on both hands of accused. 100 As per Chemistry Report No.
C 274-91, 101 the test yielded a negative result of gunpowder nitrates on accused's hands. In
said Report, she noted that accused was subjected to paraffin test more than seventy-two (72)
hours after the shooting incident. She explained that 72 hours is the reasonable period within
which nitrate residues may not be removed by ordinary washing and would remain on the hands
of a person who has fired a gun.102
ATTY. MANUEL Q. MALVAR, one of accused's counsel of record, also took the stand for the
defense. He testified that in the course of handling the cases, he was able to confer with
47
Ponferrada, Cadenas' supervisor at the Security agency where Cadenas was employed.
Ponferrada informed him that Cadenas confided to him that he was tortured at the NBI and was
compelled to execute a statement. Ponferrada, allegedly, refused to testify. Atty. Malvar,
however, admitted the defense did not compel the attendance of Ponferrada by subpoena. On
rebuttal, Cadenas denied the torture story.
Atty. Malvar also admitted that he and Atty. Jimenez were aware of the irregularities committed
in the off-court identification of their client. When asked what he did to remedy this perceived
irregularity, Malvar said he objected to the conduct of the lineup. When further pressed whether
he filed a petition for review raising this issue with the Department of Justice upon the filing of
the cases therewith, he said he did not. He offered the excuse that he deferred to Atty. Jimenez,
the principal counsel of accused at that time. He also declared that although they knew that
arraignment would mean waiver of the alleged irregularities in the conduct of the investigation
and preliminary investigation, he and Atty. Jimenez allowed accused to be arraigned. 103
The defense likewise relied on a number of news accounts reporting the progress in the
investigation of the case. It presented seven (7) newspaper reporters as witnesses, viz: Nestor
Barrameda of the Manila Times, Martin Marfil and Dave Veridiano of the Philippine Daily Inquirer,
Nida Mendoza of Malaya, Itchie Kabayan and Alex Allan of the People's Journal and Elena Aben
of the Manila Bulletin. The bulk of defense evidence consists of newspaper clippings and the
testimonies of the news reporters, thus:
NESTOR BARRAMEDA, a news reporter of the Manila Times identified two (2) news reports as
having been partly written by him. One was a news item, entitled: "JUSTICE DEP'T ORDERS
PROBE OF THREE METRO KILLINGS" (Exhibit "1"), appearing on the July 16, 1991 issue of
the Manila Times. 104 He, however, clarified that a news report is usually the product of
collaborative work among several reporters. They follow the practice of pooling news reports
where several reporters are tasked to cover one subject matter. The news editor then compiles
the different reports they file and summarizes them into one story. 105
The defense lifted only certain portions of Exhibit "1" and marked them in evidence as follows:
Exhibit "1-A":
Bello directed NBI Deputy Director Epimaco Velasco to take over the
investigation of the murders of Roland Chapman, 21, Eldon Maguan, 25,
and three members of a family Estrellita Vizconde and her daughters,
Carmela, 19, and Anne Marie Jennifer, 7.
Exhibit "1-B"
Police said that Chapman's assailant could have been angered when
Hultman, a 10th grader at the International School in Makati was escorted
home by Chapman after going to a disco.
Exhibit "1-C"
The lone gunman, witnesses told police, first pistol-whipped Hultman.
Exhibit "l-D"
The same witnesses said Chapman and Leino were shot when they tried to
escape.
Exhibit "1-E"
Other angles
Velasco said "we are pursuing two angles" in the Chapman murder.
One, he said, is the jealousy angle and the other is a "highly sensitive"
matter that might involve influential people. 106
Barrameda testified that he had no personal knowledge of the content of the news items marked
as Exhibits "1-C" to "1-D". He just culled them from previous news reports of other newspapers.
He admitted that the only portion he wrote based on an actual interview with NBI Asst. Director
Velasco was Exhibit "I-E."
Barrameda identified another news item in the July 23, 1991 issue of the Manila Times, entitled:
"NBI INSISTS IT HAS "RIGHT" SUSPECT IN CHAPMAN SLAY" which was marked as Exhibit
"2." Certain portions thereof, which were not written by Barrameda, 107 were lifted by the defense
and offered in evidence, viz:
Exhibit "2-a"
Superintendent Lucas Managuelod, CIS director for the national capital
region, claims, however, that another security guard, Vic Mangubat, had
testified before the police that another man, not Teehankee, had fired at
Chapman and his companions.
Exhibit "2-b"
The CIS official added that the absence of nitrite or powder burns on
Teehankee's hands as shown by paraffin tests at the CIS laboratory
indicated that he may not have fired the gun. 108
MARTIN MARFIL, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer identified two (2) newspaper
clippings which were partly written by him.
One news item, which appeared on the July 17, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, was
entitled: "FBI JOINS PROBE OF DASMA SLAY" (Exhibit "3"). 109
Again, the defense marked in evidence certain portions of Exhibit "3", thus:
Exhibit "3-a"
Witnesses said Hultman talked with the gunman whom she called "Daddy"
shortly before Chapman's shooting.
Exhibit "3-b"
But Ranin said they were also looking into reports that Hultman was a
dancer before she was adopted by her foster parent.
Exhibit "3-c"
Investigations showed that the gunman sped along Caballero street inside
the village after the shooting and was believed to have proceeded toward
Forbes Park using the Palm street gate.
On cross-examination, Marfil admitted that he did not write Exhibits "3-a" and "3-c". He just
reiterated previous reports in other newspapers. They were based on speculations.
Marfil also wrote some portions of a news item, entitled: "TEEHANKEE SON HELD FOR
DASMA SLAY," which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer
(Exhibit "4"), viz:
Exhibit "4-B"
According to NBI Director Alfredo Lim, the break in the case came when the
witness showed up and said that the gunman was on board a silver-metallic
Lancer.
Exhibit "4-C"
The witness said the gunman was standing a few feet away near the car
and was talking to Hultman, who was shouting "Huwag! Daddy!" several
times. 110
Marfil's source of information was Director Lim. On cross-examination, Marfil admitted
that the news reports marked as Exhibits "3" and "4" were written based on
information available at that time. 111
NIDA MENDOZA, a reporter of the Malaya identified a news report, entitled: "TEEHANKEE SON
HELD ON DASMA SLAYING," which appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of Malaya. She
testified that she wrote a portion thereof, marked as Exhibit "5-c", and the sources of her
information were several Makati policemen. 112 Exhibit "5-c" reads:
Makati policemen, meanwhile, disputed NBI accounts that Teehankee was
arrested at his house.
They said Teehankee, the last remaining owner of a car with plate control
number 566 who had not been questioned, voluntarily went to police
headquarters upon invitation of Makati police chief Superintendent Remy
Macaspac. 113
The defense presented EXHIBITS "1-5" to prove: (a) the alleged concerted effort of the
investigators to implicate accused as the lone gunman; (b) that there were other suspects aside
from accused and that someone whom Maureen called as "Daddy" was the actual gunman; (c)
that the initial police investigation showed that the gunman's car was a white Lancer with plate
no. 566; and, (d) that after the NBI took over the investigation, the white Lancer car of the
gunman became a silver gray Lancer of accused and thereafter, he became the gunman.
ITCHIE CABAYAN, a reporter of the People's Journal identified the portions she wrote in the
news item, entitled: ''I WILL HOUND YOU", which appeared on the October 24, 1991 issue
of People's Journal (Exhibit "6"). She identified the source of her information as Mr. Anders
Hultman himself. 114
48
The portions thereof were marked in evidence by the defense, viz:

Exhibit "6-a"
"I will be visiting him often and at the most unexpected occasion," Hultman
said the day after his 17-year old daughter was cremated. 115
Exhibit "6-b"
The day Maureen died, a congressional hearing granted the Hultman
family's request for permission to visit Teehankee in his cell "at anytime of
their choice."
Exhibit "6-c"
"If on my next visit he still refuses to come out and is still hiding behind the
curtain," Hultman said, "Congress told me that I can take the curtain down
and jail authorities will pull him out." 116
ALEX ALLAN, also a reporter of People's Journal co-wrote the news item marked as Exhibit "6".
Specifically, he wrote Exhibits "6-d" and "6-e" 117 which read:
Exhibit "6-d"
"Kaawaawa naman ang mga Hultmans, tulungan natin sila," Ong was
quoted as telling Vergel de Dios.
Exhibit "6-e"
BIR insiders said Ong has shown a keen interest in the Chapman-Hultman,
Vizconde and Eldon Maguan cases because he belongs to a secret but very
influential multi-sectoral group monitoring graft and corruption and other
crimes in high levels of government and society. 118
Allan was not able to check or verify the information in Exhibit "6-e" given to him by BIR insiders
for the latter refused to be identified. 119
Exhibit "6" and its sub-markings were offered to prove: (a) the alleged blind and consuming
personal rage and bias of Anders Hultman against accused; and (b) the unwarranted pressure,
prejudice and prejudgment by some congressional leaders in favor of the Hultmans in violation
of due process.
DAVE VERIDIANO, a reporter of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, identified the news account which
appeared on the July 16, 1991 issue of the Inquirer, entitled: "DASMA SLAY SUSPECT
IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit "7"). He wrote a portion of said article (Exhibit "7-c") and the source of his
information was Camp Crame. 120 It reads:
Exhibit "7-c"
Witnesses said the gunman fled aboard a white Mitsubishi Lancer with plate
number "566." The witnesses cannot tell the plate's control letters. 121
Veridiano likewise identified a news item which appeared on the July 1991 issue of the Inquirer,
entitled: "N.B.I. FINDINGS DISPUTED, SECOND WITNESS TAGS TEEHANKEE" (Exhibit "8").
The portions of said news item which he wrote were marked in evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "8-a"
At the Criminal Investigation Service, however, an investigator who asked
not to be identified insisted that the NBI got the wrong man. The NBI has
taken over the case from the CIS.
Exhibit "8-c"
He said the CIS will shortly identify the suspect killer whom he described as
"resembling Teehankee but looks much younger."
Exhibit "8-e"
The source said that the police's "prime witness," identified only as
Mangubat, saw everything that happened in the early morning of July 13.
The witness, however, failed to identify Teehankee as the gunman. 122
Veridiano was shown another news report, entitled: "CIS GIVES UP CHAPMAN SLAY CASE",
which appeared on the July 26, 1991 issue of the Philippine Daily Inquirer (Exhibit 9). 123 He
wrote the entire news account, 124 portions of which were marked by the defense in evidence,
thus:
Exhibit "9-a"
The CIS pulled out from the case a day after its so-called "surprise witness"
picked Claudio Teehankee, Jr. from an NBI lineup.
He gathered this information from his source but he was not able to interview
Mangubat himself. 125
Exhibit "9-b"
Sira ulo pala siya (Mangubat). Ilang beses kong pinarada sa kanya si
Bobby (Teehankee Jr.) puro iling siya. Hindi raw ito ang suspect. Ngayon
bigla niyang ituturo, said a red-faced Makati investigator who, as usual, did
not want to be identified.
ELENA ABEN, a reporter from the Manila Bulletin, wrote the entire article, entitled: "US
DIPLOMAT'S SON SHOT DEAD", which appeared on the July 14, 1991 issue of the Manila
Bulletin (Exhibit "10"). 126 Two (2) portions thereof were marked as evidence by the defense, viz:
Exhibit "10-a-1"
The victims were on their way home in Olanileino's Mercedez Benz with a
diplomat's plate number when a white Lancer with plate number PKX-566
blocked its path.
Exhibit "10-a-2"
US embassy spokesman Stanley Schrager said Chapman's father is a
communications specialist. He said the shooting could be the result of an
altercation on the street. 127
Finally, VICTOR VEGA, a reporter of the Manila Bulletin, identified the news account he wrote
which appeared on the July 16, 1991 issue of the Bulletin, entitled: "4 MURDER SUSPECTS
FALL" (Exhibit "22"). Portions of said news item were marked by the defense as follows:
Exhibit "22-b"
. . . He was shot to death by a group of armed men at the corner of
Mahogany and Caballero Sts. in Dasmarias Village at past 4 a.m. Friday.
Exhibit "22-c"
The NBI sources said that jealousy sparked the slaying of Chapman who
was killed in front of his friends on his way home from a party. The armed
men, on board a white Lancer car, blocked the path of the victim's Mercedes
Benz car inside the village before the shooting.
Exhibit "22-a-1"
The gunmen then alighted from their car and at gunpoint ordered Chapman
to alight from the car. They shot Chapman several times in the body, while
his companions identified as Maureen Hultman, and Jussi Olanileino, were
seriously wounded when the gunmen sprayed the car with bullets.
The gunmen escaped after the shooting. Lim said he will announce later the
names of the detained suspects after their initial investigation. 128
Finally, his article, entitled: "MAKATI SLAY SUSPECT IDENTIFIED" (Exhibit "23"), which
appeared on the July 18, 1991 issue of the Manila Bulletin, was introduced by the defense in
evidence as follows:
Exhibit "23-a-1"
The NBI said Teehankee was one of four men who blocked Chapman's car
on Mahogany St. in the subdivision.
Exhibit "23-a-2"
Witnesses said they saw Teehankee order Chapman and his two
companions, Maureen Hultman and Jussi Olanileino, a Finn, to get out of
their car.
Exhibit "23-a-3"
They identified the car used by the suspect, a silver gray Lancer with plate
No. PDW 566. They added that they saw the same car in the garage of the
Teehankee family. 129
On cross-examination, Vega declared that the source of his two (a) stories was the NBI and they
were based on information available to the NBI at that time 130
The prosecution recalled to the stand eyewitness VICENTE MANGUBAT as its rebuttal witness.
Mangubat insisted that he was able to identify accused when he saw the latter at the Makati
police station. Her reiterated that the next day, Pat. Baldado of the Makati police went to his
place of work in Dasmarias Village and asked him if he was sure about the identity of the
49
gunman. He told Baldado he was positive. Baldado then said him he would no longer require
him to sign the statement he prepared for him earlier. 131
LEONORA C. VALLADO, chief of the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI, was also
presented as a prosecution rebuttal witness. She testified that extensive washing of hands or
excessive perspiration can eliminate gunpowder nitrates lodged on skin pores of the hands.
Continued washing with hot water can induce perspiration and remove nitrate residue
embedded in the skin pores. Application of vinegar on the hand can register the same effect. 132
She testified that their practice at the NBI is to take the paraffin test on a suspect within 72 hours
from the time of the alleged firing of a gun, during which time, any possible trace of nitrate may
still be found. 133
She divulged that questions have been raised regarding the reliability of the paraffin test. She
related that she once attended a training in Baguio City where they tried to test the accuracy of a
paraffin test. In said training, two (2) NBI agents fired a .38 revolver. One of them washed his
hands. They then subjected both agents to a paraffin test using diphylamine reagent. Both
yielded a negative result. Thus, she opined, the result of a paraffin test should merely be taken
as a corroborative evidence and evaluated together with other physical evidence. 134
The records show that the case was set for hearing on October 29, 1992 for the presentation by
the defense of sur-rebuttal evidence. However, a day before the scheduled hearing, the defense
filed a Constancia 135manifesting that it shall waive its right to present sur-rebuttal evidence, the
same being unneccesary. The defense, however, declared that this is without prejudice to the
presentation of its evidence in the trial proper should the same be necessary.
At the hearing of October 29, 1992, the defense counsels did not appear. The prosecution
moved in open court that the main cases and the petition for bail be submitted for decision in
view of the absence of defense counsels who had manifested that they would no longer present
their sur-rebuttal evidence. The motion was granted and the parties were given ten (10) days
from receipt of the Order within which to submit their simultaneous Memorandum. 136 It does not
appear that the defense objected to this Order. The records show that the defense even filed a
motion asking for additional time to file its Memorandum. 137 In due time, both parties submitted
their respective Memorandum.
On December 22, 1992, the trial court convicted accused CLAUDIO TEEHANKEE, JR. of the
crimes charged. 138The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby renders judgment:
(1) In criminal Case No. 91-4605, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee, Jr.,
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, qualified by
treachery, for the fatal shooting of Roland John Chapman, and sentencing
said accused to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion perpetua, and to pay the
heirs of the said deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50, 000.00),
Philippine Currency, plus moderate or temperate and exemplary damages in
the sum of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), Philippine
Currency;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 91-4606, finding accused Claudio J. Teehankee,
Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Murder, qualified by
treachery, for the fatal shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and
sentencing him to suffer imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua, and to pay
the heirs of the said deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), Philippine Currency, plus the sums of Two Million Three
Hundred Fifty Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three
Centavos (P2,350,461.83), Philippine Currency, as actual damages;
Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, for loss of
earning capacity of the said deceased; and One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, as moral, moderate and exemplary
damages;
Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of Frustrated Murder,
qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentencing
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor, as
minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum,
and to pay the said offended party the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos
(P30,000.00), Philippine Currency; plus the sum of One Hundred Eighteen
Thousand Three Hundred Sixty-Nine Pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos
(P118,369.84), Philippine Currency, and another sum equivalent in
Philippine Pesos of U.S. $55,600.00, both as actual damages; an amount
equivalent in Philippine Pesos of U.S. $40,000.00, as loss of earning
capacity of said offended party; and One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, as moral, moderate and exemplary damages.
(4) In all these three cases ordering said accused to pay all the offended
parties the sum of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000.00), Philippine
Currency, as and for attorney's fees and expenses of litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in these three cases.
Consequently the petition for bail is hereby denied for utter lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Accused hired a new counsel in the person of Atty. Nicanor B. Gatmaytan, Jr. He filed a Motion
for New Trial, 139alleging for the first time that the trial court erred in considering as submitted for
decision not only the petition for bail but also the case on the merits. He claimed that accused's
right to adduce further evidence was violated. His motion for new trial was denied.
Accused interposed the present appeal. 140 He contends that:
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED HAD
BEEN POSITIVELY IDENTIFIED BY JUSSI LEINO, CADENAS AND
MANGUBAT AS THE ONE WHO SHOT HIM, ROLAND CHAPMAN AND
MAUREEN NAVARRO HULTMAN.
II. THE PROSECUTION HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE GUILT OF THE
ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
III. THE PUBLICITY GIVEN THE CASE AGAINST THE APPELLANT WAS
MASSIVE, OVERWHELMING, AND PREJUDICIAL AS TO EFFECTIVELY
DEPRIVE THE ACCUSED OF RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL TRIAL.
IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING OF
CHAPMAN AND HULTMAN AND THE SHOOTING OF LEINO WAS
ATTENDED BY TREACHERY.
V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GRANTING EXORBITANT MORAL
AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND LOSS OF EARNING CAPACITY.
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S FEES OF
THREE MILLION PESOS (P3,000,000.00).
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT ON THE
MERITS AND ON THE PETITION FOR BAIL AT THE SAME TIME
WITHOUT GIVING THE ACCUSED THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT
ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE IN HIS DEFENSE ON THE MERITS OF THE
CASE AND DENYING THE ACCUSED'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL.
We shall discuss these alleged errors in seriatim.
Appellant was convicted on the strength of the testimonies of three (3) eyewitnesses who
positively identified him as the gunman. He vigorously assails his out-of-court identification by
these eyewitnesses.
He starts by trying to discredit the eyeball account of Jussi Leino, the lone surviving victim of the
crimes at bar. Appellant urges:
First, that Leino's identification of him outside an unoccupied house in Forbes Park was highly
irregular.
Second, that Leino saw his pictures on television and the newspapers before he identified him.
Third, that Leino's interview at the hospital was never put in writing.
Fourth, that the sketch of appellant based on the description given by Leino to the CIS agents
was suppressed by the NBI. It is surmised that the sketch must have been among the evidence
turned over to the NBI when the latter assumed jurisdiction over the investigation.
Lastly, that Leino could not have remembered the face of appellant. The shooting lasted for only
five (5) minutes. During that period, his gaze could not have been fixed only on the gunman's
face. His senses were also dulled by the five (5) bottles of beer he imbibed that night.
50
It is understandable for appellant to assail his out-of-court identification by the prosecution

witnesses in his first assignment of error. Eyewitness identification constitutes vital evidence
and, in most cases, decisive of the success or failure of the prosecution. Yet, while eyewitness
identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the scientific forms of
identification evidence such as the fingerprint or DNA testing. Some authors even describe
eyewitness evidence as "inherently suspect." 141 The causes of misidentification are known, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Identification testimony has at least three components. First, witnessing a
crime, whether as a victim or a bystander, involves perception of an event
actually occurring. Second, the witness must memorize details of the event.
Third, the witness must be able to recall and communicate accurately.
Dangers of unreliability in eyewitness testimony arise at each of these three
stages, for whenever people attempt to acquire, retain, and retrieve
information accurately, they are limited by normal human fallibilities and
suggestive influences. (Emphasis Supplied) 142
Out-of-court identification is conducted by the police in various ways. It is done thru show-ups
where the suspect alone is brought face to face with the witness for identification. It is done thru
mug shots where photographs are shown to the witness to identify the suspect. It is also done
thru line-ups where a witness identifies the suspect from a group of persons lined up for the
purpose. Since corruption of out-of-court identification contaminates the integrity of in-court
identification during the trial of the case, courts have fashioned out rules to assure its fairness
and its compliance with the requirements of constitutional due process. In resolving the
admissibility of and relying on out-of-court identification of suspects, courts have adopted the
totality of circumstances test where they consider the following factors, viz: (1) the witness'
opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at
that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty
demonstrated by the witness at the identification; (5) the length of time between the crime and
the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the identification procedure. 143
Using the totality of circumstances test, we hold that the alleged irregularities cited by appellant
did not result in his misidentification nor was he denied due process. There is nothing wrong in
Leino's identification of appellant in an unoccupied house in Forbes Park. The records reveal
that this mode was resorted to by the authorities for security reasons. 144 The need for security
even compelled that Leino be fetched and escorted from his house in Forbes Park by U.S.
embassy security officials and brought to the house where he was to make the identification.
The Leinos refused to have the identification at the NBI office as it was cramped with people and
with high security risk. 145 Leino's fear for his safety was not irrational. He and his companions
had been shot in cold blood in one of the exclusive, supposedly safe subdivisions in the
metropolis. Atty. Salvador Ranin, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, correctly
testified that there is no hard and fast rule as to the place where suspects are identified by
witnesses. Identification may be done in open field. It is often done in hospitals while the crime
and the criminal are still fresh in the mind of the victim. 146
Appellant cannot also gripe that Leino saw his pictures and heard radio and TV accounts of the
shooting before he personally identified him. Indeed, the records show that on July 15, 1991,
while Leino was still in the hospital, he was shown three (3) pictures of different men by the
investigators. He identified appellant as the gunman from these pictures. He, however,
categorically stated that, before the mug shot identification, he has not seen any picture of
appellant or read any report relative to the shooting incident. 147 The burden is on appellant to
prove that his mug shot identification was unduly suggestive. Failing proof of impermissible
suggestiveness, he cannot complain about the admission of his out-of-court identification by
Leino.
We have no reason to doubt the correctness of appellant's identification by Leino. The scene of
the crime was well-lighted by a Meralco lamp post. Appellant was merely 2-3 meters away when
he shot Leino. The incident happened for a full five (5) minutes. Leino had no ill-motive to falsely
testify against appellant. His testimony at the trial was straightforward. He was unshaken by the
brutal cross-examination of the defense counsels. He never wavered in his identification of
appellant. When asked how sure he was that appellant was responsible for the crime, he
confidently replied: "I'm very sure. It could not have been somebody else." 148
Appellant cannot likewise capitalize on the failure of the investigators to reduce to a sworn
statement the information revealed by Leino during his hospital interviews. It was sufficiently
established that Leino's extensive injuries, especially the injury to his tongue, limited his mobility.
The day he identified appellant in the line-up, he was still physically unable to speak. He was
being fed through a tube inserted in his throat. 149 There is also no rule of evidence which
requires the rejection of the testimony of a witness whose statement has not been priorly
reduced to writing. Reliance by appellant on the case of People v. Alindog 150 to erode Leino's
credibility is misplaced. In Alindog, accused was acquitted not solely on the basis of delay in
taking his statement, but mainly on the finding that the prosecution evidence was, at best,
circumstancial and "suspiciosly short in important details," there being no investigation
whatsoever conducted by the police.
We also reject appellant's contention that the NBI suppressed the sketch prepared by the CIS on
the basis of the description given by Leino. There is nothing on the record to show that said
sketch was turned over by the CIS to the NBI which could warrant a presumption that the sketch
was suppressed. The suspicion that the sketch did not resemble appellant is not evidence. It is
unmitigated guesswork.
We are not likewise impressed with the contention that it was incredible for Leino to have
remembered appellant's face when the incident happened within a span of five (5) minutes. Five
(5) minutes is not a short time for Leino to etch in his mind the picture of appellant. Experience
shows that precisely because of the unusual acts of bestiality committed before their eyes,
eyewitnesses, especially the victims to a crime, can remember with a high degree of reliability
the identity of criminals. 151 We have ruled that the natural reaction of victims of criminal violence
is to strive to see the appearance of their assailants and observe the manner the crime was
committed. Most often, the face end body movements of the assailant create an impression
which cannot be easily erased from their memory. 152 In the case at bar, there is absolutely no
improper motive for Leino to impute a serious crime to appellant. The victims and appellant were
unknown to each other before their chance encounter. If Leino identified appellant, it must be
because appellant was the real culprit.
Appellant also assails his identification by Cadenas. He contends that Cadenas did not witness
the crime. He stresses that when the Dasmarias security force and the Makati police conducted
an on-the-spot investigation on the day of the incident, neither came across Cadenas. The next
day, in the afternoon of July 14, 1991, an NBI agent interviewed Cadenas and asked if he saw
the incident. He merely replied: "Nakita ko pero patay na." He did not volunteer information to
anyone as to what he supposedly witnessed. That same night, the NBI subpoenaed him for
investigation. He went to the NBI the next morning. It was only the next day, July 16, 1991, that
he gave his statement to the NBI. Cadenas allegedly told Ponferrada, his supervisor, that the
NBI tortured him.
We reject appellant's submission. Cadenas' initial reluctance to reveal to the authorities what he
witnessed was sufficiently explained during the trial. He related that he feared for his and his
family's safety. His fear was not imaginary. He saw with his own eyes the senseless violence
perpetrated by appellant. He knew appellant belonged to an influential family. It was only after
consistent prodding and assurance of protection from NBI officials that he agreed to cooperate
with the authorities. 153 The Court has taken judicial notice of the natural reticence of witnesses
to get involved in the solution of crimes considering the risk to their lives and limbs. In light of
these all too real risks, the court has not considered the initial reluctance of fear-gripped
witnesses to cooperate with authorities as an authorities as an indicium of credibility. 154 It will not
depart from this ruling.
Appellant's assertion that Cadenas was tortured by the NBI is not borne out by the records.
Supposedly, Cadenas passed on to his superior, a certain Ponferrada, information about his
torture. The allegation is an out and out hearsay as Ponferrada was not presented in the witness
stand. Cadenas himself stoutly denied this allegation of torture. The claim of torture is also
belied by the fact that Cadenas' entire family was allowed to stay with him at the NBI
headquarters and likewise extended protection. 155
Appellant then discredits his identification by VICENTE MANGUBAT, citing the testimony of
defense witness Pat. James Baldado of the Makati Police. Pat. Baldado testified that Mangubat
failed to identify appellant as the gunman the first time he was brought to the Makati police
station. Mangubat, however, belied Baldado's story. He declared he positively identified
51
appellant as the gunman at the Makati police station. He averred that the day after he identified
appellant, Pat. Baldado returned to his place of work in Dasmarias and asked him again
whether appellant was the gunman. Again, he replied in the affirmative. Forthwith, Pat. Baldado
said he would no longer ask him to sign a statement (Exhibit "HHH") 156 earlier prepared by
Baldado. In said statement previously prepared by Baldado, Mangubat was supposed to state
that appellant, whom he saw at the Makati police station, was NOT the gunman. We give more
weight to the testimony of Mangubat. We find nothing in the records to suspect that Mangubat
would perjure himself. The Court cannot be as generous to Pat. Baldado of the Makati Police.
Mr. Hultman has proved that the Makati police, including some of its jail officials, gave appellant
favored treatment while in their custody. The anomaly triggered nothing less than a
congressional investigation.
II
We now rule on appellant's second assignment of error, i.e., that the trial court erred in not
holding that the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
First, he claims the trial court erred in citing in its Decision his involvement in previous shooting
incidents for this contravenes the rule 157 that evidence that one did or omitted to do a certain
thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or omitted to do the same or similar thing
at another time. Second, the NBI failed to conduct an examination to compare the bullets fired
from the gun at the scene of the crime with the bullets recovered from the body of Chapman.
Third, the prosecution eyewitnesses described the gunman's car as white, but the trial court
found it to be silver mettalic gray. Fourth, appellant could not have been the gunman for
Mangubat, in his statement dated July 15, 1991, said that he overheard the victim Maureen
Hultman plead to the gunman, thus: "Please, don't shoot me and don't kill me. I promise
Mommy, Daddy." Appellant also contends that a maid in a house near the scene of the crime told
Makati police Alberto Fernandez that she heard Maureen say: "Daddy don't shoot. Don't." Fifth,
the NBI towed accused's car from Dasmarias Village to the NBI office which proved that the
same was not in good running condition. Lastly, the result of the paraffin test conducted on
appellant showed he was negative of nitrates.
Appellant points to other possible suspects, viz:. ANDERS HULTMAN, since one of the
eyewitnesses was quoted in the newspapers as having overheard Maureen plead to the
gunman: "Huwag, Daddy."; and, (b) JOSE MONTAO, another resident of Dasmarias Village,
who had a white Lancer car, also bearing license plate number 566.
We reject appellant's thesis as bereft of merit.
Appellant cannot hope to exculpate himself simply because the trial judge violated the rule
on res inter alios actawhen he considered his involvement in previous shooting incidents. This
stance is a specie of a mid-1800 rule known as the English Exchequer Rule pursuant to which "a
trial court's error as to the admission of evidence was presumed to have caused prejudice and
therefore, almost automatically required a new trial." 158 The Exchequer rule has long been laid
to rest for even English appellate courts now disregard an error in the admission of evidence
"unless in its opinion, some substantial wrong or miscarriage (of justice) has been
occasioned." 159 American courts adopted this approach especially after the enactment of a 1915
federal statute which required a federal appellate court to "give judgment after an examination of
the entire record before the court, without regard to technical errors, defects, or exceptions
which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 160 We have likewise followed the
harmless error rule in our jurisdiction. In dealing with evidence improperly admitted in trial, we
examine its damaging quality and its impact to the substantive rights of the litigant. If the impact
is slight and insignificant, we disregard the error as it will not overcome the weight of the
properly admitted evidence against the prejudiced party. 161
In the case at bar, the reference by the trial judge to reports about the troublesome character of
appellant is a harmless error. The reference is not the linchpin of the inculpatory evidence
appreciated by the trial judge in convicting appellant. As aforestated, the appellant was
convicted mainly because of his identification by three (3) eyewitnesses with high credibility.
The NBI may have also failed to compare the bullets fired from the fatal gun with the bullets
found at the scene of the crime. The omission, however, cannot exculpate appellant. The
omitted comparison cannot nullify the evidentiary value of the positive identification of appellant.
There is also little to the contention of appellant that his Lancer car was not in running condition.
Allegedly, this was vicariously proved when the NBI towed his car from Dasmarias Village
where it was parked to the NBI office. Again, the argument is negated by the records which show
that said car was towed because the NBI could not get its ignition key which was then in the
possession of appellant. Clearly, the car was towed not because it was not in running condition.
Even appellant's evidence show that said car could run. After its repairs, appellant's son, Claudio
Teehankee III, drove it from the repair shop in Banawe, Quezon City to Dasmarias Village, in
Makati,
where
it
was
parked. 162
Nor are we impressed by the alleged discrepancies in the eyewitnesses' description of the color
of the gunman's car. Leino described the car as light-colored; Florece said the car was
somewhat white ("medyo puti"); 163Mangubat declared the car was white; 164 and Cadenas
testified it was silver metallic gray. 165 These alleged discrepancies amount to no more than
shades of differences and are not meaningful, referring as they do to colors white, somewhat
white and silver metallic gray. Considering the speed and shocking nature of the incident which
happened before the break of dawn, these slight discrepancies in the description of the car do
not make the prosecution eyewitnesses unworthy of credence.
Appellant's attempt to pin the crimes at bar on Anders Hultman, the adoptive father of Maureen
Hultman, deserves scant consideration. Appellant cites a newspaper item 166 where Maureen
was allegedly overheard as saying to the gunman: "Huwag, Daddy. Huwag, Daddy." The
evidence on record, however, demonstrates that Anders Hultman could not have been the
gunman. It was clearly established that Maureen could not have uttered said statement for two
(2) reasons: Maureen did not speak Tagalog, and she addressed Anders Hultman as "Papa," not
"Daddy." 167Moreover, Leino outrightly dismissed this suspicion. While still in the hospital and
when informed that the Makati police were looking into this possibility, Leino flatly stated that
Anders Hultman was NOT the gunman. 168 Leino is a reliable witness.
Appellant cannot also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was negative of nitrates.
Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has ". . . proved extremely unreliable in
use. The only thing that it can definitely establish is the presence or absence of nitrates or
nitrites on the hand. It cannot be established from this test alone that the source of the nitrates
or nitrites was the discharge of a firearm. The person may have handled one or more of a
number of substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or nitrites, such as
explosives, fireworks, fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, and leguminous plants such as peas, beans,
and alfalfa. A person who uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands
since these substances are present in the products of combustion of tobacco." 169 In numerous
rulings, we have also recognized several factors which may bring about the absence of
gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands after
firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is
against the gunman at the time of firing. 170 In the case at bar, NBI Forensic Chemist, Leonora
Vallado, testified and confirmed that excessive perspiration or washing of hands with the use of
warm water or vinegar may also remove gunpowder nitrates on the skin. She likewise opined
that the conduct of the paraffin test after more than seventy-two (72) hours from the time of the
shooting may not lead to a reliable result for, by such time, the nitrates could have already been
removed by washing or perspiration. 171 In the Report 172 on the paraffin test conducted on
appellant, Forensic Chemist Elizabeth Ayonon noted that when appellant was tested for the
presence of nitrates, more than 72 hours has already lapsed from the time of the alleged
shooting.
III
In his third assigned error, appellant blames the press for his conviction as he contends that the
publicity given to his case impaired his right to an impartial trial. He postulates there was
pressure on the trial judge for high-ranking government officials avidly followed the
developments in the case (as no less than Vice-President Joseph Estrada and then Department
of Justice Secretary Franklin Drilon attended some of the hearings and, President Corazon
Aquino even visited victim Maureen Hultman while she was still confined at the hospital). He
submits that the trial judge failed to protect him from prejudicial publicity and disruptive
influences which attended the prosecution of the cases. He claims there were placards
displayed during the hearing of the cases, spectators inside the courtroom clapped their hands
and converted the proceedings into a carnival. In another instance, he was allegedly given the
52
"finger sign" by several young people while he was leaving the courtroom on his way back to his
cell.
We cannot sustain appellant's claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to
prejudicial publicity. It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive
publicity, just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the
right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. To be sure, responsible
reporting enhances an accused's right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, "a responsible press
has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in
the criminal field . . . The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards
against the miscarriage of justice by subjecting in the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes
to extensive public scrutiny and criticism."173
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact
that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself
prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For
one, it is impossible to seal the minds of members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court
publicity of sensational criminal cases. The state of the art of our communication system brings
news as they happen straight to our breakfast tables and right to our bedrooms. These news
form part of our everyday menu of the facts and fictions of life. For another, our idea of a fair and
impartial judge is not that of a hermit who is out of touch with the world. We have not installed
the jury system whose members are overly protected from publicity lest they lose their
impartiality. Criticisms against the jury system are mounting and Mark Twain's wit and wisdom
put them all in better perspective when he observed: "When a gentleman of high social standing,
intelligence, and probity swears that testimony given under the same oath will outweigh with
him, street talk and newspaper reports based upon mere hearsay, he is worth a hundred
jurymen who will swear to their own ignorance and stupidity . . . Why could not the jury law be so
altered as to give men of brains and honesty an equal chance with fools and
miscreants?" 174 Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard off-court evidence
and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and
publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.
At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the
barrage of publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino, et
al. v. Alejandro, et a1., 175 we rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the
test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be
allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly influenced, not simply that they might be,
by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show that the trial judge
developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of
the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that
the trial judge acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of
change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this
actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
We have minutely examined the transcripts of the proceedings and they do not disclose that the
trial judge allowed the proceedings to turn into a carnival. Nor did he consent to or condone any
manifestation of unruly or improper behavior or conduct inside the courtroom during the trial of
the case at bar. The transcripts reveal the following:
1. At the August 14, 1991 hearing, the defense counsel called the attention
of the court to the visible display of a placard inside the courtroom. Acting on
the manifestation, the trial judge immediately directed that the placard be
hidden. Only then did he order the start of the arraignment of accused. 176
On the same hearing, the defense counsel asked for the exclusion of the
media after they had enough opportunity to take pictures. The court granted
defense's request, noting that the courtroom was also too crowded. 177
2. During the testimony of Domingo Florece, an argument ensued between
the defense lawyer and the fiscal. When part of the audience clapped their
hands, the defense counsel invoked Rule 119, Section 13 of the Rules of
Court and moved for the exclusion of the public. Assistant Prosecutor VillaIgnacio objected on the ground that the public was not unruly. The trial
judge noted that there were yet no guidelines drafted by the Supreme Court
regarding media coverage of the trial proceedings. 178 Collaborating defense

counsel, Atty. Malvar, complained that the outpouring of sympathy by
spectators inside the courtroom has turned the proceedings into a carnival.
He also manifested that he personally saw that when accused was being
brought back to his cell from the courtroom, a group of young people were
pointing dirty fingers at accused in full view of policemen. Forthwith, the trial
judge declared that he could not be dissuaded by public sentiments. He
noted that the clapping of hands by the public was just a reaction at the spur
of the moment. He then admonished the audience not to repeat it. 179
3. At the hearing of July 14, 1992, the parties again argued on the coverage
of the trial by the press. The defense alleged that the media coverage will
constitute mistrial and deny accused's constitutional right to due process. It
invoked the provision in the Rules of Court which allows the accused to
exclude everybody in the courtroom, except the organic personnel. The
prosecutor, however, argued that exclusion of the public can be ordered
only in prosecution of private offenses and does not apply to murder cases.
He added that the public is entitled to observe and witness trial of public
offenses. He quoted the U.S. case of Sheppard v. Maxwell180 where it was
held: "A responsible press is always regarded as the handmaiden of
effective judicial administration especially in the criminal field. The press
does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, the prosecutors and judicial
processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism. What transpires in the
courtrooms public property." The trial judge then ruled that the media should
be given a chance to cover the proceedings before the trial proper but,
thereafter, he prohibited them from taking pictures during the trial. They
were allowed to remain inside the courtroom but were ordered to desist
from taking live coverage of the proceedings. 181
4. At the August 14, 1992 hearing, before the hearing began, the trial judge
gave the media two (2) minutes to take video coverage and no more. Trial
then ensued. 182
5. At the September 8, 1992 hearing, the trial judge again gave the media
two (2) minutes to take pictures before the trial proper. Afterwards, the
reporters were duly admonished to remain silent, to quietly observe the
proceedings and just take down notes. 183
6 On September 10, 1992 before the start of the afternoon session, the
judge admonished the media people present in the courtroom to stop taking
pictures. 184
Parenthetically, appellant should be the last person to complain against the press for prejudicial
coverage of his trial. The records reveal he presented in court no less than seven (7) newspaper
reporters and relied heavily on selected portions of their reports for his defense. The defense's
documentary evidence consists mostly of newspaper clippings relative to the investigation of the
case at bar and which appeared to cast doubt on his guilt. The press cannot be fair and unfair to
appellant at the same time.
Finally, it would not be amiss to stress that on May 29, 1992, the trial judge voluntarily inhibited
himself from further hearing the case at bar to assuage appellant's suspicion of bias and
partiality. 185 However, upon elevation of the trial judge's voluntary Order of Inhibition to this
Court, we directed the trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed up the administration of
justice. 186 We found nothing in the conduct of the proceedings to stir any suspicion of partiality
against the trial judge.
IV
In his fourth assigned error, appellant claims that treachery was not present in the killing of
Hultman and Chapman, and the wounding of Leino for it was not shown that the gunman
consciously and deliberately adopted particular means, methods and forms in the execution of
the crime. Appellant asserts that mere suddenness of attack does not prove treachery.
The three (3) Informations charged appellant with having committed the crimes at bar with
treachery and evident premeditation. Evident premeditation was correctly ruled out by the trial
53
court for, admittedly, the shooting incident was merely a casual encounter or a chance meeting
on the street since the victims were unknown to appellant and vice-versa It, however,
appreciated the presence of the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
We hold that the prosecution failed to prove treachery in the killing of Chapman. Prosecution
witness Leino established the sequence of events leading to the shooting. He testified that for no
apparent reason, appellant suddenly alighted from his car and accosted him and Maureen
Hultman who were then walking along the sidewalk. Appellant questioned who they were and
demanded for an I.D. After Leino handed him his I.D., Chapman appeared from behind Leino
and asked what was going on. Chapman then stepped down on the sidewalk and inquired from
appellant what was wrong. There and then, appellant pushed Chapman, pulled a gun from
inside his shirt, and shot him. The gun attack was unexpected. "Why did you shoot me?" was all
Chapman could utter.
Concededly, the shooting of Chapman was carried out swiftly and left him with no chance to
defend himself. Even then, there is no evidence on record to prove that appellant consciously
and deliberately adopted his mode of attack to insure the accomplishment of his criminal design
without risk to himself. It appears to us that appellant acted on the spur of the moment. Their
meeting was by chance. They were strangers to each other. The time between the initial
encounter and the shooting was short and unbroken. The shooting of Chapman was thus the
result of a rash and impetuous impulse on the part of appellant rather than a deliberate act of
will. We have consistently ruled that mere suddenness of the attack on the victim would not, by
itself, constitute treachery. 187Hence, absent any qualifying circumstance, appellant should only
be held liable for Homicide for the shooting and killing of Chapman.
As to the wounding of Jussi Leino and the killing of Maureen Hultman, we hold that treachery
clearly attended the commission of the crimes. The evidence shows that after shooting
Chapman in cold blood, appellant ordered Leino to sit on the pavement. Maureen became
hysterical and wandered to the side of appellant's car. When appellant went after her, Maureen
moved around his car and tried to put some distance between them. After a minute or two,
appellant got to Maureen and ordered her to sit beside Leino on the pavement. While seated,
unarmed and begging for mercy, the two were gunned down by appellant. Clearly, appellant
purposely placed his two victims in a completely defenseless position before shooting them.
There was an appreciable lapse of time between the killing of Chapman and the shooting of
Leino and Hultman a period which appellant used to prepare for a mode of attack which
ensured the execution of the crime without risk to himself. Treachery was thus correctly
appreciated by the trial court against appellant insofar as the killing of Hultman and the
wounding of Leino are concerned.
V and VI
We come now to the civil liability imposed against appellant. Appellant posits that the awards of
moral and exemplary damages and for loss of earning capacity of Maureen Hultman, Roland
Chapman and Jussi Leino were exorbitant. He likewise claims that the trial court's award of
attorney's fees was excessive.
In its Decision, the trial court awarded to Jussi Leino end the heirs of victims Hultman and
Chapman the following damages:
1. For the murder of Roland John Chapman, appellant was sentenced to
pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as indemnity for death and the sum of Five Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) as moderate or temperate and exemplary
damages.
2. For the murder of Maureen Navarro Hultman, appellant was sentenced to
pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of: Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) as indemnity for death; Two Million Three Hundred Fifty
Thousand Four Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos
(P2,350,461.83)
as
actual
damages;
Thirteen
Million
Pesos
(P13,000,000.00) for loss of earning capacity of deceased; and, One Million
Pesos as moral, moderate and exemplary damages.
3. For the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, appellant was sentenced to pay:
Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as indemnity for the injury; One
Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three-Hundred Sixty Nine Pesos and Eighty-
Four Centavos (P118,369.84) and the sum equivalent in Philippine pesos of

U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; an amount equivalent in
Philippine pesos of U.S.$40,000.00, for loss of earning capacity of Jussi
Leino; and, One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral, moderate and
exemplary damages.
4. In all three cases, appellant was also ordered to pay each of the offended
parties the sum of One Million Pesos (or a total of three million pesos) for
attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
5. Costs of litigation. 188
The early case of Heirs of Raymundo Castro v. Bustos 189 discussed in detail the matter of
damages recoverable in case of death arising from a felony, thus:
When the commission of a crime results in death, the civil obligations arising
therefrom are governed by penal laws, ". . . subject to the provisions of Art.
2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title on
Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book (Book IV) regulating
damages." (Art. 1161, Civil Code)
Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." (Art.
100, Revised Penal Code). This civil liability, in case the felony involves
death, includes indemnification for consequential damages (Art. 104, id.)
and said consequential damages in turn include ". . . those suffered by his
family or by a third person by reason of the crime." (Art. 107, id.) Since
these provisions are subject, however, as above indicated, to certain
provisions of the Civil Code, (w)e will now turn to said provisions.
The general rule in the Civil Code is that:
In crimes and quasi-delicts, the defendant shall be
liable for all damages which are the natural and
probable consequences of the act or omission
complained of. It is not necessary that such damages
have been foreseen or could have reasonably foreseen
by the defendant. (Art. 2202)
When, however, the crime committed involves death, there is Art. 2206
which provides thus:
The amount of damages for death caused by a crime
or quasi-delict shall be at least three thousand pesos
even though there may have been mitigating
circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the
earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity
shall be paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity
shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the
court, unless the deceased on account of permanent
physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no
earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support
according to the provisions of article 291, the recipient
who is not an heir called to the descendant's
inheritance by law of testate or intestate succession,
may demand support from the person causing the
death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact
duration to be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants
and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of
the deceased.
The amount of P3,000 referred to in the above article has already been
increased by this Court first, to P6,000.00 in People v. Amansec, 80 Phil.
426, and lately to P12,000.00 in the case of People v.Pantoja, G.R. No. L-
54
18793, promulgated October 11, 1968 190, and it must be stressed that this
amount, as well as the amount of moral damages, may be adjudicated even
without proof of pecuniary loss, the assessment of the moral damages
being "left to the discretion of the court, according to the circumstances of
each case." (Art. 2216)
Exemplary damages may also be imposed as a part of this civil liability
when the crime has been committed with one or more aggravating
circumstances, such damages being "separate and distinct from fines and
shall be paid to the offended party." (Art. 2230). Exemplary damages cannot
however be recovered as a matter of right; the court will decide whether or
not they should be given. (Art. 2233)
In any event, save as expressly provided in connection with the indemnity
for the sole fact of death (1st par., Art. 2206) and is cases wherein
exemplary damages are awarded precisely because of the attendance of
aggravating circumstances, (Art. 2230) ". . . damages to be adjudicated may
be respectively increased or lessened according to the aggravating or
mitigating circumstances," (Art. 2204) "but the party suffering the loss or
injury must exercise the diligence of a good father of a family to minimize
the damages resulting from the act or omission in question." (Art. 2203)
"Interest as a part of the damages, may, in a proper case, be adjudicated in
the discretion of the Court." (Art. 2211) As to attorneys' fees and expenses
of litigation, the same may be recovered only when exemplary damages
have been granted (Art. 2208, par. 1) or . . . when there is a separate civil
action.
Stated differently, when death occurs as a result of a crime, the heirs of the
deceased are entitled to the following items of damages:
1. As indemnity for the death of the victim of the offense
P12,000.00 (now P50,000.00), without the need of
any evidence or proof of damages, and even though
there may have been mitigating circumstances
attending the commission of the offense.
2. As indemnity for loss of earning capacity of the
deceased an amount to be fixed by the court
according to the circumstances of the deceased related
to his actual income at the time of death and his
probable life expectancy, the said indemnity to be
assessed and awarded by the court as a matter of duty,
unless the deceased had no earning capacity at said
time on account of permanent disability not caused by
the accused. If the deceased was obliged to give
support, under Art. 291, Civil Code, the recipient who is
not an heir, may demand support from the accused for
not more than five years, the exact duration to be fixed
by the court.
3. As moral damages for mental anguish, an amount
to be fixed by the court. This may be recovered even by
the illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the
deceased.
4. As exemplary damages, when the crime is attended
by one or more aggravating circumstances, an
amount to be fixed in the discretion of the court, the
same to be considered separate from fines.
5. As attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, the
actual amount thereof, (but only when a separate civil
action to recover civil liability has been filed or when
exemplary damages are awarded).
6. Interests in the proper cases.
7. It must be emphasized that the indemnities for loss of

earning capacity of the deceased and for moral
damages are recoverable separately from and in
addition to the fixed sum of P12,000.00 (now
P50,000.00) corresponding to the indemnity for the sole
fact of death, and that these damages may, however,
be respectively increased or lessened according to the
mitigating or aggravating circumstances, except items 1
and 4 above, for obvious reasons. 191
We shall first review the damages awarded to the heirs of ROLAND JOHN CHAPMAN in light of
the law and the case law.
Appellant claims that the award of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos as moderate or
temperate and exemplary damages to the heirs of Roland John Chapman was baseless.
We start with the observation that the trial court should not have lumped together the awards for
moderate or temperate and exemplary damages at Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00), without specifying the particular amount which corresponds to each, as they are
of a different kind. We shall, however, consider their propriety and reasonableness.
The amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) pesos cannot be given as temperate or
moderate damages for the records do not show any basis for sustaining the award. Nor can it be
given as exemplary damages. The killing of Chapman was not attended by either evident
premeditation or treachery. Be that as it may, the award can be considered as one for moral
damages under Article 2206 (3) of the New Civil Code. 192 It states:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime . . . shall be
at least (fifty thousand pesos, under current jurisprudence) . . . In addition:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) The spouse, legitimate or illegitimate descendants and ascendants of
the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of
the death of the deceased.
Moreover, considering the shocking and senseless aggression committed by appellant, we
increase the amount of moral damages to One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos for the death of
Chapman.
We next rule on the legality of damages awarded to the heirs of MAUREEN NAVARRO
HULTMAN.
Appellant argues that the damages for the death of Maureen should be awarded to her mother,
Vivian Hultman, and her natural father. He contends that under Article 352 of the New Civil
Code, Anders Hultman as adoptive father of Maureen, is not entitled to said award. Only the
parents by nature of Maureen should inherit from her.
We reject the argument. Under the Family Code which was already in effect at the time of
Maureen's death, Anders Hultman, as adoptive father, is entitled to the award made by the trial
court. Article 190 of the Family Code provides:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate
descendants of the adopted concur with the adopters, they shall divide the
entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or ascendants and the
other half, by the adopters;
xxx xxx xxx
(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire estate;
It does not appear on the records whether Maureen was survived by her natural father. During
the trial of these cases, only Vivian and Anders Hultman testified on their claim of damages.
Hence, we find that the award of damages in their favor has sufficient factual and legal basis.
Appellant also urges that the award to the heirs of Maureen Hultman of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as moral and exemplary damages is unjustified or, at the very least, exorbitant
and should be reduced.
We hold that the award of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos is amply justified by the
circumstances. The records reveal that Maureen recovered between life and death for ninetyseven (97) days. Her family experienced the peaks and valleys of unspeakable suffering. During
that time, she underwent brain surgery three (3) times. Her condition was never stable and
55
remained critical. It was always touch and go with death. She could not be left alone at the
hospital. Her parents had to be perpetually by her side at least six (6) to seven (7) hours daily.
After the shooting, their siblings had to be sent back to Sweden for their safety. Left unattended,
her family's business took a downspin. Soon, her family's assets were depleted, then wiped out.
A total of twenty-three (23) doctors attended to her and their bills ballooned without abatement.
They were forced to rely on the goodness of the gracious. Her family started receiving
contributions from other people to defray the medical expenses and hospital bills. 193 Maureen
never regained consciousness until her demise on October 17, 1991, at the tender age of
seventeen. Under the foregoing circumstances, we thus find the award of One Million Pesos
(P1,000,000.00) as moral damages to be reasonable.
Moreover, we find that the grant of exemplary damages is called for by the circumstances of the
case. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, 194 in addition to the award of moral damages,
exemplary or corrective damages may be adjudged in order to deter the commission of similar
acts in the future. The award for exemplary damages is designed to permit the courts to mould
behavior that has socially deleterious consequences. Its imposition is required by public policy to
suppress the wanton acts of an offender.
In the case at bar, appellant's unprovoked aggression snuffed the life of Maureen Hultman, a girl
in the prime of her youth. Hultman and her companions were gunned down by appellant in coldblood, for no apparent reason. Appellant's vicious criminality led to the suffering of his victims
and their families. Considering our soaring crime rate, the imposition of exemplary damages
against appellant to deter others from taking the lives of people without any sense of sin is
proper. Moreover, since the killing of Hultman was attended by treachery and pursuant to Article
2229 of the new Civil Code, 195 we impose an award of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as
exemplary damages against appellant for the death of Maureen Hultman.
We now review the award of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral, moderate and
exemplary damages to victim JUSSI LEINO.
From the record, it is incontrovertible that Leino likewise suffered extensive injuries as a result of
the shooting. His upper jaw bone was shattered. He would need a bone transplant operation to
restore it. His tongue was also injured. He partially lost his sense of taste for his taste buds were
also affected. When he was discharged from the hospital, he had difficulty in speaking and had
to be fed through a tube running down his nose. He lost eight of his teeth. The roots of his teeth
were cut off and the raw nerves were exposed. But all these speak only of his physical injuries
and suffering. More devastating was the emotional strain that distressed Leino. His parents were
in Europe for a vacation at the time of the shooting. Only a neighbor attended to him at the
hospital. It took two (2) days for his father to come and comfort by his bedside. Leino had trouble
sleeping in peace at night. The traumatic event woke him up in the middle of the night. Black
memories
of
the
incident
kept
coming
back
to
mind. 196 Understably, the ill-effects of the incident spilled over his family. Seppo Leino, Jussi's
father, was tortured by thoughts of insecurity. He had to relocate his entire family to Europe
where he felt they would be safe. 197 Under the foregoing circumstances, we find that an award
of One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos to Jussi Leino as indemnity for moral damages is justified
and reasonable.
As in the case of Hultman, since the shooting of Leino was committed with treachery and
pursuant to Article 2229 of the New Civil Code, 198 appellant is additionally adjudged liable for the
payment to Leino of Two Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
We come now to the trial court's monetary award to compensate the LOSS OF EARNING
CAPACITY OF VICTIMS JUSSI LEINO and MAUREEN HULTMAN.
To be compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not necessary that the victim, at the time of
injury or death, is gainfully employed. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of
earnings but for loss of capacity to earn money. In Cariaga v. Laguna Tayabas Bus
Company, 199 we awarded to the heirs of Cariaga a sum representing loss of his earning capacity
although he was still a medical student at the time of injury. However, the award was not without
basis for Cariaga was then a fourth year medical student at a reputable school; his scholastic
record, which was presented at the trial, justified an assumption that he would have been able to
finish his course and pass the board in due time; and a doctor, presented as witness for the
appellee, testified as to the amount of income Cariaga would have earned had he finished his
medical studies.
In the case at bar, the trial court awarded the amount, equivalent in Philippine pesos, of Forty
capacity of JUSSI LEINO. We agree with appellant that this amount is highly speculative and
should be denied considering that Leino had only earned a high school degree at the
International School, Manila, in 1989. He went back to Finland to serve the military and has just
arrived in Manila in February 1991 to pursue his ambition to become a pilot. At the time of the
shooting on July 13, 1991, he has just enrolled at the Manila Aero Club to become a
professional pilot. He was thus only on his first year, first semester, in said school and was
practically, a mere high school graduate. Under the foregoing circumstances, we find the records
wanting with substantial evidence to justify a reasonable assumption that Leino would have
been able to finish his studies at the Manila Aero Club and ultimately become a professional
pilot.
We now pass upon the propriety of the award of Thirteen Million Pesos (P13,000,000.00) for
loss of earning capacity of deceased MAUREEN HULTMAN. We find that the award is not
supported by the records.
In adjudging an award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, the trial court incorrectly used the
monthly salary of a secretary working in Sweden, computed at two thousand dollars ($2,000.00)
a month, as per the estimate given by Anders Hultman. Nowhere in the records does it appear
that, at the time of her death, Maureen had acquired the skills needed for a secretarial job or that
she intended to take a secretarial course in preparation for such job in Sweden. Anders Hultman
himself testified that there was uncertainty as to Maureen's future career path, thus:
ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q Mr. Witness, if Maureen would not been (sic) shot
and she continued her studies, what professional
career would she (sic) like to pursue considering her
interests and inclinations?
WITNESS:
A That is very difficult to say. She has just turned 17
and our projection is that, certainly she would have
been an artist in the creative side. She would have
become an actress or a movie producer or probably
she would have been a college graduate.
ATTY. VINLUAN:
Q But if you would just say based on the salary of a
secretary in Sweden, how much would she have much
earned?
A. Not less than Two Thousand Dollars a month. 200
Clearly, there is no factual basis for the award of thirteen million (P13,000,000.00) pesos to the
heirs of Maureen far loss of earning capacity as a probable secretary in Sweden.
In any event, what was proved on record is that after graduating from high school, Maureen took
up a short personality development course at the John Roberts Powers. Maureen was employed
at the John Roberts Powers at the time of her death. It was her first job. In fact, she had just
received her first salary, for which reason she went out with her friends to celebrate on that
fateful day. However, neither the nature of her work nor her salary in said company was
disclosed at the trial. Thus, to compute the award for Maureen's loss of earning capacity, we are
constrained to use the minimum wage prevailing as of the date of her death (October 17,
1991),i.e., one hundred eighteen pesos (P118.00). 201 Allowing for reasonable and necessary
expenses in the amount of P19,800.00, her net income per annum would amount to
P26,859.17. 202 Hence, using the formula repeatedly adopted by this Court: 203 (2/3 x [80 age
of victim at time of death]) x a reasonable portion of the net income which would have been
received by the heirs as support, 204 we fix the award for loss of earning as capacity of deceased
Maureen Hultman at Five Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand Forty-Two Pesos and Fifty-Seven
Centavos (P564,042.57).
It also bears emphasis that in the computation of the award for loss of earning capacity of the
deceased, the life expectancy of the deceased's heirs is not factored in. The rule is well-settled
that the award of damages for death is computed on the basis of the life expectancy of the
deceased, and not the beneficiary. 205
56
Lastly, appellant seeks a reduction of the award of attorney's fees in the amount of Three Million
Pesos (P3,000,000.00), claiming that the same is exorbitant.
We disagree. The three (3) private complainants were represented by the ACCRA law firm, with
Atty. Rogelio Vinluan as lead counsel. They agreed to pay the amount of One Million
(P1,000,000.00) pesos each as attorney's fees and for litigation expenses. The three criminal
cases were consolidated. A continuous trial was conducted, with some hearings having both
morning and afternoon sessions. The trial lasted for almost one and a half years. More than forty
(40) witnesses testified during the hearings. Several pleadings were prepared and filed. A total of
sixty-eight (68) documentary exhibits were presented by the prosecution. Incidents related to the
trial of the cases came up to this Court for review at least twice during the pendency of the
trial. 206 Given these circumstances and the evident effort exerted by the private prosecutor
throughout the trial, the trial court's award of a total of Three Million (P3,000,000.00) pesos as
attorney's fees and litigation expenses appears just and reasonable.
VII
In his last assigned error, appellant urges that the hearings conducted on the cases, where no
less than forty-one (41) witnesses were presented by the parties, 207 were merely hearings on
the petition for bail concerning the murder charge for the killing of Roland Chapman, and not a
trial on the merits of all three (3) cases. Appellant insists that after the termination of the hearing,
he still had the right to adduce evidence at the trial proper. He claims he was denied due
process when the trial court considered all the cases submitted for decision after the defense
waived its right to present its surrebuttal evidence.
Appellant's position is untenable. This issue was resolved at the very first hearing of the cases
on August 9, 1991. The incident then pending was appellant's petition for bail for the murder of
Chapman. It will be remembered that, initially, there was only one murder charge against
appellant since Maureen Hultman succumbed to death during the course of the proceedings on
October 17, 1991.
Thus, at the initial hearing on August 9, 1991, the incident for resolution was appellant's petition
for bail. The prosecution sought to present the surviving victim, Jussi Leino, to testify on all three
(3) charges to obviate delay and inconvenience since all three (3) charges involved one
continuing incident. Appellant, through counsel, objected to the testimony of Leino insofar as the
two (2) frustrated murder charges (with respect to the wounding of Leino and Hultman) were
concerned. He argued that since the pending incident was the petition for bail with respect to the
killing of Chapman, any testimony relative to the two (2) other charges in which bail were
recommended was irrelevant.
After arguments, the defense suggested that if the prosecution would present Leino to testify on
all three (3) charges, it should wait until after accused's arraingment on August 14, 1991. 208 The
prosecution agreed on the condition that there shall be trial on the merits and, at the same time,
hearing on the petition for bail. Defense counsel agreed. 209
As agreed upon, accused was arraigned and the prosecution presented Jussi Leino as its first
witness to testify on all three (3) cases. No objection was made by the defense. 210
Subsequent proceedings likewise disprove appellant's insistence that the hearings conducted by
the trial court were limited to the petition for bail, viz:
1. The prosecution presented all their witnesses and documentary evidence
relative to the shooting incident, including evidence in support of the claim
for damages. These witnesses were extensively cross-examined by the
defense counsels. The defense never objected that evidence on damages
would be unnecessary if its intention was really to limit presentation of
evidence to appellant's petition for bail.
2. After the prosecution and the defense rested their cases, the trial court
issued an Order 211directing the parties to submit their Memorandum, after
which "the main case as well as the petition for bail are respectively
submitted for Decision and Resolution." After receipt of this Order, the
defense counsel filed two (2) motions for extension of time to file the
defense Memorandum. In both Motions, the defense did not object to the
trial court's Order submitting for decision the main case and the petition for
bail. Neither did it move for a reconsideration of this Order and notify the
court that it still had witnesses to present.
3. In compliance with said Order, appellant's counsel, Atty. Rodolfo Jimenez,

filed a Memorandum and Supplemental Memorandum praying for accused's
acquittal. This is inconsistent with the defense's position that the hearing
conducted was only on the petition for bail. If the defense insist that what
was submitted for decision was only his petition for bail, he would have only
prayed that he be granted bail.
4. Upon receipt of the notice of promulgation of judgment from the trial
court, the defense did not interpose any objection to the intended
promulgation. In fact, the defense attended the promulgation of the Decision
and manifested that they were ready therefor.
All these clearly show that the merits of the cases and the petition for bail were heard
simultaneously and appellant acquiesced thereto. Moreover, appellant's right to present
additional evidence was not abridged by the trial court. On the contrary, the records disclose that
the trial court afforded the defense fair opportunity to adduce its evidence. It took the defense
almost one and a half years to submit its evidence. The defense presented more than twenty
(20) witnesses and several documentary evidence. It was only after the trial court rendered a
decision
against
appellant
that
he
filed
a
motion
for
new
trial, 212 through his new counsel, Atty. Gatmaytan, Jr. For the first time, he alleged that the joint
decision of the cases, both on the merits and on the petition for bail, was irregular for he was not
given a chance to present further evidence to corroborate his alibi. We note that in his motion for
new trial, 213 appellant did not even identify his alleged additional witnesses and the substance of
their testimonies. Nor was it shown that he could not have produced these evidence at the trial
with reasonable diligence. Appellant's motion was a patent ploy to delay the decision on his
cases. His motion was properly denied by the trial court.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hereby AFFIRM WITH MODIFICATIONS the Decision of the trial court,
dated December 22, 1992, thus:
Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide for the
shooting of Roland John Chapman, and sentencing said accused to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day ofreclusion temporal as maximum, and to pay the heirs of the
said deceased the following amounts: Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos
as indemnity for the victim's death; and, One Million (P1,000,000.00) pesos
as moral damages.
Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder, qualified by
treachery, for the shooting of Maureen Navarro Hultman, and sentencing
him to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the heirs of the
said deceased the following amounts: Fifty Thousand (P50,000.00) pesos
as indemnity for her death; Two Million Three Hundred Fifty Thousand Four
Hundred Sixty-One Pesos and Eighty-Three Centavos (P2,350,461.83) as
actual damages; Five Hundred Sixty-Four Thousand Fourty-Two Pesos and
Fifty-Seven Centavos (P564,042.57) for loss of earning capacity of said
deceased; One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages; and Two
Million (P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
Jr., guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder,
qualified by treachery, for the shooting of Jussi Olavi Leino, and sentencing
him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years of prision mayor as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to pay the said offended party the following
amounts: (P30,000.00) pesos as Thirty Thousand (P30,000.00) pesos as
indemnity for his injuries; One Hundred Eighteen Thousand Three Hundred
Sixty-Nine pesos and Eighty-Four Centavos (P118,369.84) and equivalent
in Philippine Pesos of U.S.$55,600.00, both as actual damages; One Million
57
(P1,000,000.00) pesos as moral damages; and, Two Million

(P2,000,000.00) pesos as exemplary damages.
(4) In all three cases, ordering said accused to pay each of the three (3)
offended parties the sum of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00; or a total of
Three Million [P3,000,000.00] pesos] for attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation; and
(5) To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
SO ORDERED.
58
Before us for automatic review is the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42,
Pinamalayan, Oriental Mindoro finding appellant Nestor Coderes y Ablaza guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of raping his daughter, Elsa Coderes y Mauhay, sentencing
him to suffer the penalty of death and ordering him to indemnify Elsa in the amount of
P50,000.00.
The criminal complaint,1 dated January 24, 1997, filed by Elsa against herein
appellant reads as follows:
That on or about the 16th day of November, 1996 at 8:00 oclock in the evening, more
or less, in barangay Subaan, municipality of Socorro, province of Oriental Mindoro,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, NESTOR CODERES y Ablaza, by means of force and intimidation, with
lewd and unchaste design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously lay
with and have carnal knowledge of the undersigned complainant against her will and
without her consent.
That the commission of the crime is attended by the aggravating circumstance of the
victim being only 16 years old and the offender-accused is her own father and living in
the same house.
CONTRARY TO ART. 335 OF THE RPC IN RELATION TO R.A. 7659.2
When arraigned on March 3, 1997, appellant pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented the complainant and Dr. Alita Fetizanan Venturanza as
witnesses.
G.R. No. 136849
October 23, 2003
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
NESTOR CODERES y ABLAZA, appellant.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
PHILIPPINES, appellee,
Complainant Elsa, 17 years old, declared on the witness stand that she had been
repeatedly raped by her father since she was eight years old, the first sexual
molestation having been committed on November 23, 1988 and the latest on
November 16, 1996 when she was already sixteen years old. Around 8:00 in the
evening of November 16, 1996, Elsa testified that she was sleeping together with her
two sisters in one of the rooms of their house located at Subaan, Socorro, Oriental
Mindoro. She woke up finding appellant lying beside her. He undressed her and,
thereafter, inserted his penis in her vagina. Elsa knew that her sisters were aware of
the various times that their father raped her but they did not inform anybody about
these incidents. Complainant herself did not tell their mother that their own father was
raping her. However, after she was raped on November 16, 1996, she was prompted
by her conscience and her fear that her sisters might suffer the same fate in the
hands of their father to reveal her ordeal to her Lola Mercedes who in turn informed
her Lola Leonor. Both grandmothers brought her to the Municipal Health Officer in
Socorro and had her examined.3
59
Testifying on the physical examination she conducted on Elsa, Dr. Venturanza

confirmed her findings that complainants sexual organ had a "healed lacerated
hymen with non-coaptible borders and retraction of the edges, 7 oclock position"
which could have been caused by the penetration of a hard object, like a penis, or by
the stretching of the thigh.4
Defense, on the other hand, presented appellant as its lone witness. He admitted that
complainant Elsa is her daughter and that she was born in 1980. However, he denies
her accusations against him. Appellant testified that since the birth of Elsa, she stayed
with her maternal grandmother, Leonora Mauhay, whose house is located at Zone I,
Socorro, Oriental Mindoro. Complainant only went to live with her parents for one
year in 1992. On November 17, 1996, complainant returned to her parents house.
She told her father that she eloped with her boyfriend four days earlier. Surprised by
her daughters revelation, appellant hit her telling her that she is still too young.
Complainant answered back saying, "Isinusumpa ko kayo bilang magulang".
Thereafter, appellant returned complainant to the care of her grandmother. On
December 8, 1996, appellant came to know of the charges against him. He cannot
think of any reason why her daughter accused him of raping her.5
After evaluation of the evidence presented by the opposing parties, the trial court
upheld the prosecution evidence and rendered judgment convicting appellant of the
crime of rape, imposing upon him the penalty of death.6 Hence, this automatic review
under Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
In his Brief, appellant assails the decision of the trial court and submits the following
Assignment of Errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSEDAPPELLANT ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT HAD CARNAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE COMPLAINANT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING
THE SUPREME PENALTY OF DEATH NOTWITHSTANDING THE FAILURE OF THE
PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF
RELATIONSHIP.7
In reviewing rape cases, we have always been guided by the following principles: (1)
an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to
prove, it is even more difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove
the charge; (2) considering that, in the nature of things, only two persons are usually
involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized
with great caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense.8
In the case at bar, we find that the prosecution failed to discharge its burden of
proving the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt. There was no evidence
that appellant forced or threatened Elsa in having carnal knowledge with him on
November 16, 1996. We quote verbatim her testimony, thus:
Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court why you filed this case, in Court?
A: Because the reason behind is that even my sister will be raped by him if I
will not file this case sir.
Q: How about you, what did your father do to you which compel you to file
this case?
A: He often times injure me sir.
Q: Aside from bitting you or injuring your physical body, what did he do to
you?
A: He threatened me sir.
Q: What was done to you by your father, please tell the Honorable Court.
A: He raped me sir.
Q: And the last time that you were raped by your own father, when was that
if you still remember?
A: November 16, 1996 sir.
We find the appeal meritorious.

Q: What time more or less, if you still remember?
60
A: 8:00 oclock in the evening sir.

Q: In what place were you rape?
A: At Subaan, Socorro sir.
Q: In whose house?
A: In our own house sir.
Q: Will you please tell the Honorable Court, how you were raped by your
own father on November 16, 1996?
A: He laid beside me in our room and undressed me sir.
Q: And thereafter, what did he do?
A: He again inserted his penis in my vagina sir.
Q: This time, after you were rape by your father on November 16, 1996,
what did you do in order to protect your rights?
A: I reported this matter to my Lola Mercedes.9
It is clear from complainants above-quoted testimony that while she claims that she
was threatened and injured by appellant, Elsa did not specify how she was
threatened, why she was threatened and on what particular occasion she was
threatened by appellant. Thus, the prosecution failed to establish that threat or injury
was employed by appellant during or on the occasion of the rape allegedly committed
on November 16, 1996 as a means to force complainant to have sex with him.
In rape committed through force or intimidation under Article 335, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 7659), the prosecution must
prove that force or intimidation was actually employed by the appellant upon his
victim to achieve his end. Failure to do so is fatal to prosecutions cause.10 In the
instant case, the prosecution failed to establish the presence of sufficient force or
intimidation that would have created a state of fear in the mind of Elsa so as to
effectively prevent her from putting up a determined resistance.
It is true that in a long line of cases, 11 the most recent of which is People vs.
Servano,12 we held that in rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the
formers moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence and
intimidation; that ascendancy or influence necessarily flows from the fathers parental
authority as well as the childrens duty to obey and observe respect towards their
parents; that such reverence and respect are deeply ingrained in the minds of Filipino
children; that abuse of both by a father can subjugate his daughters will, thereby
forcing her to do whatever he wants.13
However, a review of the evidence presented in the present case discloses that the
rule on moral ascendancy cannot be applied in this particular case. We find that the
trial court failed to appreciate the fact that appellant could have hardly wielded any
moral ascendancy or parental influence over complainant as evidenced by
theunrefuted testimony of appellant that since her birth, Elsa lived with her
grandmother and stayed in the house of her parents for only one year in 1992 when
she was only twelve years old or four years before the complained incident. On
November 16, 1996, Elsa was already sixteen years old. Thus, she could hardly be
considered to be of such tender age that she would be easily conditioned or
controlled into submitting herself to appellants sexual desires specially so, when she
lived with appellant for only one year when she was twelve years old.
In his Brief, appellant does not deny having sexual intercourse with complainant. He
claims that she consented to the sexual act. As earlier found by us, the prosecution
failed to adduce evidence to prove that complainant resisted the sexual advances of
appellant when she was allegedly raped on November 16, 1996. The gravamen in the
crime of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will or without her
consent.14 We find nothing in the testimony of complainant to show that she offered
any semblance of resistance when appellant allegedly raped her. While it may be said
that tenacious resistance from the victim is not a requirement for the crime of rape,
the lack of evidence signifying obstinate resistance to submit to the intercourse,
naturally expected from an unwilling victim, could likewise indicate that no rape has
occurred.15 Nothing in private complainants testimony indicates that she struggled
against the sexual advances of appellant. There was no evidence of appellants use
of force or threat in having sex with her that evening of November 16, 1996.
So too, we are not unmindful of the doctrine that when a woman says that she has
been raped, she says, in effect, all that is necessary to prove that rape was
committed. Moreover, there is no question that a rape by a father of his own daughter
is an odious and despicable crime that deserves condemnation in the strongest
possible terms.
In the present case, after scrutiny of the testimonies of complainant and appellant, we
found certain facts and circumstances that evince reasonable doubt as to the guilt of
appellant. Unfortunately, the trial court failed to comprehend the same.
61
First, when complainant was asked, during her direct examination, as to what
impelled her to inform her grandmother of the rape committed against her by
appellant on November 16, 1996, she testified as follows:
Q: After you were raped by your own father on November 16, 1996 what
prompted you to report this matter to your lola?
A: Nakukunsensya po ako at baka gawin sa aking mga kapatid ang
gahasain din ng aking magulang.16
During her cross-examination, she testified thus:
Q: And the reason why you finally revealed what according to you, your
father did against you was that you were nakukunsensya, is it not?
A: Yes mam.
Q: And you were nakukunsensya because you know for a fact that what you
and your father were doing was a sin against your mother, is it not?
A: Yes mam.17
While we find the last quoted question propounded by the counsel for
appellant to be downright misleading under the Rules on Evidence, to which
the inattentive prosecutor unfortunately did not object, private complainant
could have easily denied the same, if it were not really true. But she did not.
Although misleading, the question is simple enough to be easily understood
and evaluated by Elsa who, on the date of her testimony was already
seventeen years old.
Her above-quoted statements are open to different interpretations. Was she
bothered by her conscience ("nakunsiyensya") because she was afraid that
appellant would also rape her sisters; or was she bothered by her
conscience because she realized that what she and her father were doing
was a sin against her mother?
In a criminal case, every circumstance or evidence favoring a mans
innocence must be taken into account. If the inculpatory facts and
circumstances are capable of two or more interpretations, one of which is
consistent with innocence and the other with guilt, then the evidence does
not pass the test of moral certainty and is not sufficient to support a
conviction.18 Thus, the presumption of innocence founded on the basic
principle of justice as embodied in our Constitution prevails in the present

case.
Second, appellants act of trying to settle the case filed by Elsa against him
cannot be considered in this particular case as an implied admission that he
raped his daughter. During his cross-examination, the public prosecutor
propounded questions on him to which he answered, as follows:
Q: Mr. Witness, I would like you to listen very well and understand my
question before you answer, because this is a grave offense charged against
you and if the Court will find you guilty, you maybe included in the list of
those who will be given lethal injection. I would like to remind you that I filed
this case with a weak heart, bearing in mind that you are the father of the
complainant. And to remind you clearly, when you and your wife was (sic)
crying in our office. Do you remember that?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And you were pleading to your wife that you be given pity and
commensuration (sic). Is it not?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And that was for several occasion (sic). If I remember right, there were 35 times coming to our office and trying to settle the case between you and
your wife and Elsa?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You will agree with me that your wife, at that time, as well as Elsa
Coderes did not conform with the amicable settlement, for which reason, I
was constrained to file this case as actually you were raping her since
childhood. Is it not?
A: No, sir.
Q: When Elsa Coderes testified here in Court, you were present, and when I
directed her to point at you, she went down from that witness stand and
shouted to you, in this wise: "Ito po ang aking walang hiyang ama na
gumahasa sa akin". Do you still remember that?
A: Yes, sir.
62
Q: And when you were pointed at, your head bowed as if in acceptance. Is it
not?
A: No, sir.19
From the foregoing, it can be seen that while appellant admits that he tried to settle
the case filed against him by his daughter, he, nonetheless, denied that he raped her.
Thus, the fact that appellant admitted having tried to settle the case against him may
not be used as a basis of his conviction in the absence of competent evidence
presented by the prosecution that complainant was raped through force and
intimidation. The prosecution may not rely on the weakness of the evidence for the
defense. Instead, it must depend on the strength of its own evidence and establish
the guilt of appellant beyond reasonable doubt. This, the prosecution failed to do.
Where the prosecution has failed to discharge the onus probandi for a
pronouncement of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the constitutional presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused will result in acquittal.20
We need to emphasize however what we have enunciated in People vs. Eliarda, to
wit:
In an acquittal, an accused is set free not necessarily because he did not commit the
offense but, more likely than not, because the exacting proof for conviction may not
have been met. A person is presumed innocent of a crime unless his guilt has been
proven beyond any reasonable doubt. Thus, an acquittal does not always mean that
the defense evidence is given full credence, but, rather that the prosecution has failed
to overcome the presumption of innocence.21
WHEREFORE, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of appellant beyond
reasonable doubt, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 42, Pinarnalayan,
Oriental Mindoro in Criminal Case No. P-5586 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant Nestor Coderes y Ablaza is ACQUITTED and his immediate RELEASE
from confinement is ordered, unless some other lawful cause warrants his further
detention. The Director of Prisons is DIRECTED to inform this Court immediately of
the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt hereof
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
63
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
In the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, the two Sanchez brothers
Pablo and Alejo, their nephew Juan Sanchez and one Emeterio Sasota were
accused of murder for killing one Sabino Bucad. After trial, Emeterio Sasota
and Alejo Sanchez were found guilty of the crime of murder and were
sentenced each to reclusion perpetua, to jointly and severally indemnify the
heirs of the deceased Sabino Bucad in the sum of P2,000, and to pay the
proportional costs of the proceedings. Their co-defendants Pablo Sanchez
and Juan Sanchez died during the pendency of the case in the lower court
and no motion of the Fiscal, the case was dismissed as against them. Alejo
and Emeterio are now appealing from that decision.
It is not disputed that Sabino Bucad was taken from his house by four armed
men, and thereafter he was never again seen or heard from. The witnesses
for the prosecution point to the two appellants and their two companions
(Pablo and Juan Sanchez) as four the individuals who not only took Sabino
Bucad from his house to the Bato lake, ill-treating him all the way, but upon
reaching there, took him with them for about ride on the lake, and while
sailing, continued to ill-treat him until he died, and presumably thereafter
secretly disposing of his body.
G.R. No. L-3544
April 18, 1952
THE
PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
EMETERIO
SASOTA,
ET
AL., defendants;
EMETERIO SASOTA and ALEJO SANCHEZ, defendants-appellants.
Sulpicio
Platon
for
appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Pompeyo Diaz and Solicitor Pacifico P. de
Castro for appellee.
The two appellants disclaim any knowledge of, much less connection with
the disappearance of Sabino, and insist that on the night of October 17,
1943, they were nowhere near his house. After hearing the testimony of the
witnesses, both for the prosecution and the defense, and observing their
demeanor while on the witness stand, the trial court gave credence to the
testimony of the Government witnesses and disbelieved that of the defense.
We have gone over the record of the case and we see nothing in it to
disapprove of this attitude and disturb this finding of the trial court as regards
to the credibility of the witnesses. Furthermore, we believe the story told by
the witnesses for the prosecution to be more natural and probable and
therefore, more worthy of belief. Moreover, we see no reason why this
Government witnesses should deliberately and falsely pin the killing on the
two appellants and their co-defendants and accuse them of this serious
crime of murder with its corresponding heavy penalty.
The evidence in the record shows that about ten o'clock in the evening of
October 17, 1943, Sabino Bucad who was living with his common law wife
64
Maria Evalla and his 18-year old son Arsenio Bucad in the barrio of Masoli,
Bato, Camarines Sur, was awakened by calls from outside his house.
Lighting an oil lamp, he took it to the window to see who was calling. Arsenio
who was also awakened followed his father to the window and peeping, saw
and recognized the two appellants herein with their two co-accused, Pablo
and Juan, armed with bolos. Sabino inquired from his nocturnal visitors why
they came, and the group requested him to come down so that they could all
go to the house of the councilor. Reluctantly, Sabino complied with their
request. According to Arsenio, as soon as his father had gone down, the four
accused grabbed his hands and tide them and took him away. Not long
thereafter Arsenio heard the sound of beating and the groans of his father.
Because he was scared he did not dare leave the house to follow his father.
Three days afterward Pablo Villez came and told him that his father had been
taken to the lake by the four accused, placed in a banca and while sailing
toward the opposite shore, was maltreated and killed by them.
While on their way to the lake the four accused and their victim Sabino
Bucad were seen by a member of theronda organization of Agos, who
possibly, because of the extra ordinary spectacle of a man with his hands
tied being led by four armed men and late at night, hastened to inform the
barrio lieutenant named Eladio Barbacena who forthwith came and inquired
from the four men what they intend to do with Sabino. The group was
apparently, in no mood to answer questions or give explanations and Juan
Sanchez even told him to stop asking questions otherwise he would be next.
Possibly, his curiosity and sense of responsibility as a barrio lieutenant
prompted Barbacena to follow the group secretly, hiding behind tall grasses
until they came to the lake where he saw the accused place Sabino in a
banca and take him away in the direction of the opposite shore. He heard
Sabino groaning as if in pain and asking for forgiveness. Barbacena also saw
a man in a banca follow the boat occupied by the group and their victim.
Pablo Villez that same evening happened to be in the house of his father-inlaw preparing to pound palay on the occasion of the wedding of his sister-inlaw. The four accused and Sabino with hands tied passed by the yard and
Pablo recognized the accused because they were fellow members of the
guerilla organization. He secretly followed the group and upon reaching the
lake he saw the four defendants place Sabino in a boat with them and sail; in
the direction of the opposite shore. Villez took another banca and followed
them at a safe distance and he saw the four accused take turns in beating
Sabino who pleaded that he be forgiven because he had not committed any
fault, to which appellant Sasota answered, "what forgiveness." Villez says
that as a result of the beating Sabino died. Villez is the same person who as
already stated, three days later informed Arsenio Bucad that he had seen his
father being taken into a boat to the opposite shore of the lake, in the
meantime being maltreated until he died. Villez must have been the man who
Barbacena had seen take a banca and follow the defendants as they sailed
away with Sabino.
Another witness Roman Arbo, after fishing in the lake that same evening was
on his way home when he heard a noise at the bend of the road and he
immediately took cover behind tall grasses. From his hiding place he saw
appellant Sasota puling Sabino whose hands were then tied, followed by
Juan, Pablo and appellant Alejo. He saw Juan Sanchez beating the victim
and he also heard Sabino asking for forgiveness. The following morning Arbo
went to the house of Pablo Sanchez and asked the latter's wife where her
husband was because he had seen him the night before taking Sabino away.
When Pablo returned home and was informed by his wife of the visit of Arbo
he got angry and that same afternoon, his wife went to Arbo's house telling
him that her husband was mad at him for gossiping and spreading the news.
Fearing that Pablo may do him harm because of his meddling, Arbo changed
his residence and with to live on the other side of the City of Legaspi where
he stayed until Liberation.
For the purpose of determining the criminal responsibility of the appellants, it
is unnecessary to ascertain and find the specific criminal acts of each. It is
clear that they and their co-accused confederated and helped each other and
acted in concert from the time that they lured Sabino from his home to come
down and tied his hands until they reached the lake where they placed him in
a banca and then took turns in maltreating their victim until he died. In other
words there was a conspiracy between all of them and consequently,
appellants are responsible for the acts of each and every one.
The appellants interpose the defense of alibi, insisting that could not have
committed the crime because in the day in question, particularly that time of
the night, they were elsewhere. The trial court has analyzed the evidence in
this regard and in our opinion correctly rejected this theory of alibi and we
find no profit in further discussing it. Suffice it to say that aside from the
inherent weakness of this kind of defense, the appellants were clearly
identified by no less than four witnesses as the persons who took away
65
Sabino from his home and liquidated him. The important point raised by
counsel for the appellants is that of corpus delicti. He claims that inasmuch
as there is no conclusive evidence of the death of the deceased, because his
body was never found, neither was the place where he was supposed to
have been buried indicated corpus delicti was not established. In a case of
murder of homicide, it is not necessary to recover the body or to show where
it can be found. There are cases like death at sea, where the finding or
recovery of the body is impossible. It is enough that the death and the
criminal agency causing it be proven. There are even cases where said
death and the intervention of the criminal agency that caused it may be
presumed or established by circumstancial evidence. Wharton in his book on
Criminal Evidence, Vol. 2, Sec. 871, pp. 1505-1506, says:
. . . the rule now established by the weight of authority is that the
element of death in the corpus delicti may be established by
circumstancial evidence. Hence, in the case of the destruction of the
body, or in the case of its disappearance, as in murder upon the high
seas, where the body is rarely, if ever, found, death may be proved
circumstantially. To establish the corpus delicti by circumstancial
evidence, facts are admissible, to show the impossibility of rescue,
as at sea; to show the existence and extent of wounds, and
deceased's condition of health; and to show that the wound was
sufficient to cause death, and that the party was reported dead.
Death is sufficiently shown by the testimony of a witness that he saw
the flash and heard the report, and that the deceased fell to the
ground, declaring he was shot, and that accused did the shooting.
Francisco in his book on Criminal Evidence, Vol. III section 27, 1517, also
has the following to say:
Moreover, it may be remembered that in several treason cases decided by

this Court, where besides the act of treason the accused is held responsible
for the death of persons he had arrested or tortured or taken away, where the
victims were never later seen or heard from, it has been presumed that they
were killed or otherwise criminally disposed of or liquidated by the accused,
this, for the purpose of fixing the penalty.
There is nothing in the record to show that the witnesses for the prosecution
had any reason for falsely imputing this serious crime of murder to them. Of
course, appellant Alejo Sanchez insinuates that Arsenio Bucad had a motive
to testify against him because he (Alejo) was a witness against him in
criminal case in the Justice of the Peace Court for physical injuries where
Arsenio was sentenced to arresto menor and to pay P60.00 damages. It
turns out however that Alejo never testified in said case for the reason that
arsenio Bucad pleaded guilty to the charge.
As regards motive behind the killing, there is evidence showing that
defendant Pablo Sanchez was maintaining illicit relations with Sabino's
common law wife, Maria Evalla, and that the former probably to have the
woman all to himself, liquidated Sabino. Now, why did his co-defendants help
him in carrying out his dastardly plan? The reason is not far to seek.
Alejandro Sanchez was his brother, and Juan Sanchez was a nephew. As to
Emeterio Sasota, he was a friend.
In view of all the foregoing, and finding no reversible error in the decision
appealed from, except the amount of indemnity of P2,000.00 which should
be raised to P6,000.00, the same is hereby affirmed, with cost against the
appellants. So ordered.
A conviction of murder cannot be supported unless the body has

been found or there is equivalent proof of death. The more modern
rule is that the fact of death as well as the other branch of the corpus
delicti may be established by circumstancial or presumptive
evidence. Thus is held that, where the body has been destroyed or is
not recovered, it is competent to establish both elements by
presumptive evidence . . .
66
G.R. No. 101797 March 24, 1994

PEOPLE
OF
THE
vs.
ABUNDIO ROLUNA, accused-appellant.
CARLOS DAGUING, PATERNO DAGUING, MAMERTO ASMOLO, TEODULFO

DAGUING, FEDERICO SIMPRON, BIENVENIDO SIMPRON and DIDOC
BONGCALOS (all at large), accused.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Ernesto D. Labastida, Sr. for accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
In an Information dated June 26, 1990, eight (8) persons were charged with the crime
of Kidnapping with Murder before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Baybay,
Leyte. 1 They were Abundio Roluna, Carlos Daguing, Paterno Daguing, Mamerto
Asmolo, Teodulfo Daguing, Federico Simpron, Bienvenido Simpron and Didoc
Bongcalos. The Information against them reads:
That on or about the 27th day of May, 1984, in the municipality of
Baybay, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping with (sic) one another, with the
use of firearms and taking advantage of superior strength, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously hogtie and kidnap one
Anatalio Moronia and take him away to a place unknown up (to)
this time whereat said victim was killed.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Only accused Abundio Roluna was arrested, tried and convicted. The other seven (7)
accused remain at large.
The prosecution presented two (2) witnesses, namely, Conrado Sombilon and
Buenaventura Nogalada, both of whom were residents of barangay Amguhan,
Baybay, Leyte.
CONRADO SOMBILON testified that on May 27, 1984, at around seven o'clock in the
morning, he was on his way to sitio Bungabungan in barangay Amguhan to attend to
the pasture of his carabao. At a distance of thirty (30) meters, he saw his neighbor,
Anatalio Moronia, stopped in his tracks and taken captive by accused Abundio
Roluna. Roluna was then accompanied by seven (7) other persons. viz: Didoc
Bongcalos, Federico Simpron, Bienvenido Simpron, Teodulfo Daguing, Carlos
Daguing, Mamerto Asmolo and Paterno Daguing. Accused Roluna was armed with an
armalite while his companions were carrying short firearms. Using an abaca strip, he
saw Carlos Daguing tie up the hands of Moronia at the back. Frightened, he did not
shout for help and proceeded on his way. With the exception of his wife, he did not
inform anyone about what he saw that fateful day. 2
BUENAVENTURA NOGALADA corroborated in substance the testimony of Sombilon.
He testified that on said day, at around nine o'clock in the morning, he came from his
farm in barangay Monterico, Baybay and was on his way home to barangay
Amguhan. At a distance of about twenty-five (25) meters, he saw Moronia walking
along a human trail in barangay Amguhan, with his hands tied by a rope behind his
back. Moronia was followed by accused Roluna, Carlos Daguing and five (5) other
persons whom he did not recognize. Accused Roluna was carrying an armalite while
Carlos Daguing was armed with a pistol. Frightened, Nogalada immediately left the
place. 3
From that time on, both witnesses testified that Moronia was never seen or heard
from.
At the trial, accused Roluna hoisted the defense of denial and alibi. Roluna claimed
that on May 24, 1984, Danilo Noroo, a cousin of his wife, went to their house in
barangay Amguhan. They were informed by Danilo that Iluminada Cortines y Noroo,
his wife's grandmother, was bedridden and seriously ill. He and his wife immediately
proceeded to Iluminada's house in barangay Banahaw, Baybay, Leyte. As soon as
they arrived, he gathered some herbal plants for Iluminada. He boiled these plants
and regularly applied them on Iluminada's body. He and his wife attended to
Iluminada for three (3) weeks. After Iluminada recuperated from her illness, they
returned to their home in barangay Amguhan. 4 His testimony was corroborated in
substance by his wife, Teresita Roluna and his grandmother-in-law, Iluminada
Cortines de Noroo.
Accused Roluna charged that prosecution witnesses Sombilon and Nogalada,
harboring ill-feelings against him, testified falsely and implicated him in the
disappearance of Anatalio Moronia. He claimed that in 1983, he and Sombilon had a
dispute over a cara y cruz game held in their barangay. Sombilon was then drunk and
he, as chairman of the Kabataang Barangay, tried to pacify Sombilon but the latter got
mad at him. Since then, they have not talked with each other. Nogalada on the other
67
hand, also had a grudge against him. In 1982, they had an altercation during a
volleyball game held during the barangay fiesta. 5
After the trial, the court a quo promulgated its decision, 6 the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Abundio Roluna y Elhig
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Kidnapping
With Murder. As kidnapping (and serious illegal detention) is
penalized with reclusion perpetua to death and murder
with reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, under
Article 48 of the Code, the herein accused should be punished with
the maximum of the more serious crime, hereat the supreme
penalty of death. Considering that the Constitution of 1987 does not
allow the imposition of the death penalty, however, herein accused
is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua, with
the accessory penalties of the law, and to indemnify the heirs of
Anatalio Moronia the sum of P30,000.00. He is credited with the full
period of his detention in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended, except if he did not sign an agreement to
obey the prison laws, rules and regulations at the inception.
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other

circumstances and his existence has not been known for four (4)
years.
Undoubtedly, the victim, Moronia, was last seen on that fateful day of May 27, 1984.
During this time, Moronia, with his hands tied at the back, was accompanied by eight
(8) armed men. Clearly, he was then in danger of death. Since that day until the date
of the trial (or for a span of six years), Moronia has not been seen or heard from. The
People urges that these circumstances raised a presumption that Moronia has been
killed by accused-appellant and his companions.
The pivotal issues are: (a) whether or not the circumstances proved by the
prosecution are sufficient to establish the death of Anatalio Moronia, and; (b) if in the
affirmative, whether or not accused-appellants and his companions could be held
liable therefor.
Corpus delicti has been defined as the body or substance of the crime and, in its
primary sense, refers to the fact that a crime has been actually committed. As applied
to a particular offense, it means the actual commission by someone of the particular
crime charged. 7 The corpus delicti is a compound fact made up of two (2) things, viz:
the existence of a certain act or result forming the basis of the criminal charge, and
the existence of a criminal agency as the cause of this act or result. 8
SO ORDERED.
Were the two (2) aspects of the corpus delicti proved in this case?
Hence this appeal.
In his brief, accused-appellant charges that the trial court erred in finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping with Murder. Accused-appellant
points and stresses that the corpus delicti was not duly proved by the prosecution. He
submits, inter alia, that considering that the body of Anatalio Moronia was never
found, Moronia's questionable and unexplained absence and disappearance should
not be blamed on him for the alleged victim, in all probability, may still be alive.
In its brief, the People contends that the fact of Moronia's death and the culpability of
accused-appellant were sufficiently established by the evidence. The People relies on
the disputable presumption provided under Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, viz.:
The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including
the division of the estate among the heirs:
Insofar as the death of Moronia is concerned, the fact that he was last seen on May
27, 1984 with his hands tied at the back and accompanied by eight (8) armed men
undoubtedly shows that his life was then in danger or peril. Coupled with the fact that
Moronia has been absent and unheard from since that time until the trial of this case
(or a total of six years), a presumption of death was sufficiently raised. This is in
consonance with Section 5 (x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, viz.:
The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including
the division of the estate among the heirs:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and his existence has not been known for four (4)
years.
xxx xxx xxx
68
However, the circumstances presented by the prosecution would not be enough to

hold accused-appellant responsible for the death of Moronia.
In the early case of People v. Sasota, 9 the Court affirmed the conviction of the
accused for murder although the body of the victim was not found or recovered. In
said case, we ruled that in case of murder or homicide, it is not necessary to recover
the body of the victim or show where it can be found. It is enough that the death and
the criminal agency causing death is proven. The Court recognized that there are
cases where the death and intervention of the criminal agency that caused it may be
presumed or established by circumstantial evidence.
However, the ruling in the Sasota case cannot be applied to the case at bench. In
the Sasota case, the prosecution witnesses saw the four (4) armed accused forcibly
take the victim from his house to a lake, beating him up all the way to the boat. While
sailing, the accused continued ill-treating the victim until the latter died. The body of
the victim was never found.
In this case, however, the prosecution witnesses testified that they merely saw one of
the accused, Carlos Daguing, tie up the hands of Moronia. He was then taken in the
direction of barangay Monterico and was never seen or heard from since. At no point
during the trial was it ever established that any of the eight (8) accused beat up
Moronia or in any way laid a violent hand on him. Nogalada even testified that he did
not hear any shot fired by any of the eight (8) armed accused 10 so as to warrant a
reasonable conclusion that Moronia was killed by accused-appellant or any of his coconspirators. Indeed, even the possible motive of accused-appellant and his group for
abducting Moronia was not definitively established. To be sure, the circumstances
proved are insufficient to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt for the
serious crime of kidnapping with murder.
There being no evidence to the contrary, the disputable presumption under Section 5
(x) (3), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court would apply, but only insofar as to establish the
presumptive death of Moronia. Whether accused-appellant is responsible for the
death of Moronia is a different matter. The Rules did not authorize that from this
disputable presumption of death, it should be further presumed that the person with
whom the absentee was last seen shall be responsible for the subsequent
unexplained absence/disappearance of the latter. The conviction of accusedappellant for the serious crime of kidnapping with murder cannot be allowed to rest on
the vague and nebulous facts established by the prosecution. As discussed earlier,
the evidence presented by the prosecution surrounding the events of that fateful day
are grossly insufficient to establish the alleged liability of accused-appellant for the
death of Moronia.
It is a well-entrenched principle in criminal law that an accused is presumed innocent

until proven otherwise. No less than proof beyond reasonable doubt is required to
convict him. On the whole, the evidence adduced by the prosecution would not prove
beyond a shadow of a doubt that accused-appellant should be convicted for the
serious crime of kidnapping with murder.
Since none of the circumstances mentioned in Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code
(kidnapping with serious illegal detention) was proved and only the fact of kidnapping
of Anatalio Moronia was established, we find that the crime committed is slight illegal
detention under Article 268 of the Revised Penal Code. In the execution of the crime,
more than three (3) armed malefactors acted together in its commission. Thus, since
the generic aggravating circumstance of band 11 attended the commission of the
crime and there being no mitigating circumstance present, the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its maximum period as maximum and prision mayor as minimum should
be imposed on accused-appellant. 12
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby MODIFIED.
Accused-appellant Abundio Roluna is found guilty of slight illegal detention and is
meted an indeterminate sentence from twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. 13 Costs against
accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 113630 May 5, 1994
69
DIOSDADO
JOSE
ALLADO
and
ROBERTO
L.
MENDOZA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO C. DIOKNO, Presiding Judge, Br. 62, Regional Trial Court, Makati, Metro
Manila, and PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-CRIME COMMISSION, respondents.
Gamatero shot Van Twest in the chest with a baby armalite, after which Antonino stabbed him
repeatedly, cut off his private part, and later burned his cadaver into fine ashes using gasoline
and rubber tires. Umbal could not recall the exact date when the incident happened, but he was
certain it was about a year ago.
BELLOSILLO, J.:
A day after Umbal executed his extrajudicial confession, the operatives of the PACC, armed with
a search warrant issued by Judge Roberto A. Barrios of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Br.
11, 3 separately raided the two (2) dwellings of Santiago, one located at No. 7 Sangley Street,
and the other, along Amalingan Street, both in Green Heights Subdivision, Paraaque. The
raiders recovered a blue Nissan Pathfinder and assorted firearms and ammunition and placed
Santiago and his trusted aide, Efren Madolid, under arrest. Also arrested later that day were
Antonio and Bato who were found to have in their possession several firearms and ammunition
and Van Twest's Cartier sunglasses.
On balance at the fulcrum once again are the intrinsic right of the State to prosecute perceived
transgressors of the law, which can be regulated, and the innate value of human liberty, which
can hardly be weighed.
Some twelve years ago we were confronted with a similar problem when former Senator Jovito
R. Salonga invoked before this Court his "right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process
clause, alleging that no prima facie case has been established to warrant the filing of an
information for subversion against him." 1 We resolved the issue then and sustained him. He is
now back before us, this time as counsel pleading the cause of petitioners herein who, he
claims, are in a situation far worse than his predicament twelve (12) years ago. He postulates
that no probable cause likewise exists in this case, and what is worse is that no bail is
recommended.
This petition gives us an opportunity to revisit the concept and implication of probable cause, the
existence of which is necessary for the prosecutor to have an accused held for trial and for a trial
judge to issue a warrant for his arrest. It is mandatory therefore that there be probable cause
before an information is filed and a warrant of arrest issued. Unfortunately, however, at times a
criminal case is filed, a warrant of arrest issued and a person consequently incarcerated on
unsubstantiated allegations that only feign probable cause.
Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, alumni of the College of Law,
University of the Philippines, are partners of the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. In
the practice of their profession, and on the basis of an alleged extrajudicial confession of a
security guard, they have been accused of the heinous crime of kidnapping with murder by the
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) and ordered arrested without bail by respondent
judge.
The focal source of the information against petitioners is the sworn statement dated 16
September 1993 of Security Guard Escolastico Umbal, a discharge of the Philippine
Constabulary, implicating them as the brains behind the alleged kidnapping and slaying of one
Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German national. 2 In that extrajudicial confession, Umbal
claimed that he and his companions were met by petitioners at Silahis Hotel and in exchange for
P2.5M the former undertook to apprehend Van Twest who allegedly had an international warrant
of arrest against him. Thus, on 16 June 1992, after placing him under surveillance for nearly a
month, Umbal, Ex-policeman Rolando Gamatero, AFPCIG Agent Roberto Santiago and SPO2
Sergio Antonino abducted Van Twest. They blocked his blue Nissan Pathfinder under the
Alabang overpass and forced him into their car. They brought him to a "safe house" just behind
the New Bilibid Prisons. Umbal was tasked to watch over their quarry. After four (4) days,
Gamatero, Santiago and Antonino returned to the "safe house" together with petitioners and
SPO2 Roger Bato, known to Umbal also as "Batok." SPO2 Bato faked the interrogation of Van
Twest, pretending it was official, and then made him sign certain documents. The following day,
After evaluating the pieces of evidence gathered by PACC operatives, Sr., Supt. Panfilo Lacson,
Chief of PACC Task Force Habagat, referred the case to the Department of Justice for the
institution of criminal proceedings against AFPCIG Agent Roberto Santiago, SPO1 Sergio
Antonino, SPO2 Roger Bato, Ex-policeman Rolando Gamatero, Efren Madolid, and petitioners
herein, Atty. Diosdado Jose Allado and Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza, for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition, carnapping, kidnapping for ransom with murder, and usurpation of
authority. 4 In his letter to the State Prosecutor dated 17 September 1993, Sr. Supt. Lacson
charged that
Atty. Roberto L. Mendoza and Atty. Allado of Salonga, Hernandez and
Allado Law Offices . . . planned and conspired with other suspects to abduct
and kill the German national Alexander Van Twest in order to eliminate him
after forcing the victim to sign several documents transferring ownership of
several properties amounting to several million pesos and caused the
withdrawal of P5M deposit from the victim's bank account.
Thereafter, Senior State Prosecutor Ferdinand prosecutor Ferdinand R. Abesamis issued a
subpoena
to
petitioners
informing
them
that
a
complaint
was filed against them by PACC TF-Habagat, directing them to appear on
30 September 1993 at the Multi-Purpose Hall of the Department of Justice and to submit their
counter-affidavits. Attached to the subpoena were copies of the affidavits executed by Umbal
and members of the team who raided the two (2) dwellings of Santiago. 5
Not satisfied merely with the affidavits attached to the subpoena, petitioner Mendoza moved for
the production of other documents for examination and copying to enable him to fully prepare for
his defense and to submit an intelligible counter-affidavit. 6 Specifically, petitioner Mendoza was
interested in (a) the "several documents transferring ownership of several properties amounting
to several million pesos and the withdrawal of P5M deposits from the victim's bank account," as
stated in the complaint; (b) the complete records of the PACC's investigation, including
investigations on other suspects and their disposition, PACC's Order of Battle for 1992 and early
1993; and, (c) such other written statements issued in the above-entitled case, and all other
documents intended to be used in this case. 7 Petitioners likewise sought the inhibition of the
members of the panel of prosecutors, which was created to conduct the preliminary
70
investigation, on the ground that they were members of the legal staff assigned to PACC and
thus could not act with impartiality.
February 1994, petitioners filed with us the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a temporary restraining order.
In its Order of 11 October 1993, 8 the new panel of prosecutors composed of Senior State
Prosecutor Bernelito R. Fernandez as Chairman, with Rogelio F. Vista and Purita M. Deynata as
Members, confirmed that the motion for inhibition of the members of the old panel as well as the
appeal to the Secretary of Justice was resolved on 8 October 1993 resulting in the creation of a
new panel. Thereafter, the new panel granted the prayer of petitioner Mendoza for the
production of additional documents used or intended to be used against him. Meanwhile, Task
Force Habagat, in compliance with the order, submitted only copies of the request for verification
of the firearms seized from the accused, the result of the request for verification, and
a Philippine Times Journal article on the case with a marginal note of President Fidel V. Ramos
addressed to the Chief of the Philippine National Police directing the submission of a report and
summary of actions taken thereon.
On 16 February 1994, we required respondents to comment on the petition and set the case for
hearing on 28 February 1994. After the hearing, we issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining PACC from enforcing the warrant of arrest and respondent judge from conducting
further proceedings on the case and, instead, to elevate the records to us. Meanwhile, on 27
February 1994, petitioners voluntarily surrendered at the Headquarters of the Capital Command
(CAPCOM), Philippine National Police (PNP), Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Metro Manila, and
on 29 February 1994, they were released on the basis of our temporary restraining order.
Not having been provided with the requested documents, petitioners nevertheless submitted
their respective counter-affidavits denying the accusations against them. 9
After a preliminary hearing where clarificatory questions were additionally propounded, the case
was deemed submitted for resolution. But before the new panel could resolve the case, SPO2
Bato filed a manifestation stating that he was reconsidering the earlier waiver of his right to file
counter- affidavit, 10 and "in the greater interest of truth, justice and fair play" moved for the
admissions of his counter-affidavit 11 confessing participation in the abduction and slaying of Van
Twest and implicating petitioners Allado and Mendoza. Sometime in January 1994, however,
before petitioners could refute Bato's counter-affidavit, he moved to suppress it on the ground
that it was extracted through intimidation and duress.
On 3 February 1994, with the new penal failing to act on the twin motions of SPO2 Bato,
petitioners heard over the radio that the panel had issued a resolution finding a prima facie case
against them and that an information had already been filed in court. Upon verification with the
Department of Justice, however, petitioners were informed that the resolution was not yet ready
for release, but later that afternoon they were able to secure a copy of the information for
kidnapping with murder against them 12 and the 15-page undated resolution under the letterhead
of PACC, signed by the panel of prosecutors, with the Head of the PACC Task Force
recommending approval thereof. 13 That same day, the information was filed before the Regional
Trial Court of Makati and raffled off to Branch 62 presided by respondent Judge Roberto C.
Diokno.
On 4 February 1994, respondent judge, in response to petitioners' request, gave them until 8
February 1994 to submit their opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest against all the
accused. 14 On 7 February 1994, petitioners complied with the order of respondent judge. 15 The
following
day,
8 February 1994, petitioner Allado filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice seeking review
and
reversal
of
the
undated
resolution
of
the
panel
of
prosecutors, 16 which
appeal
was
adopted
by
petitioner
Mendoza. 17 On
11 February 1994, petitioner Allado moved to defer the proceedings before the trial court
pending resolution of his appeal before the Secretary of Justice. 18 However, on even date,
respondent judge issued the assailed warrant of arrest against petitioners. 19 Hence, on 15
Petitioners, in their 335-page petition, inclusive of annexes, principally contend that respondent
judge acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction in "whimsically holding
that there is probable cause against petitioners without determining the admissibility of the
evidence against petitioners and without even stating the basis of his findings," 20 and in "relying
on the Resolution of the Panel and their certification that probable cause exists when the
certification is flawed." 21 Petitioners maintain that the records of the preliminary investigation
which respondent judge solely relied upon failed to establish probable cause against them to
justify the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Petitioners likewise assail the prosecutors' "clear
sign of bias and impartiality (sic)." 22
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General argues that the determination of probable
cause is a function of the judge who is merely required to personally appreciate certain facts to
convince him that the accused probably committed the crime charged.
Section 2, Art. III, of the 1987 Constitution, lays down the requirements for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, i.e., a warrant of arrest shall issue only upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce.
As early as 1915, in Buchanan v. Viuda de Esteban, 23 this Court speaking through Associate
Justice Sherman Moreland defined probable cause as "the existence of such facts and
circumstances as would excite the belief, in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the
knowledge of the prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was
prosecuted." This definition is still relevant today as we continue to cite it in recent
cases. 24 Hence, probable cause for an arrest or for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been
defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonable discreet and prudent
man to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. 25 And
as a protection against false prosecution and arrest, it is the knowledge of facts, actual or
apparent, strong enough to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he was lawful grounds for
arresting the accused. 26
Pilapil v. Sandiganbayan 27 sets a standard for determining the existence of probable cause.
While it appears in that case that we have granted the prosecutor and the trial judge seemingly
unlimited latitude in determining the existence of absence of probable cause by affirming the
long-standing procedure that they can base their findings merely on their personal opinion and
reasonable belief, yet, this permissiveness should not be interpreted as giving them arbitrary
powers and letting them loose in the determination of the existence of probable cause, a delicate
71
legal question which can result in the harassment and deprivation of liberty of the person sought
to be charged or arrested. There we said
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or
may be, well founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as
would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or
entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so. The term does not
mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable
cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is it believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is
a trial for the reception of evidence of the prosecution in support of the
charge.
Whether an act was done causing undue injury to the government and
whether the same was done with manifest partiality or evident bad faith can
only be made out by proper and sufficient testimony. Necessarily, a
conclusion can be arrived at when the case has already proceeded on
sufficient proof.28
Accordingly, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must satisfy himself that based on the
evidence submitted there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person
to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. In the Order of respondent judge dated 11 February
1994, it is expressly stated that "[t]his court after careful evaluation of the evidence on record,
believes and rules that probable cause exists; and therefore, a warrant of arrest should be
issued." However, we are unable to see how respondent judge arrived at such ruling. We have
painstakingly examined the records and we cannot find any support for his conclusion. On the
contrary, we discern a number of reasons why we consider the evidence submitted to be
insufficient for a finding of probable cause against petitioners.
The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission relies heavily on the sworn statement of Security Guard
Umbal who supposedly confessed his participation in the alleged kidnapping and murder of Van
Twest. For one, there is serious doubt on Van Twest's reported death since the corpus delicti has
not been established, nor have his remains been recovered. Umbal claims that Van Twest was
completely burned into ashes with the use of gasoline and rubber tires from around ten o'clock in
the evening to six o'clock the next morning. 29 This is highly improbable, if not ridiculous. A
human body cannot be pulverized into ashes by simply burning it with the use of gasoline and
rubber tires in an open field. Even crematoria use entirely closed incinerators where the corpse
is subjected to intense heat. 30Thereafter, the remains undergo a process where the bones are
completely ground to dust.
In the case of Van Twest, there is not even any insinuation that earnest efforts were exerted to
recover traces of his remains from the scene of the alleged cremation. 31 Could it be that the
government investigators did to the place of cremation but could not find any? Or could it be that
they did not go at all because they knew that there would not be any as no burning ever took
place? To allege then that the body of Van Twest was completely burned to ashes in an open
field with the use merely of tires and gasoline is a tale too tall to gulp.
Strangely,
if
not
awkwardly,
after
Van
Twest's
reported
abduction
on
16 June 1992 which culminated in his decimation by cremation, his counsel continued to
represent him before judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Thus on 31 July 1992, his counsel
filed in his behalf a petition for review before this Court, docketed as G.R. Nos. 106253, and on
18 March 1993, a memorandum before the Securities and Exchange Commission in SEC Case
No.
3896.
On
26 November 1993, during the preliminary investigation conducted by the panel of prosecutors,
counsel again manifested that "even then and even as of this time, I stated in my counteraffidavit that until the matter of death is to be established in the proper proceedings, I shall
continue to pursue my duties and responsibilities as counsel for Mr. Van Twest." 32 Hence, even
Asst. Solicitor General Estoesta believes that counsel of Van Twest doubted the latter's
death. 33 Obviously, counsel himself does not believe that his client is in fact already dead
otherwise his obligation to his client would have ceased except to comply with his duty "to inform
the court promptly of such death . . . and to give the name and residence of his executor,
administrator, guardian or other legal representative," 34 which he did not.
Under the circumstances, we cannot discount petitioners' theory that the supposed death of Van
Twest who is reportedly an international fugitive from justice, a fact substantiated by petitioners
and never refuted by PACC, is a likely story to stop the international manhunt for his arrest. In
this regard, we are reminded of the leading case of U.S. v. Samarin 35 decided ninety-two years
ago where this Court ruled that when the supposed victim is wholly unknown, his body not
found, and there is but one witness who testifies to the killing, the corpus delicti is not sufficiently
proved.
Then, the extrajudicial statement of Umbal suffers from material inconsistencies. In his sworn
statement, he said that he together with his cohorts was met by petitioners in Silahis Hotel
where they hatched the plan to abduct Van Twest. 36 However, during the preliminary
investigation, he stated that he was not part of the actual meeting as he only waited outside in
the car for his companions who supposedly discussed the plan inside Silahis Hotel. 37
Umbal also said that petitioners arrived with Bato and conducted a mock interrogation of Van
Twest who thereafter signed various documents upon being compelled to do so. 38 During the
clarificatory questioning, however, Umbal changed his story and said that he was asked to go
outside of the "safe house" at the time Van Twest was interrogated and thus did not see if Van
Twest indeed signed certain documents. Why Umbal had to be sent out of the "safe house,"
no explanation was offered. Did these documents really exist? Or could the
non-existence of these documents be the reason why PACC was not able to comply with the
order of the prosecutors to produce them during the preliminary investigation? And then, what
happened to the P2.5M that was supposedly offered by petitioners in exchange for the abduction
of Van Twest? These and more remain unanswered.
Most perplexing however is that while the whole investigation was supposedly triggered off by
Umbal's confession of 16 September 1993, the application of the PACC operatives for a search
warrant
to
be
served
in
the
two (2) dwellings of Santiago was filed and granted by the Regional Trial Court of Manila on 15
September 1993, a day before Umbal executed his sworn statement. In support of the
application, the PACC agents claimed that Umbal had been in their custody since 10 September
1993. Significantly, although he was said to be already under their custody, Umbal claims he
72
was never interrogated until 16 September 1993 and only at the security barracks of Valle Verde
V, Pasig, where he was a security guard. 39
The alleged counter-affidavit of SPO2 Bato, which the panel of prosecutors also considered in
filing the charges against petitioners, can hardly be credited as its probative value has
tremendously waned. The records show that the alleged counter-affidavit, which is selfincriminating, was filed after the panel had considered the case submitted for resolution. And
before petitioners could refute this counter-affidavit, Bato moved to suppress the same on the
ground that it was extracted through duress and intimidation.
warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender
should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries be conducted in the course of one
and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about their objectives. The
determination of probable cause for the warrant is made by the judge. The preliminary
investigation
proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the
offense charged and therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and
embarrassment of trial is a function of the prosecutor.
In Lim v. Felix, 43 where we reiterated Soliven v. Makasiar and People v. Inting, we said
For sure, the credibility of Umbal is badly battered. Certainly, his bare allegations, even if the
State invokes its inherent right to prosecute, are insufficient to justify sending two lawyers to jail,
or anybody for that matter. More importantly, the PACC operatives who applied for a warrant to
search the dwellings of Santiago never implicated petitioners. In fact they claimed that according
to Umbal, it was Santiago, and not petitioners, who masterminded the whole affair. 40 While there
may
be
bits
of
evidence
against
petitioners'
co-accused, i.e., referring to those seized from the dwellings of Santiago, these do not in the
least prove petitioners' complicity in the crime charged. Based on the evidence thus far
submitted there is nothing indeed, much less is there probable cause, to incriminate petitioners.
For them to stand trial and be deprived in the meantime of their liberty, however brief, the law
appropriately exacts much more to sustain a warrant for their arrest facts and circumstances
strong enough in themselves to support the belief that they are guilty of a crime that in fact
happened. Quite obviously, this has not been met.
Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant for the arrest
of petitioners it appearing that he did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the
complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead, he merely relied
on the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed. For, otherwise, he would
have found out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest
of petitioners. In this regard, we restate the procedure we outlined in various cases we have
already decided.
In Soliven v. Makasiar, 41 we said that the judge (a) shall personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on
the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or, (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on the existence of probable cause.
In People v. Inting, 42 we emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a)
The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or
prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The
preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in
making the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the
prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor's certification of probable cause is
ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if any), and all
other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting
the judge in his determination of probable cause; and, (c) Judges and prosecutors alike should
distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a
[T]he Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a
commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a
report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscal's bare certification.
All these should be before the Judge.
The extent of the Judge's personal examination of the report and its
annexes depends on the circumstances of each case. We cannot determine
beforehand how cursory or exhaustive the Judge's examination should be.
The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal
determination is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or
as detailed as the circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the judge
must go beyond the Prosecutor's certification and investigation report
whenever necessary. He should call for the complainant and witnesses
themselves to answer the court's probing questions when the circumstances
of the case so require.
Clearly, probable cause may not be established simply by showing that a trial judge subjectively
believes that he has good grounds for his action. Good faith is not enough. If subjective good
faith alone were the test, the constitutional protection would be demeaned and the people would
be "secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects" only in the fallible discretion of the
judge. 44 On the contrary, the probable cause test is an objective one, for in order that there be
probable cause the facts and circumstances must be such as would warrant a belief by a
reasonably discreet and prudent man that the accused is guilty of the crime which has just been
committed. 45 This, as we said, is the standard. Hence, if upon the filing of the information in
court the trial judge, after reviewing the information and the documents attached thereto, finds
that no probable cause exists must either call for the complainant and the witnesses themselves
or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose
him to an open and public accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists.
But then, it appears in the instant case that the prosecutors have similarly misappropriated, if not
abused, their discretion. If they really believed that petitioners were probably guilty, they should
have armed themselves with facts and circumstances in support of that belief; for mere belief is
not enough. They should have presented sufficient and credible evidence to demonstrate the
existence of probable cause. For the prosecuting officer "is the representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution
73
is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or
innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor indeed, he should do so. But,
while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one" 46
In the case at bench, the undue haste in the filing of the information and the inordinate interest
of the government cannot be ignored. From the gathering of evidence until the termination of the
preliminary investigation, it appears that the state prosecutors were overly eager to file the case
and secure a warrant for the arrest of the accused without bail and their consequent detention.
Umbal's sworn statement is laden with inconsistencies and improbabilities. Bato's counteraffidavit was considered without giving petitioners the opportunity to refute the same. The PACC
which gathered the evidence appears to have had a hand in the determination of probable
cause in the preliminary inquiry as the undated resolution of the panel not only bears the
letterhead of PACC but was also recommended for approval by the head of the PACC Task
Force. Then petitioners were given the runaround in securing a copy of the resolution and the
information against them.
Indeed, the task of ridding society of criminals and misfits and sending them to jail in the hope
that they will in the future reform and be productive members of the community rests both on the
judiciousness of judges and the prudence of prosecutors. And, whether it is a preliminary
investigation by the prosecutor, which ascertains if the respondent should be held for trial, or a
preliminary inquiry by the trial judge which determines if an arrest warrant should issue, the
bottomline is that there is a standard in the determination of the existence of probable cause,
i.e., there should be facts and circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a
prudent and cautious man to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime with which he is
charged. Judges and prosecutors are not off on a frolic of their own, but rather engaged in a
delicate legal duty defined by law and jurisprudence.
In this instance, Salonga v. Pao 47 finds application
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against
hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him from an
open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety
of a public trial, and also to protect the state from useless and expensive
trial (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241, citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil.
216). The right to a preliminary investigation is a statutory grant, and to
withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process (People v.
Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277). However, in order to satisfy the due process
clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the
sense of making sure that the transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A
preliminary investigation serves not only for the purposes of the State. More
importantly, it is a part of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are
birthrights of all who live in the country. It is therefore imperative upon the
fiscal or the judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain
of going thru a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient to
sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a

sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused (emphasis supplied).
The facts of this case are fatefully distressing as they showcase the seeming immensity of
government power which when unchecked becomes tyrannical and oppressive. Hence the
Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, defines the limits beyond which lie unsanctioned state
actions. But on occasion, for one reason or another, the State transcends this parameter. In
consequence, individual liberty unnecessarily suffers. The case before us, if uncurbed, can be
illustrative of a dismal trend. Needless injury of the sort inflicted by government agents is not
reflective of responsible government. Judges and law enforcers are not, by reason of their high
and prestigious office, relieved of the common obligation to avoid deliberately inflicting
unnecessary injury.
The sovereign power has the inherent right to protect itself and its people from vicious acts
which endanger the proper administration of justice; hence, the State has every right to
prosecute and punish violators of the law. This is essential for its self- preservation, nay, its very
existence. But this does not confer a license for pointless assaults on its citizens. The right of the
State to prosecute is not a carte blanche for government agents to defy and disregard the rights
of its citizens under the Constitution. Confinement, regardless of duration, is too high a price to
pay for reckless and impulsive prosecution. Hence, even if we apply in this case the "multifactor
balancing test" which requires the officer to weigh the manner and intensity of the interference
on the right of the people, the gravity of the crime committed and the circumstances attending
the incident, still we cannot see probable cause to order the detention of petitioners. 48
The purpose of the Bill of Rights is to protect the people against arbitrary and discriminatory use
of political power. This bundle of rights guarantees the preservation of our natural rights which
include personal liberty and security against invasion by the government or any of its branches
or instrumentalities. Certainly, in the hierarchy of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence over
the right of the State to prosecute, and when weighed against each other, the scales of justice tilt
towards the former. Thus, relief may be availed of to stop the purported enforcement of criminal
law where it is necessary to provide for an orderly administration of justice, to prevent the use of
the strong arm of the law in an oppressive and vindictive manner, and to afford adequate
protection to constitutional rights. 49
Perhaps, this case would not have reached this Court if petitioners were ordinary people
submissive to the dictates of government. They would have been illegally arrested and detained
without bail. Then we would not have the opportunity to rectify the injustice. Fortunately, the
victims of injustice are lawyers who are vigilant of their rights, who fight for their liberty and
freedom not otherwise available to those who cower in fear and subjection.
Let this then be a constant reminder to judges, prosecutors and other government agents tasked
with the enforcement of the law that in the performance of their duties they must act with
circumspection, lest their thoughtless ways, methods and practices cause a disservice to their
office and maim their countrymen they are sworn to serve and protect. We thus caution
government agents, particularly the law enforcers, to be more prudent in the prosecution of
cases and not to be oblivious of human rights protected by the fundamental law. While we
greatly applaud their determined efforts to weed society of felons, let not their impetuous
74
eagerness violate constitutional precepts which circumscribe the structure of a civilized

community.
G.R. No. 180109
July 26, 2010
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining
order we issued on 28 February 1994 in favor of petitioners, Atty. Diosdado Jose Allado and Atty.
Roberto L. Mendoza, is made permanent. The warrant of arrest issued against them is SET
ASIDE and respondent Judge Roberto C. Diokno is ENJOINED from proceeding any further
against herein petitioners in Crim. Case No. 94-1757 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
JOSEPH "JOJO" V. GREY, FRANCIS B. GREY, and COURT OF APPEALS-CEBU CITY,
EIGHTEENTH DIVISION, Respondents.
SO ORDED.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the People
of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeking the nullification of
the Court of Appeals (CA) (Cebu City-Eighteenth Division) Resolution 1 dated March 13, 2007,
Decision2 dated May 8, 2007, and Resolution3 dated October 8, 2007, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02558,
entitled "Mayor Joseph Jojo V. Grey and Francis B. Grey v. Hon. Roberto A. Navidad, Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City, Branch 32, and the People of the
Philippines."
On December 11, 2006, an Information for Murder was filed against respondent Joseph Grey,
former Mayor of San Jorge, Samar; his son, respondent Francis Grey; and two others for the
death of Rolando Diocton, an employee of the San Jorge municipal government, before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 41, Gandara, Samar. The Information was accompanied by
other supporting documents and a motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest.4
Respondents filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice. Meanwhile, RTC Branch 41
Presiding Judge Rosario Bandal denied the motion for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Judge
Bandal found the prosecutions evidence to be insufficient to link respondents to the crime
charged. She directed the prosecution to present, within five days, additional evidence that
would show that accused were the assailants or that they conspired, confederated, or helped in
the commission of the crime charged.5
The prosecution then filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and a motion for the
inhibition of Judge Bandal.6 The judge inhibited herself but denied the motion for
reconsideration.7
Thereafter, the provincial prosecutor filed a petition for change of venue before this Court,
attaching thereto a letter from the victims wife expressing fear for her life and that of the other
witnesses.8
The Secretary of Justice, in a Resolution dated January 4, 2007, dismissed the petition for
review and respondents counter charge of perjury. He found no error to warrant the modification
or reversal of the prosecutors resolution. The Secretary of Justice ruled that the evidence
75
adduced against respondents was sufficient to establish probable cause for the offense charged.
Respondents motion for reconsideration was denied on January 30, 2007.9
Subsequently, the prosecution withdrew their motion for change of venue before this Court,
citing financial difficulties in bringing witnesses to Manila. 10 Respondents opposed the motion
and prayed that all proceedings be suspended until after the May 14, 2007 elections.11
However, on February 19, 2007, respondents filed their own petition for change of venue before
this Court, alleging that the presiding judge who took over the case, Judge Roberto Navidad,
was a pawn in the political persecution being staged against them. 12 In its August 22, 2007
Resolution, this Court denied the petition for lack of merit and directed Judge Navidad to hear
the case with dispatch.13
Accordingly, Judge Navidad proceeded with the preliminary inquiry on the existence of probable
cause, and, in an Order dated February 20, 2007, ruled that the finding of probable cause was
supported by the evidence on record. He then issued warrants of arrest against respondents
and all but one of their co-accused.14
Respondents filed a Petition 15 for Certiorari and Prohibition before the CA, alleging that Judge
Navidad gravely abused his discretion in issuing the February 20, 2007 Order, and seeking a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary injunction. They alleged that the
filing of the murder charges against them on the basis of perjured statements coming from their
political opponents supporters "smacks of political harassment at its foulest
form."16 Respondents pointed out that the criminal complaint was filed barely two months after
Joseph Grey declared his intentions to challenge incumbent Congressman Reynaldo S. Uy, a
former ally, in the May 2007 congressional elections. Likewise, respondents claimed that one of
the witnesses, Urien Moloboco, who executed an affidavit before the Provincial Prosecutor, was
the subject of an Alias Warrant of Arrest for murder issued by the RTC of Gandara, Samar on
June 26, 2006, and, hence, was a fugitive from the law at the time of the filing of the criminal
complaint against respondents. Respondents maintain that the fact that Moloboco was not
arrested when he executed his affidavit before the prosecutor, spoke of the power and clout of
the witness protectors.17
The CA Eighteenth Division issued a TRO on March 13, 2007. 18 After oral arguments, the CA
issued a Decision19dated May 8, 2007, making the TRO permanent, ordering that warrants of
arrest be set aside, and dismissing the criminal case without prejudice.
The CA held that Judge Navidad failed to abide by the constitutional mandate for him to
personally determine the existence of probable cause. 20 According to the CA, nowhere in the
assailed Order did Judge Navidad state his personal assessment of the evidence before him
and the personal justification for his finding of probable cause. It found that the judge extensively
quoted from the Joint Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor and the Resolution of the
Secretary of Justice, and then adopted these to conclude that there was sufficient evidence to
support the finding of probable cause. The CA held that the Constitution commands the judge to
personally determine the existence of probable cause before issuing warrants of arrest. 21
Moreover, the CA also ruled that the Information was not supported by the allegations in the
submitted affidavits.22 It pointed out that the Information charged respondents as principals by
direct participation, but the complaint-affidavit and supporting affidavits uniformly alleged that
respondents were not at the scene of the shooting. 23 The CA further found that the allegations in
the complaint-affidavit and supporting affidavits were insufficient to establish probable cause. It
said that there was nothing in the affidavits to show acts that would support the prosecutions
theory that respondents were also charged as principals by conspiracy.24
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the CAs May 8, 2007 Decision was denied in a
Resolution dated October 8, 2007.25 Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner argues that respondents committed forum shopping, which would warrant the outright
dismissal of their petition below. Petitioner alleges that respondents petition for change of venue
before this Court and their petition for prohibition before the CA actually involve the same subject
matter, parties, and issues that of enjoining Judge Navidad from proceeding with the trial of the
criminal case against them.26 Moreover, these two proceedings have resulted in conflicting
decisions, with this Court resolving to proceed with the case and with the CA enjoining the
same.27
Petitioner also argues against the CAs ruling that Judge Navidad failed to personally determine
the existence of probable cause. It said that although the judge adopted the findings of the
prosecutors as to the sufficiency of evidence constituting probable cause, the language of the
Order clearly reflects that the judge himself personally examined the records and found that
there was probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. 28Moreover, the judge was
correct in finding probable cause based on the sworn statements of the witnesses submitted to
the court.29 Petitioner avers that the CA disregarded the fact that the Information alleged
conspiracy.30 In any case, petitioner asserts that a perceived defect in the Information is not
jurisdictional as the same may be amended anytime before arraignment or with leave of court
after arraignment.31
Petitioner also claims that respondents had not shown any clear and unmistakable right to the
relief they sought. It said that there are more than enough plain, speedy, and adequate remedies
available to respondents. Their constitutional rights are amply protected in the enforcement of
the warrants of arrest. They can likewise apply for bail or move to quash the allegedly defective
Information.32
Petitioner also argues that this Court has laid down the rule that criminal prosecution cannot be
enjoined, and any exception to this rule must be convincingly established. 33 On the other hand,
the comparative injury to the People in permanently enjoining a criminal case is beyond any of
respondents speculative claim of injury.
Thus, petitioner is praying that the CAs May 8, 2007 Decision and October 8, 2007 Resolution
be reversed and set aside, and the writ of injunction be dissolved.34
In their Comment, respondents assert that the trial court issued its February 20, 2007 Order in
gross violation of the Constitution and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter. 35 Respondents
claim that the trial courts violation is evident in the "indecent haste" with which it issued the
76
Order and Warrants of Arrest, and in its own admission in the Order itself. 36 Respondents also
maintain that the trial court acted whimsically, capriciously, and with grave abuse of discretion
when it concluded that there was probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against
respondents.37 Respondents likewise assert that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion when it reversed the finding of Judge Bandal, who first heard the case.38
The petition is impressed with merit.
Initially, we decide the issue of forum shopping raised by petitioner.
Petitioner maintains that respondents committed forum shopping when it filed a petition for
change of venue before this Court and a petition for prohibition before the CA.
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or order has been
rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly getting a favorable opinion in another forum,
other than by appeal or special civil action for certiorari. It may also involve the institution of two
or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the
other court would make a favorable disposition.39
Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis pendentia are present, and where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other. The elements of forum shopping
are: (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same interest in both
actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same
facts; and (c) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the
other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action
under consideration.40
The elements of res judicita are: (a) the former judgment must be final; (b) the court which
rendered judgment had jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter; (c) it must be a
judgment on the merits; and (d) there must be, between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, subject matter, and cause of action.41
A reexamination of the two actions in this case, in light of the foregoing jurisprudence, is in order.
In the petition for change of venue filed on February 19, 2007, respondents prayed for the
transfer of the criminal case to any court in Metro Manila, 42 alleging that the prosecution was
politically motivated and designed to hamper the plan of respondent Joseph Grey to run for a
congressional seat in the May 2007 elections. 43 They contended that "it would be extremely
pernicious to the interest of justice if trial of this case and (of) the other two cases are held in
Samar, especially in the City of Calbayog, where the said (Congressman) Reynaldo Uy is a
resident and absolutely wields power."44 They also asked the Court to hold the proceedings in
abeyance until after the May 14, 2007 elections.
In its August 22, 2007 Resolution, the Court denied the petition for transfer of venue for lack of
merit. It also directed Judge Navidad to hear the case with dispatch.45
On March 5, 2007, while their petition for change of venue was pending before this Court,
respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. They prayed, first, for the issuance of a
TRO and/or a writ of preliminary injunction to prohibit Judge Navidad from proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 4916 and from causing the implementation of the warrants of arrest against
respondents; and second, for the Court to set aside Judge Navidads February 20, 2007 Order
and the corresponding warrants he issued. 46 The TRO was granted on March 13, 2007, and the
CA Decision making the same injunction permanent and setting aside the warrants of arrest was
promulgated on May 8, 2007, a few days before the May 14, 2007 elections.
The CA correctly ruled that respondents were not guilty of forum shopping when they filed the
two actions. Respondents raised different issues and sought different reliefs in the two actions,
although both were grounded on the same set of facts.
The issue in the petition for change of venue is whether the trial of the case was to be moved to
another court in light of respondents allegations that the same was being used as a tool for their
political persecution. On the other hand, the issue in the petition for certiorari before the CA was
whether Judge Navidad gravely abused his discretion in issuing the February 20, 2007 Order
and the warrants for respondents arrest.
Thus, this Courts Resolution would not have amounted to res judicata that would bar the petition
for certiorari before the CA.
We now resolve the substantive issues.
Respondents, in their petition before the CA, questioned the alleged lack of personal
determination of probable cause by Judge Navidad in issuing the warrants for their arrest.
Judge Navidads Order reads:
In this separate, independent constitutionally-mandated Inquiry conducted for the purpose of
determining the sufficiency of the evidence constituting probable cause to justify the issuance of
a Warrant of Arrest, the Court perforce, made a very careful and meticulous and (sic) review not
only of the records but also the evidence adduced by the prosecution, particularly the sworn
statements/affidavits of Mario Abella, Uriendo Moloboco and Edgar Pellina. 47
The language of the Order clearly shows that the judge made his own personal determination of
the existence of probable cause by examining not only the prosecutors report but also his
supporting evidence, consisting mainly of the sworn statements of the prosecutions witnesses.
It is well to remember that there is a distinction between the preliminary inquiry which
determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest and the preliminary
investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or be
released. The determination of probable cause for purposes of issuing the warrant of arrest is
made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable
ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged is the function of the
investigating prosecutor.48
77
The duty of the judge to determine probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest is mandated by
Article III, Section 2 of the Philippine Constitution:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to
be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched and the persons or things to be seized.
In Soliven v. Makasiar,49 the Court explained that this constitutional provision does not
mandatorily require the judge to personally examine the complainant and her witnesses.
Instead, he may opt to personally evaluate the report and supporting documents submitted by
the prosecutor or he may disregard the prosecutors report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses. Thus, in Soliven, we said:
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence
of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall: (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal
regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion
as to the existence of probable cause.
A perusal of the assailed Order bears out this fact.

It was only through a review of the proceedings before the prosecutor that could have led Judge
Navidad to determine that "the accused were given the widest latitude and ample opportunity to
challenge the charge of Murder which resulted, among others, (in) a filing of a counter-charge of
Perjury."54 Likewise, his personal determination revealed no improper motive on the part of the
prosecution and no circumstance which would overwhelm the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official functions.55 Thus, he concluded that the previous Order, denying the
motion for the issuance of warrants of arrest, was not correct.56
These statements sufficiently establish the fact that Judge Navidad complied with the
constitutional mandate for personal determination of probable cause before issuing the warrants
of arrest.
The CA likewise overlooked a fundamental rule we follow in this jurisdiction. It is an established
doctrine that injunction will not lie to enjoin a criminal prosecution because public interest
requires that criminal acts be immediately investigated and prosecuted for the protection of
society.57
However, it is also true that various decisions of this Court have laid down exceptions to this
rule, among which are:
a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez
v. Albano, et al., L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would by unduly laden with the
preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on
hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts.50
b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or

multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. v. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez v.
Albano, supra; Fortun v. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);
What the law requires as personal determination on the part of a judge is that he should not
rely solely on the report of the investigating prosecutor.51 This means that the judge should
consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the affidavit and the
documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of the accused and his witnesses, as
well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the preliminary investigation, if any,
submitted to the court by the investigating prosecutor upon the filing of the Information.52
c. When there is a pre-judicial question which is sub[-]judice (De Leon v. Mabanag, 70

Phil. 202);
The Court has also ruled that the personal examination of the complainant and his witnesses is
not mandatory and indispensable in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. The necessity arises only when there is an utter failure of the evidence to show
the existence of probable cause.53 Otherwise, the judge may rely on the report of the
investigating prosecutor, provided that he likewise evaluates the documentary evidence in
support thereof.
Contrary to respondents claim, Judge Navidad did not gravely abuse his discretion in issuing
the same.
d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas v. Gil, 67
Phil. 62);
e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young v.
Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);
f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang v. People and Avendia, 109
Phil. 1140);
g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez v. City Judge, L-25795,
October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);
h. Where there is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia v. Ocampo,
CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);
78
i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance
(Recto v. Castelo, 18 L.J. [1953], cited in Raoa v. Alvendia, CA-G.R. No. 30720-R,
October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al. v. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA
577); x x x
j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to
quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga v. Pao, et al., L-59524, February 18,
1985, 134 SCRA 438)[; and]
[k.] Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the
threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez v. Castelo, L-6374, August 1,
1953).58
Respondents insisted that political persecution by their political rivals was the underlying reason
for the filing of criminal charges against them, and used this as basis for asking the appellate
court to stop the proceedings in the trial court.
Indeed, this Court has recognized that, in certain instances, political persecution or political
motives may have impelled the filing of criminal charges against certain political rivals. But this
Court has also ruled that any allegation that the filing of the charges is politically motivated
cannot justify the prohibition of a criminal prosecution if there is otherwise evidence to support
the charges.59
Needless to say, a full-blown trial is to be preferred to ferret out the truth. 63 If, as respondents
claim, there is no evidence of their culpability, then their petition for bail would easily be granted.
Thereafter, the credibility of the prosecutions and the accuseds respective evidence may be
tested during the trial. It is only then that the guilt or innocence of respondents will be
determined. Whether the criminal prosecution was merely a tool for harassment or whether the
prosecutions evidence can pass the strict standards set by the law and withstand the exacting
scrutiny of the court will all be resolved at the trial of the case.
The criminal Information in this case was filed four years ago and trial has yet to begin. The
victims kin, indeed, all the parties, are awaiting its resolution. Any further delay will amount to an
injustice.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 8,
2007 and Resolution dated October 8, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 02558 are hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and the Permanent Injunction is hereby DISSOLVED. The Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City, Samar, dated February 20, 2007, is hereby REINSTATED.
The Regional Trial Court of Calbayog City, Samar, is DIRECTED to proceed with hearing, and to
decide Criminal Case No. 4916 with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
In this case, the judge, upon his personal examination of the complaint and evidence before him,
determined that there was probable cause to issue the warrants of arrest after the provincial
prosecution, based on the affidavits presented by complainant and her witnesses, found
probable cause to file the criminal Information. This finding of the Provincial Prosecutor was
affirmed by the Secretary of Justice.
To establish political harassment, respondents must prove that the public prosecutor, not just the
private complainant, acted in bad faith in prosecuting the case or has lent himself to a scheme
that could have no other purpose than to place respondents in contempt and disrepute. 60 It must
be shown that the complainant possesses the power and the influence to control the prosecution
of cases.61
Likewise, the allegation that the filing of the complaint was politically motivated does not serve to
justify the nullification of the informations where the existence of such motive has not been
sufficiently established nor substantial evidence presented in support thereof.621avvphi1
Other than their own self-serving claims, respondents have adduced absolutely no proof of the
perceived political persecution being waged by their rivals. Respondents have not shown any
evidence of such a grand design. They have not alleged, much less proved, any ill motive or
malice that could have impelled the provincial prosecutor, the judge, and even the Secretary of
Justice to have respectively ruled in the way each of them did. In short, respondents are holding
tenuously only on the hope that this Court will take them at their word and grant the relief they
pray for. This Court, however, cannot anchor its ruling on mere allegations.
79
Assailed before this Court is the August 1, 1997 decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA GR. No.
42318 which affirmed the March 24, 1995 and June 14, 1996 orders 2 of the lower court granting
accused-respondent's Motion for Bail and denying petitioner People's Motions "to Recall and
Invalidate Order of March 24, 1995" and "to Recall and/or Reconsider the Order of May 5, 1995"
confirming the hospitalization of accused-respondent.
Accused-respondent Roderick Odiamar was charged with rape upon the complaint of Cecille
Buenafe. In a bid to secure temporary liberty, accused- respondent filed a motion praying that he
be released on bail which petitioner by presenting real, documentary and testimonial evidence.
The lower court, however, granted the motion for bail in an order, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the evidence not being strong at the (sic) stage of the trial,
this court is constrained to grant bail for the provisional liberty of the
accused Roderick Odiamar in the amount of P30,000.00. (Emphasis
supplied)
Believing that accused-respondent was not entitled to bail as the evidence against him was
strong, the prosecution filed the two abovementioned motions which the lower court disposed of,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the motions dated 10 May 1995 and 15 May 1995 both filed
by Atty. Romulo Tolentino, State Prosecutor, are hereby denied, for lack of
merit.
The above-cited orders prompted petitioner to file a petition before the Court of Appeals with
prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals denied
the petition reasoning thus:
G.R. No. 131909 February 18, 1999

PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALFREDO CABRAL, Presiding Judge, RTC, Branch 30, Camarines Sur and
RODERICK ODIAMAR,respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
We have examined in close and painstaking detail the records of this case,
and find that the claim of the People that the respondent judge had overstepped the exercise of his jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders, is
unimpressed with merit. We are not inclined to declare that there was grave
abuse in respondent court's exercise of its discretion in allowing accused to
obtain bail. There is grave abuse of discretion where the power is exercised
in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or
personal hostility amounting to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
We do not find this to be so in this case. Our ruling is based not only on the
respect to be accorded the findings of facts of the trial court, which had the
advantage (not available to Us) of having observed first-hand the quality of
the autoptic preference and the documentary exhibits of the parties, as well
as the demeanor of the witnesses on the stand, but is grounded on the
liberal slant given by the law in favor of the accused. Differently stated, in
the absence of clear, potent and compelling reasons, We are not prepared
to supplant the exercise of the respondent court's discretion with that of Our
own.
80
Still convinced by the merit of its case, petitioner filed the instant petition submitting the following
sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE
ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION DESPITE A SHOWING BY THE PROSECUTION
THAT THERE IS STRONG EVIDENCE PROVING RESPONDENT'S GUILT FOR THE CRIME
CHARGED.
The above-submitted issue pertains to the orders of the lower court granting used-respondent's
application for bail which it justified through its summary of the evidence presented during the
hearing. Said order states, thus:
Now going over the evidence adduced in conjunction with the petition for
bail filed by the accused through counsel, the court believes that the
evidence so far presented by the prosecution is not strong. This is so
because the crime of rape is not to be presumed; consent and not physical
force is the common origin of acts between man and woman. Strong
evidence and indication of great weight alone support such presumption. It
is the teaching of applicable doctrines that form the defense in rape
prosecution. In the final analysis, it is entitled to prevail, not necessarily
because the untarnished truth is on its side but merely because it can raise
reasonable, not fanciful doubts. It has the right to require the complainant
(sic) strong evidence and an indication of great weight (People v. Godoy,
G.R. No. L-31177, July 15, 1976), and in the instant case, the reasonable
doubt is on the evidence of the prosecution, more so, because the intrinsic
nature of the crime, the conviction or the acquittal of the accused depends
almost entirely on the credibility of the complainant (People v. Oliquino, G.R.
No. 94703, May 31, 1993). Rightly so, because in the commission of the
offense of rape the facts and circumstances occuring either prior, during and
subsequent thereto may provide conclusion whether they may negate the
commission thereof by the accused (People v. Flores, L-6065, October 26,
1986). If they negate, they do presuppose that the evidence for the
prosecution is not strong. More so, because in the instant case, the facts
and circumstances showing that they do seem to negate the commission
thereof were mostly brought out during the cross-examination. As such, they
deserve full faith and credence because the purpose thereof is to test
accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest and bias or the reverse
(Rule 132, Sec. 6, Revised Rules of Evidence). The facts and
circumstances brought up are as follow, to wit:
a) That, when the offended party Cecille Buenafe rode
in the jeepney then driven by the accused Roderick
Odiamar in that evening of July 20, 1994 at about 8:00
o'clock from the Poblacion, Lagonoy, Camarines Sur
the former knew that it was for a joy ride. In fact, she
did not even offer any protest when the said jeepney
proceeded to the Pilapil Beach resort at Telegrafo, San
Jose, Camarines Sur instead of Sabang, same

municipality, where she and Stephen Florece intended
to go. And when the said jeepney was already inside
that resort, Cecille even followed the accused in going
down from the jeepney also without protest on her part,
a fact which shows voluntariness on the part of the
offended party and, therefore, to the mind of the court
her claim of rape should not be received with precipitate
credulity. On the contrary, an insight into the human
nature is necessary (People v. Barbo, 56 SCRA 495).
And it is only when the testimony is impeccable and
rings true throughout where it shall be believed (People
v. Tapao, G.R. No. L-41704, October 23, 1981). Rightly
so, because the aphorism that evidence to be believed
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness but it must be credible in itself in conformity
with the common experience and observation of
mankind is nowhere of moral relevance than in cases
involving prosecution of rape (People v. Macatangay,
107 Phil. 188);
b) That, in that resort, when the accused Roderick
Odiamar and companions allegedly forced the offended
party Cecille Buenafe to drink gin, the latter, at first,
refused and even did not swallow it but later on
voluntarily took four (4) shots there shows that there
(was) no force. And as regards the claim that the
accused Roderick Odiamar and companions allegedly
forced the said offended party to inhale smoke, out of a
small cigarette, presumably a marijuana, it becomes
doubtful because the prosecution, however, failed to
present any portion of that so-called small cigarette
much less did it present an expert witness to show that
inhaling of smoke from the said cigarette would cause
dizziness. Rightly so, because administration of
narcotics is covered by Art. 335, par. 2 Revised Penal
Code (People v. Giduces C.A. 38 O.C. 1434 cited in the
Revised Penal Code, Aquino, Vol.III, pp. 392). As such,
the burden of proof rests with the prosecution but it
failed to do so;
c) That, in that cottage where the accused, Roderick
Odiamar allegedly brought the offended party, Cecille
Buenafe, the former was able to consummate the
alleged offense of rape by removing the two (2) hands
of the offended party, placed them on her knee,
separating them thereby freeing the said hand and
consequently pushed the head of the accused but the
latter was able to insert his penis when the said
81
offended party was no longer moving and the latter

became tired. Neither evidence has been presented to
show that the offended party suffered an injury much
less any part of her pants or blouse was torn nor
evidence to show that there was an overpowering and
overbearing moral influence of the accused towards the
offended party (People v. Mabunga, G.R. No. 96441d,
March 13, 1992) more so, because force and violence
in the offense of rape are relative terms, depending on
the age, size and strength of the parties and their
relation to each other (People v. Erogo, 102077
January 4, 1994);
d) That, after the alleged commission of rape at about
3:00 o'clock in the early morning of July 21, 1994, the
offended party, Cecille, Stephen Florece and the latter's
companions all boarded the same jeepney going back
to the Poblacion of Lagonoy, without the said offended
party, protesting, crying or in any way showing sign of
grief regarding the alleged commission of the offense of
rape until the jeepney reached the house of Roderick
Odiamar where the latter parked it. As in other cases,
the testimony of the offended party shall not be
accepted unless her sincerity and candor are free from
suspicion, because the nature of the offense of rape is
an accusation easy to be made, hard to be proved but
harder to be defended by the party accused though
innocent (People v. Francisco G.R. No. L-43789, July
15, 1981). It becomes necessary, therefore, for the
courts to exercise the most painstaking care in
scrutinizing the testimony of the witnesses for the
prosecution (People v. Dayag, L-30619, March 29,
1974);
e) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe had herself
physically examined by Dr. Josephine Decena for
medical certificate dated July 27, 1994 and it states,
among others, that there was a healed laceration on the
hymen, her laceration might have been sustained by
the said offended party, a month, six (6) months, and
even a year, prior to the said examination and that the
said laceration might have been caused by repeated
penetration of a male sex organ probably showing that
the offended party might have experienced sexual
intercourse. This piece of testimony coming from an
expert, such finding is binding to court (Rules of Court,
Moran, op.cit,vol 5, 1963, ed. pp. 413).
f) That the offended party, Cecille Buenafe

accompanied by the Station Commander of Lagonoy,
Camarines Sur, proceeded to Naga City and upon the
suggestion of Gov. Bulaong, the said offended party
submitted for medical treatment before the same
physician per medical certificate dated August 1, 1994
but according to the said physician the lesions near the
umbilicus were due to skin diseases but the said
offended party claim they were made by the accused
after the sexual acts. As such, there were contradictions
on material points, it becomes of doubtful veracity
(People v. Palicte 83 Phil.) and it also destroys the
testimony (People v. Garcia, G.R. No. 13086, March 27,
1961). As to the fact that the said lesion was made by
the accused subsequent to the commission of the act, it
is immaterial. As such, it has no probative value.
The lower court concluded that the evidence of guilt was not strong.
The office of the Solicitor General disagreed with the lower court. It opined that aside from failing
to include some pieces of evidence in the summary, the trial also misapplied some wellestablished doctrines of criminal law. The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out the following
circumstances duly presented in the hearing for bail:
First. There was no ill motive on the part of Cecille to impute the heinous
crime of rape against respondent (People v. Paragsa, 83 SCRA 105 [1978];
People v. Delovino, 247 SCRA 637 [1995]).
Second. Dr. Belmonte, the psychiatrist who attended to Cecille testified that
based on her psychiatric examination of the latter, Cecille manifested
psychotic signs and symptoms such as unusual fear, sleeplessness, suicidal
thoughts, psychomotor retardation, poverty of thought content as well as
depressive signs and symptoms. These abnormal psychological
manifestations, according to Dr. Belmonte, are traceable to the rape incident
(Pages 5-7, TSN, November 22, 1994.)
Third. The unrebutted offer of compromise by respondent is an implied
admission of guilt (People v. Flore, 239 SCRA 83 [1994]).
Fourth. Cecille was threatened by a deadly weapon and rendered
unconscious by intoxication and inhalation of marijuana smoke.
Fifth. The fact that after the conduct of two (2) preliminary investigations,
"no bail was recommended in the information" constitutes "clear and strong
evidence of the guilt of (all) the accused" (Baylon v. Sison, 243 SCRA 284
[1995].
82
Sixth. Cecille categorically testified on re-cross examination (pages 5-7,

Order) that respondent succeeded in forcibly deflowering her because she
was already weak and dizzy due to the effect of the smoke and the gin. Her
declarations remain unrebutted.
Seventh. Cecille categorically testified that she performed acts manifesting
her lament, torment and suffering due to the rape. She went to Stephen
Florece, cried and complained about the incident. Instead of helping her,
Florece threatened to harm her and her family. (Pages 9-13, November 17,
1994). The statements of Cecille are positive statements which, under
existing jurisprudence, are stronger than the denials put forth by respondent
(Batiquin v. Court of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334 [1996]).
Eight. The reliance by trial court on the testimony of Dr. Decena to the effect
that the lacerations suffered by Cecille "might have been sustained by the
latter a month, six (6) months or even a year prior to the examination" (Page
12 (e), Order, March 24, 1995) thus implying that respondent could not have
committed the crime is highly misplaced.
Dr. Decena herself testified that she cannot tell "how old is an old hymenal
laceration" because she cannot indicate when an old laceration was inflicted
and that from the size of the vagina she "could not point the exact cause"
(Pages 7-10, TSN, December 9, 1994). Nevertheless, proof of hymenal
laceration is not indispensable in indictments for rape as a broken hymen is
not an essential element of the crime (People v. Echegaray, 257 SCRA 561
[1996]). Further, in crimes against chastity, the medical examination of the
victim's genitalia is not an indispensable element for the successful
prosecution of the crime. The examination is merely corroborative in nature.
(People v. Arce, 227 SCRA 406 [1993]).
Ninth. With respect to the cigarette wounds, Dr, Decena positively testified
that the wounds could have been '"aused by cigarette butts as alleged by
the victim" (Page 6, TSN, December 9, 1994) which confirms Cecile's
testimony (quoted in the Order at page 9) that respondent burned her "right
side of the stomach" thrice.
The above points are well taken and have impressed upon this Court the merits of the instant
petition.
The 1987 Constitution in Article III, Section 13 of the Bill of Rights provides:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not
be required. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the above exception to the constitutional guarantee on bail and in accordance with its
rule-making powers, 3 the Supreme Court, in promulgating the Rules of Court, adopted the
following provision:
Sec. 7. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable
by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution. 4 (Emphasis suppplied)
In this case, accused-respondent was being charged with rape qualified by the use of a deadly
weapon punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. 5 As such, bail is discreationary and not a
matter of right. The grant or denial of an application for is, therefore, dependent on whether the
evidence of guilt is strong which the lower should determine in a hearing called for the purpose.
The determination of the evidence of guilt is strong, in this regard, is a matter of judicial
discretion. While the lower court would never be deprived of its mandated prerogative to
exercise judicial discretion, this Court would unhesitatingly reverse the trial court's findings if
found to be laced with grave abuse of discretion.
By judicial discretion, the law mandates the determination of whether proof is evident or the
presumption of guilt is strong. 6 "Proof evident" or "Evident proof" in this connection has been
held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded disspositionate judgment to the
conclusion that the offense has been committed as charged, that accused is the guilty agent,
and that he will probably be punished capitally if the law is administered. 7 "Presumption great"
exists when the circumstances testified to are such that the inference of guilt naturally to be
drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convinsing to an unbiased judgment and excludes all
reasonable probability of any other conlusion. 8 Even though there is a reasonable doubt as to
the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire record the presumption is great that
accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be refused. 9 (Emphasis and supplied)
In other words, the test is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond reasonable doubt
but rather whether it shows evident guilt or a great presumption of guilt. As such, the court is
ministerially bound to decide which circumstances and factors are present which would show
evident guilt or presumption of guilt as defined above.10
This Court has observed that the lower court's order failed to mention and include some
significant factors and circumstances which, to the mind of this Court are strong, clear and
convincing. First, it excluded the testimony of Dr. Belmonte about her psychiatric examination of
the victim as well as her findings that the latter manifested "psychotic signs and symptoms such
as unusual fear, sleeplessness, suicidal thoughts, psychomotor retardation, poverty of thought
content as well as depressive signs and symptom." 11 This particular testimony should have
been considered and included in the summary as it was given by an expert witness. Second, the
unrebutted offer of compromise by accused-respondent is an implied admission of guilt which
should have been noted as an offer of a compromise is generally considered as admissible
evidence against the party making it. 12
Aside from failing to mention those important pieces of evidence and testimonies, this Court has
likewise observed that the lower court misappplied some doctrines in criminal law. First, the
lower court, in its order, intoned the following doctrine that "evidence to be believed must not
83
only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself in conformity
with common experience and observation of mankind."
According to the lower court, the credibility of the complainant is suspect because she willingly
went with accused-respondent to the resort where she was allegedly raped. In the scene of the
crime, complainant allegedly voluntarily drank four shots of gin. The complainant, likewise, never
protested nor cried while they on their way to accused-respondent's house. Because of those
findings, the court doubted the credibility of complainant and stated that the crime of rape is not
to be presumed and that sexual acts between a man and a woman are presumed to be
consensual. In overcoming such presumption, much depends on the credibility of the
complainant.
This Court cannot agree. First, there was no finding of any ill-motive on the part of complainant
in filing the rape charge against accused-respondent. This should have been taken into
consideration. The following rebuttal of petitioner to the findings of the lower court is more
credible:
It must also be stressed that Cecille testified that she was forced by
respondent to drink gin with the help of his friends by holding her hair and
putting the glass on her mouth (Pages 5-7, TSN, November 17, 1994).
More, respondent and his friends blew smoke into her face forcing her to
inhale the intoxicating smoke. Whenever she attempted to leave the place,
she was forced to sit down by Odiamar and his friends (Pages 6-7, TSN,
November 17, 1994).
Similarly, Cecille categorically declared that she was threatened by Florece
with a gun (Page 17, TSN, November 17, 1994).
The requirement of force and intimidation in the crime of rape are relative
and must be viewed in light of the victim's perspective and the offender's
physical condition (People v. Plaza, 242 SCRA 724 [1995]). Further,
physical resistance need not be established in rape when intimidation is
exercised upon the victim and the latter submits herself against her will
because of fear for life and personal safety. (People v. Ramos, 245 SCRA
405 [19951)
In this case, Cecille was only fifteen (l5) years old at the time of the incident
in question. At her age, it is reasonable to assume that a shot of gin
rendered her tipsy. Thus, four (4) shots of gin must have rendered her dizzy,
intoxicated and deprived of will or reason. The resulting weakness and
dizziness which deprived Cecille of reason, will and freedom must be
viewed in light of her perception and judgment at the time of the commission
of the crime, and not by any hard and fast rule because in "rape cases,
submission does not necessarily imply volition." (Querido, 229 SCRA 745
[1994])
It must likewise be taken into consideration that when Cecille went with the group of accusedrespondent, she was of the impression that it was just for a joy ride. The conclusion made by the
trial court that Cecille must have consented to the sexual act because she acquiesced to go with
them in the first place is, therefore, bereft of any legal or factual support, if not non sequitur. That
she agreed to accompany them for a joy ride does not mean that she also agreed to the bestial
acts later committed against her person.
Second, the lower court stated that "force and violence in the offense of rape relative terms,
depending on the age, size and strength of the parties and their relation to each other." The
lower court enunciated this doctrine in finding that the alleged rape was actually a consensual
act since the prosecution was unable to show the complainant suffered any injury nor show any
evidence that her pants or blouse was torn. Neither was there any evidence that accusedrespondent exerted overpowering and overbearing moral influence over the offended party.
This Court is of the impression that when the lower court invoked the above doctrine, it readily
concluded that complainant agreed to the sexual act disregarding testimonies lending credence
to complainant's allegation that she was threatened and intimidated as well as rendered weak
and dizzy, not only by the smoke of the marijuana cigarette but also by intoxication, thereby
facilitating the commission of the crime. It was not imperative for the prosecution, in order to
prove the elements of force or intimidation to show that Cecille had broken limbs or that her
blouse or pants were torn. Her testimony to that effect would have sufficed. Nevertheless, the
prosecution still exerted efforts to corroborate Cecille's claim by presenting the physician who
testified that Cecille suffered hymenal lacerations and lesions near the umbilicus area.
Unfortunately, however, the lower court chose to ignore these telling pieces of evidence.
In addition, the lower court doubted complainant's allegation that she was to smoke a small
cigarette, presumably marijuana, due to the fact that "the prosecution failed to present any
portion of that so-called small cigarette much less did it present an expert witness to show that
inhaling of smoke from the said cigarette would cause the said offended party to suffer
weakness and dizziness." Said ratiocination is trifling and unpersuasive. In fact, it is even
misleading as complainant categorically asserted that what made her weak and dizzy were the
smoke of the cigarette and the intoxicating effect of four shots of gin, not the inhalation of the
smoke alone. In any case, complainant could not be expected to produce that "portion of that socalled small cigarette." Moreover, one does not need an expert witness to testify on what is
common knowledge - that four shots of gin have a "weakening and dizzying" effect on the
drinker, especially one as young as the fifteen-year old complainant.
More disturbing than the above misapplication of criminal law doctrines is the lower court's
misinterpretation of the medical findings and deliberate withholding of some testimonies which
would have shown a very strong likelihood that complainant could indeed have been raped. The
following pieces of evidence cited in the summary of the assailed order are indications of
misleading findings:
First, the lower court did not lend any credence to the medical certificate issued after
complainant's physical examination. On the contrary, it interpreted it to mean that the offended
party is already experienced in sexual intercourse, after the examining physician had testified
that the hymenal lacerations might have been sustained a month, six months or even a year
prior to the examination. Interestingly, the lower court failed to mention that Dr. Decena also
84
testified that she cannot tell "how old is an hymenal laceration" because she cannot indicate
when an old laceration was inflicted and that from the size of the vagina she "could not point the
exact cause."
Lending credence to petitioner's case is the fact that after the conduct of two (2) preliminary
investigations, "no bail" was recommended in the information. According to Baylon v.
Sison, 15 such recommendation constitutes clear and strong evidence of guilt of the accused.
This Court views this apparent lapse on the part of the lower court with and agrees with
petitioner, in accordance with well established jurisprudence, that proof of hymenal laceration is
not indispensable in indictments for rape as a broken hymen is not an essential element of the
crime. Further, in against chastity, the medical examination of the victim's genitalia is not an
indispensable element for the successful prosecution of the crime. The examination is merely
corroborative in nature. 13 And contrary to the theory espoused by the lower court, a hymenal
laceration is not conclusive proof that one is experienced in sexual intercourse.
Aside from the apparent abuse of discretion in determining which circumstances and pieces of
evidence are to be considered, the lower court also did not strictly comply with jurisprudential
guidelines in the exercise of discretion. As reiterated in Carpio v. Maglalng, 16 discretion is guided
by: first, the applicable provisions of the Constitution and the statutes; second, by the rules
which this Court may promulgate; and third, by those principles of equity and justice that are
deemed to be part of the laws of the land.
Second, the lower court highlighted the testimony of Dr. Decena to the effect the cigarette burns
indicated that the lesions near complainant's umbilicus were due to skin diseases. Notably,
however, the lower court again failed to mention that Dr. Decena likewise positively testified that
the wounds could have been "caused by cigarette butts as alleged by the victim" which
corroborates Cecille's testimony that respondent burned her "right side of the stomach" thrice.
It is thus indicative from the above observations that the lower court abuse its discretion and
showed manifest bias in favor of accused-respondent in determining which circumstances are to
be considered in supporting its decision as to the guilt of accused-respondent. In this regard, it
must be remembered that the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail, according to
Basco v. Rapatalo 14 "is not absolute nor beyond control. It must be sound, and exercised
reasonable bounds. Judicial discretion, by its very nature, involves the exercise of the judge's
individual opinion. It is because of its very nature that the law has wisely provided that its
exercise be guided by well-know rules which, while allowing the judge rational latitude for the
operation of his own individual views, prevent them from getting out of control. An uncontrolled
or uncontrollable discretion on the part of a judge is a misnomer. It is a fallacy. Lord Mansfield, of
the discretion to be exercised in granting or denying bail said: "But discretion when applied to a
court of justice, means sound discretion guided by law. It must be governed by rule, not by
humour; it must not be arbitrary, vague and; but legal and regular."
The fact that vital prosecution evidence and testimonies have been irregularly disregarded
indicate that they have not been considered at all in arriving at the decision to grant bail. This
irregularity is even more pronounced with the misapplication of the two criminal law doctrines
cited to support the grant of the bail application. This Court cannot help but observe that the
lower court exerted painstaking efforts to show that the evidence of guilt of accused-respondent
is not strong by its non sequitur justifications, misleading or unsupported conclusions, irregular
disregard of vital prosecution evidence and strained interpretation, if not misinterpretation, of
criminal law doctrines.
It is the view of this Court that: (1) the testimony of Dr. Decena confirming complainant's
allegation that accused-respondent burned the right side of her stomach with cigarette butts, (2)
the testimony of Dr. Belmonte stating that complainant exhibited psychological manifestations
which are "traceable to the rape incident'', and (3) the unrebutted offer of compromise, are
indications of the strength of the evidence of guilt of accused-respondent.
The present Constitution, as previously adverted to, provides that in crimes punishable
by reclusion perpetuawhen evidence of guilt is strong, bail is not matter of right. This Court has
reiterated this mandate in Section 7, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court. Recently, this Court laid
down the following rules in Basco v. Judge Rapatalo 17which outlined the duties of a judge in
case an application for bail is filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require
him to submit his recommendation;
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not
the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its
discretion;
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on
the summary of evidence of the prosecution; (Emphasis supplied)
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.
Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the court's order
granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for prosecutions. 18 A summary
is defined as "a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or statement." 19
There are two corollary reasons for the summary: First, the summary of the evidence in the
order is an extension of the hearing proper, thus, a part of procedural due process wherein the
evidence presented during the prior hearing is formally recognized as having been presented
and most importantly, considered. The failure to include every piece of evidence in the summary
presented by the prosecution in their favor during the prior hearing would be tantamount to not
giving them the opportunity to be heard in said hearing, for the inference would be that they
were not considered at all in weighing the evidence of guilt. Such would be a denial of due
process, for due process means not only giving every contending party the opportunity to be
heard but also for the Court to consider every piece of evidence presented in their
favor. 20 Second, the summary of the evidence in the order is the for the basis for the judge's
exercising his judicial discretion. Only after weighing the pieces of evidence as contained in the
85
summary will the judge formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence of guilt against
the accused is strong based on his discretion. 21 (Emphasis supplied)
Based on the above-stated reasons, the summary should necessarily be a complete compilation
or restatement of all the pieces of evidence presented during the hearing proper. The lower court
cannot exercise judicial discretion as to what pieces of evidence should be included in the
summary. While conceding that some prosecution evidence were enumerated, said enumeration
was incomplete. An incomplete enumeration or selective inclusion of pieces of evidence for the
prosecution in the order cannot be considered a summary, for a summary is necessarily a
reasonable recital of any evidence presented by the prosecution. A "summary" that is incomplete
is not a summary at all. According to Borinaga v. Tamin, 22 the absence of a summary in the
order would make said order defective in form and substance. Corollarily, an order containing an
incomplete "summary" would likewise be defective in form and substance which cannot be
sustained or be a semblance of validity. In Carpio v. Maglalang, 23said order was considered
defective and voidable. As such, the order granting or denying the application for bail may be
invalidated. 24
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision dated August 1, 1997 and the resolution
dated December 22, 1997 in CA G.R. No. 42318 are REVERSED and the order dated March 24,
1995 in Criminal Case No. T-1417 is declared void for having been issued in grave abuse of
discretion. The court a quo shall immediately issue a warrant for the rearrest of Roderick
Odiamar if his bail bond has been approved and thereafter, proceed with dispatch in the
disposition of said case. This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
86
87
G.R. No. 115407 August 28, 1995

MIGUEL
P.
PADERANGA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
The adverse decision in this case promulgated by respondent Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 32233 on November 24, 1993, as well as its resolution of April
26, 1994 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof, are challenged by
petitioner Miguel P. Paderanga in this appeal by certiorari through a petition
which raises issues centering mainly on said petitioner's right to be admitted to
bail.
On January 28, 1990, petitioner was belatedly charged in an amended
information as a co-conspirator in the crime of multiple murder in Criminal Case
No. 86-39 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18 of Cagayan de Oro City for the
killing of members of the Bucag family sometime in 1984 in Gingoog City of
which petitioner was the mayor at the time. The original information, filed on
October 6, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Gingoog City, 1 had initially
indicted for multiple murder eight accused suspect, namely, Felipe Galarion,
Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe And
Richard Doe as the alleged conspirators in the indiscriminate slaying of the
spouses Romeo and Juliet Bucag and their son, Romeo, Jr. However, only one of
the accused, Felipe Galarion, was apprehended, tried and eventually convicted.
Galarion later escaped from prison. The others have remained at large up to the
present. 2
In a bizarre twist of events, one Felizardo ("Ely") Roxas was implicated in the
crime. In an amended information dated October 6, 1988, he was charged as a
co-accused therein. As herein petitioner was his former employer and thus knew
him well, Roxas engaged the former's services as counsel in said case. Ironically,
in the course of the preliminary investigation therein, said accused, in a signed
affidavit dated March 30, 1989 but which he later retracted on June 20, 1990,
implicated petitioner as the supposed mastermind behind the massacre of the
Bucag family. 3
Then, upon the inhibition of the City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City from the
case per his resolution of July 7, 1989, the Department of Justice, at the instance
of said prosecutor, designated a replacement, State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Gingoyon, for purposes of both the preliminary investigation and prosecution of
Criminal Case No. 86-39. Pursuant to a resolution of the new prosecutor dated
September 6, 1989, petitioner was finally charged as a co-conspirator in said
criminal case in a second amended information dated October 6, 1992. Petitioner
assailed his inclusion therein as a co-accused all the way to this Court in G.R.
No. 96080 entitled "Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga vs. Hon. Franklin M. Drilon, Hon.
Silvestre H. Bello III, Atty. Henrick F. Gingoyon, Helen B. Canoy and Rebecca B.
Tan." In an en banc decision promulgated on April 19, 1991, the Court sustained
the filing of the second amended information against him. 4
Under this backdrop, the trial of the base was all set to start with the issuance of
an arrest warrant for petitioner's apprehension but, before it could be served on
him, petitioner through counsel, filed on October 28, 1992 a motion for admission
to bail with the trial court which set the same for hearing on November 5, 1992.
Petitioner duly furnished copies of the motion to State Prosecutor Henrick F.
Gingoyon, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, and the private prosecutor,
Atty. Benjamin Guimong. On November 5, 1992, the trial court proceeded to hear
the application for bail. Four of petitioner's counsel appeared in court but only
Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional State Prosecution's Office
appeared for the prosecution.5
As petitioner was then confined at the Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital
due to "acute costochondritis," his counsel manifested that they were submitting
custody over the person of their client to the local chapter president of the
integrated Bar of the Philippines and that, for purposes of said hearing of his bail
application, he considered being in the custody of the law. Prosecutor Abejo, on
the other hand, informed the trial court that in accordance with the directive of the
chief of their office, Regional State prosecutor Jesus Zozobrado, the prosecution
was neither supporting nor opposing the application for bail and that they were
submitting the same to the sound discretion of the trail judge. 6
Upon further inquiries from the trial court, Prosecutor Abejo announced that he
was waiving any further presentation of evidence. On that note and in a
resolution dated November 5, 1992, the trial court admitted petitioner to bail in
the amount of P200,000.00. The following day, November 6, 1992, petitioner,
apparently still weak but well enough to travel by then, managed to personally
appear before the clerk of court of the trial court and posted bail in the amount
thus fixed. He was thereafter arraigned and in the trial that ensued, he also
personally appeared and attended all the scheduled court hearings of the case. 7
The subsequent motion for reconsideration of said resolution filed twenty (20) days later on
November 26, 1992 by Prosecutor Gingoyon who allegedly received his copy of the
petition for admission to bail on the day after the hearing, was denied by the trial court in its
88
omnibus order dated March 29, 1993. On October 1, 1993, or more than six (6) months
later, Prosecutor Gingoyon elevated the matter to respondent Court of Appeals through a
special civil action for certiorari. Thus were the resolution and the order of the trial court
granting bail to petitioner annulled on November 24, 1993, in the decision now under
review, on the ground that they were tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 8
Respondent court observed in its decision that at the time of petitioner's
application for bail, he was not yet "in the custody of the law," apparently because
he filed his motion for admission to bail before he was actually arrested or had
voluntarily surrendered. It further noted that apart from the circumstance that
petitioner was charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua, the
evidence of guilt was strong as borne out by the fact that no bail was
recommended by the prosecution, for which reasons it held that the grant of bail
was doubly improvident. Lastly, the prosecution, according to respondent court,
was not afforded an opportunity to oppose petitioner's application for bail contrary
to the requirements of due process. Hence, this appeal.
Petitioner argues that, in accordance with the ruling of this Court in Santiago
vs. Vasquez etc., et al., 9 his filing of the aforesaid application for bail with the trial
court effectively conferred on the latter jurisdiction over his person. In short, for all
intents and purposes, he was in the custody of the law. In petitioner's words, the
"invocation by the accused of the court's jurisdiction by filing a pleading in court is
sufficient to vest the court with jurisdiction over the person of the accused and
bring him within the custody of the law."
Petitioner goes on to contend that the evidence on record negates the existence
of such strong evidence as would bar his provisional release on bail.
Furthermore, the prosecution, by reason of the waiver by Prosecutor Abejo of
any further presentation of evidence to oppose the application for bail and whose
representation in court in behalf of the prosecution bound the latter, cannot
legally assert any claim to a denial of procedural due process. Finally, petitioner
points out that the special civil action for certiorari was filed in respondent court
after an unjustifiable length of time.
On the undisputed facts , the legal principles applicable and the equities involved
in this case, the Court finds for petitioner.
1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security given for the
release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman,
conditioned upon his appearing before any court as required under the conditions
specified in said Rule. Its main purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the
rigors of imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the
trial. 10 As bail is intended to obtain or secure one's provisional liberty, the same
cannot be posted before custody over him has been acquired by the judicial
authorities, either by his lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. 11 As this Court has
put it in a case "it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free." 12
The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and prevents resort to the
former pernicious practice whereby an accused could just send another in his
stead to post his bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his
personal appearance therein and compliance with the requirements
therefor. 13 Thus, inFeliciano vs. Pasicolan, etc., et al., 14 where the petitioner who
had been charged with kidnapping with murder went into hiding without
surrendering himself, and shortly thereafter filed a motion asking the court to fix
the amount of the bail bond for his release pending trial, the Supreme Court
categorically pronounced that said petitioner was not eligible for admission to
bail.
As a paramount requisite then, only those persons who have either been
arrested, detained, or other wise deprived of their freedom will ever have
occasion to seek the protective mantle extended by the right to bail. The person
seeking his provisional release under the auspices of bail need not even wait for
a formal complaint or information to be filed against him as it is available to "all
persons" 15 where the offense is bailable. The rule is, of course, subject to the
condition or limitation that the applicant is in the custody of the law. 16
On the other hand, a person is considered to be in the custody of the law (a)
when he is arrested either by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued pursuant to
Section 6, Rule 112, or by warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 in
relation to Section 7, Rule 112 of the revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, or (b)
when he has voluntarily submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court by
surrendering to the proper authorities. 17in this light, the ruling, vis-a-vis the facts
in Santiago vs. Vasquez, etc., et al., 18 should be explained.
In said case, the petitioner who was charged before the Sandiganbayan for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, filed through counsel what
purported to be an "Urgent Ex-parte Motion for Acceptance of Cash Bail Bond."
Said petitioner was at the time confined in a hospital recuperating from serious
physical injuries which she sustained in a major vehicular mishap. Consequently,
she expressly sought leave "that she be considered as having placed herself
under the jurisdiction of (the Sandiganbayan) for purposes of the required trial
and other proceedings." On the basis of said ex-partemotion and the peculiar
circumstances obtaining in that incident, the Sandiganbayan authorized petitioner
to post a cash bail bond for her provisional liberty without need of her personal
appearance in view of her physical incapacity and as a matter of humane
consideration.
When the Sandiganbayan later issued a hold departure order against her, she
question the jurisdiction of that court over her person in a recourse before this
Court, on the ground that "she neither been arrested nor has she voluntarily
surrendered, aside from the fact that she has not validly posted bail since she
never personally appeared before said court" In rejecting her arguments, the
Court held that she was clearly estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the
89
Sandiganbayan for by her own representations in the urgentex parte motion for
bail she had earlier recognized such jurisdiction. Furthermore, by actually posting
a cash bail was accepted by the court, she had effectively submitted to its
jurisdiction over her person. Nonetheless, on the matter of bail, the Court took
pains to reiterate that the same cannot be posted before custody of the accused
has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or voluntary
surrender.
In the case of herein petitioner, it may be conceded that he had indeed filed his
motion for admission to bail before he was actually and physically placed under
arrest. He may, however, at that point and in the factual ambience therefore, be
considered as being constructively and legally under custody. Thus in the
likewise peculiar circumstance which attended the filing of his bail application
with the trail court, for purposes of the hearing thereof he should be deemed to
have voluntarily submitted his person to the custody of the law and, necessarily,
to the jurisdiction of the trial court which thereafter granted bail as prayed for. In
fact, an arrest is made either by actual restraint of the arrestee or merely by his
submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. 19 The latter mode
may be exemplified by the so-called "house arrest" or, in case of military
offenders, by being "confined to quarters" or restricted to the military camp area.
It should be stressed herein that petitioner, through his counsel, emphatically
made it known to the prosecution and to the trail court during the hearing for bail
that he could not personally appear as he was then confined at the nearby
Cagayan Capitol College General Hospital for acute costochondritis, and could
not then obtain medical clearance to leave the hospital. The prosecution and the
trial court, notwithstanding their explicit knowledge of the specific whereabouts of
petitioner, never lifted a finger to have the arrest warrant duly served upon him.
Certainly, it would have taken but the slightest effort to place petitioner in the
physical custody of the authorities, since he was then incapacitated and under
medication in a hospital bed just over a kilometer away, by simply ordering his
confinement or placing him under guard.
The undeniable fact is that petitioner was by then in the constructive custody of
the law. Apparently, both the trial court and the prosecutors agreed on that point
since they never attempted to have him physically restrained. Through his
lawyers, he expressly submitted to physical and legal control over his person,
firstly, by filing the application for bail with the trail court; secondly, by furnishing
true information of his actual whereabouts; and, more importantly, by
unequivocally recognizing the jurisdiction of the said court. Moreover, when it
came to his knowledge that a warrant for his arrest had been issued, petitioner
never made any attempt or evinced any intent to evade the clutches of the law or
concealed his whereabouts from the authorities since the day he was charged in
court, up to the submission application for bail, and until the day of the hearing
thereof.
At the hearing, his counsel offered proof of his actual confinement at the hospital
on account of an acute ailment, which facts were not at all contested as they
were easily verifiable. And, as a manifestation of his good faith and of his actual
recognition of the authority of trial court, petitioner's counsel readily informed the
court that they were surrendering custody of petitioner to the president of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Misamis Oriental Chapter. 20 In other words, the
motion for admission to bail was filed not for the purpose or in the manner of the
former practice which the law proscribes for the being derogatory of the authority
and jurisdiction of the courts, as what had happened in Feliciano. There was here
no intent or strategy employed to obtain bail in absentia and thereby be able to
avoid arrest should the application therefore be denied.
2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule that before conviction, all
indictees shall be allowed bail, except only those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance thereof, Section 4
of Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction
by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be
waived considering its personal nature 21 and which, to repeat, arises from the time one is
placed in the custody of the law, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded
every accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at the outset since after
trial he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable
doubt. 22
Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the regional trial court of a criminal
offense, an accused is entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the present
exceptions thereto being the instances where the accused is charged with a capital offense
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment 23and the evidence of
guilt is strong. Under said general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, the
court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant the same after a
hearing conducted to specifically determine the conditions of the bail in accordance with
Section 6 (now, Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other hand, as the grant of bail becomes a
matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court under the exceptions to the rule, a
hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion
of the court, 24 is required with the participation of both the defense and a duly notified
representative of the prosecution, this time to ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt
is strong for the provisional liberty of the applicant. 25 Of course, the burden of proof is on
the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required quantum. 26
Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition, the prosecution must be give
an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to
introduce before the court may resolve the application, since it is equally entitled as the
accused to due process. 27 If the prosecution is denied this opportunity, there would be a
denial of procedural due process, as a consequence of which the court's order in respect
of the motion or petition is void. 28 At the hearing, the petitioner can rightfully cross-examine
the witnesses presented by the prosecution and introduce his own evidence in
90
rebuttal. 29 When, eventually, the court issues an order either granting or refusing bail, the
same should contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution, followed by its
conclusion as to whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. 30 The court, though, cannot
rely on mere affidavits or recitals of their contents, if timely objected to, for these represent
only hearsay evidence, and thus are insufficient to establish the quantum of evidence that
the law requires. 31
In this appeal, the prosecution assails what it considers to be a violation of procedural due
process when the court below allowed Assistant Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo of the Regional
State Prosecutor's Office to appear in behalf of the prosecution, instead of State
Prosecutor Henrick P. Gingoyon who is claimed to be the sole government prosecutor
expressly authorized to handle the case and who received his copy of the motion only on
the day after the hearing had been conducted. Accordingly, the prosecution now insists
that Prosecutor Abejo had no authority at all to waive the presentation of any further
evidence in opposition to the application for bail and to submit the matter to the sound
discretion of the trial court. In addition, they argue that the prosecution was not afforded
"reasonable time" to oppose that application for bail.
We disagree. Firstly, it is undisputed that the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor acted
as the collaborating counsel, with State Prosecutor Henrick Gingoyon, in Criminal Case
No. 86-39 on the basis of an authority from then Chief State Prosecutor Fernando de Leon
which was sent through radio message on July 10, 1992 and duly received by the Office of
the Regional State Prosecutor on the same date. This authorization, which was to be
continuing until and unless it was expressly withdrawn, was later confirmed and then
withdrawn only on July 12, 1993 by then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon. This was
done after one Rebecca Bucag-tan questioned the authority of Regional State Prosecutor
Jesus Zozobrado and State Prosecutor II Erlindo Abejo to enter their appearance as
collaborating government prosecutors in said criminal case. 32 It was in fact by virtue of this
arrangement that the same Prosecutor Zozobrado and Prosecutor Perseverando Arana
entered their appearance as collaborating prosecutor in the previous hearing in said
case. 33 Hence, on the strength of said authority and of its receipt of the notice of the
hearing for bail, the Regional State Prosecutor's Office, through Prosecutor Abejo, could
validly represent the prosecution in the hearing held on November 5, 1992.
Secondly, although it is now claimed that Prosecutor Abejo was allegedly not
familiar with the case, he nonetheless was explicitly instructed about the position
of the Regional State Prosecutor's Office on the matter. Prosecutor Zozobrado,
whose office received its copy of the motion on the very day when it was sent,
that is, October 28, 1992, duly instructed Prosecutor Abejo to manifest to the
court that the prosecution was neither supporting nor opposing the application for
bail and that they were submitting the matter to its sound discretion. Obviously,
what this meant was that the prosecution, at that particular posture of the case,
was waiving the presentation of any countervailing evidence. When the court a
quosought to ascertain whether or not that was the real import of the submission
by Prosecutor Abejo, the latter readily answered in the affirmative.
The following exchanges bear this out:

PROSECUTOR ERLINDO ABEJO:
I was informed to appear in this case just now Your
Honor.
COURT:
Where is your Chief of Office? Your office received a
copy of the motion as early as October 28. There is
an element of urgency here.
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am not aware of that, Your Honor, I was only
informed just now. The one assigned here is State
Prosecutor
Perseverando
Arena,
Jr.
who
unfortunately is in the hospital attending to his sick
son. I do not know about this but before I came I
received an instruction from our Chief to relay to this
court the stand of the office regarding the motion to
admit bail. That office is neither supporting nor
opposing it and we are submitting to the sound
discretion of the Honorable Court.
COURT:
Place that manifestation on record. For the record,
Fiscal Abejo, would you like to formally enter your
appearance in this matter?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor. For the government, the Regional
State Prosecutor's Office represented by State
Prosecutor Erlindo Abejo.
COURT:
91
By that manifestation do you want the Court to

understand that in effect, at least, the prosecution is
dispensing with the presentation of evidence to
show that the guilt of the accused is strong, the
denial . . .
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
I am amenable to that manifestation, Your Honor.
COURT:
Final inquiry. Is the Prosecution willing to submit the
incident covered by this particular motion for
resolution by this court?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Without presenting any further evidence?
PROSECUTOR ABEJO:
Yes, Your Honor. 34
It is further evident from the foregoing that the prosecution, on the instructions of
Regional State prosecutor Zozobrado, had no intention at all to oppose the
motion for bail and this should be so notwithstanding the statement that they
were "neither supporting nor opposing" the motion. What is of significance is the
manifestation that the prosecution was "submitting (the motion) to the sound
discretion of the Honorable Court." By that, it could not be any clearer. The
prosecution was dispensing with the introduction of evidence en contra and this it
did at the proper forum and stage of the proceedings, that is, during the
mandatory hearing for bail and after the trial court had fully satisfied itself that
such was the position of the prosecution.
3. In Herras Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, 35 it was stressed that where the
trial court has reasons to believe that the prosecutor's attitude of not opposing
the application for bail is not justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross
error or a dereliction of duty, the court, in the interest of Justice, must inquire from
the prosecutor concerned as the nature of his evidence to determine whether or
not it is strong. And, in the very recent administrative matter Re: First
Indorsement Dated July 21, 1992 of Hon. Fernando de Leon, Chief State
Prosecutor, Department of Justice; Alicia A. Baylon, City Prosecutor of Dagupan
City vs. Judge Deodoro Sison, 36 the Court, citing Tucay vs. Domagas,
etc., 37 held that where the prosecutor interposes no objection to the motion of the
accused, the trial court should nevertheless set the application for hearing and
from there diligently ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter is really not
contesting the bail application.
No irregularity, in the context of procedural due process, could therefore be
attributed to the trial court here as regards its order granting bail to petitioner. A
review of the transcript of the stenographic notes pertinent to its resolution of
November 5, 1992 and the omnibus order of March 29, 1993 abundantly reveals
scrupulous adherence to procedural rules. As summarized in its aforementioned
order, the lower court exhausted all means to convince itself of the propriety of
the waiver of evidence on the part of the prosecution. Moreover, the omnibus
order contained the requisite summary of the evidence of both the prosecution
and the defense, and only after sifting through them did the court conclude that
petitioner could be provisionally released on bail. Parenthetically, there is no
showing that, since then and up to the present, petitioner has ever committed
any violation of the conditions of his bail.
As to the contention that the prosecutor was not given the opportunity to present
its evidence within a reasonable period of time, we hold otherwise. The records
indicate that the Regional State Prosecutor's Office duly received its copy of the
application for bail on the very same day that the it was filed with the trial court on
October 28, 1992. Counted from said date up to the day of the hearing on
November 5, 1992, the prosecution had more than one (1) week to muster such
evidence as it would have wanted to adduce in that hearing in opposition to the
motion. Certainly, under the circumstances, that period was more than
reasonable. The fact that Prosecutor Gingoyon received his copy of the
application only on November 6, 1992 is beside the point for, as already
established, the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor was authorized to
appear for the People.
4. What finally militates against the cause of the prosecutor is the indubitably
unreasonable period of time that elapsed before it questioned before the
respondent court the resolution and the omnibus order of the trial court through a
special civil action for certiorari. The Solicitor General submits that the delay of
more than six (6) months, or one hundred eighty-four (184) days to be exact, was
reasonable due to the attendant difficulties which characterized the prosecution
of the criminal case against petitioner. But then, the certiorari proceeding was
initiated before the respondent court long after trial on the merits of the case had
ensued in the court below with the active participation of prosecution lawyers,
including Prosecutor Gingoyon. At any rate, the definitive rule now in that the
special civil action for certiorari should not be instituted beyond a period of the
92
three months, 38 the same to be reckoned by taking into account the duration of
time that had expired from the commission of the acts complained to annul the
same. 39
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 32233,
promulgated on November 24, 1993, annulling the resolution dated November 5, 1992 and
the omnibus order dated March 29, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro
City, as well as said respondent court's resolution of April 26, 1994 denying the motion for
reconsideration of said judgment, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The aforesaid
resolution and omnibus order of the Regional Trail Court granting bail to petitioner Miguel
P. Paderanga are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189122
March 17, 2010
JOSE
ANTONIO
LEVISTE, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Bail, the security given by an accused who is in the custody of the law for his release to
guarantee his appearance before any court as may be required, 1 is the answer of the
criminal justice system to a vexing question: what is to be done with the accused, whose
guilt has not yet been proven, in the "dubious interval," often years long, between arrest
and final adjudication?2 Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the
accuseds interest in pretrial liberty and societys interest in assuring the accuseds
presence at trial.3
Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the accused who has been sentenced to
prison must typically begin serving time immediately unless, on application, he is admitted
to bail.4 An accused not released on bail is incarcerated before an appellate court confirms
that his conviction is legal and proper. An erroneously convicted accused who is denied
bail loses his liberty to pay a debt to society he has never owed. 5 Even if the conviction is
93
subsequently affirmed, however, the accuseds interest in bail pending appeal includes
freedom pending judicial review, opportunity to efficiently prepare his case and avoidance
of potential hardships of prison. 6 On the other hand, society has a compelling interest in
protecting itself by swiftly incarcerating an individual who is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of a crime serious enough to warrant prison time. 7 Other recognized societal
interests in the denial of bail pending appeal include the prevention of the accuseds flight
from court custody, the protection of the community from potential danger and the
avoidance of delay in punishment. 8 Under what circumstances an accused may obtain bail
pending appeal, then, is a delicate balance between the interests of society and those of
the accused.9
Our rules authorize the proper courts to exercise discretion in the grant of bail pending
appeal to those convicted by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. In the exercise of that discretion, the proper
courts are to be guided by the fundamental principle that the allowance of bail pending
appeal should be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and only for strong
reasons, considering that the accused has been in fact convicted by the trial court. 10
The Facts
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum. 11
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. 12 Pending appeal, he filed an urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health
condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioners application for bail. 13 It invoked the bedrock
principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the
course of appeal should be exercised "with grave caution and only for strong reasons."
Citing well-established jurisprudence, it ruled that bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or
aged detainee or a prisoner needing medical care outside the prison facility. It found that
petitioner
failed to show that he suffers from ailment of such gravity that his continued
confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. x x x
Notably, the physical condition of [petitioner] does not prevent him from seeking medical
attention while confined in prison, though he clearly preferred to be attended by his
personal physician.14
For purposes of determining whether petitioners application for bail could be allowed
pending appeal, the Court of Appeals also considered the fact of petitioners conviction. It
made a preliminary evaluation of petitioners case and made a prima facie determination
that there was no reason substantial enough to overturn the evidence of petitioners guilt.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. 15
Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the denial of his application for bail,
considering that none of the conditions justifying denial of bail under the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioners theory is that, where the
penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more than 20 years and
the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are absent, bail must be
granted to an appellant pending appeal.
The Issue
The question presented to the Court is this: in an application for bail pending appeal by an
appellant sentenced by the trial court to a penalty of imprisonment for more than six years,
does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court?
Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail
is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court
despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to
the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can
only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
94
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded

sentence, or violated the conditions of his bail without a valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of
the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner claims that, in the absence of any of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, an application for bail by an
appellant sentenced by the Regional Trial Court to a penalty of more than six years
imprisonment should automatically be granted.
Petitioners stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive
rules.
Basic Procedural Concerns Forbid Grant of Petition
Petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
assail the denial by the Court of Appeals of his urgent application for admission to bail
pending appeal. While the said remedy may be resorted to challenge an interlocutory
order, such remedy is proper only where the interlocutory order was rendered without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.16
Other than the sweeping averment that "[t]he Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion in denying petitioners application for bail pending appeal despite the fact that
none of the conditions to justify the denial thereof under Rule 114, Section 5 [is] present,
much less proven by the prosecution,"17 however, petitioner actually failed to establish that
the Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his
claim that the Court of Appeals should have granted bail in view of the absence of any of
the circumstances enumerated in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court. Furthermore, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals committed a grave error
and prejudged the appeal by denying his application for bail on the ground that the
evidence that he committed a capital offense was strong.
We disagree.
It cannot be said that the Court of Appeals issued the assailed resolution without or in
excess of its jurisdiction. One, pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to
bail is expressly declared to be discretionary. Two, the discretion to allow or disallow bail
pending appeal in a case such as this where the decision of the trial court convicting the
accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable is exclusively
lodged by the rules with the appellate court. Thus, the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to
hear and resolve petitioners urgent application for admission to bail pending appeal.
Neither can it be correctly claimed that the Court of Appeals committed grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners application for bail pending appeal. Grave abuse of
discretion is not simply an error in judgmentbut it is such a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment which is tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. 18Ordinary abuse of
discretion is insufficient. The abuse of discretion must be grave, that is, the power is
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. 19 It
must be so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined by or to act at all in contemplation of the law. In other words,
for a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. 20
Petitioner never alleged that, in denying his application for bail pending appeal, the Court
of Appeals exercised its judgment capriciously and whimsically. No capriciousness or
arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion was ever imputed to the appellate court. Nor
could any such implication or imputation be inferred. As observed earlier, the Court of
Appeals exercised grave caution in the exercise of its discretion. The denial of petitioners
application for bail pending appeal was not unreasonable but was the result of a thorough
assessment of petitioners claim of ill health. By making a preliminary appraisal of the
merits of the case for the purpose of granting bail, the court also determined whether the
appeal was frivolous or not, or whether it raised a substantial question. The appellate court
did not exercise its discretion in a careless manner but followed doctrinal rulings of this
Court.
At best, petitioner only points out the Court of Appeals erroneous application and
interpretation of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. However, the extraordinary writ
of certiorari will not be issued to cure errors in proceedings or erroneous conclusions of law
or fact.21 In this connection, Lee v. People22 is apropos:
Certiorari may not be availed of where it is not shown that the respondent court lacked
or exceeded its jurisdiction over the case, even if its findings are not correct. Its questioned
acts would at most constitute errors of law and not abuse of discretion correctible by
certiorari.
95
In other words, certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction and not to correct
errors of procedure or mistakes in the courts findings and conclusions. An interlocutory
order may be assailed by certiorari or prohibition only when it is shown that the court acted
without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. However, this Court
generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. To tolerate
the practice of allowing interlocutory orders to be the subject of review by certiorari will not
only delay the administration of justice but will also unduly burden the courts. 23 (emphasis
supplied)
Wording of Third Paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 Contradicts Petitioners
Interpretation
The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios where the penalty
imposed on the appellant applying for bail is imprisonment exceeding six years. The first
scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated in the said paragraph (namely,
recidivism, quasi-recidivism, habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated
by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from legal confinement, evasion of
sentence or violation of the conditions of his bail without a valid justification; commission of
the offense while under probation, parole or conditional pardon; circumstances indicating
the probability of flight if released on bail; undue risk of committing another crime during
the pendency of the appeal; or other similar circumstances) not present. The second
scenario contemplates the existence of at least one of the said circumstances.
The implications of this distinction are discussed with erudition and clarity in the
commentary of retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an authority in
remedial law:
Under the present revised Rule 114, the availability of bail to an accused may be
summarized in the following rules:
xxx
xxx
xxx
e. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court wherein a penalty of imprisonment

exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years is imposed, and not one of the
circumstances stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and
proved, bail is a matter of discretion (Sec. 5);
f. After conviction by the Regional Trial Court imposing a penalty of imprisonment
exceeding 6 years but not more than 20 years, and any of the circumstances
stated in Sec. 5 or any other similar circumstance is present and proved, no bail
shall be granted by said court (Sec. 5); x x x24 (emphasis supplied)
Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in remedial law, is of
the same thinking:
Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter of right when the offense
charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. On the other
hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a matter of discretion.
Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years then
bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated circumstances
under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be
denied.25 (emphasis supplied)
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This means that, if none of
the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the
appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending
appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating 26 circumstances in the third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words, the appellate courts denial of bail pending
appeal where none of the said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute
abuse of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more stringent
discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated circumstances in
fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail pending
appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail pending appeal, grave abuse of
discretion will thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail pending appeal
should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the determination of discretion
stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of the circumstances in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will establish whether or not the
appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the
application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of discretion stage where,
assuming the appellants case falls within the first scenario allowing the exercise of sound
discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant circumstances, other than those
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114, including the demands of equity
and justice;27 on the basis thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellants case falls within the second scenario, the appellate
courts stringent discretion requires that the exercise thereof be primarily focused on the
determination of the proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial
to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of those circumstances is
by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail. Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said
circumstances is present will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such
finding will simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion
approach.
96
Petitioner disregards the fine yet substantial distinction between the two different situations
that are governed by the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114. Instead, petitioner insists
on a simplistic treatment that unduly dilutes the import of the said provision and trivializes
the established policy governing the grant of bail pending appeal.
In particular, a careful reading of petitioners arguments reveals that it interprets the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 to cover all situations where the penalty imposed by the
trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. For petitioner, in such a
situation, the grant of bail pending appeal is always subject to limited discretion, that is,
one restricted to the determination of whether any of the five bail-negating
circumstances exists. The implication of this position is that, if any such circumstance is
present, then bail will be denied. Otherwise, bail will be granted pending appeal.
Petitioners theory therefore reduces the appellate court into a mere fact-finding body
whose authority is limited to determining whether any of the five circumstances mentioned
in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 exists. This unduly constricts its "discretion"
into merely filling out the checklist of circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5,
Rule 114 in all instances where the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court on the
appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years. In short, petitioners interpretation severely
curbs the discretion of the appellate court by requiring it to determine a singular factual
issue whether any of the five bail-negating circumstances is present.
However, judicial discretion has been defined as "choice." 28 Choice occurs where, between
"two alternatives or among a possibly infinite number (of options)," there is "more than one
possible outcome, with the selection of the outcome left to the decision maker." 29 On the
other hand, the establishment of a clearly defined rule of action is the end of
discretion.30 Thus, by severely clipping the appellate courts discretion and relegating that
tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications for bail pending appeal in all instances
where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the appellant is imprisonment exceeding
six years, petitioners theory effectively renders nugatory the provision that "upon
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary."
The judicial discretion granted to the proper court (the Court of Appeals in this case) to rule
on applications for bail pending appeal must necessarily involve the exercise of judgment
on the part of the court. The court must be allowed reasonable latitude to express its own
view of the case, its appreciation of the facts and its understanding of the applicable law on
the matter.31 In view of the grave caution required of it, the court should consider whether
or not, under all circumstances, the accused will be present to abide by his punishment if
his conviction is affirmed.32 It should also give due regard to any other pertinent matters
beyond the record of the particular case, such as the record, character and reputation of
the applicant,33 among other things. More importantly, the discretion to determine
allowance or disallowance of bail pending appeal necessarily includes, at the very least, an
initial determination that the appeal is not frivolous but raises a substantial question of law
or fact which must be determined by the appellate court. 34 In other words, a threshold
requirement for the grant of bail is a showing that the appeal is not pro forma and merely
intended for delay but presents a fairly debatable issue. 35 This must be so; otherwise, the
appellate courts will be deluged with frivolous and time-wasting appeals made for the
purpose of taking advantage of a lenient attitude on bail pending appeal. Even more
significantly, this comports with the very strong presumption on appeal that the lower
courts exercise of discretionary power was sound, 36specially since the rules on criminal
procedure require that no judgment shall be reversed or modified by the Court of Appeals
except for substantial error.37
Moreover, to limit the bail-negating circumstances to the five situations mentioned in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is wrong. By restricting the bail-negating
circumstances to those expressly mentioned, petitioner applies the expressio unius est
exclusio alterius38 rule in statutory construction. However, the very language of the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 contradicts the idea that the enumeration of the five
situations therein was meant to be exclusive. The provision categorically refers to "the
following or other similar circumstances." Hence, under the rules, similarly relevant
situations other than those listed in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 may be
considered in the allowance, denial or revocation of bail pending appeal.
Finally, laws and rules should not be interpreted in such a way that leads to unreasonable
or senseless consequences. An absurd situation will result from adopting petitioners
interpretation that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding
six years, bail ought to be granted if none of the listed bail-negating circumstances exists.
Allowance of bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed is more than six
years of imprisonment will be more lenient than in cases where the penalty imposed does
not exceed six years. While denial or revocation of bail in cases where the penalty
imposed is more than six years imprisonment must be made only if any of the five bailnegating conditions is present, bail pending appeal in cases where the penalty imposed
does not exceed six years imprisonment may be denied even without those conditions.
Is it reasonable and in conformity with the dictates of justice that bail pending appeal be
more accessible to those convicted of serious offenses, compared to those convicted of
less serious crimes?
Petitioners Theory Deviates from History And Evolution of Rule on Bail Pending
Appeal
Petitioners interpretation deviates from, even radically alters, the history and evolution of
the provisions on bail pending appeal.
The relevant original provisions on bail were provided under Sections 3 to 6, Rule 110 of
the 1940 Rules of Criminal Procedure:
Sec. 3. Offenses less than capital before conviction by the Court of First
Instance. After judgment by a municipal judge and before conviction by the
Court of First Instance, the defendant shall be admitted to bail as of right.
97
Sec. 4. Non-capital offenses after conviction by the Court of First Instance.

After conviction by the Court of First Instance, defendant may, upon application,
be bailed at the discretion of the court.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending
cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies
concerning the effectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
Sec. 5. Capital offense defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this
rule, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission,
and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by
death.
1) When an accused is charged with an offense which under the law existing at
the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable
by a penalty lower than reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is
convicted by the trial court of the offense charged or of a lesser offense than that
charged in the complaint or information, he may be allowed to remain free on his
original bail pending the resolution of his appeal, unless the proper court directs
otherwise pursuant to Rule 114, Sec. 2 (a) of the Rules of Court, as amended;
Sec. 6. Capital offense not bailable. No person in custody for the commission
of a capital offense shall be admitted to bail if the evidence of his guilt is strong.
The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule 114 of the 1964
Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. They were
modified in 1988 to read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before
final conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with
a capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission
and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua,
when evidence of guilt is strong.
Sec. 4. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in this
Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission,
and at the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by
death. (emphasis supplied)
The significance of the above changes was clarified in Administrative Circular No. 2-92
dated January 20, 1992 as follows:
The basic governing principle on the right of the accused to bail is laid down in Section 3 of
Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, which provides:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. All persons in custody, shall before final
conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital
offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
strong.
Pursuant to the aforecited provision, an accused who is charged with a capital offense or
an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, shall no longer be entitled to bail as a matter
of right even if he appeals the case to this Court since his conviction clearly imports that
the evidence of his guilt of the offense charged is strong.
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under

the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is
punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by
the trial court of a lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or
information, the same rule set forth in the preceding paragraph shall be applied;
3) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under
the law at the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is
punishable by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail and after trial is convicted by
the trial court of the offense charged, his bond shall be cancelled and the
accused shall be placed in confinement pending resolution of his appeal.
As to criminal cases covered under the third rule abovecited, which are now pending
appeal before his Court where the accused is still on provisional liberty, the following rules
are laid down:
1) This Court shall order the bondsman to surrender the accused within ten (10)
days from notice to the court of origin. The bondsman thereupon, shall inform this
Court of the fact of surrender, after which, the cancellation of the bond shall be
ordered by this Court;
2) The RTC shall order the transmittal of the accused to the National Bureau of
Prisons thru the Philippine National Police as the accused shall remain under
confinement pending resolution of his appeal;
3) If the accused-appellant is not surrendered within the aforesaid period of ten
(10) days, his bond shall be forfeited and an order of arrest shall be issued by
this Court. The appeal taken by the accused shall also be dismissed under
Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Court as he shall be deemed to have
jumped his bail. (emphasis supplied)
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August 16,
1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:
98
SECTION 4. Bail, a matter of right. All persons in custody shall: (a) before or after
conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial
Court of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be
admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as prescribed by law of this Rule. (3a)
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong,

shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution. (emphasis
supplied)
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on
application, may admit the accused to bail.
The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation towards a more restrictive
approach to bail pending appeal. It indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle,
that is, bail pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with grave caution and
only for strong reasons.
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to continue on provisional liberty under
the same bail bond during the period of appeal subject to the consent of the bondsman.
If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six (6) years but not more than
twenty (20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his bail previously granted shall be
cancelled, upon a showing by the prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following
or other similar circumstances:
(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has
committed the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That the accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement,
evaded sentence or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid
justification;
(c) That the accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, under
conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of
flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused
may commit another crime.
The appellate court may review the resolution of the Regional Trial Court, on motion and
with notice to the adverse party. (n)
SECTION 6. Capital offense, defined. A capital offense, as the term is used in these
Rules, is an offense which, under the law existing at the time of its commission and at the
time of the application to be admitted to bail, maybe punished with death. (4)
SECTION 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, not bailable. No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
The above amendments of Administrative Circular No. 12-94 to Rule 114 were thereafter
amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC to read as they do now.
The earliest rules on the matter made all grants of bail after conviction for a non-capital
offense by the Court of First Instance (predecessor of the Regional Trial Court)
discretionary. The 1988 amendments made applications for bail pending appeal favorable
to the appellant-applicant. Bail before final conviction in trial courts for non-capital offenses
or offenses not punishable by reclusion perpetua was a matter of right, meaning,
admission to bail was a matter of right at any stage of the action where the charge was not
for a capital offense or was not punished by reclusion perpetua.39
The amendments introduced by Administrative Circular No. 12-94 made bail pending
appeal (of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment) discretionary. Thus, Administrative Circular No.
12-94 laid down more stringent rules on the matter of post-conviction grant of bail.
A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC modified Administrative Circular No. 12-94 by clearly identifying
which court has authority to act on applications for bail pending appeal under certain
conditions and in particular situations. More importantly, it reiterated the "tough on bail
pending appeal" configuration of Administrative Circular No. 12-94. In particular, it
amended Section 3 of the 1988 Rules on Criminal Procedure which entitled the accused to
bail as a matter of right before final conviction. 40 Under the present rule, bail is a matter of
discretion upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Indeed, pursuant to the "tough on bail
pending appeal" policy, the presence of bail-negating conditions mandates the denial or
revocation of bail pending appeal such that those circumstances are deemed to be as
grave as conviction by the trial court for an offense punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment where bail is prohibited.
Now, what is more in consonance with a stringent standards approach to bail pending
appeal? What is more in conformity with an ex abundante cautelam view of bail pending
appeal? Is it a rule which favors the automatic grant of bail in the absence of any of the
circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114? Or is it a rule that
authorizes the denial of bail after due consideration of all relevant circumstances, even if
none of the circumstances under the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present?
99
The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on bail pending appeal
parallels the approach adopted in the United States where our original constitutional and
procedural provisions on bail emanated. 41While this is of course not to be followed blindly,
it nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal is no different from that in
other democratic societies.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the allowance of bail pending
appeal is anchored on the principle that judicial discretion particularly with respect to
extending bail should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for strong
reasons.42 In fact, it has even been pointed out that "grave caution that must attend the
exercise of judicial discretion in granting bail to a convicted accused is best illustrated and
exemplified in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 amending Rule 114, Section 5."43
Furthermore, this Court has been guided by the following:
The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail should be
granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or innocent, and therefore,
where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would, generally speaking, be absurd to
admit to bail. After a person has been tried and convicted the presumption of innocence
which may be relied upon in prior applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the
accused to show error in the conviction. From another point of view it may be properly
argued that the probability of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the
accused is much more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before
conviction.44 (emphasis supplied)
As a matter of fact, endorsing the reasoning quoted above and relying thereon, the Court
declared in Yap v. Court of Appeals45 (promulgated in 2001 when the present rules were
already effective), that denial of bail pending appeal is "a matter of wise discretion."
A Final Word
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient
sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. x x x (emphasis
supplied)1avvphi1
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. 46 From then on, the grant of bail is subject
to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with
grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the accused was in fact
convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail pending appeal should be guided by a
stringent-standards approach. This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history
and evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court. It is likewise consistent with the trial courts initial determination that the accused
should be in prison. Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction may
destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is especially germane to bail pending
appeal because long delays often separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate
review. In addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain prison
sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of bail bonds or other release
conditions. Finally, permitting bail too freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and timewasting appeals which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court
processes.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits, the appeal of
petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with dispatch.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
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G.R. No.

110015 July 11, 1995

xxx xxx xxx

2. For unpaid accumulated rentals in arrears, amounting to the appreciable sum

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

IN SUSTAINING RESCISSION ON ACCOUNT OF THE PETITIONER'S

attributable to defendants who did not provide plaintiff-appellant with the

We are still working out with an Insurance Company for

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

WITNESS: However, we were not able to

WITNESS: There was an appraiser, sir.

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

For a question to be one of law it must involve no examination of the probative

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

ATTY. VILLANUEVA: So you are referring to Exhibit "K"?

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

A: Chairman of the Manila Bay and the person whom I get in

Q: And he is a signatory to the contract?

Q: And this Atty. Rivera that you mentioned in the course of

A: He was introduced by Mr. Efren Lim as the lawyer of

A: Lease contract. He made the preparation, my son is

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

Paragraph 22 of the lease contract demands that plaintiff-appellant must insure

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

G.R. No. 137873

April 20, 2001

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D. M.

4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.

THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

no such knowledge, and therefore is compelled to allege negligence in general

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

Section 5. Exclusive right to compensation. The rights and remedies granted by

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

December 17, 2007

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the

a) physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with his

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

This physical impossibility may be caused:

1) By the impotence of the husband;

How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample obtained or extracted, a

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course,

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

G.R. No. 173870

April 25, 2012

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

The RTC disposed of the case as follows:

EVIDENCE: MANILA BAY TO LEVISTE

1. x x x basing its conclusions and findings on speculations, surmises and

2. Temperate damages in the amount of Twenty-five Thousand Pesos