Sino-Cambodian Refugees in the United States:

Conceptualization of the Transnational and

Multi-cultural Ethnic Identity

Author

Shihlun Allen Chen ,

Department of Anthropology, University of Hawaii at Manoa

Sino-Cambodian Refugees in the United States: Conceptualization of

the Transnational and Multi-cultural Ethnic Identity

Author
Shihlun Allen Chen ,

Department of Anthropology, University of Hawaii at Manoa
Abstract
Many scholars in Southeast Asian studies and Ethnic studies have noticed and
addressed the importance of ethnic Chinese in the region. Such attention has reflected
on the studies from history, anthropology, economics, sociology, and political science.
However, fewer researches have noticed the ethnic origins among those Indochina
refugees who migrated to the West after 1970s. Most researches of present Indochina
refugees in Untied States from 1980s mostly focus on their Social Economic Status and
mental health care by reviewing their nationality origins rather than the ethnic origins.
By neglecting their ethnic origins, researches such as those on Cambodian refugees
assume the studied community shares homogenous cultural traits and thus project their
pre-refugee experiences with the Khmer identity under the unitary influence of Khmer
culture.
However, both literatures and the evidence from my preliminary fieldwork support
that there are significantly large amount of ethnic Chinese Cambodian refugees came
into the United States from 1970 to 1980s, although the exact ratio of ethnic Chinese
origins among Cambodian refugees remains unclear. Those Sino-Cambodian refugees
were demographically classified as Cambodian nationals before obtained their political
asylum in the US. Along with such classification, they were largely considered and
treated as ethnic Khmer. Such cultural and ethnic mistreatment or inexactitude would
lead to misjudgments and misunderstanding of their psychological and cultural root.
Thus, it is important to look into the historical development root of the ethnic identity of
Sino-Cambodian refugees in the United States, especially the first generation who have
experienced long-term livelihood in Cambodia, Thai refugee camp and later in the
United States.
Therefore, in this paper I firstly review the three stages that dynamically shift the
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ethnic identity of Sino-Cambodian refugees. And, further in this article I argue that,
rather than the flexible citizenship Professor Aihwa Ong argues in her 1998 book, the
case of ethnic Chinese refugees from Cambodians demonstrates that cultural citizenship
in sense of the ethnic identity is mainly restrained by linguistic skills and external
environmental limitation. The reviewed developing process of ethnic identity among
Sino-Cambodian refugees in present study supports that ethnic identity not only can be
seen as a formation of socially constructed ethnicity as Michael Omi addresses, but it
can be also understood as a cognitive subject that an individual optimize encountered
circumstances.

Authors Contact Information :

Name: Shihlun Allen Chen
Email: shihlunchen@gmail.com
Cambodia Cell phone:

/ shihlunc@hawaii.edu

(092)559-420 (080)205-532

It was due to a small project I used to explore possible ethnographic methodologies

for my thesis topic, Ethnic identities among overseas Chinese in Cambodia, that I
approached Uncle Sam Ly (anonymous), a so-called Cambodian American in Honolulu,
Hawaii for a semi-structure life story narrative interview in late 2010. As well-known
local Cambodian church leader and out-spoken community representative to outside
general public in town, his ethnic Chinese family background, like his name and skin
color, is not a secret. Rather, it is simply just a fact, like many other Cambodian
Americans in Hawaii. Yes, he is an ethnic Chinese, formal Cambodian refugee, and yet
a Cambodian American who has rooted down his family in Honolulu for 29 years since
he entered the US in 1982 from Thai refugee camp (Chen 2010).
It is the story and case that raises my attention on the transnational and
multicultural experiences of being a Sino-Cambodian refugee in the United States. How
does a second generation of Chinese migrant from Cambodian who was forced to
become a refuge fled to Thai border camp and later settled down in the United States, a
new world where he did not even speak the language, develop his ethnic and cultural
conscience? How does he identify and situate himself cross Chinese, Cambodian and
American cultures? How do his living experiences from Cambodian, Thai refugee
Camp and the United States influence his identification selection and cultivate his ethnic
identity? This paper is thus an attempt to answer these three questions. My conclusion
finds that, quite surprisingly, many studies and community data have misclassified these
formal Cambodian refugees as ethnic Khmer, while they are actually ethnic Chinese.
They succeed their legal and political identity of Cambodian refugees after fled to Thai
Border Camp from chaotic Cambodia, and were admitted to resettle to the West by
immigration agencies under such identity. Since then, they are viewed and treated as
Cambodians in a homogeneous culture sense of Khmer natives by migration agents,
social workers, psychologists, journalists and even some anthropologists. Such
misclassification has also been internalized by them; Chinese identity for them becomes
simply just a family legacy and remote memory that exists within first generation
Cambodian Americans, while later generations just sway between their Khmer and
American identities.
I.

To be or not to be: Chineseness, Said by whom?!

Born to a Teochewese speaking family with father migrated from Southern China
to Cambodian and second generation Sino-Khmer mother in 1954, Sam Lys family
lived in a village at the outskirt of capital city Phnom Penh. Since there was no Chinese
school around, he went to regular Cambodian public school and finished high school
when the civil war broke out in 1970s. After successfully managed to survive from
Khmer Rouge, he fled to Thai border refugee camp after Vietnamese invasion in 1979
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and resettled to the United Stated in 1982. With a Christian Churchs support, he then
completed college education in Hawaii and started his career as a pastor in a local
church that mainly gives services to Vietnamese and Cambodian migrants. With his
native in Khmer and fluency in English, his role gradually advanced from the leader of
local church to the representative of local Cambodian community to outsiders. As he
identified himself with his live story during our interview, he firstly points out that his
Khmer language, public school education and Khmer peer group is the key reasons
helped him survive from the civil war, especially Khmer Rouge period. He clearly
addresses that, I never thought myself as a Chinese (Interview with Chen 2010: 5:36)
Although he did try to join the Chinese community earlier when he arrived Hawaii, he
did not feel accepted since he does not speak Chinese mandarin and any other
vernacular languages. Since then, he always sees himself a Cambodian American but
ethnic Chinese. He did not practice any Chinese customs like his parents did either after
he came and married an ethnic Chinese Cambodian refugee who he met at Thai border
camp.
It is easy to understand his personal identification choice in the sense of ethnic
formation that Omi and Winant argue (Omi and Winant 1994) or anthropologists
situational identity connation (Ong and Nonini 1997; Ong 1999). Such arguments claim
that race, as well as ethnicity and class are classification paradigm constructed and
framed by social and power structure. Ethnic identity thus can be seen as a group
classified label exploited, mobilized, and constrained by power dominating group,
which uses state as a power frame and ethnic conscience embodiment (Espiritu et al.
2000). Despite ones individual inner thoughts, his expression and actions will largely
restrained by such racial dictatorship. Individuals ethnic identity is thus flexible and
floating to cope with the hardship in utilizing ones social economic status. For Uncle
Sam Ly, it is true that he was given choices to come to the US because of his
Cambodian refugee status. He has every reason to maintain his Cambodian identity
since it was listed as an official identification that can secure social benefit and legal
status. It is clear that such ethnic classification was actually a political and legal identity
rather than a cultural entity. Sam Ly and other formal Cambodian refugees recognition
of Cambodian American identity is indeed an extension and legalized of their
citizenship transformation from Cambodian nationals to American nationals but not
related to their daily cultural practices. Therefore, despite their legal and political
identification, the question should be asked here is what their real-life cultural and
ethnic practices are, and how they justify and coordinate their daily cultural practice
among their Chinese blood, Cambodian bone and American muscle? For this purpose,
we would have to look in to the composing of Cambodian refugees and this population
flow from Cambodian, Thai border camps and then to later settlements can be viewed as
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a divergence process to redistribute people with different ethnic identities toward

different destinations.
II.

Sino-Cambodian Refugees in the US: The Odyssey of finding HOME

Majority of currently studies on Cambodian American community in the United
States shows a clear inclination towards particular disciplines such as those in
demographic distribution, mental health, education, language, and crime studies. Most
of those studies view the Cambodian American community as a homogenous culture
entity. That is Khmer community that is defined by the first language them speak at
home, while many of these researchers presume only English and Khmer are spoken
with those households and neglect many vernacular languages like Vietnamese,
Teochewese, Fukkienese and some other minor ones are used as well. As many
communal projects have to use translators to study the community, only major language
speakers such as Khmers, Chinese Mandarin, Vietnamese speakers, thus are hired but
not vernacular language speakers. This condition therefore limits and frames our
understanding of the detail composing of ethnic diversity within the Cambodian
community in the US. Thus, we can only track back to the source of Cambodian
refugees.
In William E. Willmotts 1981 article, The Chinese in Kampuchea, he points out
two important phenomena about ethnic Chinese during the civil war. First is that most
Chinese have voluntarily and involuntarily fled to Thai border during the civil war.
Second is that, in order to survive in the crucial political environment, most of the
Chinese in Kampuchea, another name of Cambodia, tend to deny their Chineseness
(Willmott 1981). Carefully reviewing Willmotts claims in the article, he indicates that,
after Vietnamese invasion, The Vietnamese were apparently encouraging Chinese to
leave Kampuchea, gathering some twenty thousand of them in Battambang in March
1979 and urging them across the border into Thailand (Willmott 1981: 45). Such
number of ethnic Chinese was almost all the Chinese population in the area. As
Willmotts earlier record showed, he estimated there was 41,000 Chinese in Battambang
in 1962 (Willmott 1967: 16), long before the civil war decreased the population number.
Such encouragement were also reported on Washington Post (18 May, 1979, p. A32),
and a medical doctor who worked in the Thai border Camps during that time (Levy
1981).
In the same article, Willmott further argued that, due to Vietnamese governments
anti-Chinese stance, ethnic Chinese would high unlikely to identify themselves as
Chinese. This safety reason, plus two anti-Chinese tax and registration laws announced
in early 1980s, can be used to understand why there was no one willing to identify their
Chineseness in post-Khmer Rouge period. This denial of Chineseness can be also
5

seen in an open letter written by Chinese in refugee camps in Thailand to Liao

Cheng-chih, the chairman of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission and also
vice-chairperson of Standing Committee of the National peoples Congress in Beijing,
China. In this open letter, leaders from those Sino-Cambodian refugees wrote, many of
the refugees who fled to Thailand and elsewhere pretended to be Khmer because they
thought they would not receive U. N. aid if they were identified as Chinese (Willmott
1981: 44)
Apparently, it seems wired that contemporary scholars who wrote about ethnicity
in Cambodia do not mention or acknowledge what Willmott has pointed out in 1980s.
Rather, later scholars who studied Cambodian refugees around the world neglect this
ethnic reality and over-generalized that Cambodian refugees are mostly ethnic Khmer.
However, we still find some evidences in some of those newly works in supporting the
fact that most of Cambodian refugees in Thai border camps are indeed ethnic Chinese.
For example, this is also confirmed by Aihwa Ong in her 2003 book, Buddha is hiding.
She quotes from the most famous Cambodian refugee, Haing Ngor (Ong misspells as
Hiang Ngor), most of Cambodias old middle class and elite showed up in
Khao-I-Dang (Ngor 1987: 419; Ong 2003: 54). Since both W. E. Willmott and Penny
Edwards confirm that most of middle class in Cambodia were ethnic Chinese, it is
reasonable to say that, in the largest Thai border camp, Khao-I-Dang, there were
overwhelming [significant] amounts of Cambodian refugees were ethnic Chinese. It is
true that there is no any direct evidence to indicate the definite number or proportion of
ethnic Chinese among all Cambodian refugees. Nor there was any research or
observation reports manifest the clear ethnic structure in the Cambodia before 1991.
With present Cambodian American community studies, the most significant claim
about Sino-Cambodians in the United States is their livelihood predomination as small
business owners within the Cambodian American communities (Turcotte 2003; Chan
2004, 2005; Ong 2003). As their ethnographic data confirm, most of small ethnic
business in the communities are established and owned by ethnic Chinese. Those ethnic
businesses include Asian grocery stores, travel agencies, restaurants, pawnshops and
international trade companies. This tradition of ethnic capitalism and entrepreneurship
is transplanted to the new World settlement with their family tradition and know-how
knowledge from their Cambodia life experiences.
In terms of their ethnic identity studies within existing works, scholars like Nancy
Smith-Hefner, Hardman and Jean Phinney, they all address that Khmer language can be
used as ethnic signifier to understand the various development of ethnic identities. For
instance, both Smith and Hardman point out that Khmer is used as first domestic
language in most Cambodian American households (Smith-Hefner 1999; Hardman
1998). Such linguistic choice then develops as later generations ethnic and cultural
6

identity besides American political identity. Psychologists Jean Phinney, on the other
hand, brings in multiple variables to this justification by adding parental attitude, peer
group influence, and language proficiency in defining ones ethnic identity within
Cambodian American adolescents (Phinney 1990, 1997, Phinney et al 2001).
To sum up all available ethnic identity studies on Cambodian American community,
we can see clear and well-rounded conclusion about how those refugees were force to
left their homeland and later settlement experience in the United States. Many sources
have carefully looked into their mental health, education, cultural adjustment and crime
issues. However, there is no clear evidence and argument can be used to justify their
ethnicity formation and identification. Even more, the data of Cambodian refugees
ethnic status and full records of their resettling whereabouts are not reachable as well.
Therefore, it is understandable that many researchers mislabel all of those Cambodian
refugees as ethnic Khmers. This is why it is important that, in this article, I attempt to
reconstruct the ethnic reality among Cambodian refugees who resettled to the United
States, especially ethnic Chinese Cambodian refugees.
III.

Cambodia: A Home away from Home.

From late French colonization period, the Chinese in Cambodge has been seen as a
treat for the fact that their isolation and independence as a state in the State. French
administrator has started to regulated the power of the five Chinese assemble halls.
However, the real battle began along with the raising of Cambodian nationalism and its
independence in 1953. In the 1949, a series of citizenship and immigration laws were
launched by French colonial administration to unify the power of customs and
immigration management. Chinese migrants were asked to obtain visa with valid
passports (Lin 2008). After Cambodian gained its independence in 1953, the new
Kingdom of Cambodia regulated its qualification of Cambodian citizenship with jus
sanguinis, right of blood system. In addition, Khmer language was also set as a part of
qualification, which is considered targeted at ethnic Chinese since they tended to
maintain their Chinese education and vernacular languages.
After the Kingdom of Cambodia gained its independence in 1953, there were two
key dilemmas that the Chinese countered in Cambodia. First is the antagonism between
indigenous political Elites and Chinese economic class. This reflects on a series of
anti-Chinese laws and regulations announced respectively from 1954 to 1970. These
new policies regulated the naturalization of the Chinese (1954), restricted 18 kinds of
professions that Chinese can work into (1956), increased the tax load (1957), limited the
asset ownership (1957), gradually restrained Chinese education (1956~1957), restriction
of remittance outflow (1957), confined the property-owning duration to 99 years (1958),
7

banned the Chinese hometown associations and social organizations (1958), shut down
all eight Chinese newspapers (1967), and closed all Chinese schools (1970) (Chen
2007). Among all these anti-Chinese policies, the taxing, curriculum censorship, and
licensing management in 1956, 1957 and 1958 respectively have increased the cost and
difficulty to operate.
Most importantly, the prohibition of Chinese newspapers in 1967 and the bans of
Chinese schools and language in 1970 then have official terminated the sources of
forming Chinese identity. On the other hand, the main purpose of these series of
anti-Chinese regulations, of course, is to counterbalance the predominately economic
power that the Chinese had enjoyed. Yet, it is also to assimilate the centrifugal Chinese
community in the nation by shrinking the economic gap and breaking down the culture
barriers. This is to say, Chinese Cambodians class, culture, communal and national
identities during this period were gradually pressed to compromise, assimilate or
dissimulate by the local political elites with compelling regulations or encouraging
naturalization enactments. It is clear that the first six prohibition orders aimed to reduce
the influential power of the Chinese in the economic affairs. But the prohibition of
Chinese social organization, Chinese schools and newspaper were to dismantle the
original social structure of the Chinese in Cambodia and force them to be assimilated
into Khmer culture, language and society.
In terms of ethnic identity cultivation during this period, it is clear that we can see
that ethnic Chinese, who were born in 1950s and educated in 1960s, are major age
group who later became refugees in 1970s and early 1980s and migrated to the west.
Living under anti-Chinese atmosphere, they grew up in Khmer public school and spoke
Khmer since there had less exposure to Chinese education and newspapers. They might
speak mandarin and other vernacular languages at home but were forced to speak
Khmer outside and in public. This can explicitly explain most of ethnic Chinese in this
age tend to be bilingual and have looser ethnic boundary with Khmer indigenous,
comparing with how their parental generation situated into. This bilingualism later
evolved into a survival advantage and identity capital in coping with the extreme
predicaments during the civil war, refugee camp and to the New World.
Beside the anti-Chinese policies, it is important to review another historical debate
of whether ethnic Chinese was particularly singled out to wipe out during the civil war
period. This has been one of the biggest debate on contemporary Cambodian history
that whether the massive killing during the civil war was target on particular ethnic
8

groups, given the label of genocide that aimed at Chinese and Vietnamese. Leading by
famous Yale historian Ben Kiernan, some claim that the massive killing was
intrinsically a massacre that targeted on intellectuals, formal public servants, landlords,
middle class, and professionals, in order to create a self-sufficient agriculture Utopia.
Although that the majority of those targeted elites in Cambodian were ethnic Chinese,
there were also ethnic Khmers and Vietnamese as well. They were killed because of
their class identity, education, working experience, and knowledge, but not because of
their ethnicity. The idea of genocide was an image publicized by Vietnam to justify its
invasion. Furthermore, ethnic Chinese were oppressed during Vietnamese invasion
period and early time (1979-1985) of Peoples Republic of Kampuchea. Thus, from
1970, when the civil war broke out, to 1985, when Indochina three countries announce
their economic reform policy under Vietnams leadership, more than hundreds of
thousands of Cambodian refugees fled to more than eighty refugees camps.
However, there is not a certain and precise statistic number to confirm the total
amount of Cambodia refugees fled out during the civil war. From 1970 onward, there
are more than eighty recorded refugee camps existed between Thai and Cambodia
border. Some were established by the United Nations, international non-profit
organizations, private foundations, religion organizations. And some were even
controlled by Cambodias different domestic political parties and military forces,
including Sihanouks Funcinpec, Khmer Rouge, and KPNLF. Most of those refugee
camps were not able to maintain a clear record of personal identification and tracking
numbers of refugees they took in. From the other way around, if we look into the
population change of the Chinese in Cambodia, perhaps we can find some new
evidences to estimate the approximation of all refugee population. As Willmotts field
observation and estimation, there were about 465,000 ethnic Chinese in the Cambodian
in 1950. Before the civil war broke out in 1970, he estimated there was 420,000
(Willmott 1967) since anti-Chinese laws reduce new migrants but also pushed out some
ethnic Chinese population. Another Overseas Chinese expert from the Republic of
China (Taiwan) appraises the Chinese population in Cambodia reduced to 360,000 in
1974 (Liang 1974) before the Khmer Rouge took over. After Khmer Rouges massive
killings, I estimate that the lowest point should be in the early 1980s when the People
Republic of Kampuchea announced two anti-Chinese regulations, Order 351 and K5
Plan. However, there was indeed no reliable number of ethnic Chinese during this
period since the definite number of national population is even an intellectual debate
center. However, it is later estimated that there were around 420,000 self-claimed ethnic
Chinese in 1991 (Xing 1992) and the number bound up to 882,000 in 2010s national
census, six percent of national population.

A Hilton in Border Zone: Thai Refugee Camp

As I have addressed earlier in this article, literatures show a contradiction on the
ethnicity formation of Cambodia refugee in the Thai border refugee camps. Therefore, it
is important to clarify the ethnic composition of Cambodian refugees in Thai border
camps. It is for sure that there is no precise record of refugee numbers and its ethnicity
composition. Thus we can only use extant literature evidences to roughly understand the
composition of Cambodia refugees. Several scholars like Jean Smith-Hefner, Frank
Smith and Sucheng Chan, they all indicate that many of those Cambodian refugees are
indeed the victims of Khmer Rouge, who are mostly Khmer villagers and peasants
(Smith-Hefner 1999, Smith 1994; Chan 2004). However, William Willmott and Aihwa

IV.

Ong believe most of they are actually ethnic Chinese, middle class merchants and
professionals who were targeted as national enemy of Khmer Rouges Communism
Utopian (Willmott 1981, Ong 2003). Without any physical evidence, it may not be
practical to judge whether most of those Cambodian refugees are Khmer peasants or
Chinese Merchants, while they could be both as well.
However, there are two logic hints we can use to make educational judgment. First
one is that information gaining and the decision to flee from the war calamity. After
Chinese Communist Party won the civil war and established the People Republic of
China in 1949, the negative image and severe life condition of Chinese in the homeland
have been intensively spreading and promoted as a part of cold war. Thus, it is
understandable that ethnic Chinese in Cambodia should be fully aware of the possible
consequence if Khmer Communist Party took over, which it did happen and later
established a regime known as Democratic Kampuchea or Khmer Rouge. Meanwhile,
General Lon Nols 1970 coup and his regime has been known now of CIAs support and
his anti-Chinese stance. Therefore, it is reasonable that ethnic Chinese in Cambodia
were exposed to more information and crucial conditions that may all forced them to
flee. Secondly, most Chinese were middle class in Cambodia and it is also true that
most middle class in Cambodia were ethnic Chinese. After civil war broke out in 1970,
political turmoil had collapsed Cambodias economy. The turbulent political and
economy apparently was first influenced urban citizens and Chinese merchants who
stayed and migrated at Cambodia for economic incentives. When such incentive
disappeared, it is a logic guess that most ethnic Chinese will decide to flee away.
Accordingly, Willmott and Ongs claim that most of Cambodian refugees who fled to
the border were ethnic Chinese could be a more factual judgment.
Meanwhile, the second question followed this judgment is that, if Willmott and
Ongs judgment are true, should those Cambodian refugees preferred to be resettled to
the Republic of China, as known as Taiwan KHM administration? Or should they
identify themselves as Chinese rather than claim their Cambodia citizenship since most
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of those Cambodian refugees were accepted by the West with their Cambodian refugee
identity? For the first question above, I have not yet found any evidence to show that the
exact numbers of Sino-Cambodian refugees were taken in by Hong Kong or Taiwan.
But it is true that the council of Overseas Chinese in Taiwan have long history on taking
care of those who settled in Taiwan since Vietnam War broke out. Those Indochina
refugees were called as refugees from Indochina Peninsula [Zhong Nam Ban Dao Nan
Min; ]. So, it is true that many of they were accepted and resettled in
Taiwan.
For the second question, it has to be reviewed from a historical aspect as I have
briefly reviewed the history of anti-Chinese policies in Cambodia. With all those crucial
anti-Chinese regulations, many of ethnic Chinese in Cambodia have been forcefully
assimilated to Khmer identity since Chinese language and school were both banned in
late 1960s. Many of them went to Khmer speaking public school and only spoke Khmer
outside their household. This may explain why many Sino-Cambodian refugees speak
better Khmer than Chinese mandarin, the only official language in both cross-Strait
regimes. Although many of them can also speak at least one Chinese vernacular
languages such as Teochowese, but obviously it is not enough and still difficult for them
to fit in to their mother land anymore. Rather, many of them learned to speak French
since Cambodia was once colonized by France for ninety years, and, as middleman
under the colonial regime, many of them still speak French. Therefore, it is not
surprised that many of them would decide to go to France since a lot of them already
families over there. It is also important to acknowledge that, in the refugee camps, may
custom agency from the West have also stationed in the camp to evaluate the
possibilities of taking in some refugees. They obviously would set up particular
qualification and conditions to accept refugees applicants. Such qualifications would
include language competency, family support, life sponsorship, and even political
ideology. Their scanning process can be seen as a selection process that forced
Cambodian refugees who wanted to go to those countries to fit in those expectancies.
According to Sucheng Chan and Audrey Kims interviews, one refugee points out
that most of Ethnic Chinese choose to go to France since some of them were fluent in
French and have many relatives in France already (Two Interviews, Chan 2003). These
Sino-Cambodians were well-being middle-class economic elites who may be from
merchant and colonial employee families. However, it would be an educational guess
that many of those Sino-Cambodian refugees would choose to their Homeland, either
China, Hong Kong or Taiwan, depending on their political identities and family ties.
Both the Republic of China in Taiwan and the People Republic of China in the mainland
have established bureaucratic institutes in charge of Overseas Chinese Affairs. Both
bureaus were competing not only richer ones in Southeast Asian countries to bring back
11

home more capital investment but also contending overseas Chinese who were willing
to political recognize its cold war ideologies. Besides such cold war ideology and
political identity, other reasons that a refugee family decided the location of their new
life may involve economic incentives, geographic kinship tie, family and personal
network chain, and of course, livelihood support from their own skills and social
security of reception countries. Some may even simply go where they were accepted
without rational thinking. However, we can see such process of decision making of
relocation destinations as a pre-selection process of group identities, such as their
various identities of particular political ideology, class, ethnic, culture or simply just
ones irrational preference on specific location. This is to say, for those who applied and
were accepted by the United States may show a homogeneous quality comparing with
those who were relocated to China or France.
V.

American Dream, Khmer Town, Chinese Mirage

According to the data from US Committee for Refugees, from 1975 to 1998, the
United States alone has accepted around 147,228 Cambodian refugees to relocate to it
soil from refugee camps. Most of them distribute in Long Beach, California and Lowell,
Massachusetts. Being war refugees, Cambodian Americans are considered disadvantage
minority in the country since most of they are English illiterate and lacks of advanced
professional skills. Most of first generation Cambodian refugees even still suffer from
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, especially with new stress from resettlement in new
environment. This is why most present studies on Cambodian Americans largely focus
on the issues of mental Health, education, social aids, crime, and material abuse
problems within the community. Those researches all assume that Cambodian
Americans as a homogeneous entity of Khmer culture, while neglecting the fact that
many of them do self-identify as ethnic Chinese. This homogeneous Khmer identity was
only accepted by many scholars including Chandler (1983), Smith-Hefner (1989),
Ledgerwood (1990) and Mortland (1994). With Khmer language competency and
Cambodian political refugee identity, it is understandable that Khmer culture was used
as a blurred but practical signifier to identify those new arrivals, which employed and
also was evaluated with their Cambodian political identification as a qualification to
award new citizenship. Transferring this Cambodian political identity into a
pseudo-ethnic identity in order to gain the same benefit and access the same
opportunities, many ethnic Chinese soon picked up this transformation opportunity and
utilized it into their daily practice in community by self identifying themselves as
Cambodian refugees rather than Sino-Cambodian migrants. In a cultural sense, Ong and
Smith-Hefner also find the Theravada Buddhist as the greatest cultural common
denominator between ethnic Chinese and Khmers. They use Theravada Buddhist as the
12

core element of a common Khmer Identity (Ong 2003, Smith-Hefner 1999, Mortland
1994, Hein 2006) despites the ethnic diversity among Cambodian refugees. With new
American identification while living in Cambodian Enclave such as Long Beach CA
and Lowell MA, Chineseness seems to become a remote collective Memory that remind
many Cambodian Americans their parents and grandparents.

VI.

Ethnicity of Necessarity
As I describe above, due to the domestic anti-Chinese policies in Cambodia since
1950s, ethnic Chinese in Cambodia had started to adopt local identities. It started from
citizenship naturalizing, the adaption of local political identity at the beginning of
independence, and followed with local education and language assimilation in late
1960s. This cultural and language assimilation has dramatically changed Chinese
Cambodians even before the civil war broke out in 1970. Thats why Chinese
Cambodians who were born after independence in 1953 usually went to Khmer public
schools and spoke Khmer in public, while most of their parent generation still
maintained strong Chinese identity since they went through isolated Chinese
community under French colonization. After the civil war broke out, the departure to
Thai border refugee camps and the transition to new settlements are considered as
selection processes or divergence flows that separated people toward various
destinations. Such population divisions are strongly based on refugees personal
decisions that rationally made according to their surviving advantages and different
identities that associate with particular ethnic or political identities. Although economic
incentive plays an important role as well, the surviving conditions in new settlements
and the acceptance by those countrys immigration agencies are the keys as well.
These are the reasons that, although literature evidences show that the majority of
Cambodian refugees in Thai border camps are actually ethnic Chinese. But immigration
agencys filtration with cold-war ideological censorship has impacted Sino-Cambodian
refugees identity choices. Such situational identity engagement is indeed coachable and
can be utilized, simply through accentuating ones Cambodian language and political
identifications. Therefore, it is understandable that many Sino-Cambodian refugees
came to the United States because of their identity status as Cambodian refugees.
Thus, they are treated and classified in the social welfare system, census and
demographic data as Cambodian Americans. Their diaspora Chinese ethnicity and
incompetence in Chinese mandarin or other vernacular languages, otherwise, have also
marginalized their ethnic tie with Chinatown Chinese. Therefore, it is not a surprise to
know that Sino-Cambodian refugees do aware of their Chinese ethnic background, but
they are still willing to be identified as Cambodian Americans. It is indeed an
13

acquiescence act, starting from time when they applied to the US asylum, and
transmitted this Cambodian Refugees political identity into Cambodian American
identity. This Cambodian American identity mainly associates with Khmer and
American language and culture, rather that Chinese ones.
As Sino-Cambodian refugees have situated their historical political identity, that is
Cambodian identity, as ethnic identity, this politicized identity in the first generation has
also changed how later generations cultivate their ethnic identity. Later generations has
less; or in some cases even do not aware of their ethnic Chinese root, since they
assimilated after long process of grew up American (Kim2004). Most of them would
have mentioned about Chineseness and refugee experiences as parts of their family
legacy and collective memory. But they still have clear ethnic and cultural identities as
Cambodian Americans. According to my personal communication and small scale field
survey with second or third generation of Cambodian Americans from Honolulu, Long
beach and Boston area, almost every one of them would mention that one or both of
their parents or grandparents are ethnic Chinese. And many of them, especially
grandparents, speak Teochowese at home, or can still speak or understand Teochowese.
Many of them would exemplify several words of Teochowese that the elders used at
home, and describe their Chinese culture practice at home while they clearly define
themselves as Cambodian Americans.
For first generation Sino-Cambodian refugees, they have been socialized and
exposed to Chinese, Khmer and American cultures that I describe as three different life
scenes. Despite their parental choices and others who resettled to China, Taiwan or
Vietnam, those who have been through all these three scenes made the decisions to
become Americans for all kinds of motives, incentives and reasons. But clearly, their
Cambodian refugee status is the quality to ensure their gain political asylum here in the
United States. This Cambodian identity then was transferred and given to their children
and relative dependents who immigrated to the United States by immigration laws
article on family reunification. Many of those new generations are only exposed to
American culture and their Cambodian identity, but not Chinese identification.
Especially for those whose live in Cambodian towns like Long beach or Lowell, their
Cambodianess is sometimes used as culture heritage in association with their family
refugee background, social status and social circle against mainstream American
culture.
In terms of later generations who were raised and educated in the United States, it
is clear that they were only exposed to American culture in formal institutional channels
such as school and media, and also exposed to general Cambodia culture in informal
channels like parental cultivation and community events, if there are willing to associate
with. Therefore, new generations are articulated with only American identities and
14

Cambodia culture as heritage. Most of them supposedly identify themselves as

Americans or Cambodian Americans, rather than taking consideration of their Chinese
root as any part of it. With this cultivation process, it is understandable that their
language competencies in English and Khmer are used as the key component to define
their ethnic identity. And since most of their parents do not speak any more Chinese
Mandarin and vernacular languages, they have thus even more alienated from their
Chinese root but thinking their Chineseness as a family legacy and remote family
memory. This identity phenomenon largely echoes what Omi and Winant argue of how
the reality of political and social power hierarchy has limited and in a way formulate
minoritys identities. Also, this process of how Cambodian refugee political identity is
used and transferred into new American identity and later maintained as cultural identity
or even ethnic identity in some cases demonstrates Aihwa Ongs argument of flexible
citizenship. And it can be said that political identity, ethnic identity, and cultural identity
can be viewed as three fundamental prototypes of self identities. The process of how an
individual employ one to lever the other is strongly associated with the socio-political
conditions and the decision space edge out between political power and individual rights.
Such transformation and identity politics can also be found on the cases of
Sino-Vietnamese Americans, Taiwanese citizens in China, and Tibetan-Chinese exiles.
To sum up, the self-identification experience of Sino-Cambodian refugees in the United
States displays a clear model of ethnic identification determination. It shows that ethnic
identity is not only a complex result of socialization, assimilation, resistance and
articulation, but it is also embedded with the impacts from the political reality,
generation difference, and particularly historical restriction.
VII.

Conclusion: From Who-you-are to What-you-are

As I have reviewed the journey of Sino-Cambodian Refugees from Cambodian to
Thai refugee camps and later to the United States, this case shows a transnational
voyage of surviving and livelihood from one to the other countries. Sino-Cambodian
Americans transformation experience of ethnic identity and utilization of their identity
position are restrained by environmental political structure while each individual can
still vote by feet, taking Cambodian refugees decisions on departure of Cambodia,
destination selection for relocation, and resettlement with adjustment and compromise
as an example. Their decision space or options among Chinese, Cambodia, and
American cultures, on the other hand, represent the fuzzification of culture boundary
and politics of ethnic classification. Although ethnic hierarchy and social economic
status do limit an individual or minority groups option content and numbers, social
welfare system and community support from public channels, in a way, do compensate
their inequity position within the hierarchy. Ethnicity classification and culture heritage
15

therefore becomes collective assets that a group can mobilize to accumulate their
political dynamic to influence the higher groups who are in power. This utilization may
initially sound like James Scotts claims of resistance of the weak. But, in
Sino-Cambodian refugees case, it is actually an unconscious response with two Chinese
philosophic attitudes of reconciliation [] and gratification[]. Their
multicultural experience in a transnational contest will soon become a prototype of
international immigration in the future with the unavoidable trend of globalization.
Since the measurement of ethnic identity and its universal equation of formation are still
ambiguous and difficult to define, the case of Sino-Cambodian Americans and their
multi-ethnic self identification experience in a transnational scope may address the point
that, maybe such pursuit of clear-cut ethnic identity and its measurement is actually
meaningless since multi-ethnicity and multiculturalism become normal and usual.
Heavily relying on William E. Willmotts two monographs from 1967 and 1970
and the last article he published in same subject in 1981, it may be dangerous and risky
to conclude my argument which is pretty much against the mainstream Khmer cultural
identity of Cambodian Americans. However, it is important to address that many of
Sino-Cambodian refugees have committed to their Cambodian political identity into
new American identity, while forgetting their original Chinese ethnic identity. It is still
unclear that how many Cambodian refugees are ethnic Chinese in a proportion sense.
And I also agree that further historical investigation is urgent and necessary since most
of those first generation Cambodian refugees are aging. But any counter-thesis materials
and evidences will be welcomed to enrich this discourse.

16

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