Larin vs Executive Secretary

The ultimate issue to be resolved in the instant case falls on the determination of the validity of petitioners
dismissal from office. Incidentally, in order to resolve this matter, it is imperative that We consider these
questions : a) Who has the power to discipline the petitioner?, b) Were the proceedings taken pursuant to
Memorandum Order No. 164 in accord with due process?, c) What is the effect of petitioners acquittal in the
criminal case to his administrative charge? d) Does the President have the power to reorganize the BIR or to
issue the questioned E.O. No. 132? e) Is the reorganization of BIR pursuant to E.O. No. 132 tainted with bad
faith?
Petitioner is a presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil Service. Being a presidential
appointee, he comes under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This is in line with the well settled
principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint conferred to the President by Section
16, Article VII of the Constitution. Thus, it is ineluctably clear that Memorandum Order No. 164, which created
a committee to investigate the administrative charge against petitioner, was issued pursuant to the power of
removal of the President.
HOWEVER, Under the Administrative Code of 1987, career service is characterized by the existence of security
of tenure.
Was petitioner then removed from office for a legal cause under a valid proceeding? SC said NO.
It should be noted that what precipitated the creation of the investigative committee to look into the
administrative charge against petitioner is his conviction by the Sandiganbayan. HOWEVER, THIS JUDGMENT
WAS SUBSEQUENTLY REVERSED BY THE SUPREME COURT. Although an administrative case is independent of
the criminal case and the dismissal of the latter does not necessarily follow the dismissal of the former, this case
falls within the exceptions since there will be no basis for the administrative case anymore.
WITH REGARD TO THE ISSUANCE OF EO 132 (reorganizing the BIR), SC ruled that the Admin Code authorizes
SCALING DOWN AND PHASING OUT OF ACTIVITIES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.
The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational changes
including the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned.
While the President's power to reorganize cannot be denied, this does not mean however that the
reorganization itself is properly made in accordance with law. Well-settled is the rule that reorganization is
regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith.
The existence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad
faith in the removals made as a result of the reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or
reappointment by an aggrieved party:
a) Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the
department or agency concerned;
b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created;
c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and
merit;

d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified
offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices;
e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof."

Section 1.1.2 of said executive order provides that:

"1.1.2 The Intelligence and Investigation Office and the Inspection Service are abolished. An Intelligence and
Investigation Service is hereby created to absorb the same functions of the abolished office and service. xxx"
(italics ours)
This provision is a clear illustration of the circumstance mentioned in Section 2 (b) of R.A. No. 6656 that an office
is abolished and another one performing substantially the same function is created.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is granted, and petitioner is hereby reinstated.

Dario vs Mison
At this point, we must distinguish removals from separations arising from abolition of office (not by virtue of
the Constitution) as a result of reorganization carried out by reason of economy or to remove redundancy of
functions. In the latter case, the Government is obliged to prove good faith. In case of removals undertaken to
comply with clear and explicit constitutional mandates, the Government is not hard put to prove anything,
plainly and simply because the Constitution allows it.
As we have seen, since 1935, transition periods have been characterized by provisions for "automatic"
vacancies. We take the silence of the 1987 Constitution on this matter as a restraint upon the Government to
dismiss public servants at a moment's notice.

Simply, the provision benefits career civil service employees separated from the service. And the separation
contemplated must be due to or the result of (1) the reorganization pursuant to Proclamation No. 3 dated March
25, 1986, (2) the reorganization from February 2, 1987, and (3) the resignations of career officers tendered in
line with the existing policy and which resignations have been accepted. The phrase "not for cause" is clearly
and primarily exclusionary, to exclude those career civil service employees separated "for cause." In other
words, in order to be entitled to the benefits granted under Section 16 of Article XVIII of the Constitution of
1987, two requisites, one negative and the other positive, must concur, to wit:

1. the separation must not be for cause, and

2. the separation must be due to any of the three situations mentioned above.

After February 2, 1987, incumbent officials and employees have acquired security of tenure, which is not a
deterrent against separation by reorganization under the quondam fundamental law.
Noteworthy is the injunction embodied in the Executive Order that dismissals should be made on the basis of
findings of inefficiency, graft, and unfitness to render public service.*
When, therefore, Arroyo permitted a reorganization under Executive Order No. 127 after the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, Arroyo permitted a reorganization provided that it is done in good faith. Otherwise, security
of tenure would be an insuperable implement.
*** Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As
a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make
bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs
because the position itself ceases to exist. And in that case, security of tenure would not be a Chinese wall. Be
that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons
or purposely to defeat sty of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition' takes place and whatever
"abolition' is done, is void ab initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of
nomenclature of positions, 82 or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. 83

It is to be stressed that by predisposing a reorganization to the yardstick of good faith, we are not, as a
consequence, imposing a "cause" for restructuring. Retrenchment in the course of a reorganization in good faith
is still removal "not for cause," if by "cause" we refer to "grounds" or conditions that call for disciplinary
action.**

Good faith, as a component of a reorganization under a constitutional regime, is judged from the facts of each
case. However, under Republic Act No. 6656, we are told:

SEC. 2. No officer or employee in the career service shall be removed except for a valid cause and after due
notice and hearing. A valid cause for removal exists when, pursuant to a bona fide reorganization, a position has
been abolished or rendered redundant or there is a need to merge, divide, or consolidate positions in order to
meet the exigencies of the service, or other lawful causes allowed by the Civil Service Law. The existence of any
or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a
result of reorganization, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved party: (a)
Where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department
or agency concerned; (b) Where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same
functions is created; (c) Where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of
appointment, performance and merit; (d) Where there is a reclassification of offices in the department or
agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices;
(e) Where the removal violates the order of separation provided in Section 3 hereof.
The records indeed show that Commissioner Mison separated about 394 Customs personnel but replaced them
with 522 as of August 18, 1988.

Commissioner's appointing power is subject to the provisions of Executive Order No. 39. Under Executive Order
No. 39, the Commissioner of Customs may "appoint all Bureau personnel, except those appointed by the
President." 89

Accordingly, with respect to Deputy Commissioners Cesar Dario and Vicente Feria, Jr., Commissioner Mison
could not have validly terminated them, they being Presidential appointees.
The occupancy of a position in a hold-over capacity was conceived to facilitate reorganization and would have
lapsed on 25 February 1987 (under the Provisional Constitution), but advanced to February 2, 1987 when the
1987 Constitution became effective (De Leon. et al., vs. Hon. Benjamin B. Esquerra, et. al., G.R. No. 78059, 31
August 1987). After the said date the provisions of the latter on security of tenure govern.
In resume, we restate as follows:
1. The President could have validly removed government employees, elected or appointed, without cause but
only before the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution on February 2, 1987 (De Leon v. Esguerra, supra; PalmaFernandez vs. De la Paz, supra); in this connection, Section 59 (on non-reappointment of incumbents) of
Executive Order No. 127 cannot be a basis for termination;

2. In such a case, dismissed employees shall be paid separation and retirement benefits or upon their option
be given reemployment opportunities (CONST. [1987], art. XVIII, sec. 16; Rep. Act No. 6656, sec. 9);

3. From February 2, 1987, the State does not lose the right to reorganize the Government resulting in the
separation of career civil service employees [CONST. (1987), supra] provided, that such a reorganization is
made in good faith. (Rep. Act No. 6656, supra.)

Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs Zamora

a) Does the President have the authority to reorganize the executive department? and, b) How should the
reorganization be carried out?
Surely, there exists a distinction between the words deactivate and abolish. To deactivate means to
render inactive or ineffective or to break up by discharging or reassigning personnel, while to abolish means
to do away with, to annul, abrogate or destroy completely. In essence, abolition denotes an intention to do
away with the office wholly and permanently. Thus, while in abolition, the office ceases to exist, the same is not
true in deactivation where the office continues to exist, albeit remaining dormant or inoperative. Be that as it
may, deactivation and abolition are both reorganization measures.

The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This
proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either

created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the
Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence.

The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned,
the Presidents power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws
may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures.
Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the Executive Branch. xxx
The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational changes
including the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned.
Another legal basis is the Residual Powers granted to the President under Admin Code.
This provision speaks of such other powers vested in the President under the law. What law then gives him the
power to reorganize? It is Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential Decree No. 1416. These
decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the continuing authority to reorganize the national
government, which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to
transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and
materials.

Under Section 31, Book III of Executive Order No. 292 (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987),
the President, subject to the policy in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and
efficiency, shall have the continuing authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the
President. For this purpose, he may transfer the functions of other Departments or Agencies to the Office of
the President. In Canonizado v. Aguirre, we ruled that reorganization involves the reduction of personnel,
consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy or redundancy of functions. It takes place
when there is an alteration of the existing structure of government offices or units therein, including the lines
of control, authority and responsibility between them. The EIIB is a bureau attached to the Department of
Finance. It falls under the Office of the President. Hence, it is subject to the Presidents continuing authority to
reorganize.
What is then left for us to resolve is whether or not the reorganization is valid. In this jurisdiction, reorganizations
have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is carried out in good
faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act No.
6656[28] provides for the circumstances (5).
Petitioners claim that the deactivation of EIIB was done in bad faith because four days after its deactivation,
President Estrada created the Task Force Aduana.
We are not convinced.
An examination of the pertinent Executive Orders shows that the deactivation of EIIB and the creation of Task
Force Aduana were done in good faith. It was not for the purpose of removing the EIIB employees, but to
achieve the ultimate purpose of E.O. No. 191, which is economy.

Firstly, there is no employment of new personnel to man the Task Force.

PETITION DENIED.

Bagaoisan vs National Tobacco Authority

Essentially, the core question raised by them is whether or not the President, through the issuance of an
executive order, can validly carry out the reorganization of the NTA.

The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This
proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either
created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by
the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence.
The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are
concerned, the Presidents power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or
certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. The case in point is Larin
v. Executive Secretary [280 SCRA 713]. In this case, it was argued that there is no law which empowers the
President to reorganize the BIR. In decreeing otherwise, this Court sustained the following legal basis, thus:
`Initially, it is argued that there is no law yet which empowers the President to issue E.O. No. 132 or to
reorganize the BIR.
`We do not agree.
`Section 48 of R.A. 7645 provides that:
``Sec. 48. Scaling Down and Phase Out of Activities of Agencies Within the Executive Branch. The heads of
departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities which
are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled down, phased out or abolished,
subject to civil service rules and regulations. x x x. Actual scaling down, phasing out or abolition of the activities
shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or Orders issued for the purpose by the Office of the President.
``Sec. 62. Unauthorized organizational changes. Unless otherwise created by law or directed by the President
of the Philippines, no organizational unit or changes in key positions in any department or agency shall be
authorized in their respective organization structures and be funded from appropriations by this Act.
`The foregoing provision evidently shows that the President is authorized to effect organizational changes
including the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned.
It having been duly established that the President has the authority to carry out reorganization in any branch
or agency of the executive department, what is then left for us to resolve is whether or not the reorganization
is valid. (5 criteria)
The Court of Appeals, in its now assailed decision, has found no evidence of bad faith on the part of the NTA;
thus -

In the case at bar, we find no evidence that the respondents committed bad faith in issuing the notices of
non-appointment to the petitioners.
Firstly, the number of positions in the new staffing pattern did not increase. Rather, it decreased from 1,125
positions to 750. It is thus natural that ones position may be lost through the removal or abolition of an office.

Secondly, the petitioners failed to specifically show which offices were abolished and the new ones that were
created performing substantially the same functions.
Thirdly, the petitioners likewise failed to prove that less qualified employees were appointed to the positions
to which they applied.
x x x

xxx

x x x.

Fourthly, the preference stated in Section 4 of R.A. 6656, only means that old employees should be considered
first, but it does not necessarily follow that they should then automatically be appointed. This is because the
law does not preclude the infusion of new blood, younger dynamism, or necessary talents into the government
service, provided that the acts of the appointing power are bona fide for the best interest of the public service
and the person chosen has the needed qualifications.
In the present instance, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of offices, the assailed action is a mere
reorganization under the general provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NTA in the interest
of simplicity, economy and efficiency. It is an act well within the authority of President motivated and carried
out, according to the findings of the appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this Court could
only but accept.

Domingo vs Zamora
Although the issue is already academic, its significance constrains the Court to point out that Executive Order
No. 292 (EO 292 for brevity), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, expressly grants the
President continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President. Section 31 of EO 292 provides:

SEC. 31. Continuing Authority of the President to Reorganize his Office. The President, subject to the policy
in the Executive Office and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President. For this purpose, he may
take any of the following actions:

(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices,
the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Support System, by abolishing,
consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;

(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer
functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and

(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other department or agency as well as transfer
agencies to the Office of the President from other Departments or Agencies. (Emphasis supplied.)

Since EO 81 is based on the Presidents continuing authority under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292,[8] EO 81 is
a valid exercise of the Presidents delegated power to reorganize the Office of the President. The law grants the
President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To
remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the
President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. After all, the Office of the President
is the command post of the President. This is the rationale behind the Presidents continuing authority to
reorganize the administrative structure of the Office of the President.

Petitioners contention that the DECS is not part of the Office of the President is immaterial. Under EO 292, the
DECS is indisputably a Department of the Executive Branch. Even if the DECS is not part of the Office of the
President, Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 clearly authorizes the President to transfer any function or agency of
the DECS to the Office of the President. Under its charter, the PSC is attached to the Office of the President.[9]
Therefore, the President has the authority to transfer the functions, programs and activities of DECS related to
sports development[10] to the PSC, making EO 81 a valid presidential issuance.

However, the Presidents power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292
should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1)
of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or
merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3)
of EO 292, the Presidents power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within
the Office of the President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President
to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa.

This distinction is crucial as it affects the security of tenure of employees. The abolition of an office in good
faith necessarily results in the employees cessation in office, but in such event there is no dismissal or
separation because the office itself ceases to exist. On the other hand, the transfer of functions or agencies does
not result in the employees cessation in office because his office continues to exist although in another
department, agency or office. In the instant case, the BPESS employees who were not transferred to PSC were
at first temporarily, then later permanently reassigned to other offices of the DECS, ensuring their continued
employment. At any rate, RA 9155 now mandates that these employees shall be retained by the Department.

Makati Stock Exchange vs SEC

Hence, it is pertinent to inquire whether the Commission may "in the public interest" prohibit (or make
impossible) the establishment of another stock exchange (besides the Manila Stock Exchange), on the ground
that the operation of two or more exchanges adversely affects the public interest.
Forgetting for the moment the monopolistic aspect of the Commission's resolution, let us examine the authority
of the Commission to promulgate and implement the rule in question.

It is fundamental that an administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him by the
statute, and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof.
In its brief and its resolution now subject to review, the Commission cites no provision expressly supporting its
rule. that there should only be one stock exchange.
On the legality of its rule, the Commission's argument is that: (a) it was approved by the Department Head
before the War; and (b) it is not in conflict with the provisions of the Securities Act. In our opinion, the approval
of the Department, 5 by itself, adds no weight in a judicial litigation
According to many court precedents, the general power to "regulate" which the Commission has (Sec. 33)
does not imply authority to prohibit."
(in prohibiting the additional stock exchange, SEC argues that: This brings up the Commission's principal
conclusions underlying its determination viz.: (a) that the establishment of another exchange in the environs of
Manila would be inimical to the public interest; and (b) that double or multiple listing of securities should be
prohibited for the "protection of the investors.")

But until otherwise directed by law, the operation of exchanges should not be so regulated as practically to
create a monopoly by preventing the establishment of other stock exchanges and thereby contravening:
(a) the organizers' (Makati's) Constitutional right to equality before the law;
(b) their guaranteed civil liberty to pursue any lawful employment or trade; and
(c) the investor's right to choose where to buy or to sell, and his privilege to select the brokers in his employment.
Thus, it has been held that where the licensing statute does not expressly or impliedly authorize the officer in
charge, he may not refuse to grant a license simply on the ground that a sufficient number of licenses to serve
the needs of the public have already been issued.

Taule vs Santos
Petitioner raises the following issues:
1) Whether or not the respondent Secretary (of local government) has jurisdiction to entertain an election
protest involving the election of the officers of the Federation of Association of Barangay Councils;

2) Whether or not the respondent Governor has the legal personality to file an election protest;
3) Assuming that the respondent Secretary has jurisdiction over the election protest, whether or not he
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in nullifying the election;

The respondent Secretary, acting in accordance with the provision of the Local Government Code empowering
him to "promulgate in detail the implementing circulars and the rules and regulations to carry out the various
administrative actions issued Department of Local Government Circular No. 89-09 on April 7, 1989, 8 to provide
the guidelines for the conduct of the elections
It is now the contention of petitioner that neither the constitution nor the law grants jurisdiction upon the
respondent Secretary over election contests involving the election of officers of the FABC, the katipunan ng mga
barangay at the provincial level. It is petitioner's theory that under Article IX, C, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, it is the Commission on Elections which has jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
barangay officials.
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC over contests involving elective barangay officials is limited to appellate
jurisdiction from decisions of the trial courts. Under the law, the sworn petition contesting the election of a
barangay officer shall be filed with the proper Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court
The jurisdiction of the COMELEC does not cover protests over the organizational set-up of the katipunan ng mga
barangay composed of popularly elected punong barangays
However, the Secretary of Local Government is not vested with jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving
the election of officers of the FABC.
There is no question that he is vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations as set forth in
Section 222 of the Local Government Code.

Now the question that arises is whether or not a violation of said circular vests jurisdiction upon the respondent
Secretary, as claimed by him, to hear a protest filed in relation thereto and consequently declare an election
null and void.
It is a well-settled principle of administrative law that unless expressly empowered, administrative agencies
are bereft of quasi- judicial powers. The jurisdiction of administrative authorities is dependent entirely upon
the provisions of the statutes reposing power in them; they cannot confer it upon themselves. Such jurisdiction
is essential to give validity to their determinations.
There is neither a statutory nor constitutional provision expressly or even by necessary implication conferring
upon the Secretary of Local Government the power to assume jurisdiction over an election protect involving
officers of the katipunan ng mga barangay. An understanding of the extent of authority of the Secretary over
local governments is therefore necessary if We are to resolve the issue at hand.
Presidential power over local governments is limited by the Constitution to the exercise of general supervision
22 "to ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." 23 The general supervision is exercised by
the President through the Secretary of Local Government. 24

In administrative law, supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that the
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fails or neglects to fulfill them the former may take such
action or step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control, on the other hand, means the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The fundamental
law permits the Chief Executive to wield no more authority than that of checking whether said local government
or the officers thereof perform their duties as provided by statutory enactments. Hence, the President cannot
interfere with local governments so long as the same or its officers act within the scope of their authority. 25
Supervisory power, when contrasted with control, is the power of mere oversight over an inferior body; it does
not include any restraining authority over such body.
Construing the constitutional limitation on the power of general supervision of the President over local
governments, We hold that respondent Secretary has no authority to pass upon the validity or regularity of the
election of the officers of the katipunan. To allow respondent Secretary to do so will give him more power than
the law or the Constitution grants. It will in effect give him control over local government officials for it will
permit him to interfere in a purely democratic and non-partisan activity aimed at strengthening the barangay
as the basic component of local governments so that the ultimate goal of fullest autonomy may be achieved.

Indeed, it is the policy of the state to ensure the autonomy of local governments. 28 This state policy is echoed
in the Local Government Code wherein it is declared that "the State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy
of local government units to ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more
effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress."
Moreover, although the Department is given the power to prescribe rules, regulations and other issuances, the
Administrative Code limits its authority to merely "monitoring compliance" by local government units of such
issuances. 30 To monitor means "to watch, observe or check.
Even the Local Government Code which grants the Secretary power to issue implementing circulars, rules and
regulations is silent as to how these issuances should be enforced. Since the respondent Secretary exercises
only supervision and not control over local governments, it is truly doubtful if he could enforce compliance with
the DLG Circular. 32 Any doubt therefore as to the power of the Secretary to interfere with local affairs should
be resolved in favor of the greater autonomy of the local government.
The respondent Secretary not having the jurisdiction to hear an election protest involving officers of the FABC,
the recourse of the parties is to the ordinary courts. The Regional Trial Courts have the exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear the protest.

Cario vs CHR
***The power to investigate does not include the power to adjudicate, unless expressly granted.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate,
i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of

justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom
the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of
receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of
applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or
observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by
careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;"
In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally.
Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle
or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."

Villaluz vs Zaldivar
Administrative proceedings may be commenced a government officer or employee by the head or chief of the
bureau or office concerned motu proprio or upon complaint of any person which shall be subscribed under
oath by the complainant: Provided, That if a complaint is not or cannot be sworn to by the complainant, the
head or chief of the bureau or office concerned may in his discretion, take action thereon if the public interest
or the special circumstances of the case, so warrant.

Ruiz vs Drilon
Petitioner is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee
created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to an administrative decision that is based
on substantial evidence made of record and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges made against him
and the evidence presented against him during the hearings of the investigating committees. There is no doubt
that he has been accorded his rights.

Pefianco vs Moral
Moral, a Chief librarian was charged with dishonesty, grave misconduct etc. After investigation, she filed a
Petition for Production of Investigation Committee Report purportedly to guide her on whatever course of
action to take.

There is no law or rule which imposes a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the
investigation report. On the contrary, we unequivocally held in Ruiz v. Drilon that a respondent in an
administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating
committee created to inquire into charges filed against him. He is entitled only to the administrative decision

based on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the
evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. Respondent no doubt had
been accorded these rights.

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion (Motion for Reconsideration)

In extradition proceedings, due process rights of notice and hearing may not be invoked in requesting the
findings of the investigation. Extradition is sui generis. It is not a criminal action which will call upon the
constitutional rights of the defendant.
THE POTENTIAL EXTRADITEE SHOULD NOT BE AFFORDED A COPY OF THE EXTRADITION PAPERS DURING THE
EVALUATION STAGE OF THE EXTRADITION PROCESS.
However, this does not mean that the possible extradite has no right to due process at all throughout the
extradition proceeding.
He is only prohibited from inquiring about the extradition papers during the evaluation stage. Upon filing of the
formal petition for extradition in the court, he is afforded with the right to due process.

Camara vs Municipal Court

In this case, appellant has been charged with a crime for his refusal to permit housing inspectors to enter his
leasehold without a warrant. There was no emergency demanding immediate access; in fact, the inspectors
made three trips to the building in an attempt to obtain appellant's consent to search. Yet no warrant was
obtained, and thus appellant was unable to verify either the need for or the appropriate limits of the inspection.
No doubt, the inspectors entered the public portion of the building with the consent of the landlord, through
the building's manager, but appellee does not contend that such consent was sufficient to authorize inspection
of appellant's premises. Cf. Stoner v. California,376 U. S. 483; Chapman v. United States,365 U. S. 610; McDonald
v. United States,335 U. S. 451. Assuming the facts to be as the parties have alleged, we therefore conclude that
appellant had a constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a warrant to search and that appellant
may not constitutionally be convicted for refusing to consent to the inspection. It appears from the opinion of
the District Court of Appeal that, under these circumstances, a writ of prohibition will issue to the criminal court
under California law.

Salazar vs Achacoso
We reiterate that the Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants.
Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, we declare Article 38, paragraph (c),
of the Labor Code, unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

No search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce,
and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

Catura vs CIR accounts, records, reports or statements may be required to be delivered and deposited with
administrative body.
All that the challenged order did was to require petitioners, as President and Treasurer of the labor organization,
to "deliver and deposit" with respondent Court all of its book of accounts, bank accounts, pass books, union
funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to its finances at the hearing of the petition before it on
January 3, 1967.

On its face, it cannot be said that such a requirement is beyond the statutory power conferred. If it were
otherwise, the specific provisions of law allegedly violated may not be effectively complied with. The authority
to investigate might be rendered futile if respondent Court could be held as having acted contrary to law.

Evangelista vs Jarencio
An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in proceedings of a legislative or
judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole purpose is to obtain information upon which future action
of a legislative or judicial nature may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of
a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report
findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions. 10

We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from Executive Order No.
4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon witness, administer oaths, and take
testimony relevant to the investigation" 11 with the authority "to require the production of documents under a
subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply
in judicial proceedings of a similar character.".

OCA vs Canque In administrative investigation, formal or trial type hearing is not required.
Lastly, the Court does not agree with the finding of the Office of the Court Administrator in its first Report dated
June 13, 2006 recommending that the Investigation Report of Investigating Judge Dumdum be set aside and
that the complaint be investigated anew since Canque was not informed of her right to be heard by herself and
counsel during the investigation an omission allegedly amounting to a denial of her right to due process. The
essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to present any
evidence he may have in support of his defense. Technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly
applied to administrative proceedings. Thus, administrative due process cannot be fully equated with due
process in its strict judicial sense.[13] A formal or trial-type hearing is not required.

Carmelo vs Ramos
The main issue in this ease is the power, if any, of committee, like the committee of which petitioner is the
chairman, to subpoena witnesses to appear before it and to ask for their punishment in case of refusal.
The rule is that Rule 64 (Contempt)1 of the Rules of Court applies only to inferior and superior courts and does
not comprehend contempt committed against administrative officials or bodies like the one in this case, unless
said contempt is clearly considered and expressly defined as contempt of court, as is done in paragraph 2 of
Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code.

Petitioner invokes Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides as follows:
Powers incidental to taking of testimony. xxx includes power to discipline (contempt).
HOWEVER, One who invokes this provision of the law must first show that he has "authority to take testimony
or evidence"
To be sure, there is nothing said in the executive order of the Mayor creating the committee about such a grant
of power. All that the order gives to this body is the power to investigate anomalies involving certain city
employees.
We do not agree with the petitioner that a delegation of such power to investigation implies also a delegation
of the power to take testimony or evidence of witnesses whose appearance may be require by the compulsory
process of subpoena.

Masangcay vs COMELEC Power of contempt is inherently judicial in nature. Thus, administrative bodies
may only excercise it if they are performing quasi-judicial functions.
In this case, the unauthorized opening of ballot boxes was only administrative in nature and not quasi-judicial.
Thus, no power of contempt may be exercised.

We expressed the view that when the Commission exercises a ministerial function it cannot exercise the power
to punish contempt because such power is inherently judicial in nature, as can be clearly gleaned from the
following doctrine we laid down therein:
. . . In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did not exercise any judicial function.
Such being the case, it could not exercise the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such
power is inherently judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly said: 'The power to punish for contempt is inherent
in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement
of judgments, orders and mandates courts, and, consequently, in the administration of justice (Slade Perkins v.
Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271; U.S. v. Lee Hoc, 36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 O.G., 2570; In Re Kelly, Phil., 944).
The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary incident and attribute of courts (Slade
Perkins v. Director of Prisons, Ibid.). Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making

effective the power to elicit testimony (People v. Swena, 296 P., 271). And the exercise of that power by an
administrative body in furtherance of its administrative function has been held invalid

Bedol vs Comelec
The main thrust of petitioners argument is that the COMELEC exceeded its jurisdiction in initiating the contempt
proceedings when it was performing its administrative and not its quasi-judicial functions as the National Board
of Canvassers for the election of senators. According to petitioner, the COMELEC may only punish contemptuous
acts while exercising its quasi-judicial functions.

ACCORDING TO SC, the COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was exercising its quasi-judicial power
in pursuit of the truth behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in Maguindanao.
In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power to punish individuals who refuse to appear during
a fact-finding investigation, despite a previous notice and order to attend, would render nugatory the
COMELECs investigative power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional mandate to secure the
conduct of honest and credible elections.

SUMMARIZING THE SC RULINGS WRT POWER OF CONTEMPT, an administrative agency may exercise power of
contempt provided that:
1. The power to punish must be expressly granted to the administrative body; and
2. It must be exercised only in quasi-judicial proceedings

Gaoiran vs Alcala
It must be pointed out that, while the letter-complaint of respondent Castillejo was not concededly verified,
appended thereto were the verified criminal complaint that he filed against the petitioner, as well as the sworn
statements of his witnesses. These documents could very well be considered as constituting the complaint
against the petitioner. In fact, this Court, through the Court Administrator, investigates and takes cognizance of,
not only unverified, but also even anonymous complaints filed against court employees or officials for violations
of the Code of Ethical Conduct. Indeed, it is not totally uncommon that a government agency is given a wide
latitude in the scope and exercise of its investigative powers. After all, in administrative proceedings, technical
rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied.

Ang Tibay vs CIR

Technical rule of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied in administrative proceedings. However, this
does not mean that the rules on due process could be disregarded.

Due process in administrative proceeding

due process in administrative proceedings requires compliance with the following cardinal principles:
(1) the respondents right to a hearing, which includes the right to present ones case and submit supporting
evidence, must be observed;
(2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
(3) the decision must have some basis to support itself;
(4) there must be substantial evidence;
(5) the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected;
(6) in arriving at a decision, the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of
the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate; and
(7) the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the
various issues involved.