April 18, 1949

G.R. No. L-856

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SUSANO PEREZ (alias KID PEREZ), defendant-appellant.
Crispin Oben and Isidro Santiago for appellant.
Assistance Solicitor General Manuel P. Barcelona and Solicitor Esmeraldo Umali for appellee.
TUASON, J.:
Susano Perez alias Kid Perez alias Kid Perez was convicted of treason by the 5th Division of the People's Court sitting in Cebu City and sentenced to
death by electrocution.
Seven counts were alleged in the information but the prosecution offered evidence only on counts 1, 2, 4, 5 and 6, all of which, according to the court,
were substantiated. In a unanimous decision, the trial court found as follows:
"As regards count No. 1
Count No. 1 alleges that the accused, together with the other Filipinos, recruited, apprehended and commandeered numerous girls and women against
their will for the purpose of using them, as in fact they were used, to satisfy the immoral purpose and sexual desire of Colonel Mini, and among such
unfortunate victims, were Felina Laput, Eriberta Ramo alias Miami Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay, Feliciana Bonalos and Flaviana Bonalos.
It would be unnecessary to recite here the testimonies of all the victims of the accused; it sufficient to reproduce here succinctly the testimony of
Eriberta Ramo. She testified that on June 15, 1942, the accused came to her house to get her and told her that she was wanted in the house of her
aunt, but instead, she was brought to the house of the Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that she escaped and returned to Baclayon her
hometown; that the accused came again and told her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his Information Clerk; that she did not accept the job; that a
week later the accused came to Baclayon to get her, and succeeded in taking some other girls Puppet Governor Agapito Hontanosas; that Governor
Hontanosas told her that Colonel Mini wanted her to be his wife; that when she was brought to Colonel Mini the latter had nothing on but a "G" string;
that he, Colonel Mini threatened her with a sword tied her to a bed and with force succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her; that on the following
night, again she was brought to Colonel Mini and again she was raped; that finally she was able to escape and stayed in hiding for three weeks and
only came out from the hiding when Colonel Mini left Tagbilaran.
"As regards count No. 2
Count No. 2 of the information substantially alleges: That accused in company with some Japanese and Filipinos took Eriberta Ramo and her sister
Cleopatra Ramo from their home in Baclayon to attend a banquet and a dance organized in honor of Colonel Mini by the Puppet Governor, Agapito
Hontanosas in order that said Japanese Colonel might select those first who would later be taken to satisfy his carnal appetite and that by means of
threat, force and intimidation, the above mentioned two sister were brought to the headquarters of the Japanese Commander at the Mission Hospital in
Tagbilaran where Eriberta Ramo was forced to lived a life of shame. All these facts alleged in count No. 2 were testified to by said witnesses Eriberta
Ramo her mother Mercedes de Ramo. It is not necessary here to recite once more their testimony in support of the allegations in court No. 2; this Court
is fully convinced that the allegation in said count No. 2 were fully substantiated by the evidence adduced.
"As regards count No. 4
Count No. 4 substantially alleges that on July 16, 1942, the two girls named Eduardo S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, were taken from their homes in
Corella, Bohol, by the accused and his companion named Vicente Bullecer, and delivered to the Japanese Officer, Dr. Takibayas to satisfy his carnal
appetite, but these two, the accused Susano Perez and his companion Vicente Bullecer, before delivering them to said Japanese Officer, satisfied first
their lust; the accused Susano Perez raping Eduarda S. Daohog and his companion, Vicente Bullecer, the other girl Eutiquia Lamay. Eduarda S.
Daohog, testifying, said: that while on the way to Tagbilaran, the accused though force and intimidation, raped her in an uninhabited house; that she
resisted with all her force against the desire of the accused, but of no avail; that upon arriving in Tagbilaran, she was delivered to the Japanese Officer
named Takibayas who also raped her. Eutiquia Lamay testified that on July 16, 1942, the accused and his companion, Bullecer, went to her house to
take her and her sister; that her sister was then out of the house; that the accused threatened her with a revolved if she refuses to go; that she was
placed in a car where Eduarda Daohog was; that while they were in the car, the accused carried Eduarda out of the car, and their companion Bullecer
took the other witness (Eutiquia Lamay); that when the accused and Eduarda returned to the car, the latter; Eduarda, covered her face, crying; that
later, she and Eduarda were taken to the Governor's house; that on arriving and in the presence of the Puppet Governor Hontanosas, the Governor
exclaimed: "I did not call for these girls": but the accused replied saying: "These girls talked bad against the Japanese , and that is why we arrested
them"; that the said Governor Hontaosas then, said: "Take them to the Japanese "; that the accused and Bullecer brought the two girls to the
Japanese headquarters; that Eduarda was taken to one room by the Japanese Captain called Dr. Takibayas, and she (Eutiquia Lamay) was taken to
another room by another Japanese living in that house; that she was raped by that Jap while in the room; that she resisted all she could, but of no
avail.

In the light of the testimonies of these two witnesses, Eduarda S. Daohog and Eutiquia Lamay, all the allegations in Court No. 4 were fully proven
beyond reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 5
Count No. 5 alleges: That on or about June 4, 1942, the said accused commandeered Feliciana Bonalos and her sister Flaviana Bonalos on the pretext
that they were to bee taken as witnesses before a Japanese Colonel in the investigation of a case against a certain Chinese (Insik Eping), and
uponarriving at Tagbilaran, Bohol, the accused brought the aforesaid two girls to the residence of Colonel Mini, Commander of the Japanese Armed
Forces in Bohol and by means of violence threat and intimidation, said Japanese Colonel abused and had sexual intercourse with Flaviana Bonalos;
that the accused subsequently of Colonel Mini and through violence, threat and intimidation, succeeded in having carnal knowledge with her against
her will; that two days, later, upon the pretext of conducting the unfortunate girls to their home, said accused brought the other girls Feliciana Bonalos
to a secluded place in Tagbilaran, Bohol, and in the darkness, by mean of threat and violence had carnal knowledge with her against her will.
Feliciana Bonalos testifying in this count, declared that the accused came to get her on the pretext that she was to be used as witness in a case
affecting certain Chinaman before Colonel Mini; that she and her younger sister Flaviana were brought in a car driven by the accused; they were
brought to the house of Colonel Mini; that sister Flaviana was conducted into a room and after remaining in the same for about an hour, she came out
with her hair and her dress in disorder; that Flaviana told her immediately that she was raped against her will by Colonel Mini; that she (Feliciana), after
leaving the residence of said Jap officer, was taken by Perez to an uninhabited house and there by threat and intimidation, the accused succeeded in
raping her; that when she returned to her (the witness), Flaviana was crying; that the following day while conducting the two girls back to their
hometown, she (Feliciana) was also raped by the accused in an uninhabited house, against her will.
Victoriana Arayan (mother of Feliciana and Flaviana Bonalos) testified as following: That on June 15, 1942, the accused came and told her that the
Japanese needed her daughters to be witnesses; that accordingly, he daughters, under that understanding, started for Tagbilaran; that later, she went
to Tagbilaran to look for her daughters and she found them in the office of the Puppet Governor; that on seeing her, both daughters wept and told her
that they were turned over to the Japanese and raped them; that her daughter Flaviana told her (the witness) that after the Japanese had raped her the
accused also raped her (Flaviana) in an uninhabited house; that the accused did not permit her two daughter to return home on the pretext that the
Puppet Governor was then absent and in the meanwhile they stayed in the house of the accused Perez; that when her daughter returned to her house
ultimately, they related to her (mother) what happened; that both daughters told her they would have preferred death rather than to have gone to
Tagbilaran; that Feliciana told her (the mother) that the accused had raped her.
The information give by Feliciana to her mother is admitted in evidence as a part of the res gestae regardless of the time that had elapsed between the
occurrence and the time of the information. In the manner these two witnesses testified in court, there could be no doubt that they were telling the
absolute truth. It is hard to conceived that these girls would assume and admit the ignominy they have gone through if they were not true. The Court is
fully convinced that all the allegations contained in Court No. 5 have been proven by the testimonies of these two witnesses beyond reasonable doubt.
"As regards count No. 6
Count No. 6, alleges: That the accused, together with his Filipino companion apprehended Natividad Barcinas, Nicanora Ralameda and Teotima
Barcinas, nurses of the provincial hospital, for not having attended a dance and reception organized by the Puppet Governor in honor of Colonel Mini
and other Japanese high ranking officers, which was held in Tagbilaran market on June 25, 1942; that upon being brought the Puppet Governor, they
were severely reprimanded by the latter; that on July 8, 1942, against said nurses were forced to attend another banquet and dance in order that the
Jap officers Mini and Takibayas might make a selection which girls would suit best their fancy; that the real purpose behind those forcible invitations
was to lure them to the residence of said Japanese Officer Mini for immoral purposes.
Natividad Barcinas, a Lieutenant of the P.A., testified at length. She declared: That on June 29, 1942, she and companion nurses, saw the accused
coming to the hospital with a revolver and took them on a car to the office of the Puppet Governor where they were severely reprimanded by the latter
for not attending the dance held on June and receptions was to select from among them the best girl that would suit the fancy of Colonel Mini for
immoral purposes that she and her companions were always afraid of the accused Perez whenever he came to said hospital; that on one occasion,
one of the nurses on perceiving the approach of the accused, ran up into her room, laid down on bed and simulated to be sick; that said accused, not
satisfied, went up into the room of that particular nurse and pulled out the blanket which covered her and telling her that it was only her pretext that she
was sick.
The testimony of Lt. Natividad Barcinas is fully corroborated by that of Nicanora Ralameda. Said testimony need not be reproduced here.
In a carefully written brief for the appellant these findings are not questioned, but it is contended that the deeds committed by the accused do not
constitute treason. The Solicitor General submits the opposite view, and argues that "to maintain and preserve the morale of the soldiers has always
been, and will always be, a fundamental concern of army authorities, for the efficiency of rests not only on its physical attributes but also, mainly, on the
morale of its soldiers" (citing the annual report of the Chief of Staff, United State Army, for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1933).
If furnishing women for immoral purposes to the enemies was treason because women's company kept up their morale, so fraternizing with them,
entertaining them at parties, selling them food and drinks, and kindred acts, would be treason. For any act of hospitality without doubt produces the
same general result. yet by common agreement those and similar manifestation of sympathy and attachment are not the kind of disloyalty that are
punished as treason.

In a broad sense, the law of treason does not prescribe all kinds of social, business and political intercourse between the belligerent occupants of the
invaded country and its inhabitants. In the nature of things, the occupation of a country by the enemy is bound to create relations of all sorts between
the invaders and the natives. What aid and comfort constitute treason must depend upon their nature degree and purpose. To draw a line between
treasonable and untreasonable assistance is not always easy. The scope of adherence to the enemy is comprehensive, its requirement indeterminate
as was said Cramer vs. United States. 89 Law. ed., 1441.
As general rule, to be treasonous the extent of the aid and comfort given to the enemies must be to render assistance to them as enemies and not
merely as individuals and in addition, be directly in furtherance of the enemies' hostile designs. To make a simple distinction: To lend or give money to
an enemy as a friend or out of charity to the beneficiary so that he may buy personal necessities is to assist him as individual and is not technically
traitorous. On the other hand, to lend or give him money to enable him to buy arms or ammunition to use in waging war against the giver's country
enhance his strength and by same count injures the interest of the government of the giver. That is treason. (See United States vs. Fricke, 259 F., 673;
63 C.J., 816, 817.)
Applying these principles to the case at bar, appellant's first assignment of error is correct. His "commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust of
Japanese officers or men or to enliven the entertainment held in their honor was not treason even though the women and the entertainment helped to
make life more pleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he was not guilty any more than the women themselves would have been if they
voluntarily and willingly had surrendered their bodies or organized the entertainment. Sexual and social relations with the Japanese did not directly and
materially tend to improve their war efforts or to weaken the power of the United State. The acts herein charged were not, by fair implication, calculated
to strengthen the Japanese Empire or its army or to cripple the defense and resistance of the other side. Whatever favorable effect the defendant's
collaboration with the Japanese might have in their prosecution of the war was trivial, imperceptible, and unintentional. Intent of disloyalty is a vital
ingredient in the crime of treason, which, in the absence of admission, may be gathered from the nature and circumstances of each particular case.
But the accused may be punished for the rape of Eriberta Ramo, Eduarda Daohog, Eutiquia Lamay and Flaviana Bonalos as principal by direct
participation. Without his cooperation in the manner above stated, these rapes could not have been committed.
Conviction of the accused of rapes instead of treason finds express sanction in section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 682, which says:
Provided further, That where, in its opinion, the evidence is not sufficient to support the offense (treason) charged, the People's Court may,
nevertheless, convict and sentence the accused for any crime included in the acts alleged in the information and established by the evidence.
All the above mentioned rapes are alleged in the information and substantiated by the evidence.
Counsel assails the constitutionality of this of his provision as violative of section 1, paragraph 17, Article III of the Constitution, which guarantees to an
accused the right "to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." The contention is not well taken. The provision in requires
that the private crimes of which an accused of treason may be convicted must be averred in the information and sustained by evidence. In the light of
this enactment, the defendant was warned of the hazard that he might be founded guilty of rapes if he was innocent of treason and thus afforded an
opportunity to prepare and meet them. There is no element of surprise or anomaly involved. In facts under the general law of criminal procedure
convicted for crime different from that designated in the complaint or information is allowed and practiced, provided only that such crime "is included or
described in the body of the information, and afterwards justified by the proof presented during the trial." (Peoplevs. Perez, 45 Phil., 599.)
The defendant personally assaulted and abused two of the offended girls but these assaults are not charged against him and should be ruled out. The
crime of coercion alleged and founded on count No. 6. need not be noticed in view of the severity of the penalty for the other crimes which he must
suffer.
We find the defendant guilty of four separate crimes of rape and sentence him for each of them to an indeterminate penalty of from 10 year of prision
mayor to 17 year and 4 months of reclusion temporal, with the accessories of law, to indemnify each of the offended women in the sum of P3,000, and
to pay the costs; it being understood that the total duration of these penalties shall not exceed forty years.
G.R. No. 153675

April 19, 2007

GOVERNMENT OF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. FELIXBERTO T. OLALIA, JR. and JUAN ANTONIO MUOZ, Respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to nullify the two Orders
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, Manila (presided by respondent Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr.) issued in Civil Case No. 99-95773. These
are: (1) the Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing Juan Antonio Muoz, private respondent, to post bail; and (2) the Order dated April 10, 2002
denying the motion to vacate the said Order of December 20, 2001 filed by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented

by the Philippine Department of Justice (DOJ), petitioner. The petition alleges that both Orders were issued by respondent judge with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
The facts are:
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of
Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20, 1997.
On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted back to the Peoples Republic of China and became the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region.
Private respondent Muoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in
violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of
conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. On August 23, 1997 and October 25, 1999, warrants of arrest were issued against
him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The
DOJ then forwarded the request to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) which, in turn, filed with the RTC of Manila, Branch 19 an application for
the provisional arrest of private respondent.
On September 23, 1999, the RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested
and detained him.
On October 14, 1999, private respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, prohibition andmandamus with application for
preliminary mandatory injunction and/or writ of habeas corpus questioning the validity of the Order of Arrest.
On November 9, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision declaring the Order of Arrest void.
On November 12, 1999, the DOJ filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 140520, praying that the Decision of the
Court of Appeals be reversed.
On December 18, 2000, this Court rendered a Decision granting the petition of the DOJ and sustaining the validity of the Order of Arrest against private
respondent. The Decision became final and executory on April 10, 2001.
Meanwhile, as early as November 22, 1999, petitioner Hong Kong Special Administrative Region filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the
extradition of private respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-95733, raffled off to Branch 10, presided by Judge Ricardo Bernardo, Jr. For his part,
private respondent filed, in the same case,-a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner.
After hearing, or on October 8, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting
bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk."
On October 22, 2001, Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing Civil Case No. 99-95733. It was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided
by respondent judge.
On October 30, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail. This was granted by
respondent judge in an Order dated December 20, 2001 allowing private respondent to post bail, thus:
In conclusion, this Court will not contribute to accuseds further erosion of civil liberties. The petition for bail is granted subject to the following
conditions:
1. Bail is set at Php750,000.00 in cash with the condition that accused hereby undertakes that he will appear and answer the issues raised in these
proceedings and will at all times hold himself amenable to orders and processes of this Court, will further appear for judgment. If accused fails in this
undertaking, the cash bond will be forfeited in favor of the government;
2. Accused must surrender his valid passport to this Court;
3. The Department of Justice is given immediate notice and discretion of filing its own motion for hold departure order before this Court even in
extradition proceeding; and
4. Accused is required to report to the government prosecutors handling this case or if they so desire to the nearest office, at any time and day of the
week; and if they further desire, manifest before this Court to require that all the assets of accused, real and personal, be filed with this Court soonest,

with the condition that if the accused flees from his undertaking, said assets be forfeited in favor of the government and that the corresponding
lien/annotation be noted therein accordingly.
SO ORDERED.
On December 21, 2001, petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge in his Order dated April 10,
2002.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner alleged that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
admitting private respondent to bail; that there is nothing in the Constitution or statutory law providing that a potential extraditee has a right to bail, the
right being limited solely to criminal proceedings.
In his comment on the petition, private respondent maintained that the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
extraditee; and that extradition is a harsh process resulting in a prolonged deprivation of ones liberty.
Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that the right to bail shall not be impaired, thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Jurisprudence on extradition is but in its infancy in this jurisdiction. Nonetheless, this is not the first time that this Court has an occasion to resolve the
question of whether a prospective extraditee may be granted bail.
In Government of United States of America v. Hon. Guillermo G. Purganan, Presiding Judge, RTC of Manila, Branch 42, and Mark B. Jimenez, a.k.a.
Mario Batacan Crespo,1 this Court, speaking through then Associate Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, later Chief Justice, held that the constitutional
provision on bail does not apply to extradition proceedings. It is "available only in criminal proceedings," thus:
x x x. As suggested by the use of the word "conviction," the constitutional provision on bail quoted above, as well as Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to extradition proceedings
because extradition courts do not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt" (De la Camara v. Enage, 41 SCRA 1, 6,
September 17, 1971, per Fernando,J., later CJ). It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that the "right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended"
does not detract from the rule that the constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal proceedings. It must be noted that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpusfinds application "only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion" (Sec. 18, Art. VIII, Constitution). Hence, the second sentence in the constitutional provision on bail merely emphasizes the right to bail in
criminal proceedings for the aforementioned offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the right is available even in extradition proceedings that are not
criminal in nature.
At first glance, the above ruling applies squarely to private respondents case. However, this Court cannot ignore the following trends in international
law: (1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century, has gradually attained global recognition;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere; (3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal
human rights in fulfilling their treaty obligations; and (4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one
hand, and the law on extradition, on the other.
The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights.
Slowly, the recognition that the individual person may properly be a subject of international law is now taking root. The vulnerable doctrine that the
subjects of international law are limited only to states was dramatically eroded towards the second half of the past century. For one, the Nuremberg and
Tokyo trials after World War II resulted in the unprecedented spectacle of individual defendants for acts characterized as violations of the laws of war,
crimes against peace, and crimes against humanity. Recently, under the Nuremberg principle, Serbian leaders have been persecuted for war crimes
and crimes against humanity committed in the former Yugoslavia. These significant events show that the individual person is now a valid subject of
international law.
On a more positive note, also after World War II, both international organizations and states gave recognition and importance to human rights. Thus, on
December 10, 1948, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in which the right to life, liberty and all
the other fundamental rights of every person were proclaimed. While not a treaty, the principles contained in the said Declaration are now
recognized as customarily binding upon the members of the international community. Thus, in Mejoff v. Director of Prisons,2 this Court, in

granting bail to a prospective deportee, held that under the Constitution, 3 the principles set forth in that Declaration are part of the law of the land.
In 1966, the UN General Assembly also adopted the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which the Philippines signed and ratified.
Fundamental among the rights enshrined therein are the rights of every person to life, liberty, and due process.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth
and dignity of every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and promoting the
right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it
to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under obligation
to make available to every person under detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right
to be admitted to bail. While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in light of the various
international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Courts ruling
in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the States power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily limited to criminal proceedings.
Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation and quarantine, 4 have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history. Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the
exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact,
bail has been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings, taking into cognizance the
obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human rights.
The 1909 case of US v. Go-Sioco5 is illustrative. In this case, a Chinese facing deportation for failure to secure the necessary certificate of registration
was granted bail pending his appeal. After noting that the prospective deportee had committed no crime, the Court opined that "To refuse him bail is to
treat him as a person who has committed the most serious crime known to law;" and that while deportation is not a criminal proceeding, some of the
machinery used "is the machinery of criminal law." Thus, the provisions relating to bail was applied to deportation proceedings.
In Mejoff v. Director of Prisons6 and Chirskoff v. Commission of Immigration,7 this Court ruled that foreign nationals against whom no formal criminal
charges have been filed may be released on bail pending the finality of an order of deportation. As previously stated, the Court in Mejoff relied upon the
Universal declaration of Human Rights in sustaining the detainees right to bail.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both are
administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the
Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty.
Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Section 2(a) of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) defines "extradition" as "the removal of an accused from the
Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in connection
with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state
or government."
Extradition has thus been characterized as the right of a foreign power, created by treaty, to demand the surrender of one accused or convicted of a
crime within its territorial jurisdiction, and the correlative duty of the other state to surrender him to the demanding state. 8 It is not a criminal
proceeding.9 Even if the potential extraditee is a criminal, an extradition proceeding is not by its nature criminal, for it is not punishment for a crime,
even though such punishment may follow extradition. 10 It is sui generis, tracing its existence wholly to treaty obligations between different nations. 11 It is
not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. 12 Nor is it a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in
character.13 Its object is to prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for
the purpose of trial or punishment.14
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential
extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law." This is shown by Section 6 of
P.D. No. 1069 (The Philippine Extradition Law) which mandates the "immediate arrest and temporary detention of the accused" if such "will best
serve the interest of justice." We further note that Section 20 allows the requesting state "in case of urgency" to ask for the "provisional arrest of the
accused, pending receipt of the request for extradition;" and that release from provisional arrest "shall not prejudice re-arrest and extradition of the
accused if a request for extradition is received subsequently."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal process. A potential extraditee may be
subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings. "Temporary
detention" may be a necessary step in the process of extradition, but the length of time of the detention should be reasonable.

Records show that private respondent was arrested on September 23, 1999, and remained incarcerated until December 20, 2001, when the trial court
ordered his admission to bail. In other words, he had been detained for over two (2) years without having been convicted of any crime. By any
standard, such an extended period of detention is a serious deprivation of his fundamental right to liberty. In fact, it was this prolonged deprivation of
liberty which prompted the extradition court to grant him bail.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion
for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
The applicable standard of due process, however, should not be the same as that in criminal proceedings. In the latter, the standard of due process is
premised on the presumption of innocence of the accused. As Purganancorrectly points out, it is from this major premise that the ancillary presumption
in favor of admitting to bail arises. Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the arrest warrant and
the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from
justice.15 Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be
granted bail.
The time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty it entered into with
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. Failure to comply with these obligations is a setback in our foreign relations and defeats the purpose of
extradition. However, it does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditees
rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions,
to which the Philippines is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a certain standard for the
grant is satisfactorily met.
An extradition proceeding being sui generis, the standard of proof required in granting or denying bail can neither be the proof beyond reasonable
doubt in criminal cases nor the standard of proof of preponderance of evidence in civil cases. While administrative in character, the standard of
substantial evidence used in administrative cases cannot likewise apply given the object of extradition law which is to prevent the prospective
extraditee from fleeing our jurisdiction. In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice, now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, proposed that
a new standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to him, this
standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by
"clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be
remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the
basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter,
conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch. SO ORDERED.
February 27, 1922
G.R. No. 17958
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOL-LO and SARAW, defendants-appellants.
Thos. D. Aitken for appellants.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
MALCOLM, J.:
The days when pirates roamed the seas, when picturesque buccaneers like Captain Avery and Captain Kidd and Bartholomew Roberts gripped the
imagination, when grostesque brutes like Blackbeard flourished, seem far away in the pages of history and romance. Nevertheless, the record before
us tells a tale of twentieth century piracy in the south seas, but stripped of all touches of chivalry or of generosity, so as to present a horrible case of
rapine and near murder.
On or about June 30, 1920, two boats left matuta, a Dutch possession, for Peta, another Dutch possession. In one of the boats was one individual, a
Dutch subject, and in the other boat eleven men, women, and children, likewise subjects of Holland. After a number of days of navigation, at about 7
o'clock in the evening, the second boat arrived between the Islands of Buang and Bukid in the Dutch East Indies. There the boat was surrounded by
six vintas manned by twenty-four Moros all armed. The Moros first asked for food, but once on the Dutch boat, too for themselves all of the cargo,
attacked some of the men, and brutally violated two of the women by methods too horrible to the described. All of the persons on the Dutch boat, with
the exception of the two young women, were again placed on it and holes were made in it, the idea that it would submerge, although as a matter of
fact, these people, after eleven days of hardship and privation, were succored violating them, the Moros finally arrived at Maruro, a Dutch possession.
Two of the Moro marauder were Lol-lo, who also raped one of the women, and Saraw. At Maruro the two women were able to escape.

Lol-lo and Saraw later returned to their home in South Ubian, Tawi-Tawi, Sulu, Philippine Islands. There they were arrested and were charged in the
Court of First Instance of Sulu with the crime of piracy. A demurrer was interposed by counsel de officio for the Moros, based on the grounds that the
offense charged was not within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, nor of any court of the Philippine Islands, and that the facts did not
constitute a public offense, under the laws in force in the Philippine Islands. After the demurrer was overruled by the trial judge, trial was had, and a
judgment was rendered finding the two defendants guilty and sentencing each of them to life imprisonment (cadena perpetua), to return together with
Kinawalang and Maulanis, defendants in another case, to the offended parties, the thirty-nine sacks of copras which had been robbed, or to indemnify
them in the amount of 924 rupees, and to pay a one-half part of the costs.
A very learned and exhaustive brief has been filed in this court by the attorney de officio. By a process of elimination, however, certain questions can be
quickly disposed of.
The proven facts are not disputed. All of the elements of the crime of piracy are present. Piracy is robbery or forcible depredation on the high seas,
without lawful authority and done animo furandi, and in the spirit and intention of universal hostility.
It cannot be contended with any degree of force as was done in the lover court and as is again done in this court, that the Court of First Instance was
without jurisdiction of the case. Pirates are in lawhostes humani generis. Piracy is a crime not against any particular state but against all mankind. It
may be punished in the competent tribunal of any country where the offender may be found or into which he may be carried. The jurisdiction of piracy
unlike all other crimes has no territorial limits. As it is against all so may it be punished by all. Nor does it matter that the crime was committed within the
jurisdictional 3-mile limit of a foreign state, "for those limits, though neutral to war, are not neutral to crimes." (U.S. vs. Furlong [1820], 5 Wheat., 184.)
The most serious question which is squarely presented to this court for decision for the first time is whether or not the provisions of the Penal Code
dealing with the crime of piracy are still in force. Article 153 to 156 of the Penal Code reads as follows:
ART. 153. The crime of piracy committed against Spaniards, or the subjects of another nation not at war with Spain, shall be punished with a penalty
ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with Spain, it shall be punished with the penalty of presidio mayor.
ART. 154. Those who commit the crimes referred to in the first paragraph of the next preceding article shall suffer the penalty of cadena perpetua or
death, and those who commit the crimes referred to in the second paragraph of the same article, from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua:
1. Whenever they have seized some vessel by boarding or firing upon the same.
2. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, or by any of the physical injuries specified in articles four hundred and fourteen and four
hundred and fifteen and in paragraphs one and two of article four hundred and sixteen.
3. Whenever it is accompanied by any of the offenses against chastity specified in Chapter II, Title IX, of this book.
4. Whenever the pirates have abandoned any persons without means of saving themselves.
5. In every case, the captain or skipper of the pirates.
ART. 155. With respect to the provisions of this title, as well as all others of this code, when Spain is mentioned it shall be understood as including any
part of the national territory.
ART. 156. For the purpose of applying the provisions of this code, every person, who, according to the Constitution of the Monarchy, has the status of a
Spaniard shall be considered as such.
The general rules of public law recognized and acted on by the United States relating to the effect of a transfer of territory from another State to the
United States are well-known. The political law of the former sovereignty is necessarily changed. The municipal law in so far as it is consistent with the
Constitution, the laws of the United States, or the characteristics and institutions of the government, remains in force. As a corollary to the main rules,
laws subsisting at the time of transfer, designed to secure good order and peace in the community, which are strictly of a municipal character, continue
until by direct action of the new government they are altered or repealed. (Chicago, Rock Islands, etc., R. Co. vs. McGlinn [1885], 114 U.S., 542.)
These principles of the public law were given specific application to the Philippines by the Instructions of President McKinley of May 19, 1898, to
General Wesley Meritt, the Commanding General of the Army of Occupation in the Philippines, when he said:
Though the powers of the military occupant are absolute and supreme, and immediately operate upon the political condition of the inhabitants, the
municipal laws of the conquered territory, such as affect private rights of person and property, and provide for the punishment of crime, are considered
as continuing in force, so far as they are compatible with the new order of things, until they are suspended or superseded by the occupying belligerent;
and practice they are not usually abrogated, but are allowed to remain in force, and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals, substantially as they

were before the occupations. This enlightened practice is so far as possible, to be adhered to on the present occasion. (Official Gazette, Preliminary
Number, Jan. 1, 1903, p. 1. See also General Merritt Proclamation of August 14, 1898.)
It cannot admit of doubt that the articles of the Spanish Penal Code dealing with piracy were meant to include the Philippine Islands. Article 156 of the
Penal Code in relation to article 1 of the Constitution of the Spanish Monarchy, would also make the provisions of the Code applicable not only to
Spaniards but to Filipinos.
The opinion of Grotius was that piracy by the law of nations is the same thing as piracy by the civil law, and he has never been disputed. The specific
provisions of the Penal Code are similar in tenor to statutory provisions elsewhere and to the concepts of the public law. This must necessarily be so,
considering that the Penal Code finds its inspiration in this respect in the Novelas, the Partidas, and the Novisima Recopilacion.
The Constitution of the United States declares that the Congress shall have the power to define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high
seas, and offenses against the law of nations. (U.S. Const. Art. I, sec. 8, cl. 10.) The Congress, in putting on the statute books the necessary ancillary
legislation, provided that whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and is afterwards brought into or
found in the United States, shall be imprisoned for life. (U.S. Crim. Code, sec. 290; penalty formerly death: U.S. Rev. Stat., sec. 5368.) The framers of
the Constitution and the members of Congress were content to let a definition of piracy rest on its universal conception under the law of nations.
It is evident that the provisions of the Penal Code now in force in the Philippines relating to piracy are not inconsistent with the corresponding
provisions in force in the United States.
By the Treaty of Paris, Spain ceded the Philippine Islands to the United States. A logical construction of articles of the Penal Code, like the articles
dealing with the crime of piracy, would be that wherever "Spain" is mentioned, it should be substituted by the words "United States" and wherever
"Spaniards" are mentioned, the word should be substituted by the expression "citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands."
somewhat similar reasoning led this court in the case of United States vs. Smith ([1919], 39 Phil., 533) to give to the word "authority" as found in the
Penal Code a limited meaning, which would no longer comprehend all religious, military, and civil officers, but only public officers in the Government of
the Philippine Islands.
Under the construction above indicated, article 153 of the Penal Code would read as follows:
The crime of piracy committed against citizens of the United States and citizens of the Philippine Islands, or the subjects of another nation not at war
with the United States, shall be punished with a penalty ranging from cadena temporal to cadena perpetua.
If the crime be committed against nonbelligerent subjects of another nation at war with the United States, it shall be punished with the penalty
of presidio mayor.
We hold those provisions of the Penal code dealing with the crime of piracy, notably articles 153 and 154, to be still in force in the Philippines.
The crime falls under the first paragraph of article 153 of the Penal Code in relation to article 154. There are present at least two of the circumstances
named in the last cited article as authorizing eithercadena perpetua or death. The crime of piracy was accompanied by (1) an offense against chastity
and (2) the abandonment of persons without apparent means of saving themselves. It is, therefore, only necessary for us to determine as to whether
the penalty of cadena perpetua or death should be imposed. In this connection, the trial court, finding present the one aggravating circumstance of
nocturnity, and compensating the same by the one mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction provided by article 11, as amended, of the Penal Code,
sentenced the accused to life imprisonment. At least three aggravating circumstances, that the wrong done in the commission of the crime was
deliberately augmented by causing other wrongs not necessary for its commission, that advantage was taken of superior strength, and that means
were employed which added ignominy to the natural effects of the act, must also be taken into consideration in fixing the penalty. Considering,
therefore, the number and importance of the qualifying and aggravating circumstances here present, which cannot be offset by the sole mitigating
circumstance of lack of instruction, and the horrible nature of the crime committed, it becomes our duty to impose capital punishment.
The vote upon the sentence is unanimous with regard to the propriety of the imposition of the death penalty upon the defendant and appellant Lo-lo
(the accused who raped on of the women), but is not unanimous with regard to the court, Mr. Justice Romualdez, registers his nonconformity. In
accordance with provisions of Act No. 2726, it results, therefore, that the judgment of the trial court as to the defendant and appellant Saraw is affirmed,
and is reversed as to the defendant and appellant Lol-lo, who is found guilty of the crime of piracy and is sentenced therefor to be hung until dead, at
such time and place as shall be fixed by the judge of first instance of the Twenty-sixth Judicial District. The two appellants together with Kinawalang
and Maulanis, defendants in another case, shall indemnify jointly and severally the offended parties in the equivalent of 924 rupees, and shall pay a
one-half part of the costs of both instances. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-60100 March 20, 1985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JAIME RODRIGUEZ alias JIMMY alias WILFRED DE LARA y MEDRANO and RICO LOPEZ, accused-appellants.

G.R. No. L-60768 March 20, 1985

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DARIO DE REYES alias DARIO DECE RAYMUNDO y ELAUSA, accused- appellant.
G.R. No. L-61069 March 20, l985
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PETER PONCE y BULAYBULAY alias PETER POWE, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:
Appellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Jimmy alias Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, Rico Lopez, Davao Reyes alias Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa and Peter
Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power were charged of the crime of piracy in an information filed before the then Court of First Instance of Sulu and
Tawi-Tawi, which reads:
That on or about 3:15 in the morning of August 31, 1981, at the vicinity of Muligin Island and within the territorial waters of the Municipality of Cagayan
de Tawi-Tawi, Province of Tawi-Tawi, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable Court, the above-named accused Wilfred de Lara y Medrano, alias
Jaime Rodriguez (Jimmy) Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa; Rico Lopez y Fernandez and Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay alias Peter Power being crew
members of the M/V Noria 767, a barter trade vessel of Philippine registry, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another and
armed with bladed weapons and high caliber firearms, to wit: three (3) daggers, two (2) M-14, one (1) garand and one (1) Browning Automatic Rifle,
with intent of gain and by means of violence and intimidation upon persons, did then and there willfully and unlawfuflly, and feloniously take, steal and
carry away against the consent of the owners thereof, the equipments and other persona) properties belonging to the crew members and passengers
of the said M/V Noria 767, consisting of cash money amounting to Three Million Five Hundred Seventeen Thousand Three Hundred Pesos
(P3,517,300.00), personal belongings of passengers and crew amounting to One Hundred Thirty Thousand Pesos (P130,000.00), the vessel's
compass, navigational charts and instruments amounting to Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00) to the damage and prejudice of the aforementioned
owners in the total amount of THREE MILLION SIX HUNDRED EIGHTY SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED PESOS (P3,687,300.00) Philippine
Currency; that by reason of and on the occasion of the said piracy and for the purpose of enabling the abovenamed accused to take, steal and carry
away the properties abovementioned, the herein accused in pursuance to their conspiracy, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with
intent to kill and with evident premeditation, treacherously attack, assault, stab, shot and, taking advantage of superior strength, use personal violence
upon the persons of Abdusador Sumihag, Vicente America, Perhan Tan, Marcos Que, Ismael Turabin, Mabar Abdurahman, Wadi Aduk Rasdi Alfad,
Kasmir Tan, Peter Paul Chiong, Juaini Husini Ismael Ombra, Sabturani Ulag, Mutalib Sarahadil, Bajubar Adam, Quillermo Wee, Reuben Segovia Ho,
Michael Lao, Yusop Abubakar, Hahji Hussin Kulavan, Amjad Quezon, Rebuan Majid Edgar Tan, Abdurasul Alialam Federico Canizares, Omar Tahil
Gilbert Que, Arajul Salialam, Masihul Bandahala, Asola Mohammaddin, Batoto Sulpicio, Sakirani Bassal, Ibrahim Jamil, Saupi Malang and Gulam
Sahiddan, thereby inflicting upon them multiple gunshot wounds which caused their instantaneous death and likewise causing physical injuries upon
the persons of Inggal Issao Abduhasan Indasan Hadji Yusop H. Alfad and Hadji Mahalail Alfad, thus performing all acts of execution which could have
produced the death of said persons, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason or cause independent of the will of said accused, that is, by the
timely and able medical assistance rendered to said victims which prevented death.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, night time and the use of superior strength. (pp. 97-98,
Rollo of L-61069)
Upon arraignment on February 25, 1982, Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez, assisted by their counsel, pleaded guilty to the charge, were convicted on
March 5, 1982 and sentenced each "to suffer the extreme penalty of death."
Dario Dece Raymundo, upon arraignment, interposed a plea of not guilty. However, he withdrew his plea and substituted it with that of guilty. On March
10, 1982 he was convicted of the crime charged and sentenced "to suffer the extreme penalty of death."
Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entered the plea of not guilty.
After trial, he was found guilty and was also sentenced "to suffer the extreme penalty of death."
No pronouncement was made with respect to the civil liabilities of the four defendants because "there was a separate civil action for breach of contract
and damages filed with the same trial court in Civil Case No. N-85 against the several defendants, including the four accused aforementioned." (p. 26,
L-61069)
The case of the four convicted defendants is now before Us on automatic review.

Evidence shows that on August 29, 1981, at about 7:30 in the evening, the vessel M/V Noria 767, owned and registered in the name of Hadji Noria
Indasan left Jolo wharf for Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi. It arrived at the port of Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi the following day, August 30, 1981, at around 2:00 in
the afternoon. In the evening of the same date, the vessel left for Labuan. On board the vessel were several traders and crew members. Two or three
hours after its departure, while sailing about 25 miles from Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi, a commotion occurred in one of the cabins of the vessel.
Three witnesses testified on what they saw and heard.
Mr. Clyde Que, a passenger, heard noises inside a cabin and, after awhile, he heard shots being fired. He rushed to the motor launch to hide and on
his way through the engine room, he saw appellant Peter Ponce. Then appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Dario Dece and Rico Lopez, all armed with rifles,
started firing towards Que's companions after which they brought Que to the pilot's house to handle the steering wheel. He was substituted by Usman,
another passenger, while Que and the other crew members were ordered to throw overboard sacks of copra and the dead bodies of Peter Chiong,
Michael Lao, Casmin Tan and Vicente America. At the time, appellant Peter Ponce, armed with a M-14 rifle, stood guard.
Hadji Mahalail Alfad, another passenger, heard commotions from the motor launch, followed by gunfire. He hid by laying down among the sacks of
copra. He saw appellants Peter Ponce, Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario Dece coming down the stairs as they were firing shots until Fred
Canizares and Guilbert Que were hit, their bodies falling upon him. When he tried to move, he realized that he was also hit on the right side of his
stomach. Thereafter, he pretended to be dead till daytime.
Emil Macasaet, Jr., the skipper of the vessel heard the commotion from one of the cabins. He ordered his men to open the door but it could not be
opened. After awhile, the door opened and he saw a gun pointed at them. Whereupon, he hid behind the bags of copra until appellant Jaime Rodriguez
came and fired at him. Luckily, he was not hit. He and some of his men crawled and they took cover in the bodega of copra. While in hiding there were
gunfires coming from Dario Dece and Peter Ponce. About four (4) hours later, his Chief Mate Usman persuaded him to come out otherwise something
worse would happen. He saw Jaime Rodriguez who ordered him to direct his men to throw the copras as well as the dead bodies overboard.
About ten o'clock in the morning of the same day, the vessel reached an island where the four appellants were able to secure pumpboats. Macasaet
was ordered to load in one of the pumpboats nine (9) attache cases which were full of money. Rico Lopez and Jaime Rodriguez boarded one
pumpboat, while Peter Ponce and Dario Dece boarded another, bringing with them: dressed chicken, softdrinks, durian, boxes of ammunitions, gallons
of water and some meat, as well as rifles.
Municipal Health Officer Leopoldo Lao went aboard the vessel M/V Noria when it arrived at Cagayan de Tawi-Tawi on September 2, 1981 and saw at
the wharf ten dead bodies, all victims of the sea-jacking, namely: Gulam Sahiddan, Arajul Naran Salialam, Mallang Saupi, Guilbert Que, Frederico
Canizares, Masihul Bandahala, Ribowan Majid Edgar Tan, Omar Sabdani Tahir and Abdurasul Salialam.
In their brief, appellants Jaime Rodriguez, Rico Lopez and Dario Dece claim that the trial court erred (1) in imposing the death penalty to the accusedappellants Jaime Rodriguez alias Wilfred de Lara, Rico Lopez y Fernandez and Davao de Reyes, alias Dario Dece Raymundo y Elausa despite their
plea of guilty; (2) in giving weight to the alleged sworn statements of Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay, Identified as Exhibits "C" to "C-10" and Exhibits "I to I5", as evidence against Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay; (3) in holding that accused-appellant Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay is guilty of the crime of piracy; (4) in
holding that the defense of Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay was merely a denial; and, (5) in holding that Peter Ponce y Bulaybulay entrusted the P1,700.00
which was his personal money to Atty. Efren Capulong of the National Bureau of Investigation.
There is no merit in this appeal of the three named defendants, namely: Jaime Rodriguez and Rico Lopez in G.R. No. L-60100, and Dario Dece in G.R.
No. L-60768.
Anent the first assigned error, suffice it to say that Presidential Decree No. 532, otherwise known as the Anti-Piracy Law, amending Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code and which took effect on August 8, 1974, provides:
SEC. 3. Penalties.Any person who commits piracy or highway robbery/brigandage as herein defined, shall, upon conviction by competent court be
punished by:
a) Piracy.The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed. If physical injuries or other crimes are committed
as a result or on the occasion thereof, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed. If rape, murder or no homocide is committed as a result or
on the occasion of piracy, or when the offenders abandoned the victims without means of saving themselves, or when the seizure is accomplished by
firing upon or boarding a vessel, the mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the penalty imposable upon persons found guilty of the crime of piracy where rape, murder or homicide is committed is mandatory death
penalty. Thus, the lower court committed no error in not considering the plea of the three (3) defendants as a mitigating circumstance. Article 63 of the
Revised Penal Code states that:
b) ART. 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.In all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shag be applied by
the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed.

With respect to the other assigned errors, We also find them to be devoid of merit. Appellants Peter Ponce gave a statement (Exhibits "C" to "C-11") to
the Malaysian authorities and another statement (Exhibits "I" to "I-15") before the National Bureau of Investigation of Manila. When said statement
(Exhibits "C" to "C-11") was offered in evidence by the prosecution, the same was not objected to by the defense, aside from the fact that Peter Ponce,
on cross examination, admitted the truthfulness of said declarations, thus:
Q And the investigation was reduced into writing is that correct?
A Yes. sir.
Q And you were investigated by the police authority of Kudat and Kota Kinabalo, is that right?
A Yes, sir. Only in Kudat.
Q And that statement you gave to the authority at Kudat, you have signed that statement, is that correct?
A Yes, sir.
Q And what you stated is all the truth before the authority in Kudat?
A Yes, sir. (pp. 33-34, tsn, May 28, 1982)
Relative to the appeal of appellant Peter Ponce (G.R. No. L-61069), which We likewise declare to be without merit, evidence shows that his
participation in the commission of the offense was positively testified to by the master of the vessel, Emil Macasaet, Jr., and a passenger, Hadji
Mahalail Alfad. Another witness, passenger Clyde Que also pointed to have seen him (Peter Ponce) armed with an M-14 rifle.
Considering the testimonies of Clyde Que and Emil Macasaet, Jr. who actually saw appellant Peter Ponce firing his weapon indiscriminately at the
passengers and crew members in wanton disregard of human lives and the fact that after the looting and killing, appellant Peter Ponce, still armed,
joined Dario Dece in one pumpboat, there can be no question that he was in conspiracy with the three other defendants. After his arrest, Ponce gave a
statement to the authorities stating therein his participation as well as those of his companions (Exhibits "I" to "I-1").
The four (4) appellants were arrested and detained by the Malaysian authorities. On January 8, 1982, the National Bureau of Investigation authorities
fetched and brought them to Manila where they executed their respective statements after Rico Lopez and Peter Ponce delivered to the NBI,
P3,700.00 and P1,700.00, respectively, aside from the P527,595.00 and one Rolex watch which the Malaysian authorities also turned over to the
Acting In-Charge of the NBI in Jolo.
The statement of Ponce (Exhibit " I ") contains the questions and answers pertinent to Section 20 of the 1973 Constitution, to wit:
l. QUESTION: Mr. Peter Ponce, we are informing you that you are under investigation here in connection with the robbery committed on the M/V Noria
last August 31, 1981, where you are an Assistant Engineer. You have a right to remain silent and to refuse to answer any of our questions here. You
have the right to be represented by counsel of your choice in this investigation. Should you decide to be represented by a lawyer but cannot afford one
we will provide a lawyer for you free. Should you decide to give a sworn statement, the same shall be voluntary and free from force or intimidation or
promise of reward or leniency and anything that you saw here maybe used for or against you in any court in the Philippines. Now do you understand an
these rights of yours?
ANSWER: Yes, sir.
2. Q: Do you need the services of a lawyer?
A: No, sir.
3. Q: Are you willing to affix your signature hereinbelow to signify that you so understand all your rights as above stated and that you do not need the
services of a lawyer?
A: Yes, sir. (p. 11 6, Rollo)
Thus, it is clear that Peter Ponce was fully advised of his constitutional right to remain silent and his right to counsel.
Considering the written statements of all the appellants, (Exhibits "E", "F", "G", "H", "J" and "K"), interlocking as they are with each other as each admits
his participation and those of the other co-accused, there is no room for doubt that conspiracy existed among them. The conduct of appellant

Peter Ponce before, during and after the commission of the crime is a circumstance showing the presence of conspiracy in the commission of the
crime. As a consequence, every one is responsible for the crime committed.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-37007

July 20, 1987

RAMON S. MILO, in his capacity as Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan, and ARMANDO VALDEZ,petitioners,
vs.
ANGELITO C. SALANGA, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Branch IV), and JUAN TUVERA,
SR., respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of an order of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial District, in Criminal Case No. D-529
entitled "The People of the Philippines versus Juan Tuvera, Sr., et al.," granting the motion to quash the information filed by accused Juan Tuvera, Sr.,
herein respondent. The issue is whether a barrio captain can be charged of arbitrary detention.
The facts are as follows:
On October 12, 1972, an information for Arbitrary Detention was filed against Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat, in the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, which reads as follows:
The undersigned Assistant Provincial Fiscal accuses Juan Tuvera, Sr., Tomas Mendoza and Rodolfo Mangsat alias Rudy, all of Manaoag, Pangasinan,
of the crime of ARBITRARY DETENTION, committed as follows:
That on or about the 21st day of April 1973, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, in barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Juan Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain, with the aid of some other private persons, namely Juan Tuvera, Jr.,
Bertillo Bataoil and one Dianong, maltreated one Armando Valdez by hitting with butts of their guns and fists blows and immediately thereafter, without
legal grounds, with deliberate intent to deprive said Armando Valdez of his constitutional liberty, accused Barrio captain Juan Tuvera, Sr., Cpl. Tomas
Mendoza and Pat. Rodolfo Mangsat, members of the police force of Mangsat, Pangasinan conspiring, confederating and helping one another, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, lodge and lock said Armando Valdez inside the municipal jail of Manaoag, Pangasinan for about eleven
(11) hours.(Emphasis supplied.)
CONTRARY TO ARTICLE 124 of the R.P.C.
Dagupan City, October 12, 1972.
(SGD.) VICENTE C. CALDONA
Assistant Provincial Fiscal
All the accused, including respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr., were arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
On April 4, 1973, Tuvera filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense and that the proofs
adduced at the investigation are not sufficient to support the filing of the information. Petitioner Assistant Provincial Fiscal Ramon S. Milo filed an
opposition thereto.
Finding that respondent Juan Tuvera, Sr. was not a public officer who can be charged with Arbitrary Detention, respondent Judge Angelito C. Salanga
granted the motion to quash in an order dated April 25, 1973.
Hence, this petition.
Arbitrary Detention is committed by a public officer who, without legal grounds, detains a person. 1 The elements of this crime are the following:
1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.
2. That he detains a person.

3. That the detention is without legal grounds.2

The ground relied upon by private respondent Tuvera for his motion to quash the information which was sustained by respondent Judge, is that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense,3 that is, that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute the elements of Arbitrary Detention.
The Information charges Tuvera, a barrio captain, to have conspired with Cpl. Mendoza and Pat. Mangsat, who are members of the police force of
Manaoag, Pangasinan in detaining petitioner Valdez for about eleven (11) hours in the municipal jail without legal ground. No doubt the last two
elements of the crime are present.
The only question is whether or not Tuvera, Sr., a barrio captain is a public officer who can be liable for the crime of Arbitrary Detention.
The public officers liable for Arbitrary Detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime. Such
public officers are the policemen and other agents of the law, the judges or mayors. 4
Respondent Judge Salanga did not consider private respondent Tuvera as such public officer when the former made this finding in the questioned
order:
Apparently, if Armando Valdez was ever jailed and detained more than six (6) hours, Juan Tuvera, Sr., has nothing to do with the same because he is
not in any way connected with the Police Force of Manaoag, Pangasinan. Granting that it was Tuvera, Sr., who ordered Valdez arrested, it was not he
who detained and jailed him because he has no such authority vested in him as a mere Barrio Captain of Barrio Baguinay, Manaoag, Pangasinan. 5
In line with the above finding of respondent Judge Salanga, private respondent Tuvera asserts that the motion to quash was properly sustained for the
following reasons: (1) That he did not have the authority to make arrest, nor jail and detain petitioner Valdez as a mere barrio captain; 6 (2) That he is
neither a peace officer nor a policeman,7(3) That he was not a public official;8 (4) That he had nothing to do with the detention of petitioner Valdez; 9 (5)
That he is not connected directly or indirectly in the administration of the Manaoag Police Force; 10 (6) That barrio captains on April 21, 1972 were not
yet considered as persons in authority and that it was only upon the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 299 that Barrio Captain and Heads of
Barangays were decreed among those who are persons in authority; 11 and that the proper charge was Illegal Detention and Not Arbitrary Detention. 12
We disagree.
Long before Presidential Decree 299 was signed into law, barrio lieutenants (who were later named barrio captains and now barangay captains) were
recognized as persons in authority. In various cases, this Court deemed them as persons in authority, and convicted them of Arbitrary Detention.
In U.S. vs. Braganza,13 Martin Salibio, a barrio lieutenant, and Hilario Braganza, a municipal councilor, arrested Father Feliciano Gomez while he was
in his church. They made him pass through the door of the vestry and afterwards took him to the municipal building. There, they told him that he was
under arrest. The priest had not committed any crime. The two public officials were convicted of Arbitrary Detention. 14
In U.S. vs. Gellada,15 Geronimo Gellada, a barrio lieutenant, with the help of Filoteo Soliman, bound and tied his houseboy Sixto Gentugas with a rope
at around 6:00 p.m. and delivered him to the justice of the peace. Sixto was detained during the whole night and until 9:00 a.m. of the next day when
he was ordered released by the justice of the peace because he had not committed any crime, Gellada was convicted of Arbitrary Detention. 16
Under Republic Act No. 3590, otherwise known as The Revised Barrio Charter, the powers and duties of a barrio captain include the following: to look
after the maintenance of public order in the barrio and to assist the municipal mayor and the municipal councilor in charge of the district in the
performance of their duties in such barrio; 17 to look after the general welfare of the barrio; 18 to enforce all laws and ordinances which are operative
within the barrio;19 and to organize and lead an emergency group whenever the same may be necessary for the maintenance of peace and order within
the barrio.20
In his treatise on Barrio Government Law and Administration, Professor Jose M. Aruego has this to say about the above-mentioned powers and duties
of a Barrio Captain, to wit:
"Upon the barrio captain depends in the main the maintenance of public order in the barrio. For public disorder therein, inevitably people blame him.
"In the event that there be a disturbing act to said public order or a threat to disturb public order, what can the barrio captain do? Understandably, he
first resorts to peaceful measures. He may take preventive measures like placing the offenders under surveillance and persuading them, where
possible, to behave well, but when necessary, he may subject them to the full force of law.
"He is a peace officer in the barrio considered under the law as a person in authority. As such, he may make arrest and detain persons within legal
limits.21 (Emphasis supplied.)
One need not be a police officer to be chargeable with Arbitrary Detention. It is accepted that other public officers like judges and mayors, who act with
abuse of their functions, may be guilty of this crime.22 A perusal of the powers and function vested in mayors would show that they are similar to those

of a barrio captain23 except that in the case of the latter, his territorial jurisdiction is smaller. Having the same duty of maintaining peace and order, both
must be and are given the authority to detain or order detention. Noteworthy is the fact that even private respondent Tuvera himself admitted that with
the aid of his rural police, he as a barrio captain, could have led the arrest of petitioner Valdez. 24
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that a barrio captain, like private respondent Tuvera, Sr., can be held liable for Arbitrary Detention.
Next, private respondent Tuvera, Sr. contends that the motion to quash was validly granted as the facts and evidence on record show that there was no
crime of Arbitrary Detention;25 that he only sought the aid and assistance of the Manaoag Police Force; 26 and that he only accompanied petitioner
Valdez to town for the latter's personal safety.27
Suffice it to say that the above allegations can only be raised as a defense at the trial as they traverse what is alleged in the Information. We have
repeatedly held that Courts, in resolving a motion to quash, cannot consider facts contrary to those alleged in the information or which do not appear on
the face of the information. This is because a motion to quash is a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged in the information. 28 Matters of defense
cannot be proved during the hearing of such a motion, except where the Rules expressly permit, such as extinction of criminal liability, prescription, and
former jeopardy.29 In the case of U.S. vs. Perez,30 this Court held that a motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense cannot allege new facts not only different but diametrically opposed to those alleged in the complaint. This rule admits of only one exception
and that is when such facts are admitted by the prosecution. 31lawphi1
Lastly, private respondent claims that by the lower court's granting of the motion to quash jeopardy has already attached in his favor 32 on the ground
that here, the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent.
Respondent's contention holds no water. An order granting a motion to quash, unlike one of denial, is a final order. It is not merely interlocutory and is
therefore immediately appealable. The accused cannot claim double jeopardy as the dismissal was secured not only with his consent but at his
instance.33
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The questioned Order of April 25, 1973 in Criminal Case No. D-529 is
hereby set aside. Let this case be remanded to the appropriate trial court for further proceedings. No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.
BENITO ASTORGA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986,
dated July 5, 2001,[1] as well as its Resolutions dated September 28, 2001 and July 10, 2002.
On October 28, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the following Information against Benito Astorga, Mayor of Daram, Samar, as well as a
number of his men for Arbitrary Detention:
That on or about the 1st day of September, 1997, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Daram, Province of Samar, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Daram, Samar, in such
capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with unidentified persons, who are herein
referred to under fictitious names JOHN DOES, who were armed with firearms of different calibers, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously detain Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz, Wenifredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto Pelias, DENR Employees, at
the Municipality of Daram, by not allowing them to leave the place, without any legal and valid grounds thereby restraining and depriving them of their
personal liberty for nine (9) hours, but without exceeding three (3) days.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[2]
On September 1, 1997, Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Office No. 8,
Tacloban City sent a team to the island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct intelligence gathering and forest protection operations in line with the
governments campaign against illegal logging. The team was composed of Forester II Moises dela Cruz, Scaler Wenifredo Maniscan, Forest Ranger
Renato Militante, and Tree Marker Crisanto Pelias, with Elpidio E. Simon, Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Section, as team
leader. The team was escorted by SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian. [3]
The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram, Western Samar at 2:00 p.m., where they saw two yacht-like boats being constructed. After consulting
with the local barangay officials, the team learned that the boats belonged to a certain Michael Figueroa. However, since Figueroa was not around at
the time, the team left Brgy. Bagacay.[4]

En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar, the team spotted two more boats being constructed in the vicinity of Brgy. Lucob-Lucob, Daram, Samar,
between 4:30-5:00 p.m., prompting them to stop and investigate. Thus, Maniscan and Militante disembarked from the DENRs service pump boat and
proceeded to the site of the boat construction. There, they met Mayor Astorga. After conversing with the mayor, Militante returned to their boat for the
purpose of fetching Simon, at the request of Mayor Astorga. [5]
When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3 Cinco, and SPO1 Capoquian, approached Mayor Astorga to try and explain the purpose of their
mission, Simon was suddenly slapped hard twice on the shoulder by Mayor Astorga, who exclaimed, Puwede ko kamo papaglanguyon pag-uli ha
Tacloban. Ano, di ka maaram nga natupa ako? Natupa baya ako. Diri kamo makauli yana kay puwede kame e charge ha misencounter. (I can make
you swim back to Tacloban. Dont you know that I can box? I can box. Dont you know that I can declare this a misencounter?) [6] Mayor Astorga then
ordered someone to fetch reinforcements, and forty-five (45) minutes later, or between 5:00-6:00 p.m., a banca arrived bearing ten (10) men, some of
them dressed in fatigue uniforms. The men were armed with M-16 and M14 rifles, and they promptly surrounded the team, guns pointed at the team
members.[7] At this, Simon tried to explain to Astorga the purpose of his teams mission. [8] He then took out his handheld ICOM radio, saying that he
was going to contact his people at the DENR in Catbalogan to inform them of the teams whereabouts. Suddenly, Mayor Astorga forcibly grabbed
Simons radio, saying, Maupay nga waray kamo radio bis diri somabut an iyo opisina kon hain kamo, bis diri kamo maka aro hin bulig. (Its better if
you have no radio so that your office would not know your whereabouts and so that you cannot ask for help). [9] Mayor Astorga again slapped the right
shoulder of Simon, adding, Kong siga kamo ha Leyte ayaw pagdad-a dinhi ha Samar kay diri kamo puwede ha akon. (If you are tough guys in Leyte,
do not bring it to Samar because I will not tolerate it here.) [10] Simon then asked Mayor Astorga to allow the team to go home, at which Mayor Astorga
retorted that they would not be allowed to go home and that they would instead be brought to Daram. [11] Mayor Astorga then addressed the team,
saying, Kon magdakop man la kamo, unahon an mga dagko. Kon madakop niyo an mga dagko, an kan Figueroa dida ha Bagacay puwede ko liwat
ipadakop an akon. (If you really want to confiscate anything, you start with the big-time. If you confiscate the boats of Figueroa at Brgy. Bagacay, I will
surrender mine.)[12] Simon then tried to reiterate his request for permission to leave, which just succeeded in irking Mayor Astorga, who angrily said,
Diri kamo maka uli yana kay dad on ko kamo ha Daram, para didto kita mag uro istorya. (You cannot go home now because I will bring you to
Daram. We will have many things to discuss there.) [13]
The team was brought to a house where they were told that they would be served dinner. The team had dinner with Mayor Astorga and several others
at a long table, and the meal lasted between 7:00-8:00 p.m. [14] After dinner, Militante, Maniscan and SPO1 Capoquian were allowed to go down from
the house, but not to leave the barangay.[15] On the other hand, SPO3 Cinco and the rest just sat in the house until 2:00 a.m. when the team was finally
allowed to leave.[16]
Complainants filed a criminal complaint for arbitrary detention against Mayor Astorga and his men, which led to the filing of the above-quoted
Information.
Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on July 3, 2000, wherein he pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. [17] At the trial, the prosecution
presented the testimonies of SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, as well as their Joint Affidavit. [18] However, the presentation of Simons testimony was
not completed, and none of his fellow team members came forward to testify. Instead, the members of the team sent by the DENR RSOG executed a
Joint Affidavit of Desistance.[19]
On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision, disposing of the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused BENITO ASTORGA Y BOCATCAT guilty of Arbitrary Detention,
and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correctional as maximum.
SO ORDERED.[20]
The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 11, 2001 [21] which was denied by the Sandiganabayan in a Resolution dated September 28,
2001.[22] A Second Motion for Reconsideration dated October 24, 2001 [23] was also filed, and this was similarly denied in a Resolution dated July 10,
2002.[24]
Hence, the present petition, wherein the petitioner assigns a sole error for review:
5.1. The trial court grievously erred in finding the accused guilty of Arbitrary Detention as defined and penalized under Article 124 of the Revised
Penal Code, based on mere speculations, surmises and conjectures and, worse, notwithstanding the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the five (5)
complaining witnesses wherein the latter categorically declared petitioners innocence of the crime charged. [25]
Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to establish the required quantum of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, [26] especially in light of
the fact that the private complainants executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance. [27] Petitioner asserts that nowhere in the records of the case is there any
competent evidence that could sufficiently establish the fact that restraint was employed upon the persons of the team members. [28] Furthermore, he
claims that the mere presence of armed men at the scene does not qualify as competent evidence to prove that fear was in fact instilled in the minds of
the team members, to the extent that they would feel compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. [29]
Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person. [30] The elements of the crime are:

1.

That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2.

That he detains a person.

3.

That the detention is without legal grounds.[31]

That petitioner, at the time he committed the acts assailed herein, was then Mayor of Daram, Samar is not disputed. Hence, the first element of
Arbitrary Detention, that the offender is a public officer or employee, is undeniably present.
Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on the part of petitioner that his acts were spurred by some legal purpose. On the contrary, he admitted
that his acts were motivated by his instinct for self-preservation and the feeling that he was being singled out. [32] The detention was thus without
legal grounds, thereby satisfying the third element enumerated above.
What remains is the determination of whether or not the team was actually detained.
In the case of People v. Acosta,[33] which involved the illegal detention of a child, we found the accused-appellant therein guilty of kidnapping despite
the lack of evidence to show that any physical restraint was employed upon the victim. However, because the victim was a boy of tender age and he
was warned not to leave until his godmother, the accused-appellant, had returned, he was practically a captive in the sense that he could not leave
because of his fear to violate such instruction.[34]
In the case of People v. Cortez,[35] we held that, in establishing the intent to deprive the victim of his liberty, it is not necessary that the offended party be
kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. At the time of her rescue, the offended party in said case was found outside talking to
the owner of the house where she had been taken. She explained that she did not attempt to leave the premises for fear that the kidnappers would
make good their threats to kill her should she do so. We ruled therein that her fear was not baseless as the kidnappers knew where she resided and
they had earlier announced that their intention in looking for her cousin was to kill him on sight. Thus, we concluded that fear has been known to
render people immobile and that appeals to the fears of an individual, such as by threats to kill or similar threats, are equivalent to the use of actual
force or violence.[36]
The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment of the victims liberty need not involve any physical restraint
upon the victims person. If the acts and actuations of the accused can produce such fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to
the extent that the victim is compelled to limit his own actions and movements in accordance with the wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all
intents and purposes, detained against his will.
In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the witnesses and the complainants were not allowed by petitioner
to go home.[37] This refusal was quickly followed by the call for and arrival of almost a dozen reinforcements, all armed with military-issue rifles, who
proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the complainants and the witnesses. [38] Given such circumstances, we give credence to SPO1
Capoquians statement that it was not safe to refuse Mayor Astorgas orders. [39] It was not just the presence of the armed men, but also the evident
effect these gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that fear was indeed instilled in the minds of the team members, to the extent that
they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent to prevent the departure of the complainants and witnesses against their will is thus clear.
Regarding the Joint Affidavit of Desistance executed by the private complainants, suffice it to say that the principles governing the use of such
instruments in the adjudication of other crimes can be applied here. Thus, in People v. Ballabare, it was held that an affidavit of desistance is merely
an additional ground to buttress the defenses of the accused, not the sole consideration that can result in acquittal. There must be other circumstances
which, when coupled with the retraction or desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and accepted by
the judge. Here, there are no such circumstances.[40] Indeed, the belated claims made in the Joint Affidavit of Desistance, such as the allegations that
the incident was the result of a misunderstanding and that the team acceded to Mayor Astorgas orders out of respect, are belied by petitioners own
admissions to the contrary.[41]The Joint Affidavit of Desistance of the private complainants is evidently not a clear repudiation of the material points
alleged in the information and proven at the trial, but a mere expression of the lack of interest of private complainants to pursue the case. This
conclusion is supported by one of its latter paragraphs, which reads:
11. That this affidavit was executed by us if only to prove our sincerity and improving DENR relations with the local Chiefs Executive and other official
of Daram, Islands so that DENR programs and project can be effectively implemented through the support of the local officials for the betterment of the
residence living conditions who are facing difficulties and are much dependent on government support. [42]
Petitioner also assails the weight given by the trial court to the evidence, pointing out that the Sandiganbayans reliance on the testimony of SPO1
Capoquian is misplaced, for the reason that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private complainants in the case. [43] He also makes much of the fact that
prosecution witness SPO1 Capoquian was allegedly not exactly privy to, and knowledgeable of, what exactly transpired between herein accused and
the DENR team leader Mr. Elpidio E. Simon, from their alleged confrontation, until they left Barangay Lucob-Lucob in the early morning of 2
September 1997.[44]
It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial courts factual findings are conclusive and binding upon appellate courts unless some facts or circumstances
of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted. [45] Nothing in the case at bar prompts us to deviate from this
doctrine. Indeed, the fact that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private complainants is completely irrelevant. Neither penal law nor the rules of

evidence requires damning testimony to be exclusively supplied by the private complainants in cases of Arbitrary Detention. Furthermore, Mayor
Astorgas claim that SPO1 Capoquian was not exactly privy to what transpired between Simon and himself is belied by the evidence. SPO1
Capoquian testified that he accompanied Simon when the latter went to talk to petitioner.[46] He heard all of Mayor Astorgas threatening remarks. [47] He
was with Simon when they were encircled by the men dressed in fatigues and wielding M-16 and M-14 rifles. [48] In sum, SPO1 Capoquian witnessed all
the circumstances which led to the Arbitrary Detention of the team at the hands of Mayor Astorga.
Petitioner submits that it is unclear whether the team was in fact prevented from leaving Brgy. Lucob-Lucob or whether they had simply decided to
while away the time and take advantage of the purported hospitality of the accused. [49] On the contrary, SPO3 Cinco clearly and categorically denied
that they were simply whiling away the time between their dinner with Mayor Astorga and their departure early the following morning. [50] SPO1
Capoquian gave similar testimony, saying that they did not use the time between their dinner with Mayor Astorga and their departure early the following
morning to enjoy the place and that, given a choice, they would have gone home. [51]
Petitioner argues that he was denied the cold neutrality of an impartial judge, because the ponente of the assailed decision acted both as magistrate
and advocate when he propounded very extensive clarificatory questions on the witnesses. Surely, the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is not an idle
arbiter during a trial. It can propound clarificatory questions to witnesses in order to ferret out the truth. The impartiality of the court cannot be assailed
on the ground that clarificatory questions were asked during the trial. [52]
Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Arbitrary Detention. Article 124 (1) of the
Revised Penal Code provides that, where the detention has not exceeded three days, the penalty shall be arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period, which has a range of four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner is entitled to a minimum term to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, or arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods, which has a range of one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months. Hence, the Sandiganbayan was correct in
imposing the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as
maximum.
Before closing, it may not be amiss to quote the words of Justice Perfecto in his concurring opinion in Lino v. Fugoso, wherein he decried the impunity
enjoyed by public officials in committing arbitrary or illegal detention, and called for the intensification of efforts towards bringing them to justice:
The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or illegal detention committed by government officers form part of our statute books even before the advent of
American sovereignty in our country. Those provisions were already in effect during the Spanish regime; they remained in effect under American rule;
continued in effect under the Commonwealth. Even under the Japanese regime they were not repealed. The same provisions continue in the statute
books of the free and sovereign Republic of the Philippines. This notwithstanding, and the complaints often heard of violations of said provisions, it is
very seldom that prosecutions under them have been instituted due to the fact that the erring individuals happened to belong to the same government
to which the prosecuting officers belong. It is high time that every one must do his duty, without fear or favor, and that prosecuting officers should not
answer with cold shrugging of the shoulders the complaints of the victims of arbitrary or illegal detention.
Only by an earnest enforcement of the provisions of articles 124 and 125 of the Revised Penal Code will it be possible to reduce to its minimum such
wanton trampling of personal freedom as depicted in this case. The responsible officials should be prosecuted, without prejudice to the detainees right
to the indemnity to which they may be entitled for the unjustified violation of their fundamental rights. [53]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5,
2001 finding petitioner BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum, is
AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
September 6, 1910
G.R. No. 5649
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISAAC SAMONTE, defendant-appellant.
Godofredo Reyes, for appellant.
Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.
TRENT, J.:

The defendant, Isaac Samonte, was tried in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tayabas on a charge of criminal attempt against an agent of
the authorities, and sentenced to one year eight months and twenty-one days of prision correctional, to pay a fine of P65, in case of insolvency to suffer
the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, to the accessory penalties provided in article 61 of the Penal Code, and to pay the costs. He appealed to
this court.
Counsel for appellant insists, first, that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the policeman, Gregorio Glindo,
attempted to arrest the accused in Verdales Street, the place where the trouble occurred; and, second that if said policeman did attempt to arrest the
defendant at this place he, not having a judicial warrant, was not, under the circumstances, authorized to make the arrest which he attempted to make.
About 8 o'clock on the night of September 6, 1908, the appellant, Isaac Samonte, and Basilio Rabe were together in the house of one Demetrio
Pandeio in the barrio of Macalalong, jurisdiction of Pitogo, Province of Tayabas. They both left the house and met shortly afterwards in the street
(Verdades) in said barrio. On meeting there they became engaged in a quarrel, the appellant knocking or pushing Rabe down, then proceeded to
maltreat him. At this moment Rabe called "police! police!" Gregorio Glindo, a municipal policeman of Pitogo, being a patrol duty that night in said barrio,
hearing these words went to the scene, arriving just as the offended party was getting up, and attempted to arrest the appellant, saying to him: "In the
name of the United States, don't move." The appellant, on seeing the policeman and hearing this command, said: Don't come near, because I will take
your life." The policeman continued toward the appellant and when very near him the appellant struck at the policeman with a knife. On account of this
resistance the policeman could not arrest the appellant at that time, so he went immediately to the house of the councilman of that barrio, Demetrio
Pandenio, and reported the matter. Pandenio ordered him to arrest the appellant. He returned to obey this order, being followed by Pandenio. They
found the appellant in a place called Mutingbayan. The policeman attempted to take hold of the appellant, but he resisted, striking at the policeman
again with his knife. The councilman then ordered the appellant to submit himself, and on receiving this order the appellant said: "I do not recognize
anyone," and struck at the councilman with the knife.
The appellant was not arrested on that night on account of this resistance. He did not lay hands on to touch with his knife either the policeman or the
councilman, but he did refuse to submit himself to the authorities, and resisted arrest. The policeman did not see the appellant knock the priest down,
neither did he see him kick the said priest, but we heard the cries of the priest calling for help, saying "police! police!" and when he arrived on the scene
the priest was getting up and freeing himself from the appellant. When the policeman heard these cries for help he was only a very short distance
some 6 or 8 brazas away, and when arrived the trouble had not terminated, although no active fighting took place after his arrival. Under these facts
and circumstances it was the duty if this police officer to stop this disturbance by placing the defendant under arrest.
Any officer in charged with the preservation of the public peace may arrest, without a warrant, any person who is committing, or has committed, a
breach of the peace in his presence. (3 Cyc., 881; Carolina vs. McAfee, 10 L. R. A., 607; Commonwealth vs. Tobin, 11 Am., Rep., 375; People vs.
Rounds, 35 N. W., 77; Douglas vs. Barber, 28 Atl. Rep., 805.)
An offense is committed in the presence or within the view of an officer, within the meaning of the rule authorizing an arrest without a warrant, when the
officer sees the offense, although at a distance, or hears the disturbances created thereby and proceeds at once to the scene thereof; of the offense is
continuing, or has not been consummated, at the time the arrest is made. (3 Cyc., 886; Ramseyvs. State, 17 S. E., 613; Dilger vs. Com., 11 S. W., 651;
State vs. McAfee, 12 S. E., 435; State vs. Williams, 15 S. E., 554; and Hawkins vs. Lutton, 70 N. W., 483.)
In the case at bar Gregorio Glindo, being a peace officer, not only had authority to arrest the defendant at that time, but it was his duty to do so, he
having heard the priest call for help and having arrived on the scene before the disturbance had finally ended.
Article 249 of the Penal Code provides that the following commit criminal attempt:
xxx

xxx

xxx

2. Those who attack the authorities or their agents or employ force against them, or gravely intimidate them, or offer an equally grave resistance while
they are discharging the functions of their office or on the occasion thereof.
Article 250 of the same code fixes the penalty to be imposed for those guilty of an attempt against the authorities or their agents, as provided in the
above article.
The accused in this case, after an attempt had been made to arrest him by duly authorized police officer in the discharge of his duty a such, offered
grave resistance by refusing to submit himself to arrest and by striking at the policeman with a knife, thereby attempting to a personal injury. Although
the policeman was not wounded or touched by the accused, these facts do not receive him from criminal responsibility.
The penalty imposed by the court below being in accordance with the law and the proofs presented, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-2128

May 12, 1948

MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO, petitioners,

vs.
THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH OF CITY OF MANILA,respondents.
Enrique Q. Jabile for petitioners.
Acting City Fiscal A. P. Montesa, Assistant City Fiscal Arsenio Naawa and D. Guinto Lazaro for respondents.
FERIA, J.:
Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin Dumlao, a policeman of the City
of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint against them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when
the petition for habeas corpusfiled with this Court was heard, the petitioners were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released
or filed against them an information with the proper courts justice.
This case has not been decided before this time because there was not a sufficient number of Justices to form a quorum in Manila, And it had to be
transferred to the Supreme Court acting in division here in Baguio for deliberation and decision. We have not until now an official information as to the
action taken by the office of the city fiscal on the complaint filed by the Dumlao against the petitioners. But whatever night have been the action taken
by said office, if there was any, we have to decide this case in order to lay down a ruling on the question involved herein for the information and
guidance in the future of the officers concerned.
The principal question to be determined in the present case in order to decide whether or not the petitioners are being illegally restrained of their liberty,
is the following: Is the city fiscal of manila a judicial authority within the meaning of the provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided in the next proceeding article shall be imposed upon the public officer or
employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of
six hours."
Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above quoted article, the precept of our Constitution guaranteeing individual liberty, and the
provisions of Rules of Court regarding arrest and habeas corpus, we are of the opinion that the words "judicial authority", as used in said article, mean
the courts of justices or judges of said courts vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with
having committed a public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law". (Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution.)
Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken from article 202 of the old Penal Code formerly in force of these Islands, which
penalized a public officer other than a judicial officer who, without warrant, "shall arrest a person upon a charge of crime and shall fail to deliver such
person to the judicial authority within twenty four hours after his arrest." There was no doubt that a judicial authority therein referred to was the judge of
a court of justice empowered by law, after a proper investigation, to order the temporary commitment or detention of the person arrested; and not the
city fiscals or any other officers, who are not authorized by law to do so. Because article 204, which complements said section 202, of the same Code
provided that "the penalty of suspension in its minimum and medium degrees shall be imposed upon the following persons: 1. Any judicial officer who,
within the period prescribed by the provisions of the law of criminal procedure in force, shall fail to release any prisoner under arrest or to commit such
prisoner formally by written order containing a statement of the grounds upon which the same is based."
Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old Penal Code has not been incorporated in the Revised Penal Code the import of said
words judicial authority or officer can not be construed as having been modified by the mere omission of said provision in the Revised Penal Code.
Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons...against unreasonable seizure
shall not be violated, and no warrant [of arrest, detention or confinement] shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after the
examination under oath or affirmation of the complaint and the witness he may produce." Under this constitutional precept no person may be deprived
of his liberty, except by warrant of arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the complainant and his witness.
And the judicial authority to whom the person arrested by a public officers must be surrendered can not be any other but court or judge who alone is
authorized to issue a warrant of commitment or provisional detention of the person arrested pending the trial of the case against the latter. Without such
warrant of commitment, the detention of the person arrested for than six hours would be illegal and in violation of our Constitution.
Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of court, which, referring to the duty of an officer after arrest without warrant, provides
that "a person making arrest for legal ground shall, without unnecessary delay, and within the time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the
person arrested to the proper court orjudge for such action for they may deem proper to take;" and by section 11 of Rule 108, which reads that "after
the arrest by the defendant and his delivery to the Court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against him. He shall also informed
of the substance of the testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses or evidence in his favor, he
may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to writing but that of the defendant shall be taken in writing and
subscribed by him.
And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1 and 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. According to the provision of said section, "a writ
of habeas corpus shall extend any person to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is illegally deprived of his liberty"; and "if
it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a

judgement or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment, or make the order, the writ
shall not be allowed. "Which a contrario sensu means that, otherwise, the writ shall be allowed and the person detained shall be released.
The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can not be construed to include the fiscal of the City of Manila or any other
city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary confinement of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a
person arrested without warrant. (Section 7, Rule 108; Hashim vs. Boncan, 40 Off. Gaz. 13th Supp., p.13; Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, promulgated on
January 30, 1947, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214). The investigation which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary investigation proper provided for
in section 11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all person charged with offenses cognizable by the Court of First Instance in provinces are entitled, but
it is a mere investigation made by the city fiscal for the purpose of filing the corresponding information against the defendant with the proper municipal
court or Court of First Instance of Manila if the result of the investigation so warrants, in order to obtain or secure from the court a warrant of arrest of
the defendant. It is provided by a law as a substitute, in a certain sense, of the preliminary investigation proper to avoid or prevent a hasty or malicious
prosecution, since defendant charged with offenses triable by the courts in the City of Manila are not entitled to a proper preliminary investigation.
The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary investigation in case of temporary absence of both the justice of the peace
and the auxiliary justice of the peace from the municipality, town or place, are the municipal mayors who are empowered in such case to issue a
warrant of arrest of the caused. (Section 3, Rule 108, in connection with section 6, Rule 108, and section 2 of Rule 109.) The preliminary investigation
which a city fiscal may conduct under section 2, Rule 108, is the investigation referred to in the proceeding paragraph.
Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an offense cognizable by the courts of Manila is not filed with municipal court or
the Court of First Instance of Manila, because as above stated, the latter do not make or conduct a preliminary investigation proper. The complaint
must be made or filed with the city fiscal of Manila who, personally or through one of his assistants, makes the investigation, not for the purpose of
ordering the arrest of the accused, but of filing with the proper court the necessary information against the accused if the result of the investigation so
warrants, and obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or commitment of the accused.
When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted bylaw, the officer or person making the arrest should, as abovestated, without
unnecessary delay take or surrender the person arrested, within the period of time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having
jurisdiction to try or make a preliminary investigation of the offense (section 17, Rule 109); and the court or judge shall try and decide the case if the
court has original jurisdiction over the offense charged, or make the preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the peace court having no original
jurisdiction, and then transfer the case to the proper Court of First Instance in accordance with the provisions of section 13, Rule 108.
In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal court or the Court of First Instance, the officer or person making the
arrest without warrant shall surrender or take the person arrested to the city fiscal, and the latter shall make the investigation above mentioned and file,
if proper, the corresponding information within the time prescribed by section 125 of the Revised Penal Code, so that the court may issue a warrant of
commitment for the temporary detention of the accused. And the city fiscal or his assistants shall make the investigation forthwith, unless it is materially
impossible for them to do so, because the testimony of the person or officer making the arrest without warrant is in such cases ready and available,
and shall, immediately after the investigation, either release the person arrested or file the corresponding information. If the city fiscal has any doubt as
to the probability of the defendant having committed the offense charged, or is not ready to file the information on the strength of the testimony or
evidence presented, he should release and not detain the person arrested for a longer period than that prescribed in the Penal Code, without prejudice
to making or continuing the investigation and filing afterwards the proper information against him with the court, in order to obtain or secure a warrant of
his arrest. Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by the
Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well as the hour of arrested and other circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the
material possibility for the fiscal to make the investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be taken into consideration.
To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, would be to authorize the detention of a person
arrested without warrant for a period longer than that permitted by law without any process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal,
may not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground for filing an information or prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the latter had
been illegally detained for days or weeks without any process issued by a court or judge.
A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party or any other person, except in
those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do in such case is to file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly
with the justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other political subdivisions. If the City Fiscal has no authority, and he has not, to order the
arrest even if he finds, after due investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a
police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint of the offended party or other persons even
though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.
In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as to the responsibility of the officers who intervened in the detention of the petitioners,
for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the absence of a clear cut ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied with the
mandate of article 125 by delivering the petitioners within six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have ignored the fact that the
petitioners were being actually detained when the said policeman filed a complaint against them with the city fiscal, we hold that the petitioners are
being illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process issued by a competent
court of justice. So ordered.
G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993

ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner,

vs.
The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable
FRANKLIN DRILON (in his capacity as Secretary of Justice), JOVENCITO R. ZUO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB, CARLOS L. DE LEON,
RAMONCITO C. MISON, REYNALDO J. LUGTU, and RODRIGO P. LORENZO, the last six respondents in their official capacities as members
of the State Prosecutor's Office), respondents.
Mario E. Ongkiko and Marciano P. Brion, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
There is probably no more notorious person in the country today than Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna, who stands accused of an
unspeakable crime. On him, the verdict has already been rendered by many outraged persons who would immediately impose on him an angry
sentence. Yet, for all the prejudgments against him, he is under our Constitution presumed innocent as long as the contrary has not been proved. Like
any other person accused of an offense, he is entitled to the full and vigilant protection of the Bill of Rights.
Sanchez has brought this petition to challenge the order of the respondent judge denying his motion to quash the informations for rape with homicide
filed against him and six other persons. We shall treat it as we would any other suit filed by any litigant hoping to obtain a just and impartial judgment
from this Court.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission requested the filing of appropriate charges against several persons, including the petitioner,
in connection with the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan Gomez.
Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the Department of Justice conducted a preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993. Petitioner
Sanchez was not present but was represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr.
On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the petitioner requesting him to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim
in Canlubang, Laguna. It was served on Sanchez in the morning of August 13,1993, and he was immediately taken to the said camp.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed
confessions implicating him as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest status" and
taken to the Department of Justice in Manila.
The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo as his counsel.
After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez. This warrant was issued on August 13, 1993, by Judge Enrico A. Lanzanas of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7, in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of Section 8, in relation to
Section 1, of R.A. No. 6713. Sanchez was forthwith taken to the CIS Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he remains confined.
On August 16, 1993, the respondent prosecutors filed with the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, seven informations charging Antonio L.
Sanchez, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of Mary Eileen
Sarmenta.
On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that court issued a warrant for the arrest of all the accused, including the petitioner, in
connection with the said crime.
The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehension that the trial of the said cases might result in a miscarriage of justice
because of the tense and partisan atmosphere in Laguna in favor of the petitioner and the relationship of an employee, in the trial court with one of the
accused. This Court thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled to respondent
Judge Harriet Demetriou.
On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were amended to include the killing of Allan Gomez as an aggravating circumstance.

On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations substantially on the grounds now raised in this petition. On September 13,
1993, after oral arguments, the respondent judge denied the motion. Sanchez then filed with this Court the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ of injunction.
The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against him should be quashed because: 1) he was denied the right to present evidence at the
preliminary investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman had the competence to conduct the investigation; 3) his warrantless arrest is illegal and the court has
therefore not acquired jurisdiction over him, 4) he is being charged with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons; 5) the informations
are discriminatory because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by
the Sandiganbayan.
The respondents submitted a Comment on the petition, to which we required a Reply from the petitioner within a non-extendible period of five
days. 1 The Reply was filed five days late. 2 The Court may consider his non-compliance an implied admission of the respondents' arguments or a loss
of interest in prosecuting his petition, which is a ground for its dismissal. Nevertheless, we shall disregard this procedural lapse and proceed to discuss
his petition on the basis of the arguments before us.
The Preliminary Investigation.
The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13, 1993, belie the petitioner's contention that he was not accorded the right to present counteraffidavits.
During the preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993, the petitioner's counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, manifested that his client was waiving the
presentation of a counter-affidavit, thus:
Atty. Brion, Jr.:
[W]e manifest that after reviewing them there is nothing to rebut or countermand all these statements as far as Mayor Sanchez is concerned, We are
not going to submit any counter-affidavit.
ACSP Zuo to Atty. Brion:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. So far, there are no other statements.
A. If there is none then, we will not submit any counter-affidavit because we believe there is nothing to rebut or countermand with all these statements.
Q. So, you are waiving your submission of counter-affidavit?
A. Yes, your honor, unless there are other witnesses who will come up soon.

Nonetheless, the head of the Panel of Prosecutors, respondent Jovencito Zuo, told Atty. Brion that he could still file a counter-affidavit up to August
27, 1993. No such counter-affidavit was filed.
During the hearing on August 1'3, 1993, respondent Zuo furnished the petitioner's counsel, this time Atty. Salvador Panelo, with copies of the sworn
statements of Centeno and Malabanan, and told him he could submit counter-affidavits on or before August 27, 1993. The following exchange ensued:
ACSP Zuo:
For the record, we are furnishing to you the sworn statement of witness Aurelio Centeno y Roxas and the sworn statement of SPO3 Vivencio
Malabanan y Angeles.
Do I understand from you that you are again waiving the submission of counter-affidavit?
Atty. Panelo:
Yes.
ACSP Zuo:

So, insofar as the respondent, Mayor Antonio Sanchez is concerned, this case is submitted for resolution.

On the other hand, there is no support for the petitioner's subsequent manifestation that his counsel, Atty. Brion, was not notified of the inquest held on
August 13, 1993, and that he was not furnished with the affidavits sworn to on that date by Vivencio Malabanan and Aurelio Centeno, or with their
supplemental affidavits dated August 15, 1993. Moreover, the above-quoted excerpt shows that the petitioner's counsel at the hearing held on August
13, 1993, was not Atty. Brion but Atty. Panelo.
The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never disowned Atty. Panelo as his counsel. During the entire proceedings, he remained quiet and let
this counsel speak and argue on his behalf. It was only in his tardy Reply that he has suddenly bestirred himself and would now question his
representation by this lawyer as unauthorized and inofficious.
Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, provides that if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or, if subpoenaed, does not submit
counter-affidavits, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by the complainant.
Just as the accused may renounce the right to be present at the preliminary investigation 5, so may he waive the right to present counter-affidavits or
any other evidence in his defense.
At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does not impair the validity of the information or otherwise render the same
defective and neither does it affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute a ground for quashing the information. 6
If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is flawed, the trial court may, on motion of the accused, order an investigation or reinvestigation and
hold the proceedings in the criminal case in abeyance. 7 In the case at bar, however, the respondent judge saw no reason or need for such a step.
Finding no arbitrariness in her factual conclusions, we shall defer to her judgment.
Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
Invoking the case of Deloso v. Domingo, 8 the petitioner submits that the proceedings conducted by the Department of Justice are null and void
because it had no jurisdiction over the case. His claim is that it is the Office of the Ombudsman that is vested with the power to conduct the
investigation of all cases involving public officers like him, as the municipal mayor of Calauan, Laguna.
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15, paragraph (1) of R.A. 6770 to investigate and prosecute, any illegal act or omission of any
public official. However, as we held only two years ago in the case ofAguinaldo v. Domagas, 9 this authority "is not an exclusive authority but rather a
shared or concurrent authority in. respect of the offense charged."
Petitioners finally assert that the information and amended information filed in this case needed the approval of the Ombudsman. It is not disputed that
the information and amended information here did not have the approval of the Ombudsman. However, we do not believe that such approval was
necessary at all. In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA. 545 (1990), the Court held that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate charges of illegal or
omissions on the part of any public official, i.e., any crime imputed to a public official. It must, however, be pointed out that the authority of the
Ombudsman to investigate "any [illegal] act or omission of any public official" (191 SCRA at 550) isnot an exclusive authority but rather a shared or
concurrent authority in respect of the offense here charged, i.e., the crime of sedition. Thus, the non-involvement of the office of the Ombudsman in the
present case does not have any adverse legal consequence upon the authority the panel of prosecutors to file and prosecute the information or
amended information.
In fact, other investigatory agencies, of the government such as the Department of Justice, in connection with the charge of sedition,
Presidential Commission on Good Government, in ill-gotten wealth cases, 11 may conduct the investigation,

10

and the

The Arrest
Was petitioner Sanchez arrested on August 13, 1993?
"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for
the commission of an offense. Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his
voluntary submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.
Application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not, required. It is enough that there be an
intent on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent onthe part of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary. 12
The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna, by virtue of a letter-invitation issued by PNP Commander Rex Piad requesting him
to appear at the said camp for investigation.

In Babst v. National Intelligence Board 13 this Court declared:

Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions, which the person invited may heed or
refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily assume a
different appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time
when the country has just emerged from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted,
and the designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same can be easily taken,not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as
an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking military official and the investigation of Sanchez was to be made at a military camp. Although
in the guise of a request, it was obviously a command or an order of arrest that the petitioner could hardly he expected to defy. In fact, apparently
cowed by the "invitation," he went without protest (and in informal clothes and slippers only) with the officers who had come to fetch him.
It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438, the requisites of a "custodial investigation" are applicable even to a person not formally
arrested but merely "invited" for questioning.
It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the petitioner was placed on "arrest status" after he was pointed to by Centeno and Malabanan
as the person who first raped Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Respondent Zuo himself acknowledged during the August 13, 1993 hearing that, on the basis of
the sworn statements of the two state witnesses, petitioner had been "arrested."
We agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escapes from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present when the petitioner allegedly participated in the killing of Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of
Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Neither did they have any personal knowledge that the petitioner was responsible therefor because the basis of the arrest was
the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan. Moreover, as the rape and killing of Sarmenta allegedly took place on June 28-June 29, 1993, or
forty-six days before the date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense had "in fact just been committed" when the petitioner was arrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in connection with the rapeslay cases. It was belated, to be sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all, we find that the trial court still lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
The rule is that if the accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his person, he may move to quash the information, but only on that ground. If,
as in this case, the accused raises other grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived that objection and to have submitted his person
to the jurisdiction of that court. 14
The Court notes that on August 13, 1993, after the petitioner was unlawfully arrested, Judge Lanzanas issued a warrant of arrest against Antonio L.
Sanchez in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation of R.A No. 6713. 15 Pending the issuance of the warrant of arrest
for the rape-slay cases, this first warrant served as the initial justification for his detention.
The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing of charges, and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest, against a person invalidly
detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be released because of such defect. * Applicable by analogy to the case
at bar is Rule 102 Section 4 of the Rules of Court that:
Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the
person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall, anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.

In one case, 16 the petitioner, sued on habeas corpus on the ground that she had been arrested by virtue of a John Doe warrant. In their return, the
respondents declared that a new warrant specifically naming her had been issued, thus validating her detention. While frowning at the tactics of the
respondents, the Court said:
The, case has, indeed, become moot and academic inasmuch as the new warrant of arrest complies with the requirements of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court regarding the particular description of the person to be arrested. While the first warrant was unquestionably void, being a general
warrant, release of the petitioner for that reason will be a futile act as it will be followed by her immediate re-arrest pursuant to the new and valid
warrant, returning her to the same prison she will just have left. This Court will not participate in such a meaningless charade.
The same doctrine has been consistently followed by the Court,

17

more recently in the Umil case. 18

The Informations
The petitioner submits that the seven informations charging seven separate homicides are absurd because the two victims in these cases could not
have died seven times.
This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor General in this wise:
Thus, where there are two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of each rape, must be deemed
as a constituent of the special complex crime of rape with homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes
committed.
In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty to the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the
occasion or by reason of rape, loses its character as an independent offense, but assumes a new character, and functions like a qualifying
circumstance. However,by fiction of law, it merged with rape to constitute an constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with homicide with
a specific penalty which is in the highest degree, i.e. death (reduced to reclusion perpetua with the suspension of the application of the death penalty
by the Constitution).
It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a
simple punishment for various offenses.
Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111, amending the Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed by him in conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven
accused is charged with having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words, the allegation
of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other
six. Afterwards, their lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and later killing her instead of merely assisting the petitioner
in raping and then slaying her. The separate informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed by
the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in
succession by the seven accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.
It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez were killed seven times, but the informations do not make such a
suggestion. It is the petitioner who does so and is thus hoist by his own petard.
The Alleged Discrimination
The charge of discrimination against the petitioner because of the non-inclusion of Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia in the informations must also
be dismissed.
While the prosecuting officer is required by law to charge all those who in his opinion, appear to be guilty, he nevertheless cannot be compelled to
include in the information a person against whom he believes no sufficient evidence of guilt exists. 19 The appreciation of the evidence involves the use
of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, and we do not find in the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a grave abuse of such discretion. 20
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified by the Secretary of Justice or in special cases by the President of the Philippines. 21 But
even this Court cannot order the prosecution of a person against whom the prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at least a prima
facie case. The courts try and absolve or convict the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial decision to prosecute him.

The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable showing of a grave abuse of discretion that will justify judicial intrusion into the precincts of
the executive. But in such a case the proper remedy to call for such exception is a petition for mandamus, not certiorari or prohibition. 22 Moreover,
before resorting to this relief, the party seeking the inclusion of another person as a co-accused in the same case must first avail itself of other
adequate remedies such as the filing of a motion for such inclusion. 23
At any rate, it is a preposterous contention that because no charges have been filed against Alqueza and Lavadia, the charges against the petitioner
and his co-accused should also be dropped.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
The petitioner argued earlier that since most of the accused were incumbent public officials or employees at the time of the alleged commission of the
crimes, the cases against them should come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and not of the regular courts. This contention was withdrawn
in his Reply but we shall discuss it just the same for the guidance of all those concerned.
Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as amended by P.D. No.1861, provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:
a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter
II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code:
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged obviously does not fall under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and
corruption cases. Neither is it covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an offense committed in relation to the office of the petitioner.
In Montilla v, Hilario, 24 this Court described the "offense committed in relation to the office" as follows:
[T]he relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the
Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office. In other words, the office must be a
constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of
the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant,
and the penalty is the same except when the perpetrator. being a public functionary took advantage of his office, as alleged in this case, in which event
the penalty is increased.
But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality arises not from the
allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime
There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner's office as municipal mayor because public
office is not an essential element of the crime charged. The offense can stand independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged in the
information that the commission of the crime charged was intimately connected with the performance of the petitioner's official functions to make it fall
under the exception laid down in People v. Montejo. 25
In that case, a city mayor and several detectives were charged with murder for the death of a suspect as a result of a "third degree" investigation held
at a police substation. The appearance of a senator as their counsel was questioned by the prosecution on the ground that he was inhibited by the
Constitution from representing them because they were accused of an offense committed in relation to their office. The Court agreed. It held that even
if their position was not an essential ingredient of the offense, there was nevertheless an intimate connection between the office and the offense, as
alleged in the information, that brought it within the definition of an offense "committed in relation to the public office."
As Chief Justice Concepcion said:
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in abstract, as committed by the main
respondents herein, according to the amended information, the offense therein charged is intimately connected with their respective offices and was
perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed they had no personal motive to commit

the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his
instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of Basilan City. (Emphasis supplied).
We have read the informations in the case at bar and find no allegation therein that the crime of rape with homicide imputed to the petitioner was
connected with the discharge of his functions as municipal mayor or that there is an "intimate connection" between the offense and his office. It follows
that the said crime, being an ordinary offense, is triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
Conclusion
As above demonstrated, all of the grounds invoked by the petitioner are not supported by the facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence. They
must, therefore, all be rejected. In consequence, the respondent judge, who has started the trial of the criminal cases against the petitioner and his coaccused, may proceed therewith without further hindrance.
It remains to stress that the decision we make today is not a decision on the merits of the criminal cases being tried below. These will have to be
decided by the respondent judge in accordance with the evidence that is still being received. At this time, there is yet no basis for judgment, only
uninformed conjecture. The Court will caution against such irrelevant public speculations as they can be based only on imperfect knowledge if not
officious ignorance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The respondent judge is DIRECTED to continue with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 101141, 101142,
101143, 101144, 101145, 101146 and 101147 and to decide them with deliberate dispatch.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-62992 September 28, 1984

ARLENE BABST, ODETTE ALCANTARA CERES P. DOYO, JO ANN Q. MAGLIPON, DOMINI TORREVILLAS SUAREZ, LORNA KALAW-TIROL,
CIELO BUENAVENTURA, SYLVIA MAYUGA, SHEILA S. CORONEL, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE BOARD, SPECIAL COMMITTEE NO. 2, BRIG. GEN. WILFREDO ESTRADA (ret.), COL. RENATO ECARMA, NBI
ASST. DIRECTOR PONCIANO FERNANDO, COL. BALBINO DIEGO, COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, COL. EUSTAQUIO PERALTA, ET
AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION

PLANA, J.:
This was originally a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction which was superseded by the amended and supplemental petition for prohibition
with preliminary injunction filed by petitioners on March 3, 1983, seeking to prohibit the respondents (a) from issuing subpoenas or letters of invitation
to petitioners and interrogating them, and (b) from filing libel suits on matters that have been the subject of inquiry by respondent National Intelligence
Board (NIB).
Petitioners are columnists, feature article writers and reporters of various local publications. At different dates since July, 1980, some of them have
allegedly been summoned by military authorities who have subjected them to sustained interrogation on various aspects of their works, feelings,
sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives. Typical of the letters received by the petitioners from respondent NIB is that addressed to
petitioner Arlene Babst, dated December 20,1982, which reads:
Madam:

Pursuant to the authority vested in me by law, you are hereby requested to appear before this Special Committee at Philippine Army Officer's
Clubhouse, Fort Bonifacio, Metro Manila (sketch attached), 9:00 A.M., December 22, 1982, to shed light on confidential matters being looked into by
this Committee.
Your failure to appear on the specified date and place shall be considered as a waiver on your part and this Committee will be constrained to proceed
in accordance with law.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) WILFREDO C. ESTRADA
Brig. General, AFP (Ret.)
Chairman
Aside from the interrogations, a criminal complaint for libel was filed by Brig. Gen. Artemio Tadiar, Jr. on February 9, 1983 with the Office of the City
Fiscal, Manila, against petitioners Domini Torrevillas-Suarez, editor of the Panorama, and Ma. Ceres Doyo based on an article written by Doyo and
published in the March 28, 1982 issue of the Panorama, on which the author had been interrogated by respondents. The complaint included an
staggering P10 million claim for damages. (An information for libel has since been filed with the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region
against Suarez and Doyo.)
Petitioners maintain that the respondents have no jurisdiction over the proceedings which are violative of the constitutional guarantee on free
expression since they have the effect of imposing restrictive guidelines and norms on mass media; that they are a punitive ordeal or subsequent
punishment of petitioners for lawful publications; that they amount to a system of censorship, curtailing the "free flow of information and petition and
opinion," indispensable to the right of the people to know matters of public concern guaranteed in Section 6 of Article IV of the Constitution; and that
they constitute intrusions into spheres of individual liberty. Regarding the libel charge against Suarez and Doyo, petitioners denounce the filing as
instituted with intent to intimidate and based on illegally obtained evidence, referring to the matters inquired into by respondents in previously
conducted, allegedly illegal interrogations.
In their comment, respondents counter that no issue of jurisdiction exists since they do not pretend to exercise jurisdiction over the petitioners; that
what respondents have sent to petitioners were neither subpoenas nor summonses, but mere invitations to dialogues which were completely voluntary,
without any compulsion employed on petitioners; that the dialogues themselves were designed simply to elicit information and exchange Ideas and that
the expression of personal preferences and opinions by members of the respondent Board is not equivalent to the imposition of norms and guidelines
to be followed by petitioners. Relative to the libel case, respondents contend that petitioners have no cause of action against respondent Board since
respondent General Tadiar is not a member of respondent Board and has filed the libel case in his personal capacity; and the libel case is not pending
before any of the respondents. Furthermore, respondents aver that this case has been rendered moot and academic because the proceedings before
NIB Special Committee No. 2 (which conducted the interrogations) have already been ordered terminated by General Fabian C. Ver in his capacity as
Director General and Chairman of the NIB, and said proceedings have in fact been terminated.
The petition is premised upon the alleged illegality and unconstitutionality of the issuance by respondent NIB to petitioners of letters of invitation, their
subsequent interrogation, and the filing of the aforementioned libel suit.
Under the circumstances of the case, the petition cannot be granted.
The assailed proceedings have come to an end. The acts sought to be prohibited (i.e., the issuance of letters of invitation petition and subsequent
interrogations) have therefore been abated, thereby rendering the petition moot and academic as regards the aforesaid matters.
Be that as it may, it is not Idle to note that ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing and answer some questions, which the person invited may heed
or refuse at his pleasure, is not illegal or constitutionally objectionable. Under certain circumstances, however, such an invitation can easily assume a
different appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes from a powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time
when the country has just emerged from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted
and the designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same can easily be taken, not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as
an authoritative command which one can only defy at his peril, especially where, as in the instant case, the invitation carries the ominous seaming that
"failure to appear . . . shall be considered as a waiver . . . and this Committee will be constrained to proceed in accordance with law." Fortunately, the
NIB director general and chairman saw the wisdom of terminating the proceedings and the unwelcome interrogation.
Similarly, prohibition will not issue in respect of the libel charges now pending in court against two of the petitioners and similar suits that might be filed.
Firstly, the writ of prohibition is directed against a tribunal, board or person acting without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
vis-a-vis certain proceedings pending before it. The libel cases adverted to are not pending before respondent NIB or any other respondent.
Secondly, the issue of validity of the libel, charges by reason of their alleged collision with freedom of expression, is a matter that should be raised in
the proper forum, i.e., before the court where the libel cases are pending or where they may be filed. The same rule applies to the issue of admissibility
as evidence of matters that have been elicited in the course of an inquiry or interrogation conducted by respondent NIB, which petitioners claim to have
been illegally obtained.

Finally, the right to seek redress when libeled is a personal and individual privilege of the aggrieved party, and no one among the respondent officials
has the authority to restrain any of his subordinates who has been libeled from vindicating his right by instituting a libel suit. Brig. Gen. Tadiar has filed
the libel case against petitioners Suarez and Doyo in his personal capacity. Moreover, he is not even a member of respondent NIB. And the NIB does
not appear to have anything to do with Gen. Tadiar's private right to complain of libel.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.