Plato's Rejection of Thoughtless and Pleasureless Lives

Author(s): Matthew Evans

Source: Phronesis, Vol. 52, No. 4 (2007), pp. 337-363
Published by: BRILL
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'
' r

PHRONESIS
Phronesis
52 (2007) 337-363

BRILL

www.brul.nl/phro

and
Plato'sRejectionofThoughtless
Lives
Pleasureless
MatthewEvans

NY 10003,USA
NewYork,
NewYorkUniversity,
Department
ofPhilosophy,
me56@nyu.edu

Abstract

a
rational
humanbeing,giventhechoice,willprefer
In thePhilebus
Platoarguesthatevery
andmoderately
lifethatis moderately
thoughtpleasantto a lifethatis utterly
thoughtful
lifeat issueis
evenifthethoughtless
Thisis true,he thinks,
lessor utterly
pleasureless.
Plato
life
at
issue
is
the
and
Evidently
intensely
thoughtful.
intensely
pleasureless
pleasant
issufficient
takenbyitself,
northought,
wantsthisargument
toshowthatneither
pleasure
forus. Butthereis somedisagreement
to makea lifechoiceworthy
amongcommentators
to
toshowwhy.
Is theargument
aboutwhether
ornothealsowantstheargument
designed
and
lives
some
because
thatweshouldreject
and
establish
pleasures
thoughtless pleasureless
takethefirst
somethoughts
aregoods?Or is it silenton thisissue?Manyinterpreters
viewthatonly
to attackboththehedonist
thatPlatousestheargument
option,claiming
aregoods.Myaiminthis
viewthatonlythoughts
aregoodsandtheintellectualist
pleasures
as
the
bothexegetically
is
at
least
as
attractive
is
to
show
that
the
second
first,
option
paper
andphilosophically.
Keywords
Philebus
hedonism,
Plato,pleasure,

I
timeexplainingwhyit would be rational
Stricthedonistshave a difficult
foryou, giventhe choice, to prefera lifethatis somewhatpleasantand
to a lifethatis intensely
somewhatthoughtful
thoughtpleasantbututterly
less. For strictversionsof hedonismentailthata lifeis choiceworthy
just
to admit
insofaras it is pleasant.1This is whyhedonistsare hard-pressed

ofhedonism
do notentailthis,ofcourse.Butitisworthnotingthatmost
Manyversions
soas notto entailthis.Fora famousand
versions
aredevised
ofthesealternative
precisely
Koninklijke
BrillNV,Leiden,2007

DOI: 10.1163/156852807X229249

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338

M. EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007) 337-363

thatyou could rationally

rejectthemostblissfullifeavailableto you,even
ifthatlifewerecompletelyidiotic.Non-hedonists,
on theotherhand,can
acceptthe claim thatthevalue of thinkingdoes not deriveentirelyfrom
the value of enjoyingthinking.It is preciselybecause hedonistscannot
accept thisclaim thattheyare compelledto denyeitherthatyou could
rationally
rejecttheblissfullifeofan idiot,or thatthelifeofan idiotcould
the overall
be blissful.Since both of these responsesare bullet-biters,
inferior
dialecticalposition.
exchangeleavesthehedonistin a significantly
thislineof attack
CommentatorsoftengivePlato creditfordiscovering
on hedonism,since Socratesdeploysit - or somethingveryclose to it againsthis hedonistrespondentProtarchusin the opening and closing
In thesetextsSocratesis plainlytryingto establish
roundsof thePhilebus.2
norwhollyjoyless.
thatthe besthuman lifeis neitherwhollythoughtless
His argument- whichI willcall theChoiceArgument-turnson thelargely
a life
uncontroversial
claimthatanyhumanbeing,ifrational,would prefer
with some hedonic contentand some cognitivecontentto a lifewholly
withouteitherone (22al-b8; 60d3-e5). But at firstglanceit is notentirely
is rationallyrequiredof us.
clearwhySocratesthinksthatthispreference
Most leadingcommentators
hold that,accordingto Socrates,we arerationallyrequiredto rejectthetwo unmixedlivesbecausethinkingand enjoying are among the inherently
good thingsthatmake a humanlifegood.3
for
that"both the pleasureand the knowlholds
JohnCooper,
example,
are
the
mixed
life] recognized[bySocrates]to be good thingsin
edge [in
for a
themselves(thingswithoutwhich life would not be satisfactory
would
absence
their
humanbeing,notmerelybecauseofthefurthe
things
make unavailable,but becauseof theverynaturesof thepleasureand the
FollowingCoopers lead, I will definea good
knowledgethemselves)."4
as somethingthat,because of its own nature,is worthpursuingforits

recent
discussion
influential
seeMill(1861/1947),chapter
2; andforan excellent
example,
ofthisandothersimilar
see
Feldman
(2004).
objections,
2) The
form,at
appearsfirstat 20b6-22b8and thenlater,in an abbreviated
argument
ofthearguments
influential
discussion
60b7-61a3.Foran especially
upshotforhedonism,
seeMoore(1903/1993),139-141.
3) Fordefenses
ofthisview,seeCooper(1999), 150-164;Irwin(1995),332-338;Carone
views,seeGosling(1975) 181-185;
(2000); andCooper(2004),270-308.Fordissenting
Bobonich(1995); Richardson
Lear(2005),53-59;andRussell(2005), 168-171.
4>Cooper(1999), 152.

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M. EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007) 337-363

339

own sake.5As Cooper understandshim, Plato thinksthata lifeis worth

choosing(or rejecting)just insofaras it includes(or lacks)goods; sincewe
a lifethatis morechoiceworthy
to one that
arerationally
requiredto prefer
we arerationally
is lesschoiceworthy,
requiredto preferone lifeto another
lifeinsofaras the second lacks some goods thatthe firstdoes not. So, if
Cooper is right,thenPlato thinkswe are rationallyrequiredto preferthe
mixed lifeto eitherof the two unmixedlives because each of the two
unmixedlives lacks some good - eitherthoughtor pleasure- that the
mixedlifedoes not. On thisinterpretation,
then,Plato denies not only
are
that
view
all
and
thehedonist
onlypleasures goods,but also theantihedonistview that no pleasuresare goods.6 Because this interpretation
liberalattitudetowardthepursuitofat least
to Plato a relatively
attributes
some pleasures,I will call it theLiberalReadingand thosewho defendit
Liberais.

One seriousproblemforthe LiberalReadingis thatSocratesseemsto

argueat length,laterin thedialogue,againsttheclaimthatsomepleasures
are goods. In thislaterargument(53c-55a) Socratesevidentlydrawsthe
conclusionthatno pleasureis worthpursuingforits own sake, on the

5) According
thathasfinalvalueofa certainkind
a goodis something
to thisdefinition,
some hasfinalvalue
valueofa certainkind.Roughly
becauseit has intrinsic
speaking,
as a meansorfor
as an endorforitsownsake,notmerely
justincaseisworthpursuing

in
case
is
worthpursuing

has
intrinsic
value
and
some
thesakeofanother
just
thing;
toanother
becauseofhowstandsinrelation
notmerely
becauseofhowisinitself,
thing.
somephilosophers
As Christine
insists,
(suchas Kantand Moore)disrightly
Korsgaard
fortheirownsakesonly
thatareworthpursuing
thereareanythings
agreeaboutwhether
thentheyhavefinalvaluebutdo not
becausewecareaboutthem.Iftherearesuchthings,
fortheirownsakes,butonlybecause
value.(Thatis,theyareworthpursuing
haveintrinsic
thedistinction
to someone.)So thosewhofailto respect
theystandin a caringrelation
disto adjudicatethisimportant
valueand finalvalueareill-equipped
intrinsic
between
this
Plato
Does
see
this
to
For
effect, Korsgaard
(1983).
recognize
agreement. arguments
and pleasurehave?
And ifso, whatkindofvaluedoes he thinkknowledge
distinction?
themhere.Fora
butI cannothopetoanswer
andinteresting
Thesearepressing
questions,
havefinalvalue
to creditPlatowiththeviewthatsomepleasures
attempt
comprehensive
more
limited
For
a
Daniel
Russell
see
haveintrinsic
butnopleasures
value,
(2005).
attempt
ithasintrinsic
hasfinalvaluebecause
to creditPlatowiththeviewthatno pleasure
value,
seemy(forthcoming).
6) Notethatanti-hedonism,
is a
ithere,doesnotentailthateverypleasure
as I formulate
ofa certainkindbecauseit has intrinsic
thathas finaldisvalue
bad- thatis,something
kind.
ofa certain
disvalue

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340

M. EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007) 337-363

groundsthateverypleasureis itselfforthe sake of some good, and that

nothingworthpursuingforitsown sakeis itselfforthesakeof something
else.Whateverthemeaningand meritof thisargument,itsappearanceat
to makea decithispointin thedialogueforcesthecharitableinterpreter
sion: eitherfinda way to weakenwhat seemson its faceto be a radical
to the LiberalReading
anti-hedonist
argument,or developan alternative
of theChoice Argument.7
My goal in thispaperis not to makea conclusivecase foreitherof thesetwooptions,but ratherto showthatthereis an
alternative
to the LiberalReading- naturallyI'll call it theConservative
defensible.
that
is bothexegetically
and philosophically
ReadingThe ConservativeReading holds that Platos rejectionof the two
unmixedlivesis not groundedin anyviewhe mighthaveabout thegoodnessof thoughtor joy. Some of Socrates'remarkssuggestthatin his view
kindsofreasonto rejecta
we humanbeingsmighthavetwoverydifferent
givenlife:we havea valuingreasonto rejecta lifeifit lackssomegood,and
we have a limitingreasonto rejecta lifeifit is notlivablebyus. Conservativesthenclaimthat,accordingto Plato,we havea limitingreasonto reject
or notweaho havea valuingreason
each of thetwo unmixedliveswhether
todo so.As Conservatives
suggeststhathuman
pointout, Plato repeatedly
extent
and
that
human
is
to
some
pleasureis to some
pleasant,
cognition
extentcognitive;fromthisit seemsto followthathuman beingsas such
or thoughtful
and
cannotlead livesthatare eitherjoyfuland thoughtless
forus
joyless.So ifhe holds theplausibleview thata lifeis choiceworthy
if
is
reason
live
that
there
a
we
can
then
he
must
also
think
it,
only
limiting
forus to rejecteach ofthetwounmixedlives.Ifso, thentheChoice Argument - as he himselfunderstandsit - would go througheven on the
assumptionthatno thoughtsand no pleasuresweregoods. Thus, on the
Conservative
Reading,itremainsan open questionat theend oftheChoice
whether
or notPlatoacceptsthatsomecognitionsor somepleaArgument
suresaregoods.
At stakein thedebatebetweenLiberalsand Conservatives
is thecharacterand coherenceof Platos theoryof value. While the LiberalReading
commitsPlato to the view that some pleasuresand some thoughtsare
goods,theConservativeReadingdoes not commithim to anyviewabout
7) Of theLiberals,
an interpretation
anddevelops
onlyCaronefacesthisproblem
squarely
thatweakens
thelaterargument.
SeeCarone(2000),264-270.1discussCaronesinterpretationin my(forthcoming).

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M EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007)337-363

34 1

the goodnessof any thoughtsor any pleasures.Thus the Conservative

positionthatno pleasure
Readingleaveshimfreeto hold theanti-hedonist
is worthpursuingforits own sake, or the (even stronger)intellectualist
positionthatonly knowledgeis worthpursuingforits own sake. Since
thereis someevidencethatPlatodefendsone or moreofthesepositionsin
theConservativeReadinghas theadvantageof beingable to
thePhilebuSy
accommodatethisevidence.But the ConservativeReadingalso carriesa
cost.ForitstripsPlatoofthecredithe has receivedfordiscoversignificant
what
manyphilosopherscontinueto regardas a persuasiveargument
ing
As I willsuggest,however,the
againstbothhedonismand anti-hedonism.8
obtuse.
Conservative
Readingdoes not renderPlatos viewphilosophically
it allowshim to emergeas a morecombative,moreradiOn thecontrary,
cal, and (to thatextent)moreexcitingfigure.By denyingthatPlato ever
embracesan accountof the value of pleasurethatstrikesmanyphilosopherstodayas sensibleor enlightenedor evenobvious,theConservatives
betweenvalucan givehimcreditforhavinggraspedthecrucialdifference
on
that
basis
an intrigufor
and
and
havingdeveloped
limitingreasons,
ing
position one thatin myviewremainsunder-explored
ing anti-hedonist
ethicistsand historiansalike.9
and under-appreciated
by contemporary
such a positionmightbe, theConservative
But no matterhow intriguing
unlessit can
Readingshould not be recognizedas a genuinealternative
make good senseof what Socratesactuallysaysin the text.The primary
goal ofthispaperis to showthatit can.10
II
theconclusionof theChoice Argumentis far
The choicethatunderwrites
standardsthat,
It is constrainedby a set of interrelated
fromarbitrary.
8) Manyrecentandwidelyacceptedlinesofargument
and anti-hedoagainsthedonism
to theLiberalReadingofPlato'sChoice
affinities
nismhavedeep(andunacknowledged)
seeAnscombe
Forarguments
anti-hedonism,
(1957/1999),76-78,and
against
Argument.
seeMoore(1912),146-147,and
hedonism,
against
Nagel(1986),156-162.Forarguments
Kagan(1998),34-36.
9) Forsome
seemy(forthcoming).
tothiseffect,
arguments
10)Sincemyprimary
I
as itappearsinthisdialogue,
thisargument
goalhereistointerpret
Thisis
thatappearinotherdialogues.
torelated
littleattention
devoterelatively
arguments
a narrower
butbecauseI think
wouldbefruitless,
a widerinterpretation
notbecauseI think
us
to
start.
for
the
better
is
place
interpretation

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342

M. EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007)337-363

takentogether,
conditionsforwhatSocratescalls
providethemembership
"theclassofthegood" (,20dl).11 Thisclass,according
to Socrates,is (1) complete(,20dl-2), (2) sufficient
20d4),
(,
and (3) suchthat
togetholdofitandpossess
itaimsatandpursues
it,wishing
anyonewhorecognizes
itforhisveryown,andcaresfornothing
elseexceptwhatis accomplished
alongwith

].12
goods[
(20d7-10)

Taken as a whole,thispassagestrongly
suggeststhattheclassof thegood
containsall and onlythosethingsthatareworthpursuingas ends.The first
twostandardsguaranteethatthisclassneitherlacksanyofthegoods there
are,norincludesanythingthatis not a good.13The thirdstandardguaranteesthat,no matterwhatwe careabout,we careaboutiteitherbecause(we
think)it is worthpursuingforits own sake or because (we think)it is
somethingwe acquireor accomplishalongwithsomethingworthpursuing forits own sake. So thisthirdstandardimpliesthatwe are rationally
justifiedin caringabout thingsthatare not goods,providedthatthereare
some goods thatwe do not (or cannot) acquireor accomplishunlesswe
acquireor accomplishtheseotherthingstoo. Since theseotherthingsare
whatwe get "alongwith"goods,but are not themselves
goods,I will call
careaboutsubnot
be
rational
to
themsubsidiaries.14
it
would
Presumably
n) Plato'suse of (allotment,
thathe is conpart)in thisphrasesuggests
portion,
aswiththemanythings
cernedherenotso muchwiththegooditself
that,takenas a whole,
tothegoodorhavea shareinthegood.ThisiswhyI prefer
"theclassofthegood"to
belong
are modifiedfromFrede
Fredes"thegood." Unlessotherwise
noted,all translations
(1993).
12)On thetranslation
ofthislastphrase,
seeWhite(2002), 185,note87. Fora different
takeon thetranslation
of,
seeCooper(2004) 271-272,note2.
13)Moredetailed
discussions
ofthefirst
twostandards
canbe foundinBury(1897/1973),
Lear(2005),53-59.
211-214;Cooper(2004) 270-278;andRichardson
14)Fora different
seeBoboaccountofthedistinction
introduced
bythethirdstandard,
nich(1995), 118-123,and Bobonich(2002), 153-159.Primarily
on thebasisof Laws
he callsa
is something
631b-632a,BobonicharguesthateachthingI calla "subsidiary"
if[andonlyif]shepossesses
thatis "goodforitspossessor
"dependent
good":something
else"((1995) 122).WhileBobonich
s interpretation
oftheLawspassageisintersomething
hisattempt
to bringthissectionofthePhilebus
intoconformity
with
estingandplausible,
hisinterpretation
strikes
meas forced.
HereSocrates
does
not
that
these
secondsay
clearly
whatever
arythings,
theyare,become
goodsiftheyareacquiredalongwithgoods;he says
thatthesethings
areacquired
alongwithgoods,butarenotthemselves
goods.

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M. EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007)337-363

343

sidiariesfortheirown sake, since the value of each of them is entirely

it wouldbe rationalto
parasiticon thevalueofsomegood; butpresumably
forthesakeofthegoods theysubsidize,sincethere
careaboutsubsidiaries
are some goods we do not (or cannot)securewithoutalso securingtheir
subsidiaries.
betweengoodsand
As I understand
it,thepurposeofPlatos distinction
subsidiariesis to set aside a class of thingsthat are worthgettingonly
becausewe haveto getthemifwe aregoingto getsome otherthings.But
is
to noticethattherelationbetweengoodsand subsidiaries
itis important
instruand
relation
between
not equivalentto the more familiar
goods
to a good is a subsidiaryof that
ments.For althougheveryinstrument
to thatgood. To
good, not everysubsidiaryof a good is an instrument
as
human
where
our
nature
world
a
this
beingscompoint,imagine
grasp
pelsus to enjoylisteningto complexmelodies.Then assumethateveryact
to a complexmelodyis a good. So, accordingto thedistinction
oflistening
betweengoodsand subsidiaries,
everypleasuretakenin listeningto a comis
us
plex melody (for humans) a subsidiary.But it is plainlyabsurdto
supposethat,even in thisimaginaryworld,everypleasuretakenin that
to thatactivity;we would not (and presumably
activityis an instrument
as a meansto theend of
could not) seekthepleasurewe takein an activity
if
we
wereunableto listento
other
the
in
On
that
hand,
activity.
engaging
complexmelodieswithoutrestingourearsforan houreveryday,thenrestingourearsforan houreverydaywould countas an exampleofsomething
to listeningand - becausewe mustrestifwe are
thatis bothan instrument
a
goingto listen subsidiaryof listening.So subsidiariesareworthcaring
butnotonlyiftheyareinstruments.
about iftheyareinstruments,
The relationbetweengoods and subsidiariesis subtle,but I believethat
it ratherclearly,at
Plato has a good intuitivegraspof it. For he illustrates
several
relevant
with
variousstagesofthedialogue,
examples.The cumulativeforceof theseexamplesis that,forhuman beingsat least,cognition
necessarilyaccompaniespleasure,and pleasurenecessarilyaccompanies
Socratesclaimsthatwe achievebothpleasure
cognition.More specifically,
some appeand cognitionwheneverwe: (1) anticipatethatwe will satisfy
tite(32b9-c2); (2) remembereitherhavingsatisfiedan appetite(33c5-6)
orhavingbeenpleased(21cl-2); (3) learn(51e7-52a3); (4) exerciseabstract
formorethanan instant(21c2-4);
knowledge(63e3-4); (5) enjoysomething
and (6) are awareof being pleased (21c4-5). The purportedconnection
betweenpleasureand cognitionin thesecases is plainlynon-accidental:
Socratesis supposingthat,giventhesortofanimalswe are,we justdo not

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M. EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007)337-363

then,is that
(or cannot)achieveone withouttheother.What thissuggests,
if some cognitionsare goods, then the pleasuresthat accompanythese
cognitionsare subsidiaries;likewise,ifsome pleasuresare goods,thenthe
cognitionsthataccompanythesepleasuresaresubsidiaries.So Plato'sown
in a
treatment
of the relationbetweenpleasureand cognitionillustrates,
and
subsidiaries
the
relation
between
fairlystraightforward
way,
goods
and does so withoutimplyinganyviewaboutwhichis which.
As interpreters
oftheChoice Argument,
we needto keepthedistinction
betweengoods and subsidiariesin mind.For ifwe do not,we runtherisk
of conflating
twoverydifferent
sortsof reasona humanagentmighthave
forrejectingone kind of lifein favorof another.One sortof reason- a
valuingreason- is thatthelifelackssomegood; anothersortofreason a
reason- is thatthelifelackssomesubsidiary.
As we shallsee,Plato
limiting
think
a
it
for
reason
to
may
possible
prescribea choiceevenwhen
limiting
no valuingreasondoes. And ifthisis whathe thinks,thentheconclusion
of theChoice Argumentis farweakerthantheLiberalReadingcan allow.
Ill
Once Socrateshas specifiedthemembership
conditionsof theclassof the
good,he setsout to providetherationalhumanagentwitha setofpossible
choices.But he is not admirablyclearabout how he wantsthisset constructed.One interpretive
questionthatlingerswell into the body of the
argumentis whetherthe agentis supposedto be choosingamongseveral
livesor amongseveral(psychological)
featuresoflives.At thebeginningof
thedialogue,Socratesexplicitly
"eachof us [i.e.,
recognizesthedifference:
he and Protarchus]
will tryto show thatsome stateand conditionof the
psychecan providethe happy life foreveryhuman being" (

(1 ld4-6). Then later,in thepreludeto

)
theChoiceArgument,
Socratessuggeststhattheargumentitselfis designed
to establisha claimabouttherelative
valueofpleasureand thought,understood now as features
ratherthanlives(20b6-9). But herehe does not say
whetherthisclaimwill be establishedon thebasisof a choiceamongfeaturesor a choiceamonglives.Stilllater,whenSocratessetsout theconditionsunderwhicha negativechoice(thatis,a rejection)wouldbe rationally
his languageis ambiguous:
justified,
Lettherebe neither
in thelifeofpleasure
inthelifeofintelnorpleasure
intelligence
elsein
ligence.Forifin facteitherof themis thegood,it mustnotneedanything

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M. EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007)337-363

345

. Butifone or theothershouldappearto be lacking,

addition[]
thenI
betherealgoodforus [
].
(20e4-21a2)
supposethiscannolonger

Fromthispassagealone it is notobviouswhethertheproposedtestis supor whichof thetwolives,is not

posed to revealwhichof thetwofeatures,
"therealgood forus." In thelinesthatfollow,however,Socratesstrongly
suggeststhathe meansthelatter(see,e.g.,21a8-9, 21d6-7, and 22a9-b6).
And ifthisis whathe means,thenthechoicetestis designedto determine
whethereitherof the two unmixedlives"needs" somethingextra,not
whethereitherof the twopsychological
features"needs"somethingextra.
that
the
choicetestwilltellus whethereitherof
ObviouslySocratesthinks
has thepowerto makea life"therealgood
features
thetwo psychological
[life]forus." Butas he seesit,thetestitselfis to be appliednotto thesetwo
devotedto them.
but to thetwo livesuniquelyand exhaustively
features,
The interpretive
challengenow is to figureout why and how Socrates
thinksthatthechoicetest,eventhoughitis appliedonlyto lives,can yield
thatcharacterize
them.
aboutthevalueofthefeatures
reliableinformation
thinks
that
the
rational
to
Socrates
the
Liberals,
agentwill
According
rejecta lifejustinsofaras thatlifelacksgoods. Since a lifethatlacksgoods
cannotbe thegood lifeforus, therationalagents rejectionof a givenlife
to establishthatit is not thegood lifeforus. On this
would be sufficient
the
choice
testcan yielda conclusionabout the comparainterpretation,
tivevalue of pleasureand thoughtbecausewe can constructlivesthatare
fullofone and emptyoftheother,and thenfindout whethereitherofthe
twowould be acceptableto everyrationalhuman agent.If thejoyfulbut
thoughtlesslifefailsthe test,thenwe should inferthatsome goods are
but joyless
thoughts,and hence thathedonismis false;if the thoughtful
lifefailsthetest,thenwe shouldinferthatsome goods are pleasures,and
is false.Or so theLiberalssuggest.
hencethatintellectualism
to dismissthepreviously
But to endorsethisinterpretation
is, in effect,
markeddistinctionbetweengoods and subsidiaries.For it presupposes
rationalhumanagentfindsa givenlifewanting,
thatifthehypothetically
then that life must lack some good. Given Plato's distinctionbetween
should revisethis
goods and subsidiaries,however,we (as interpreters)
rationalhumanagentfindsa
assumptionas follows:ifthe hypothetically
life
must
lack
either
somegood orsomesubsidthen
that
life
given wanting,
revision
Now
first
this
at
some
mightseem not to
glance
good.
iaryof
come along
if
all subsidiariesnon-accidentally
since
make a difference,
withthe goods theysubsidize any lifethatlackssome subsidiarymust

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M. EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007) 337-363

also lacksomegood. But thisis incorrect.

To be a subsidiary
is to be a thing
thatan agentgets,as a matterof necessity,
with
some
along
good. Thus a
thingsstatusas a subsidiarydepends to some extenton the powersof
To see
variousagents,and thepowersofvariousagentscan differ
radically.
thismoreclearly,
with
Plato
for
a
moment
and
assume
that
gods,
go along
unlikehumans,exercisetheirintelligence
withoutevertakingpleasurein
that exercise.15
Then assume that the exerciseof intelligenceis a good.
intelFromthesetwoassumptionsitfollowsthatthepleasureofexercising
is
a
a
Thus
there
humans
but
not
ligence subsidiary^
subsidiary^ g0.16
is no guaranteethat a particularlifewill include all the subsidiariesof
whatevergoods it includes,becauseone and thesamelifemightlacksubsidiariesforone sortofagentbutnotforanother.So ifwe takethedistinction betweengoods and subsidiariesat all seriously,
we should hesitate
beforeendorsingtheLiberalviewthat,accordingto Plato,theonlypossible reasonfora human agentto finda givenlifewantingis thatit lacks
view
some good. We shouldconsiderendorsinginsteadthe Conservative
that,accordingto Plato,thereare two possiblereasonsfora humanagent
to finda givenlifewanting:thefirst
is thevaluingreasonthatitlackssome
good, and the second is the limitingreason that it lacks some human
subsidiary.17
If we decide to endorsethe ConservativeReading because it alone
thenwe are
betweengoods and subsidiaries,
respectsthecrucialdifference
bound to noticethat by Plato'sown lights each of the two unmixed
lives lacks human subsidiaries.For,as I arguedin the previoussection,
Plato holds thathumanpleasurenecessarily
accompanieshumanthought
and human thoughtnecessarilyaccompanieshuman pleasure.So when
Socratesremovesall joy fromthethoughtful
lifeand all thoughtfromthe
he
weakens
the
inference
licensedby the rational
life,
effectively
joyful
humanagentsrejectionof each. To see why,assumeforthesake of argumentthathedonismis trueand thatall and onlypleasuresaregoods.Thus
some thoughtsare human subsidiaries,and a human agent would be
lifeforlimitingreasonsalone. In this
justifiedin rejectinga thoughtless
I5)Textualevidence
thatPlatoacceptsthisaccountofthegodscanbe foundat 33b6-c4.1
discussthisevidence
ingreater
detailbelow,insectionIV.
16)As GabrielaCarone
Platothinks
thatgodsareanimalstoo.See Carone
insists,
rightly
(2000),263-264andnote13.
17)Fromnowon, forthesakeof
I willuse "humansubsidiary"
and "divine
simplicity,
insteadof"subsidiary
forhumans"
and"subsidiary
forgods."
subsidiary"

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M. EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007)337-363

347

case it would obviouslynot be safeto inferfromthehumanagentsrejeclifethatsome thoughtsare goods and (therefore)

tion of the thoughtless
itis plainthat
thathedonismis false.Sincehedonismis truebyhypothesis,
the inferencein questionis a bad one. The lessonhere,I take it, is that
to Plato thedistinctionbetweengoods and subsidiarthosewho attribute
to
attributed
ies mustultimately
acknowledgethatthepatternofinference
Plato bytheLiberalsis fallaciousbyPlatos own lights.
skirmish.The deeperconflictbetween
But this is only a preliminary
will be settledonlyby a close analysisof the
Liberalsand Conservatives
let
argumentas it appearsin thetext.Beforewe turnto thattask,however,
us pausefora momentto considerthedeeperphilosophicalmotivationfor
endorsingsome versionof the ConservativeReading.Accordingto Conthe LiberalReadingcommitsPlato to the unreasonableview
servatives,
ofa life- whethertheybe thoughtsor pleathatthegood-makingfeatures
evenin theabsence
sures mustsucceedin makingthatlifechoiceworthy
Conservatives
view
is
This
other
think,because
unreasonable,
features.
ofany
it rulesout in advancethe possibilitythatthe best human lifehas some
whichare not goods,butwhichanylifemusthave in orderto be
features
understand
as Conservatives
These features,
thelifeof a humanperson.18
them,are not necessitiessuch as food and shelter;theyare conditionson
a humanperand maintaining
ofestablishing
thepsychological
possibility
Sinceitseemspossibleforthereto be suchenablingpsychological
sonality.19
18)In hisrecent
related
a closely
ofintrinsic
bookon theconcept
value,NoahLemosrejects
- haveno limiting
reasontoreject
totheviewthatwe- as humanpersons
lineofresistance
"is thatthereasonno one wouldfindthe
he writes,
lives:"One objection,"
thoughtless
is thatwhatexists
imbecile
desirable
ora verylong-lived
cricket
changeintoan immortal
ofthe
'wouldnotbe me.'In otherwords,sucha changewouldbe destructive
afterward
to
think
is
"no
reason
there
Lemos
since
has
no
This
thinks,
force,
good
person." objection
someaccidentor disease,to befallme that
forsomemisfortune,
it logically
impossible
has
thatsuchan imbecile
imbecile."
in mybeingsucha contented
wouldresult
Assuming
that
he
as
a
Lemos
thinks
I
odd
that
find
it
as
a
thesamecognitive
very
capacities cricket,
- though
I agreewithhimthatthisissuewill
sucha transition
humanpersoncouldsurvive
notbe settled
possible.See Lemos(1994), 53. Moreon the
byappealto whatis logically
worthcallinga
"ifthereis to be anything
is DorotheaFrede,whowrites:
mark,I think,
ofpresent
and fullcomprehension
ofpastpleasures
humanlife,therehasto be memory
ones."See Frede(1993),xxxii.
andpossiblefuture
19)ThusConservatives
lifewecannotlivefailstobe choiceshouldconcedethatnotevery
becausewe cannotliveit.AsTerenceIrwinhaspointedoutto mein
forussimply
worthy
freeofillnessdoesnotmakesucha
to livea lifecompletely
ourinability
correspondence,
forus.
lifeanylesschoiceworthy

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348

M. EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007) 337-363

featuresthatnonethelessfailto be goods,Liberalsare makinga veryhazOr so Conservatives

ardousmovewhentheyassumeotherwise.
suggest.
But even if Conservativeshave a view that is philosophicallywellmotivated,it is no easytaskforthemto makedecentsenseof theChoice
Argumentas Plato presentsit in thetext.And iftheycannotdo this,then
Liberalsare entitledto returnto the preliminary
stagesof the argument
and reconsiderwhetherPlato reallyacceptsthe distinctionI have drawn
betweengoods and subsidiaries.Since the decisivetestforeitherreading
letus focusourattenwillbe itsadequacyto thetextoftheargumentitself,
tionon thatnow.

IV
The Choice Argumentis dividedneatlyinto two parts.Taken together,
theyaim to establishthat neitherthe unmixedlifeof pleasurenor the
forus. The firstpartrulesout the
unmixedlifeofthoughtis choiceworthy
the
second
and
unmixedlifeofpleasure,
partrulesout theunmixedlifeof
but forobviousreasonsthe
thought.Both partshave the same structure,
firstpartis moredetailedand less compressedthanthe second. Socrates
whetherhe would choose "to live
startsthefirstpartbyaskingProtarchus
the
[his] entirelife enjoying
greatestpleasures"(
)or whetherhe would rather"needsomedeniesthathe would
thingelse in addition."(21a8-12) When Protarchus
need anythingelse,thefollowingexchangetakesplace:
or
or reasonor calculation
S: Butlook,wouldn't
youneedsomesortofintelligence
elserelated
to them?
anything
I wouldhaveeverything.
P: Whatfor?In havingpleasure
S: Butin livingthiswayalwaysthroughout
yourlife,wouldyouenjoythegreatest
]

[
pleasures?
: Whynot?
ortrueopinion,
orknowledge
ormemory
S: Giventhatyoudo notpossessintellect
ofthisitself,
whether
itcertainly
follows
thatyouareignorant,
first,
youareenjoyofallintelligence.
(21al4-b9)
ingornot,sinceyouareempty

Withoutanyintelligence
disabilities.
Socratesgoes on to add fourfurther
atall,Protarchus
wouldbe unableto:remember
anyofhispleasures(2 Ici -2);
experiencea singlepleasureacrosstime(21c2-4); judge thathe is pleased
whenhe is pleased(21c4-5); and calculatethathe will be pleasedat some

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M. Evans
I Phronesis
52 (2007)337-363

349

pointin thefuture(21c5-6). Fromall thisSocratesdrawsa conclusionthat

startlesProtarchus:
S: Youwouldlivenota humanlife[
]butthatofa mollusk
orone ofthoseothershelledcreatures
thatlivein thesea.Is thisright,
or canwe
thinkofanyotherconsequences
besidethese?
P: How couldwe?
forus?[
S: Butissucha lifechoiceworthy
]
atthemoment.
hasleftmecompletely
: Socrates,
thisargument
(21c6-d5)
speechless

Accordingto the Liberals,Protarchussuddenlyrealizeshere that the

forus becausecognitive
unmixedlifeof pleasurefailsto be choiceworthy
activityis worthpursuingforits own sake. But thisway of readingthe
argumentis not mandatedby the text.When Socratesasks Protarchus
whetherhe "wouldenjoythegreatest
pleasures"whilelivinga thoughtless
The
is
he
what
life,
potentialoptative"would enjoy"
asking?
question
) is ambiguousand can sustainat leasttwodifferent
(
interpretations.On the first,Socratesis askingwhetherProtarchuswouldchooseto
on the secenjoythegreatestpleasures,giventhecost to his intelligence;
in
the
Protarchus
could
whether
is
Socrates
ond,
factenjoy
greatest
asking
pleasures,given the cost to his intelligence.On eitherinterpretation,
lifeof pleasureis not the good
Socrateswantsto say thatthe thoughtless
lifeforus, but each yieldsa different
groundforthisconclusion.On the
that the joyous clam's life is not
Socrates
holds
first(Liberal) reading,
forus because at least some cognitiveactivitiesare worth
choiceworthy
for
their
own sake; on the second (Conservative)reading,he
pursuing
forus becausewe could not liveit.
holdsthatthislifeis not choiceworthy
live
So ifthesecondreadingis a
option,thenwe shouldnotsupposewithout further
argumentthatPlatos aim hereis to showthatsome cognitive
aregoods.
activities
But is the ConservativeReadingreallya live option?As faras I know,
to defenda versionof thisreadingis JustinGosling.
thefirstcommentator
on thePhilebus,GoslingclaimsthatProtarchus
In his 1975 commentary
is persuadedof thevalue of intelligence
withhorror
is notaskedto contemplate
. . . Protarchus
hedonistic
on straight
grounds
or
but one wherehe cannotremember
a lifewherehe cannotdo mathematics,
The first
twocouldbe seenas addingto one's
or predicthisenjoyments.
recognize
them.So Protarchus
could
an assuredmeansofobtaining
thelastas giving
pleasures,

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M. EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007) 337-363
be admitting
in so faras theyeither
activities
constituted
orwerea
intelligent
simply
goodmeanstopleasures.20

Goslings claim here,I take it, is that SocratesconvincesProtarchusto

rejectthe unmixedlifeof pleasureonly because thislifeis not pleasant
enough; if it were mixed with some cognitiveactivity,it would be
morepleasantthanit currently
the
is. On thisinterpretation,
significantly
as
of
this
of
creatures
the
is
that
(such
upshot
part
argument
thoughtful
can
or
those
that
clams
more
than
humans)
experience
greaterpleasures
can experience.Goslingsproposalcountsas a versionof theConservative
Reading,then,since it entailsthatProtarchusrejectsthe unmixedlifeof
pleasurebecausehe couldnotenjoythegreatest
pleasureswithinthatlife.
Liberals
claim
that
this
part of the argument
Leading
Gosling gets
Irwin,forexample,writesthat"Socrateswouldbe dealingunfairly
wrong.21
withthehedonistpositionifhe meantto recommendtheseformsofrational consciousnesssimplyas a meansto greaterpleasures.Forhe has already
conceded that the unmixedlife of pleasureincludesthe greatestpleasures."22
Accordingto Irwin,then,Socratesassumesforthe sake of the
argument(20e4-21a9) thatthe unmixedlifeof pleasurelacksnothingas
faras pleasureis concerned;thushe cannotjust rescindthisassumption
halfwaythroughthe argumentand stillexpectit to succeed. If Irwinis
rightabout this- as I believehe is - thenGosling'sversionof theConservativeReadingis unsuccessful.
But Goslingsversionis not theonlyone.
As I see it,thecoreclaimoftheConservative
Readingis that,accordingto
Protarchus
could
not
the
Socrates,
enjoy
greatestpleasureswithin a
life.And thiscoreclaimcan be defendedin twodifferent
ways.
thoughtless
The firstis to hold (withGosling)thatno thoughtless
lifecan includethe
greatestpleasures;the second is to hold (againstGosling) thatalthough
some thoughtless
livescan includethegreatestpleasures,theselivesare not
human.Irwinsobjectionto thefirst
approachdoes notapplyto thesecond
approach,since the second does not entailthatSocratesillicitlyrescinds
20)
on an earlier
draftofthispaper,RichardPatGosling(1975), 183. In hiscomments
terson
a similar
Fortwobroadly
view,callingit"theNeo-Conservative
proposed
Reading."
similar
seeRichardson
Lear(2005),56,andRussell(2005), 169.
proposals,
21)One
is Carone,whoholdsboththatPlatowantsto recommend
the
possibleexception
mixedlifeon hedonistic
and
that
the
Choice
establishes
that
some
grounds,
Argument
aregoods.See Carone(2000),271-283.
pleasures
22)Irwin(1995),334. Fora similar
seeCooper(2004),274-275.
response,

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M EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007)337-363

35 1

specificassumptionsabout the relevantlives.Accordingto this second

could notenjoythegreatest
pleaapproach,SocratesholdsthatProtarchus
insofaras he is a
lifeonlybecause Protarchus,
sureswithina thoughtless
life.And thisapproach,unlike
humanbeing,couldnotlivea thoughtless
is notvulnerableto Irwin'schallenge.
thefirst,
But Liberalsare freeto attackthe ConservativeReadingon different
promisingline of attackis to claim that,ifthe
grounds.One particularly
thentheexplicitly
statedconclusionof
were
Conservative
correct,
Reading
Considerthefolwould be a grotesquenonsequitur.
theChoice Argument
lowingexchange:
thepointofthepresent
S: Do wenowunderstand
argument?
for
andchoiceworthy
twoarenotsufficient
livesavailable,
P: Yes.Its that,ofthethree
.
]
humanoranimal[
either
it
of thesetwohas thegood?Forotherwise
S: Wellthen,isn'tit clearthatneither
for
and
and
wouldbe sufficient,
animal,
complete, choiceworthy everyplant
itslife[
ofthemisabletoliveinthiswayconsistently
whichever
throughout

]. Andifoneofuswereto choosesomeother
out
whatistruly
life,hewoulddo so involuntarily,
choiceworthy
bynature,
against
orsomeotherunhappy
ofignorance
necessity.
P: Thatseemsright.
(22a7-b9;cf.60d3-61a2)

Socratesmakesthreerelevantremarksin thispassage,and at firstblush

theyall weighheavilyagainstthe ConservativeReading.First,he claims
thatone oftheresultsofthechoicetestis thatneitherof thetwounmixed
lives"hasthegood."Takenat facevalue,thisclaimimpliesthateach ofthe
two unmixedlives lacks goods, not that each of the two unmixedlives
lackseithergoods or subsidiaries.Second,he suggeststhattheconclusion
that
oftheChoiceArgumenthingeson theclaim,proposedbyProtarchus,
forany floraor fauna.
neitherof the two unmixedlivesis choiceworthy
Thus Socratesseemsto be sayingthatbothlivesareto be rejectedfromthe
standpointof anynature,not just fromthe standpointof humannature.
Third,and perhapsmost important,Socratesseemsto assumethatProtarchushimselfis quitecapableoflivingbothofthetworejectedlives.For
if Socratesdid not thinkthis,then it'shard to see why he would think
himselfentitledto inferfromProtarchus'rejectionof the two unmixed
"foreveryplantand animal,whichever
livesthatneitheris choiceworthy
in
this
live
of them is able to
way consistently
throughoutits life."If
Socrateshad assumed that Protarchuswas unable to live eitherof the
two unmixedlives,then presumablythe choice test(when presentedto

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M. EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007) 337-363

Protarchus)would not have issuedin a negativeverdictforbothof them.

The mostnaturalinterpretation
of thesethreeremarks,
then,seemsnot to
can
be consistentwiththeConservativeReading.So unlessConservatives
Socrates'remarksis flawedor optional,
showthatthiswayof interpreting
Liberals have good reason to deny that Plato accepts the distinction
- at leastas I havedrawnit here.
betweengoods and subsidiaries
V
The mosteffective
way forConservativesto resistthisline of interpretation,I think,is to look forevidenceelsewherein thePhilebusthatSocrates
does not reallyendorseanyof thethreeclaimshe seemsto endorsein this
passage.One obviousplace to look forsuch evidenceis theexchangethat
directlyfollowsupon the one we have just examined.In this exchange
Socratesexpresseshisviewthat,despitewhattheradicalhedonistPhilebus
mightthink,theChoice Argumentdoes notconsignpleasureand thought
to thesame fate:
S: Thenenoughhasbeensaid,itseemsto me,to showthatthegodofPhilebusand
thegoodcannotbe recognized
as oneandthesame.
sincethesamecomPhilebus:Nor is yourintellect
[]thegood,Socrates,
plaintappliesto it!
tothetrueanddivineintellect
S: Itmayapplytomyintellect,
butnot,I think,
Philebus,
condition
(22cl-6)
[
],whichisina quitedifferent
[
].

to theargument
Philebus'outburstheremakesan importantcontribution
of thedialogueas a whole. For it is onlyin responseto thisoutburstthat
the Choice ArguSocratessounds his firstwarningnot to overestimate
ment'sachievement.Though the meaningof his warningis somewhat
it is plainlybased on whathe takesto be an importantdistinction
cryptic,
betweenhisintellectand thedivineintellect.In hisviewthere'ssomething
about the distinctionbetweenbeinga god and beinga humanthatwarrants(or at least allows) a continuingcommitmenton his partto some
versionof intellectualism.
This is newsto Philebus,and strikingin itself,
becauseit suggeststhattheChoice Argument- at Socratessetsit- failsto
establishthatintellectualism
versionofintel(or at leastsomerecognizable
is
false.
not
on
the
But
Socrates
does
elaborate
lectualism)
god/human
distinctionin thispassage,nor does he discussitsrelevanceto theChoice
Argument.So at thispoint we'releftwonderinghow thisdistinctionis

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M EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007) 337-363

353

supposedto performits limitingrole and how powerfulits limitingrole

reallyis.
Perhapsthe bestway to startansweringthesequestionsis to consider
betweenbeinga god
one of Socrates'variousremarksabout thedifference
littleabout gods in the
and being a human. Though he says relatively
Philebus,thereis one memorablepassagein whichhe suggeststhattheir
lives are both pleasurelessand painless.This passage coversone part of
Socrates'ambitiousattemptto spellout theconsequencesofwhatI callhis
ofpleasureand pain.23(Thistheoryholds,veryroughly,
EquilibriumTheory
of
and destructions,
thatpleasuresand pains are restorations
respectively,
certainmentalequilibria.)Here Socratesclaimsthatthereis a kindof life
and thatifthe Equilibthatinvolvesneitherdestructionnor restoration,
riumTheoryis correct,thenwhoeverlivessuch a lifeundergoesneither
conclusion:
pleasurenorpain (32e-33a). Fromthishe drawsan interesting
in thecomparison
oflives,thattheonewhochoosesthelife
S: Itwasagreedbefore,
whether
andreasonmustnotexperience
ofintelligence
largeorsmall.
pleasure,
P: Thatwascertainly
agreed.
S: So [theonewhochoosesthislife]livesin thisway.Andperhapsitwouldnotbe
if,ofalllives,thisis themostdivine[].
strange
: Well,it'snotlikelythatgodsareeither
pleasedorpained.
isn't.ForI supposeeachofthesewouldbe inappropriate
S: It certainly
[].
(33a8-bll)

for
By "inappropriate"here Socratespresumablymeans "inappropriate
gods'" This would make sense,giventhe EquilibriumTheory,since the
of an
EquilibriumTheoryentailsthatpleasureand pain are symptomatic
nature.It is a standarddoctrineofPlatonic(and Socratic)theolimperfect
so Socrateswould naturally
the
that
gods haveno suchimperfections,
ogy
infer- giventheEquilibriumTheory- thatthedivinelifeis bothpleasureformypurposes
What makesthisinference
lessand painless.24
interesting
to theChoice Argument.
is thatSocrates,whiledrawingit,refers
explicitly
And in doingso he impliesthatthe "mostdivine"lifeis none otherthan
Protarchus
life- theverysamelifethathe thinks
intellectual
thepleasureless
is rationaltoreject.So we can safelyassumethatwhateverpurposethegod/
23)Formoredetaileddiscussion
seemy(2007).
ofthistheory,
24)HereI am in broadagreement
see
withFrede(1993) xliii.Foran intriguing
dissent,
for
and involved
aretoo intricate
GabrielaCarone(2000),260-264.Caronesarguments
inmy(2007).
metodealwithhere,butI discussthemmorecarefully

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M EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007)337-363

it is not to protect
humandistinctionmighthavein theoverallargument,
thedivinelifefromthenegativeresultof theChoice Argument.Forifthat
wereitspurpose,thenSocrateswould be sayingherethatwe haveno reason to rejectthe thoughtfulbut pleasurelesslife;and in sayingthis he
the explicitconclusionof the Choice Argument.
would be contradicting
To avoidsaddlingSocrateswithinconsistent
then,we need
commitments,
to understandhow the god/humandistinctioncould warrantthe claim
is true,but notwarranttheclaimthat
thatsomeversionofintellectualism
forus evenifit is joyless.
lifeis choiceworthy
themaximallythoughtful
The pressureon us to reachsuch an understanding
merelyincreases
when we consideranotherpassage,laterin the Philebus,whereSocrates
seemsto contradicttheconclusionoftheChoice Argumentin evenstarker
thata certerms.In thispassageSocratesis tryingto persuadeProtarchus
its
because
be
false
must
tain claim about pleasure
consequencesare
is twofold:firsthe adoptsthe
strategy
patentlyabsurd.Socrates'rhetorical
who
a
theorist
of
certain
scornfully
rejectsthis claim about
perspective
attitude
this
theoreticians
he
thinks
then
he
and
explainswhy
pleasure,
I
will
call
which
his
is
how
towardpleasureis justified.Here
argument
thePreference
Argument appearsin thetext:
ofbecoming
S: Andthismanwillalsolaughat thosewhofindtheirendin processes
.
[
]

: Why?Andwhichpeopledo youmean?
thata processof
or anything
S: I meanthosewho,whencuringhungeror thirst
insofar
as it is a
of
on
account
of
the
cures,rejoice
process becoming
becoming
that
claim
and

they
pleasure
all the
andexperiencing
andhungering
wouldnotagreeto livewithout
thirsting
andhungering].
effects
thatfollowupon[thirsting
notlikelyto,atanyrate.
P: They're
is theoppositeofbecoming?
we allsaythatdestruction
S: Butwouldn't
P: Necessarily.
butnot
and becoming,
S: So someonechoosingthislifewouldchoosedestruction
but
nor
thatthirdlife,inwhichthereis neither
beingpleased beingpained, only
in itspurest
[]
possibleform.
thinking
ifone holdsthat
follows
P: Well,Socrates,
it seemsthata greatabsurdity
[]
is good.
pleasure
S: A greatabsurdity
indeed.. . (54el-55al2)

The targetof Socrates'criticismhere,I takeit, is some human agent(or

pleasuregroupofhumanagents)who would rejectanylifethatis entirely
less- no matterhow thoughtful
it mightbe - in favorof a lifethatis to

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M. EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007) 337-363

355

froman interpreter
s pointofview,
someextentpleasant.Thisis surprising,
because the targetof Socrates*criticismhereseems to be someone with
close to Socrates'own. For he too holds,in
viewsthatare uncomfortably
thatanyhuman
accordancewiththeconclusionoftheChoice Argument,
even
themaximally
that
is
life
should
entirely
pleasureless
rejectany
agent
to
in
of
a
life
that
is
some
extent
favor
divinelife
pleasant.
thoughtful
Thus the Choice Argumentseems to license as rationalthe verysame
choice that the Preference
Argumentseems to dismissas irrational.So
we need
unlesswe arewillingto accuseSocratesof a patentcontradiction,
two
that
removes
the
of
the
to developa comprehensive
arguments
reading
apparentconflictbetweenthem.
The simplestand mostobviouswayto do this,I think,is to claimthat
what Socratescondemnsas irrationalin the Preference
Argumentis not
but the agents choice as guidedbycertain
the agents choice simpliciter,
of the Preference
at
the
outset
considerations.
ArgumentSocrates
Right
makesit clearthathisgoal is to discreditthosewho both"findtheirend in
processesofbecoming"and (sinceall pleasuresareprocessesof becoming)
"hold thatpleasureis good."25His primarytarget,then,is not so much a
a particuparticularchoicebetweenlivesas it is a viewaboutwhatjustifies
he seems to be arguingthat
lar choice betweenlives. More specifically,
livesforthereasonthatpleasureis worth
anyonewho rejectsall pleasureless
a seriouserror.The detailsof this
foritsownsakeis committing
pursuing
in
own
their
are
right,and to my mind extremely
argument interesting
What does mathere
for
our
but
theydo not matter.26
purposes
powerful,
is
the
teris thatSocrates'argument(on
proposedreading) not designedto
discrediteveryonewho rejectspleasurelesslives;it is designedto discredit
liveson thegroundthatsomepleasuresare
onlythosewho rejectpleasureless
in
the
If
read
we
argument this way,then it no longerconflicts
good.
withtheChoice Argument.The Choice Argumententailsthatwe
directly
lifein favorofthemixedlife,and thePrefoughtto rejectthepleasureless
erenceArgumententailsthatthereasonwhywe oughtto rejectthe pleasurelesslifein favorof themixedlifeis notthatsome pleasuresareworth
are consistent,
pursuingfortheirown sakes.Since thesetwo entailments
himself.
withoutcontradicting
Socratescan endorsebotharguments
25)ThePreference
withina larger
is embedded
(53c4-55al1) thekey
argument
Argument
of
is
a
is
that
of
which
().
becoming"
every
"process
pleasure
premise
26)Fora detailedanalysis
seemy(forthcoming).
ofthislarger
andevaluation
argument,

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M. EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007)337-363

Thiswayofresolving
theconflicttellsstrongly
againsttheLiberalReadthe
it
out
of
the
Choice
For
rules
that,according
possibility
ing
Argument.
to Plato,thereis a valuingreasonforeveryhumanagentto rejectthoughtfulbutpleasureless
lives.SinceLiberalscannotacceptthisresult,theylikewise cannotacceptthisway of resolvingthe conflict.And yet,as faras I
to offer.27
can see,theyhaveno comparablyclearalternative
Conservatives,
on the otherhand, are well-placedto explainwhyPlato thinkshe is in a
positionto acceptboth thatpleasurelessliveslack no goods and thatwe
humans should rejectthemanyway.For if the ConservativeReading is
forus,
correct,thenhe holds thatthedivinelifefailsto be choiceworthy
but onlybecausewe are unable to live it: we have a limitingreason- but
no valuingreason- to picksomethinglessgodlike.Thus theConservative
Readingcan explainquite clearlywhy Plato thinksthatthe god/human
fromthe jaws of the
distinctionsaves some versionof intellectualism
Choice Argument.Foritgiveshimroomto claimthatwe shouldrejectthe
unmixedlifeofcognitioneventhoughcognitionsaretheonlygoodsthere
are.The LiberalReading,on theotherhand,seemsto leavePlatowithno
comparablycoherentstoryto tell.
VI
As we haveseen,thereis evidencein otherpartsof thePhilebusthatPlato
betweena valuingreasonto rejecta life(thatis,a
recognizesthedifference
reasonto rejecta
reasonprovidedbythelife'slackofgoods) and a limiting
life(thatis, a reasonprovidedby thelifes lack of subsidiaries).ConservaLibtivescan use thisevidenceas leverageagainsttheotherwiseattractive
eralReadingof Socrates'recapitulation
of theChoice Argument.On that
reading,remember,Socratesmakes threerelatedclaims: first,that the
choicetestshowsthateach of thetwo unmixedliveslacksgoods; second,
thatProtarchusshould rejectthe two unmixedlivesfromany biological
standpointwhatsoever;and third,thatProtarchus(as a human) is fully
27)GabrielaCaroneis theonlyLiberalI am awareofwhobothnoticesthisconflict
and
to
resolve
it.
But
her
seems
claims
that
Plato
does
not
forced.
She
really
attempts
proposal
isa "process
thatevery
ofbecoming",
anddoesnotreally
draw
acceptthepremise
pleasure
theconclusion
thatno pleasure
is a good.See Carone(2000),264-266.Of courseCarone
hasreasons
of
ofherownformaking
suchradicalmoves,butitisobviousthatherreading
I
thisparticular
out
all
is
more
strained
than
the
one
other
issues
argumentbracketing
amproposing
here.

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M. Evans
I Phronesis
52 (2007)337-363

357

can
capable of livingthe two unmixedlives. Because we as interpreters
nowappreciatethehighexegeticalcostoftheLiberalReadingas whole,we
can now also appreciatehow relatively
cheap a defensibleConservative
a
time
forus to consider,as we did not
this
is
be.
So
alternative
good
might
before,whatsucha Conservativealternative
mightlook like.
The Liberal Reading of Socrates'recapitulationis initiallyappealing
because it makes excellentsense of his claim that,if eitherof the two
and comunmixedliveshad "thegood" thenthatlifewould be "sufficient
whichever
of
themis
and
for
and
animal,
choiceworthy everyplant
plete
As
its
life"
in
able to live thiswayconsistently
(22b4-6). Liberthroughout
thata given
als arequickto pointout,thisseemsto implytwothings:first,
lifecan failthehumanchoicetest- thatis, thechoicetestas presentedto
livethatlife;and
a humanbeing- onlyifa humanbeingcan consistently
second,thatifa lifefailsthehumanchoice test,thenit does not have all
thegoodsthatthereare.So ifSocratesmeanswhathe seemsto meanhere,
thenobviouslyhe does nothold thatthereasonwhythetwounmixedlives
failthehumanchoicetestis thatno humanbeingcan livethem;he must
hold insteadthattheybothfailbecauseeach lacksgoods. Thisjibes nicely
thechoicetest:
withthewayLiberalsproposeto interpret
ChoiceTest(LiberalVersion)

thatcanliveL.
LetL be anylifeandletC be anycreature
forC.
andchoiceworthy
L passesthechoicetestifandonlyifL issufficient,
complete,
forC ifandonlyifL lacksno goods.
andchoiceworthy
L issufficient,
complete,
IfL doesnotpassthechoicetest,thenL failsthechoicetest.

that
On thisreading,thechoicetesthas a built-instipulationto theeffect
a lifecan pass or failonlyifthecreatureforwhomit is or is notsufficient,
ifthe LiberalReading
can live it. Therefore,
complete,and choiceworthy
of thepassageas a whole is correct,thenPlato holds thatthe reasonwhy
theunmixedlivesfailthehumanchoicetestis notthathumanbeingscannotlivethem,but ratherthateach of themlacksgoods.
The mostseriousphilosophical
problemwiththisreadingis thatitseems
to leavePlatowithno comfortable
wayto explainwhytheunmixedlifeof
forus. For ifPlato
not
is
sufficient,
complete,and choiceworthy
thought
thinksthattheunmixedlifeof thoughtlacksgoods,and if- as I indicated
in sectionIV - he thinksthattheunmixedlifeofthoughtis thedivinelife,
thenhe mustalso thinkthatthe divinelifelacksgoods; but ifthe divine
lifelacksgoods,thenhumanbeingshave a reasonto rejectit evenifthey

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358

M. EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007) 337-363

to
can consistently
live it. Thus the LiberalReadingends up attributing
view
that
the
divine
Platotheextremely
to
mention
peculiar(not
impious)
inferiorin value to the good human life.Since thisis a
lifeis inherently
can plausidoes notaccept,Conservatives
viewthatPlatoalmostcertainly
with
the
must
be
claim
that
there
initiallyattractive
bly
somethingwrong
LiberalReadingof Socrates'remarks.For if Plato thinksthatwe do not
have a limitingreasonto rejectthe unmixedlifeof thought,then it is
unclearwhatsortof reasonhe thinkswe do haveto rejectit.
need to be
To exploitthisproblemeffectively,
however,Conservatives
of
able to proposea minimallycrediblealternative
interpretation Socrates'
I takeit,is to look forambiactualremarks.
Theironlypromisingstrategy,
as passingor failingthe
in
a
life's
status
Socrates'
claim
that
guities
given
choice testdependsto some extenton the chooser'sbiologicalcapacities.
Here,once again,is theproblematicpassage:
itwould
ofthesetwohasthegood?Forotherwise
Wellthen,isn'titclearthatneither
of
whichever
for
and
be sufficient,
and
animal,
complete, choiceworthy everyplant

life
its
themis ableto livein thiswayconsistently

[
throughout
,
].
(22b4-6)

Recallthatin thispassageSocratesseemsto saytwothingsthathelpLiberals and hurtConservatives:

first,thateach of the two unmixedlivesfails
the choice testbecause it lacksgoods; and second,thata lifecan failthe
choicetestonlyifthehypothetical
choosercan liveit. Considerthesecond
claim first.Here it is possibleto raisedoubts about whetherthe Liberal
Readingis mandatedbythetext.Liberalssee thecrucialqualifying
phrasetheone beginningwiththerelativepronoun as placinga restrictionon thesetofcreatures
whosechoicescandetermine
whether
thetested
life
I
As
have
the
this
is
most
natural
alreadysuggested,
way to
passesorfaiL.
read the text.But I believeit can sustaina different
The
interpretation.
can
be
seen
the
of
instead
as
a
restriction
on
set
phrase
qualifying
placing
creatures
whom
the
tested
can
If
be
deemed
this
alternayr
life
choiceworthy.
tiveinterpretation
is on thetable,thentherearetwo subtlydifferent
ways
in whichSocrates'claimcan be understood:(i) ifL has thegood, thenfor
forC; and (ii) ifL has thegood,
anyC thatcan liveL, L is choiceworthy
thenforanyC, L is choiceworthy
forC ifand onlyifC can liveL. Conservatives
advocatea different
version
opt for(ii) insteadof (i), and thereby
of thechoicetest:

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M. Evans/Phronesis
52 (2007) 337-363

359

ChoiceTest(Conservative
Version)

LetL be anylifeandletC be anycreature.

L passesthechoicetestforC ifandonlyifL issufficient,
andchoiceworthy
complete,
forC.
L is sufficient,
andchoiceworthy
forC ifandonlyifL lacksno goodsand
complete,
C canliveL.
IfL doesnotpassthechoicetestforC, thenL failsthechoicetestforC.

Versiondiffers
fromthe LiberalVersionin two imporThe Conservative
itallowsthechoicetestto yielddifferent
tantrespects:first,
verdictsforthe
samelife,dependingon thesortof chooserto whomthatlifeis presented
and second,it requiresthechoicetestto yielda negative
forconsideration;
resultfora givenlifeifthe choosingcreaturecannotlive thatlifeconsisis importantbecauseConservatives
The firstdifference
wantto be
tently.
fora god
able to explainwhytheunmixedlifeof thoughtis choiceworthy
wantto be
but not forus; thesecondis importantbecauseConservatives
able to saythatwe havelimitingreasonsto rejectunmixedlives.
Versionof the choice testis correct,however,
Even ifthe Conservative
have a remainingproblem.To see why,assume thattheir
Conservatives
preferred
readingis correct.Then Socratesclaimsthatifsome lifeis unlivforthatcreature.
able by some creaturethenthatlifeis not choiceworthy
for
But thatis not all. He also claimsthatifsome lifeis not choiceworthy
us, thenthatlifedoes not "havethegood." As Liberalsare rightto point
out,Socrates'languageheresuggeststhatifa lifefailsthechoicetest,then
withtheConservative
claim
it lacksgoods.And thisis plainlyinconsistent
thata lifecan failthechoicetestwithout
lackinggoods.Here Conservatives
haveno choicebut to hold thatSocratesis beingsloppy:whenhe saysthat
a givenlifedoes not "havethegood" he just meansthatthislifedoes not
forus.
wouldmakeitsufficient,
havewhatever
complete,and choiceworthy
can be gleaned
Some supportforthisinitiallyunappealinginterpretation
thatthereis
fromSocrates'concession,at theend oftheChoice Argument,
thattheChoice Argumentdoes conat leastone versionof intellectualism
defeat.He makesthisconcessionjustafterdrawingthegod/human
clusively
which- as I arguedin sectionIV - he deploysin orderto show
distinction,
thatthe Choice Argument
thatthereis anotherversionof intellectualism
defeat.Here is how he teasesout thislineof thought:
doesnotconclusively
winsfirst
thatintelligence
Now I do notmaintain
placeoverthemixedlife,butwe
howwearegoingtoawardsecondplace.For,asweattribute
needtolookandconsider

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M. EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007)337-363
forthismixedlife,one ofus mightholdthatthecauseis intelligence
responsibility
ofthese
andthus,whileneither
whiletheothermightholdthatthecauseis pleasure;
wouldbe thegood,someonecouldstillsupposethatoneofthemis thecause,[
,
' ,
].(22dl-4)
,'

were"thegood,"then
Here Socratesmakesitveryclearthat,ifintelligence
in theunmixedlifeof thoughtwould makethatlifemost
theintelligence
weremerelythe "thecause",then
forus; but ifintelligence
choiceworthy
in the mixedlifewould make thatlifemostchoiceworthy
theintelligence
standardsseem to yieldtwo cruciallydifferent
forus. These two different
as follows:
whichcan be formulated
versionsof intellectualism,
StrongIntellectualism

ina lifegivesus a valuingreasontochooseit,andtheunmixed

Onlytheintelligence
forus.
lifeofintelligence
is mostchoiceworthy
WeakIntellectualism

ina lifegivesusa valuingreasontochooseit,butthemixedlife

Onlytheintelligence
forus.
is mostchoiceworthy

is false,since
Everyonein the debate agreesthat StrongIntellectualism
forus than the
neitherof the two unmixedlives is more choiceworthy
mixedone; but Socratesapparently
refusesto giveup on Weak Intellectualism. Conservativescan plausiblysay,in lightof thisrefusal,thatwhen
Socratesclaimsthatneitherof thetwounmixedlives"has thegood,"he is
Conservatives
not WeakIntellectualism.
denyingStrongIntellectualism,
can then go on to say thatWeak Intellectualism,
properlyspelled out,
entailsthatcognitionsare the only thingsworthpursuingfortheirown
sakes- sincetheonlythingsthatgiveus valuingreasonsto choosea life,if
it is choiceworthy,
arethingsworthpursuingfortheirown sakes.So ifthe
thenhe
Conservatives
are right,and Plato endorsesWeak Intellectualism,
forus
can consistently
denyboth thata pleasurelesslifeis choiceworthy
and thatanypleasuresare goods.
VII
Conservativescan make a good case fortheirview.They can providea
defensibleinterpretation
of thecentraltexts,and theyare betterprepared
thanLiberalsto explainsome otherwisepuzzlingfeaturesof Plato'sargu-

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M. Evans/Phronesis
52 (2007) 337-363

361

ment.Indeed,it is temptingto concludeon thesegroundsalone thatthe

Conservative
Readingis therightone. But thegoal ofthispaper,as I stated
at theoutset,is not to establishthatthe ConservativeReadingis correct,
and (to thatextent)
butonlyto showthatit can withstandcarefulscrutiny
Ifit can makebetshouldstayon thetableas a liveoptionforinterpreters.
I
tersenseof Platos overallpositionin thePhilebus as suspectit does shouldfeelfreeto adopt it.
theninterpreters
the ConservativeReadingdoes indeed qualifyas a live
that
Assuming
someoftheconsequences,
I
liketo exploreverybriefly
would
for
option us,
bothpositiveand negative,ofadoptingit. Perhapsthemostobviousnegais thattheymustdenyPlato'sauthortiveconsequenceforConservatives
effective
as an extremely
strike
continues
to
of
what
manyphilosophers
ship
The
Conservative
Reading,by comparison,mightseem to
argument.28
or unsound. Not only
make the Choice Argumentweak, uninteresting,
does the argument(on this reading)license no conclusionwhatsoever
about the goodnessof any thoughtsor pleasures,but the conclusionit
can make
does license- thatneitherthoughtsnorpleasuresbythemselves
forus seemsto gainverylittlegroundon hedonism.
a lifechoiceworthy
ReadtheConservative
forceoftheargument,
Becauseofthesymmetrical
Weak
Intellectualism
to
retain
is
entitled
that
Socrates
entails
onlyto
ing
Weak
HedonismP
to
retain
is entitled
theextentthatProtarchus
For,ifthe
areright,thenitwouldbe a mistaketo thinkthattheChoice
Conservatives
is
Argument designed even in part to establishthatnot all goods are
pleasures;theargumentdefeatsonlythosehedonistswho hold thata given
forus justinsofaras itis pleasant.Cleverhedonistscan
lifeis choiceworthy
endorsethe argument,concede thatwe have a limitingreasonto reject
lives,but denythatwe havea valuingreasonto do so. Ifthisis
thoughtless
Choice Argumentis farless damagingto Plato'shedonist
the
then
right,
opponentsthanit appears.
For
My own viewis thatthisoutcomeis onlya minordisappointment.
itleavesPlatowiththeroomhe needsto developwhatI taketo be a much
and powerfulline of attackon hedonism.As I suggested
moreinteresting
28)BothLiberalsand Conservatives
as they
seemto assumethattheChoiceArgument
is
An
to
so.
tend
not
but
it
is
sound,
exception Cooper,who
say
interesting
they
interpret
in itsown
is persuasive
as
that
the
claims
Liberals,
by
interpreted
argument,
repeatedly
See Cooper(2004),276-277.
right.
29)Severalcommentators
to it.
andagreethatPlatois committed
noticethisconsequence
Lear(2005),56-57.
SeeGosling(1975),183-184;Bobonich(1995),122;andRichardson

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M. EvansI Phronesis
52 (2007) 337-363

362

in sectionIV, I believethatthecleverhedonistswho weakentheirviewin

the faceof the Choice Argumentbecome the targetsof a verydifferent,
non-symmetrical
argumentthatappearsmuch laterin the Philebus.If I
it is designednot onlyto vindiunderstandthislaterargumentcorrectly,
cate thepopularviewthatsome goods arenot pleasures,but also to repudiate theequallypopularview thatsome goods are pleasures.Since Plato
would notbe able to endorsethisconclusionifhe werealreadycommitted
to the Liberalversionof the Choice Argument,I believethereare good
thatfreeshim of thiscomexegeticalreasonsto developan interpretation
mitment.Of courseI cannothope to defendheremyreadingof thelater
argument,let alone my consideredendorsementof it.30Sufficeit to say,
reasonsto suspectnot onlythatPlato
then,thattherearesome interesting
but also thatthisverthe
version
of
the
Liberal
Choice
rejects
Argument,
sion of the argumentis unsound.The Conservativeversionmaywell be
Platos betterbet.31

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