Statutory interpretation

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Judicial interpretation
Forms

Constitutional interpretation
Statutory interpretation

General Rules of Interpretation

Plain meaning rule

Mischief rule
Golden rule

General Theories of Interpretation

Living Constitution/Living tree doctrine

Originalism (Original meaning)

Original intent
(Legislative intent, Legislative history)

Strict constructionism

Textualism

Purposive Approach

Statutory interpretation is the process by which courts interpret and apply legislation. Some
amount of interpretation is often necessary when a case involves a statute. Sometimes the words of
a statute have a plain and straightforward meaning. But in many cases, there is
some ambiguity or vagueness in the words of the statute that must be resolved by the judge. To find
the meanings of statutes, judges use various tools and methods of statutory interpretation, including
traditional canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and purpose. In common
law jurisdictions, the judiciary may apply rules of statutory interpretation to legislation enacted by
the legislature or to delegated legislation such as administrative agency regulations.
Contents
[hide]

1 General principles
o

1.1 Meaning

1.2 Conflicts between sources of law

1.3 Internal and external consistency

1.4 Statements of the legislature

2 Canons
o

2.1 Textual

2.2 Substantive

2.3 Deference

2.4 Criticism

3 European perception

4 Philosophies

5 See also

6 References

7 Further reading

8 External links

General principles[edit]
Meaning[edit]
The judiciary interprets how legislation should apply in a particular case as no legislation
unambiguously and specifically address all matters. Legislation may contain uncertainties for a
variety of reasons:

Words are imperfect symbols to communicate intent. They are ambiguous and change in
meaning over time.

Unforeseen situations are inevitable, and new technologies and cultures make application of
existing laws difficult.

Uncertainties may be added to the statute in the course of enactment, such as the need for
compromise or catering to special interest groups.

Therefore, the court must try to determine how a statute should be enforced. This requires statutory
construction. It is a tenet of statutory construction that the legislature is supreme (assuming
constitutionality) when creating law and that the court is merely an interpreter of the law.
Nevertheless in practice, by performing the construction the court can make sweeping changes in
the operation of the law.
Statutory interpretation refers to the process by which a court looks at a statute and determines what
it means. A statute, which is a bill or law passed by the legislature, imposes obligations and rules on
the people. Statutes, however, although they make the law, may be open to interpretation and have
ambiguities. Statutory interpretation is the process of resolving those ambiguities and deciding how a
particular bill or law will apply in a particular case.

Assume, for example, that a statute mandates that all motor vehicles travelling on a public roadway
must be registered with the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). If the statute does not define the
compass of the term "motor vehicles", then that term will have to be interpreted if questions arise in
a court of law. A person driving a motorcycle might be pulled over and the police may try to fine him if
his motorcycle is not registered with the DMV. If that individual argued to the court that a motorcycle
is not a "motor vehicle," then the court would have to interpret the statute to determine what the
legislature meant by "motor vehicle" and whether or not the motorcycle fell within that definition and
was covered by the statute.
There are numerous rules of statutory interpretation. The first rule and most important rule is the rule
dealing with the statute's plain language. This rule essentially states that the statute means what it
says. If, for example, the statute says "motor vehicles", then the court is most likely to construe that
the legislation is referring to the broad range of motorised vehicles normally required to travel along
roadways and not "aeroplanes" or "bicycles" even though aeroplanes are vehicles propelled by a
motor and bicycles may be used on a roadway.

Conflicts between sources of law [edit]

Where legislation and case law are in conflict, there is a presumption that legislation takes
precedence insofar as there is any inconsistency. In the United Kingdom this principle is known
as Parliamentary Sovereignty. In Australia and in the United States, the courts have consistently
stated that the text of the statute is used first, and it is read as it is written, using the ordinary
meaning of the words of the statute.

U.S. Supreme Court: "We begin with the familiar canon of statutory construction that the
starting point for interpreting a statute is the language of the statute itself. Absent a clearly
expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must ordinarily be regarded as
conclusive.:" Consumer Product Safety Commission et al. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. et al.,447 U.S.
102 (1980). "[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn to one cardinal canon before all
others. . . .[C]ourts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means and means in
a statute what it says there." Connecticut Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 112 S. Ct. 1146, 1149 (1992).
Indeed, "when the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first canon is also the last:
'judicial inquiry is complete.'" 503 U.S. 249, 254.

9th Circuit Court of Appeals: In the dissent in Silveira v. Lockyer, 352 F.3rd 1052 (2002),
Judge Kleinfeld stated "it is 'a cardinal principle of statutory construction that we must give effect,
if possible, to every clause and word of a statute.' Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 404, 120
S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000)."

Supreme Court of Virginia: "Every part of an act is presumed to be of some effect and is not
to be treated as meaningless unless absolutely necessary." Red Ash Coal Corp. v. Absher, 153
Va. 332, 335, 149 S.E. 541, 542 (1929).

Supreme Court of Alaska: "In assessing statutory language, unless words have acquired a
peculiar meaning, by virtue of statutory definition or judicial construction, they are to be
construed in accordance with their common usage." Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923
P.2d 783, 787-88 (Alaska 1996);

Arkansas Supreme Court: "When reviewing issues of statutory interpretation, we keep in

mind that the first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it
reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language.
When the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of
statutory construction. A statute is ambiguous only where it is open to two or more constructions,

or where it is of such obscure or doubtful meaning that reasonable minds might disagree or be
uncertain as to its meaning. When a statute is clear, however, it is given its plain meaning, and
this court will not search for legislative intent; rather, that intent must be gathered from the plain
meaning of the language used. This court is very hesitant to interpret a legislative act in a
manner contrary to its express language, unless it is clear that a drafting error or omission has
circumvented legislative intent." Farrell v. Farrell, 365 Ark. 465, 231 S.W.3d 619. (2006)

Supreme Court of New Mexico: "The principal command of statutory construction is that the
court should determine and effectuate the intent of the legislature using the plain language of the
statute as the primary indicator of legislative intent." State v. Ogden, 118 N.M. 234, 242, 880
P.2d 845, 853 (1994) The words of a statute . . . should be given their ordinary meaning, absent
clear and express legislative intention to the contrary, as long as the ordinary meaning does
not render the statutes application absurd, unreasonable, or unjust. State v. Rowell, 121 N.M.
111, 114, 908 P.2d 1379, 1382 (1995) When the meaning of a statute is unclear or ambiguous,
we have recognized that it is the high duty and responsibility of the judicial branch of
government to facilitate and promote the legislatures accomplishment of its purpose. State ex
rel. Helman v. Gallegos, 117 N.M. 346, 353, 871 P.2d 1352, 1359 (1994). - New Mexico v. Juan,
2010-NMSC-041, August 9, 2010

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit: "As in all statutory construction cases, we
begin with the language of the statute. The first step is to determine whether the language at
issue has a plain and unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute in the
case." Barnhart v. Sigmon Coal Co., 534 U.S. 438, 450 (2002) "[U]nless otherwise defined,
statutory words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common
meaning." United States v. Piervinanzi, 23 F.3d 670, 677 (2d Cir. 1994).

Federal jurisdictions may presume that either federal or local government authority prevails in the
absence of a defined rule. In Canada, there are areas of law where provincial governments and the
federal government have concurrent jurisdiction. In these cases the federal law is held to be
paramount. However, in areas where the Canadian constitution is silent, the federal government
does not necessarily have superior jurisdiction. Rather, an area of law that is not expressly
mentioned in Canada's Constitution will have to be interpreted to fall under either the federal residual
jurisdiction found in the preamble of s. 91 -- known as the Peace, Order and Good Government
clause -- or the provinces residual jurisdiction of "Property and Civil Rights" under s. 92(13) of the
1867 Constitution Act. This contrasts with other federal jurisdictions, notably the United
States andAustralia, where it is presumed that if legislation is not enacted pursuant to a specific
provision of the federal Constitution, the states will have authority over the relevant matter in their
respective jurisdictions, unless the state's definitions of their statutes conflicts with federally
established or recognized rights.

Internal and external consistency[edit]

It is presumed that a statute will be interpreted so as to be internally consistent. A particular section
of the statute shall not be divorced from the rest of the act. The ejusdem generis (or eiusdem
generis, Latin for "of the same kind") rule applies to resolve the problem of giving meaning to groups
of words where one of the words is ambiguous or inherently unclear. The rule results that where
"general words follow enumerations of particular classes or persons or things, the general words
shall be construed as applicable only to persons or things of the same general nature or kind as
those enumerated." 49 F. Supp. 846, 859. Thus, in a statute forbidding the concealment on one's
person of "pistols, revolvers, derringers, or other dangerous weapons," the term "dangerous
weapons" may be construed to comprehend only dangerous weapons of the kind enumerated; i.e.,
firearms, or perhaps more narrowly still, handguns. A hypothetical court may have to determine
whether a sword, a Japanese throwing star, or a Taser fit into the "other" category of the statute.

Here, the term "other dangerous weapons" must be given a meaning of the "same kind" as the word
of established meaning.
A statute shall not be interpreted so as to be inconsistent with other statutes. Where there is an
inconsistency, the judiciary will attempt to provide a harmonious interpretation.

Statements of the legislature[edit]

Legislative bodies themselves may try to influence or assist the courts in interpreting their laws by
placing into the legislation itself statements to that effect. These provisions have many different
names, but are typically noted as:

Findings;

Declarations, sometimes suffixed with of Policy or of Intent; or

Sense of Congress, or of either house in multi-chamber bodies.

These provisions of the bill simply give the legislature's goals and desired effects of the law, and are
considered nonsubstantive and non-enforcable in and of themselves. [1][2]

Canons[edit]
Also known as canons of construction, canons give common sense guidance to courts in interpreting
the meaning of statutes. Most canons emerge from the common lawprocess through the choices of
judges. Proponents of the use of canons argue that the canons constrain judges and limit the ability
of the courts to legislate from the bench. Critics argue that a judge always has a choice between
competing canons that lead to different results, so judicial discretion is only hidden through the use
of canons, not reduced.

Textual[edit]
Textual canons are rules of thumb for understanding the words of the text. Some of the canons are
still known by their traditional Latin names.
Plain meaning
When writing statutes, the legislature intends to use ordinary English words in their ordinary
senses. The United States Supreme Court discussed the plain meaning rule inCaminetti v.
United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917), reasoning "[i]t is elementary that the meaning of a
statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if
that is plain... the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms." And if a
statute's language is plain and clear, the Court further warned that "the duty of interpretation
does not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful meanings need no discussion."
Rule against surplusage
Where one reading of a statute would make one or more parts of the statute redundant and
another reading would avoid the redundancy, the other reading is preferred. [citation needed]
Ejusdem generis ("of the same kinds, class, or nature")
When a list of two or more specific descriptors is followed by more general descriptors, the
otherwise wide meaning of the general descriptors must be restricted to the same class, if
any, of the specific words that precede them. For example, where "cars, motor bikes, motor
powered vehicles" are mentioned, the word "vehicles" would be interpreted in a limited sense
(therefore vehicles cannot be interpreted as including airplanes).
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("the express mention of one thing excludes
all others")

Items not on the list are impliedly assumed not to be covered by the statute or a contract
term.[3] However, sometimes a list in a statute is illustrative, not exclusionary. This is usually
indicated by a word such as "includes" or "such as."
In pari materia ("upon the same matter or subject")
When a statute is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined in light of other statutes on the
same subject matter.
Noscitur a sociis ("a word is known by the company it keeps")
When a word is ambiguous, its meaning may be determined by reference to the rest of the
statute.
Reddendo singula singulis or "referring each to each"
"When a will says "I devise and bequeath all my real and personal property to A", the
principle of reddendo singula singulis would apply as if it read "I devise all my real property,
and bequeath all my personal property, to A", since the word devise is appropriate only to
real property and the term bequeath is appropriate only to personal property." [4]
Generalia specialibus non derogant ("the general does not detract
from the specific")
Main article: lex specialis
Described in The Vera Cruz[5] as: "Now if anything be certain it is this, that where there are
general words in a later Act capable of reasonable and sensible application without
extending them to subjects specially dealt with by earlier legislation, you are not to hold that
earlier legislation indirectly repealed, altered, or derogated from merely by force of such
general words, without any evidence of a particular intention to do so." This means that if a
later law and an earlier law are potentiallybut not necessarilyin conflict, courts will adopt
the reading that does not result in an implied repeal of the earlier statute. Lawmaking bodies
usually need to be explicit if they intend to repeal an earlier law.

Substantive[edit]
Substantive canons instruct the court to favor interpretations that
promote certain values or policy results.
"Charming Betsy" Canon
National statute must be construed so as not to conflict with international law. See Murray v.
The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804): "It has also been observed that an act of
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
construction remains..."
Interpretation in Light of Fundamental Values
Statute does not violate fundamental societal values. See, for example, Holy Trinity Church
v. United States,[6] or Coco v The Queen.[7] However, legislation that is intended to be
consistent with fundamental rights can be overridden by clear and unambiguous language. [8]
Rule of Lenity
In construing an ambiguous criminal statute, the court should resolve the ambiguity in favor
of the defendant. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987); See, e.g., Muscarello
v. U.S., 524 U.S. 125 (1998) (declining to apply the rule of lenity); Evans v. U.S., 504 U.S.
255 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Scarborough v. U.S., 431 U.S. 563 (1977) (Stewart, J.,
dissenting); See United States v. Santos (2008).
Avoidance of abrogation of state sovereignty
[9]
See Gregory v. Ashcroft; see also Gonzales v. Oregon;[10] see also Nevada Dept. of Human
Resources v. Hibbs,[11] except where such would deprive the defendant of bedrock,
foundational rights that the Federal Government intended to be the minimum floor that the
states were not allowed to fall beneath; Dombrowski v Pfister.[12]
"Indian" Canon

National statute must be construed in favor of Native Americans. See Chickasaw Nation v.
United States, 534 U.S. 84 (2001): "statutes are to be construed liberally in favor of Indians
with ambiguous provisions interpreted to their benefit." This canon can be likened to the
doctrine of contra proferentem in contract law.

Deference[edit]
Deference canons instruct the court to defer to
the interpretation of another institution, such as
an administrative agency or Congress. These
canons reflect an understanding that the
judiciary is not the only branch of government
entrusted with constitutional responsibility.
Deference to Administrative Interpretations
(US Chevron deference)
If a statute administered by an agency is ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the
courts will defer to the agency's reasonable interpretation of the statute. This rule of
deference was formulated by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
Avoidance Canon (Canon of
Constitutional Avoidance)
If a statute is susceptible to more than one reasonable construction, courts should choose an
interpretation that avoids raising constitutional problems. In the US, this canon has grown
stronger in recent history. The traditional avoidance canon required the court to choose a
different interpretation only when one interpretation was actually unconstitutional. The
modern avoidance canon tells the court to choose a different interpretation when another
interpretation merely raises constitutional doubts.[13][14]
Avoiding Absurdity
The legislature did not intend an absurd or manifestly unjust result. [15][16]
Clear statement rule
When a statute may be interpreted to abridge long-held rights of individuals or states, or
make a large policy change, courts will not interpret the statute to make the change unless
the legislature clearly stated it. This rule is based on the assumption that the legislature
would not make major changes in a vague or unclear way, and to ensure that voters are able
to hold the appropriate legislators responsible for the modification.
Leges posteriores priores
contrarias
abrogant (Subsequent laws
repeal those before enacted
to the contrary, aka "Last in
Time")
When two statutes conflict, the one enacted last prevails.

Latin phrases in statutory construction

Posted on March 23, 2009 by danabatnag

He says: You are the one I love the most among the women in my life, and that includes my mother, my sister and
my grandmother. You ask him, Is that ejusdem generis or expressio unius? And he answers, Ejusdem generis.
Should you slap him or kiss him?
Heres a short reviewer on some Latin phrases in Legal Method. The phrases are followed by a very short description
of cases that illustrate the Latin rule. The definitions are taken from Agpalos book on Statutory Construction.
NOSCITUR A SOCIIS
Words must be construed in conjunction with the other words and phrases used in the text.
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole. The particular words, clauses
and phrases should not be studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute
must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts and in order to produce a harmonious whole. Where a
particular word or phrase in a statement is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings, its true
meaning may be clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found or with which it is associated.
Aisporna vs. CA: wife of insurance agent prosecuted for having sold an insurance without registering as an agent.
Using this doctrine, the Court ruled that an insurance agent is one who sells insurance in return for compensation,
and it was not proved that Aisporna received compensation for the insurance she was alleged to have sold. (Her
defense was that as her husbands clerk, she only renewed the insurance because her husband was out at the time).
Dai-Chi Electronics Manufacturing Corp. v. Villarama: Dai-Chi filed a complaint against Villarama for violating an
agreement that he would not join the companys competitor within two years after leaving Dai-Chi. Dai-Chi filed a
complaint against Villarama at the RTC, which dismissed it on grounds of lack of jurisdiction, for it should have been
filed before a labor arbiter. Using the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, the court ruled that while the Labor Code says that
all money claims of workers were under the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter, it did not mean to encompass the entire
universe of money claims that might be asserted by workers against their employers. Paragraph 3 should not be read
in isolation, but rather in conjunction with paragraphs 1 to 5, which all refer to money claims of workers arising from
violations of or in connection with an employee-employer relationship. Dai-Chis complaint was anchored on a
violation of contract, since Villarama was no longer an employee. The court ruled that the RTC was the proper venue
for filing of the case.
EJUSDEM GENERIS
Where a statute describes things of particular class or kind accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic
words will usually be limited to things of a kindred nature with those particularly enumerated, unless there be
something in the context of the statute to repel such influence. Ejusdem generis could be expansive, however,
because the list is not exclusive; it may be expanded if a juridical tie could be found with another item.
Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corp: Because gambling was with the phrase and other prohibited games of chance it
was construed to refer only to illegal gambling.
PBA v CA: Where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to
persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
EXPRESSIO UNIUS EST EXCLUSION ALTERIUS
The express mention of one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. Variation: Expressium

facit cessare tacitum. What is expressed puts an end to what is implied. Where a statute is expressly limited to
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be extended to other matters. Canon of restrictive
interpretation.
Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specified
enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict its meaning and to confine its terms to those expressly
mentioned.
Malinias v Comelec: An attempt to use an administrative charge for a criminal complaint against police officers
accused of violating the election code. The court ruled that not all violations of the election code provided for criminal
penalties and in this case, the violated provisions only warrant the imposition of administrative, not criminal, penalties.
Centeno v Villalon-Pornillos: A group of old men charged with violating the solicitation permit law was acquitted
because the term religious purpose was not expressly included in the provisions of the statute, and what the law does
not include, it excludes. The law referred only to charitable purposes, which phrase cannot be construed so as to
include a religious purpose.
DISSIMILUM DISSIMILIS EST RATIO
The courts may distinguish when there are facts and circumstances showing that the legislature intended a distinction
or qualification.
Garvida v. Sales: Sales sought to have Garvida disqualified from the SK post because of age. The court ruled that
while the Local Govt Code provided that SK members should be 21 years old, it added a qualification that should
officials should be 21 years old on the date of election. Garvida was disqualified because she was more than 21
years old, although she was less than 22 years old.
CASUS OMISSUS
Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est. A person, object, or thing omitted from an enumeration in a statute must be
held to have been omitted intentionally.
This needs two laws. In expressio unius, its just the enumeration you are looking at, not another law.
COA of the Province of Cebu v Province of Cebu: This case is about the effects of a new law on an old law. The
Special Education Fund (SEF) allowed the use of part of the realty and cigarette taxes for extension programs and
scholarships. When the Cebu provincial office used it to pay for salaries of teachers and scholars, COA said those
were not chargeable to the SEF since RA 5447, which created the SEF, was deemed repealed by the Local Govt
Code. Because the two retained sections in the LGC omitted the scholarship grants, the court ruled that what was
omitted must have been omitted intentionally, and so may not be included.
UBI LEX NON DISTINGUIT NEC NOS DISTINGUERE DEBEMOS
Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish.
Ramirez v CA: The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be
a party other than or different from those involved in the private communication.

Cebu Institute of Medicine v Cebu Institute of Medicine Employees Union-National Federation of Labor: Other
benefits may refer to SSS, Medicare, Pagibig and may be taken from the 70% tuition increase since the law only
says that money from this may be given to employees in the form of salaries and other benefits. Since the law did not
distinguish between other benefits and SSS, etc, these may be deducted from the 70% increase in tuition charged
by the school.
REDEENDO SINGULAR SINGULIS
Referring each to each; let each be put in its proper place, that is, the words should be taken distributively.
Amadora v CA: Teachers should apply to pupils and students; and heads of establishment of arts and trades to
apprentices. The teacher in charge must answer for a students tort, but in this case none of those charged were
either the teacher in charge or the dean of boys.
People vs Tamani: Promulgation should refer to judgment and notice should refer to order. The computation of the
filing of the petition was wrong. (This was an obiter because the filing was late either way it is computed, and the
court decided on the case anyway).