Rule 118 - Pre-Trial

Sec. 1 - Purpose and subject matter of prePEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE v. AMIL SAJOLGA Y
OMERA
G.R. No. 146684, August 21, 2002, EN BANC,
(MENDOZA, J.)
Genlei Abejaron stayed in the house of her
teacher, Mrs. Erlinda Alceso, during weekdays as a
working student because the Maramag Elementary
School in Bukidnon, where she was studying. She
went home to her mothers house only on weekends.
Genlei testified that at about 5 oclock in the
afternoon, while she was alone in her mothers house
playing cards, someone knocked on the door, and, it
was her half-brother, accused-appellant Ramil Sajolga,
who was drunk. The latter boxed her in the abdomen,
causing her to fall on the floor on her buttocks. Genlei
said accused-appellant dragged her to the bedroom,
made her lie on the bed, and took off her shorts and
panties. When Genlei recovered, she found herself
naked and lying on the bed. Her body was aching and
her vagina was sore, with a sticky substance,
presumably semen, in her private part. She was afraid
that her mother would not believe her. However, with
the assurance of teachers that they would help her,
she filed a case of Rape. Her half-brother was found
guilty by the trial court and was sentenced to death.
The accused filed an appeal.
ISSUE: Is the stipulation of minority in the pre-trial
order sufficient absent birth certificate?
HELD: YES.
Although no birth certificate or document was
presented to prove that complainant was 15 years old
at the time she was raped, the parties stipulated that
she was born on February 15, 1983. This
stipulation is contained in a Pre-Trial Order
issued by the trial court. A stipulation of facts in
criminal cases is now authorized to be made by Rule
118, 1 and 4 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Thus, not only was complainants age
alleged in the information, it was proven, having been
made the subject of stipulation and admission.
Accused-appellant is not a parent, ascendant,
step-parent, or guardian or the common-law spouse
of the victims mother, but a relative by consanguinity.
Hence, as this Court has held, it must be alleged in the
information that he is a relative by consanguinity or
affinity, as the case may be, within the third civil
degree.
Not
only
should
relationship
by
consanguinity or affinity be alleged, it is also
necessary to specify that such relationship is within
the third civil degree. Mere allegation and the

stipulation that accused-appellant is the brother of the

victim because they have a common mother are not
enough to satisfy the special qualifying circumstance
of relationship.
Anent accused-appellants contention that he
is guilty only of simple rape and not qualified rape
because he is not a full-blooded brother of the victim
sister and there are no half measures in the Heinous
Crime Law, suffice it to say the law does not
distinguish between full blood and half blood relatives.
The law does not in fact speak of full blood and half
blood relatives but of relatives by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree. As a recent
study has found, around 92% of the perpetrators in
rape cases are known to the child and 39% of these
cases were committed by legal or common law
relatives.
In any event, because of the failure of the
prosecution to allege that accused-appellant is a
relative by consanguinity within the third civil
degree of the offended party, accused-appellant can
only be held liable for simple rape even if it was
proven and stipulated that the victim was under
eighteen (18) years of age and that he is a halfbrother of complainant.
ARTURO ALANO v. CA, et al.
G.R. No. 111244, December 15, 1997, THIRD
DIVISION (Romero, J.)
Alano defrauded Roberto Carlos by pretending
to still be the owner of a parcel of land at Taguig. He
sold the land to Carlos then sold the property for the
second time to Erlinda Dandoy. Thereby, it deprived
Carlos of his rightful ownership/possession of the said
parcel of land, to the damage and prejudice of Carlos.
Alano moved for the suspension of his case on estafa
in Manila RTC, on the ground that there was a
prejudicial question pending resolution in another
case being tried in Pasig RTC which concerns the
nullity of the sale and recovery of possession and
damages. In the civil case, Carlos filed a complaint
against Alano seeking the annulment of the second
sale of said parcel of land. Alano contends that he
never sold the property to the private respondents and
that his signature appearing in the deed of absolute
sale in favour of the latter was a forgery, hence, the
alleged sale was fictitious and inexistent. At this
juncture, it is worth mentioning that the civil case was
filed 5 years before when the criminal case for estafa
was instituted.
ISSUE:
Is Alanos admission in the pre-trial of the
criminal case a waiver of his defense in the civil case?
HELD:
YES. Notwithstanding the apparent prejudicial
question involved, the CA still affirmed the Order of
the RTC denying Carloss motion for the suspension of
the proceeding on the ground that Alano, in the
stipulation of facts, had already admitted during the

pre-trial order of the criminal case the validity of his

signature in the first deed of sale between him and
Carlos, as well as his subsequent acknowledgment of
his signature in 23 cash vouchers evidencing the
payments made by Carlos. Moreover, it was also noted
by the CA that Alano even wrote to Carlos offering to
refund whatever sum the latter had paid.
There is no question that a stipulation of facts
by the parties in a criminal case is recognized as
declarations constituting judicial admissions, hence,
binding upon the parties and by virtue of which the
prosecution dispensed with the introduction of
additional evidence and the defense waived the right
to contest or dispute the veracity of the statement
contained in the exhibit. Accordingly, the stipulation of
facts stated in the pre-trial order amounts to an
admission by the petitioner resulting in the waiver of
his right to present evidence on his behalf. While it is
true that the right to present evidence is guaranteed
under the Constitution, this right may be waived
expressly or impliedly.
Since the suspension of the criminal case due
to a prejudicial question is only a procedural matter,
the same is subject to a waiver by virtue of the prior
acts of the accused. After all, the doctrine of waiver is
made solely for the benefit and protection of the
individual in his private capacity, if it can be dispensed
with and relinquished without infringing on any public
right and without detriment to the community at
large. Accordingly, Alanos admission in the stipulation
of facts during the pre-trial of the criminal case
amounts to a waiver of his defense of forgery in the
civil case. Hence, we have no reason to nullify such
waiver, it being not contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals or good customs, or prejudicial to
a third person with a right recognized by law.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that the pre-trial
order was signed by Alano himself. As such, the rule
that no proof need be offered as to any facts admitted
at a pre-trial hearing applies.
Sec. 2 - Requisites of pre-trial agreements
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE, VS. RICARDO AGRAVANTE Y
ZANTUA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
G.R. Nos. 137297 & 138547-48, December 11,
2001, EN BANC, MENDOZA, J.
Crime: Rape - Location: Camarines Norte
Facts
On the night of November 5, 1994, Maria was
home with her father, herein accused-appellant, and
the latter's ward, Gary Fraga. Accused appellant and
Gary Fraga slept in the living room, while Maria slept
in her room. Accused-appellant's common-law wife,
Virginia Bangayciso1, had gone to a dance party. At
around 7 o'clock in the evening, Maria woke up to find
accused-appellant on top of her and pursued his
carnal intentions with Maria and raped her. Maria
lighted a lamp and went to the kitchen, where she

1 Ricardo had long been separated with the victims

mother.

washed off blood and a whitish substance from her

private parts. She then returned to her bedroom and
went to sleep. At around midnight, however, accusedappellant was back and raped her again. On
November 19, 1994, Maria came home for the
weekend2. Because she did not arrive until noon, she
was scolded and given some lashes by accusedappellant and was later on raped again.
Three informations for rape were filed against
accused-appellant and was later on found guilty by the
trial court sentencing him to death on account of
minority and relationship.
Issue
WON the trial court erred in considering the
qualifying circumstances for rape
notwithstanding the lack of signature of the
accused-appellant found in the stipulation of
facts from which such circumstances were based.
Held
Yes, Art. 335 of the RPC, as amended by R.A.
No. 7659, provides for the imposition of the death
penalty on the offender in rape cases if the victim is
under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is,
among others, a parent of the victim. As a qualifying
circumstance which increases the range of the
penalty, the concurrence of the minority of the victim
and her relationship to the offender must be both
alleged and proven. In these cases, while the
informations allege that complainant was a "minor
fourteen years of age" at the time of the commission of
the rapes and that accused-appellant is the "father of
the offended party," only the relationship of accusedappellant to the complainant has been sufficiently
established. To be sure, the minority of complainant
(14 years of age at the time of the commission of the
rapes) was the subject of the parties' stipulation of
facts. However, the stipulation of facts was not signed
by accused-appellant as required by Rule 118, sec.2 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which
provides that "No agreement or admission made or
entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used
in evidence against the accused unless reduced to
writing and signed by him and his counsel." This
requirement is mandatory. As held in Fule v. Court of
Appeals: omission of the signature of the accused and
his counsel renders the Stipulation of Facts
inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of
the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the
Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect because
Rule 118 requires both the accused and his counsel to
sign the Stipulation of Facts.
The testimonies of complainant concerning her
age and that of her father, herein accused-appellant,
concerning this matter are insufficient. In People v.
Tundag, in which the complaints alleged that the
victim was 13 years old at the time of the rapes, it was
held that it was error for the trial court to take judicial
notice of the victim's age even if the defense admitted
the victim's minority. The Court emphasized that there
must be independent proof, such as a birth certificate,

2 Maria stays at a boarding house owned by Adelina

Rancho, one of the witnesses, for her school was 7
kilometers away from their home.

of the age of the victim. In People v. San Agustin, this

Court held that the latter's minority had not been
sufficiently
established
notwithstanding
the
appellant's admission that the victim was 13 years of
age. Judicial notice of the victim's age may be taken if
the victim is 10 years old or below, but not where, as
in this case, the victim is alleged to be 14 years old
when she was raped. As no independent evidence was
presented by the prosecution to prove the minority of
complainant, it was error for the trial court to find
accused-appellant guilty of qualified rape and to
sentence him to death.
Decision modified, Accused-appellant was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua.
Sec. 4 - Pre-trial Order
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE, VS. NICOLAS GUZMAN Y
BOCBOSILA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
FACTS
Appellant was charged with murder after he, and two
other persons, allegedly killed Michael Balber by
repeatedly stabbing the latter on his trunk which took
place in Commonwealth, QC. During the pre-trial, the
defense named only four witnesses and thereafter and
during the trial, only appellant and Antonio were able
to testify. When the two other witnesses in the pretrial order failed to appear and testify in court several
times, the defense counsel moved to substitute them
explaining that they were hesitant to testify, and, that
one of them went home to his province. The trial court
denied the motion of the appellant to present
substitute witnesses. Subsequently, appellant was
convicted for murder and was then affirmed by the CA
on appeal.
ISSUE
WON appellants constitutional rights to
produce evidence on his behalf and to due process
were violated when the trial court denied his motion
to present substitute witnesses
RULING
NO.Rule 118 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides:
SEC. 4. Pre-trial order. After the pre-trial conference,
the court shall issue an order reciting the actions
taken, the facts stipulated, and evidence marked.
Such order shall bind the parties, limit the trial
to matters not disposed of, and control the
course of the action during the trial, unless
modified by the court to prevent manifest injustice.
The RTC was correct in denying the defense
counsels motion for substitution of witnesses since
Section 4, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure mandates that the matters agreed upon in
the pre-trial conference and as stated in the pre-trial
order shall bind the parties. The pre-trial order of the
RTC clearly shows that the defense named only four
witnesses. The parties were also informed therein that
witnesses who were not mentioned in the pre-trial
order will not be entertained during the trial on the
merits. Thus, pursuant to the afore-stated provision
and its purpose of preventing undue delay in the
disposition of criminal cases and ensuring fair trial,

the denial of the defense counsels motion for

substitution of witnesses is justified. Moreover, if
appellants motion for substitution of witnesses is
given due course, it will amount to an unreasonable
disregard of solemn agreements submitted to and
approved by the court of justice and would make a
mockery of the judicial process.
This is not to say, however, that such provision
is absolute. It can be relaxed in the greater interest of
justice. Nevertheless, the exception does not apply in
favor of appellant as the RTC had observed that his
motion for substitution of witnesses appears to be a
fishing expedition of evidence which is clearly unfair
to the case of the prosecution. Moreover, as aptly
stated by the Solicitor General, if the two other
witnesses of appellant were indeed afraid or hesitant
to testify, he should have moved the RTC to subpoena
the said witnesses to testify in court pursuant to his
constitutional right to compulsory process to secure
the attendance of his witnesses. Unfortunately,
appellant did not avail himself of this remedy.
Rule 119 - Trial
Sec. 3 - Exclusions
FEDERICO OLBES v. JUDGE DANILO BUEMIO, et
al.
G.R. No. 173319, 4 December 2009, FIRST
DIVISION, (Carpio-Morales, J.)
Olbes was indicted for Grave Coercion before
the MeTC of Manila. On He posted bail and was
released.
His motion to defer or suspend his
arraignment in light of his pending petition for review
before the DOJ from the City Fiscals Resolution
finding probable cause to hale him into court, the
MeTC judge proceeded with petitioners arraignment
on February 12, 2003 in which he pleaded not guilty to
the charge. Pre-trial was thereupon set to May 28,
2003 which was, however, declared a non-working day
due to the occurrence of typhoon "Chedeng." The pretrial was thus reset to October 23, 2003.
At the scheduled pre-trial on October 23,
2003, Olbes failed to appear, prompting the trial court
to issue a warrant for his arrest, which warrant was,
however, later recalled on discovery that neither Olbes
nor his counsel was notified of said schedule. Pre-trial
was again reset to January 21, 2004.
Before the scheduled pre-trial on January 21,
2004 or on November 3, 2003, Olbes filed a Motion to
Dismiss the Information on the ground of violation of
his right to a speedy trial under Republic Act No.
8493(Speedy Trial Act of 1998). Judge Buemio denied
the motion to dismiss. Upon appeal before the RTC, it
affirmed the MeTC decision.
ISSUE:
Is the time gap of 105 days from his
arraignment (February 12, 2003) up to May 28,
2003(the first pre-trial setting), and another gap of
148 days from the latter date up to the October 23,
2003(second pre-trial setting) or for a total of 253
days - a clear contravention of the 80-day time limit
from arraignment to trial?
RULING:

NO. On his arraignment on February 12, 2003,

petitioner interposed no objection to the setting of the
pre-trial to May 28, 2003 which was, as earlier stated,
later declared a non-working day. Inarguably, the
cancellation of the scheduled pre-trial on that date
was beyond the control of the trial court.
The Court stressed that the exceptions
consisting of the time exclusions provided in the
Speedy Trial Act of 1998 reflect the fundamentally
recognized principle that "speedy trial" is a relative
term and necessarily involves a degree of
flexibility.
R.A. No. 8493 and its implementing rules and
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure enumerate
certain reasonable delays as exclusions in the
computation of the prescribed time limits. They
also provide that "no provision of law on speedy
trial and no rule implementing the same shall be
interpreted as a bar to any charge of denial of
speedy trial as provided by Article III, Section
14(2), of the 1987 Constitution."
While justice is administered with dispatch,
the essential ingredient is orderly, expeditious and not
mere speed. It cannot be definitely said how long is
too long in a system where justice is supposed to be
swift, but deliberate. It is consistent with delays and
depends upon circumstances. It secures rights to the
accused, but it does not preclude the rights of public
justice. Also, it must be borne in mind that the rights
given to the accused by the Constitution and the Rules
of Court are shields, not weapons; hence, courts are to
give meaning to that intent.
In determining whether the accused has been
deprived of his right to a speedy disposition of the
case and to a speedy trial, four factors must be
considered: (a) length of delay; (b) the reason for
the delay; (c) the defendants assertion of his
right; and (d) prejudice to the defendant.
To
the
Court,
the
reasons
for
the
postponements and delays attendant to the present
case reflected above are not unreasonable. While the
records indicate that neither petitioner nor his counsel
was notified of the resetting of the pre-trial to October
23, 2003, the same appears to have been occasioned
by oversight or simple negligence which, standing
alone, does not prove fatal to the prosecutions case.
The faux pas was acknowledged and corrected when
the MeTC recalled the arrest warrant it had issued
against petitioner under the mistaken belief that
petitioner had been duly notified of the October 23,
2003 pre-trial setting.
Sec. 15 - Prosecution Evidence
CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA
and THE HON. RAMON C. CODILLA, JR.,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Cebu City, Branch 19, Petitioners, vs. RAUL
RISOS, Respondents. G.R. No. 152643, August
28, 2008
TOPIC: Prosecution Evidence, Sec. 15, Rule 119
(TRIAL)
CRIME: Estafa Through Falsification of Public
Document
PLACE OF CRIME: Cebu City

FACTS:
On November 4, 1999, he respondents were
charged with Estafa Through Falsification of Public
Document before the RTC of Cebu City. The case
arose from the falsification of a deed of real estate
mortgage allegedly committed by respondents where
they made it appear that Concepcion, the owner of the
mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property,
affixed her signature to the document. Hence, the
criminal case.
Earlier, on September 10, 1999, Concepcion,
who was a resident of Cebu City, while on vacation in
Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati
Medical Center due to upper gastro-intestinal
bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for further
treatment.
On August 16, 2000, the counsel of
Concepcion filed a motion to take the latters
deposition.
He explained the need to perpetuate
Concepcions testimony due to her weak physical
condition and old age, which limited her freedom of
mobility. The RTC granted the motion and directed
that Concepcions deposition be taken before the
Clerk of Court of Makati City. The court ratiocinated
that procedural technicalities should be brushed aside
because of the urgency of the situation, since
Concepcion was already of advanced age.
After
several motions for change of venue of the depositiontaking, Concepcions deposition was finally taken on
March 9, 2001 at her residence.
Aggrieved, respondents assailed the August 25
and November 3 RTC orders in a special civil action
for certiorari before the CA. On August 15, 2001, the
CA rendered a Decision favorable to the respondents,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
GRANTED and the August 25, 2000 and
November 3, 2000 orders of the court a
quo are hereby SET ASIDE, and any
deposition that may have been taken on
the authority of such void orders is
similarly declared void.
SO ORDERED.
At the outset, the CA observed that there was a
defect in the respondents petition by not impleading
the People of the Philippines, an indispensable party.
This notwithstanding, the appellate court resolved the
matter on its merit, declaring that the examination of
prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is
governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of
Court. The latter provision, said the appellate court,
only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the specific
provision of Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcions
deposition should have been taken before the judge or
the court where the case is pending, which is the RTC
of Cebu, and not before the Clerk of Court of Makati
City; and thus, in issuing the assailed order, the RTC
clearly committed grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE:
WON RULE 23 OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL
PROCEDURE
APPLIES
TO
THE
DEPOSITION OF PETITIONER.

RULING:
NO. It is basic that all witnesses shall give
their testimonies at the trial of the case in the
presence of the judge.
This is especially true in
criminal cases in order that the accused may be
afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the
witnesses pursuant to his constitutional right to
confront the witnesses face to face. It also gives the
parties and their counsel the chance to propound such
questions as they deem material and necessary to
support their position or to test the credibility of said
witnesses. Lastly, this rule enables the judge to
observe the witnesses demeanor. This rule, however,
is not absolute. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12,
13 and 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, allow the conditional examination of both
the defense and prosecution witnesses.
Petitioners
contend
that
Concepcions
advanced age and health condition exempt her from
the application of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls for the application
of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The
contention does not persuade.
Undoubtedly, the procedure set forth in Rule
119 applies to the case at bar. It is thus required that
the conditional examination be made before the court
where the case is pending. It is also necessary that
the accused be notified, so that he can attend the
examination, subject to his right to waive the same
after reasonable notice.
As to the manner of
examination, the Rules mandate that it be conducted
in the same manner as an examination during trial,
that is, through question and answer.
We agree with the CA and quote with approval
its ratiocination in this wise:
Unlike an examination of a
defense witness which, pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 119 of the previous Rules,
and now Section 13, Rule 119 of the
present Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, may be taken before any
judge, or, if not practicable, a member of
the Bar in good standing so designated by
the judge in the order, or, if the order be
made by a court of superior jurisdiction,
before an inferior court to be designated
therein, the examination of a witness for
the prosecution under Section 15 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
(December 1, 2000) may be done only
before the court where the case is
pending.
Rule 119 categorically states that the
conditional examination of a prosecution witness
shall be made before the court where the case is
pending. Contrary to petitioners contention, there is
nothing in the rule which may remotely be interpreted
to mean that such requirement applies only to cases
where the witness is within the jurisdiction of said
court and not when he is kilometres away, as in the
present case.
Therefore, the court may not
introduce exceptions or conditions. Neither may
it engraft into the law (or the Rules)
qualifications not contemplated.
When the
words are clear and categorical, there is no room

for interpretation.
application.

There is only room for

Petitioners further insist that Rule 23 applies

to the instant case, because the rules on civil
procedure apply suppletorily to criminal cases.
It is true that Section 3, Rule 1 of the Rules of
Court provides that the rules of civil procedure apply
to all actions, civil or criminal, and special
proceedings. In effect, it says that the rules of civil
procedure have suppletory application to criminal
cases. However, it is likewise true that the criminal
proceedings are primarily governed by the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure. Considering that Rule
119 adequately and squarely covers the situation in
the instant case, we find no cogent reason to apply
Rule 23 suppletorily or otherwise.
Sec. 17 - Discharge of accused as state
witness
EUGENE C. YU vs. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING
JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF TAGAYTAY
CITY, BRANCH 18, THE HONORABLE
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
ASSISTANT PROVINCIAL PROSECUTOR JOSE M.
VELASCO, SEC. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA,
RODOLFO OCHOA and REYNALDO DE LOS
SANTOS A.K.A. "Engine,"
G.R. No. 142848; June 30, 2006; Chico-Nazario, J.
Facts:
An information was filed before the RTC of
Tagaytay City against Messrs. Pedro Lim, Bonifacio
Rojas, Capt. Alfredo Abad, Toto Mirasol, Venerando
Ozores, Mariano Hizon, Eugenio Hizon and private
respondents de los Santos and Ochoa for the
kidnapping and murder of the late Atty. Eugene Tan
(former President of IBP) and his driver, Eduardo
Constantino that happened on 14 November 1994.
While under custody of the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission (PACC), private respondents Ochoa and
de los Santos executed separate sworn statements
implicating petitioner in the crime. The PACC re-filed
the complaint against petitioner. Thereafter, three (3)
separate informations were filed against him.
The RTC found probable cause and directed
the prosecution to amend the information to include
him as an accomplice. However, the prosecution
maintains that the petitioner should be charged as a
principal and impugns the resolution of the judge. The
prosecution then filed a Petition to Discharge as State
Witnesses and Exclude from the Information accused
Ochoa and de los Santos and the judge granted the
said motion. The CA affirmed the said order and
concluded that there was no necessity for a hearing to
determine a persons qualification as a state witness
after the DOJ had attested to his qualification.
Republic Act No. 6981, Witness Protection and
Security Benefit Program (WPSBP), conferred upon
the DOJ the sole authority to determine whether or not
an accused is qualified for admission into the program.
It held that under Section 12 of the said act, upon the
filing by the prosecution of a petition to discharge an
accused from the information, it is mandatory for the

court to order the discharge and exclusion of the

accused.
Issue:
Whether the discharge of the accused as state
witnesses needs prior determination of the trial court
for their qualification
Ruling:
No, Section 17 of Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure is only one of the modes
of the discharge of the accused as a state witness.
The prosecution availed of RA 6981 in the
discharge of the accused as state witnesses. It is
distinct and separate from Section 17, Rule 119. The
immunity provided under the former is granted by the
DOJ while the latter is granted by the court. The
former only requires compliance with Section 14, Rule
110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. On
the other hand, Section 17, Rule 119, contemplates a
situation where the information has been filed and the
accused had been arraigned and the case is
undergoing trial. The discharge of an accused under
this rule may be ordered upon motion of the
prosecution before resting its case, that is, at any
stage of the proceedings, from the filing of the
information to the time the defense starts to offer any
evidence.
As pointed out by the Court in the case of
Soberano v. People, Section 14, Rule 110 allows the
amendment of the information made before plea
excluding some or one of the accused to be made only
upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the
offended party and with leave of court in compliance.
It does not qualify the grounds for the exclusion of the
accused and therefore, applies when it is for
utilization of the accused as state witness, as in this
case, or on some other ground. At this level, the
procedural requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 on
the need for the prosecution to present evidence and
the sworn statement of each state witness at a hearing
in support of the discharge do not yet come into play.
This is because the determination of who should be
criminally charged in court is essentially an executive
function, not a judicial one. Section 12 of Republic Act
No. 6981 provides that the issuance of a certification
of admission into the program shall be given full faith
by the provincial or city prosecutor who is required
not to include the witness in the criminal complaint or
information, and if included, to petition for his
discharge in order that he can be utilized as a state
witness. This provision justifies the regularity of the
procedure adopted by the prosecution for the
discharge of the private respondents. Section 9 of
Rule 119 does not support the proposition that the
power to choose who shall be a state witness is an
inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the
court is given the power to discharge a state witness
only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over
the crime and the accused.
The petitioner argues that the petition to
discharge is not supported by any proof or evidence.
There is no requirement under Republic Act No. 6891
that the sworn statement and memorandum of
agreement between the private respondents and the
DOJ be first presented in court before an accused may
be admitted to the WPSBP. Moreover, the DOJ which is

tasked to implement the provisions of RA 6981, has

determined that the private respondents have satisfied
the requirements for admission under the WPSBP.
PEOLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs HON. NAZAR U.
CHAVES, Judge RTC-Cagayan de Oro City
G.R. No. 131377
February 11, 2003
FACTS:
A Criminal information for Multiple Murder for
the killing of members of the Bucag family were filed
against Felipe Galarion, Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit,
Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and
Richard Doe. It was originally filed before the RTC of
Gingoog City, however by virtue of Administrative
Order, the case was transferred to RTC of Cagayan de
Oro which was presided by Judge Nazar Chaves. Only
Felipe Galarion was tried and convicted. All the other
accused were at large. Two years later, Felizardo
Roxas was identified as another member of the group
who was responsible for the murder. With that, an
amended information was filed before the same court.
During the preliminary investigation, Roxas implicated
Atty. Miguel Paderanga, his counsel, as the
mastermind of the killings. Consequently, the amended
information was again amended to include Atty.
Paderanga as one of the accused.
During the trial, the court ruled that before Roxas
be presented as a witness for the prosecution, he must
first be discharged as a state witness, otherwise the
prosecution can not present him as a hostile witness.
The prosecution filed a motion for reconsideration, in
the alternative, to discharge Roxas as a state
witness. The trial court issued an Order allowing the
presentation of the testimony of Felizardo Roxas for
purposes of proving the conditions of Rule 119,
Section 9 of the Rules of Court on the discharge of a
state witness. However, the trial court ruled against
Roxas on the ground that the presentation of Roxas
testimony will be tantamount to allowing him to testify
as a state witness even before his discharge as such;
that the qualification of a proposed state witness
must be proved by evidence other than his own
testimony; and that at the hearing for the
discharge of a proposed state witness, only his
sworn statement can be presented and not his
oral testimony, thought the prosecution may still
present any other evidence in support of the
discharge. The prosecution filed a motion for
reconsideration but it was denied. Thereupon, the
prosecution filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition,
and mandamus with the CA assailing the order of the
trial court, but it was denied. Hence, the present
petition in SC.
ISSUE:

Is the evidence that needs to be presented

by the prosecution in its motion to discharge
limited to the sworn statement executed by its
proposed witness?
HELD:
NO, Rule 119, Section 17 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure provides that the trial court may
direct one or more of the accused to be discharged
with their consent so that they may be witnesses for
the state after requiring the prosecution to
present evidence and the sworn statement of
each proposed state witness at a hearing in
support of the discharge. The provision does not
make any distinction as to the kind of evidence the
prosecution may present. What it simply requires, in
addition to the presentation of the sworn statement of
the accused concerned, is the presentation of such
evidence as are necessary to determine if the
conditions exist for the discharge, so as to meet the
object of the law, which is to prevent unnecessary or
arbitrary exclusion from the complaint of persons
guilty of the crime charged. No exemption from the
term evidence is provided by the law as to
exclude the testimony of the accused. When the
law does not distinguish, we should not
distinguish.
In the case at bar, there is no other evidence
more competent than the testimony of the proposed
witness himself to prove the conditions that his
testimony is absolutely necessary; that there is no
other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense; that his testimony can be
corroborated in its material points; that he does not
appear to be the most guilty; and that he has not been
convicted
of
any
offense
involving
moral
turpitude. Further, the trial judge will not be able to
clarify matters found in the sworn statements of the
proposed witnesses if they are not allowed to testify.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs
FELICIANO ANABE y CAPILLAN, Appellant.
G.R. No. 179033, September 6, 2010

in the living room. She maintained that Feliciano

admitted to her the authorship of the crime.
Thereafter, he instructed them to immediately leave
the house so that they would not be suspected of
killing Uy. Before leaving, Feliciano set the house on
fire. They headed for the pier and boarded a boat that
brought them to Masbate. On Felicitas request,
appellant brought her to her province, Butuan. She
was soon brought to Bombo Radio where she
surrendered.
The Quezon City RTC convicted appellant as
charged robbery with homicide and destructive
arson based on the testimony of Felicita in which such
decision was affirmed by the appellate court. Hence,
the present appeal.
ISSUE:
WON Felicitas uncorroborated testimony on
appellants confession can stand alone and be given
full credence.
RULING:
The claim of Felicita that appellant confessed
to the killing of Uy must be corroborated to be given
credence. Like any other testimony, Felicita's
statements cannot be readily accepted hook, line and
sinker. More important, the testimony of a state
witness must be received with great caution and
carefully scrutinized. The rule is that the testimony of
a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing
the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by
itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof
of a moral certainty that the latter committed the
crime. It must be substantially corroborated in its
material points by unimpeachable testimony and
strong circumstances, and must be to such an extent
that its trustworthiness becomes manifest
Turning an accused into a state witness is not
a magic formula that cures all the deficiencies in the
prosecutions evidence. The state witness cannot
simply
allege
everything
left
unproved
and
automatically produce a conviction of the crime
charged
against
the
remaining
accused. Corroboration of the account of the state
witness is key. It is in fact a requirement for the
discharge of an accused to be a state witness
under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court that the testimony to be given can be
substantially corroborated in its material points.
Felicitas testimony was found to be uncorroborated.
Hence, it couldnt be given full credit by the court.

FACTS:
Feliciano Anabe and Felicita Generalao in
conspiracy with another person, were charged with
robbery with homicide and destructive arson in the
Quezon City RTC. When arraigned, appellants pleaded
not guilty. FELICITA, who turned state witness gave
her version of the crime. She imputed guilt to
Feliciano for the death of Lam Tiong Uy (Uy), the
brother-in-law of Jose Chan whom the latter requested
to stay in his house while he and his family were
vacationing abroad. The appellants and one Conrada
were Chans household helpers who were with Uy
during the commission of the crime. She alleged that
she saw appellant (Feliciano) holding a knife which
was purportedly used in killing Uy then lying lifeless

Sec. 18 - Effect of Discharge

EDUARDO ROSALES, HON. RODOLFO G.
PALATTAO and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, NELSON EXCONDE and
RONILO AONUEVO
G.R. Nos. 80418-19 October 23, 1992 FIRST
DIVISION (BELLOSILLO, J.)
Topic: Effect of discharge Sec. 18
Crime: Murder
Place of commission: Lucena City
FACTS:
An Information was filed before RTC of Lucena
City charging Eduardo Rosales, together with Crisanto

Bautista and private respondents Nelson Exconde and

Ronilo Aonuevo for the murder of Marcial Punzalan,
an ex-Mayor of San Antonio and Tiaong towns in
Quezon Province, and his leader, Demetrio Ramos. In
the trial of the case, the prosecution presented
Eduardo Rosales and then Crisanto Bautista as
witnesses before moving for their discharge.
Admittedly, their testimonies led to the identification
of the alleged masterminds of the slayings, which
included prominent local political leaders like exMayor Ananiano Wagan of San Antonio and ex-Mayor
Francisco Escueta of Tiaong as well as two (2)
barangay captains, and to the filing of an information
against the four. The trial court granted the discharge
of Rosales but deferred action on the motion to
discharged Bautista pending resolution of this case.
Private respondents pleaded for the reconsideration of
Rosales' discharge by the same was denied. Upon
petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals,
however, the order of discharge was recalled as the
appellate court found no plausible reason for the
discharge of Rosales after he admitted his guilt in the
course of his testimony. Hence, this petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals
and its Resolution denying reconsideration.
ISSUE:
Is the Court of Appeals correct in annulling the
discharge of the accused?
HELD:
NO, At the time of Rosales' discharge, the
corresponding Information against the alleged
masterminds had not yet been filed. His testimony, if
ever, was then to be a future undertaking on his part,
and the successful prosecution of those responsible for
the dastardly acts would hinge solely on his testimony
as a state witness. As such, his discharge satisfied the
intent of Sec. 9 of Rule 119 that one or more
discharged accused "may be witnesses for the State"
and was therefore in accord with law.
The rule is that the discharge of an accused is
left to the sound discretion of the lower court, which
has the exclusive responsibility to see to it that the
conditions prescribed by the Rules are met. While it is
the usual practice of the prosecution to present the
accused who turns state witness only after his
discharge, the trial court may nevertheless sanction
his discharge after his testimony if circumstances so
warrant. In this case, the imminent risk to his life
justified the deviation from the normal course of
procedure as a measure to protect him while at the
same time ensuring his undaunted cooperation with
the prosecution. Indeed, as is explicit from the Rule,
as long as the motion for discharge of an accused to
be utilized as a state witness is filed before the
prosecution rests, the trial court should, if warranted,
grant it.
Once a discharge is effected, any subsequent
showing that not all the five (5) requirements outlined
in Sec. 9 of Rule 119 were actually fulfilled cannot
adversely affect the legal consequences of such
discharge which, under Sec. 10 of the Same Rule,
operates as an acquittal of the accused thus
discharged and shall forever be a bar to his
prosecution for the same offense. The Court of
Appeals committed a reversible error when it annulled

and set aside the order for the discharge of the

accused Eduardo Rosales there being no showing that
he actually failed or refused to testify against his coconspirations.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE v. PABLO L.
ESTACIO, JR. and MARITESS ANG
G.R. No. 171655, July 22, 2009, (MORALES, J.)
FACTS:
At around 10:00 in the evening of October 10,
1995, Maritess, together with Estacio and Sumipo,
arrived at Casa Leonisa, a bar-restaurant at Examiner
Street, Quezon City where the three of them would
meet with Charlie Mancilla Chua (the victim). On
Estacios instruction, Sumipo drove towards San Jose
del Monte, Bulacan and on reaching a secluded place,
Estacio ordered Sumipo to stop the car as he did.
Maritess and Estacio then brought the victim to a
grassy place.
Estacio with bloodied hands later
resurfaced. The three then headed towards Malinta,
Valenzuela, Bulacan.
On the way, Estacio and
Maritess talked about how they killed the victim. The
three later abandoned the car in Malinta.
The
following morning, Estacio went to the residence of
Sumipo where he called up by telephone the victims
mother and demanded a P15,000,000 ransom. The
mother replied, however, that she could not afford that
amount. In the afternoon of the same day, Maritess
and Estacio went to Sumipos residence again where
Estacio again called up the victims mother, this time
lowering the ransom demand to P10,000,000 which
she still found to be too steep. The group then went to
Greenhills where Estacio still again called up the
victims mother, still lowering the ransom demand to
P5,000,000, P1,000,000 of which should be advanced.
The victims mother having agreed to the demand,
Maritess and Estacio directed her to place the money
in a garbage can near Pizza Hut in Greenhills at 11:30
in the evening.
On May 16, 1996, Sumipo surrendered to the
National Bureau of Investigation. On May 23, 1996,
Estacio surrendered to the police. The police then
informed the victims mother that Estacio had
admitted having killed her son, and that he offered to
accompany them to the crime scene.
Branch 219 of the Quezon City RTC found both
Estacio and Maritess guilty of kidnapping on the
occasion of which the victim was killed,
The Court of Appeals affirmed, with
modification, the trial courts decision, and finding
accused-appellants Maritess Ang and Pablo Estacio, Jr.
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
kidnapping with murder and sentencing them to each
suffer the penalty of death.

ISSUE:

erroneous, such error would not affect

competency and quality of his testimony.

WON the offense of which appellants were convicted

was erroneously designated.
HELD:
YES, The crime committed was thus plain
Murder. The killing was qualified by treachery. The
victim was gagged, bound, and taken from Quezon
City to an isolated place in Bulacan against his will to
prevent him from defending himself and to facilitate
the killing.
Respecting
the
assigned
error
in
discharging Sumipo as a state witness, the same
does not lie. The conditions for the discharge of an
accused as a state witness are as follows:
a.

There is absolute necessity for the testimony

of the accused whose discharge is requested;

b.

There is no other direct evidence available for

the proper prosecution of the offense
committed except the testimony of said
accused;

c.

The testimony of said accused

substantially corroborated in its
points;

the

Finally, the Court brushes aside Maritess

disclaimer of
participation in killing the victim. It
was she who bound the hands and gagged the victim.
When Estacio, in Maritess company, brought the
victim to the scene of the crime and thereafter
returned to the car, her and Estacios hands were
bloodied.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals of May 12, 2005 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The Court finds appellants Maritess
Ang and Pablo Estacio, Jr. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of Murder, with the generic aggravating
circumstance of use of motor vehicle.
PONTEJOS V DESIERTO
CRIME: Grave misconduct
TOPIC: Effect of discharge
FACTS:

can be
material

d.

Said accused does not appear to be the most

guilty; and

e.

Said accused has not at any time been

convicted of any offense involving moral
turpitude.

These conditions were established by the

prosecution. Sumipo was the only person other than
appellants who had personal knowledge of the acts for
which they were being prosecuted. Only he could
positively identify appellants as the perpetrators of the
crime. He does not appear to be the most guilty. He
did not participate in planning the commission of the
crime. He in fact at first thought that Maritess was
joking when she said, Diretsong dukot na rin kay
Charlie. He tried to dissuade appellants from
pursuing their plan. He did not participate in the
actual stabbing. And he tried to extricate himself from
the attempts to extract ransom from the victims
family.
And there is no proof that Sumipo had, at
any time, been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude. Even assuming arguendo that
the discharge of Sumipo as a state witness was

In a case decided by petitioner arbiter

Pontejos, Rasemco, through Aquino, asked for the
nullification of all the proceedings conducted before
said petitioner for alleged extortion, bribery and graft
and corruption committed by him in conspiracy with
Director Wilfredo Imperial and Ms. Carmen Atos, both
of HLURB and one Roderick Ngo, officer of
Hammercon, Inc.
Respondent Ombudsman Desierto issued an
order placing petitioner Pontejos under preventive
suspension for 6 months without pay and further
directing him and Dir. Imperial to file their counteraffidavits and other controverting evidence to the
complaint. Thereafter, the Evaluation and preliminary
investigation bureau (EPIB) of the Office of the
Ombudsman issued a joint resolution recommending
that: an Information for Estafa (one count), direct
bribery and unauthorized practice of profession in
violation of RA 6713 be filed against respondent
Pontejos; complaint against Director Imperial and Ngo
be dismissed for insufficiency of evidence; and
respondent Atos be extended immunity from criminal
prosecution in accordance with Section 17 of R.A 6770
and be utilized as a state witness. So the Office of the
Ombudsman filed criminal informations for bribery
and estafa against respondent Pontejos. Then in a
Resolution dated June 21, 1999, the Office of the
Ombudsman granted Atos immunity from criminal
prosecution for bribery and estafa filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the above
decision but was denied by the Ombudsman. Filed
Petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
in the CA, denied also and upheld the Ombudsman's
decision finding petitioner guilty of grave misconduct.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the CA
denied his motion. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:

Did CA err in not declaring that the grant of immunity

to Ms. Atos was improper.
HELD:
NO, the power to choose who to discharge as
state witness is an executive function. Essentially, it is
not a judicial prerogative. It is constitutionally
permissible for Congress to vest the prosecutor with
the power to determine who can qualify as a witness
and be granted immunity from prosecution. The Court
has previously upheld the discretion of the DOJ,
Comelec, and the PCGG to grant immunity from
prosecution on the basis of the respective laws that
vested them with such power. The OMB was also
vested with the power to grant immunity from
prosecution.
According to Pontejos, the OMB's authority to
grant immunity is subject to the "pertinent provisions
of the Rules of Court (Sec.17)." He claims that the
procedural rules allow the discharge of an accused as
state witness only upon conformity of the trial court.
An information against the accused must first be filed
in court prior to the discharge. Moreover, the
prosecution could only recommend and propose, but
not grant immunity. The Court has already held that
this provision is applicable only to cases already filed
in court. The trial court is given the power to
discharge an accused as a state witness only because
it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and
the accused. The fact that an individual had not been
previously charged or included in an information does
not prevent the prosecution from utilizing said person
as a witness.
Section 17 of the Ombudsman Act requires
conformity with the Rules of Court, thus requiring the
following circumstances prior to the discharge: (1)
absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused
sought to be discharged; (2) no direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution of the offense
committed except the testimony of the said accused;
(3) the testimony of the said accused can be
substantially corroborated in its material points; (4)
said accused does not appear to be most guilty; and
(5) said accused has not any time been convicted of
any offense involving moral turpitude.
There must be a standard to follow in the
exercise of the prosecutor's discretion. The decision to
grant immunity cannot be made capriciously. Should
there be unjust favoritism, the Court may exercise its
certiorari power.
In the present case, certiorari is not proper.
Pontejos' allegations do not show, much less allege,
grave abuse of discretion in the granting of immunity
to Atos. The OMB considered Atos' position, record
and involvement in the case prior to the discharge.
DENIED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ELMER DE LA
CRUZ and TRANGUILINO MARTINEZ
G.R.no. 173308 June 25, 2008
FACTS:
Charged with the crime of kidnapping for
ransom were accused-appellants De la Cruz and
Martinez, along with three others, namely, Aldrin Tano
(Tano), Romeo Dano (Dano) and Rex Tarnate
(Tarnate).

Thereafter, while in the process of presenting

its witnesses, the prosecution filed a motion to
discharge accused Tano as a state witness. The RTC
granted the motion.
De la Cruz was employed by Erwin as a family
driver. He brought Aaron, then an eight-year-old thirdgrade student, to and from Claret School. On
November 9, 1998, De la Cruz fetched Aaron from
school. Martinez got inside the car and handcuffed
Aaron's left wrist. Martinez then drove the car all the
way to Batasan Hills where Dano resided. They
fetched Dano who took over control of the car from
Martinez. They proceeded to Minuyan, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan. Upon arrival, they removed Aaron's
handcuff and entered a vacant house. Martinez and
Tano left Aaron with De la Cruz and proceeded to
Tarnate's house. The following morning, Martinez
ordered Tano to call Erwin to prepare P3 million for
your sons safety.
At the vacant house where Aaron and De la
Cruz were being kept, Quinano saw the two and asked
them why they were there. Quinano then brought the
two to the barangay hall. Erwin was then informed by
phone that his son was already in the custody of the
barangay officials. The Police thereafter conducted an
investigation.
Tarnate immediately admitted his participation
and revealed information on the identities and
whereabouts of the other accused. The police
proceeded to Batasan Hills to arrest the three other
accused but Dano and Martinez were able to escape in
the confusion and only Tano was arrested.
ISSUE:
Whether Tano appear to be the least guilty among the
accused and that his testimony was necessary
HELD:
For an accused to be discharged as a state witness,
the following conditions must be present:
When two or more persons are jointly
charged with the commission of any offense,
upon motion of the prosecution before resting its
case, the court may direct one or more of the
accused to be discharged with their consent so
that they may be witnesses for the state when,
after requiring the prosecution to present
evidence and the sworn statement of each
proposed state witness at a hearing in support of
the discharge, the court is satisfied that:
a)

There is absolute necessity for the

testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence
available for the proper prosecution of
the offense committed, except the
testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be
substantially
corroborated
in
its
material points;
d) Said accused does not appear to be the
most guilty; and,
e) Said accused has not at any time been
convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.
f)

The provision does not require that a state

witness should appear to be the "least guilty" among
the accused. Rather, it provides that he "does not
appear to be the most guilty" the finding of the lower
court revealed that Tano merely facilitated the
commission of the crime. He merely boarded the car
and sat beside accused-appellant De la Cruz
throughout the whole ride and accompanied accusedappellant Martinez in going back to Batasan Hills after
leaving Aaron and accused-appellant De la Cruz in
Bulacan. True, he was the one who placed the call to
Erwin to demand ransom. However, he was neither
the mastermind nor the one who hatched the plan to
kidnap Aaron in exchange of money. Clearly, he did not
appear to be the most guilty among the accused.
Moreover, his testimony was absolutely
necessary as it was the only direct evidence
establishing the presence of conspiracy, from the
planning stage up to the commission of the crime.
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS, De la
Cruz and Martinez were found guilty of kidnapping for
ransom.
Galo Monge v. People
March 7, 2008, Tinga, J.
PETITION DENIED
Monges
challenge
against
Potencios
discharge as a state witness must also fail. Not a few
cases established the doctrine that the discharge of
an accused so he may turn state witness is left to
the exercise of the trial courts sound discretion
limited only by the requirements set forth in Sec.
17 and 25 of Rule 119. Thus, whether the accused
offered to be discharged appears to be the least guilty
and whether there is objectively an absolute necessity
for his testimony are questions that lie within the
domain of the trial court, it being the competent to
resolve issues of fact. The discretionary judgment of
the trial court with respect to highly factual issue is
not to be interfered with by the appellate courts
except in case of grave abuse of discretion. Hence, no
such grave abuse of discretion is present in this case.
Suffice it to say that issues relative to the discharge of
an accused must be raised in the trial court as they
cannot be addressed for the first time on appeal.
An order discharging an accused from the
information in order that he may testify for the
prosecution has the effect of an acquittal. Once the
discharge is ordered by the trial court, any future
development showing that any or all of the conditions
provided in Sec.17 have not actually been fulfilled will
not affect the legal consequence of an acquittal.
Any witting or unwitting error of the
Prosecution, therefore, in moving for the discharge
and of the court in granting the motion (no question of
jurisdiction being involved) will not deprive the
discharged accused of the benefit of acquittal and of
his right against double jeopardy. A contrary rule
would certainly be unfair to the discharged accused
because he would then be faulted for a failure
attributable to the prosecutor. It is inconceivable that
the rule has adopted the abhorrent legal policy of
placing the fate of the discharged accused at the
mercy of anyone who may handle the prosecution.

Indeed, then only instance where the

testimony of a discharged accused may be
disregarded is when he deliberately fails to
testify truthfully in court in accordance with his
commitment (Sec 18). Potencio lived up to his
commitment, with such, petition is denied.
Sec. 23 - Demurrer to Evidence
ANTONIO Y. DE JESUS, SR., ANATOLIO A. ANG,
and MARTINA S. APIGO vs. SANDIGANBAYAN 4TH
DIVISION and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
FACTS
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Mayor
Antonio De Jesus, Sr. as well as his Vice Mayor and
Treasurer of falsification of public document before
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 26764. The three
accused along with the Mayors son were also charged
of violation of RA 3019 before the same court in
Criminal Case 26766. The first information allege that
the accused local officials falsified the Requests for
Quotation and Abstract of Proposal of Canvass by
making it appear that Cuad Lumber and Hinundayan
Lumber submitted quotations for the supply of coco
lumber, when they did in fact do so, in violation of
Article 171 of the RPC.
The second information
alleges that, taking advantage of their positions, the
three municipal officers gave unwarranted advantage
to De Jesus, Jr., who operated under the name
Anahawan Coco Lumber Supply, by awarding to him
the supply of coco lumber worthP16,767.00.
On April 12, 2005, after the prosecution rested
its case, all three accused filed a motion for leave to
file demurrer to evidence, which motion the
Sandiganbayan denied. Rather than present evidence,
however, they proceeded to file their demurrer, in
effect waiving their right to present evidence. The
prosecution opposed the demurrer. Sandiganbayan
rendered judgment convicting the accused local
officials, but acquitted the mayors son.
ISSUE
WON the Sandiganbayan erred in denying the
accused local officials of the opportunity to present
their defense after it denied their demurrer to
evidence.
HELD
NO. The accused local officials assail the
Sandiganbayans refusal to allow them to present
evidence of their defense after it denied their
demurrer to evidence. But, contrary to their claim,
the Sandiganbayan did not grant these officials leave
to file their demurrer. It in fact denied them that leave
without prejudice, however, to their nonetheless filing
one subject to the usual risk of denial.
Having denied the accused local officials
demurrer to evidence, the Sandiganbayan was
justified in likewise denying their motion to be allowed
to present evidence in their defense. The 2000 Rules
on Criminal Procedure, particularly Section 23, Rule
119, provide:
Section 23. Demurrer to evidence. x x x
If the court denies the demurrer to
evidence filed with leave of court, the

accused may adduce evidence in his

defense.
When the demurrer to
evidence is filed without leave of
court, the accused waives the right
to present evidence and submits
the case for judgment on the basis
of
the
evidence
for
the
prosecution.
WHEREFORE,
the
Court DENIES the
petition
and AFFIRMS the
Sandiganbayan
Decision
promulgated on March 7, 2007 and its Resolution
dated April 16, 2008.
PEOPLE V UY
CRIME: Murder
TOPIC: Demurrer to evidence
FACTS:
The Decision dated April 7, 2003 of the RTC
Misamis Oriental, granting the separate demurrer to
evidence of accused Louel Uy and Teofilo Panangin
resulting in their acquittal for murder due to
insufficiency of evidence, but nevertheless holding
them jointly and severally liable to pay P35,000 to the
heirs of the victim Rabel Campos representing vigil
and burial expenses is being assailed in the present
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court by the People and the mother of the
victim.
The victim, Rabel Campos, was found dead
with several stab wounds in the morning of March 23,
2001 along the National Highway of Maputi, Naawan,
Misamis Oriental. Panangin was arrested and during
the investigation he executed a Sworn Statement with
the assistance of Atty. Celso Sarsaba of the Public
Attorneys Office (PAO), stating that, he thus stabbed
Rabel once at the stomach as instructed by Uy,
he was hesistant but Uy threatened to shoot him.
After he stabbed Rabel, she was able to run away.
Uy, however, took the knife from him and chased
Rabel. On catching up with her, Uy dragged her
to the ground and stabbed her several times until
she expired.
Thus, Atty. Patricio S. Bernales, Jr., District
Agent-in-Charge of the NBI-ILDO, filed a case for
murder against Panangin and Uy before the10 th MCTC
of Lugait-Manticao Naawan. The MCTC found both Uy
and Panangin as the accused and thereby issued a
warrant of arrest against them. When arraigned, both
entered plea of not guilty.

NO, the general rule in this jurisdiction is that

a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable. The
same rule applies in criminal cases where a demurer
to evidence is granted. However, just like any other
rule, such is not absolute. By way of exception, a
judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court upon a clear showing by the
petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting the
accused, committed not merely reversible errors of
judgement but also grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial
of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment
void.
This Court finds that the trial court committed
not only gross reversible error of judgment but also
was actuated with grave abuse of discretion,
exceeding the parameters of its jurisdiction, in holding
that Panangins retracting of his confession shows that
the execution thereof was involuntary and that in any
event it was inadmissible as it was a fruit of [a]
poisonous tree3. The trial court blindly accepted the
claim of the defense that the confession was not made
voluntarily on the basis of an affidavit executed by
Panangin on July 1, 2002 or more than 5 months after
his sworn statement-confession was given and after
the prosecution rested its case, which affidavit
Panangin was not even called to identify and
affirm at the witness stand, hence, hearsay.
The decision of the trial court undoubtedly
deprived the prosecution of due process as it was not
given the opportunity to check the veracity of
Panangins alleged retraction. GRANTED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BENJAMIN
SABAYOC, PATRICIO ESCORPISO, MARLON
BUENVIAJE and MIGUEL BUENVIAJE
G.R.No. 147201 January 15, 2004
Facts
On December 2, 1994, Galam was shot to
death at the Rooftop Disco and Lodging House
(Rooftop) owned by him, which was located at
Barangay Quezon, Solano, Nueva Vizcaya.
Earlier that day, Benjamin Sayaboc went to the
Rooftop looking for Galam. Sayaboc waited for about 3
hours when the vehicle of Joseph Galam arrived.
Shortly thereafter, employees heard four gunbursts
emanating from the ground floor of the building. One
of them saw Sayaboc shooting Galam, causing the
latter to fall to the ground face up. Sayaboc forthwith
ran out and toward the tricycle boarded by Marlon
Buenviaje, his father Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio
Escorpiso and sped off towards the center of the town.

Thereafter, Panangin, with leave of court, filed

on March 3, 2003 a demurrer to evidence on the
ground that when he executed his extra-judicial
confession, his rights under Sec. 12, Bill of Rights of
the Constitution were violated. More than a month
from the filing, the trial court granted the same.

At the hearing, after the prosecution rested its

case, counsel for accused Buenviajes and Patricio
Escorpiso manifested that he be given 15 days to file a
motion for leave to admit demurrer to the evidence.

ISSUE:

poisonous tree in jurisprudence is that contemplated

in above-quoted constitutional provisions. It refers
to object, not testimonial, evidence. And it refers to
an object seized in the course of an illegal search and
seizure.

Was the demurrer to evidence valid

HELD:

3 The inadmissible evidence termed as fruit of a

The trial court acceded. But instead of filing such

motion first, he filed a Demurrer to Evidence on 12
July 1999. The motion for leave to file the pleading
was filed the next day only. The trial court denied the
demurrer to evidence and the Buenviajes and
Escorpiso were deemed to have submitted their case
for judgment. Thus, only Sayaboc was allowed to
proceed with the presentation of his defense.
Trial Court: Benjamin Sayaboc - guilty of the
crime of murder; Marlon Buenviaje, Miguel Buenviaje,
and Patricio Escorpiso - guilty of the crime of homicide
only
ISSUE:
Whether the Buenviajes and Escorpiso were denied
constitutional right to due process when they were not
able to present evidence in their defense
HELD:
The case CANNOT be remanded to the trial
court. The filing of the demurrer was clearly without
leave of court. The trial court, therefore, correctly
applied the rule on demurrer to evidence found in
Section 15, Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure when it disallowed the abovementioned
appellants to present evidence on their behalf. They
cannot now claim that they were denied their right to
be heard by themselves and counsel.
The filing of a demurrer to evidence without
leave of court is an unqualified waiver of the right to
present evidence for the accused. The rationale for
this rule is that when the accused moves for dismissal
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence of the
prosecution evidence, he does so in the belief that said
evidence is insufficient to convict and, therefore, any
need for him to present any evidence is negated. An
accused cannot be allowed to wager on the outcome of
judicial proceedings by espousing inconsistent
viewpoints whenever dictated by convenience. The
purpose behind the rule is also to avoid the dilatory
practice of filing motions for dismissal as a demurrer
to the evidence and, after denial thereof, the defense
would then claim the right to present its evidence.
Decision of RTC, MODIFIED: Benjamin
Sayaboc and Marlon Buenviaje guilty, homicide.
Miguel Buenviaje and Patricio Escorpiso - ACQUITTED
on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Sec. 24 - Reopening
People v. Danilo Gole Cruz
Sept. 13, 1989, Regalado, J.
Where and When: Cayombo, Sta. Maria, Bulacan;
1977
Facts
Antonio San Victores testified that around
4:30pm, while on his way to the uninhabited resthouse
of Antonio antaleon to get water, he saw Cruz who
suddenly ran away from the washing area beside the
resthouse and jump over the fence. As he was about to
leave the Kitchen, he heard someone moaning and
found his cousin Teresita Gumapay lying on her back,
wounded in the neck and naked. Teresita said that she
had been raped and stabbed by Cruz. Antonio brought

her to her father, who then got a jeep which brought

Teresita to the hospital, where 15mins later she was
declared dead. Pat. De Jesus, as told by San Victores
that Cruz raped and stabbed Teresita, went to the
house Pio Cruz (father) who said that Danilo was not
at home but promised to surrender him. On the same
night, Danilo with his father surrendered.
The next day, Danilo was interrogated by
Beunviaje, in the presence of De Jesus, which was
reduced into a written statement in Filiino
(Sinumpaang Salaysay), signed by the accused and
witnessed by Benilda (sister) and Pat. Delos Santos.
However, since the judge was not in his office when
Danilo was brought in before noon and in the
afternoon, and when Danilo was presented to the
judge wherein the Judge refused to administer the
oath, the statement was not placed under oath. The
statement presents that the inquiry started with
questions showing compliance with Sec.20, Art IV,
1973 Const. and that Danilo admitted killing Teresita,
who then resorted to the discreditable non mi ricordo
answers to the following questions by the investigator.
The information for Rape with Homicide was
filed with the CFI Sta.Maria, Bulacan presided by
Judge Elbinias. Bail was recommended, but for failure
to post, accused was not released and pleaded not
guilty. In 1980, defense counsel filed by mail a Motion
to submit the accused to Psychiatric Examination, by
which the court ordered NMI Director to cause such
and submit corresponding report., and in accordance
with such signed by Drm Masikip, the accused was
found suffering from a mental disorder called
Schizohreniahe needs further hospitalization and
treatment Danilo escaped from the hospital but was
apprehended the next day by the security force and
police agencies. In 1982, Dr.Maaba reorted that Danilo
is now free from sign and symptoms of Psychosis and
can now stand trial. He is recommended for discharge
and to be returned to jail.
Defense counsel said that Danilo refused to
testify but instead will present a new witness. The
prosecution moved that the testimony of the accused
be stricken for lack of cross-examination. The trial
court declared the case submitted for decision. The
prosecution waived their right to present rebuttal
evidence. In 1983, court issued an order motu propio
to reopen the case to enable it to receive farther
exert testimony from psychiatrists on the mental
condition of the accused at about the time he
committed the instant offense as well as at the time he
was placed on the witness stand during trial, but
refused to continue testifying xxx
ISSUE:
WON the reopening of the case was valid.
HELD:
DENIED. The failure of the accused to complete his
testimony was of his own making, on the initiation,
confirmation and reiteration of his own counsel. The
mere filing of a motion to reopen a case must not in
any way automatically vacate an agreement and order
submitting the case for decision. While the court may
reopen a case for reception of further evidence after
the parties have closed their evidence, such action is
addressed to the sound discretion of the court, to be

exercised only on valid and justifiable reasons which

undoubtedly are inexistent in this case.