CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION

PEOPLE V. GALIT
The correct procedure for peace officers to follow when
making an arrest and in conducting a custodial
investigation:
1. At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty
of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason
for the arrest and he must be shown the warrant of
arrest, if any.
2. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement
he might make could be used against him.
3. The person arrested shall have the right to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or anyone
he chooses by the most expedient means by
telephone if possible or by letter or messenger. It
shall be the responsibility of the arresting officer to
see to it that this is accomplished.
4. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless
it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the
person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the
detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf.
5. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver
shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of
counsel.
6. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure
herein
laid
down,
whether
exculpatory
or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible
in evidence.
In the case at bar, the only evidence against the accused is
his alleged confession. It behooves Us therefore to give it a
close scrutiny. The statement begins as follows:
TANONG: Ipinagbibigay-alam ko sa inyo ang inyong mga karapatan sa
ilalim ng Saligang-Batas ng Pilipinas na kung inyong nanaisin ay

maaaring hindi kayo magbigay ng isang salaysay, na hindi rin kayo

maaaring pilitin o saktan at pangakuan upang magbigay ng naturang
salaysay, na anuman ang inyong sasabihin sa pagsisiyasat na ito ay
maaaring laban sa inyo sa anumang usapin na maaaring ilahad sa
anumang hukuman o tribunal dito sa Pilipinas, na sa pagsisiyasat na ito
ay maaaring katulungin mo ang isang manananggol at kung sakaling
hindi mo kayang bayaran ang isang manananggol ay maaaring bigyan
ka ng isa ng NBI. Ngayon at alam mo na ang mga ito nakahanda ka bang
magbigay ng isang kusang-loob na salaysay sa pagtatanong na ito?
SAGOT: Opo.

Such a long question followed by a monosyllabic

answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law
that the accused be informed of his rights under the
Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be
several short and clear questions and every right explained
in simple words in a dialect or language known to the
person under investigation. Accused is from Samar and
there is no showing that he understands Tagalog. Moreover,
at the time of his arrest, accused was not permitted to
communicate with his lawyer, a relative, or a friend. In fact,
his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had
been brought to the NBI for investigation and it was only
about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay that
his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does
not even contain any waiver of right to counsel and yet
during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the
supposed reenactment, again accused was not assisted by
counsel of his choice. These constitute gross violations of
his rights.
The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed reenactment are inadmissible as evidence because they were
obtained in a manner contrary to law.
Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the
circumstances surrounding the taking of any confession,
especially where the prisoner claims having been
maltreated into giving one. Where there is any doubt as to
its voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.
***

PEOPLE V. ORDONO
The accused are now before us assailing their conviction on
the ground that constitutional infirmities attended the
execution of their extrajudicial confessions, i.e., mainly the
lack of counsel to assist them during custodial investigation
thereby making their confessions inadmissible in evidence.
Under the Constitution and the rules laid down pursuant to
law and jurisprudence, a confession to be admissible in
evidence must satisfy four (4) fundamental requirements:
a) the confession must be voluntary;
b) the confession must be made with the assistance of
competent and independent counsel;
c) the confession must be express; and,
d) the confession must be in writing.
Among all these requirements none is accorded the
greatest respect than an accused's right to counsel to
adequately protect him in his ignorance and shield him
from the otherwise condemning nature of a custodial
investigation. The person being interrogated must be
assisted by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice
of extorting false or coerced admissions or
confessions from the lips of the person undergoing
interrogation for the commission of the offense.
Hence, if there is no counsel at the start of the
custodial investigation any statement elicited from
the accused is inadmissible in evidence against him.
This exclusionary rule is premised on the presumption that
the defendant is thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and
runs through menacing police interrogation procedures
where the potentiality for compulsion, physical and
psychological, is forcefully apparent.

In the instant case, custodial investigation began when the

accused Ordoo and Medina voluntarily went to the Santol
Police Station to confess and the investigating officer
started asking questions to elicit information and/or
confession from them. At such point, the right of the
accused to counsel automatically attached to them.
Concededly, after informing the accused of their rights the
police sought to provide them with counsel. However, none
could be furnished them due to the non-availability of
practicing lawyers in Santol, La Union, and the remoteness
of the town to the next adjoining town of Balaoan, La
Union, where practicing lawyers could be found. At that
stage, the police should have already desisted from
continuing with the interrogation but they persisted and
gained the consent of the accused to proceed with the
investigation. To the credit of the police, they requested the
presence of the Parish Priest and the Municipal Mayor of
Santol as well as the relatives of the accused to obviate the
possibility of coercion, and to witness the voluntary
execution by the accused of their statements before the
police. Nonetheless, this did not cure in any way the
absence of a lawyer during the investigation.
In providing that during the taking of an extrajudicial
confession the accused's parents, older brothers and
sisters, his spouse, the municipal mayor, municipal judge,
district school supervisor, or priest or minister of the gospel
as chosen by the accused may be present, RA 7438 does
not propose that they appear in the alternative or as a
substitute for counsel without any condition or clause. It is
explicitly stated therein that before the above-mentioned
persons can appear two (2) conditions must be met: (a)
counsel of the accused must be absent, and, (b) a valid
waiver must be executed. RA 7438 does not therefore
unconditionally and unreservedly eliminate the necessity of
counsel but underscores its importance by requiring that a
substitution of counsel with the above-mentioned persons
be made with caution and with the essential safeguards.

Hence, in the absence of such valid waiver, the Parish

Priest of Santol, the Municipal Mayor, the relatives
of the accused, the Chief of Police and other police
officers of the municipality could not stand in lieu of
counsel's presence. The apparent consent of the two (2)
accused in continuing with the investigation was of no
moment as a waiver to be effective must be made in
writing and with the assistance of counsel. Consequently,
any admission obtained from the two (2) accused
emanating from such uncounselled interrogation would be
inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding.

authorities to assure the constitutional rights of the

accused in the instant case therefore fell short of the
standards demanded by the Constitution and the law.

Securing the assistance of the PAO lawyer five (5) to

eight (8) days later does not remedy this omission
either. Although there was a showing that the PAO lawyer
made a thorough explanation of the rights of the accused,
enlightened them on the possible repercussions of their
admissions, and even gave them time to deliberate upon
them, this aid and valuable advice given by counsel still
came several days too late. It could have no palliative
effect. It could not cure the absence of counsel during the
custodial investigation when the extrajudicial statements
were being taken.

As testified to, the police informed the accused of their

rights to remain silent and to counsel in a dialect
understood by them, but despite the accused's apparent
showing of comprehension, it is doubtful if they were able
to grasp the significance of the information being
conveyed.

The second affixation of the signatures/ thumbmarks of the

accused on their confessions a few days after their closeddoor meeting with the PAO lawyer, in the presence and
with the signing of the MTC judge, the PAO lawyer and
other witnesses, likewise did not make their admissions an
informed one. Admissions obtained during custodial
investigation without the benefit of counsel
although reduced into writing and later signed in the
presence of counsel are still flawed under the
Constitution. If the lawyer's role is diminished to being
that of a mere witness to the signing of a prepared
document albeit an indication therein that there was
compliance with the constitutional rights of the accused,
the requisite standards guaranteed by Art. III, Sec. 12, par.
(1), are not met. The standards utilized by police

It should further be recalled that the accused were not

effectively informed of their constitutional rights when they
were arrested, so that when they allegedly admitted
authorship of the crime after questioning, their admissions
were obtained in violation of their constitutional rights
against self-incrimination under Sec. 20, Art. IV, of the Bill
of Rights.

The advice proffered by the investigating officer to Ordoo

starkly resembles that given to Medina, thus leading us to
conclude that the advice was given perfunctorily and
belonged to the stereotyped class - a long question by the
investigator informing the appellant of his right followed by
a monosyllabic answer - which this Court has condemned
for being unsatisfactory. The desired role of counsel in the
process of custodial investigation is rendered meaningless
if the lawyer gives an advice in a cursory manner as
opposed to a meaningful advocacy of the rights of the
person undergoing questioning. If advice is given casually
and tritely as to be useless, understanding on the part of
the accused is sacrificed and the unconstrained giving up
of a right becomes impaired.
To be informed of the right to remain silent and to
counsel
contemplates
"the
transmission
of
meaningful information rather than just the
ceremonial and perfunctory recitation of an abstract
constitutional principle." It is not enough for the

interrogator to merely enumerate to the person under

investigation his rights as provided in Sec. 12, Art. III, of the
Constitution; the interrogator must also explain the effect
of such provision in practical terms, e.g., what the person
under interrogation may or may not do, and in a language
the subject fairly understands.
With the extrajudicial confession of the accused rendered
inadmissible in evidence, we are left with the interview
taken by DZNL radio announcer Roland Almoite as
evidence. The taped interview was offered to form part of
the testimony of witness Roland Almoite to whom the
admissions were made and to prove through electronic
device the voluntary admissions by the two (2) accused
that they raped and killed Shirley Victore. The defense
objected to its acceptance on the ground that its integrity
had not been preserved as the tape could easily have been
spliced and tampered with. However, as Roland Almoite
testified, it was the original copy of the taped interview; it
was not altered; the voices therein were the voices of the
two (2) accused; and, the defense never submitted
evidence to prove otherwise. Under the circumstances, we
are inclined, as was the lower court, to admit the
authenticity of the taped interview.
A review of the contents of the tape as included in Roland
Almoite's testimony reveals that the interview was
conducted free from any influence or intimidation from
police officers and was done willingly by the accused.
Despite allegations to the contrary, no police authority
ordered or forced the accused to talk to the radio
announcer. While it may be expected that police officers
were around since the interview was held in the police
station, there was no showing that they were within
hearing distance nor within the vicinity where the interview
was being conducted. At most, the participation of the
police authorities was only to allow Roland Almoite to
conduct an interview.

The taped interview likewise revealed that the accused

voluntarily admitted to the rape-slay and even expressed
remorse for having perpetrated the crime. We have held
that statements spontaneously made by a suspect to
news reporters on a televised interview are deemed
voluntary and are admissible in evidence. By analogy,
statements made by herein accused to a radio announcer
should likewise be held admissible. The interview was not
in the nature of an investigation as the response of the
accused was made in answer to questions asked by the
radio reporter, not by the police or any other investigating
officer. When the accused talked to the radio announcer,
they did not talk to him as a law enforcement officer, as in
fact he was not, hence their uncounselled confession to
him did not violate their constitutional rights.
Sections 12, pars. (1) and (3), Art. III, of the Constitution do
not cover the verbal confessions of the two (2) accused to
the radio announcer. What the Constitution bars is the
compulsory disclosure of incriminating facts or confessions.
The rights enumerated under Sec. 12, Art. III, are
guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the
state as would lead the accused to admit something false,
not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the
truth.
The Bill of Rights does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and another
individual. It governs the relationship between the
individual and the State. The prohibitions therein are
primarily addressed to the State and its agents. They
confirm that certain rights of the individual exist without
need of any governmental grant, rights that may not be
taken away by government, rights that government has the
duty to protect. Governmental power is not unlimited and
the Bill of Rights lays down these limitations to protect the
individual against aggression and unwarranted interference
by any department of government and its agencies.

***

PEOPLE V. LUGOD
Issue: The court erred in holding that appellant confessed
his guilt before the vice-mayor, which confession is
admissible as it was not made in response to any
interrogation.
There is no question that at the time of his apprehension,
accused-appellant was already placed under arrest and was
suspected of having something to do with the
disappearance of Nairube. However, at the time of his
arrest, the apprehending officers did not inform the
accused-appellant and in fact acted in a blatant and
wanton disregard of his constitutional rights specified in
Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, which provides:
(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of
an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he
must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or
any other means which vitiate the free will shall be
used
against
him. Secret
detention
places,
solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of
this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.
(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for
violations of this section as well as compensation to
and rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar
practices, and their families.

Records reveal that accused-appellant was not informed of

his right to remain silent and to counsel, and that if he
cannot afford to have counsel of his choice, he would be
provided with one. Moreover, there is no evidence to
indicate that he intended to waive these rights. Besides,
even if he did waive these rights, in order to be valid, the
waiver must be made in writing and with the assistance of
counsel. Consequently, the accused-appellants act of
confessing to SPO2 Gallardo that he raped and killed
Nairube without the assistance of counsel cannot be used
against him for having transgressed accused-appellants
rights under the Bill of Rights. This is a basic tenet of our
Constitution which cannot be disregarded or ignored no
matter how brutal the crime committed may be. In the
same vein, the accused-appellants act in pointing out the
location of the body of Nairube was also elicited in violation
of the accused-appellants right to remain silent. The same
was an integral part of the uncounselled confession and is
considered a fruit of the poisonous tree. Thus, in People
vs. De La Cruz, we ruled that:
Equally indmissible, for being integral parts of the
uncouselled admission or fruits of the poisonous
tree are the photographs of subsequent acts which the
accused was made to do in order to obtain proof to support
such admission or confession, such as (a) his digging in the
place where Virginia Trangia was allegedly buried, (b) his
retrieving of the bones discovered therein (c) his posing
before a photographer while executing such acts.
Even if we were to assume that accused-appellant was not
yet under interrogation and thus not entitled to his
constitutional rights at the time he was brought to the
police station, the acts of accused-appellant subsequent to
his apprehension cannot be characterized as having been
voluntarily made considering the peculiar circumstances
surrounding his detention. His confession was elicited by
SPO2 Gallardo who promised him that he would help him if
he told the truth. Furthermore, when accused-appellant

allegedly pointed out the body of the victim, SPO2

Gallardo, the whole police force as well as nearly one
hundred (100) of the townspeople of Cavinti escorted him
there. Ricardo Vida stated that the townspeople were
antagonistic towards accused-appellant and wanted to hurt
him. The atmosphere from the time accused-appellant was
apprehended and taken to the police station up until the
time he was alleged to have pointed out the location of the
body of the victim was highly intimidating and was not
conducive to a spontaneous response. Amidst such a
highly coercive atmosphere, accused-appellants claim that
he was beaten up and maltreated by the police officers
raises a very serious doubt as to the voluntariness of his
alleged confession. The Vice-Mayor, who testified that
when he visited accused-appellant in the jail cell, he
noticed that the accused-appellant had bruises on his face,
corroborated accused-appellants assertion that he was
maltreated.
In addition, the records do not support the confession
allegedly made by the accused-appellant to the Mayor and
Vice-Mayor of Cavinti. Records show that the Mayor of
Cavinti did not testify in the criminal trial. Moreover, the
testimony of the Vice-Mayor with respect to the alleged
confession made by the accused-appellant is not
conclusive.
As can be seen from the testimony of the Vice-Mayor,
accused-appellant merely responded to the ambiguous
questions that the Vice-Mayor propounded to him. He did
not state in certain and categorical terms that he raped
and killed Nairube. In fact, the Vice-Mayor admitted that
the accused-appellant did not tell him that he raped and
killed Nairube. In addition, we note the contradiction
between the testimony of the Vice-Mayor who stated that
he was alone when he spoke to the accused-appellant and
that of SPO2 Gallardo who claimed that he was present
when accused-appellant confessed to the Mayor and ViceMayor.

***

PEOPLE V. TABOGA
Issue: The trial court erred in admitting in evidence the
extrajudicial confession made by the accused to a radio
reporter for the latter was acting as an agent for the
prosecution and hence the procedural safeguards
enshrined in the constitution should have been observed.
The assigned error is untenable.
There is nothing in the record to show that the radio
announcer colluded with the police authorities to
elicit inculpatory evidence
against
accusedappellant. Neither is there anything on record which even
remotely suggests that the radio announcer was instructed
by the police to extract information from him on the details
of the crimes. Indeed, the reporter even asked permission
from
the
officer-in-charge
to
interview
accusedappellant. Nor was the information obtained under
duress. In fact, accused-appellant was very much aware of
what was going on. He was informed at the outset by the
radio announcer that he was a reporter who will be
interviewing him to get his side of the incident:
The records also show that accused-appellant not only
confessed to the radio reporter but to several others,
among
them
his
live-in
partner, Barangay Captain
William Pagao, and SPO1 Tiburcio Panod.
The defense maintained that the confessions were
obtained through compulsion. Accused-appellant claimed
that the policemen maltreated him by hitting him four (4)
times on the head with a chair and forced him to admit the
crimes. However, accused-appellant failed to present
convincing evidence to substantiate his claim, other than
his bare self-serving assertion. Apropos is our ruling
in People v. Pia, where we said that: where the defendants

did not present evidence of compulsion or duress or

violence on their persons; where they failed to complain to
the officers who administered the oaths; where they did not
institute any criminal or administrative action against their
alleged intimidators for maltreatment; where there
appeared to be no marks of violence on their bodies and
where they did not have themselves examined by a
reputable physician to buttress their claim, all these should
be considered as factors indicating the voluntariness of the
confession.
Furthermore,
accused-appellants
confession
is
replete with details on the manner in which the
crimes were committed, thereby ruling out the
probability
that
it
was
involuntarily
made. The voluntariness of a confession may be inferred
from its language such that if, upon its face the confession
exhibits no sign of suspicious circumstances tending to cast
doubt upon its integrity, it being replete with details
which could be supplied only by the accused reflecting
spontaneity and coherence which, psychologically,
cannot be associated with a mind to which violence
and torture have been applied, it may be considered
voluntary. In the early case of U.S. v. De los Santos, we
stated:
If a confession be free and voluntary the deliberate act of
the accused with a full comprehension of its significance,
there is no impediment to its admission as evidence, and it
becomes evidence of a high order; since it is supported by
the presumption a very strong presumption that no
person of normal mind will deliberately and knowingly
confess himself to be a perpetrator of a crime, especially if
it be a serious crime, unless prompted by truth and
conscience.
Under Rule 133, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, an
extrajudicial confession made by an accused shall not be a
sufficient ground for conviction, unless corroborated by

evidence of corpus delicti. As defined, it means the body of

the crime and, in its primary sense, means a crime has
actually been committed. Applied to a particular offense, it
is the actual commission by someone of the particular
crime charged. In the case at bar, the confession made by
accused-appellant was corroborated by several items found
by the authorities, to wit: the knife which was used to kill
the victim and the charred body of the victim.
The court a quo did not err in admitting in evidence
accused-appellants taped confession. Such confession did
not form part of custodial investigation. It was not given to
police officers but to a media man in an apparent attempt
to elicit sympathy. The record even discloses that accusedappellant admitted to the Barangay Captain that he
clubbed and stabbed the victim even before the police
started investigating him at the police station. Besides, if
he had indeed been forced into confessing, he could have
easily asked help from the newsman. In People v. Endino,
et al., we held:
We
do
not
suggest
that
videotaped
confessions given before media men by an
accused with the knowledge of and in the
presence
of
police
officers
are
impermissible. Indeed, the line between proper
and invalid police techniques and conduct is a
difficult one to draw, particularly in cases such as
this where it is essential to make sharp judgments in
determining whether a confession was given under
coercive physical or psychological atmosphere.
Even assuming for the nonce that the extra-judicial
confession was indeed inadmissible, this will not absolve
accused-appellant from criminal liability because there
exists independent evidence to establish his authorship of
the victims death. While there was no prosecution witness
who positively identified accused-appellant as the assailant

of the victim, his culpability was nonetheless proven

through circumstantial evidence.
***

PEOPLE V. BALOLOY
We shall first address the issue of admissibility of JUANITOs
extrajudicial confession to Barangay Captain Ceniza.
It has been held that the constitutional provision on
custodial investigation does not apply to a
spontaneous
statement,
not
elicited
through
questioning by the authorities but given in an
ordinary manner whereby the suspect orally admits
having committed the crime. Neither can it apply to
admissions or confessions made by a suspect in the
commission of a crime before he is placed under
investigation. What the Constitution bars is the
compulsory
disclosure
of
incriminating
facts
or
confessions. The rights under Section 12 of the
Constitution are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of
coercion by the state as would lead the accused to admit
something false, not to prevent him from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth.
In the instant case, after he admitted ownership of the
black rope and was asked by Ceniza to tell her everything,
JUANITO voluntarily narrated to Ceniza that he raped
GENELYN and thereafter threw her body into the
ravine. This narration was a spontaneous answer, freely
and voluntarily given in an ordinary manner. It was given
before he was arrested or placed under custody for
investigation in connection with the commission of the
offense.
Moreover, JUANITO did not offer any evidence of improper
or ulterior motive on the part of Ceniza, which could have
compelled her to testify falsely against him. Where there is

no evidence to show a doubtful reason or improper motive

why a prosecution witness should testify against the
accused or falsely implicate him in a crime, the said
testimony is trustworthy.
However, there is merit in JUANITOs claim that his
constitutional rights during custodial investigation were
violated by Judge Dicon when the latter propounded to him
incriminating questions without informing him of his
constitutional rights. It is settled that at the moment
the accused voluntarily surrenders to, or is arrested
by, the police officers, the custodial investigation is
deemed to have started. So, he could not
thenceforth be asked about his complicity in the
offense without the assistance of counsel. Judge
Dicons claim that no complaint has yet been filed and that
neither was he conducting a preliminary investigation
deserves scant consideration. The fact remains that at that
time JUANITO was already under the custody of the police
authorities, who had already taken the statement of the
witnesses who were then before Judge Dicon for the
administration of their oaths on their statements.
While Mosqueda claims that JUANITO was not arrested but
was rather brought to the police headquarters on 4 August
1996 for his protection, the records reveal that JUANITO
was in fact arrested. If indeed JUANITOs safety was the
primordial concern of the police authorities, the need to
detain and deprive him of his freedom of action would not
have been necessary. Arrest is the taking of a person into
custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense, and it is made by an actual
restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission
to the person making the arrest.
At any rate, while it is true that JUANITOs extrajudicial
confession before Judge Dicon was made without the
advice and assistance of counsel and hence inadmissible in
evidence, it could however be treated as a verbal

admission of the accused, which could be established

through the testimonies of the persons who heard it or who
conducted the investigation of the accused.