Assignment No.

11
1.
REYNANTE TADEJA, RICKY TADEJA, RICARDO TADEJA and FERDINAND
TADEJA vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES [G.R. No. 145336, February 20, 2013]
Facts: Maria Elena brnardo Almaria (Elena) and Jacinta del Fierro (Jacinta), were
prosecution witnesses, they testified that they were watching a public dance during the
celebration of the annual fiesta of Barangay Talabaan, Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro when
they saw Ruben Bernardo (Elena's brother and Jacinta's uncle) being hacked to death by the
brothers Reynante, Ricky, Ricardo, and Ferdinand (petitioners), and petitioners first cousin
Plaridel all surnamed Tadeja. According to them, they stayed at the scene of the incident
until Ruben was brought to the hospital. An Information for homicide for the death of Ruben
was filed against petitioners. On the other hand, petitioners alleged that Ruben and his sons,
Russell and Robenson Bernardo, went to the barangay plaza shortly after Rusell had been
twice prevented by barangay tanods from entering the dance hall due to his drunken state
and inappropriate attire (no upper garment). Ruben was brandishing a knife and cursing at
the crowd. The Bernardos challenged Reynante then took turns in attacking him. Ruben got
hold of Reynante's right hand and shouted to his two sons to run away. He then stabbed
Reynante on the right part of the chest and the left side of the body before running away.
Reynante struggled back to the plaza. From there, he was taken to the hospital where later
Ruben arrived at the emergency room of the hospital in serious condition. He later died of
"hypovolemic shock secondary to acute blood loss" due to multiple stab wounds and a
hacking wound. Meanwhile, Reynante filed a complaint for frustrated homicide against
Russell and Robenson however they were acquitted.
Petitioners were found gulity of homicide and the same was affirmed by CA. Petitioners then
filed with this Court a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set
aside the CA Decision and Resolution. Petitioners claimed that since the two Criminal Case
were tried jointly, and all pieces of evidence presented by the parties in one case were
adopted in the other, all the evidence in both cases should have been considered and given
due weight in the resolution of the two cases. SC affirmed the decision of CA on the ground
that petitioners were correct however the testimonies of Leticia, Regina and Eduardo would
not have altered the judgment of conviction by the RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion with Leave
of Court to Vacate Judgment, invoking the power of the Supreme Court to suspend its own
rules for the purpose of substantial justice and to remand the case to the RTC for further
reception of evidence. Later, petitioners filed a Supplemental Motion to Motion with Leave of
Court to Vacate Judgment Due to Supervening Event alleging that on 29 November 2006, the
Mamburao Municipal Police Force of Occidental Mindoro finally arrested Plaridel. The SC
denied the same, stated that no further pleadings would be entertained, and directed that
entry of judgment be made in due course. Several letters were submitted by the petitioners
praying to reopen the case. Several motions and letters were submitted by the petitioners to
vacate the judgment and reopen the same, however it was constantly vacated by the SC until
the case reached its finality.
On the strength of their co-accused Plaridel Tadeja's extrajudicial confession, taken after his
apprehension on 29 November 2006, petitioners pray for the reopening of the homicide case
against them. Their prayer is for the reception of newly discovered evidence, despite the fact

that this Court's Decision affirming their conviction already became final and executory on 26
July 2007.
Issue: Whether letters and motions to reopen the case by the petitioners should be given due
course?
Ruling: NO. Fundamental considerations of public policy and sound practice necessitate that,
at the risk of occasional errors, the judgment or orders of courts should attain finality at some
definite time fixed by law. Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.
This is the reason why we have consistently denied petitioners motions for reconsideration of
this Courts Decision and subsequent pleas for the reopening of the case.
Section 1 of Rule 121 of the Rules of Court provides that a new trial may only be
granted by the court on motion of the accused, or motu proprio with the consent of the
accused "(a)t any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final." In this case,
petitioners judgment of conviction already became final and executory on 26 July 2007 the
date on which the Decision of this Court denying the petition and affirming the ruling of the CA
was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments. Thus, pleas for the remand of this case to
the trial court for the conduct of a new trial may no longer be entertained.
2.
JOEL B. CAES vs. Hon. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (Fourth Special
Cases Division), Hon. ALFREDO M. GORGONIO, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City, Branch CXXV, National Capital Region and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES [G.R. Nos. 74989-90, November 6, 1989]
Facts: Petitioner Joel Caes was charged in two separate informations with illegal possession
of firearms and illegal possession of marijuana which were consolidated.
Arraignment was originally scheduled but was for some reason postponed. Caes was arraigned and pleaded not
guilty. Trial was rescheduled for several times. The prosecution moved for the provisional

dismissal of the case because its witnesses had not appeared which was granted by the RTC
on the ground that failure of the prosecution witnesses to appear on several scheduled
hearing and also for the hearing today which is an indication of lack of interest. Motion to
revive the cases was filed by Maj. Dacanay (he had been promoted in the meantime) and Sgt.
Lustado who alleged that they could not attend the hearing scheduled on November 14, 1983,
for lack of notice. The same was granted. The petitioner questioned the judge's order on
certiorari with this Court, which reffered his petition to the respondent court. The same was
dismissed as well as the motion for reconsideraetion. Hence this petition.
Issue: Whether the motion to revive the cases was invalid because it was riot filed by the
proper party nor was a copy served on the petitioner?
Ruling: YES. It is axiomatic that the prosecution of a criminal case is the responsibility of
the government prosecutor and must always be under his control. This is true even if a
private prosecutor is allowed to assist him and actually handles the examination of the

witnesses and the introduction of other evidence. The witnesses, even if they are the
complaining witnesses, cannot act for the prosecutor in the handling of the case. Although
they may ask for the filing of the case, they have no personality to move for its dismissal or
revival as they are not even parties thereto nor do they represent the parties to the action.
Their only function is to testify. In a criminal prosecution, the plaintiff is represented by
the government prosecutor, or one acting under his authority, and by no one else.
It follows that the motion for the revival of the cases filed by prosecution witnesses (who never even
testified) should have been summarily dismissed by the trial judge. The mere fact that the government
prosecutor was furnished a copy of the motion and he did not interpose any objection was not enough to justify
the action of these witnesses. The prosecutor should have initiated the motion himself if he thought it proper. The
presumption that he approved of the motion is not enough, especially since we are dealing here with the liberty
of a person who had a right at least to be notified of the move to prosecute him again. The fact that he was not
so informed made the irregularity even more serious. It is curious that the motion was granted just the same, and
ex parte at that and without hearing, and the petitioner's subsequent objection was brushed aside.

3. NELSON VALLENO y LUCITO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES [G.R. No. 192050,
January 9, 2013]
PEREZ, J.:
Facts: As a result a search and seizure, by virtue of a search warrant, Valleno was arreseted
and indicted for the crime of illegal possession of methamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu,
a dangerous drug. The trial court lent credence to the straightforward testimonies of the police
officers over the mere denial of the accused. The trial court ruled that the chain of custody
over the illegal drugs seized was properly established. Hence petitioner was convicted. The
CA affirmed the same. Hence he filed this petition and harped on the inconsistencies of the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses.
Petitioner highlights the following acts of non-compliance with the aforementioned rule:
1) there was failure to present the alleged photographs of the seized substance in court; 2)
there were no representatives from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ) during the
conduct of the inventory of the seized items; 3) there was a major contradiction from among
prosecution witnesses on who actually brought the seized items to the PNP Crime
Laboratory; and 4) the manner of conducting the physical inventory of the alleged drugs taken
from petitioners house appeared to be irregular as the seized items were allowed to be
handled by persons not authorized to do so.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in not finding that the prosecution was not able to discharge its
burden of proving by proof beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner has committed the
crime?
Ruling: NO. It is hornbook doctrine that the factual findings of the appellate court
affirming those of the trial court are binding on this Court unless there is a clear
showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable
error. After an exhaustive review of the records of this case, we see no sufficient reason for
resort to the exception to the rule.
In People v. Concepcion, this Court ruled that the failure to submit in evidence the
required physical inventory of the seized drugs and the photograph, as well as the
absence of a member of media or the DOJ, pursuant to Section 21, Article II of Republic

Act No. 9165 is not fatal and will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items
seized/confiscated from him inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as the same would be utilized in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
This Court notes the inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses,
particularly that of barangay tanod Reynaldo Brito and PO3 Molina, relating to the place
where one of the plastic sachets was found and to the person who brought the illegal drugs to
the crime laboratory, respectively. We however brush aside these inconsistencies as
inconsequential. Indeed, one can hardly expect their testimonies to be in perfect agreement.
As held in the past, it is perhaps too much to hope that different eyewitnesses shall
give, at all times, testimonies that are in all fours with the realities on the ground. Minor
discrepancies in their testimonies are, in fact, to be expected; they neither vitiate the
essential integrity of the evidence in its material entirety nor reflect adversely on the
credibility of witnesses. For a successful appeal, the inconsistencies brought up should
pertain to that crucial moment when the accused was caught selling shabu, not to peripheral
matters. Testimonies of witnesses need only corroborate each other on important and
relevant details concerning the principal occurrence.
4.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LINDA ALVIZ y YATCO and ELIZABETH DE LA
VEGA y BAUTISTA [G.R. No. 177158, February 06, 2013]
Facts: A confidential informant reported an unlawful seeling of drug by Linda and Elizabeth.
As a result a buy bust opereation team was formed. The same yielded positive results
wherein Linda and Elizabent were arrested. They were charged for unlawfully sell, dispense,
deliver, transport, distribute or act as broker in the said transaction. Petitioners version was
that they and their children were on board a passenger to see a magtatawas because Lindas
daughter was sick. The jeepney was flagged down by two men in civilian clothes who asked
them to alight. However, the jeepney driver and two (2) other passengers were not bothered
by the two men. Linda, Elizabeth and their three children were asked to board a Ford Fiera
and were taken to the police station. The RTC found petitioners guilty of drug pushing which
was affirmed by the CA. They filed this petition however Linda moved to withdraw and the
case insofar as she was concerned was considered closed and terminated. Now, only
Elizabeths appeal is left for consideration by the Court.
Issue: Whether the Lower Court gravely erred in giving credence to the inconsistent
statements of the police officers?
Ruling: NO. It is a fundamental rule that factual findings of the trial courts involving
credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors, gross misapprehension of
facts, and speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be gathered from
such findings. The reason for this is that the trial court is in a better position to decide the
credibility of witnesses having heard their testimonies and observed their deportment and
manner of testifying during the trial. The rule finds an even more stringent application where
said findings are sustained by the Court of Appeals,such as in this case. The Court, therefore,
has no reason to deviate from this rule.
The inconsistencies adverted to by Elizabeth are trivial and insignificant and refer only to

minor details. Time and again, the Court has steadfastly ruled that inconsistencies on
minor and trivial matters only serve to strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of
witnesses for they erase the suspicion of rehearsed testimony. Furthermore, the Court
cannot expect the testimonies of different witnesses to be completely identical and to coincide
with each other since they have different impressions and recollections of the incident. Hence,
it is only natural that their testimonies are at variance on some minor details. As this Court
ruled in People v. Madriaga.
Settled is the rule that discrepancies on minor matters do not impair the essential
integrity of the prosecutions evidence as a whole or reflect on the witnesses honesty. These
inconsistencies, which may be caused by the natural fickleness of memory, even tend to
strengthen rather than weaken the credibility of the prosecution witnesses because they
erase any suspicion of rehearsed testimony. What is important is that the testimonies agree
on the essential facts and that the respective versions corroborate and substantially coincide
with each other to make a consistent and coherent whole.
5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. PETER LINDA y GEROLAGA,
Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 200507
June 26, 2013
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS: A confidential informant reported to SPO1 Rodolfo Ramos a reliable information
regarding the illegal drug activity of Peter Linda along Ma. Orosa Street, Malate, Manila.
Thus, SPO1 Ramos ordered his team to conduct a buy-bust operation on appellant and
designated PO2 Archie Bernabe as poseurbuyer, who was given two (2) P100 bills as buybust money. The money was then marked as "DAID" and a coordination with the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) was made. After the preparation, the team, together with
the confidential informant, proceeded to the target area. The buy-bust operation was a
success. Thereafter, PO2 Bernabe arrested appellant and introduced himself as police officer.
The other members of the team arrived at the scene. PO2 Bernabe informed appellant of his
constitutional rights and marked the plastic sachet with the letters "PGL" from the initials of
the appellant. The former frisked appellant and recovered the marked money form the latter.
When the substance was examined by Forensic Chemist Elisa G. Reyes, the white crystalline
substance tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.
However, the defense countered that he was not informed of the charges, only
knowing it in court. After trial, the court convicted accused-appellant of the crime charged. On
appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision in toto.
ISSUE: Whether the Court shall give credence to the prosecution witness.
RULING: YES. Settled are the rule that "findings of the trial courts which are factual in
nature and which involve credibility are accorded respect when no glaring errors; gross
misapprehension of facts; or speculative, arbitrary, and unsupported conclusions can be
gathered from such findings," and that "the determination by the trial court of the credibility of
witnesses, when affirmed by the appellate court, is accorded full weight and credit as well as
great respect, if not conclusive effect."
Here, we see no reason to deviate from the findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals. Corroborated by supporting documents, PO2 Bernabe rendered a clear and direct
narration of the details of the buy-bust operation from the moment SPO1 Rodolfo Ramos

organized the team, upon receipt of the information from the confidential informant, to the
time the shabu was marked and turned over to the crime laboratory for examination.20
Absent any showing of ill-motive or bad faith on the part of the arresting officers, as in this
case where accused-appellant testified that he did not know any of the members of the team,
the doctrine of presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty finds application.
his, we explained in People v. Tion: x x x Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the
members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing
their duty, their testimonies on the buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit. Settled is the rule
that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act, credence is given to prosecution
witnesses who are police officers, for they are presumed to have performed their duties in a
regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary suggesting ill motive on the part of the
police officers or deviation from the regular performance of their duties. The records do not show
any allegation of improper motive on the part of the buy-bust team. Thus, the presumption of regularity
in the performance of duties of the police officers must be upheld.
6. GEORGE UY, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, OMBUDSMAN and ROGER C.
BERBANO, SR., Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor,
respondents.
G.R. Nos. 105965-70
August 9, 1999
PARDO, J.:
FACTS: On July 2, 1991, six (6) informations for estafa through falsification of official
documents and one (1) information for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. No. 3019, as amended,
were filed with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner and nineteen (19) co-accused
Sandiganbayan issued an Order directing a comprehensive re-investigation of the cases
against all the twenty (20) accused. After conducting the re-investigation, the Special
Prosecutor issued an Order dated November 14, 1991 recommending that the informations
for estafa through falsification of official documents be withdrawn and in lieu thereof,
informations for violation of Section 3 (e) of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, be filed against
eleven (11) accused, which included the petitioner.
Special Prosecutor Aniano A. Desierto reduced the number of those to be charged under R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, to five (5), including petitioner.
Acting on the separate motions for reconsideration of the five (5) remaining accused, the
Special Prosecutor issued an Order dated February 18, 1992 dropping two (2) more names
from the five (5) officers recommended for prosecution, and recommending that six (6)
separate informations for violation of Section 3 (e), R.A. 3019, as amended, be filed against
the petitioner, LCMDR. Rodolfo Guanzon and LT. Teddy Pan. Except for the variance in the
Purchase Order numbers involved and the Payees, the six (6) amended informations filed by
Special Prosecutor Officer III Roger C. Berbano, Sr. recite identical allegations. The petitioner
filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the informations. Sandiganbayan issued the
now-assailed Resolution denying petitioner's motion to quash for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases or the
person of the petitioner

RULING: On the issue of jurisdiction, petitioner and the Solicitor General submit that it is the
court-martial, not the Sandiganbayan, which has jurisdiction to try petitioner.
Emphasizing the fundamental doctrine that the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action, they claim that at the time the
amended informations were filed on July 2, 1991, the controlling law on the jurisdiction over
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is P.D. 1850, "Providing for the trial by
courts-martial of members of the Integrated National Police and further defining the
jurisdiction of courts-martial over members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines" (which
took effect on October 4, 1982), as amended by P. D. 1952 (which took effect in September of
1984), more particularly Section 1(b) thereof provides:
Sec. 1.
Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the
Armed Forces. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, (a) uniformed
members of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable by
the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in
accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles
of War; (b) all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited Articles of War
who commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case
disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned
situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when
court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth
Act Numbered 408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused
military or Integrated National Police personnel can no longer be exercised by virtue of their
separation from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless
otherwise provided by law: Provided, further, that the President may, in the interest of Justice,
order or direct, at any time before arraignment, that a particular case be tried by the
appropriate civil court.
As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall refer to
police officers, policemen, firemen, and jail guards.
7. G.R. No. 175602

February 13, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ and EDWIN VALDEZ, Accused-Appellants.
BERSAMIN, J.:
FACTS: The two accused were tried for three counts of murder by the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon City. On January 20, 2005, after trial, the RTC convicted them
as charged, prescribed on each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count, and
ordered them to pay to the heirs of each victim P93,000.00 _as actual damages, P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages.
The Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC on July 18, 2006, subject to the modification that
each of the accused pay to the heirs of each victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00

as moral damages, P25,000.00 as temperate damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary

damages, plus costs of suit.
The two accused then came to the Court on final appeal, but on May 9, 2007, Edwin Valdez
filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted on October 10, 2007, thereby
deeming Edwins appeal closed and terminated.1
On January 18, 2012, the Court promulgated its judgment on the appeal of PO2 Eduardo
Valdez, finding him guilty of three counts of homicide, instead of three counts of murder, and
meting on him for each count of homicide the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision
mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
ISSUE: WON an appeal taken by one or more of several accused may not affect those who
did not appeal?
HELD: YES.
Section 11. Effect of appeal by any of several accused. (a) An appeal taken by one or more
of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment
of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
Edwin cannot be barred from seeking the application to him of the downgrading of the crimes
committed (and the resultant lighter penalties) despite the finality of his convictions for three
counts of murder due to his withdrawal of his appeal. The downgrading of the crimes
committed would definitely be favorable to him. Worth pointing out is that to deny to him the
benefit of the lessened criminal responsibilities would be highly unfair, considering that this
Court had found the two accused to have acted in concert in their deadly assault against the
victims, warranting their equal liabiliy under the principle of conspiracy.
We grant Edwins plea based on Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the Rules of Court.
8. G.R. No. 198338

February 20, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
P/SUPT. ARTEMIO E. LAMSEN, P02 ANTHONY D. ABULENCIA and SPOl WILFREDO L.
RAMOS, Accused-Appellants.
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
FACTS: On February 19, 2001, PCI Bank Manager Fernando Sy (Sy), together with his
security guards, Arturo Mariado (Mariado) and Jolly Ferrer (Ferrer), went to Malasiqui,
Pangasinan using Sys owner-type jeep to collect cash deposits in the amount of
P2,707,400.77 from their clients. On their way back to their office in San Carlos City, a white
Toyota car overtook the jeep. The cars occupants then fired at Sy and his companions.
Thereafter, a green Lancer car, which was coming from San Carlos City, made a U-turn,
chased and sideswiped the jeep, with its passengers also firing at Sy and his companions.
This resulted in the jeep going off the road and hitting two (2) concrete posts. Sy and Mariado
succumbed to gunshot wounds, while Ferrer got away unscathed as he jumped out of the

jeep during the shooting. The malefactors then took the bag containing the cash deposits and
immediately fled towards the direction of San Carlos City.
After investigation, Lamsen, Abulencia, Ramos, and four (4) John Does, were charged in an
Information dated March 1, 2001 for the aforesaid crime.5 Accused-appellants pleaded "not
guilty" then, individually filed their respective petitions for bail.
Opposing the petitions for bail, the prosecution presented four (4) eyewitnesses, namely John
Delos Santos (Delos Santos), Arnel Reyes (Reyes), Esteban Mercado (Mercado), and
Domingo Marcelo (Marcelo). The prosecution likewise presented two (2) investigators,
namely P/Supt. Alejandro Valerio (Valerio) and NBI Agent Diogenes Gallang (Gallang).
Delos Santos, Reyes, Mercado, and Marcelo gave their respective accounts as to what
transpired, identifying Lamsen, Abulencia, and Ramos in the process. For their part, Valerio
testified, among others, that Abulencia admitted that he was driving the green car subjected to
a flash alarm and that Lamsen was with him at the time. On the other hand, Gallang testified
that the dents and streaks of paint found on Sys jeep matched the dents and scratches found
on the green and white car, respectively owned by Abulencia and Ramos.
Regional Trial Court (court a quo) granted Abulencias petition for bail, while denying
Lamsens and Ramos respective petitions. It found that the testimonies of eyewitnesses
Delos Santos, Reyes and Mercado, aside from positively identifying Lamsen and Ramos,
were candid, straightforward, and categorical. However, it found that Marcelos testimony, the
one positively identifying Abulencia as one of the perpetrators, is incredible because it is
absurd, inconsistent, unnatural, and has strong indication of fabrication and concoction.
Lamsen and Abulencia raised the defense of denial. In support of their defense, they
presented their respective testimonies as well as the testimonies of Cayetano dela Vega, Atty.
Salvador Imus, Vilma Soriano, and P/Sr. Inspector Jimmy Agtarap.
The court a quo found accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
robbery with homicide, sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and
holding them jointly and severally liable to pay for damages.
CA affirmed the court a quos judgment of conviction, with modifications reducing the award of
actual damages in favor of Fernando Sys heirs to P100,000.00 and deleting the awards of
temperate damages and attorneys fees.
ISSUE:
1. WON the eyewitnesses positively identified accused-appellants Lamsen and Ramos as
active participants to the crime.
2. WON there is enough circumstantial evidence to prove that accused-appellant Abulencia
participated in the commission of the crime.
3. WON the manner by which the crime was perpetrated shows conspiracy among the
accused-appellants.

HELD:
1. YES.
Well-settled is the rule that the trial courts assessment of the credibility of the witnesses is
entitled to great weight, sometimes even with finality, considering that it was the trial judge
who personally heard such witnesses, observed their demeanor, and the manner in which
they testified during trial. Thus, where there is no showing that the trial judge overlooked or
misinterpreted some material facts or that it gravely abused its discretion, then the Court shall
not disturb the assessment of the facts and credibility of the witnesses by the trial court.
Contrary to Lamsens and Ramos contentions in their respective briefs, as early as the court
a quos Order dated June 25, 200249 denying their respective petitions for bail, the trial judge
already gave weight and credence to the testimonies of eyewitnesses Delos Santos, Reyes,
and Mercado positively identifying Lamsen and Ramos as active participants to the crime as
their testimonies were candid, straightforward, and categorical. Moreover, the CA reiterated
such findings when it decided on the matter on appeal, explaining that while there were
indeed inconsistencies in the eyewitnesses testimonies, they are only with respect to minor,
collateral or incidental matters which do not impair the weight of their unified testimony to the
prominent facts.
Considering the absence of either a mistake in the appreciation of material facts or grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge who had the opportunity to directly observe
the eyewitnesses and ascertain their credibility, there is no reason to disturb the court a quos
findings, which the CA affirmed.

2. YES.
To uphold a conviction based on circumstantial evidence, it is essential that the circumstantial
evidence presented must constitute an unbroken chain which leads one to a fair and
reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of the others, as the guilty
person. The test to determine whether or not the circumstantial evidence on record is
sufficient to convict the accused is that the series of circumstances duly proved must be
consistent with each other and that each and every circumstance must be consistent with the
accuseds guilt and inconsistent with the accuseds innocence.
Contrary to Abulencias contention in his brief, there are numerous circumstances sufficient to
prove his participation in the crime, to wit: [a] it was established that Lamsen was an active
participant to the crime; [b] Lamsen and Abulencia both admitted they were together in the
vicinity of the crime scene when it happened; [c] his car with plate number PEW 781 was
subjected to a flash alarm in connection with the crime; [d] Abulencia admitted he was driving
his car when the flash alarm was raised; and [e] the dents and bluish green streaks of paint
found on Sys jeep matched the dents and scratches found on Abulencias car.
The combination of the aforementioned circumstances forms an unbroken chain which
irrefragably points to Abulencia as among the perpetrators of the crime.

3. YES.
It is settled that direct proof is not essential to establish conspiracy as it may be inferred from
the collective acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime. It can
be presumed from and proven by acts of the accused themselves when the said acts point to
a joint purpose, design, concerted action, and community of interests.
As correctly found by the court a quo and affirmed by the CA, the events surrounding the
commission of the crime would readily establish conspiracy among the accused-appellants in
committing robbery with homicide. Thus, they were correctly convicted of the aforementioned
crime.
9. G.R. No. 175327
April 3, 2013
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
EDMUNDO VITERO, Accused-Appellant.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Facts: in the month of April, 1998, at around 7:00 oclock in the evening, more or less, at
Barangay XXX, Municipality of Ligao, Province of Albay, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd and unchaste design, by
means of force, threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
have carnal knowledge of his own daughter, 13-year-old AAA, against her will and consent, to
her damage and prejudice.
When arraigned on June 14, 2001, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to all six rape
charges.
The six rape cases against accused-appellant were jointly tried.
The RTC rendered a Decision on October 9, 2003. According more weight and credibility to
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as compared to those of the defense, the trial
court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of raping his minor daughter,
AAA. However, the RTC held that the prosecution was only able to prove one of the six
counts of rape against accused-appellant.
For the other remaining five (5) counts of rape, finding reasonable doubt, this Court finds the
accused-appellant EDMUNDO VITERO NOT GUILTY, and hereby ACQUITS him of such
criminal charges.
CA affirmed
ISSUE: WON Vitero is guilty of rape?
HELD: YES
Accused-appellant essentially argues that AAAs testimony was "highly incredible and
illogical" as she had ample opportunity to ask for help. According to AAA herself, at the time of
the alleged rape, her siblings were sleeping right beside her and accused-appellant in the
room, while her grandparents were right in the next room.20 Accused-appellant also
highlights AAAs delay in reporting the purported rape and instituting a criminal case against
him, and further implies that AAA might have some sinister or ulterior motive in falsely
charging him with rape. Moreover, accused-appellants alibi that he was living and working in
Manila from 1996 to 2000 was corroborated by two witnesses.

the argument of accused-appellant deserves scant consideration. Different people react

differently to different situations and there is no standard form of human behavioral response
when one is confronted with a frightful experience. While the reaction of some women, when
faced with the possibility of rape, is to struggle or shout for help, still others become virtually
catatonic because of the mental shock they experience. In the instant case, it is not
inconceivable or improbable that [private complainant], being of tender age, would be
intimidated into silence by the threats and actions of her father.
the accused may be convicted solely on the basis of the testimony of the victim that is
credible, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things, as in
this case.
Court of Appeals that pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, accused-appellant is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of death, we specify that accused-appellant will
not be eligible for parole. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346 explicitly provides:
Section 3. Persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose
sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for
parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended.
Reclusion Perpetua instead of lethal injection.
10. G.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DEMOSTHENES L. MAGALLANES, as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 54, Bacolod City, and P/COL. NICOLAS M. TORRES, P/INSP. ADONIS C. ABETO,
PO MARIO LAMIS Y FERNANDEZ, PO JOSE PAHAYUPAN, PO VICENTE CANUDAY, JR.,
JEANETTE YANSON-DUMANCAS, CHARLES DUMANCAS, DOMINADOR GEROCHE Y
MAHUSAY, JAIME GARGALLANO, ROLANDO R. FERNANDEZ, EDWIN DIVINAGRACIA,
TEODY DELGADO, CESAR PECHA, and EDGAR HILADO, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
FACTS: On 13 January 1994, two informations for kidnapping for ransom with murder were
filed with the RTC of Bacolod City against fourteen persons, five of whom are members of the
PNP, namely, P/Col. Nicolas M. Torres, P/Insp. Adonis C. Abeto, Police Officers Mario Lamis,
Jose Pahayupan, and Vicente Canuday, Jr.; the other nine are civilians. The informations,
later docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in Branch 47 of the said court, are
similarly worded, except as to the names of the victims, who are Rufino Gargar, Jr. in the first
case and Danilo Lumangyao in the second
After the prosecution rested its case and the trial court started to receive the evidence for the
accused. Accused Torres and Abeto presented their respective evidence. Presentation of
evidence by the other accused was, however, suspended because of the motions of several
accused for the inhibition of Judge Garvilles. Despite opposition by the prosecution, Judge
Garvilles voluntarily inhibited himself from further hearing both cases, which were thereafter
re-raffled to Branch 54, presided by herein public respondent Judge Demosthenes L.
Magallanes.
the respondent Judge voluntarily inhibited himself on 15 September 1994. The cases were
then re-raffled to Branch 49 of the RTC of Bacolod City.
On 5 December 1994, the prosecution, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General,

filed with us a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order challenging the refusal of the respondent Judge to transfer the cases to the
Sandiganbayan. (The judge reraffeld the case instead of transferring the case to the
sandigan)
ISSUE: 1. WON the case should be transferred to sandigan, 2. WON bail can be granted
HELD: 1. NO. The public respondent Judge Magallanes committed no grave abuse of
discretion in holding that it is his court and not the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over
the two cases for kidnapping for ransom with murder.
For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original jurisdiction over offenses or felonies
committed by public officers or employees under Section 4(a) (2) above, it is not enough that
the penalty prescribed therefor is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six
years, or a fine of P6,000.00; it is also necessary that the offenses or felonies were committed
in relation to their office.
There is no dispute that the prescribed penalties for the offenses charged in Criminal Cases
Nos. 15562 and 15563 before the court below are higher than prision correcional or
imprisonment for more than six years. The only question that remains to be resolved then is
whether the said offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP
officers.
The informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not indicate
that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course
of the investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused, for the purpose of
extracting or extorting the sum of P353,000.00, abducted, kidnapped, and detained the two
victims, and failing in their common purpose, they shot and killed the said victims. For the
purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations that shall control, and not the
evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.
"the information did not allege that there was an intimate connection between the discharge of
official duties and the commission of the offense.
2. NO. In the instant case, the motions for bail filed by the said accused-respondents with the
Regional Trial Court where the cases against them are pending were denied sometime in
February, 1994
In Enrile vs. Salazar, as reiterated in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, this Court said: "Only after
that remedy petition to be admitted to bail was denied by the trial court should the review
jurisdiction of this Court be invoked, and even then, not without first applying to the Court of
Appeals if appropriate relief was also available there."
There is no showing that the said accused-respondents have questioned the denial of their
applications for bail in a petition for certiorari either before the Court of Appeals or this Court.
It was only on 26 December 1994, when they filed their respective comments on the instant
petition, that they challenged the denial premised on the ground that the evidence of guilt
against them was not strong. Even if their respective Comment and Reiteration of Motion for
Bail and respondent Dumancas's Motion for Bail filed on 22 March 1995, were treated as
petitions for certiorari, still the same would not prosper for not having been seasonably filed.
While the Rules of Court does not fix a time-frame for the filing of a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, existing jurisprudence requires that the same
be filed within a reasonable period of time from receipt of the questioned judgment or order.
And, in Philec Workers' Union vs. Hon. Romeo A. Young it was held that a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court should be filed within a reasonable period of
three months from notice of the decision or order. Here, about nine to ten months had already

elapsed before the respondents assailed the denial of their motions for bail.
11. G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional
Trial Court, NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable FRANKLIN DRILON (in his capacity as
Secretary of Justice), JOVENCITO R. ZUO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB, CARLOS L. DE
LEON, RAMONCITO C. MISON, REYNALDO J. LUGTU, and RODRIGO P. LORENZO, the
last six respondents in their official capacities as members of the State Prosecutor's Office),
respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
(THIS IS 227 scra 627)
FACTS: On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of
appropriate charges against several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the
rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.
Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted
a preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was not present but was
represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr.
On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the petitioner
requesting him to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It was
served on Sanchez in the morning of August 13,1993, and he was immediately taken to the
said camp.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio Centeno, and
SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed confessions implicating him as a principal in
the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest
status" and taken to the Department of Justice in Manila.
The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon his arrival, with Atty.
Salvador Panelo as his counsel.
After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez. This warrant was issued on
August 13, 1993, by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against him should be quashed
because: 1) he was denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation; 2)
only the Ombudsman had the competence to conduct the investigation; 3) his warrantless
arrest is illegal and the court has therefore not acquired jurisdiction over him, 4) he is being
charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons; 5) as a public
officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan throu a certiorari.
ISSUE: WON Antonio Sanchez is correct
HELD: NO
1) The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13, 1993, belie the petitioner's contention
that he was not accorded the right to present counter-affidavits.
During the preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993, the petitioner's counsel, Atty. Marciano
Brion, manifested that his client was waiving the presentation of a counter-affidavit.
The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never disowned Atty. Panelo as his counsel.
During the entire proceedings, he remained quiet and let this counsel speak and argue on his
behalf.
Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, provides that if the respondent

cannot be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits, the investigating
officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.
Just as the accused may renounce the right to be present at the preliminary investigation , so
may he waive the right to present counter-affidavits or any other evidence in his defense.
If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed, the trial court may, on motion of
the accused, order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the proceedings in the criminal
case in abeyance.
2) Ombudsmans authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent
authority in. respect of the offense charged."
3) It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the petitioner was placed on "arrest
status" after he was pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan as the person who first raped
Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Respondent Zuo himself acknowledged during the August 13, 1993
hearing that, on the basis of the sworn statements of the two state witnesses, petitioner had
been "arrested."
4) Each one of the seven accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of
simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words, the allegation of the
prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times, with each of the seven accused taking
turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all
seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and
later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her.
5) The petitioner argued earlier that since most of the accused were incumbent public officials
or employees at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes, the cases against them
should come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and not of the regular courts. There
is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the
petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the
crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even
alleged in the information that the commission of the crime charged was intimately connected
with the performance of the petitioner's official functions to make it fall under the exception
laid down in People v. Montejo. intimate connection between the office and the offense, as
alleged in the information, that brought it within the definition of an offense "committed in
relation to the public office."
12. G.R. No. 189280
April 17, 2013
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
ALBERTO DELIGERO y BACASMOT, Accused-Appellant.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
FACTS: on December 15, 2000 and any time thereafter, and until July 2002, at x x x, Butuan
City, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with the use of force, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
carnal knowledge with his own granddaughter, one AAA, a minor, 15 years of age, against her
will. AAA was already seventeen (17) years old at the time of her testimony before the court a
quo. She was barely thirteen (13) years old when appellant allegedly raped her.
on December 15, 2000, while inside the bedroom of appellants house, AAA was awakened
from her sleep when she felt appellant inside her "malong" which she used as blanket.
Appellant, who was already naked, held AAAs hands and mounted her. While on top of AAA,
appellant threatened AAA not to tell her parents because he would kill her. Appellant then
inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA felt appellants penis penetrating her four (4) times.
On September 9, 2003, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty

On September 20, 2006, the trial court found him guilty, CA affirmed
ISSUE: WON granpa is innocent
HELD: NO. In rape committed by close kin, such as the victims father, stepfather, uncle, or
the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be
employed. Moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation.
Neither is it required that specific evidence be presented to prove the disparity in physical
strength between AAA and accused-appellant. As argued by the prosecution, accusedappellant is a grown man who is used to hard work and manual labor as a farmer and a
chainsaw operator, while AAA is a very young girl when she was allegedly raped and when
she testified. It was the trial court which had the opportunity to observe the physical
disproportion between them and considered the same in finding accused-appellant guilty.
Accordingly, it is not for this Court to reverse the findings of fact of the trial court on this
matter.
It is possible for the victims hymen to remain intact despite repeated sexual intercourse. x x
x. Likewise, whether the accuseds penis fully or only partially penetrated the victims
genitalia, it is still possible that her hymen would remain intact because it was thick and
distensible or elastic.
Reclusion perpetua instead of lethal injection.
DISCLAIMER: items13-15 walang kinalaman sa crimpro puros criminal cases pero iedit
nyo n rin just for compliance
13. People vs Somoza
G.R. No. 197250, July 17, 2013
Facts:
Reynaldo Andy Somoza appeals from the Decision dated June 22, 2010 of the Court
of denying his appeal from the Joint Judgment dated May 30, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 17700 and 17701, which found him guilty of violation of Sections
5 (selling) and 11 possessing), Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the
Comprehensive
Dangerous
Drugs
Act
of
2002.
He presented a lone assignment of error: the trial court erred in convicting him of the
crimes charged because his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt. He cited three
things in support of his appeal. First, there was failure to present the full amount of the
marked money used in the buy-bust operation as only P800.00 was presented. There was
also no pre-operation report which would have stated the details of the buy-bust operation,
including the serial numbers of the marked money. Second, it was not sufficiently established
that the packs of shabu actually came from accused-appellant, as both PO1 Bautista and NBI
Agent Celon claimed to have personally recovered the six sachets of shabu. Also, the
chemical officer who identified the drug specimen mentioned the total weight of shabu as 0.44
gram only, not 0.69 gram as stated in the Information in Criminal Case No. 17701. Third, the
regularity of the inventory-taking done at his house is questionable and affected the chain of
custody of the shabu.
The Court of Appeals found nothing irregular in the buy-bust operation. The nonpresentation of the entire amount of P1,000.00 marked money did not diminish the integrity of
the buy-bust process, especially considering the circumstance that accused-appellant threw
the money while trying to evade arrest. Moreover, the successful prosecution of illegal sale of

dangerous drugs does not hinge on the presentation of all the marked money used in the buybust operation. The Court of Appeals held that the buy-bust was not affected by the absence
of a pre-operation report. Under the obtaining facts, no pre-operation report was prepared as
the buy-bust operation was urgently conceived. Notwithstanding the swiftness of the
execution of the strategy, the law enforcers described their operation in detail during trial.
Issue:
WON the conviction of the accused is correct despite the alleged defects of the buy
bust operation?
Ruling:
Yes. In both cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the
prosecution must show the chain of custody over the dangerous drug in order to establish
the corpus delicti, which is the dangerous drug itself. Such chain of custody should show that
the dangerous drug sold by or in the possession of the accused is the same dangerous drug
seized from the said accused and taken into custody by the apprehending officer, marked and
subjected to physical inventory by the apprehending officer, submitted to the PDEA or PNP
forensic laboratory, subjected by the forensic laboratory examiner to laboratory examination
the results of which are contained in a sworn certification, and presented to the court as
evidence against the accused. This is to ensure the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items and preclude the possibility of alteration, tampering or substitution of substance
in the chain of custody of the dangerous drug. Nevertheless, a perfect chain is not always the
standard as it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. What is of utmost
importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items,
because the same will be utilized in ascertaining the guilt or innocence of the accused. In the
prosecution for the sale of dangerous drugs, the absence of marked money does not create a
hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution, as long as the sale of dangerous drugs is
adequately proved and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court.
14. People vs Pepino Consulta
G.R. No. 191071
August 28, 2013
Facts:
PO2 Dizon testified that on February 7, 2005, he was assigned as an operative of the
Drug Enforcement Unit, Intelligence Section of the City of San Fernando Police Station. On
that date, his unit conducted a buy-bust operation along General Hizon Extension Avenue,
Barangay Sta. Lucia, City of San Fernando. The target of the operation was a certain Manang
who, according to PO2 Dizon, was the accused-appellant in this case. From their office, he
proceeded to the place where the buy-bust operation would take place along with PO3
Tiongco and a confidential informant. They rode his private vehicle and arrived at the scene at
around 5:45 p.m. When they reached the place, the informant pointed to accused-appellant
who was four meters away from them, standing in front of the Akim Restaurant. They passed
by her. He gave instructions to the confidential informant to alight from the vehicle, approach
accused-appellant, and conduct the buy-bust operation. They turned back and parked the
vehicle on the other side of the road in front of the Akim Restaurant. They were about eight to
ten meters away from where the accused-appellant was situated. 10
While PO2 Dizon and PO3 Tiongco remained inside the car, they saw the informant

talk to accused-appellant for about five to seven minutes. The informant then handed
something to accused-appellant and the latter gave something in return. PO2 Dizon and PO3
Tiongco witnessed this as they were sitting inside the vehicle on the other side of the road,
watching the informant and accused-appellant sideways. They saw the informant extend his
left hand to give the buy-bust money to accused-appellant and the latter handed the object of
the sale using her right hand. Thereafter, the informant gave the pre-arranged signal of
placing the substance bought inside his pocket. PO2 Dizon and PO3 Tiongco then got out of
the vehicle and approached accused-appellant. 11
PO2 Dizon and PO3 Tiongco introduced themselves as police officers and asked
accused-appellant to empty the contents of her pocket. PO2 Dizon stated that he was able to
see the five pieces of transparent plastic sachets of shabu handed by the informant to PO3
Tiongco. After accused-appellant was arrested, they brought her to their office at the City of
San Fernando Police Station. On cross-examination, PO2 Dizon stated that the informant
who participated in the buy-bust operation on February 7, 2005 came to their office for the
first time on said date. Also, the police did not conduct any surveillance to confirm the
informants tip that a certain Manang was selling shabu on that date. The accused-appellant
was, however, already included in their drug watch list.
On May 8, 2007, the trial court adjudged accused-appellant guilty of the crime of
selling illegal.On appeal, the Court of Appeals sustained the conviction of accused-appellant
in its assailed Decision. The Court of Appeals stated that non-compliance with the first
paragraph of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 was not fatal as long as there was
justifiable ground therefor and the integrity of the confiscated illegal drugs was properly
preserved by the police officers. The appellate court found that the integrity and the
evidentiary value of the five sachets of shabu were preserved in this case as the seized items
were immediately brought to the police station for marking.
Issue:
WON the procedural lapse in the preservation of corpus delicti warrants the acquittal of
the accused in this case?
Ruling:
Yes.Accused-appellant stresses that no justification was offered for the failure of the
police officers to comply with the provisions of Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.
Furthermore, accused-appellant claims that the evidentiary value of the items allegedly seized
was not preserved.
In the present case, the above-mentioned procedures were not observed at all by the
police officers. Both PO2 Dizon and PO3 Tiongco clearly and categorically admitted during
their respective cross-examinations that the five sachets of suspected shabu allegedly
obtained from the buy-bust operation were not physically inventoried nor photographed in the
presence of accused-appellant or her counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ,
and an elective official. In fact, they stated that the buy-bust operation was actually conducted
without the presence of the said representatives. Thus, non-compliance with the strict
directive of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution's case;
police procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence may still have some lapses, as in
the present case. These lapses, however, must be recognized and explained in terms of their
justifiable grounds and the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized must be
shown to have been preserved.
Here, the integrity and evidentiary value of the illegal drugs seized were not shown to
have been preserved. Contrarily, the records of the case bear out the glaring fact that the

chain of custody of the seized illegal drugs was broken even at the very first link thereof.
Thus, it was the poseur-buyer who supposedly received the suspected illegal drugs from
accused-appellant, which allegedly consisted of five plastic sachets of shabu. PO2 Dizon and
PO3 Tiongco did not participate at all in this transaction. They merely witnessed the exchange
while they were seated inside a vehicle parked across the road eight to ten meters away from
where accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer were situated. Even more damning was PO2
Dizons admission that he did not in fact see the item(s) handed by accused-appellant to the
poseur-buyer
15. People vs Gani
G.R. NO. 195523, June 05, 2013
Facts:
AAA, who was then only five (5) years old, was harvesting vegetables with her elder
brother. While they were busy with their work, appellant, who is their uncle, arrived carrying a
knife. Subsequently, he instructed AAA's brother to go home ahead. After the latter left,
appellant approached AAA and, right then and there, removed her underwear, placed himself
on top of her and inserted his penis into her vagina. After having sexual intercourse with AAA,
appellant drew out his knife and slashed her vagina causing her serious injury. Thereafter,
appellant left. AAA then went home and recounted her ordeal to her grandmother. AAA was
then brought to the health center for first aid treatment and later to Bacolod City for further
medical care. Subsequently, AAA's aunt, Leticia Alingasa filed, in her behalf, a Criminal
Complaint against appellant. Appellant interposed the defense of alibi claiming that he was in
Quezon City at the time that AAA was raped. He pointed to his brother-in- law, Ermelo
Alingasa,
as
the
one
who
committed
the
rape.
RTC finds accused Ernesto Gani y Tupas alias "Botyok," GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape committed against his niece [AAA], five years of age and being the
uncle of said victim. CA promulgated its Decision affirming the findings of the RTC, but
modified the penalty imposed and the amount of moral damages awarded. On February 10,
2010,
appellant
filed
his
Notice
of
Appeal 23 of
the
CA
Decision.
Issue:
WON RTC erred in convicting the accused?
Ruling:
The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the RTC's factual findings, as affirmed by
the CA. It is doctrinally settled that factual findings of the trial court, especially on the
credibility of the rape victim, are accorded great weight and respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal.26 More importantly, this Court's assessment of the records of the case indicates no
reversible error committed by the lower courts. There is no compelling reason to disbelieve
AAA's declaration given that she was only five (5) years old when she was ravished and eight
(8) years old when she testified in court. It has long been established that the testimony of a
rape victim, especially a child of tender years, is given full weight and credit. At any rate,
settled is the rule that alibi and denial cannot prevail over the positive and categorical
testimony and identification of an accused by the complainant
Given the foregoing, the CA correctly affirmed appellant's conviction for qualified rape.
Both the minority of the victim and her relationship to appellant were sufficiently alleged in the

Information and proved by the prosecution. Such offense was punishable by death under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code and the trial court correctly imposed such penalty.
However, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 (RA 9346), which became
effective on June 30, 2006 after the promulgation of the RTC Decision and which prohibits the
imposition of death penalty, the CA correctly modified the judgment of the RTC by imposing
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
16. LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
301
SCRA
298

JAN

1999

Facts:
Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang,
an organized crime syndicate involved in bank robberies, were slain by elements of the AntiBank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included in the ABRITG
were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors. Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos
Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what actually transpired was a
summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and
the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators to investigate the
said incident. Said panel found the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a
review board modified the panels finding and recommended the indictment for multiple
murder against twenty-six respondents including Lacson, charged as principal. After a
reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations before the Sandiganbayan,
where
petitioner
was
charged
only
as
an
accessory.
The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan,
asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They contend that the said law
limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the principal
accused are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of
Chief Superintendent or higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However,
pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was approved amending the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan by deleting the word principal from the phrase principal accused in Section
2 of R.A. 7975. Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including
Section 7 which provides that the said law shall apply to all cases pending in any court over
which
trial
has
not
begun
as
of
the
approval
hereof.
Issues:
WON the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in
relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination
whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayans or Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction.
Ruling:
No. In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed
in relation to the office if it is intimately connected with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such intimate relation
must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no
specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said principal accused was

intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the
amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the
victim and then killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the
charge set forth with such particularity as will reasonably indicate the exact offense which the
accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not established.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the
offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan. Section
4 of RA 8249, requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender IN
RELATION TO HIS OFFICE in order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.
What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would
indicate the close intimacy that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of
the accuseds official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to qualify the
crime as having been committed in relation to public office.
17.) PEOPLE v. PIOSANG, G.R. No. 200329, June 5, 2013.
Facts: An information was filed before the RTC charging the accused with rape committed
against AAA, a minor. It was alleged that CCC invited AAA to play computer games with him
at the accused-appellants house, on the instruction of the latter. On the way, however, AAA
and CCC were suddenly pushed inside accused-appellants comfort room, which was built
separately from the house. There he threatened the children and succeeded having carnal
knowledge of AAA. He even instructed CCC to insert his organ to hers, which CCC pretended
to obey. The accused pleaded not guilty and denied committing the rape against AAA and
pointed to CCC instead, as the perpetrator. Upon appeal, the CA affirmed RTCs conviction of
rape against the accused. Hence, this appeal alleging that the trial court erred in finding him
guilty as charged.
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in giving more weight and credence to the evidence
of the prosecution?
Held: Accused-appellants appeal lacks merit. Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly holds that
findings of fact of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
binding upon this Court. As a general rule, on the question whether to believe the version of
the prosecution or that of the defense, the trial courts choice is generally viewed as correct
and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to conclude so, having had
the opportunity to observe the witnesses demeanor and deportment on the witness stand as
they gave their testimonies. The trial court is, thus, in the best position to weigh conflicting
testimonies and to discern if the witnesses were telling the truth. AAA, who was six years old
by the time she testified in court, had consistently, positively, and categorically identified
accused-appellant as her abuser. Her testimony was direct, candid, and replete with details of
the rape.
As between the a categorical testimony which has a ring of truth on one hand, and a
mere denial and alibi on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.
18.) PEOPLE v. DIAZ, G.R. No. 200882, June 13, 2013.
Facts: The information filed against the accused alleged that he raped Mara, his neighbor,
inside the latters studio type unit at early dawn. The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty
when charged and trial ensued thereafter. The accused denied raping Mara and claimed that

he was at a birthday party that time and was having a drinking spree and immediately went
home after consuming their 4th bottle of Emperador. The trial court gave credence to the
Maras testimony which was supported by physical evidence, particularly her medical
examination. The accused-appellant appealed his case to the Court of Appeals. For him, the
trial court gave undue credence to the testimony of Mara. In particular, her identification of
him was contrary to human experience as she admitted that her room was dark and she was
not wearing her eyeglasses at the time of the alleged assault. claimed that his guilt was not
proven beyond reasonable doubt. For him, the prosecution failed to prove the element of
force or intimidation as there was an absence of any "real apprehension of dangerous
consequences or serious bodily harm that would overpower the mind of the victim and
prevent her from offering resistance." While claiming that she was verbally threatened of
being stabbed, Mara admitted that she did not see any knife in his possession. Mara also
failed to make an outcry during the two hours that the accused-appellant allegedly stayed in
her room. The Court of Appeals rejected the contentions of the accused-appellant. Mara
positively identified the accused-appellant as her assailant. Thus, the CA denied his appeal
and affirmed his conviction
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the accused by giving weight and
credence to the testimony of the victim?
Held: No. When the issues revolve on matters of credibility of witnesses, the findings of fact
of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses, and its assessment of the
probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings, are accorded
high respect, if not conclusive effect. This is so because the trial court has the unique
opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and is in the best position to discern
whether they are telling the truth. Thus, in the absence of any clear showing that it
overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would have affected the result of the case, the trial courts findings on the
matter of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.23 On the one hand, this
judicial deference is a recognition of the role of trial judges in fact-finding trial judges have
the unique opportunity of having the privilege of a front-row seat to observe first-hand the
details of a testimony, the demeanor and deportment of witnesses, and the drama during the
trial. On the other hand, this is an acknowledgment by this Court of the limitations of its review
in appealed cases this Court stands outside the trial court, is far-removed from the witness
stand, and relies solely on the records of the case.
Acutely aware of the Courts position as the last resort of litigants, The Court nevertheless
carefully sifted through the records of this case but found nothing that indicates that the trial
and the appellate courts overlooked or failed to appreciate facts that, if considered, would
change the outcome of the case. Thus, the SC upholds the Court of Appeals ruling that Mara
made a clear and positive identification of the accused-appellant as her sexual assaulter. The
records bear this out.
19.) DOMINGO v. COLINA, G.r. No. 173330, June 17, 2013.
Facts: In an information filed, the accused was charged with violation of BP. 22 before the
MTCC by issuing a UCPB check as a payment in favor of Merlinda Colina. However, when
such check was presented before the drawee bank, the same was dishonored due to
ACCOUNT CLOSED. After the prosecution rested its case, the defense filed a Demurrer to
Evidence, which the MTCC granted. The prosecution filed a MR to the Order of Dismissal and
In the Alternative To Reopen The Civil Aspect of the case, however, both were denied. Thus,
the respondent appealed the civil aspect before the RTC, which was granted. The petitioner
filed a MR but it was denied. Aggrieved, the petitioner filed a petitioner for review before the

CA. However, the CA affirmed the RTCs decision and dismissed the petition for review.
Issue: (1.) Whether or not the CA erred in upholding that the RTC-Branch 16 of davao city
has jurisdiction to entertain an appeal interposed which was violative of section 2, rule 111 of
the rules on criminal procedure when the trial court (MTCC-branch 6 of davao city) had
already ruled that the act from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
(2.) Whether or not the CA erred in denying petitioner's request to adduce evidence on
the civil aspect and ruled that the petitioner has waived that right despite the fact that the
demurrer to evidence filed was with prior leave of court
Held: (1.) No. The last paragraph of Section 2, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides that the extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of
the civil action. However, the civil action based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there
is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist. Moreover, Moreover, the second paragraph of Section 2,
Rule 120 of the same Rules states that: In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state
whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or
merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall
determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.
In the instant case, the Orders of the MTCC, dated October 25, 2001 and November
23, 2001, did not contain any such finding or determination. The Court agrees with the CA
that in acquitting petitioner in its Order dated October 25, 2001, the MTCC did not rule on the
civil aspect of the case. While it subsequently held in its November 23, 2001 Order that the
act from which the civil liability of the accused in favor of the private complainant may arise
does not exist in this case, the MTCC, nonetheless, failed to cite evidence, factual
circumstances or any discussion in its October 25, 2001 Decision which would warrant such
ruling. Instead, it simply concluded that since the prosecution failed to prove all the elements
of the offense charged, then the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. The
MTCC held that its observations and ratiocinations in its October 25, 2001 Order justified its
conclusion. However, after a careful review of the abovementioned Orders, the Court finds
nothing therein which the MTCC could have used as a reasonable ground to arrive at its
conclusion that the act or omission from which petitioner's civil liability might arise did not
exist.
(2.) With respect to the second argument, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart
from the ruling of the CA in its Resolution dated May 26, 2006 that for petitioner's failure to
invoke her right to present evidence, despite the clear ruling by the RTC that she is civilly
liable, she is deemed to have waived such right. Petitioner may not argue that her right to due
process was violated, because she was given the opportunity to raise this issue a number of
times both in the RTC and the CA. Petitioner does not dispute that neither in her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision of the RTC nor in her Petition for Review, as well as in her
Memorandum filed with the CA, did she raise the issue of her right to present evidence on the
civil aspect of the present case. As correctly observed by the CA, it was only in her Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision that she brought up such matter. Where a party was
given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to have been
denied due process of law. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense.
Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there
is no denial of due process. The question is not whether petitioner succeeded in defending
her rights and interests, but simply, whether she had the opportunity to present her side of the
controversy.

In the instant case, petitioner was able to participate in all the proceedings before the lower
courts, and, in fact, obtained a favorable judgment from the MTCC. She also had a similar
opportunity to ventilate her cause in the CA. Simply because she failed to avail herself of all
the remedies open to her did not give her the justification to complain of a denial of due
process. She cannot complain because she was given the chance to defend her interest in
due course, for as stated above, it was such opportunity to be heard that was the essence of
due process.
Equally settled is the rule that no question will be entertained on appeal unless it has
been raised in the proceedings below. Points of law, theories, issues and arguments not
brought to the attention of the lower court, administrative agency or quasi-judicial body, need
not be considered by a reviewing court, as they cannot be raised for the first time at that late
stage. For her failure to timely invoke her right to present evidence, petitioner is already
estopped
20.) JANDUSAY v. PEOPLE, G.R. No. 185129, June 17, 2013.
Facts: Petitioner was the former treasurer of the CALAPUPATODA. Consequent to the
election of the new set of officers for the year 2001, a turnover meeting was held between the
outgoing and incoming officers on April 3, 2001. During the meeting, the petitioner turned over
to the incoming officers the so-called "blue book" which contained entries of the income and
expenses of the association for the year 2000. Based thereon, the net remaining funds of the
association for the year 2000 is P661,015.00 which, the petitioner, however failed to turn-over
despite written and verbal demands. Consequently, the petitioner was formally charged with
estafa before the RTC. The petitioner denied signing the undertaking and claimed that the
same was merely inserted on top of his signature when he was asked to sign the minutes. He
averred that finances of the association were never subjected to audit. He also endeavored to
establish that it was the associations President, Dionisio Delina (Delina) and not him who
handled the funds of the association for the year 2000 as shown by the Memorandum issued
by Delina himself in January 2000. Apparently, Delina assumed such responsibility because
the petitioner then had a pending criminal case for estafa in relation to the associations funds
in 1999. The RTC accorded merit to the minutes presented by the prosecution, and together
with the other evidence proffered, found the petitioner guilty of misappropriating the
associations funds. However, the RTC rejected the petitioners contentions and held that an
examination of the minutes show that there is no indication that the undertaking reflected
therein was merely inserted after the petitioner signed the same. Anent the memorandum
allegedly issued by Delina, the RTC found the same to be of dubious origin and at best only
self-serving. The CA affirmed the petitioners conviction. In an attempt to overturn the decision
of the CA, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 14, 2008 and a Motion for
New Trial on May 18, 2008. The CA denied both motions.
Issue: Whether the CA committed a reversible error in affirming the judgment of the RTC
finding him guilty of estafa beyond reasonable doubt.
Held: No. The petitioners allegations are nothing but feeble reiteration of the arguments
unsuccessfully raised before the RTC and CA. It must be emphasized that the grounds raised
by the petitioner involve factual issues already passed upon by the abovementioned courts,
and are inappropriate in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. The Court accords
respect to the finding of the RTC that the bare denial of the petitioner cannot prevail over the
evidence of the prosecution consisting not only of testimonies of witnesses but also
documents establishing the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. It is a wellentrenched rule that the findings of facts of the CA affirming those of the trial court are binding
on the Court. At any rate, the Court concurs with the remark of the RTC that the

memorandum whereby Delina admitted to have handled the associations funds for the year
2000 is highly specious as to its authenticity in reflecting the actual dynamics between the
petitioner and Delina as officers of the association.
The courts a quo were correct in convicting the petitioner of estafa. As correctly found
by the CA: In the case at bar, the aforementioned elements have been sufficiently established
by the prosecution. It cannot be denied that accused-appellant, as Treasurer of
CALAPUPATODA, received and held money for administration and in trust for the association.
He was thus under an obligation to turn over the same upon conclusion of his term as
Treasurer. Instead, however, he misappropriated the same to the prejudice of the association
and, despite demand, failed to account for or return them. Such failure to account, upon
demand, of funds or property held in trust is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation.
21.
G.R. No. L-35825 February 20, 1989
LEGADOSvs. HON. DOROTEO DE GUZMAN
NARVASA, J.:
FACTS: A complaint for simple seduction 6 was filed with the then City Court of Dipolog
(Branch 11) 7 against Vilmor Icao. The complaint was presented by the offended girl, Cora
Legados, represented by her mother, Rosa, and was subsequently made the basis of an
information filed by the First Assistant City Fiscal. 8 After entering a plea of not guilty on
arraignment, Icao moved to quash the information on the ground that the City Court had no
jurisdiction to try the offense, and the fiscal who filed the information bad no authority to do
so. The Court denied the motion and scheduled the case for trial on the merits. Icao
thereupon instituted an action of prohibition 9 with the then Court of First Instance of
Zamboanga City 10 which, in due course, granted the petition and permanently enjoined the
proceedings in the City Court. It is this Order which is now assailed in this Court as having
been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether the court acted wrong?
RULING: YES. The writ of prohibition was, of course, correctly issued by the respondent
Judge, being consistent with the doctrine obtaining at the time, i.e., that an inferior court had
no jurisdiction over the crime of simple seduction. But, the doctrine has since been changed.
Now, the offense is explicitly declared by law to be within the exclusive original jurisdiction, no
longer of Courts of First Instance (since abolished and replaced by Regional Trial Courts), but
of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.
Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, effective August 14, 1981, grants to Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts 1 "(e)xclusive original
jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and
two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and
imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil
liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or
amount thereof. 2
The proviso altered and superseded the long standing doctrine first laid down in a 1911 case 3
that an inferior court had no jurisdiction over the crime of simple seduction although the
penalty imposed is arresto mayor because conviction thereof carried with it the liability
imposed by Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code to acknowledge and give Support to the
offspring. The doctrine was made applicable whatever the peculiar circumstances of the
offender and offended party might be, it not being permitted, upon considerations of
consistency and orderliness, "to speculate on whether or not an offspring may still arise from
the crime, whether or not the complainant or the accused may be sterile or incapable of

procreation, whether or not the complaint was already pregnant by another man when the
crime was committed and various other factual considerations before the jurisdiction may be
fixed.
22.
G.R. No. 186137
June 26, 2013
PEOPLE vs. DATU NOT ABDUL
SERENO, CJ.:
FACTS: Police Officer 2 Daniel E. Akia (PO2 Akia) of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency-Cordillera Administrative Region (PDEA-CAR) received a telephone call from an
informant reporting the illegal drug activities of appellant. Acting on this information, PO2 Akia
met with the informant and brought her to the PDEA office for an interview, in the course of
which she disclosed that appellant would be coming from Agoo, La Union to meet her
between 1:00 p.m. and 2:00 p.m. of that day. Losing no time, Police Senior Inspector Paul
John A. Mencio (P S/Insp. Mencio), together with Senior Police Officer 4 Marquez K. Madlon
(SPO4 Madlon) and Police Officer 2 Erwin M. Garcia (PO2 Garcia), planned and prepared for
a buy-bust operation that was to take place in the afternoon of that day. The team agreed that
PO2 Akia would pose as the buyer and bring with him two pieces of 500-peso bills and
some fake money. They also agreed that the signal for the other police officers to arrest
appellant was when PO2 Akia grabbed him.4
The police officers, together with the informant, then proceeded to San Vicente, Baguio City.
Upon arriving there, SPO4 Madlon and PO2 Garcia hid, while PO2 Akia and the informant
stood along the sidewalk. After twenty minutes, appellant arrived on board a taxi. The
informant touched PO2 Akias back to let him know that the passenger of the cab was their
target. Appellant got out of the taxi and approached the informant, who introduced the police
officer as her friend. PO2 Akia asked appellant how much shabu the latter brought, and
appellant replied that he had shabu worth P6,500. Appellant pulled out of his pocket a
medium-sized, transparent, heat-sealed plastic sachet containing a white crystalline
substance and handed it to PO2 Akia, who subsequently handed the buy-bust money to the
former. Appellant started to count it, but soon realized that he was being paid with fake
money. PO2 Akia immediately grabbed him and announced that the former was a PDEA
agent. Upon seeing the signal, SPO4 Madlon and PO2 Garcia hurried to the scene and
assisted PO2 Akia in arresting appellant. Afterwards, the police officers brought him to the
PDEA office, where the operation was documented and the arrest report and the Affidavits of
the arresting officers were prepared. Also, an inventory of the item seized from appellant was
made in the presence of representatives from the Department of Justice (DOJ), the media,
and the barangay council. PO2 Akia allegedly marked the plastic sachet with the initials
"MKM, DEA, EMG" and Exhibit "A." The plastic sachet was then forwarded to the PNP
Regional Crime Laboratory Office Cordillera Administrative Region for analysis.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution sufficiently established compliance with the chain-of-custody
rule?
RULING: NO. The chain-of-custody rule is a method of authenticating evidence, by which the
corpus delicti presented in court is shown to be one and the same as that which was retrieved
from the accused or from the crime scene.39 This rule, when applied to drug cases, requires a
more stringent application, because the corpus delicti the narcotic substance is not readily
identifiable and must be subjected to scientific analysis to determine its composition and
nature.40 Malillin v. People41 explains this rigorous standard when it comes to the chain of
custody of narcotic substances:
xxx the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded by

evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent
claims it to be. It would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the
item was picked up to the time it was offered into evidence, in such a way that every person
who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witness possession, the condition in which it was
received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These
witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no
change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same. (Emphasis supplied)
Hence, every link in the chain of custody must not show any possibility of tampering,
alteration or substitution.42 However, it is accepted that a perfect chain is not the standard. 43
Nonetheless, two crucial links must be complied with. First, the seized illegal drug must be
marked in the presence of the accused and immediately upon confiscation. This marking
must be supported by details on how, when, and where the marking was done, as well as the
witnesses to the marking. Second, the turnover of the seized drugs at every stage from
confiscation from the accused, transportation to the police station, conveyance to the
chemistry lab, and presentation to the court must be shown and substantiated. 44
The records are replete with instances of noncompliance with the foregoing. The time and
place of the marking was never established. Although the item confiscated from appellant had
undoubtedly been marked, no evidence was presented to adequately indicate when, where,
and how it was marked.
Moreover, the prosecution failed to show and substantiate the identity of the person who
carried the plastic sachet from the location of the buy-bust operation to the police station, who
kept it before it was transmitted to the laboratory, who received it after the examination, and
who stored it until it was brought to court.
Evidentiary gaps in the chain of custody of the confiscated plastic sachet cast reasonable
doubt on its integrity.
THE accused must be acquitted!
23.
G.R. No. 197360
July 3, 2013
PEOPLE vs. RONALD CREDO aka "ONTOG"
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS: On 22 June 2005, at around 10:30 in the evening, the victim, Joseph Nicolas
(Joseph), was at a "bingohan" together with his wife Maria and friends Manuel Chica (Manuel)
and Ramon Tirao. Randy Credo (Randy) arrived at the "bingohan," approached Joseph and
suddenly punched the latter on the chest, causing him to fall down. Randy then immediately
ran away towards the direction of their house located at Zone 4. Joseph, on the other hand,
stood up, gathered his things consisting of a lemon and an egg, and gave Randy a chase.
The people at the "bingohan" all scampered away as a result of the commotion. 4 Josephs
friend Manuel proceeded towards Zone 3. There, he met Randy, who was already
accompanied by his co-appellants: his brother Ronald Credo (Ronald) and their father
Rolando Credo (Rolando). The three were each armed with a bolo. 5
Meanwhile, when Josephs children, Russel, Ramon, Roldan and Rea, heard that their father
was in trouble, they decided to look for him in Zone 3. On their way, they met appellants, who
suddenly started throwing stones at them, causing them to run away. Russel got separated
from his siblings but he continued to look for his father. He came across appellants again in

Zone 2 where he saw them hacking somebody with their bolos. That person later turned out
to be their father. Russel saw that when all three appellants were done hacking their victim,
Randy and Rolando went back to where the victim was lying and gave him another blow,
saying in the Bicolano dialect, "pang-dulce" (for dessert).
ISSUE: Whether the accused are guilty of murder?
RULING: YES.
At the outset, it bears repeating that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are generally binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court. 21 Except for
compelling or exceptional reasons, such as when they were sufficiently shown to be contrary
to the evidence on record, the findings of fact of the Regional Trial Court will not be disturbed
by this Court.22 Thus, once a guilty verdict has been rendered, the appellant has the burden of
clearly proving on appeal that the lower court committed errors in the appreciation of the
evidence presented.23 Here, there is no showing that the trial court or the Court of Appeals
overlooked some material facts or committed any reversible error in their factual findings.
Trial courts assessment of the credibility of a witness accorded great weight
Corollary to the principle that appellate courts generally will not interfere with the factual
findings of the trial court is the rule that when the credibility of an eyewitness is at issue, due
deference and respect is given by the appellate courts to the assessment made by the trial
courts, absent any showing that the trial courts overlooked facts and circumstances of
substance that would have affected the final outcome of the case. 25 "As consistently adhered
to by this Court, the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best
and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had the unmatched opportunity to
observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not
reflected on the record."26
We agree with the findings of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals which gave weight
to the accounts of the two eyewitnesses, Russel and Francis. Their respective testimonies
positively and categorically identified appellants as the perpetrators of the crime. Their
statements on the witness stand also corroborate each other on material aspects. Both
Russel and Francis testified that they saw the appellants hacking a man. Although Francis
was able to immediately recognize the victim as Joseph, Russel was to learn only later on
that the appellants victim was his own father. It is also worth noting that the statement of
Russel and Francis claiming that all three of the appellants were holding a bolo at the time of
the incident is corroborated by another witness: Manuel Chica. Manuel testified that after
Randy and Joseph left the "bingohan," he also left to follow the two. On his way, he met the
three appellants all armed with a bolo.
24.
G.R. No. 190340
July 24, 2013
PEOPLE vs.ROGELIO RAMOS
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
FACTS: On June 28, 2006, appellants were charged with the crime of murder under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The accused, with intent to kill, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another by using their superior strength to subdue the victim
RONALD A. ABACCO, by attacking him with a bladed weapon, pulling him to the ground to
subdue him and while there on the ground and defenseless, accused ROGELIO RAMOS
hacked him several times while accused MARISSA INTERO-RAMOS shouted, "kill him, kill
him" thus causing massive injuries to the body of the victim that caused his death to the
damage and prejudice of his heirs.

The crime is attended by the qualifying circumstances of treachery by attacking a defenseless

victim and with abuse of superior strength.
The PROSECUTOR PRESENTED 8 WITNESSES and the DEFENSE PRESENTED 6. The
accused was contending that he acted in self defense over the said crime.
ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was guilty?
RULING: YES.
ACCUSEDs claim of self-defense is unavailing.
Factual findings of the trial court involving the credibility of witnesses are accorded respect
especially when affirmed by the CA.
Appellants challenge the RTCs reliance on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
claiming the same to be highly incredulous. They particularly question the credibility of
prosecution witnesses, husband and wife Anthony and Gina, who they claim had testified
against them for improper motives. They aver that since they previously filed a complaint
against Anthony for cutting down their narra tree, the said spouses had every reason to
falsely testify against them. By virtue of their previous altercation, the testimonies of the said
witnesses should not be given weight as they are not considered credible witnesses.
The Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court. It is a well-settled rule that
factual findings of the trial court involving the credibility of witnesses are accorded utmost
respect since trial courts have first hand account on the witnesses manner of testifying in
court and their demeanor during trial.28 The Court shall not supplant its own interpretation of
the testimonies for that of the trial judge since he is in the best position to determine the issue
of credibility.
Moreover in the absence of misapprehension of facts or grave abuse of discretion, and
especially when the findings of the judge have been affirmed by the CA as in this case, the
findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed. 29 Besides, even assuming that Anthony and
Gina were indeed impelled by improper motive, appellants failed to impeach Ryan, an
eyewitness to the incident who positively identified them as the assailants. As observed by the
CA:While the appellants question the credibility of the prosecution witness Anthony Ramos,
who allegedly had ill motive in testifying against them because appellant Marissa had filed
charges against him for cutting the narra tree in front of their house, they failed to impute
similar motive on the part of Ryan (Roquero) who also witnessed the incident. x x x
Treachery attended the killing of Abacco, hence, the crime committed is murder.
25. People vs. Ramos, 702 SCRA 204, G. R. No. 190340, July 24, 2013
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Facts:
Appellants were charged with the crime of murder against the victim Ronald Abacco.
Upon arraignment, both appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. After pre-trial, trial
on the merits followed. After hearing all the testimonies presented by both sides and receiving
their respective evidence, the RTC convicted Rogelio and Marissa of the crime of murder. The
RTC rejected the claim that Rogelio only acted in lawful self-defense. It held that the elements
of self-defense, specifically unlawful aggression on the part of Abacco and reasonable
necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression, were not established. On appeal,
the CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the RTC. The CA held that the appellants
failed to discharge the burden of evidence in proving that Rogelio killed Abacco in selfdefense. Instead, what Rogelio did was an act of retaliation. With respect to Marissa, the said
court ruled that her defense of denial and alibi cannot prosper as it was not physically
impossible for her to have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.

Issue:
Whether the court erred in giving credence to the highly incredulous testimonies of
prosecutions eyewitnesses and disregarding the credible version of the defense.
Ruling:
No. The Court finds no reason to disturb the findings of the trial court. It is a wellsettled rule that factual findings of the trial court involving the credibility of witnesses are
accorded utmost respect since trial courts have first hand account on the witnesses manner
of testifying in court and their demeanor during trial. The Court shall not supplant its own
interpretation of the testimonies for that of the trial judge since he is in the best position to
determine the issue of credibility. Moreover in the absence of misapprehension of facts or
grave abuse of discretion, and especially when the findings of the judge have been affirmed
by the CA as in this case, the findings of the trial court shall not be disturbed. Besides, even
assuming that Anthony and Gina were indeed impelled by improper motive, appellants failed
to impeach Ryan, an eyewitness to the incident who positively identified them as the
assailants.
As observed by the CA: While the appellants question the credibility of the prosecution
witness Anthony Ramos, who allegedly had ill motive in testifying against them because
appellant Marissa had filed charges against him for cutting the narra tree in front of their
house, they failed to impute similar motive on the part of Ryan (Roquero) who also witnessed
the incident.
26. Crespo vs. Mogul, 151 SCRA 462, G. R. No. L-53373, June 30, 1987
GANCAYCO, J.:
Facts:
An information for Estafa was filed against him by the prosecutor in the lower court in
Lucena City. During the scheduled arraignment, he moved to defer his arraignment on the
ground that there was a pending Petition for Review before the Secretary of Justice of his
case. The lower court denied the motion, as well as the motion for reconsideration, but
deferred the arraignment so the accused can elevate his quandary to the appellate court. He
elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, to which the Office of the Solicitor General sided
with him. The Court of Appeals restrained the lower court from proceeding with the
arraignment of the accused until such time that the Secretary of Justice acted on the
accuseds petition. The then Undersecretaty of Justice reversed the Resolution filed by the
Provincial Prosecutor, thus the provincial fiscal filed a motion to dismiss the information
attaching thereto the letter of the Undersecretary of Justice. The trial court denied the motion
to dismiss the information, citing among others that the motion seeks to dismiss the case
based on evidence not before it, and the motion erodes the independence and integrity of the
court. The Court of Appeals initially restrained the lower court from proceeding with the
arraignment but later dismissed the petition of Mario and lifted the restraining order. Mario
appealed the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether the trial court may refuse to grant a motion to dismiss filed by the Fiscal under
orders from, the Secretary of Justice and insists on arraignment and trial on the merits.
Ruling:

No. It is a cardinal principle that criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by

information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of
a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the
complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according
to whether the evidence in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction
and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private
persons. 19 It cannot be controlled by the complainant. Prosecuting officers under the power
vested in them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons
who, according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a
crime committed within the jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the legal duty not to
prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced that the evidence adduced is
not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.
It is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the
existence of a puma facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts
cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. It is not
prudent or even permissible for a Court to compel the fiscal to prosecute a proceeding
originally initiated by him on an information, if he finds that the evidence relied upon by him is
insufficient for conviction. Neither has the Court any power to order the fiscal to prosecute or
file an information within a certain period of time, since this would interfere with the fiscal's
discretion and control of criminal prosecutions. Thus, a fiscal who asks for the dismissal of the
case for insufficiency of evidence has authority to do so, and Courts that grant the same
commit no error. The fiscal may re-investigate a case and subsequently move for the
dismissal should the re-investigation show either that the defendant is innocent or that his
guilt may not be established beyond reasonable doubt. In a clash of views between the judge
who did not investigate and the fiscal who did, or between the fiscal and the offended party or
the defendant, those of the Fiscal's should normally prevail. On the other hand, neither an
injunction, preliminary or final nor a writ of prohibition may be issued by the courts to restrain
a criminal prosecution except in the extreme case where it is necessary for the Courts to do
so for the orderly administration of justice or to prevent the use of the strong arm of the law in
an oppressive and vindictive manner.
27. Roberts vs. Court of Appeals, 254 SCRA 307, G. R. No. 113930, March 5, 1996
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Facts:
Petitioners are corporate officers and members of the Board of Pepsi Cola Products
Phils., Inc. were prosecuted in connection with the Pepsi Number Fever promotion by
handlers of the supposedly winning 349 Pepsi crowns. Of the four cases filed against the
petitioners, probable cause was found by the investigating prosecutor only for the crime of
estafa, but not for the other alleged offenses. The information was filed with the trial court
without anything accompanying it. A copy of the investigating prosecutors Joint Resolution
was forwarded to and received by the trial court only on April 22, 1993. However, no affidavits
of the witnesses, transcripts of stenographic notes of the proceedings during the preliminary
investigation, or other documents submitted in the course thereof were found in the records of
the case.

Petitioners Roberts, et al. filed a petition for review to the Department of Justice
seeking the reversal of the finding of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor. They
also moved for the suspension of the proceedings and the holding in abeyance of the
issuance of warrants of arrest against them. Meanwhile, the public prosecutor also moved to
defer the arraignment of the accused-appellants pending the final disposition of the appeal to
the Department of Justice.
Respondent Judge Asuncion issued the challenged order (1) denying, on the basis
of Crespo vs. Mogul, the foregoing motions respectively filed by the petitioners and the public
prosecutor, and directing the issuance of the warrants of arrest after June 1993 and setting
the arraignment on 28 June 1993. In part, respondent judge stated in his order that since
the case is already pending in this Court for trial, following whatever opinion the Secretary of
Justice may have on the matter would undermine the independence and integrity his court.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals arguing that the respondent judge had not the
slightest basis at all for determining probable cause when he ordered the issuance of
warrants of arrest. After finding that a copy of the public prosecutors Joint Resolution had in
fact been forwarded to, and received by, the trial court on 22 April 1993, the CA denied
petitioners application for writ of preliminary injunction. The CA ruled that the Joint Resolution
was sufficient in itself to have been relied upon by respondent Judge in convincing himself
that probable cause indeed exists for the purpose of issuing the corresponding warrants of
arrest and that the mere silence of the records or the absence of any express declaration in
the questioned order as to the basis of such finding does not give rise to an adverse
inference, for the respondent Judge enjoys in his favor the presumption of regularity in the
performance of his official duty. Roberts, et al. sought reconsideration, but meanwhile, the
DOJ affirmed the finding of probable cause by the investigating prosecutor. The CA therefore
dismissed the petition for mootness.
Issue:
Whether public respondent Judge Asuncion committed grave abuse of discretion in
denying, on the basis of Crespo vs. Mogul, the motions to suspend proceedings and hold in
abeyance the issuance of warrants of arrest and to defer arraignment until after the petition
for review filed with the DOJ shall have been resolved.
Ruling:
No. There is nothing in Crespo vs. Mogul which bars the DOJ from taking cognizance
of an appeal, by way 'of a petition for review, by an accused in a criminal case from an
unfavorable ruling of the investigating prosecutor. It merely advised the DOJ to, "as far as
practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the
fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court."
Crespo could not have intended otherwise without doing violence to, or repealing, the
last paragraph of Section 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court which recognizes the authority of
the Secretary of Justice to reverse the resolution of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief
state prosecutor upon petition by a proper party.
Pursuant to the said provision, the Secretary of Justice had promulgated the rules on
appeals from resolutions in preliminary investigation. At the time the petitioners filed their
petition for the review of the Joint Resolution of the investigating prosecutor, the governing
rule was Circular No. 7, dated 25 January 1990. Section 2 thereof provided that only
resolutions dismissing a criminal complaint may be appealed to the Secretary of Justice. Its

Section 4, however, provided an exception, thus allowing, upon a showing of manifest error or
grave abuse of discretion, appeals from resolutions finding probable cause, provided that the
accused has not been arraigned.
The DOJ gave due course to the petitioners' petition for review as an exception
pursuant to Section 4 of Circular No. 7.
28. People vs. Mabuyo, 63 SCRA 532, G. R. No. L-29129, May 8, 1975
MAKALINTAL, C.J.:
Facts:
The victim Norberto Anillo was shot dead at the doorstep of his house in Bo.
Ambulong, Tanauan, Batangas. Immediately thereafter a police team headed by Lt. Roque
Garcia, Deputy Chief of Police of Tanauan, went to the scene of the incident and conducted
an investigation. Fifteen empty carbine shells were recovered from the premises. Agaton
Anillo, the father of the deceased, and Adelaida Mirania, the widow, when interviewed by Lt.
Garcia, declined to name the assailants but promised to go to his office after the interment to
disclose to him their identities. Agaton Anillo and Adelaida Mirania went to the Office of the
Chief of Police of Tanauan and submitted themselves to a formal investigation. In their
respective statements they named Domingo Mabuyo as the triggerman and alluded to a
certain Juan Mendoza as the instigator of the crime. The following day, a complaint for murder
was filed in the Municipal Court of Tanauan against both Mendoza and Mabuyo. Upon a
finding of a probable cause, the municipal judge ordered the issuance of the corresponding
warrants of arrest, but Domingo Mabuyo was nowhere to be found.
Domingo Mabuyo presented himself at the Office of the Chief of Police of Tanauan, but
only to be fingerprinted since he had with him an order of release issued by the Municipal
Court. It appears that Mabuyo had previously prepared a bail bond in the sum of P30,000.00,
which was approved by the Municipal Judge. Through counsel Mabuyo waived his right to the
second stage of the preliminary investigation. Accordingly the municipal court in its order
elevated the case to the Court of First Instance of Batangas for further proceedings. The
case went to trial upon a "not guilty" plea. The widow of the victim testified that it was Mabuyo
who killed his husband. Sumarraga and Anillo corroborated with the testimony of Mirania.
Mabuyo denied the same and claimed that he was in Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija when the
incident happened. Upon the evidence presented the trial court rendered its judgment of
conviction as aforestated; hence, this appeal.
Issue:
Whether trial court erred in convicting him of a crime not properly charged in the
information since he was charged with murder allegedly committed in Bo. Bagumbayan,
Tanauan, Batangas, but was found guilty of said crime committed in Bo. Ambulong, some 12
kilometers away in the same municipality and province.
Ruling:
No. It is a settled rule that unless the particular place of commission is an essential
element of the offense charged, conviction may be had even if it appears that the crime was
committed not at the place alleged in the information, provided the place of actual commission
was within the jurisdiction of the court. In the instant case the place of commission does not
constitute an essential element of the offense charged and the evidence discloses that said
offense was in fact committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. Moreover,
there is no reason to believe that the appellant was misled or surprised by the variance
between the proof and the allegation in the information as to the place where the offense was
committed.

29. PEOPLE OF THE

ALAYON, Accused-Appellant.
PEREZ, J.:

PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RUPER

POSING

FACTS: SPO1 Angeles who testified that while on duty on 13 August 2003, at the Station Anti
Illegal Drugs (SAID), an asset based at Makabayan St., Brgy. Obrero informed the duty officer
about the illegal activities of certain Ruper Posing (Posing), a known drug pusher in
their barangay. As a result a team was formed to conduct a buy bust operation. The buy-bust
operation was rendered successfully. The team arrested Posing and recovered from him two
plastic sachet of shabu. Prior to the turnover of the evidence to the desk officer, SPO1
Angeles placed his marking on the two (2) small heat sealed transparent plastic sachets. The
same were then turned over to PO2 Sales, who prepared a request for laboratory
examination. On the same day, the specimens were delivered by PO1 Nicart to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for quantitative and qualitative examination, wherein each sachet was found
to contain 0.03 gram and tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a
dangerous drug. An information was thereafter filed for violation of RA 9165. On arraignment
Posing pleaded not guilty. Trial court found him guilty. On appeal, CA affirmed the ruling of the
Trial Court. Hence this appeal.
Posing, argued that the following instances would constitute a break in the chain of
custody of the seized plastic sachets of shabu: (1) SPO1 Angeles failed to identify the duty
officer to whom he turned over the alleged confiscated shabu; (2) SPO1 Angeles was not able
to recall who brought the drug specimens to the crime laboratory; (3) SPO1 Angeles failed to
mark the confiscated sachets at the crime scene immediately after the accused-appellant was
arrested; and (4) the police officers failed to prepare an inventory report of the confiscated
drugs, no photographs of the same were taken in the presence of the accused-appellant and
that of a representative from the media or the Department of Justice or any elected public
official.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution failed to prove the chain of custody requirements based on
testimony of their witness.
RULING: NO. In Malillin v. People, we laid down the chain of custody requirements that
must be met in proving that the seized drugs are the same ones presented in court: (1)
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it
is offered into evidence; and (2) witnesses should describe the precautions taken to ensure
that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone
not in the chain to have possession of the item.
In this case, the prosecution was able to prove, through the testimonies of its
witnesses that the integrity of the seized item was preserved every step of the process. After
the sale of shabu and another sachet was discovered in the person of accused-appellant,
SPO1 Angeles, who was the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation, marked the drug
specimens, and then turned over the same to the desk officer, who in turn handed it to PO1
Sales. The latter then prepared a Request for Laboratory Examination, and on the same day,
the specimens were delivered by PO1 Nicart to the PNP Crime Laboratory for quantitative
and qualitative examination, conducted by Engr. Jabonillo
The defense kept on harping on alleged lapses in the procedure observed by the
apprehending officers, like SPO1 Angeles failure to recall the duty officer to whom he turned
over the specimens, and the officer who brought the specimens to the crime laboratory. Also,
they questioned the absence of an inventory report of the confiscated drugs and that there

were no photographs taken in the presence of the accused-appellant and that of a

representative from the media or the Department of Justice or any elected public officer.
But time and again, jurisprudence is consistent in stating that less than strict
compliance with the procedural aspect of the chain of custody rule does not
necessarily render the seized drug items inadmissible.
As
held
in People
v. Llanita
as
cited
in People
v. Ara:
library
RA 9165 and its subsequent Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) do not require strict
compliance as to the chain of custody rule. x x x We have emphasized that what is
essential is "the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of
the accused." Briefly stated, non-compliance with the procedural requirements under RA
9165 and its IRR relative to the custody, photographing, and drug-testing of the apprehended
persons, is not a serious flaw that can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buybust operation.
As to the charge of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the prosecution must
establish the following elements: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object,
which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized
by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. In the case at hand,
the prosecution was able to prove that the accused-appellant was in possession of one (1)
plastic sachet of shabu, when he was frisked on the occasion of his arrest. There was also no
showing that he had the authority to possess the drugs that was in his person.
In fine, considering the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution, the denial of the
accused-appellant fails. Courts generally view the defense of denial with disfavor due to the
facility with which an accused can concoct it to suit his or her defense. As evidence that is
both negative and self-serving, this defense cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the
various aspects of the crime committed.
30.
PEOPLE
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.ANDY ZULIETA a.k.a. "Bogarts," Accused-Appellant. G.R. No. 192183
November 11, 2013
FACTS: Andy Zulieta a.k.a Bogarts was charged of Murder for stabbing Armand Labando, Jr.
Prosecution presented three witnesses. First witness was SPO1 Ubilas who testified that at
the time the crime was committed he was directed to verify the report of the stabbing incident.
As the victim was no longer at the crime scene he went to the hospital where he found that
the latter was declared dead-on-arrival. A pursuit operation was therafter conducted and was
able to arrest companions of Andy. The next witness, testified he and deceased Armand
Labando, Jr. were outside their boarding house, seated at the bench just outside the store of
Jimmy Saura. While they were eating bananas, Bogarts, Rey and Tantan approached them.
Bogarts, who had with him a pitcher, dropped it in front of them so they immediately stood up.
He then heard Tantan shout, "birahi na na" (hit him now), then saw Bogarts pull a batangas
knife and stab the deceased, hitting him on his chest. And last witness, Dr. Francisco Romulo
C. Villaflor, a Medico-Legal Officer who testified that he conducted an autopsy of the
deceased Armand Labando, Jr. and found that the stab wound was inflicted on the anterior
chest hitting the most vital organ of the body.
Accused set up denial and alibi as his defense claiming that on June 13, 2006 at 10:00
oclock in the evening, he was asleep in his house in Gingoog City with his wife and in-laws.
The next witness for the defense was Maryflor Mamba Zulieta, wife of the accused, who

testified that she married the accused [o]n August 28, 2005 in Nazareno Parish, Cagayan de
Oro City. They resided in Gingoog City from the time they got married until the day that her
husband was arrested. RTC found Andy guilty. On appeal, CA affirmed RTCs ruling. Hence,
this present appeal. Appellant insists on his alibi that on June 13, 2006, at around 10 oclock
in the evening, he was sleeping at his house in Gingoog City. He argues further that even
assuming his presence at the scene of the crime at Sto. Nio, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City,
and that he killed Labando, the killing could not have been attended by the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. He posits that the prosecution failed to show that he employed
means or methods to ensure that Labando would not be able to defend himself.
ISSUE: Whether appellants alibi shall give credence as to that witnesses of prosecution.
RULING: No. Appellants alibi, being inherently weak, deserves no credence at all especially
when measured up against the positive identification by the prosecution witness, Bryan
Pascua (Pascua), pointing to appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. Besides, nobody
corroborated appellants alibi other than his wife who is obviously biased in his favor thus
making her testimony self-serving. Moreover, appellant failed to prove that it was physically
impossible for him to be present at the crime scene at the time of its commission. As
observed by the CA, Cagayan de Oro City could be traversed from Gingoog City within two
hours; hence, it is not physically impossible for appellant to commit the crime in Cagayan de
Oro City and still go home to Gingoog City after its commission.
Aside from having been positively identified by prosecution witness Pascua, appellant
failed to impute any ill motive to Pascua. Thus, the trial court correctly lent credence to
Pascuas testimony:
The testimony of witness Bryan Pascua is clear, spontaneous and straightforward when he
said that accused Andy Zulieta stabbed the deceased. When asked if he can identify the
accused, the witness pointed his finger at the accused Andy Zulieta who was in the
courtroom. Asked how he knew of such fact, he categorically said that he knew the accused
long before the incident, recognized his face that night because the place was lighted and at
the time of the stabbing incident, he was one (1) meter away from the assailant and the
victim. He further testified that he was surprised when the accused, together with his
companions, approached them, dropped the pitcher in front of them and suddenly stabbed
the deceased on his chest when in fact there was no prior heated argument or statement
made by deceased Armand Labando, Jr. which could have caused the ire of accused Andy
Zulieta.
Settled is the rule that factual findings of the trial court and its assessment on the
credibility of witnesses deserve utmost respect by this Court. In this case, we find no reason
to deviate from the findings or assessment of the trial court there being no showing that it has
overlooked or mis-appreciated some facts which if considered would materially impact on or
change the outcome of the case. On the contrary, we find that the trial court meticulously
studied the case and properly weighed the evidence presented by the parties.
31.
ANTONIO
L.
SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs. The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court, NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable FRANKLIN DRILON (in his
capacity as Secretary of Justice), JOVENCITO R. ZUO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB,
CARLOS L. DE LEON, RAMONCITO C. MISON, REYNALDO J. LUGTU, and RODRIGO P.
LORENZO, the last six respondents in their official capacities as members of the State
Prosecutor's Office), respondents.

G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993

CRUZ, J.:
FACTS: The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate charges
against several persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the rape-slay of Mary
Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez. Acting on this request, the Panel of State
Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary investigation. Petitioner
Sanchez was not present but was represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr. PNP
Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the petitioner requesting him to appear for
investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the
morning of August 13,1993, and he was immediately taken to the said camp. At a
confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified. The petitioner was then
placed on "arrest status" and taken to the Department of Justice in Manila. The respondent
prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo as
his counsel. After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez. Sanchez was
forthwith taken to the CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he remains confined. The
respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, seven
informations. Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court issued a warrant for the arrest of
all the accused, including the petitioner, in connection with the said crime.
The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehension that
the trial of the said cases might result in a miscarriage of justice. SC thereupon ordered the
transfer of the venue of the seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled to
respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou. On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were
amended to include the killing of Allan Gomez as an aggravating circumstance. On that same
date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations substantially on the grounds now
raised in this petition. However, it was denied, Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ of
injunction.
The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against him should be quashed
because: he was denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation; only
the Ombudsman had the competence to conduct the investigation; his warrantless arrest is
illegal and the court has therefore not acquired jurisdiction over him; the informations are
discriminatory because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia; and as a
public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUES: (1) Whether Sanchez was unlawfully withheld of his right to Preliminary
Investigation;
(2) Whether it should be the Obudsman who shal have the jurisdiction over the case
being vested with the power to conduct the investigation of all cases involving public officers
like him, as the municipal mayor of Calauan, Laguna.
(3)Whether the arrest of Sanchez was legal
(4) Whether seven informations charging seven separate homicides are absurd
because the two victims in these cases could not have died seven times.
(5) Whether as a public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the
Sandiganbayan.
RULING: (1) NO. The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13, 1993, belie the
petitioner's contention that he was not accorded the right to present counter-affidavits.
On the other hand, there is no support for the petitioner's subsequent manifestation that his

counsel, Atty. Brion, was not notified of the inquest held on August 13, 1993, and that he was
not furnished with the affidavits sworn to on that date by Vivencio Malabanan and Aurelio
Centeno, or with their supplemental affidavits
The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never disowned Atty. Panelo as
his counsel. During the entire proceedings, he remained quiet and let this counsel
speak and argue on his behalf. It was only in his tardy Reply that he has suddenly
bestirred himself and would now question his representation by this lawyer as
unauthorized and inofficious.
Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, provides that if the respondent
cannot be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits, the
investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the
complainant.
Just as the accused may renounce the right to be present at the preliminary
investigation , so may he waive the right to present counter-affidavits or any other evidence in
his defense.
At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the
validity of the information or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it affect the
jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the information.
If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed, the trial court may, on motion of
the accused, order an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the proceedings in the criminal
case in abeyance. In the case at bar, however, the respondent judge saw no reason or need
for such a step. Finding no arbitrariness in her factual conclusions, we shall defer to her
judgment.
(2) NO. The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of
R.A. 6770 to investigate and prosecute, any illegal act or omission of any public official.
However, as we held only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo v. Domagas, this authority
"is not an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in. respect of
the offense charged."
Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in this case
needed the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that the information and amended
information here did not have the approval of the Ombudsman. However, we do not believe
that such approval was necessary at all. In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA. 545 (1990), the
Court held that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate charges of illegal or
omissions on the part of any public official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public official.
It must, however, be pointed out that the authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
"any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" (191 SCRA at 550) is not
an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the
offense here charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-involvement of the office of
the Ombudsman in the present case does not have any adverse legal consequence upon the
authority the panel of prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or amended
information.
(3) YES (by virtue of the jurisdiction subsequently acquired)
"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person
into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to
be arrested or by his voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a

formal declaration of arrest is not, required. It is enough that there be an intent on the
part of one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a
letter-invitation issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear at the said
camp for investigation.
In the case at bar, the invitation came from a highranking military official and the investigation
of Sanchez was to be made at a military camp. Although in the guise of a request, it was
obviously a command or an order of arrest that the petitioner could hardly he expected to
defy. In fact, apparently cowed by the "invitation," he went without protest (and in informal
clothes and slippers only) with the officers who had come to fetch him.
It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438, the requisites of a
"custodial investigation" are applicable even to a person not formally arrested but
merely "invited" for questioning.
It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the petitioner was placed on
"arrest status" after he was pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan as the person who first
raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Respondent Zuo himself acknowledged during the August 13,
1993 hearing that, on the basis of the sworn statements of the two state witnesses, petitioner
had been "arrested."
His arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the petitioner allegedly
participated in the killing of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Neither
did they have any personal knowledge that the petitioner was responsible therefor because
the basis of the arrest was the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as
the rape and killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on June 28-June 29, 1993, or forty-six
days before the date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense had "in fact just been
committed" when the petitioner was arrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the
Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner by virtue of
the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in
connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
Applicable by analogy to the case at bar is Rule 102 Section 4 of the Rules of Court that:
Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a
court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or
judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ
shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not
be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor
shall, anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or
convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.
(4) NO. It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense,
except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a simple punishment for various
offenses.
The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed by
him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with having
himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In

other words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times, with each
of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other six.
Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta
and later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her.
The separate informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven
successive rapes is complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated
by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed
in succession by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.
It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez were killed
seven times, but the informations do not make such a suggestion. It is the petitioner who does
so and is thus hoist by his own petard.
(5) NO. There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide
and the petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential
element of the crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the office.
Moreover, it is not even alleged in the information that the commission of the crime
charged was intimately connected with the performance of the petitioner's official
functions to make it fall under the exception laid down in People v. Montejo.
As Chief Justice Concepcion said: It is apparent from these allegations that, although public
office is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the main
respondents herein, according to the amended information, the offense therein charged
is intimately connected with their respective offices and was perpetrated while they
were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions.
Indeed they had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have
committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent
Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of
Basilan City.
We have read the informations in the case at bar and find no allegation therein that the crime
of rape with homicide imputed to the petitioner was connected with the discharge of his
functions as municipal mayor or that there is an "intimate connection" between the offense
and his office. It follows that the said crime, being an ordinary offense, is triable by the regular
courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
32.
ROSALINDA
PUNZALAN,
PUNZALAN, Petitioners, v.MICHAEL
PLATA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 160316, September 02, 2013
MENDOZA, J.:

RANDALL
GAMALIEL

PUNZALAN
J.
PLATA

AND
AND

RAINIER
RUBEN

FACTS: Rainier filed a criminal complaint for Attempted Homicide against Michael Gamaliel
Plata (Michael) and one for Illegal Possession of Firearms against Robert Cagara (Cagara).
On the other hand, Michael, Ruben Plata (Ruben) and several others filed several complaints
against petitioners Rosalinda, Randall, Rainier, and several individuals before the Office of
the City Prosecutor, Mandaluyong City. The Office of the City Prosecutor, in its Joint
Resolution, dismissed the complaints filed against the petitioners for lack of sufficient basis
both in fact and in law, giving the following reasons:The investigation and affidavits of all
parties reveal that the above cases have no sufficient basis. First, as regards the Grave Oral

Defamation charges against Rosalinda Punzalan (I.S. Nos. 97-11487, 97-11786; 97-11522
and 97-11523), the alleged defamatory statements are not supported by any evidence to
prove that they would cast dishonor, discredit or contempt upon another person (Article 359,
Revised Peal Code), which are essential requisites of Grave Oral Defamation. Complainants
presented no evidence aside from their claims to prove their cases; hence, insufficient.
As regards the case of Attempted Murder (I.S. No. 97-11528) by Ranier Punzalan, et
al., the same is already the subject of other two (2) criminal cases docketed as Crim. Case
No. 66879 and 66878 entitled People vs. Michael Plata for Attempted Homicide and People
vs. Roberto Cagara for Illegal Possession of Firearm, respectively, both pending before
Branch 60, MTC of Mandaluyong; hence, cannot be the subject of another case. With regard
to the alleged robbery (I.S. no. 97-11766) which was allegedly committed on the same date
as the malicious mischief (I.S. No. 97-11765), these two (2) cases cannot be the product of
the same criminal act for some element of one may be absent in the other, particularly
animus lucrandi. Further, it is noted that the complainant in the robbery case, who is the
same complainant in the malicious mischief (Michael Plata), use the very same affidavit for
the two (2) different charges with no other obvious intention aside from harassing the
respondents.As regards the claim of Slight Physical Injuries (I.S. No. 97-11485), it appears
on the affidavit of the complainants, Robert Cagara (CAGARA) and Dencio Dela Pea
(DENCIO), that they have conflicting statements which were not properly explained during
the investigation. As regards the charge of Grave Threat (I.S. No. 97-11492, 97-11520 and
97-11521), there is no act which may fall under the definition of grave threat because the
utterances claimed do not amount to a crime. Further, in I.S. No. 97-11492, the alleged threat
was made through telephone conversations and even to the complainant himself, hence, they
did not pose any danger to the life and limbs nor to the property of the complainant.
The complainants in I.S. Nos. 97-11487, 97-11523, 97-11786, 97-11520, 97-11521, 9711528, 97-765, and 11-766 filed their separate petitions before the DOJ. The DOJ modified
the July 28, 1998 Joint Resolution of the Office of the City Prosecutor and ordered the filing of
separate informations for Slight Oral Defamation, Light Threats, Attempted Homicide,
Malicious Mischief, and Theft against Rosalinda, Rainier, Randall and the other respondents
in the above cases. The latter filed a motion for reconsideration, dated April 28, 2000. Upon
review, the DOJ reconsidered its findings and ruled that there was no probable cause. In its
Resolution, dated June 6, 2000, the DOJ set aside its March 23, 2000 Resolution and
directed the Office of the City Prosecutor to withdraw the informations. Not in conformity, the
complainants moved for a reconsideration of the June 6, 2000 Resolution but the DOJ denied
the motion. The complainants elevated the matter to the CA by way of certiorari ascribing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the DOJ Secretary which ordered the withdrawal of
the separate informations for Slight Oral Defamation, Other Light Threats, Attempted
Homicide, Malicious Mischief and Theft. The CA annulled and set aside the June 6, 2000 and
October 11, 2000 Resolutions of the DOJ and reinstated its March 23, 2000 Resolution.
Hence, this petition filed by Rosalinda, Randal and Rainier. In essence, the petitioners argue
that the determination of the existence of probable cause is lodged with the prosecutor, who
assumes full discretion and control over the complaint. They insist that the DOJ committed no
grave abuse of discretion when it issued the June 6, 2000 and October 11, 2000 Resolutions
ordering the withdrawal of the informations. In the absence of grave abuse of discretion, they
contend that the courts should not interfere with the discretion of the prosecutor.
ISSUE: Whether the DOJ committed no grave abuse of discretion when it issued the June 6,
2000 and October 11, 2000 Resolutions ordering the withdrawal of the informations and that
the courts should not interfere with the discretion of the prosecutor.

RULING: YES.
The well-established rule is that the conduct of preliminary
investigation for the purpose of determining the existence of probable cause is a
function that belongs to the public prosecutor. Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
as
amended,
provides:nadcralaw
Section 5. Who must prosecute criminal action. - All criminal actions either commenced by
complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public
prosecutor. In case of heavy work schedule of the public prosecutor or in the event of lack of
public prosecutors, the private prosecutor may be authorized in writing by the Chief of the
Prosecution Office or the Regional State Prosecutor to prosecute the case subject to the
approval of the court. Once so authorized to prosecute the criminal action, the private
prosecutor shall continue to prosecute the case up to end of the trial even in the absence of a
public prosecutor, unless the authority is revoked or otherwise withdrawn.
The prosecution of crimes lies with the executive department of the government whose
principal power and responsibility is to see that the laws of the land are faithfully executed. A
necessary component of this power to execute the laws is the right to prosecute their
violators. Succinctly, the public prosecutor is given a broad discretion to determine whether
probable cause exists and to charge those whom he believes to have committed the crime
and should be held for trial. In the case of Crespo v. Mogul, the Court ruled:nadcralaw
xxx. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of
the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecution by private persons. It
cannot be controlled by the complainant. Prosecuting officers under the power vested in
them by law, not only have the authority but also the duty of prosecuting persons who,
according to the evidence received from the complainant, are shown to be guilty of a crime
committed within the jurisdiction of their office. They have equally the legal duty not to
prosecute when after an investigation they become convinced that the evidence adduced is
not sufficient to establish a prima facie case.16
Consequently, the Court considers it a sound judicial policy to refrain from interfering in
the conduct of preliminary investigations and to leave the DOJ a wide latitude of discretion in
the determination of what constitutes sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for the
prosecution of the supposed offenders. The rule is based not only upon the respect for
the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the executive
department but upon practicality as well. As pronounced by this Court in the separate
opinion of then Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa in the case of Roberts, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals,
In this special action, this Court is being asked to assume the function of a public
prosecutor. It is being asked to determine whether probable cause exists as regards
petitioners. More concretely, the Court is being asked to examine and assess such evidence
as has thus far been submitted by the parties and, on the basis thereof, make a conclusion as
to whether or not it suffices to engender a well founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial.
It is a function that this Court should not be called upon to perform. It is a
function that properly pertains to the public prosecutor, one that, as far as crimes
cognizable by a Regional Trial Court are concerned, and notwithstanding that it
involves adjudication process of a sort, exclusively pertains, by law, to said executive
officer,
the
public
prosecutor.
xxx
Whether or not that function has been correctly discharged by the public prosecutor-i.e.,
whether or not he had made a correct ascertainment of the existence of probable cause in a
case- is a matter that the trial court itself does not and may not be compelled to pass upon.

There is no provision of law authorizing an aggrieved party to petition for a such a

determination. It is not for instance permitted for an accused, upon the filing of an
information against him by the public prosecutor, to preempt trial by filing a motion
with the Trial Court praying for the quashal or dismissal of the indictment on the
ground that the evidence upon which the same is based is inadequate. Nor is it
permitted, on the antipodal theory that the evidence is in truth adequate, for the complaining
party to present a petition before the Court praying that the public prosecutor be compelled to
file the corresponding information against the accused.
Besides, the function this Court is asked to perform is that of a trier of facts which it
does not generally do, and if at all, only exceptionally, as in an appeal in a criminal action
where the penalty of life imprisonment, reclusion perpetua, or death has been imposed by a
lower court (after due trial, of course), or upon a convincing showing of palpable error as
regards a particular factual conclusion in the judgment of such lower court.
Thus, the rule is that this Court will not interfere in the findings of the DOJ
Secretary on the insufficiency of the evidence presented to establish probable cause
unless it is shown that the questioned acts were done in a capricious and whimsical
exercise of judgment evidencing a clear case of grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion, thus means such capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The party seeking
the writ of certiorari must establish that the DOJ Secretary exercised his executive power in
an arbitrary and despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and the abuse of
discretion must be so patent and gross as would amount to an evasion or to a unilateral
refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of lawawlibrary
In the present case, there was no clear evidence of grave abuse of discretion committed by
the DOJ when it set aside its March 23, 2000 Resolution and reinstated the July 28, 1998
Resolution of the public prosecutor. The DOJ was correct when it characterized the complaint
for attempted murder as already covered by two (2) other criminal cases. As to the other
complaints, the Court agrees with the DOJ that they were weak and not adequately supported
by credible evidence. Thus, the CA erred in supplanting the prosecutors discretion by its own.
33.

G.R. No. L-32849 July 31, 1984

QUIRICO
A.
ABELA,
petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE CESARIO C. GOLEZ, Judge, Court of First Instance of Capiz, Branch I,
and AGUSTIN ALMALBIS respondents.
FACTS:
Pivate respondent Agustin Almalbis filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Roxas City a
complaint for estafa against one Virginia Anisco. After conducting a preliminary investigation,
herein petitioner Quirico A. Abela dismissed the complaint "for lack of merit." Thereafter,
private respondent Almalbis commenced the action for mandamus in the Court of First
Instance of Roxas City against herein petitioner Quirico A. Abela.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the fiscal can be controlled by mandamus.

HELD:
NO. As held in Bagatua vs. Revilla, 104 Phil. 393, "[w]hile it is the duty of the fiscal or the City
Attorney, as prosecuting officer, to prosecute persons who, according to the evidence
received from the complainant; are shown to be guilty of a crime, said officer is likewise
bound by his oath of office to protect innocent persons from groundless, false or malicious
prosecution. The prosecuting officer would be committing a serious dereliction of duty if he
files the information based upon a complaint, where he is not convinced that the sufficiency
and strength of the evidence would warrant the filing of the action in court against the
accused. This duty of the prosecuting officer involves discretion, hence, it cannot be
controlled by mandamus unless there has been a grave abuse thereof which is not shown in
the case at bar." Or, he may file a civil action for damages under Article 27 of the New Civil
Code.
But then, the question may be asked: What are the remedies of the offended party or
complainant when the prosecuting officer refuses or fails to file an information or to prosecute
the criminal action? As stated above, "[i]n case the provincial fiscal should fail or refuse to act
even when there is sufficient evidence on which action may be taken, the offended party may
take up the matter with the Secretary of Justice who may then take such measures as may be
necessary in the interest of justice under Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code.
34.
G.R. No. 69863-65 : December 10, 1990.
LINO BROCKA VS. ENRILE
FACTS:
Petitioners were arrested on January 28, 1985 by elements of the Northern Police District
following the forcible and violent dispersal of a demonstration held in sympathy with the
jeepney strike called by the Alliance of Concerned Transport Organization (ACTO).
Thereafter, they were charged with Illegal Assembly. Except for Brocka, et al. who were
charged as leaders of the offense of Illegal Assembly and for whom no bail was
recommended, the other petitioners were released on bail of P3,000.00 each. Brocka, et al.'s
provisional release was ordered only upon an urgent petition for bail for which daily hearings
from February 1-7, 1985 were held. Brocka, et al. were subsequently charged on February
11, 1985 with Inciting to Sedition, They were released provisionally on February 14, 1985, on
orders of then President F. E. Marcos.
In their RETURN, it appeared that all the accused had already been released, four of them on
February 15, 1985 and one February 8, 1985. The petitioner, nevertheless, argued that the
petition has not become moot and academic because the accused continue to be in the
custody of the law under an invalid charge of inciting to sedition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not criminal prosecution of a case may be enjoined.

HELD:
Yes. We are impelled to point out a citizen's helplessness against the awesome powers of a
dictatorship. Thus, while We agree with the Solicitor General's observation and/or
manifestation that Brocka, et al. should have filed a motion to quash the information, We,
however, believe that such a course of action would have been a futile move, considering the
circumstances then prevailing. Thus, the tenacious invocation of a spurious and inoperational
PDA and the sham and hasty preliminary investigation were clear signals that the prosecutors
intended to keep Brocka, et al. in detention until the second offense of "Inciting to Sedition"
could be facilitated and justified without need of issuing a warrant of arrest anew.
In the case of J. Salonga v. Cruz Pao, We point out:
"Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure
is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but
also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution . . ." (G.R. No. L-59524, February 18, 1985,
134 SCRA 438-at p. 448).
We, therefore, rule that where there is manifest bad faith
criminal charges, as in the instant case where Brocka, et
provisional release until such time that charges were filed,
investigation was hastily conducted, charges that are filed
enjoined.
35.

that accompanies the filing of

al. were barred from enjoying
and where a sham preliminary
as a result should lawfully be

G.R. No. 190863, November 19, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAUL SATO, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:
6
hen nine-year old AAA and her six-year old cousin BBB were invited by the appellant,
who was their neighbor, to an abandoned nipa hut. Appellant then carried AAA while BBB
walked towards the hut. Upon entering the premises, appellant told AAA and BBB to
undress. When the children complied, appellant started playing with the private parts of
AAA. He then counted one, two, three, inserted his penis into AAAs vagina, and made
coital movements that caused AAA to feel pain. Thereafter, appellant gave AAA P5.00
and threatened to kill her and her father with a knife if she tells anyone of the things he did to
her. The whole time, BBB, who was likewise naked, was just sitting beside AAA. Appellant
did not molest or touch her. Appellant then carried AAA and BBB and brought them out of
the nipa hut through the window. AAA reported the incident to her grandmother because
7
her
parents
were
not
around
at
that
time. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
At the time of the incident, prosecution witness Efren Alcover (Alcover) was near the
abandoned nipa hut gathering balani (banana trunk). When he passed by the hut which had
no door, he saw appellant, AAA and BBB inside. Upon getting closer, he saw all of them

naked. AAA was lying down while appellant was doing push and pull movements on top of
her. Beside AAA was BBB whom appellant only gazed at. When appellant was done,
Alcover saw him give the children money.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused was guilty of the charged against him.
HELD:
Testimonies of child-victims are normally given full weight and credit, since when a girl,
particularly if she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape has in fact been committed. When the offended party is of
tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired,
considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be
exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally
badges of truth and sincerity. Considering her tender age, AAA could not have invented a
20
horrible story.
And although AAAs testimony was already convincing proof, by itself, of
[appellants] guilt, it was further corroborated by the testimony of [Alcover], who personally
21
witnessed
the
rape.
x
x
x chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On the other hand, all that appellant put forward for his defense was mere denial and the alibi
that at the time of the incident, he went fishing, was back ashore in the afternoon, cooked
some fish, went home and slept throughout the night. As this Court has oft pronounced, both
denial and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot prevail over the positive and
credible testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that [appellant] committed the crime. For
alibi to prosper, the requirements of time and place must be strictly met. It is not enough to
prove that [appellant was] somewhere else when the crime happened. [He] must also
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for [him] to
have been at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its commission. Unless
substantiated by clear and convincing proof, such defense is negative, self-serving, and
22
undeserving of any weight in law.
Obviously, the physical impossibility is not present in
this case. Appellant did not present any proof that it was physically impossible for him to be
at
the
locus
criminis
at
the
time
of
the
incident.
In the same vein, appellants denial is inherently weak and constitutes self-serving negative
evidence, which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.
36.

G.R. No. 198904

December 11, 2013

DELIA
INES
RINGOR,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Petitioner,

FACTS:
An information was filed against the Delia Ringor for estafa under art. 315 of RPC.
The petitioner was employed as sales clerk/agent of Peoples Consumer Store (PCS) a
merchandise distributor owned by Honesto Ibarra and managed by Annelyn Ingan (Ingan). As
PCSs sales clerk/agent, the petitioner scouts the towns of Sinait, Badoc, Currimao, and
Batac, Ilocos Sur to look for customers, takes note of their orders, and submits the said
orders to Ingan for approval. Once approved, the petitioner, together with a driver and a
helper, delivers the ordered merchandise to the customers. After delivery, the petitioner turns
over the delivery receipts to Ingan. Seven days after delivery, the petitioner would then collect
the payment from their customers and remit the same to Ingan.
Seven days thereafter, the petitioner informed Ingan and her brother Nestor Ibarra (Ibarra)
that she lost the money she collected from LACS, claiming that she was a victim of a robbery.
Later, the petitioner claimed that she lost the amount collected from LACS in a mini bus.
However, upon inquiry by Ingan, the driver of the said mini bus said that the petitioners claim
was impossible since they only had a few passengers then. After the incident, the petitioner
no longer reported back to work. Neither did the petitioner remit the amount she collected
from LACS. Ingan alleged that, during a meeting between her and the petitioner in a police
station, in response to inquiries regarding the unremitted amount to PCS, the petitioner stated
that she no longer have the amount which she collected from LACS and that she would just
have to go to jail.
RTC rendered its decision in convicting the accused with the crime of estafa. CA AFFIRMED,
subject to the MODIFICATION that accused appellant Delia Ringor is convicted of qualified
theft

Issue:
whether the CA erred in convicting the petitioner for the felony of qualified theft under Article
310 in relation to Article 308 of the RPC.

Held:
No. Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of the felony of qualified theft, must be the
result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the
appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them
which the appellant abused.15