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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 159218

March 30, 2004

SALVADOR S. ABUNADO and ZENAIDA BIAS ABUNADO, Petitioners,


vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Responden
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 26135 which affirmed with modification the decision
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 77, San Mateo, Rizal in Criminal Case No. 2803
convicting petitioner Salvador S. Abunado of bigamy.
The records show that on September 18, 1967, Salvador married Narcisa Arceo at the
Manila City Hall before Rev. Pedro Tiangco.2 In 1988 Narcisa left for Japan to work but
returned to the Philippines in 1992, when she learned that her husband was having an
extra-marital affair and has left their conjugal home.
After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe Corazon
Plato. She also discovered that on January 10, 1989, Salvador contracted a second
marriage with a certain Zenaida Bias before Judge Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in San
Mateo, Rizal.3
On January 19, 1995, an annulment case was filed by Salvador against Narcisa.4 On May
18, 1995, a case for bigamy was filed by Narcisa against Salvador and Zenaida.5
Salvador admitted that he first married Zenaida on December 24, 1955 before a
municipal trial court judge in Concepcion, Iloilo and has four children with her prior to
their separation in 1966. It appeared however that there was no evidence of their 1955
marriage so he and Zenaida remarried on January 10, 1989, upon the request of their son
for the purpose of complying with the requirements for his commission in the military.
On May 18, 2001, the trial court convicted petitioner Salvador Abunado of bigamy and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day, as maximum. Petitioner Zenaida Bias was acquitted for
insufficiency of evidence.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court,
as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED as to the penalty
imposed but AFFIRMED in all other respects. Appreciating the mitigating circumstance
that accused is 76 years of age and applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of two (2)
years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as Minimum to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as Maximum. No costs.
SO ORDERED.7
Petitioner is now before us on petition for review.
First, he argues that the Information was defective as it stated that the bigamous marriage
was contracted in 1995 when in fact it should have been 1989.

Indeed, an accused has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him.8 It is required that the acts and omissions complained of as constituting the
offense must be alleged in the Information.9
The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the Information
and not by the title or designation of the offense contained in the caption of the
Information. It is fundamental that every element of which the offense is comprised must
be alleged in the Information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to be alleged in
the Information must be determined by reference to the definition and essential elements
of the specific crimes.10
The question, therefore, is whether petitioner has been sufficiently informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, namely, that he contracted a subsequent
marriage with another woman while his first marriage was subsisting.
The information against petitioner alleges:
That in or about and sometime in the month of January, 1995 at the Municipality of San
Mateo, Rizal place (sic) within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, having been legally married to complainant Narcisa Abunado on September 16,
1967 which has not been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously contract a subsequent marriage to Zenaida Bias Abunado on January 10,
1989 which has all the essential requisites of a valid marriage.
CONTRARY TO LAW.11
The statement in the information that the crime was committed "in or about and
sometime in the month of January, 1995," was an obvious typographical error, for the
same information clearly states that petitioner contracted a subsequent marriage to
Zenaida Bias Abunado on January 10, 1989. Petitioners submission, therefore, that the
information was defective is untenable.
The general rule is that a defective information cannot support a judgment of conviction
unless the defect was cured by evidence during the trial and no objection appears to have
been raised.12 It should be remembered that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted
provided all its elements concur two of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent
marriage which possesses all the requisites for validity.13 All of these have been
sufficiently established by the prosecution during the trial. Notably, petitioner failed to
object to the alleged defect in the Information during the trial and only raised the same
for the first time on appeal before the Court of Appeals.
Second, petitioner argues that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida, which had
the effect of absolving him of criminal liability.
In this regard, we agree with the Court of Appeals when it ruled, thus:
x x x, while he claims that there was condonation on the part of complainant when he
entered into a bigamous marriage, the same was likewise not established by clear and
convincing evidence. But then, a pardon by the offended party does not extinguish
criminal action considering that a crime is committed against the State and the crime of
Bigamy is a public offense which can be denounced not only by the person affected
thereby but even by a civic-spirited citizen who may come to know the same.14
Third, petitioner claims that his petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage
was a prejudicial question, hence, the proceedings in the bigamy case should have been
suspended during the pendency of the annulment case. Petitioner, in fact, eventually
obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999.15
A prejudicial question has been defined as one based on a fact distinct and separate from
the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of
the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said
case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would

be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the
guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. The rationale behind
the principle of suspending a criminal case in view of a prejudicial question is to avoid
two conflicting decisions.16
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated.
Moreover, petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases
considering that an accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage
void and invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case.
We cannot allow that.17
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioners marriage to Narcisa had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioners innocence or guilt in the criminal case for
bigamy, because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.18
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed
valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.19 In this case, even if petitioner
eventually obtained a declaration that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is,
both the first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was
annulled.
Finally, petitioner claims that the penalty imposed on him was improper.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor for bigamy.
Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the court shall sentence the accused to an
indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the
attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the Revised Penal Code, and
the minimum term of which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the Code for the offense. The penalty next lower would be based on the
penalty prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying
circumstance attendant to the commission of the crime. The determination of the
minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be
anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods
into which it might be subdivided. The modifying circumstances are considered only in
the imposition of the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence.20
In light of the fact that petitioner is more than 70 years of age,21 which is a mitigating
circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum
term of the indeterminate sentence should be taken from prision mayor in its minimum
period which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years, while the
minimum term should be taken from prision correccional in any of its periods which
ranges from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Therefore, the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals, i.e., two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as maximum, is proper.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 26135, finding petitioner Salvador S. Abunado guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of bigamy, and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty of
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, is AFFIRMED.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ.

Concurring Opinion
CARPIO, J.:
I concur in the result of the ponencia of Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago finding
appellant Salvador S. Abunado guilty of bigamy.
The material facts are not in dispute. On 18 September 1967, Abunado married Narcisa
Arceno. While his marriage with Arceno remained unannulled, Abunado married Zenaida
Bias on 10 January 1989. Subsequently, on 29 October 1999, Abunado obtained from
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Arceno. On 18 May 2001, the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal rendered a
decision convicting Abunado of bigamy.
The sole issue is whether the second marriage of Abunado to Bias on 10 January 1989
constitutes the crime of bigamy under Article 3491 of the Revised Penal Code. More
precisely, the issue turns on whether Abunados first marriage to Arceno was still
subsisting at the time Abunado married Bias.
Under the Family Code, before one can contract a second marriage on the ground of
nullity of the first marriage, one must first secure a final judgment declaring the first
marriage void. Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
The Family Code took effect on 3 August 1988, before the second marriage of Abunado
on 10 January 1989.
Prior to the Family Code, one could contract a subsequent marriage on the ground of
nullity of the previous marriage without first securing a judicial annulment of the
previous marriage. If subsequently the previous marriage were judicially declared void,
the subsequent marriage would not be deemed bigamous. The nullity of the previous
marriage could even be judicially declared in the criminal case for bigamy,2 although the
person remarrying "assume(d) the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy" 3 should the court
uphold the validity of the first marriage. Article 40 of the Family Code has changed this.
Now, one must first secure a final judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage
before he is freed from the marital bond or vinculum of the previous marriage. If he fails
to secure a judicial declaration of nullity and contracts a second marriage, then the second
marriage becomes bigamous. As the Court stated in Domingo v. Court of Appeals4 in
explaining Article 40 of the Family Code:
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is illegal and void,
marries again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity of his or her first marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with bigamy.
Conversely, if the person remarries without securing a judicial declaration of nullity of
his previous marriage, he is liable for bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family Code considers the marital vinculum of the previous marriage to
subsist for purposes of remarriage, unless the previous marriage is judicially declared
void by final judgment. Thus, if the marital vinculum of the previous marriage subsists
because of the absence of judicial declaration of its nullity, the second marriage is
contracted during the existence of the first marriage resulting in the crime of bigamy.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the marital vinculum of a previous marriage that is
void ab initio subsists only for purposes of remarriage. For purposes other than
remarriage, marriages that are void ab initio, such as those falling under Articles 35 and
36 of the Family Code, are void even without a judicial declaration of nullity. As the
Court held in Cario v. Cario:5

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than
remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. x x
x . (Emphasis supplied)
Cario, penned by Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago herself, contradicts the statement in
her present ponencia that "under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable,
shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding." I believe the
ruling in Cario is correct and should not be disturbed. As Justice Jose C. Vitug explained
in his recent textbook on Civil Law (Volume I):
The phrase "for purposes of remarriage" is not at all insignificant. Void marriages, like
void contracts, are inexistent from the very beginning. It is only by way of exception that
the Family Code requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the previous marriage before
a subsequent marriage is contracted; x x x.6 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the general rule is if the marriage is void ab initio, it is ipso facto void without need
of any judicial declaration of nullity. The only recognized exception7 under existing law
is Article 40 of the Family Code where a marriage void ab initio is deemed valid for
purposes of remarriage, hence necessitating a judicial declaration of nullity before one
can contract a subsequent marriage.
Article 40 of the Family Code applies only to a situation where the previous marriage
suffers from nullity while the second marriage does not. Under Article 40, what requires a
judicial declaration of nullity is the previous marriage, not the subsequent marriage.
Article 40 does not apply to a situation where the first marriage does not suffer from any
defect while the second is void.
Accordingly, I vote to deny the petition and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals
finding appellant Salvador S. Abunado guilty of the crime of bigamy.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1

Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and concurred in by


Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Danilo B. Pine.
2

Exhibit "C", Records, p. 68.

Exhibit "J", Records, p. 81.

Records, p. 202.

Records, p. 1.

Penned by Judge Francisco C. Rodriguez; Rollo, pp. 33-42.

Rollo, p. 53.

Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 14(2).

Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, Rule 110, Sec. 6.

10

Garcia v. People, G.R. No. 144785, 11 September 2003.

11

Rollo, p. 30; underscoring ours.

12

People v. Villamor, G.R. No. 124441, 7 October 1998, 297 SCRA 262, 270.

13

Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747, 752753.
14

Rollo, p. 51.

15

Annex "1", Records, p. 208

16

Te v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126746, 29 November 2000, 346 SCRA 327,
335.
17

Mercado v. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122, 133.

18

Te v. Court of Appeals, supra.

19

Supra.

20

Garcia v. People, supra.

21

Exhibit "J", Records, p. 81.

CARPIO
1

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code provides as follows: "Bigamy- The
penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings."
2

People v. Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 (1954); People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033
(1957).
3

Landicho v. Relova, et al., 130 Phil. 745 (1968).

G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572.

G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127.

Civil Law, Persons and Family Relations, Vol. I, (2003 Ed.)

See also note 4.