DIZON V.

SUNTAY- Pledge of Immovable

An owner of a movable unlawfully pledged by another is not estopped from recovering possession. Where
the owner delivered the diamond ring solely for sale on commission but the seller instead pawned it
without authority, the owner is not stopped form pursuing an action against the pawnshop.

FACTS:
Lourdes Suntay is the owner of a 3-carat diamond ring valued at P5,500. She and Clarita Sison entered
into a transaction wherein the ring would be sold on commission. Clarita received the ring and issued a
receipt. After some time, Lourdes made demands for the return of the ring but the latter refused to comply.
When Lourdes insisted on the return, Clarita gave her the pawnshop ticket which is the receipt of the
pledge and she found out that 3 days after the ring was received by Clarita, it was pledged by Melia
Sison, the niece of Claritas husband in connivance with Clarita with the pawnshop of Dominador Dizon
for P2,600. Lourdes then filed an estafa case. She then asked Dominador Dizon for the return of the ring
pledged but refused to return the ring thus the case filed by Lourdes.
The CFI issued a writ of replevin so Lourdes was able to have possession of the ring during the pendency
of the case. The CFI also ruled in her favor which was affirmed by the CA on appeal. Thus the case at
bar.

ISSUE:
W/N the CA erred in ruling that Lourdes has a right to possession of the ring

HELD: NO
It reiterated the ruling in de Garcia v. CA, that the controlling provision is Art. 559 of the CC which states
that the possession ofmovable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title. Nevertheless, one
who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it from the person in
possession of the same. If the possessor of a movable lost of which the owner has been unlawfully
deprived, has acquired it in good faith at a public sale, the owner cannot obtain its return without
reimbursing the price paid therefor.
Lourdes, being unlawfully deprived of her ring thus she has a right to recover it from the current
possessor. Dizon is engaged in a business where presumably ordinary prudence would require him to
inquire whether or not an individual who is offering the jewelry by pledge is entitled to do so. The principle
of estoppel cannot help him at all. Since there was no precaution availed of, perhaps because of the

difficulty of resisting opportunity for profit, he only has himself to blame and should be the last to complain
if the right of the true owner of the jewelry should be recognized.