SOLIVEN, petitioner VS.

JUDGE MAKASIAR, respondent

Per curiam

FACTS:
This case is a PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila

ISSUES:
1.

Whether or not the petitioners were denied due process when information for libel were filed
against them although the finding of the existence of a prima facie case was still under review by the
Secretary of Justice and, subsequently by the President

2.

Whether or not the constitutional rights of Beltran (petitioner) were violated when respondent
RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest without personally examining the complainant and the
witnesses, if any, to determine probable clause

3.

Whether or not the President of the Philippines, under the Constitution, may initiate criminal
proceedings against the petitioners through filing of a complaint-affidavit

DECISION:
Finding no grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction on the part of the public
respondents, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petitions.
The Order to maintain the status quo contained in the Resolution of the Court en banc is LIFTED.

RATIO:
Background of the first issue

MARCH 30, 1988: Secretary of Justice denied petitioners motion for reconsideration

APRIL 7, 1988: A second motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Beltran was denied by the
Secretary of Justice

MAY 2, 1988: On appeal, the President, through Executive Secretary, affirmed the resolution of
the Secretary of Justice

MAY 16, 1988: Motion for reconsideration was denied by the Executive Secretary

Petitioner Beltran alleges that he has been denied due process of law.

-This is negated by the fact that instead of submitting his counter-affidavits, he filed a Motion to Declare
Proceedings Closed, in effect, waiving his right to refute the complaint by filing counter-affidavits.
Due process of law does not require that the respondent in a criminal case actually file his
counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed completed. All that is required is
that the respondent be given the opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if he is so minded.

Second issue
This calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the issuance of warrants of arrest:
Art. III, Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Petitioner Beltran is convinced that the Constitution requires the judge to personally examine the
complainant and his witness in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrests.
-However, what the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing
judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In doing so, the judge is not required to
personally examine the complainant and his witness.

Following the established doctrine of procedure, the judge shall: (1) Personally evaluate the report
and supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause (and
on the basis, thereof, issue a warrant of arrest); or (2) If on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscals report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the evidence of probable cause.

Third issue
Petitioner Beltran contends that proceedings ensue by virtue of the Presidents filing of her complaintaffidavit, she may subsequently have to be a witness for the prosecution, bringing her under the trial
courts jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her privilege of immunity from suit, as by
testifying on the witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible contempt of court or perjury.
-This privilege of immunity from suit, pertains to the President by virtue of the office and may be invoked
only by the holder of the office; not by any other person in the Presidents behalf.
-The choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive is solely the Presidents prerogative. It is a
decision that cannot be assumed and imposed by any other person (And there is nothing in our laws that
would prevent the President from waiving the privilege).

Additional Issue:

Beltran contends that he could not be held liable for libel because of the privileged character of the
publication. He also says that to allow the libel case to proceed would produce a chilling effect on press
freedom.
-Court reiterates that it is not a trier of facts And Court finds no basis at this stage to rule on the chilling
effect point.
SEPARATE CONCURRING OPINION Guitierrez, Jr., J.
Concurs with the majority opinion insofar as it revolves around the three principal issues. With regard to
whether or not the libel case would produce a chilling effect on press freedom, Gutierrez believes that
this particular issue is the most important and should be resolved now rather than later.
Quotable quotes: Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be
assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. United States v. Bustos
No longer is there a Minister of the Crown or a person in authority of such exalted position that the citizen
must speak of him only with bated breath. People v. Perfecto

Lladoc vs Commisioner of Internal Revenue (1965)

J. Paredes
Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc. of Bacolod City donated P10,000 in cash to the parish priest of
Victorias, Negros Occidental; the amount spent for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the
locality,m as intended. In1958, MB Estate filed the donors gift tax return. In 1960, the Commissioner
issued an assessment for donees gift tax against the parish. The priest lodged a protest to the
assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof.
Issue: Whether the Catholic Parish is tax exempt.
Held: The phrase exempt from taxation should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds
of taxes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties as property
taxes as contradistinguished from excise taxes. A donees gift tax is not a property tax but an excise
tax imposed on the transfer of property by way of gift inter vivos. It does not rest upon general
ownership, but an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the exercise of the privilege of
receiving the properties. The imposition of such excise tax on property used for religious purpose do
not constitute an impairment of the Constitution.
The tax exemption of the parish, thus, does not extend to excise taxes.

NPC vs Sangkay
J. Bersamin
NPC Charter; prescription. The SC ruled that the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i)
of Republic Act No. 6395 (the NPC Charter) is applicable only to an action for damages, and does
not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC cannot
thereby bar the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just compensation for their land. The
action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action
for damages. It would very well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to bar the
recovery of just compensation for private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of
statutory prescription. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay,
namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit, G.R. No. 165828. August
24, 2011.
Power of Eminent Domain; action to recover just compensation from the state and
action for damages; distinction. An action to recover just compensation from the State or its
expropriating agency differs from an action for damages. The former, also known as inverse
condemnation, is intended to recover the value of property taken in fact by the government
defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by
the taking agency. On the other hand, the latter action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through
damages. When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms enshrined in
Article 19 and like provisions on human relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise results in
damage to another, a legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held responsible. The two
actions are different in nature and purpose. The action to recover just compensation is based on the
Constitution while the action for damages is predicated on statutory enactments. Indeed, the former
arises from the exercise by the State of its power of eminent domain against private property for
public use, but the latter emanates from the transgression of a right. The fact that the owner rather

than the expropriator brings the former does not change the essential nature of the suit as an inverse
condemnation, for the suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the
taking of property without just compensation. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of
Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit, G.R.
No. 165828. August 24, 2011.
Power of Eminent Domain; just compensation; reckoning value. The RTC based its fixing of
just compensation ostensibly on the prevailing market value at the time of the filing of the complaint,
instead of reckoning it from the time of the taking pursuant to Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 6395.
The SC affirmed this and ruled that the reckoning value is the value at the time of the filing of the
complaint. Compensation that is reckoned on the market value prevailing at the time either when
NPC entered or when it completed the tunnel, as NPC submits, would not be just, for it would
compound the gross unfairness already caused to the owners by NPCs entering without the
intention of formally expropriating the land, and without the prior knowledge and consent of the Heirs
of Macabangkit. NPCs entry denied elementary due process of law to the owners since then until
the owners commenced the inverse condemnation proceedings. Reckoning just compensation on
the value at the time the owners commenced these inverse condemnation proceedings is
warranted. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu,
Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit,G.R. No. 165828. August 24, 2011.
Power of Eminent Domain; just compensation; rentals. In this case, the CA upheld the RTCs
granting to the Heirs of Macabangkit of rentals of Php30,000.00/month from 1979 up to July 1999
with 12% interest per annum by finding NPC guilty of bad faith in taking possession of the land to
construct the tunnel without their knowledge and consent. However, the SC found that the granting
rentals is legally and factually bereft of justification, in light of the taking of the land being already
justly compensated. Accordingly, the SC deleted the award of back rentals and in its place
prescribed interest of 12% interest per annum from November 21, 1997, the date of the filing of the
complaint, until the full liability is paid by NPC. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of
Macabangkit Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit, G.R.
No. 165828. August 24, 2011.
Power of Eminent Domain; limitations. The power of eminent domain is not an unlimited power.
Section 9, Article III of the 1987 Constitution sets down the essential limitations: (a) the taking must
be for a public purpose; and (b) just compensation must be paid to the owner. In addition, the owner
is entitled to legal interest from the time of taking until the actual payment in order to place the owner
in a position as good as, but not better than, the position he was in before the taking occurred. In
this case, it is undeniable that just compensation was not promptly made to the Estate of Salud
Jimenez for the taking of Lot 1406-B by the petitioner. In view of this, the SC found the CAs fixing of
legal interest at only 6% per annum as insufficient for that rate would not ensure that compensation

was just in the face of the long delay in payment. Accordingly, it imposed a 12% per annum legal
interest, from August 23, 1993, the date of the approval of the failed Compromise Agreement,
until the full amount of the just compensation is paid, instead. Export Processing Zone Authority
(now Philippine Economic Zone Authority) vs. Estate of Salud Jimenez, G.R. No.
188995. August 24, 2011.
Power of Eminent Domain; meaning of taking. There was a full taking on the part of NPC,
notwithstanding that the owners were not completely and actually dispossessed. It is settled that the
taking of private property for public use, to be compensable, need not be an actual physical taking or
appropriation. Indeed, the expropriators action may be short of acquisition of title, physical
possession, or occupancy but may still amount to a taking.

Compensable taking includes

destruction, restriction, diminution, or interruption of the rights of ownership or of the common and
necessary use and enjoyment of the property in a lawful manner, lessening or destroying its value. It
is neither necessary that the owner be wholly deprived of the use of his property, nor material
whether the property is removed from the possession of the owner, or in any respect changes
hands. In this case, NPC constructed a tunnel underneath the land of the Heirs of Macabangkit
without going through formal expropriation proceedings and without procuring their consent or at
least informing them beforehand of the construction. NPCs construction adversely affected the
owners rights and interests because the subterranean intervention prevented them from introducing
any developments on the surface, and from disposing of the land or any portion of it, either by sale
or mortgage. This was considered by the SC as compensable taking. NPC should pay just
compensation for the entire land. National Power Corporation vs. Heirs of Macabangkit
Sangkay, namely: Cebu, Batowa-an, et al., all surnamed Macabangkit, G.R. No.
165828. August 24, 2011.