02-088

Leading by
Leveraging Culture

Jennifer A. Chatman1
Sandra E. Cha

The first author wrote this chapter while a Marvin Bower Fellow at the Harvard Business School, and is
grateful for their support.

Copyright 2002 by Jennifer A. Chatman and Sandra E. Cha

Working papers are in draft form. This working paper is distributed for purposes of comment and
discussion only. It may not be reproduced without permission of the copyright holder. Copies of working
papers are available from the author.

Leading by Leveraging Culture

Jennifer A. Chatman1
Haas School of Business
University of California
Berkeley, CA 94720-1900
chatman@haas.berkeley.edu
And
Sandra E. Cha
Harvard Business School
Soldiers Field, Sherman Hall 102
Harvard University
Boston, MA 02163
scha@hbs.edu

December 11, 2001

To appear in, Subir Chowdhury (Ed), Next Generation Business Series: Leadership, Financial
Times-Prentice Hall Publishers, forthcoming, 2003.

The first author wrote this chapter while a Marvin Bower Fellow at the Harvard Business School, and is
grateful for their support.

We occasionally get calls from prospective clients who, having heard that we consult
with organizations to improve their cultures, ask us to come on down to our organization and get
us a better one. Perhaps they are thinking that, somehow, after we have worked our culture
magic, employees will be singing and dancing in their cubicles. Although this is a nice image,
simply trying to make employees happy misses the power of leveraging culture. The problem is
that organizational culture has become faddish, and as such, it has been over-applied and underspecified. Our goal in this chapter is to precisely clarify why culture is powerful, and provide
specific criteria for developing a strong, strategically relevant culture that is likely to enhance
your organizations performance over the long haul.
A few caveats apply to our discussion. First we wont claim that by simply managing
culture, leaders will be assured of organizational success, or by neglecting culture, doomed to fail.
As this volume illustrates, leveraging culture is but one of a number of key leadership tools. We
will claim, however, that by actively managing culture, your organization, and the people
working within it, will be more likely to deliver on your strategic objectives over the long run.
We begin by defining organizational culture and psychological basis of its powerful effects on
performance. We then discuss how emphasizing innovation enhances long-term strategic success.
Next, we present a set of managerial practicesrecruiting and selecting employees for culture fit,
intensive socialization and training, and the use of formal and informal rewardsthat leverage
culture for performance. Throughout the chapter, we show that culture boosts organizational
performance when it (1) is strategically relevant, (2) is strong, and (3) emphasizes innovation and
change. We conclude that culture works when it is clear, consistent and comprehensive,
particularly during challenging times.
Why is Organizational Culture Powerful?
Focusing People Intensely on Strategy Execution
A Fortune magazine article highlighting path-breaking research by Ram Charan and
Geoffrey Colvin (1999) led with a provocative cover Why CEOs Fail. The definitive answer

had been found, and it was notoriously simple: CEOs failed when they failed to execute their
strategy. This was an amazing conclusion because, in contrast to what industrial economists have
been telling us for yearsthat firms with well-formulated and hard-to-imitate business strategies
emerge as the winners (e.g., Porter, 1980)Charan and Colvins article suggested that firms with
merely reasonable strategies who execute fully on those could be the most successful.
This shifts our focus from strategy formulation to strategy execution, and culture is all
about execution. Consider the often-cited example of Southwest Airlines, a company with a
transparent, almost simple, strategy: high volume; short, convenient flights; using only fuel
efficient 737s; culminating in low costs and the ability to offer customers low-priced tickets. And
yet, Southwest has been the only U.S. airline to be profitable for 28 consecutive years (Laing,
2001). One key to Southwests success is its remarkably short turnaround time, 15 minutes versus
competitors average of 35 minutes (OReilly & Pfeffer, 1995). Planes dont sit long at the jet
way. Instead, employees across functional lines band together to get the planes out quickly,
despite being 89% unionized. This results in an average plane utilization of around 12 hours at
Southwest versus the industry average of closer to 9 hours. Southwests success hinges not on
how brilliant, unique, or opaque their strategy is, but on the alignment between their culture and
strategy, and how clearly employees understand, and intensely they feel, about the culture.
Strong cultures enhance organizational performance in two ways. First, they improve
performance by energizing employees appealing to their higher ideals and values, and rallying
them around a set of meaningful, unified goals. Such ideals excite employee commitment and
effort because they are inherently engaging (Walton, 1980), and fill voids in identity and meaning
that some believe; characterize contemporary Western society (Baumeister, 1998). Second, strong
cultures boost performance by shaping and coordinating employees behavior. Stated values and
norms focus employees attention on organizational priorities that then guide their behavior and
decision-making. They do so without impinging, as formal control systems do, on the autonomy
necessary for excellent performance under changing conditions (Tushman & OReilly, 1997).

Culture is a system of shared values defining what is important, and norms, defining
appropriate attitudes and behaviors, that guide members attitudes and behaviors (OReilly &
Chatman, 1996: 166). Culture is more specific than vision in that a good vision engages
employees emotionally by setting up motivating overarching goals to which they can aspire. For
example, Citigroups admirable vision, We want to be seen as one of the most respected
financial institutions in the world, as a unique global full-service bank, can be seen throughout
the organization. The bank is global located in 94 different countries for nearly 100 years, and
full-service as evidenced by its recent merger with Travelers. But, if you work for Citigroup and
wake up one morning saying, Ok, todays the day Im going to be really global, its not clear
exactly what this would mean. Culture operates at the level of daily beliefs and behavior to
translate abstract visions into useful information about how to behave and what decisions and
tradeoffs to make.
An effective culture is also closely related to business strategy. Strategy focuses on the
specific business objectives such as your target market, the products or services you offer, and
how you compete. Indeed, you cannot craft an organizational culture until you fully develop and
articulate your business strategy; strategy must come first. Thus, our first criterion for using
culture as a leadership tool is that it must be strategically relevant.
Formal Versus Social Control: The Power of Shared Norms
Norms, or legitimate, socially shared standards against which the appropriateness of
behavior can be evaluated (Birenbaum & Sagarin, 1976), are the psychological bases of culture.
As regular behavioral patterns that are relatively stable and expected by group members, norms
influence how members perceive and interact with one another, approach decisions, and solve
problems (Bettenhausen & Murnighan, 1991: 21). Norms are distinct from rules, which are
formal, codified directives. The concept of norms also implies social control; that is, norms act as
positive or negative means of ensuring conformity and applying sanctions to deviant behavior
(e.g., OReilly & Chatman, 1996).

We have appreciated the influence of norms at work since Roethlisberger and Dicksons
(1939) classic research showing that group norms shaped employees behavior more powerfully
than either monetary rewards or physical work environments. Employees developed norms at
Western Electrics Hawthorne Plant that dictated the acceptable amount of work each employee
should complete. Unfortunately, this constrained many employees productivity; just like those
who worked too little, those who worked too much were shunned by other members of the work
unit, and, as a result, few employees deviated from the norm. We are so influenced by others
expectations, specifically their expectations that we uphold shared social norms, that we are
willing and likely to alter our behavior in their presence, that is, to do something different than
we would do if we were alone. We assimilate because the consequences of violating strong
normsat best embarrassment, and, at worst, exclusion or alienation from the social group
threaten our ability to survive in an interdependent world.
How then, do norms work in todays organizations? Consider an example from the first
authors personal experience. While shopping at Nordstrom, a strong culture organization known
for its emphasis on customer service, Lance, a polite and attentive sales associate showed her nine
pairs of shoes. Unfortunately, the store did not have the size/color/style combination that she
wanted. As she was leaving, another sales associate, Howard, approached and suggested that he
call a few other Nordstrom stores to find the shoes. Ten minutes later, Howard excitedly informed
her that, though he had not found the shoes at another Nordstrom store, he did find them at a
nearby Macys (a primary Nordstrom competitor). Rather than sending her to Macys, Howard
had already arranged for the shoes to be overnight mailed to her home. Of course, Howard
informed her, Macys will bill you for the shoes, but Nordstrom will pay for the overnight
delivery charge.Howard understood the importance of customer service and was willing to go
above and beyond the call of duty to ensure that even Lances customer was completely satisfied.
But, the most interesting part of the story occurred next. While leaving Nordstrom, the first author
overheard an interaction that she was not supposed to hear. Howard had gone back to Lance and

said, I cant believe you didnt work harder to find those shoes for her. You really let us down.
Remember, Howard is not Lances boss they are peers and yet, the norms encouraging
customer service at Nordstrom are so strong that members are willing to sanction each other,
regardless of level, for a failure to uphold those norms.
Nordstrom prides itself on providing, not average or good, but outstanding customer
service. The problem is that relying on formal rules, policies, and procedures will not result in
outstanding anything, be it customer service, innovation, or quality. Think back to the last time
you had a peak consumer experience you were wowed by someone or an organization what
impressed you? When we ask people this question they typically talk about how someone went
above and beyond the call of duty to solve their specific problem. Formal rules are useful for
standardizing performance and avoiding having to relearn things each time. But they are only
useful for addressing situations that are predictable and regular. In contrast, outstanding service
is determined, in customers eyes, by how you deal with situations that are nearly impossible to
anticipate, unique to a particular person, and difficult to solve.
The irony of leading through culture is that the less formal direction you give employees
about how to execute strategy, the more ownership they take over their actions and the better they
perform. New employees at Nordstrom are told simply to, Use your good judgment in all
situations. (Spector & McCarthy, 1995: 16), and at Southwest to, Do what it takes to make the
Customer happy (OReilly & Pfeffer, 1995: 7). Employees have to be freed up from rules in
order to deliver fully on strategic objectives; they have to understand the ultimate strategic goals
and the norms through which they can be successfully achieved, and they must care about
reaching those goals and what their coworkers will think of them if they dont. Strong norms
increase members clarity about priorities and expectations, and their bonds with one another.
Unlike formal rules, policies and procedures, culture empowers employees to think and act on
their own in pursuit of strategic objectives, increasing their commitment to those goals.
Violations are considered in terms of letting their colleagues down rather than breaking rules. The

payoff is huge: If Howard is monitoring his own behavior against Nordstroms strategic
objectives and Lances their manager does not have to spend time looking over their
shoulders and can, instead, focus on the really important work of leadership: planning for the next
strategic challenge and supporting employees so they can do an outstanding job. Thus, the second
criterion for using culture as a leadership tool is that it be strong.
What Makes Culture Strong?
Strong cultures are based on two characteristics, high levels of agreement among
employees about whats valued, and high levels of intensity about these values. If both are high, a
strong culture exists, and if both are low, the culture is not strong at all. Some organizations are
characterized by high levels of intensity but low levels of agreement, or what could be called
warring factions (OReilly, 1989). Within many high-tech firms such intensity exists but groups
disagree about priorities. For example, marketing groups typically focus on customer driven
product features while engineering groups focus on elegant product designs. More common,
however, are organizations in which members agree about whats important, but they dont much
care, and as such, are unwilling to go the extra mile (e.g., take a risk, stay late) to deliver on
strategic objectives or to sanction others for a failure to uphold those norms. These are called
vacuous cultures (OReilly, 1989) and their frequency probably reflects the faddish nature of
organizational culture and the lip service such organizations pay to it. Most organizations are
aware of the importance of managing culture, but in their attempt to jump on the culture
bandwagon, are unable to develop the clarity, consistency, and comprehensiveness that encourage
employees to care intensely about executing strategic objectives.
Though strong organizational cultures have long been touted as critical to bottom-line
performance in large organizations (e.g., Collins & Porras, 1994), new evidence from a unique
sample suggests that developing a strong, strategically relevant culture may be best accomplished
when an organization is new. In a longitudinal study of 173 young high technology companies,
founders initial model of the employment relation dramatically influenced their firms later

success (e.g., Baron, Hannan, & Burton, 2001). Firms that switched models as they aged were
less successful and firms that were built around the commitment model, which emphasized a
strong culture and hiring based on cultural fit, stood out from those founded on the engineering or
bureaucracy models by, for example, completing initial public stock offerings sooner (Hannan,
Burton, & Baron, 1996).
So far, we have identified two of three criteria for using culture as a leadership tool. First,
the culture must be strategically relevant; Southwests culture emphasizes keeping costs low
while Nordstroms emphasizes customer service. Second, the culture needs to be strong in that
people agree and care about whats important. The final criterion involves the content of
organizational culture, to which we now turn.
Emphasizing Innovation
Though organizational norms revolve around many dimensions (e.g., Chatman & Jehn,
1994), only one appears to be universally applicable across organizations regardless of their size,
industry, or age: innovation, or generating and implementing creative ideas (Caldwell &
OReilly, 1995). In a comprehensive longitudinal study of 207 large firms over an 11-year period,
Kotter and Heskett (1992) found that firms which developed a strong, strategically appropriate
culture performed effectively over the long run only if their culture also contained norms and
values that promoted innovation and change.
Most creativity research has focused on hiring creative people, but innovation may
depend more on whether cultural norms support risk-taking and change (Amabile, 1997).
Consider the following study: Outside observers were asked to evaluate the intelligence of
product development team members engaged in meetings in which one member was pitching a
product idea to the other members. Guess whose intelligence was rated the lowest by the outside
observers time and again? The person pitching the product idea! Why would this be the case?
Imagine what team members are saying things like: Didnt you think of and We already
tried The product pitcher is responding with phrases like, Um, Im not sure, and I dont

know. Not only are critical skills valued more than creative skills, but also creativity and
wisdom are inversely related in peoples minds (Sternberg, OHara, & Lubart, 1997). Expressing
a creative idea is, therefore, riskysince a person suggesting one can end up being perceived as
unintelligent (Amabile, 1983). The lesson for organizations is clear: your people may not be
generating creative ideas because the cost of expressing them is too high. You can bet on your
employees having creative ideas in their head about how to do their jobs better, improve a
system, or develop a new product. The question is, are they willing to say their ideas out loud?
Establishing these norms and promoting innovation may require thinking
unconventionally and adopting some weird ideas such as, Ignore people who have solved the
exact problem you face and, Find some happy people and get them to fight (Sutton, 2001: 97).
Three times a year, executives at Walt Disney Company host a "Gong Show," in which everyone
in the company-including secretaries, janitors, and mailroom staff-gets to pitch movie ideas to the
top executives (McGowan, 1996). Structured brainstorming groups can also create an
environment where publicly raising creative ideas is not only acceptable, but also rewarded
socially. At IDEO, one of the most successful product development companies in history,
brainstorming sessions take on the character of a status auction where the more creative the
idea, the higher the bid (Hargadon & Sutton, 2000).
Leaders also promote innovation by creating a shared belief that team members are safe
to take interpersonal risks. When employees feel psychologically safe they engage in learning
behavior such as asking questions, seeking feedback, experimenting, reflecting on results, and
discussing errors or unexpected outcomes (Edmondson, 1999). Leaders create these norms by
influencing the way creative ideas and errors are handled, which, in turn, leads to shared
perceptions of how consequential it is to make a mistake. These perceptions influence employees
willingness to report mistakes and ultimately can feed into a more lasting culture of fear or of
openness that will influence employees ability to identify and discuss problems and develop new
ideas (Edmondson, 1996).

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Finally, leaders must move quickly to implement promising ideas. Consider Charles
Schwabs foray into Internet stock trading, or rather, their near-invention of this entire category of
trading (Schonfeld, 1998). In late 1995, one of CIO Dawn Lepores research groups developed
experimental software that would allow Schwabs computer systems to talk to one another. The
research team was aware that it would be difficult to explain to Lepore the merits of this rather
unsexy middleware project. So they put together a separate piece of front-end software that would
demonstrate one of many possible applications. The demo was scheduled, and Lepore by chance,
brought along Charles Schwab, a self-described techno-buff. The front-end software the
engineers put together was a simple web-based software trade. They were, of course, less
interested in pursuing an online brokerage than in gaining Lepores approval to continue working
on their obscure project. But, Lepore and Schwab instantly recognized the value of this
technology, with Schwab recalling that, I fell off my chair. (Schonfeld, 1998: 95).
Within weeks, Schwab had put together a team to commercialize an online brokerage.
The team was fed resources and protected from the larger bureaucracy, reporting directly to
Schwab President, David Pottruck. As Pottruck said, We needed a group that felt like they were
nimble, unshackled from the larger bureaucracy. (Schonfeld, 1998: 96). Within three months the
team had developed a commercial product, and within two weeks of introducing it, Schwab
amassed 25,000 online brokerage subscribers, their goal for the entire year. By 1998 Schwab had
captured 30% of the online market share, roughly equal to the next three online competitors
combined (E*Trade, Fidelity, and Waterhouse Securities). Two lessons are relevant: first,
developing a culture that supports expressing creativity may cause good ideas to crop up from
unexpected places. And, more importantly, once you spot a good idea, norms that emphasize
urgency and speed will ensure its implementation.
Leadership Tools to Manage and Change Organizational Culture
We are not the first to identify these three criteria for using culture as a leadership tool.
They are supported by substantial empirical and applied evidence (e.g., Kotter & Heskett, 1992).

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The next question, however, is how can leaders develop, manage, and change their culture to
meet these criteria and promote extraordinary performance? We now briefly describe three key
managerial tools for leveraging culture for performance.2
Tool #1: Recruiting and Selecting People for Culture Fit
Selection is the process of choosing new members (for organizations) and choosing to
join a particular organization (for job candidates). Our approach to selection contrasts with typical
approaches by emphasizing person-culture fit in addition to person-job fit (Chatman, 1991). This
requires anticipating whether the culture your firm emphasizes will be rewarding for potential
recruits.
First, consider General Electrics description of desirable candidates, who stimulate and
relish change and are not frightened or paralyzed by it, see change as an opportunity, not a
threat, and have a passion for excellence, hating bureaucracy and all the nonsense that comes
with it. Note the intensity of the language, which does not focus on which computer programs
people know or their geographic preferences, but rather, their thirst for challenge and change.
These are qualities that differentiate between people who are, and are not, successful at GE. Firms
often get caught focusing exclusively on hiring people whose skills fit their entry-level jobs, and
yet, if a person is successful, he or she will hold multiple jobs within the firm. These jobs are
linked by the organizational culture. Therefore, it makes sense to hire people who will fit the
culture, possibly even trading off some immediate skills necessary for the specific entry job for
better culture fit. People can learn new skills; establishing cultural fit is much harder.
Second, be mindful of recruiter characteristics (Connerly & Rynes, 1997). A fundamental
theory in psychology is the similarity-attraction effect (e.g., Berscheid & Reis, 1998). We are
attracted to people who are similar to ourselves. Why? Well, most of us like ourselves, think
were doing a pretty good job, and wouldnt mind having lunch with ourselves now and then. So,

For greater detail on these three tools, see, Chatman, 1991; OReilly, 1989; OReilly & Chatman, 1996; and Tushman & OReilly,
1997.

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when you ask us to recruit new members, we are likely to pick people just like us! The message is
simple but important: Be careful which people you send out to do your recruiting because you
will get more of them back.
Third, consider your selection process in light of your culture. How, for example, did
Cisco Systems ensure high culture fit despite facing Silicon Valleys brutally competitive labor
market in the late 1990s, hiring an average of 1000 new employees through small acquisitions
and individual recruiting every month? First, they developed culturally consistent selection
criteria targeting candidates who were frugal, enthusiastic about the future of the Internet, smart,
and not consumed with status (OReilly, 1998). Second, they conducted benchmarking studies
and focus groups, so that the selection process was maximally effective in getting the people they
wanted (Beck, 2000). Third, they targeted passive applicants, people who are satisfied in their
current jobs and not job hunting but who might be lured to Cisco, and developed a convenient
website for them to learn about Cisco. Noticing that they were getting over 500,000 hits per
month during work hours, Cisco made sure that the website was fast and easy to use; for example,
the initial application took 5 minutes to complete. Applicants who pressed a friends@Cisco hot
key got a call from a current Cisco employee at a comparable level within 24 hours (OReilly,
1998). These discussions typically focused on the hard-to-convey culturally relevant information
that, because of the similarity of the source to the candidate, provided credible information about
what it is really like to work at Cisco. Cisco aggressively pursued and won desired candidates by
constructing a comprehensive, culturally relevant selection process.
Tool #2: Managing Culture Through Intensive Socialization and Training
Socialization is the process by which an individual comes to understand the values,
abilities, expected behaviors, and social knowledge that are essential for assuming an
organization role and participating as an organization member. Socialization and selection
processes are somewhat substitutable (Chatman, 1991). In tight labor markets, firms need to rely

13

more on socializing people once they join, and, conversely, when labor is more freely available
and firms can be highly selective, they will not need to invest as much in socialization practices.
Much is known about effective socialization practices (e.g., Pfeffer, 1998). Here we comment on
two key aspects of socialization, ensuring that employees acquire cultural knowledge and that
they bond with one another.
At E*Trade, which was founded in 1996 and grew to become the #2 online brokerage by
1999, new employees are asked to stand up on a chair at their first staff meeting and tell everyone
something embarrassing about themselves (Lee, 2000). Though a slightly bizarre practice, it jibes
with sound psychological logic. Once newcomers disclose this embarrassing thing about
themselves, asking questions about their new job or company wont be nearly as embarrassing.
Newcomers will be much more likely to ask their new colleagues for the information they need to
hit the ground running in their new job without worrying about a loss of face since they already
lost their face at that first meeting! Newcomers are grateful that their new colleagues accept them
despite their faults. Further, knowing that others have gone through this unique initiation rite
creates a bond that allows members to work together more effectively, and, by increasing their
accountability to others, makes it more likely that newcomers will work hard to uphold
established organizational norms. E*Trades CEO, Chistos Cotsakos, has also taken his executive
team Formula One racing to make them move faster, and enrolled them in cooking school to
increase their agility in working together (Lee, 2000). These practices promote the two goals of
socialization: clarifying the cultural values and creating strong bonds among employees so that
they are accountable to one another for upholding those values.
Tool #3: Managing Culture Through the Reward System
Culture is an organizations informal reward system, and needs to be intricately
connected to formal rewards. At CompUSA, the largest retailer and reseller of personal computer
related products and services in the United States; CEO James Halpin has created a cross
between a college fraternity and a military boot camp (Puffer, 1999: 29). The companys

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strategic focus on revenue is extremely salient, sometimes encompassed in rather uncomfortable

practices. For example, regional sales managers attending quarterly meetings are assigned a seat
at the U-shaped table according to their store sales, with those with the lowest sales being
assigned to the tables nearest the front because, as Halpin says, they have to listen to everything
weve got to say (Puffer, 1999: 33). Name badges include a persons name and their stores
shrink number, or inventory losses due to theft or accounting errors. On the positive
reinforcement side, when employees make large commissionssuch as when a young employee
made $50,000 in commission in one month Halpin travels to their store to deliver the cash to
them personally, in front of customers and other employees. Though these specific rewards (and
punishments) may be inappropriate for your organization, the lesson is that rewards need to be
clear, consistent, and comprehensive the focus on revenues at CompUSA is simply impossible
for employees to miss.
Pitfalls Inherent in Leading Through Culture
We hope that we have convinced you that leaders should cultivate their organizational
culture. Employees attend vigilantly to leaders behavior, even the rather mundane such as what
they spend time on, put on their calendar, ask and fail to ask, follow up on, and celebrate (Pfeffer,
1981). These behaviors provide employees with evidence about what counts, and what behaviors
of their own are likely to be rewarded or punished, and they convey much more to employees
about priorities than do printed vision statements and formal policies. It is critical that, once
leaders embark on the path to using culture as a business tool, they regularly review their own
behavior to understand the signals they are sending to members.
Ironically, leading through culture can set leaders up to be vulnerable to a problem,
created by a series of psychological processes recently labeled the hypocrisy attribution dynamic
(Cha & Edmondson, 2001). The reasoning goes something like this: Cultural values are powerful
because they inspire people by appealing to high ideals, and they clarify expectations by making
salient the consistency between these values and each members own behavior (Rokeach, 1973).

15

But, just as emphasizing cultural values inherently alerts us to our own behavior, it makes others
behavior salient too, giving us high standards for judging them as well. We then become
particularly attentive to possible violations, especially by leaders, who are highly visible based on
their power over our fate at work. When we detect potential inconsistencies between stated values
and observed actions, our cognitive tendency to judge others harshly then kicks in.
Leaders who emphasize cultural values should expect employees to interpret those values
by adding their own layers of meaning to them. Over time, an event inevitably occurs that puts
leaders at risk of being viewed as acting inconsistently with the values he or she has espoused.
When leaders behave in ways that appear to violate espoused organizational values, employees,
driven by the so called actor observer bias (Jones & Nisbett, 1971), or the human tendency to
explain ones own behavior generously (viewing good outcomes as caused by ones own
enduring dispositional attributes and bad outcomes as caused by situational influences) and to
explain others behavior unsympathetically (attributing good outcomes to situational influences
and bad outcomes to others enduring dispositional traits), conclude that the leader is personally
failing to walk the talk. In short, organization members perceive hypocrisy and replace their
hard-won commitment with performance-threatening cynicism. Worse yet, because such negative
interpersonal judgments are inherently threatening, employees say nothing publicly, precluding a
fair test of their conclusions and disabling organizational learning from the event. The process
cycles as subsequent events are taken to confirm hypocrisy, and eventually a large number of
employees may become disillusioned.
To avoid this undermining dynamic, leaders need to uphold their commitment to their
culture even in the most trying times. Consider a pivotal moment at Dreyers Grand Ice Cream, a
$1 Billion company (Chang, Chatman, & Carroll, 2001). In June of 1998, a set of unexpected
events coincided to make it the toughest period the company had ever faced. First, the
investments and actions to implement Dreyers Grand Plans brand-building and national
expansion goals took longer than expected and also substantially increased Dreyers cost

16

structure, thus affecting profitability. Second, Dreyers CEO, Gary Rogers, had been diagnosed
with a brain tumor and had undergone neurosurgery and radiation treatment earlier that spring. A
number of unexpected external challenges surfaced as well. Butterfat, the key ice cream
ingredient, rose to a record high of $2.91 per pound, costing the Company an unanticipated $22
million in gross profits in 1998; but aggressive discounting by Dreyers competitors made it
difficult for Dreyers to raise prices by an amount sufficient to compensate for higher dairy costs.
Further, the entire Better-For-You segment (healthier low-fat desserts), in which Dreyers had
invested heavily, began to reverse its upward trajectory. Finally, Ben & Jerrys, the socially
conscious superpremium ice cream company, was threatening to terminate its long-term
distribution contract (and subsequently did so in August 1998), influencing Dreyers national
distribution system, which required distributing significant volumes of their own and competitors
ice cream to offset the cost of building such a system.
Rather than engaging in the kind of panicked cost-cutting common among organizations
in tough situations like this, Dreyers executive team intentionally handled this near-crisis period
in a way that was consistent with the culture in which they had long invested. They started with
honest and open communication and valuing their employees, core components of their culture
that had taken many decades to develop and stemmed directly from Gary Rogers and Rick
Cronks (Dreyers President) personalities of openness and accessibility. As soon as they were
prepared to announce the restructuring to the financial community and their employees,
Executive Committee members were on planes, flying across the country, and by the end of that
week, had met with every one of their more than 4000 employees. As Cronk put it, we know our
limits and understand the law, but we tend to be very open with our employees, we communicate
a lot. An account executive recalled that, They reassured us by calling it straightthey
informed us of their game plan and that they needed us and counted on usyou looked at these
[senior managers] and thought, youd run through a wall for this guy, Dreyers executive staff
and employees were motivated by senior executive visits to rally around the company.

17

Rogers also instituted 1-800 calls to reinforce Dreyers strategy and the successes and
shortcomings of the Grand Plan. These 1-800 calls allowed employees to call in to hear prerecorded speeches by Rogers, and humanized the leadership and ensured that employees had an
avenue to learn about Dreyers strategy and plans directly from the leader. Rogers speeches had
an honest tone that celebrated successes and disclosed shortcomings, and they were exceptionally
popular with employees with anywhere between 600 to 1,100 employees calling in to listen.
In June 1998, Dreyers executive team made a key financial decision to continue to invest
in the Dreyers Leadership University (DLU) providing unequivocal evidence that Dreyers
cared about employee development, even during difficult times. They hoped to reinvent and
rejuvenate the Dreyers leadership, said Cronk. They knew that they would reap the benefits of
such training in the longer term. There was a real foundational understanding that [DLU] was an
investment in the future, said the Director of People Support and Development, that you have
to make an investment in your people and theyll deliver in the future. The VP of sales agreed,
when people heard that we were investing another million dollars into the [culture] and DLU it
created a high degree of comfort and confidence that were focused on whats really important
and that its not just talk.
These culturally consistent actions paid off for Dreyers. By the fall of 2000, the
company rebounded with its robust premium and superpremium (e.g., Dreamery) product lines.
Even though Dreamery only launched in September 1999, it successfully captured 11.5 percent of
the superpremium category. Dreyers entire superpremium portfolio had a 31.3 percent volume
share, while Haagen Dazs had a 34.1 percent share and Ben & Jerrys had a 33.4 percent share
(Teitelbaum & Geissler, 2000). The company also reported positive earnings and analysts
estimated revenue to be $1.2 billion in 2000 and $1.4 billion in 2001 with earnings per share of
$.80 and $1.33 respectively. Dreyers stock price, down as low as 9.88 in September 1998 at the
time of the restructuring announcement, reached over 36 by January, 2001, and, despite the

18

recession and ice cream slow down in winter, closed on December 6, 2001 at 36.12. Dreyers also
signed a new agreement with Ben & Jerrys to distribute its products nationally (after the
Unilevers purchase of Ben & Jerrys was finalized). Finally, Dreyers acquired a number of
distributors to expand its presence in non-grocery outlets. The acquisitions would provide
Dreyers with substantial synergies and cost savings.
Reflecting on that period, Cronk said, It was a common trust and of sharing the facts
opennesswe werent sugarcoating anything, putting a Hollywood spin on anythingwe were
honest and clearpeople believed the story and they understoodthere was an enormous
amount of pride and optimism. Another senior executive recalled his confidence in his sales
team to help Dreyers through difficult times. Weve invested in the culture, I know my people,
my people are winners, not losers weve hired people with the right personalities and weve
instilled in them the Dreyers culture and we have the confidence that they will do the right
thing.
Just as the executive team at Dreyers did, leaders must instill employees with confidence
and clarity about key cultural values. They must make the time to help employees interpret key
events and changes in light of cultural values, on an ongoing basis. If they do not, employees will
provide their own explanations, and when leader behaviors are ambiguous or beloved structures
are axed, the explanations that employees spontaneously generate are not likely to be charitable.
The Three Cs of Culture
Organizational culture can be a powerful force that clarifies whats important and
coordinates members efforts without the costs and inefficiencies of close supervision.
Culture also identifies an organizations distinctive competence to external constituencies.
Managing culture requires creating a context in which people are encouraged and empowered to
express creative ideas and do their very best. Selection, socialization, and rewards should be used
as opportunities to convey whats important to organizational members. Organizational cultures

19

that are strategically relevant, strong, and emphasize innovation and change are most effective.
Three levers exist for forming, strengthening, and changing culture, how you (1) recruit and
select, (2) socialize, orient, and train, (3) reward and lead people. Paradoxically, the very strength
of cultural values can also be a leaders downfall. But, leaders who embrace cultural values when
threatening events occur can avoid this risk. Culture works when it is clear, consistent, and
comprehensive.
One thing is guaranteed: A culture will form in your organization, your group, and your
department. In fact, it already has. The question is whether it is one that helps or hinders your
ability to execute your strategic objectives. Organizational culture is too important to leave to
chance; use your culture to fully execute your strategy and inspire innovation at your company. It
is your primary role as a leader to develop and maintain an effective culture.

20

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