EUTIQUIO TORRE, TRANQUILINO TORRE, and BENITO

TORRE vs. HON. JOSE R. QUERUBIN, Judge of the Court of

First Instance, Branch II, of Capiz, and SATURNINA UY BIEN
PIAO
SYLLABUS
1. PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTION; WRIT AVAILABLE
DURING THE PENDENCY OF AN ACTION TO RECOVER POSSESSION.
Prior to the promulgation of the New Civil Code of 1950, during the
pendency of an action for the recovery of possession of real property, it was
improper to issue a preliminary writ of injunction where the party to be
enjoined had already taken complete material possession of the property
involved, this under the theory that the effect of the writ would be to
deprive the actual possessor of his material and actual possession and
place the plaintiff in possession, all without due process of law; that a writ
of injunction should not be used to take away property from one and give it
to another; and that the writ of preliminary injunction operates only upon
unperformed and unexecuted acts to prevent a threatened but nonexistent
injury, or to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of
dispossession against the plaintiff. However, the law has now been
changed, and under Article 539 of the New Civil Code, a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction is now available to the plaintiff during
the pendency of his action to recover possession.
DECISION
This is a petition for a writ of certiorari to declare null and void the order
of respondent Judge Jose R. Querubin, dated March 21, 1955, in Civil Case
No. K-576 of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, Branch II, issuing a writ
of preliminary injunction against Eutiquio, Tranquilino, and Benito, all
surnamed Torre, defendants in said civil case and petitioners herein.
In her complaint in said case (Annex A), Saturnina alleged that she was the
owner of a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 1574 of the Cadastral
Survey of Kalibo, Capiz, with an area of about two and a half hectares, she
and her predecessor in interest having possessed and exercised dominion
over the same since the year 1888; that the lot was adjudicated to her in
Civil Case No. K-331, entitled Pablo Meez v. Crisanta Torre and Roque
Morales, wherein she, Saturnina, took part as intervenor; that after the
decision in said case had become final and executory, by virtue of a writ of
execution, the provincial sheriff placed her in actual and material
possession of the land; that on or about August, 1954, after she had been
placed in possession, the defendants in Civil Case No. K-576, without any
legal right of title and by means of force and intimidation, entered the land
and deprived her of the possession thereof and enjoyment of the products,
and had been continuously disturbing and interfering with her possession
and usufruct; and that despite repeated demands made by her and her
caretaker, Defendants, the Torres, refused to vacate the property. In her
complaint, she asked for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction to restore her in her possession, and to restrain the defendants
and their attorneys and agents, and she offered to file a bond.
Due apparently to the opposition of Eutiquio Torre, one of the defendants
(Annex B), as well as the claim of ownership of the land made by
defendants in their answer, and their denial that Saturnina was ever placed
in possession of the land by the sheriff, respondent Judge Querubin, by
order of February 5, 1955, denied the petition for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction. However, on motion for reconsideration by
Saturnina (Annex F), and despite the opposition filed by defendant
Tranquilino Torre (Annex G) respondent Judge Querubin, by order of
March 21, 1955, set aside his previous order denying the petition for the
issuance of the writ of injunction and granted the petition, ordering that a
writ of preliminary injunction issue "restraining the defendants and their
agents from the possession of the land in question, upon filing a bond in
the sum of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000)." In said order granting the
petition, respondent Judge found and stated that Saturnina had really
been placed in possession by the sheriff, as evidenced not only by the
Sheriffs Return of Service and the Minutes of the Delivery of Possession,
but by the declaration of the sheriff himself to the effect that he actually
delivered possession of the land to Saturnina on February 26, 1954; that on
the occasion of the delivery of possession to her, Defendants, the Torres, in
Civil Case No. K-576 were not present; that when he, the sheriff, returned
to the land on July 3, 1954 to execute the order for the demolition of the
house on it, Eutiquio Torre and his brother, Tranquilino Torre, were
present and opposed the demolition, claiming that the house belonged to
them and that they were the exclusive owners of the land. The respondent
Judge found that the occupation of the land by the defendants began only
after Saturnina had been placed in possession. A motion for
reconsideration of said order of March 21, 1955 having been denied, the
present petition for a writ of certiorari was filed, as already stated, to
annul the order just mentioned.
The question involved in the present case is whether or not the trial court,
or rather, respondent Judge Querubin was authorized to issue the writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction during the pendency of Civil Case No.
K-576.
Prior to the promulgation of the New Civil Code of 1950, during the
pendency of an action for the recovery of possession of real property, it was
improper to issue a preliminary writ of injunction where the party to be
enjoined had already taken complete material possession of the property
involved, this under the theory that the effect of the writ would be to
deprive the actual possessor of his material and actual possession and

place the plaintiff in possession, all without due process of law; that a writ
of injunction should not be used to take away property from one and give it
to another; and that the writ of preliminary injunction operates only upon
unperformed and unexecuted acts to prevent a threatened but nonexistent
injury, or to prevent the defendant from committing further acts of
dispossession against the plaintiff.
However, the law has now been changed, and under Article 539 of the New
Civil Code, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction is now available to
the plaintiff during the pendency of his action to recover possession. We
reproduce said Article 539:
"ART. 539. Every possessor has a right to be respected in his possession;
and should he be disturbed therein he shall be protected in or restored to
said possession by the means established by the laws and the Rules of
Court.
A possessor deprived of his possession through forcible entry may within
ten days from the filing of the complaint present a motion to secure from
the competent court, in the action for forcible entry, a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction to restore him in his possession. The court shall
decide the motion within thirty (30) days from the filing thereof."
The reason for this change in the law is found in the report of the Code
Commission which says the following:
"The writ of preliminary injunction is called for by the fact that there are at
present prolonged litigations between the owner and usurper, and the
former is frequently deprived of his possession even when he has an
immediate right thereto." (Report of the Code Commission, p. 98).
In the present case, according to the findings of the trial court, plaintiff
Saturnina was actually placed in possession on the land in question by the
sheriff, in execution of a final judgment in her favor. The defendantpetitioners herein were appraised of said action of the sheriff, knew that
Saturnina was placed in material possession of the property, and yet they
apparently entered the land by force and intimidation and deprived
Saturnina of the possession given to her by the sheriff. It will also be
remembered that Saturnina, in her complaint against the defendantspetitioners herein, asked for the issuance of the writ of injunction, at the
same time offering to file a bond. It is therefore clear that the case comes
under the provisions of Article 539 of the New Civil Code, authorizing the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, as was done by
respondent Judge Querubin.
In view of the foregoing, the petition for a writ of certiorari is hereby
denied, with costs.
BACOLOD-MURCIA MILLING CO., INC. and HON. JOSE F.
FERNANDEZ vs. CAPITOL SUBDIVISION, INC. and THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS
The Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., applied for a writ of certiorari to
annul and set aside the resolution adopted on 18 March 1966 by the Fourth
Division of the Court of Appeals, in its Case CA-G.R. No. 27141-R, entitled
Capitol Subdivision, Inc. vs. Judge Jose F. Fernandez and Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co., enjoining enforcement of a writ of preliminary injunction
issued by respondent Judge Fernandez in Civil Case No. 7698 of the Court
of First Instance of Occidental Negros, upon posting by Capitol
Subdivision, Inc. of a bond in the sum of P50,000.00.
On 11 April 1966, we enjoined enforcement of the resolution of the Court of
Appeals upon the Milling Company's putting up a bond of P100,000.00.
The entire case originated in a suit filed on 10 October 1965 by BacolodMurcia Milling Company (hereinafter termed the Central) against Capitol
Subdivision, Inc. (herein designated as the Subdivision) "to award plaintiff
a legal easement of right of way over defendant's property known as
"Hacienda Mandalagan", particularly Lots 410-3 and 1205 of the Bacolod
cadastre. The complaint averred that on 30 August 1920 the original
owners of said "Hacienda" had entered into a milling contract with the
Central for a period of thirty (30) years, later extended to forty-five (45)
years, from the crop year 1920-1921; that the contract stipulated that the
planter gratuitously ceded for a period of forty-five (45) years a right of
way for the railways, canals, water pipes and telephone lines that the
Central might require, and that although a certain portion of the
"Hacienda" was intended for subdivision the easement of right of way
granted would be always respected; that pursuant to the stipulation, the
Central had built a railroad line occupying 2,138 lineal meters in length
and seven (7) meters wide, over the lands of the "Hacienda Mandalagan
using the same for transporting to Sto. Nio Dock the export sugar of the
Central and its adherent planters, and other materials, that the milling
contracts would expire on the crop year 1964-1965, and the Subdivision
had demanded from plaintiff Central the removal of the railroad tracks and
threatened to close the same; that such action, if carried out, would cause
irreparable damage to the Central and its planters, who have to fill a yearly
quota which is part of the commitment to the Republic of the United
States, unless the right of way and its continued use be legally recognized
as a legal easement of right of way, upon payment of reasonable
compensation, for a period coterminous with the existence and operation
of the Central. Plaintiff then prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction to
restrain the Subdivision from interfering, obstructing, or preventing the
passage of the Central's locomotives and cars, as otherwise plaintiff's mill
operation would be completely paralyzed.

Over the Subdivision's objections and motion to dismiss, on the ground

that the complaint stated no cause of action, the Court of First Instance, as
previously noted, issued, on 13 October 1965, the preliminary injunction
prayed for by the Central. Its motions for reconsideration having proved
unavailing, the Subdivision resorted to the Court of Appeals on certiorari,
alleging abuse of discretion, and the Fourth Division, after answer by the
Central, issued the resolution of 18 March 1966, which recites as follows:
It being admitted in respondent's answer to the petition
for certiorari, etc., that the questions whether or not the sugar
central of respondent's Bacolod-Murcia abuts a public highway;
whether or not said respondent's mill actually abuts a principal
city street, and whether or not the said public highway is
inadequate or insufficient are matters of evidence that should
be first established during the trial of the merits of Civil Case No.
7698. Bacolod-Murcia Milling, Co., Inc. vs. Capitol Subdivision,
Inc., before respondent Judge; that pending decision of the case
just mentioned, it cannot be safely assumed that respondent
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., is entitled to the legal
easement prayed for in its complaint therein; that when
respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction
complained of, the contractual easement had already expired,
hence the said injunction was issued on the premature
assumption that respondent Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., is
entitled to the legal easement prayed for by it; that one of the
purposes for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is to
maintain the status quo, which in this case is the fact that the
right of respondent Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., to operate
the right of way over petitioner's property had already ceased
with the said expiration or termination of its contractual
easement, and that for these reasons, in addition to those
adduced by petitioner in its said petition forcertiorari etc., and
in its rejoinder to respondent's answer, it follows that herein
petitioner is entitled to the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction restraining respondent Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co.,
Inc., its agents, representatives and employees from committing
acts of trespass upon the property of petitioner, more
specifically, from passing its locomotives and rail cars through
the said property, and respondent Judge from enforcing the writ
of preliminary injunction that he has authorized under his order
dated October 13, 1965 it is ordered that, upon the filing of
bond in the amount of P50,000.00, the said writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for by petitioner will be issued, until further
order of this Court.
"SO ORDERED."
The Central in turn resorted to this Court for certiorari against the
resolution of the Court of Appeals, alleging that the same virtually decides
the case, usurping the functions of the trial judge, and, unless restrained,
would enervate and render nugatory whatever judgment might be
rendered in the main case.
After mature consideration and deliberation, this Court has reached the
conclusion that the present petition of the Central is unmeritorious, and
should be dismissed. The records submitted by the parties show that the
Court of Appeals has correctly pointed out a fatal defect in the issuance of
the preliminary injunction by the Court of origin, and that is its having
ignored the undisputed fact that the Central's right to use the railway
across the lands of the respondent subdivision expired with its milling
contract, i.e., on 30 September 1965. From and after that date, the Central
had to rely strictly on its being entitled to a compulsory servitude without
first establishing the preconditions for its grant fixed by Articles 649 and
650 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:
(1) That it is surrounded by other immovables and has no
adequate outlet to a public highway (Art. 649, par. 1);
(2) After payment of proper indemnity (Art. 649, p. 1, end);
(3) That the isolation was not due to the Central's own acts (Art.
649, last par.); and
(4) That the right of way claimed is "at the point least prejudicial
to the servient estate; and insofar as consistent with this rule,
where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway
may be the shortest (Art. 650).
By express provision of law, therefore, a compulsory right of way can not
be obtained unless the four requisites enumerated are first shown to exist,
and the burden of proof to show their existence was on the Central.
Nowhere in the complaint is any specific averment, nor is there in the
Court of First Instance orders for the issuance of the writ of temporary
injunction, and denying its reconsideration, any specific finding, even
preliminary, that each and everyone of the four preconditions do exist. The
Central's original complaint only makes reference to a reasonable
compensation in paragraph 14 and no more. Assuming that such
expression can be stretched into a manifestation that the Central is willing
to pay such compensation as may be ultimately fixed by the Court, it still is
not the prepayment required by Article 649 of the Civil Code; so that all

four requisites are lacking. This deficiency made the issuance of a

preliminary injunction improvident and arbitrary, for the first condition
for the granting of the writ is "that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
demanded" (sec. 3[a]), Rule 58, Revised Rules) and "that the complaint in
the action is verified, and shows facts entitling the plaintiff to the relief
demanded" (section 4[a], Rule 58). None of the four requisites for
compelling the grant of a right of way being shown, the title or right of
petitioner Central to the relief demanded is not clearly established and the
extraordinary writ of injunction should not have been issued, since
injunction, whether preliminary or final, is not designed to protect
contingent or future rights.
The basic rule in this matter is laid down in 32 C.J. 34, 35, quoted with
approval in North Negros Sugar Co. vs. Hidalgo, 63 Phil. 671, 677:
"x x x Where it is clear that the complainant does not have the
right that he claims, he is not entitled to an injunction, either
temporary or perpetual, to prevent a violation such supposed
right. ... An injunction will not issue to protect of a right not in
esse and which may never arise or to restrain an act which does
not give rise to a cause of action, x x x ." (32 C.J., pp. 34, 35.)
To the same effect is the rule stated in American Jurisprudence (Vol. 28,
section 26, p. 517):
"Injunction, like other equitable remedies, will issue only at the
instance of a suitor who has sufficient interest or title in the right
or property sought to be protected. A court of equity has no
power to issue an injunction where only abstract rights are
involved. For the court to act there must be an existing basis of
facts affording a present right which is directly threatened by
the act sought to be enjoined. An impending or threatened
invasion of some legal right of the complainant, and some
interest in preventing the wrong sought to be perpetrated must
be shown. It is always a ground for denying injunction that the
party seeking it has insufficient title or interest to sustain it, and
no claim to the ultimate relief sought in other words, that he
shows no equity. Want of equity on the part of the plaintiff in
attempting to use the injunctive process of the court to enforce a
mere barren right will justify the court in refusing the relief even
though the defendant has little equity on his side. The
complainant's right or title, moreover, must be clear and
unquestioned, for equity, as a rule, will not take cognizance of
suits to establish title, and will not lend its preventive aid by
injunction where the complaint's title or right is doubtful or
disputed. He must stand on the strength of his own right or title,
rather than on the weakness of that claimed by his adversary."
(28 Am. Jur., Sec. 26; Emphasis supplied.)
The possibility of irreparable damage, without proof or violation of an
actually existing right, is no ground for an injunction, being mere damnum
absque injuria. In Boix, et al., vs. Ilao, et al., G.R. No. L-20010, 30
October 1962, this Court held:
"It may be observed that the original order of March 29, 1962,
granting the writ of preliminary injunction that restrained
petitioners from obstructing the passage of Batalla's trucks, was
based on the allegation in the complaint of the existence of
plaintiff's right to the use of the road. In its order of June 18,
1962, dissolving the writ of injunction, the lower court found
otherwise and declared the said road as "belonging to
defendants and that plaintiff has not acquired any right to use
the same for her logging purposes." Later, however, or on July
13, 1962, the lower court, without setting aside this order of June
18, 1962 expressly declaring the road as belonging to defendants
and that plaintiff has not acquired any right to use the same, the
respondent judge revived the injunction on the mere
representation of plaintiff that she had to load and ship her
lumber on July 18, 1962. This, we believe, constitutes no
sufficient justification for her use of petitioner Boix' road,
against the latter's will. Upon the facts before the court at the
time, it was irregular and improper and was a grave abuse of
discretion to issue or revive the mandatory injunction
compelling respondent Boix to permit the use of his private
road by the plaintiff who up to that time the court has declared
not to have acquired any right to use the same." (Emphasis
supplied).
In truth, the court of origin seems to have proceeded on the erroneous
assumption that, even after expiration of its contractual right of way,
petitioner Central was entitled to a compulsory right of way in the same
location and route it had been using up to the present. This is not true: the
Central's use of the present railway for the preceding 45 years was based
on the assent of the Subdivision's predecessors-in-interest, as evidenced by
their milling contract, while a compulsory servitude of right of way on the
same spot and route must be predicated on the minimum inconvenience to
the would be servient estate, in addition to the other requisites above set
forth. There is no specific finding by the court of origin that the
prerequisites exist, and the lack of it suffices to negate the Central's right to
the servitude claimed, as it likewise negates the propriety of the temporary
injunction issued.

In issuing the preliminary writ for defendant to permit the Central to use
its railway, in the manner established under the milling contract, the court
of origin in effect extended that corresponding part of the contract even
beyond the term stipulated by the parties. Such action is not warranted by
law. The function of an injunction is the maintenance of the status quo as
of the time of its issuance, and at that time, the right of the Central under
the milling contract had uncontrovertibly expired. It needs no emphasizing
that the court can not create contracts between the parties.
Neither can it be said that the isolation in which petitioner Central would
find itself, if not allowed to use its contractual right of way, was not due to
its own acts. The Central had every reason to know that its continued
operation of the railway in its present route would expire on 30 September
1965, and is held bound to know the requisites upon which the law
conditions the right to demand a compulsory right of way. Yet the record is
bereft of showing that the petitioner Central took seasonable any legal or
otherwise, to secure the uninterrupted operation of the railway in question.
This laches of the Central is another reason that makes the issuance of the
preliminary junction complained of entirely unwarranted and abusive, for
a remedy based on equity may not be awarded in favor of those who sleep
on their rights.
Finally, the charge of petitioner Central, that the resolution of the Court of
Appeals anticipated the final decision on the merits by the court below, is
without merit. Said resolution correctly declared that the preliminary
injunction was issued on an erroneous premise, "the premature
assumption that respondent Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc., is entitled to
the legal easement prayed for by it", since the existence of the statutory
requisites for such easement had not been properly averred or proved, as
elsewhere discussed in this decision. Of course, petitioner may duly show
at the hearing on the merits that the preconditions required by the Civil
Code do actually exist; but until that is done, the right to the legal servitude
is not clear, and the writ of injunction is unwarranted, and issued in grave
abuse of discretion.
Wherefore, the petition for certiorari is dismissed, and the preliminary
injunction previously issued by this Court is lifted and set aside, and the
injunction of the Court of Appeals is restored. Costs against petitioner,
Bacolod-Murcia Milling Co., Inc.
G.R. No. 13228

September 13, 1918

WILLIAM OLLENDORFF, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IRA

ABRAHAMSON, defendant-appellant.
This is an appeal by defendant from a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila by which he was enjoined for a term of five years, from
September 10, 1915, from engaging in the Philippine Islands in any
business similar to or competitive with that of plaintiff.
The record discloses that plaintiff is and for a long time past has been
engaged in the city of Manila and elsewhere in the Philippine Islands in the
business of manufacturing ladies embroidered underwear for export.
Plaintiff imports the material from which this underwear is made and
adopts decorative designs which are embroidered upon it by Filipino
needle workers from patterns selected and supplied by him. Most of the
embroidery work is done in the homes of the workers. The embroidered
material is then returned to plaintiff's factory in Manila where it is made
into finished garments and prepared for export. The embroiderers
employed by plaintiff are under contract to work for plaintiff exclusively.
Some fifteen thousand home workers and eight hundred factory workers
are engaged in this work for plaintiff, and some two and a half million
pesos are invested in his business.
On September 10, 1915, plaintiff and defendant entered into a contract in
the following terms:
Contract of agreement made and entered into this date by and between
William Ollendorff, of Manila, Philippine Islands, party of the first part,
and Ira Abrahamson, of Manila, Philippine Islands, party of the second
part:
The party of first part hereby agrees to employ the party of the second part,
and the party of the second part hereby obligates and binds himself to
work for the party of the first part for a term of two years from date
commencing from the sixth of September, one thousand nine hundred and
fifteen and ending on the fifth day of September, one thousand nine
hundred seventeen, at a salary of fifty peso (50) per week payable at the
end of each week.
The party of the second part hereby obligates and binds himself to devote
his entire time, attention, energies and industry to the promotion of the
furtherance of the business and interest of the party of the first part and to
perform during the term of this contract such duties as may be assigned to
him by the party of the first part, and failure by the said party of the second
part to comply with these conditions to the satisfaction of the party of the
first shall entitle the party of the first part to discharge and dismiss the said
party of the second part from the employ of the party of the first part.

It is mutually understood and agreed by the parties hereto that this

contract, upon its termination, may be extended for a like for a longer or a
shorter period by the mutual consent of both contracting parties.
The said party of the second part hereby further binds and obligates
himself, his heirs, successors and assigns, that he will not enter into or
engage himself directly or indirectly, nor permit any other person under
his control to enter in or engage in a similar or competitive business to that
of the said party of the first part anywhere within the Philippine Islands for
a period of five years from this date.
Under the terms of this agreement defendant entered the employ of
plaintiff and worked for him until April, 1916, when defendant, on account
of ill health, left plaintiff's employ and went to the United States. While in
plaintiff's establishment, and had full opportunity to acquaint himself with
plaintiff's business method and business connection. The duties performed
by him were such as to make it necessary that he should have this
knowledge of plaintiff's business. Defendant had a general knowledge of
the Philippine embroidery business before his employment by plaintiff,
having been engaged in similar work for several years.
Some months after his departure for the United States, defendant returned
to Manila as the manager of the Philippine Underwear Company, a
corporation. This corporation does not maintain a factory in the Philippine
Islands, but send material and embroidery designs from New York to its
local representative here who employs Filipino needle workers to
embroider the designs and make up the garments in their homes. The only
difference between plaintiff's business and that of the firm by which the
defendant is employed, is the method of doing the finishing work -- the
manufacture of the embroidered material into finished garments.
Defendant admits that both firms turn out the same class of goods and that
they are exported to the same market. It also clearly appears from the
evidence that defendant has employed to work his form some of the same
workers employed by the plaintiff.
Shortly after defendant's return to Manila and the commencement by him
of the discharge of the duties of his position as local manager of the
Philippine Embroidery Company, as local manager of the Philippine
Embroidery Company, plaintiff commenced this action, the principal
purpose of which is to prevent by injunction, any further breach of that
part of defendant's contract of employment by plaintiff, by which he agreed
that he would not "enter into or engage himself directly or indirectly . . . in
a similar or competitive business to that of (plaintiff) anywhere within the
Philippine Islands for a period of five years . . ." from the date of the
agreement. The lower court granted a preliminary injunction, and upon
trial the injunction was made perpetual.
Defendant, as appellant, argues that plaintiff failed to substantiate the
averments of his complaints to the effect that the business in which the
defendant is employed is competitive with that of plaintiff. The court below
found from the evidence that the business was "very similar." We have
examined the evidence and rare of the opinion that the business in which
defendant is engaged is not only very similar to that of plaintiff, but that it
is conducted in open competition with that business within the meaning of
the contract in question. Defendant himself expressly admitted, on crossexamination, that the firm by which he is now employed puts out the same
class of foods as that which plaintiff is engaged in producing. When two
concerns operate in the same field, produce the same class of goods and
dispose them in the same market, their businesses are of necessity
competitive. Defendant having engaged in the Philippine Islands in a
business directly competitive with that of plaintiff, within five years from
the date of his contract of employment by plaintiff, under the terms of
which he expressly agreed that he would refrain form doing that very
thing, his conduct constitutes a breach of that agreement.
Defendant argues that even assuming that there has been a breach of the
agreement, the judgment of the court below is nevertheless erroneous,
contending that (1) the contract is void for lack of mutuality; (2) that the
contract is void as constituting an unreasonable restraint of trade; (3) that
plaintiff has failed to show that he has suffered any estimable pecuniary
damage; and (4) that even assuming that such damage as to warrant the
court in restraining by injunction its continuance.
The contention that the contract is void for lack of mutuality is based upon
that part of the agreement which authorizes plaintiff to discharge the
defendant before the expiration of the stipulated term, should defendant
fail to comply with its conditions to plaintiff's satisfaction. It is argued that
by this contracts it was sought to impose upon defendant the absolute
obligation of rendering service, while reserving to plaintiff the right to
rescind it at will. We are of the opinion that this question is largely
academic. It is admitted that defendant left plaintiff's employ at his own
request before the expiration of the stipulated terms of the contract. Had
plaintiff sought to discharge defendant without just cause, before the
expiration of the term of the employment, it might have been a serious
question whether he could lawfully do so, notwithstanding the terms in
which the contract was drawn. (Civil Code, art. 1256.) But even assuming
this particular clause of the contract to be invalid, this would not
necessarily affect the rest of the agreement. The inclusion is an agreement
of one or more pacts which are invalid does not of necessity invalidate the
whole contract.

We are of the opinion that the contract was not void as constituting an
unreasonable restraint of trade. We have been cited to no statutory
expression of the legislative will to which such an agreement is directly
obnoxious. The rule in this jurisdiction is that the obligations created by
contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and must
be enforce in accordance with their tenor. (Civil Code, art 1091.) The only
limitation upon the freedom of contractual agreement is that the pacts
established shall not be contrary to "law, morals or public order." (Civil
Code, Art. 1255.) The industry of counsel has failed to discover any direct
expression of the legislative will which prohibits such a contract as that
before us. It certainly is not contrary to any recognized moral precept, and
it therefore only remains to consider whether it is contrary to "public
order." This term, as correctly stated by Manresa (Commentaries, vol. 8, p.
606) "does not mean, as here used, the actual keeping of the public peace,
but signifies the public weal . . . that which is permanent, and essential in
institutions . . . ." It is the equivalent, as here used and as defined by
Manresa, of the term "public policy" as used in the law of the United
States. Public policy has been defined as being that principle under which
freedom of contract or private dealing is restricted for the freedom of
contract or private dealing is restricted for the good of the community.
(People's Bankvs. Dalton, 2 Okla., 476.) It is upon this theory that
contracts between private individuals which result in an unreasonable
restraint of trade have frequently being recognized by article 1255 of our
Civil Code, the court of these Islands are vested with like authority.

conflicts with, and must, to avail the defendant, for some sufficient reason,
prevail over, the manifest public policy, which, as a rule holds him to his
bond . . . .

In the nature of things, it is impossible to frame a general rule by which to

determine in advance the precise point at which the right of freedom of
contract must yield to the superior interest of community in keeping trade
and commerce free from unreasonable restrictions. Originally the English
courts adopted the view that any agreement which imposed restrictions
upon a man's right to exercise his trade or calling was void as against
public policy. (Cyc. vol. 9, p. 525.) In the course of time this opinion was
abandoned and the American and English courts adopted the doctrine that
where the restraint was unlimited as to space but unlimited as to time were
valid. In recent years there has been a tendency on the part of the courts of
England and America to discard these fixed rules and to decide each case
according to its peculiar circumstances, and make the validity of the
restraint depend upon its reasonableness. If the restraint is no greater than
is reasonably necessary for the protection of the party in whose favor it is
imposed it is upheld, but if it goes beyond this is declared void. This is the
principle followed in such cases by the Supreme Court of the United States.
In the case of Gibbs vs. Consolidated Gas Co. of Baltimore (130 U.S., 396)
the court said:

The remedy by injunction to prevent the violation of negative

agreements, or contracts not to do a particular thing, is closely
akin to the remedy by way of specific performance of agreements
of an affirmative nature. In both cases the object sought is
substantially one and the same, and by enjoining the violation of
a negative agreement the court of equity in effect decrees its
specific performance. (Lumley vs. Wagner, 1 DeGex, M. & G.,
604.)

The decision in Mitchel vs. Reynolds (1P. Wms. 181 [Smith's

Leading Cases, Vol. 1, Pt. II, 508]), is the foundation of rule in
relation to the invalidity of contracts in restraint of trade; but as
it was made under a condition of things, and a state of society,
different from those which now prevail, the rule laid down is not
regarded as inflexible, and has been considerably modified.
Public welfare is first considered, and if it be not involved, and
the restraint upon one party is not greater than protection to the
other party requires, the contract may be sustained. The
question is, whether, under the particular circumstances of the
case and the nature of the particular contract involved in it, the
contract is, or is not, unreasonable. (Rousillon vs.Rousillon, L.
R. 14 Ch. Div., 351; Leather Cloth Co. vs. Lorsont, L. R. 9 Eq.,
345.)
Following this opinion, we adopt the modern rule that the validity of
restraints upon trade or employment is to be determined by the intrinsinc
reasonableness of restriction in each case, rather than by any fixed rule,
and that such restrictions may be upheld when not contrary to afford a fair
and reasonable protection to the party in whose favor it is imposed.
Examining the contract here in question from this stand point, it does not
seem so with respect to an employee whose duties are such as of necessity
to give him an insight into the general scope and details of his employers
business. A business enterprise may and often does depend for its success
upon the owner's relations with other dealers, his skill in establishing
favorable connections, his methods of buying and selling -- a multitude of
details, none vital if considered alone, but which in the aggregate
constitute the sum total of the advantages which the result of the
experience or individual aptitude and ability of the man or men by whom
the business has been built up. Failure or success may depend upon the
possession of these intangible but all important assets, and it is natural
that their possessor should seek to keep them from falling into the hands
of his competitors. It is with this object in view that such restrictions as
that now under consideration are written into contracts of employment.
Their purpose is the protection of the employer, and if they do not go
beyond what is reasonably necessary to effectuate this purpose they should
be upheld. We are of the opinion, and so hold, that in the light of the
established facts the restraint imposed upon defendant by his contract is
not unreasonable. As was well said in the case of Underwood vs. Barker
(68 Law J. Ch., 201). "If there is one thing more than another which is
essential to the trade and commerce of this country, it is the inviolability of
contract deliberately entered into; and to allow a person of mature age, and
not imposed upon, to enter into a contract, to obtain the benefit of it, and
then to repudiate it and the obligation which he has undertaken, is prima
facie, at all events, contrary to the interest of any and every country . . . .
The public policy which allows a person to obtain employment on certain
terms understood by and agreed to by him, and to repudiate his contract,

Having held that the contract is valid, we pass to a consideration of

defendant's objections to its enforcement by injunction.
It is contended that plaintiff has not proved that he has suffered any
estimable pecuniary damage by reason of defendant's breach of the
contract, and that for that reason his action must fail. It is further
contended that in no event is it proper to enforce such a contract as this by
injunction, because it has not been alleged and proved that the
continuance of the acts complained of will cause plaintiff "irreparable
damage." These objections can conveniently be considered together.
The obligation imposed upon defendant by the particular clause of his
contract now under consideration is negative in character. Unless
defendant voluntarily complies with his undertaking there is no way by
which the contract can be enforced except by the injunctive power of
judicial process. Such negative obligations have long been enforced by the
courts in this manner. As stated by High in his well-known work on
Injunctions (vol. 2, pp. 877-878):

Where by the terms of a contract imposing a positive obligation the obligor

is entitled to a specific performance, it will not avail the defendant to show
that plaintiff will suffer no pecuniary damage if the contract is not
performed. Upon like reasons, when the undertaking is negative in
character and defendant is violating the obligation imposed upon him the
court may interfere without requiring proof of actual damage. (High on
Injunctions, par. 1135, citing Dickenson vs. Grand Junction Canal Co., 15
Beav., 270.)
The admitted fact that plaintiff has failed to establish proof of pecuniary
damage by reason of the breach of the contract by defendant by the acts
committed prior to the issuance of the preliminary injunction is, of course,
a bar or nay money judgment for damages for the breach of the contract,
but will not justify us in permitting defendant to continue to break his
contract over plaintiff's objection. The injury is a continuous one. The fact
that the court may not be able to give damages for that part of the breach
of the contract which had already taken place when its aid was invoked is
no reason why it should countenance a continuance of such disregard of
plaintiff's rights.
With respect to the contention that an injunction may only be granted to
prevent irreparable injury, the answer is that any continuing breach of a
valid negative covenant is irreparable by the ordinary process of courts of
law. As stated by High, (vol. 2, p. 906) injunctive relief is granted in cases
like this "upon the ground that the parties cannot be placed in statu quo,
and that damages at law can afford no adequate compensation, the injury
being a continuous one irreparable by the ordinary process of courts of
law."
In the case of Gilchrist vs. Cuddy (29 Phil. rep., 542), at page 552, this
court said, citing with approval the case of Wahle vs. Reinbach (76 Ill.,
322):
By "irreparable injury" is not meant such injury as is beyond the
possibility of repair, or beyond possible compensation in
damages, nor necessarily great injury or great damage, but that
species of injury, whether great or small, that ought not be
submitted to on the one hand or inflicted on the other; and,
because it is so large on the one hand, or so small on the other, is
of such constant and frequent recurrence that no fair or
reasonable redress can be had therefor in a court of law.
This definition was quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Donovan vs.Pennsylvania Co., (199 U.S., 279),
in which the injury complained of was continuous in its nature.
It is true, as held in the case of Liongson vs. Martinez (36 Phil. Rep., 948)
that "an injunction should never issue when an action for damages would
adequately compensate the injuries caused" But it frequently happens that
the acts of the defendant, while constituting a very substantial invasion of
plaintiff's rights are of such a character that the damages which result
therefrom "cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard." (Eau
Claire Water Co. vs. City of Eau Claire, 127 Wis., 154.) The Civil Code (art.
1908) casts upon real estate owners liability in damages for the emission,
upon their premises, of excessive smoke, which may be noxious to person
or property. The injury caused by such a nuisance might bring about a

depreciation in the value of adjoining properties, but there is no "certain

pecuniary standard" by which such damages can be measured, and in that
sense the threatened injury is "irreparable" and may appropriately be
restrained by injunction.

4. A writ of preliminary injunction should be issued only to prevent great

and irreparable injury. The injury must be actual, positive, substantial and
irremediable at law. Respondent corporations have not shown that they
would suffer such injury if the injunction were not issued.

. . . If the nuisance is a continuing one, invading substantial

rights of the complainant in such a manner that he would
thereby lose such rights entirely but for the assistance of a court
of equity he will entitled but for the assistance of a court of
equity he will be entitled to an injunction upon a proper
showing, notwithstanding the fact the he might recover some
damages in an action at law. (Tise vs. Whitaker-Harvey Co., 144
N. C., 507.)

5. The order of respondent judge places the government in a worse

position than a private litigant for the latter may secure the lifting of an
injunction by filing a counterbond. Such right cannot be exercised by the
government for the latter is not only by law required to file a bond.

The injury done the business of a merchant by illegal or unfair competition

is exceedingly difficult to measure. A diminution of the volume of a
business may be due to so many different causes that it is often impossible
to demonstrate that it has in fact been caused by the illegal competition of
the defendant. This is frequently the case in suit for the infringement of
trademark rights, in which the courts may enjoin the continued use of the
infringing mark, although unable to assess damages for the past injury.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed with costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-13555

May 30, 1962

THE SOCIAL SECURITY COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. THE HON.

JUDGE FROILAN BAYONA, ET AL., respondents.
On August 30, 1957, the Faculty Club of the University of Santo Tomas,
Inc. and San Beda College Lay Faculty Club, Inc. filed a petition for
declaratory relief with preliminary injunction before the Court of First
Instance of Manila alleging in substance that they have existing
agreements with their respective employers the University of Santo
Tomas and San Beda College for the establishment of gratuity and
retirement funds which have been in operation prior to September 1, 1957;
that the Social Security Commission tried to compel them to integrate their
private system into the Social Security System on said date; that inasmuch
as their private systems grant more benefits to the members than the
Social Security System the integration of their private systems would
deprive their members of property without due process of law, as well as
would impair the obligation of their contract to the detriment of the
members. Hence, they prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction ex
parte commanding the Social Security Commission to desist from
compelling them to integrate during the pendency of the case on the
ground that, unless said Commission is enjoined, it might enforce the
penal provisions of the Social Security Act.
On August 30, 1957, the court a quo, Judge Froilan Bayona, presiding,
issued ex parte a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the Social
Security Commission from compelling the integration sought for.
On September 7, 1957, the Social Security Commission moved to dissolve
the preliminary injunction on the following grounds (1) a statute is
presumed constitutional; (2) there is no irreparable injury shown to justify
the issuance of injunction; (3) injunction does not lie against laws for
public welfare; (4) injunction does not lie against enforcement of penal
law; (5) injunction does not lie to stop the collection of contributions under
the Social Security Laws; and (6) the preliminary injunction was barred by
laches.
The motion to dissolve was denied. A motion for reconsideration of the
order having likewise been denied, the Social Security Commission filed
the present petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
In charging respondent judge with having acted with grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction ex parte, petitioner
advances the following reasons:
1. Respondent judge enjoined the enforcement of the Social Security Law
for the benefit of an insignificant few who had manifested their defiance
against its implementation. It is his sworn duty to enforce the law and not
to tamper with it. The task of suspending the operation of a social
legislation is a matter of extreme delicacy because it is an interference with
the official acts not only of the duly elected representatives of the people
but also of the highest magistrate of the land.
2. The order of respondent judge in effect enjoined the enforcement of a
penal statute which he has no power to do. The rule is that equity will not
intervene for the purpose of enjoining the enforcement of a penal statute
even if the same is alleged to be unconstitutional since such invalidity
should be interposed as a defense in a prosecution based on such statute.
3. Respondent judge cannot enjoin the collection of contributions under
the Social Security Law for the same have the category of taxes which are
collectible under the National Internal Revenue Code.

Respondent corporations, on the other hand, advance the following

arguments in refutation of those adduced by petitioner:
1. It is erroneous to state that the writ of preliminary injunction has the
effect of suspending the operation of the Social Security Law. That law,
regardless of any injunction, continues to be in force except only with
respect to those who have private plans of their own in existence at the
time of the effectivity of the law.
2. It is not also correct to state that courts have no power to enjoin the
enforcement of penal statutes even if they are alleged to be
unconstitutional, for there are cases in this jurisdiction which hold that,
under penal statutes affecting persons and property rights, where their
constitutionality is doubtful, courts may grant preliminary
injunction.1wph1.t
3. While under the law the contributions to the system shall be collected in
the same manner as taxes under the National Revenue Code, the same may
be enjoined if special circumstances exist having relation to the existence
of irreparable injury.
4. Petitioner is also in error when it states that respondent corporations
have not shown that the non-issuance of the injunction would cause them
irreparable injury. This injury consists of the following:
(a) To lift the injunction would mean to take away the availability of the
funds of respondent corporation from their members who may borrow
them in case of necessity;.
(b) To dissolve the injunction would be to take away respondents' funds
which they may never be able to get back taking note of Section 31 of the
Social Security Act, as amended, which says that no person shall be
deemed to be vested with any property or right by virtue of the enactment
of said Act;
(c) If respondent corporations refuse to join the Social Security System,
criminal prosecution would ensue against their officers and members.
A careful evaluation of the foregoing arguments provide us with some
observations.
A law is presumed constitutional until otherwise declared by judicial
interpretation. The task of suspending the operation of a law even if
alleged to be unconstitutional is a matter of extreme delicacy because it is
an interference with the official acts not only of the duly elected
representatives of the people but also of the highest magistrate of the land.
This notwithstanding, respondent corporations resisted the integration of
their private systems into the system established by the Social Security Act,
and in order to avoid being recreant to their duty which may result in their
prosecution, they filed the present petition seeking a judicial declaration
on its constitutionality. But pending such action, they sought the
restraining hand of the court on the plea that unless the enforcement of the
law is restrained, they would suffer an irreparable injury.
At this stage of the proceeding, it is not the task of the Court to pass on the
question of constitutionality of the law. This concerns the merits of the
case. We shall confine our inquiry into the propriety of the issuance of the
writ which is the main issue raised in this petition. The foremost inquiry
regarding this issue is the existence or non-existence of irreparable injury
which seems to be the main basis of the issuance of the writ.
Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the
issuance of injunction where there is no standard by which their amount
can be measured with reasonable accuracy (Crouc v. Central Labor
Council, 83 ALR, 193). "An irreparable injury which a court of equity will
enjoin includes that degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing kind
which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that can be estimated only
by conjecture, and not by any accurate standard of measurement" (Phipps
v. Rogue River Valley Canal Co., 7 ALR, 741). An irreparable injury to
authorize an injunction consists of "a serious charge of, or is destructive to,
the property it affects, either physically or in the character in which it has
been held and enjoined, or when the property has some peculiar quality or
use, so that its pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the owner of the
loss thereof" (Dunker v. Field and Tub Club, 92 P., 502).
Respondent corporations made a lengthy discourse on the matter of
irreparable injury they may suffer if the injunction were not issued, but the

array of figures they have laid out merely succeeded in proving that the
damage, if any they may suffer is susceptible of mathematical
computation. It is not then irreparable. As already stated, this term has a
definite meaning in law. It does not have reference to the amount of
damages that may be caused but rather to the difficulty of measuring the
damages inflicted. If full compensation can be obtained by way of
damages, equity will not apply the remedy of injunction (28 Am. Jur., 244;
43 C.J.S., 427, 446).
Neither can respondent corporations contend that their integration would
mean the destruction of their existing private systems. The most that can
happen would be a diminution of benefits in proportion to the reduction of
the contributions to their private systems. But while they may suffer such
reduction in benefits they also stand to benefit under the government
system. Bear in mind that the integration does not mean the
discontinuance of the private system for under the law three alternatives
are open to respondents in effecting the integration. 1 In other words,
respondents may continue with whatever private social system they may
have at present as a complement to the benefits afforded to them under the
government system without prejudice to their integration into the
government security system.
It may be conceded that, if the injunction be lifted, the possible damages
respondents may suffer are their contributions and those of their
employers to the government security system. But restoration of said
contributions had been assured by petitioner should the provision under
consideration be declared unconstitutional and invalid. There can always
be an appropriate arrangement to provide for refund in the event of such
circumstance. Surely, the millions of pesos available to the Social Security
System would be more than sufficient to compensate respondents for the
contributions they have made.
The same thing may not be said if the enforcement of the law is restrained,
for then respondents would be more harassed and prejudiced in case the
constitutionality of the law is upheld, since they will have to pay all the
back contributions from September, 1957, including interests, up to the
time the preliminary injunction is dissolved. Restoration would then be
much more difficult in view of the contingencies that may arise with regard
to the members of their private system. There are, to be sure, more weighty
reasons favoring the lifting of the injunction issued by respondent judge.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petition is granted. The writ of preliminary
injunction issued by respondent judge is hereby lifted. No costs.
G.R. No. L-14595

October 11, 1919

GREGORIO SARASOLA, plaintiff-appellant, vs. WENCESLAO

TRINIDAD, Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine
Islands, defendant-appellee.
The complaint in this case was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila
for the purpose of having an injunction issue to restrain the defendant, the
Collector of Internal Revenue, from the alleged illegal collection of taxes in
the amount of P11,739.29. The defendant interposed a demurrer to the
complaint, based on two grounds, namely: (1) that the court had no
jurisdiction of the subject-matter of the action because of the provisions of
section 1578 of the Administrative Code of 1917; and (2) that the facts
stated in the complaint did not entitle the plaintiff to the relief demanded.
The Honorable James A. Ostrand, Judge of First Instance, sustained the
demurrer, holding that "In the opinion of the court, the case is still
controlled by the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Churchill
and Tait vs. Rafferty (32 Phil., 580). The fact that section 1579 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 disallows interest on the internal revenue
taxes recovered back is hardly sufficient to vary the rule." It is from the
final order dismissing the complaint, without special finding as to costs,
that the plaintiff to this court.
As will be noted, the judge was induced to take such action be reason of his
understanding of the decision of this court in the case of Churchill and
Tait vs. Rafferty (supra, appeal dismissed in the United States Supreme
Court [1918], 248 U.S., 555), in which the plaintiffs likewise endeavor
unsuccessfully to have the defendant Collector of Internal Revenue
enjoined from collecting and enforcing against the plaintiffs an internal
revenue tax on bill boards. Both counsel for appellant and appellee herein
seem to find comfort in this decision. Instead, however, of devoting our
time to a fine analysis of this decision with the object of ascertaining if it is
still controlling, it would seem preferable to place it to one side for the
nonce and to proceed independently thereof to settle the instant issues.
Appellant's formal specifications of error are epitomized in three points: "1.
The statute is a mere expression of the equity rule and does not close the
door of equity where there is no adequate remedy at law; 2. The equitable
jurisdiction to issue writs where the legal remedy is inadequate is
crystallized and cannot be abbreviated by local statute; 3. The legal remedy
is grossly inadequate and the injury irreparable and the writ should issue."
The Attorney-General, in his brief for the appellee, says that a resolution of
the three errors assigned by appellant depends upon the answer to the
question, "Is the legal provision prohibiting the courts from granting an
injunction to retrain the collection of internal revenue taxes
constitutional?" Whether, therefore, we agree with the Attorney-General in

his bold assertion relative to the issue being the constitutionality of

sections 1578 and 1579 of the Administrative Code of 1917, or whether we
consider the more subtle argument of the learned counsel for appellant
which seems merely to squint at this question, it is necessary to have
before us the pertinent provisions of Philippine law.
Sections 1578 and 1579 of the Administrative Code of 1917 read as follows:
SEC. 1578. Injunction not available to restrain collection of
tax. No court shall have authority to grant an injunction to
restrain the collection of any internal-revenue tax.
SEC. 1579. Recovery of tax paid under protest. When the
validity of any tax is questioned, or its amount disputed, or other
question raised as to liability therefor, the person against whom
or against whose property the same is sought to be enforced
shall pay the tax under instant protest, or upon protest within
ten days, and shall thereupon request the decision of the
Collector of Internal Revenue. If the decision of the Collector of
Internal Revenue is adverse, or if no decision is made by him
within six months from the date when his decision was
requested, the taxpayer may proceed, at any time within two
years after the payment of the tax, to bring an action against the
Collector of Internal Revenue for the recovery without
interest of the sum alleged to have been illegally collected, the
process to be served upon him, upon the provincial treasurer, or
upon the officer collecting the tax.
These portions of our tax laws, leaving out of notice the two words
"without interest," are in no way different from American tax laws. The
antecedents of sections 1578 and 1579 of the existing Administrative Code
are the Administrative Code of 1916, the Internal Revenue Law of 1914 (Act
No. 2339), and Internal Revenue Law of 1904 (Act No. 1189). Section 1578
of the Administrative Code and its corresponding sections in previous
Philippine Laws, found its particular inspiration in a similar provision in
the Act of Congress of March 2, 1867. (14 Stat. at L., 475; sec. 3224, U.S.
Rev. Stat.) Again expressly leaving out of our present consideration the
phrase "without interest," a vast array of interpretative jurisprudence
which culminates in the decision in Churchill and Taitvs .Rafferty, supra,
would leave no room for doubt that such legislation is constitutional. The
point, however, to keep sharply before us is, that until the enactment of the
Administrative Code of 1917, no law of the Philippine Legislature or
Commission had contained a provision permitting the recovery of taxes
"without interest," and no provision essentially the same can be found in
the statutes United States or of the several States.
Before we recur to our precise question, a good background for this
decision might well concern the more general subject of the remedies of
the taxpayer. The broad principle is that every taxpayer has a right to a
remedy for any actual wrong he may have suffered in the collection of
taxes. Usually a party will find a plain and sufficient remedy for the injuries
complained of, or threatened, in the courts of law; in such instances, equity
will not take jurisdiction. "Presumptively," Judge Cooley says, "the remedy
at law is adequate." (Cooley on Taxation, 3d Ed., Vol. 2, pp. 1377, 1412,
1415.) Where, as in the Philippines, the taxpayer is permitted to pay the
amount demanded of him under protest and then maintain an action at
law to recover back the whole amount paid or so much of it as was illegally
exacted, this is ordinarily regarded as an adequate remedy. Thus, the
Legislature of the State of Tennessee enacted a statute not greatly different
from the Philippine statute, with the exception that the words, "without
interest," were not included, and the United States Supreme Court in
discussing the law said: "This remedy is simple and effective. . . . It is a
wise and reasonable precaution for the security of the government. No
government could exist that permitted its collection to be delayed by every
litigious man or every embarrassed man, to whom delay was more
important than the payment of costs." (State of Tennessee vs. Sneed
[1877], 6 Otto, 69. See also 37 Cyc., 1267, 1268.) Again in the case of
Snyder vs. Marks ([1883], 109 U.S., 185) the sole object of the suit was to
restrain the collection of a tax which was assessed under the United States
Internal Revenue Laws. The court said: The remedy of a suit to recover
back the tax after it is paid, is provided by statute, and a suit to restrain its
collection is forbidden. The remedy so given is exclusive, and no other
remedy can be substituted for it."
An exceptional circumstance which serves to take cases out of the general
rule comes under the head of irreparable injury. In a decision of the United
States Supreme Court in which this was explained (Dows vs. The City of
Chicago [1871], 11 Wall., 108) it was remarked that there can be no case of
equitable cognizance "where there is a plain and adequate remedy at law.
And except where the special circumstances which we have mentioned
exist, the party of whom an illegal tax is collected has ordinarily ample
remedy, either by action against the officer making the collection or the
body to whom the tax is paid." Accordingly it was held that since the
plaintiff had his action after the tax was paid "against the officer or the city
to recover back the money," a bill in equity to restrain the collection of a
tax would not be sustained. If the ground alleged is alone that the tax was
illegal, this is not sufficient for the maintenance of an injunction.
(Dows vs .The City of Chicago, supra; Shelton vs.Platt [1891], 139 U.S.,
591, reviewing previous decisions; Nye Jenks & Co. vs. Town of Washburn
[1903], 125 Fed., 817; Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, supra, followed
approvingly in Young vs. Rafferty [1916], 33 Phil., 556, 563.)

While we have these decisions in mind, it might be well to recall that in one
way or another, the whole question harks back to the legality of sections
1578 and 1579 of the Administrative Code. But in addition, according to the
averments of the plaintiff's complaint which are provisionally admitted by
the demurrer of the defendant, the plaintiff's claim is, that he was not
engaged in the business of a commission merchant in the city of Manila,
and so was not liable to the payment of a tax as such, and that he is without
means of complying with the demand of the defendant under protest or
otherwise. Such, likewise, was one of three grounds which were suggested
as giving equitable jurisdiction to the Supreme Court of the State of
Michigan. Regarding it, Judge Cooley said:
The force of the third contention must rest in the fact that
enforcing the tax may in some cases compel the suspension of
business, because it is more than the person taxed can afford to
pay. But if this consideration is sufficient to justify the transfer
of a controversy from a court of law to a court of equity, then
every controversy where money is demanded may be made the
subject of equitable cognizance. To enforce against a dealer a
promissory not may in some cases as effectually break up his
business as to collect from him a tax of equal amount. This is not
what is known to the law as irreparable injury. The courts have
never recognized the consequences of the mere enforcement of a
money
demand
as
falling
within
that
category.
(Youngblood vs. Sexton [1875], 32 Mich., 406.)
No one could very convincingly argue against the force of these leading
cases. Not neglecting, therefore, to remember their importance, the precise
and narrower question is suggested Did the addition of the words
"without interest" in the statute so deprive an aggrieved taxpayer of his
adequate remedy at law as to justify judicial interference? In two recent
decisions of this court, interest on judgments for the recovery of taxes was
allowed, but without deciding this precise question. Thus, in Viuda e Hijos
de Pedro P. Roxas vs. Rafferty [1918], 37 Phil., 957), it was said that
whether interest could be adjudged a taxpayer against the United States, a
State of the American Union, or the Government of the Philippine Islands,
was beside the question. And in Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation vs. Rafferty [1918], 39 Phil., 145), it was said that whether
interest may be recovered under section 1579 of the Administrative Code,
is left for decision when a case arises after the Code became effective. As
the point can no longer be evaded, we shall proceed to resolve it, and in so
doing can find no better approach than that to be found in the right to
interest.
It is well settled both on principle and authority that interest is not to be
awarded against a sovereign government, as the United States or a State,
unless its consent has been manifested by an Act of its Legislature or by a
lawful contract of its executive officers. If there be doubt upon the subject,
that doubt must be resolved in favor of the State. In Gosman's Case
([1881], L. R. 17 Ch. Div., 771) Sir George Jessel, Master of the Rolls,
speaking for the Court of Appeals, summed up the Law of England in this
concise statement: "There is no ground for charging the Crown with
interest. Interest is only payable by statute or by contract." In AttorneyGeneral vs. Cape Fear Navigation Co. ([1843], 37 N.C., 444) Chief Justice
Ruffin laid down as undoubted law that "the State never pays interest
unless she expressly engages to do so." Judge Cooley says that "The
recovery (in tax suits) must be limited to the money received. . . . Interest is
recoverable only when expressly allowed by statute." (2 Cooley on
Taxation, 3d Ed., p. 1510; Savings and Loan Society vs. San Francisco
[1901], 131 Cal., 356.) In United Statesvs. Sherman [1878], 98 U.S., 465)
the court, in considering a law relating to suits against revenue officers
providing for recovery of the amount payable out of the treasury, held that
the amount recoverable did not include interest upon the judgment.
Justice Strong, delivering the opinion of the court, in part said:
When the obligation arises, it is an obligation to pay the amount
recovered; that is, the amount for which judgment has been
given. The act of Congress says not a word about interest.
Judgments, it is true, are by the law of South Carolina, as well as
by Federal legislation, declared to bear interest. Such legislation,
however, has no application to the government. And the interest
is no part of the amount recovered. It accrues only after the
recovery has been had. Moreover, whenever interest is allowed
either by statute or by common law, except in cases where there
has been a contract to pay interest, it is allowed for delay or
default of the debtor. But delay or default cannot be attributed to
the government. It is presumed to be always ready to pay what it
owes.
As this is the main rule, the converse proposition must be equally true, that
taxes only draw interest as do sums of money when expressly authorized. A
corollary to the principle is also self-evident, that interest cannot be
recovered on an abatement unless the statute provides for it. (1 Cooley on
Taxation, 3d Ed., p. 20; 2 Cooley on Taxation, 3d Ed., p. 1392; City of
Lowell vs. County Commissioners of Middlesex [1862], 3 Allen [Mass.],
550.) The only contrary dictum is to the effect that where an illegal tax has
been collected, the citizen who has paid and is obliged to bring suit against
the collector is entitled to interest from the time of the illegal exaction.
(Erskine vs.Van Arsdale [1872], 15 Wall., 75; National Home vs. Parrish
[1913], 229 U.S., 494; Matter of O'Berry [1904], 179 N.Y., 285.) The
distinction undoubtedly arises through the fiction that the suit is against

the collector and not against the State, although the judgment is not to be
paid by the collector but directly from the treasury.
It has been urged that since interest is in the nature of damages, it is
proper for allowance. While this may be true in the general run of cases, it
is not necessary true when the sovereign power is concerned. The state is
not amenable to judgments for damages or costs without its consent.
(Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation vs.Rafferty, supra, citing
numerous decisions.) In Morley vs. Lakeshore & Michigan Southern
Railway Co. ([1892], 146 U.S., 162, followed recently in Missouri &
Arkansas Lumber & Mining Co. vs. Greenwood District of Sebastian
County, Arkansas [1919], U.S. Sup. Ct. Adv. Op., April 1, 1919, p .239), the
United States Supreme Court had under consideration a state statute
which reduced the rate of interest upon all judgments obtained within the
courts of the state. The court said:
After the cause of action, whether a tort or a broken contract, not
itself prescribing interest till payment, shall have been merged
into a judgment, whether interest shall accrue upon the
judgment is a matter not of contract between the parties, but of
legislative discretion, which is free, so far as the Constitution of
the United States is concerned, to provide for interest as a
penalty or liquidated damages for the nonpayment of the
judgment, or not to do so. When such provision is made by
statute, the owner of the judgment is, of course, entitled to the
interest so prescribed until payment is received, or until the
State shall, in the exercise of its discretion, declare that such
interest shall be changed or cease to accrue. Should the statutory
damages for nonpayment of a judgment be determined by a
State, either in whole or in part, the owner of a judgment will be
entitled to receive and have a vested right in the damages which
shall have accrued up to the date of the legislative change; but
after that time his rights as to interests as damages are, as when
he first obtained his judgment, just what the legislature chooses
to declare. He has no contract whatever on the subject with the
defendant in the judgment, and his right is to receive, and the
defendant's obligation is to pay, as damages, just what the State
chooses to prescribe. . . .
If it be true, as we have endeavored to show, that interest
allowed for nonpayment of judgments is in the nature of
statutory damages, and if the plaintiff in the present case has
received all such damages which accrued while his judgment
remained unpaid, there is no change or withdrawal of remedy.
His right was to collect such damages as the State, in its
discretion, provided should be paid by defendant who should fail
to promptly pay judgments which should be entered against
them, and such right has not been destroyed or interfered with
by legislation. The discretion exercised by the legislature in
prescribing what, if any, damages shall be paid by way of
compensation for delay in the payment of judgments is based on
reasons of public policy, and is altogether outside the sphere of
private contracts.
Our statute, it will be remembered, not only does not authorize interest but
negatives the payment of interest .While, therefore, coming under the
purview of the general principle pertaining to legislative discretion, it also
avoids any trouble to be found in those decisions which allow interest
without any express provision on the subject, because the statute provides
that interest shall not be allowed .From whatever direction we look at the
subject, therefore, we reach either the conclusion that the law is valid, or
that the plaintiff has not proven such a case of irreparable injury as would
warrant the issuance of the extraordinary writ of injunction.
The reason for what superficially seems to be a harsh ruling goes back to
the fundamental conception of the nature of taxation. It is but a truism to
restate that taxation is an attribute of sovereignty. It is the strongest of all
the powers of government. It involves, as Chief Justice Marshall in his
historical statement said, the power to destroy. (McCulloch vs. Maryland
[1819], 4 Wheat., 316; Loan Association vs. Topeka [1875], 20 Wall., 655.)
"The right of taxation where it exists," the court said in
Austin vs. Aldermen ([1868], 7 Wall., 694), "is necessarily unlimited in its
nature. It carriers with it inherently the power to embarrass and
destroy." 1awph!l.net
Public policy decrees that, since upon the prompt collection of revenue
there depends the very existence of government itself, whatever
determination shall be arrived at by the Legislature should not be
interfered with, unless there be a clear violation of some constitutional
inhibition. As said in Dows vs. The City of Chicago, supra, "It is upon
taxation that the several states chiefly rely to obtain the means to carry on
their respective governments, and it is of the utmost importance to all of
them that the modes adopted to enforce the taxes levied should be
interfered with as little as possible. Any delay in the proceedings of the
officers, upon whom the duty is devolved of collecting the taxes, may
derange the operations of government, and thereby cause serious
detriment to the public." Or as said in Snyder vs. Marks, supra, "The
system prescribed by the United States in regard to both customs duties
and internal revenue taxes, of stringent measures, not judicial, to collect
them, with appeals to specified tribunals and suits to recover back moneys
illegally exacted, was a system of corrective justice, intended to be

complete and enacted under the right belonging to the Government, to

prescribe the conditions on which it would subject itself to the judgment of
the courts in the collection of its revenues." Or as said in
Tennesse vs. Sneed, supra, "The Government may fix the conditions upon
which it will consent to litigate the validity of its original taxes." Or as said
in a New York case, "The power of taxation being legislative, all the
incidents are within the control of the Legislature." (Genet vs .City of
Brooklyn [1885], 99 N.Y., 296.) Or as said by Chief Justice Marshall in
McCulloch vs. Maryland, supra, "The people of a state give to their
government a right of taxing themselves and their property, and as the
exigencies of the Government cannot be limited, they prescribe no limit to
the exercise of this right, resting confidently on the interest of the legislator
and on the influence of the constituents over their representatives, to
guard themselves against its abuse." (See to the same effect the Philippine
case of De Villata vs. Stanley [1915], 32 Phil., 541; and Churchill and
Tait vs. Concepcion [1916], 34 Phil., 969.)
Applying these well-known principles to the case at bar, it would seem that
the legislature has considered that a law providing for the payment of a tax
with a right to bring a suit before a tribunal to recover back the same
without interest is a full and adequate remedy for the aggrieved taxpayer.
The disallowance of interest in such case, like the other steps prescribed as
conditional to recovery, has been made one of the conditions which the
lawmakers have seen fit to attach to the remedy provided. As the
Legislature in the exercise of its wide discretionary power, has deemed the
remedy provided in section 1579 of the Administrative Code to be an
adequate mode of testing the validity of an internal revenue tax and has
willed that such a remedy shall be exclusive, the courts not only owe it to a
coordinate branch of the government to respect the opinion thus
announced, but have no right to interfere with the enforcement of such a
law.
The last remaining point touches upon the possibility that section 1579 of
the Administrative Code, in conjunction with the following section, has
served to diminish the jurisdiction of the courts and, in pursuance of wellknown principles, is thus invalid. Section 9 of the Philippine Bill and
section 26 of the Jones Law, the first the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
and the second the Act of Congress of August 29, 1916, have provided
"That the Supreme Court and the Courts of First Instance of the Philippine
Islands shall possess and exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and
such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be prescribed by law. . . ."
The Supreme Court of the Philippines, in interpreting these provisions, has
reached the conclusion that they had the effect of taking one or more Acts
of the Philippine Commission and Legislature out of the field of ordinary
legislation and making of them in effect basic laws. In other words, it was
held that the Legislature could add to but could not diminish the
jurisdiction of the courts. (Barrameda vs .Moir [1913], 25 Phil., 44.) But
any argument predicated upon such a proposition must necessarily assume
that the Philippine courts have had the power to restrain by injunction the
collection of taxes. And since, with or without a law, the Philippine courts
would not have presumed to issue an injunction to restrain the collection
of a tax, the prohibition expressed in the law has had no other effect than
to confirm a universal principle. This was expressly decided in the case of
Churchill and Tait vs.Rafferty, supra, and has since then not been open to
discussion.
To conclude in answer to the argument made by appellant, we can say
that sections 1578 and 1579 of the Administrative Code establish an
adequate remedy at law and that we are not convinced that the
enforcement of the tax will produce irreparable injury, and, in answer to
the argument of appellee, that sections 1578 and 1579 of the
Administrative Code of 1917 are valid. The result is, thus, to affirm the final
order appealed from. Costs shall be taxed against the appellant. So
ordered.
G.R. No. L-19633

November 28, 1966

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HERMOGENES CONCEPCION,

JR., as City Fiscal of Manila, MANUEL R. PAMARAN, as
Investigating Assistant Fiscal and JOSE G. LUKBAN, Director,
National Bureau of Investigation, petitioners, vs. THE HON.
EULOGIO MENCIAS of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
MARTINIANO ABAD and COSME P. GARCIA, respondents.
Petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction from an
order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, enjoining petitioners from
proceeding with the preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint filed
with the City Fiscal of Manila.
On January 2, 1962, the City Fiscal of Manila received a criminal complaint
of the Department of Justice against Martiniano Abad and Cosme P.
Garcia, together with Jorge B. Vargas, Gaudencio L. Mascareas, Victorino
Arambulo, Bartolome San Diego and George M. O'Keefe (directors of the
Continental Oil Company) for violation of Section 17-1/2 of Act No. 1459
(Corporation Law) and Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 (Anti-Graft
Law), which was docketed as I.S. No. 62-202.
The crime allegedly committed arose from the purchase of a lot by
Continental Oil Company from the Xavier School, Inc. for the construction
and operation of a large supermarket and applying the income therefrom

continuously to finance its ordinary business expenses incident to the

development of its mining concessions, as contrary to the purpose clause
of its articles of incorporation.
While the said complaint was under preliminary investigation, one Gus B.
Dodds filed a minority stockholder's suit before the Court of First Instance
of Rizal (Civil Case No. 6935) on January 17, 1962, against the members of
the Board of Directors of the Continental Oil Company, to restrain the
latter from proceeding with their conditional deed of sale of the subject lot
to one Jose A. Roxas and to take such steps with the view of annulling or
rescinding the same, claiming the purchase of the lot to be valid because it
was done by the corporation's directors not for the purpose of investing its
funds for a purpose different from its business purpose, in the sense of
engaging in the supermarket business as a fixed and principal commercial
activity, but for the purpose of immediately putting its idle corporate
capital for use in a temporary but profitable business scheme contemplated
to last, and for the purpose of financing the corporation's huge financial
needs during the time that the corporation is unable to produce from its
primary business end of mining.
Meanwhile, the proposed sale of the subject lot was taken by the board of
directors after the Securities Exchange Commission notified the
Continental Oil Company that such investment was contrary to the
purpose clause of the articles of incorporation of the said company and
requested the latter to take immediate corrective measures in the
premises.
On January 24, 1962, respondents Martiniano Abad and Cosme P. Garcia
intervened in the aforementioned civil suit and filed a third-party
complaint before the same Court of First Instance, against herein
petitioners, praying, among other things, that said petitioners be enjoined
from proceeding with the investigation of the criminal complaint because
of the existence of a prejudicial civil question created with the institution of
the civil case, that is, whether or not the acquisition of the property from
Xavier School, Inc. constituted a violation of the corporation law.
The following day, or on January 25, 1962, the respondent Judge issue
an ex-parte restraining order directing, among others, that pending the
resolution of the application for writ of preliminary injunction, the herein
petitioners are enjoined from proceeding with the investigation of the
criminal complaint.
On January 30, 1962, the petitioners filed a motion for the dissolution and
lifting of the restraining order and at the same time answered the thirdparty complaint wherein they contended that the Court of First Instance of
Rizal did not have jurisdiction to hear and decide an action for injunction
and prohibition as well as to enjoin a preliminary investigation being held
in Manila.
After due hearing, on March 20, 1962, the respondent Judge issued an
order denying the petitioners' motion to dissolve the restraining order and
directed the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the
third-party complaint, which, pursuant to the said order, a writ of
preliminary injunction was issued against the petitioners on April 5, 1962.
Hence, this petition raising the issue as to the jurisdiction of the
respondent Judge to issue a restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the petitioners from proceeding with the preliminary
investigation of the complaint.
This Court, through its resolution dated April 11, 1962, ordered the herein
respondent to file an answer to the petition and issued the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for, restraining the respondent Judge from
enforcing his orders dated January 25, 1962, March 20, 1962, and April 5,
1962, in the Civil Case No. 6953 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal. Due
to the writ of preliminary injunction issued by this Court, the City Fiscal of
Manila scheduled the continuation of the preliminary investigation of the
criminal complaint on April 14, 16 and 17, 1962, but the hearings were
postponed upon petition of the respondents.
On April 13, 1962, the defendants and defendants-intervenors in Civil Case
No. 6953 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal filed with this Court an
Urgent Motion For Stay, praying that the effectivity of the writ of
preliminary injunction be held in abeyance and that they be given
opportunity to give their side. But since the writ of preliminary injunction
was already issued, the respondents filed a motion on April 17, 1962, for
dissolution of the preliminary injunction on the ground that the writs of
injunction and prohibition were sought by them from the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, not through a complaint but through a third-party
complaint and that a prejudicial civil question was raised.
Subsequently, a motion was filed by petitioners praying to set aside the
order of Judge Mencias dated July 17, 1962 granting the motion for
exclusion of defendants and third-party plaintiffs from Civil Case No.
6953.
We decided to defer action on these various motions filed by the parties
until the final resolution of the case on the merits.

The main issue now before this Court is: Can the Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal issue a restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction joining the City Fiscal of Manila from proceeding with the
preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint if before the former a
civil action with prejudicial question is raised?
On the issue of jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari
and prohibition with injunction, it is already a settled rule that jurisdiction
or authority of court of first instance to control or restrain the acts which
are being committed or about to be commited within the territorial
boundaries of their respective provinces and districts. (Alhambra Cigar
and Cigarette Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. The National Administrator of
Regional Office No. 2, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-20491, August 31, 1965, and
the cases cited therein)
The contention of the respondents that the decisions of this Court cited in
the Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette case,supra, do not apply in the instant
case because they sought the writs of injunction and prohibition from the
Court of First Instance of Rizal not through a complaint but through a
third-party complaint, is untenable for we agree with the observation of
the Solicitor General that there is no basic difference and fundamental
reason for making a distinction in the issuance of the writ whether through
an original complaint or third-party complaint.
Another point to be considered is that, "as a general rule, an injunction will
not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution." (Kwong Sing v. City of
Manila, 41 Phil. 103; Gorospe v. Peaflorida, 101 Phil. 886; University of
the Philippines v. City Fiscal of Quezon City, G.R. No. L-18562, July 31,
1961; and Lava v. Gonzales, G.R. No. L-23048, July 31, 1964).
We do not have to discuss whether there is a prejudicial question involved
in this case, for even assuming that there is, still the Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal cannot enjoin the City Fiscal of Manila from
proceeding with the preliminary investigation of the complaint, the latter
being outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the former.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted and the writ of preliminary
injunction dated April 11, 1962, restraining the respondent Judge from
enforcing his questioned orders, is hereby made permanent. No costs.
G.R. No. L-21988

September 30, 1966

ALICIA S. GONZALES, represented by her Attorney-inFact, HUMBERTO DE LOS SANTOS, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE
SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS,
DISTRICT ENGINEER, Province of Davao and
LUCIA O. TOLENTINO, respondents-appellees.
Appeal by petitioner Alicia S. Gonzales from an order of the Court of First
Instance of Davao dismissing Civil Case No. 3689 thereof.
The records show that, acting upon a letter-complaint filed by Lucia O.
Tolentino, and after hearing Alicia S. Gonzales, among others, the
Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications rendered, on July
11, 1961, a decision ordering the demolition of certain dams constructed by
Gonzales and three other persons across Cabatan River and seemingly
enclosing Gonzales' fishponds in Magbongcogon, Lupon, Davao. On
subsequent motion of Gonzales, this decision was reconsidered by the
Head of said Department on September 7. However, on appeal taken by
Tolentino, the last action thus taken by said Department Head was, on
December 1, 1961, reversed by the Office of the President, which ordered
the dams aforementioned demolished. Accordingly, said Department
directed the District Engineer of Davao to proceed with the demolition of
the dams. A reconsideration of the decision of the Executive having been,
subsequently, denied, on January 16, 1962, the District Engineer of Davao
advised Gonzales that the former's representatives would execute said
decision.
Hence, on January 17, 1962, Gonzales commenced against the Secretary of
Public Works and Communications, the District Engineer of Davao and
Lucia O. Tolentino, said Civil Case No. 3689, which is an action
for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction and/or preliminary
mandatory injunction, to prevent the demolition of petitioner's dams in
compliance with the departmental order aforementioned. Acting upon a
motion to dismiss filed by respondent Tolentino and upon the authority
of Samar Mining Co. vs. Arnaldo, G.R. No. L-17709 (June 30, 1961)
and Acosta vs,. Alvendia, G.R. No. L-14598 (October 31, 1960), the lower
court dismissed the case. A reconsideration of the order to this effect
having been denied, Gonzales interposed the present appeal.
The only question raised therein is whether the Court of First Instance of
Davao had jurisdiction to entertain said Case No. 3689, considering that its
main purpose was to prevent the enforcement of a decision of the Secretary
of Public Works and Communications, who is in Manila. The cases relied
upon in the order appealed from do not justify the conclusion reached
therein.

The Acosta case referred to a writ of preliminary injunction issued by the

Court of First Instance of Manila restraining the Sheriff of Nueva
Ecija from enforcing or executing the decision of the Court of Agrarian
Relations in a tenancy case involving lands situated in Nueva Ecija. The
Supreme Court held that the said Court of First Instance had overstepped
its authority in issuing said writ.
The Samar Mining case involved a petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction, filed with the Court of First Instance
of Manila, to restrain the Regional Administrator and the Labor Attorney
of the Department of Labor in its Regional Office No. VI, established in the
City of Cebu, from further proceedings in a given Workmen's
Compensation case in that City. Applying Section 44(h) of the Judiciary
Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 296) and Rule 67, Sec. 4 of the Rules of Court, we
held that said Court had no authority to issue the writ prayed for.
This view was reiterated in Alhambra Cigar and Cigarette Co. vs. The
National Administrator of Regional Office No. 2, G.R. No. L-20491
(August 31, 1965), which was a case of certiorari and prohibition, with
preliminary injunction, filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila to
restrain and prohibit the hearing officer and the Administrator of Labor
Regional Office No. 2 established in Tuguegarao, Cagayan, from hearing,
deciding and otherwise taking further action on a given claim for
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.
These cases have the following things in common, namely: 1) they were
filed in Manila; 2) they sought to restrain the performance of certain
acts outside Manila; and 3) it was held that the court of first instance of
Manila had no jurisdiction to grant the relief prayed for, because "the
authority of courts of first instance to control or restrain acts by means of
the writ of injunction is limited to acts which are being committed or
about to be committed within the territorial boundaries of their
respective provinces or districts."
In the case at bar, the acts sought to be restrained were about to be
performed within the territorial boundaries of the province of Davao, in
which the lower court is sitting. Hence, the above cases uphold the
jurisdiction of the said court to hear this case and decide whether or not
the relief prayed for by petitioner-appellant mayor should be granted.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the record
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with the costs of this
instance against respondent-appellee, Lucia O. Tolentino. It is so ordered.
G.R. No. L-6354

July 26, 1954

EPIFANIO FARRALES, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO FUENTECILLA,

Justice of the Peace of San Narciso, Zambales, QUIRINO
DUMLAO and JESUS AMON, ex oficio Provincial Sheriff of
Zambales, respondents.
Epifanio Farrales has come to this court by way of certiorari seeking to set
aside the order issued on September 29, 1952 by respondent Justice of the
Peace dissolving the preliminary mandatory injunction previously issued
by him on the ground that said order is illegal it having been issued
without notice and hearing.
On February 16, 1952, Epifanio Farrales, petitioner herein, filed an action
for forcible entry before the Justice of the Peace Court of San Narciso,
Zambales, relative to certain lands situated in barrio Paete of said
municipality against Quirino Dumlao and several other persons.
On February 26, 1952, petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction under article 539 of the new Civil Code,
which was granted after due notice and hearing, and as a result, the sheriff
placed petitioner in possession of the lands in litigation.
In the meantime, the case was heard on May 3, 6, and 8, 1952, but
thereafter further proceedings were discontinued apparently for the reason
that respondent Justice of the Peace seldom came to his office or ceased to
act in San Narciso, Zambales. Then, suddenly, about five months after the
last hearing on the main case, respondent Justice of the Peace issued an
order on September 29, 1952 dissolving the preliminary injunction issued
by him on March 25, 1952.
Considering that this order is illegal because it was issued ex parte or
without giving petitioner an opportunity to be heard, he filed the present
petition imputing grave abuse of discretion to respondent Justice of the
Peace.
In his answer, respondent Justice of the Peace denies the imputation that
he committed certain irregularities in the performance of his official duties
and alleges that when he issued the order dissolving the preliminary
injunction he merely acted in accordance with the rules of court
considering the great damage that would be caused to the defendants and
the fact that petitioner can be fully compensated for the damage he may
suffer by the counterbond posted by the defendants.

The law governing the power of the court to dissolve a preliminary

injunction is section 6, Rule 60, of the Rules of Court. This rule grants the
court authority to dissolve a preliminary injunction if in its opinion its
continuance may cause great damage to the defendant provided the latter
posts a bond in an amount to be fixed by the court, but is silent as to the
procedure to be followed in granting the relief. It does not say whether it
may be granted ex parte, or only after notice and hearing. Apparently, the
rule gives to the court ample discretion to act on the matter provided that
in doing so the substance of the rule is observed. That such is the case is
apparent in a number of cases decided by this court. Thus, it was held that
"... At any rate, as already stated, the respondent judge was not even
required to hear the parties, if the record convinced him that the writ of
preliminary injunction should be dissolved. (Ong Su Han vs. Gutierrez
David,1 43 Off. Gaz., 95). Specifically, it has been held that, in dissolving
an injunction already issued the court cannot be considered as having
acted without jurisdiction or with excess of jurisdiction, even if the
dissolution has been made without previous notice to the adverse party,
and without a hearing" (Emphasis ours) (Caluya vs. Ramos,2 45 Off. Gaz.,
No. 5, 2075.) And in case of Clarke vs. Phil. Ready Mix Concrete Co. Inc., et
al., 88 Phil., 460, this court made a summary of the ruling on this matter:
The issues in the present case may be briefly stated as follows:
(1) May a writ of preliminary injunction granted by a trial court
after a hearing, be dissolved upon an ex parte application by
defendant?
The question involved in the first part has already been passed
upon by this court in the case of Caluya vs. Ramos, G. R. No. L1307, 45 Off. Gaz., No. 5, p. 2075, where we said:
". . . Specifically, it has been held that, in dissolving an
injunction already issued the court cannot be considered as
having acted without jurisdiction or with excess of jurisdiction,
even if the dissolution has been made without previous notice to
the adverse party, and without a hearing." (Emphasis ours.)
Again in the case of Cine Ligaya vs. the Court of First Instance
of Laguna, et al., 66 Phil., 659, this court held:
. . . Nevertheless, even if a previous notice were required
and even if there had been no hearing on the petition to lift or
dissolve the injunction granted, it cannot be said for that reason
that the court dissolving the injunction thus issued,
acted without or in excess of jurisdiction. ... The failure to send a
notice or to hold a hearing as required by section 169 aforecited
of Act No. 190 is not in any way jurisdictional so as to invalidate
the proceedings of the court on the ground of lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
Also in the case of Jaranillo vs. Jacinto et al., 43 Phil., 588, this
court held that "failure to give such notice is merely an
irregularity in the proceedings which do not go to the
jurisdiction of the court and cannot be corrected by certiorari ."
And, in the case of So Chu et al. vs. Nepomuceno, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, 29 Phil., 208, it was held that
"where court has jurisdiction over the person and subject matter
of the action, a failure to give notice of subsequent steps in the
action or proceeding is not jurisdictional and does not render an
order without notice void."
It is thus seen that notice and hearing are not necessary in order that the
court may act on a motion for dissolution of an injunction previously
issued. The court can act ex parte and if it does so it cannot be deemed as
having acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Such is the
predicament of respondent Justice of the Peace. He acted substantially in
accordance with the rules of court. Nor can it be that he acted with abuse of
discretion because, according to him, he dissolved the injunction after
considering the great damage that would be caused to defendants and the
fact that petitioner can be fully compensated for the damage he may suffer
by the counter-bond posted by defendants. This appears to be
substantiated by the record.
With regard to the claim of petitioner that respondents Justice of the Peace
has committed certain irregularities in the performance of his official
duties, aside from the fact that such imputation has been denied, we are of
the opinion that this is not the place where it should be aired. The matter
may be brought to the Judge of the Court of First Instance who has
supervision over the Justice of the Peace or to the Secretary of Justice.
(Section 96-97, Judiciary Act of 1948.)
The petition is dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 49046

November 22, 1943

MARCELO DIMAUNAHAN, Petitioner-Appellant, vs. HON. DIEGO

ARANAS and A. M. VERGARA, Respondents-Appellees.

SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; MANDAMUS DOES NOT LIE TO COMPEL
CHIEF OF POLICE TO SUBSCRIBE AND SWEAR TO A CRIMINAL
COMPLAINT. Before the accused were arraigned on the original
complaint for less serious physical injuries, the private prosecutor tended a
second amended complaint charging the accused with serious physical
injuries, but the chief of police refused to sign it and the justice of the peace
denied the oral petition of the private prosecutor to order the chief of
police to sign it. Held: That mandamus does not lie against either the chief
of police or the justice of the peace. To subscribe and swear to a criminal
complaint is not a ministerial but a discretionary act of a peace officer. To
coerce him by mandamus to perform such an act would make him a mere
robot and nullify the oath.
2. ID.; PROCEDURE WHERE OFFERED PARTY DESIRES TO AMEND
HIS COMPLAINT. All criminal actions must be commenced either by
complaint or information. (Section 1, Rule 106.) "Complaint is a sworn
written statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the
offended party, any peace officer or other employee of the Government or
governmental institution in charge of the enforcement or execution of the
law violated." (Section 2, id.) Thus, under the law the offended party
himself may subscribe and swear to the complaint in question. The correct
procedure for him to follow was to ask for the dismissal of the original
complaint for less serious physical injuries and to file another complaint
for serious physical injuries, subscribed and sworn to by himself. The
justice of the peace would have to accept it and give it due course by
holding the preliminary investigation required by Rule 108. Should the
justice of the peace refuse to issue the warrant of arrest after the
preliminary investigation, and should the offended party be dissatisfied
with the action of the justice of the peace, he could appeal to the provincial
fiscal. This goes to show that appellant has not been excluded from the use
and enjoyment of a right; he simply did not know how to exercise his right.
3. ID.; INJUNCTION REMAINS IN FORCE BECAUSE NOT EXPRESSLY
DISSOLVED BY JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL AND IN VIEW OF APPEAL
TAKEN FROM SAID JUDGMENT. In the action for mandamus, the trial
court issued a temporary injunction to restrain the justice of the peace
from going ahead with the trial of criminal case No. 1. After hearing the
case, the trial court entered judgment dismissing the action without,
however, expressly dissolving the injunction. That judgment was
subsequently appealed. The question to determine is whether the first
order issued by the trial court, which may be considered as a temporary
injunction, was ipso facto dissolved by the judgment dismissing the action,
notwithstanding the appeal from said judgment and notwithstanding the
absence of an express provision therein dissolving the injunction. In the
instant case the appeal, which was expressly admitted by the trial court,
would have been a moot case if the court had dissolved the temporary
injunction. That is evidently the reason why the trial court refrained from
dissolving it in the order of dismissal. The injunction ordered the justice of
the peace to suspend all further action in criminal case No. 1 "hasta nueva
orden." Held: That in view of the abstention by the trial court from
expressly dissolving the temporary injunction, and in view of the appeal
from the judgment of dismissal, the temporary injunction was not
dissolved but remained in force until the appeal was finally decided. Hence
the actuations of the justice of the peace in violation of said injunction
were null and void.
DECISION
Appellant is the offended party in criminal case No. 1 of the justice of the
peace court of Alitagtag, Batangas, filed by the chief of police against
Apolonio Jumarang and Geronimo Jumarang, for less serious physical
injuries alleged to have been committed on January 13, 1943. An attempt
was subsequently made by the chief of police to amend the complaint by
charging the accused with frustrated homicide instead of less serious
physical injuries, but the amended complaint was rejected by the justice of
the peace. On March 6, 1943, before the accused were arraigned on the
original complaint, the private prosecutor tendered a second amended
complaint (exhibit C) charging the accused with serious physical injuries,
but the chief of police refused to sign it and the justice of the peace denied
the oral petition of the private prosecutor to order the chief of police to
sign it. The private prosecutor, announcing his intention to institute a
mandamus proceeding in the Court of First Instance, objected to the
arraignment of the accused upon the original complaint. The objection was
overruled, and the accused were arraigned.
On March 11, 1943, appellant filed a petition for mandamus against the
justice of the peace and the chief of police of Alitagtag to compel the latter
to sign the second amended complaint exhibit C, and the former to accept
said complaint; and, in the meantime, to restrain the justice of the peace
from going ahead with the trial of said criminal case No. 1. Upon the filing
of said petition the Court of First Instance issued the following order:
From that order the petitioner has appealed to this Court. In the
meantime, and on August 2, 1943, the justice of the peace called criminal
case No. 1 for trial and then and there dismissed it for nonappearance of
the offended party and his witnesses. In a motion filed by the petitionerappellant herein on September 1, 1943, he prays this Court to "issue an
order requiring the reinstatement of the said criminal case No. 1, to vacate
the order of dismissal and to arrest the accused," upon the ground that the
hearing of said criminal case and the entry of the order of dismissal were in

violation of the trial courts injunction. Action upon said motion was
deferred until the consideration of the case on the merits.
We find the order appealed from to be correct in every respect. It is patent
that mandamus does not lie here against either the chief of police or the
justice of the peace. To subscribe and swear to a criminal complaint is not
a ministerial but a discretionary act of a peace officer. To coerce him by
mandamus to perform such an act would make him a mere robot and
nullify the oath.
All criminal actions must be commenced either by complaint or
information. (Section 1, Rule 106.) "Complaint is a sworn written
statement charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the offended
party, any peace officer or other employee of the Government or
governmental institution in charge of the enforcement or execution of the
law violated." (Section 2, id.) Thus, under the law the offended party
himself may subscribe and swear to the complaint in question. The correct
procedure for him to follow was to ask for the dismissal of the original
complaint for less serious physical injuries and to file another complaint
for serious physical injuries, subscribed and sworn to by himself. The
justice of the peace would have to accept it and give it due course by
holding the preliminary investigation required by Rule 108. Should the
justice of the peace refuse to issue the warrant of arrest after the
preliminary investigation, and should the offended party be dissatisfied
with the action of the justice of the peace, he could appeal to the provincial
fiscal. This goes to show that appellant has not been excluded from the use
and enjoyment of a right; he simply did not know how to exercise his right.
We have now to consider appellants motion to vacate the order of
dismissal of criminal case No. 1 entered by the justice of the peace during
the pendency of this appeal. The question to determine is whether the first
order issued by the trial court, which may be considered as a temporary
injunction, was ipso facto dissolved by the judgment dismissing the action,
notwithstanding the appeal from said judgment and notwithstanding the
absence of an express provision therein dissolving the injunction.
In an action for injunction, the judgment granting, dissolving, or denying
an injunction is immediately operative, unless otherwise ordered by the
court. (See section 4, Rule 39.) But in an action in which the writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued as an auxiliary remedy, does the
judgment of dismissal ipso facto dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction
notwithstanding an appeal? In the cases of Watson v. Enriquez, 1 Phil.,
480, and Sitia Teco v. Ventura, 1 Phil., 497, the trial court, in rendering
judgment in favor of the defendants, dissolved the temporary injunction
theretofore issued by it. This Court held that the dissolution was operative
notwithstanding the appeal from the judgment. This Court quoted with
approval from Knox Company v. Harshman, 132 U.S., 14, that "when an
injunction has been dissolved, it cannot be revived except by a new
exercise of judicial power, and no appeal by a dissatisfied party can of itself
revive it." It was also held in said cases that the trial court "has the power,
if the purposes of justice require it, to order a continuance of the status quo
until a decision should be made by the appellate court or until that court
should order to the contrary."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the instant case the trial court did not dissolve the temporary injunction
it had issued. Thus, we have here the converse of the Watson and Sitia
Teco cases. There it was held that once an injunction has been dissolved, it
stays dissolved unless revived by another order. Here we have an
injunction which has not been dissolved and which, therefore, should
remain in force, unless otherwise ordered by the court, until the case is
finally decided. In the instant case the appeal, which was expressly
admitted by the trial court, would have been a moot case if the court had
dissolved the temporary injunction. That is evidently the reason why the
trial court refrained from dissolving it in the order of dismissal. The
injunction ordered the justice of the peace to suspend all further action in
criminal case No. 1 "hasta nueva orden." We hold, therefore, that in view of
the absention by the trial court from expressly dissolving the temporary
injunction, and in view of the appeal from the judgment of dismissal, the
temporary injunction was not dissolved but remained in force until the
appeal was finally decided. Hence the actuations of the justice of the peace
in violation of said injunction were null and void.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, without prejudice to
the right of the appellant to present a new complaint against Apolonio
Jumarang and Geronimo Jumarang for either less serious physical injuries
or serious physical injuries. No finding as to costs.
CASTOR AGUILAR, petitioner, vs. ERNESTO TAN and THE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
VICENTE RIVERA, JR., in his capacity as Director of civil
Aviation, petitioner, vs. ERNESTO TAN and THE COURT OF
APPEALS, respondent.
The primary object of the petitions in these two cases for certiorari is to
reverse and/or nullify the June 16, 1964 decision and September 21, 1964
resolution of the Court of Appeals, it appearing that said decision and
resolution would have the effect of depriving Castor Aguilar of his alleged
right to operate the porterage service at the Manila International Airport
and vesting it in respondent Ernesto Tan.1
The cases have their roots in Civil Case No. 2190-P of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, entitled "Ernesto Tan, Plaintiff, versus Urbano B.
Caldoza,
et
al.,
Defendants,
Celso
Gazzingan,
Intervenor",

for mandamus to compel defendants to allow plaintiff to resume porterage

service at the Manila International Airport. The judgment of the Court of
First
Instance
of
Rizal
of
March
31,
1964
dismissed
plaintiff's mandamus suit and dissolved the writ of preliminary injunction
theretofore issued. Ernesto Tan took steps to appeal to the Court of
Appeals.
Meanwhile, plaintiff Ernesto Tan, in a motion before the court of first
instance, sought to stop enforcement of the decision and to maintain
the status quo under the dissolved injunction. The court, on April 27, 1964,
ruled out the motion. On April 29, 1964, the court rejected the motion for
reconsideration and directed Tan and/or his agents, workers or laborers
"to refrain or cease from operating the porterage service in the Manila
International Airport immediately."
Parenthetically, Castor Aguilar (petitioner herein in L-23600) was
afterwards placed in the operation of the poterage service.
Ernesto Tan then went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari and
prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. 2
On June 16, 1964, without first giving due course to the petition and
without as much as giving notice of Tan's petition to herein petitioners, the
Court Appeals rendered judgment, viz: "WHEREFORE, the instant
petition is hereby granted, with orders for respondent court to give due
course to petitioner's appeal from its adverse decision dated March 31,
1964; desist from carrying out its order of April 7, 1964; 3 and the civil
Aeuronautics Administration, or Aguilar or any other party acting in his
stead, to desist from interfering or molesting petitioner [Ernesto Tan] who
is hereby understood to have remained all the time as concessionaire of the
Manila International Airport, with the costs against respondents, except
respondent court."
By way of follow-up to the foregoing judgment, Ernesto Tan moved in the
Court of Appeals for a directive for the issued against the judge of first
instance and herein petitioners to comply with the terms thereof.
Simultaneuosly, Tan filed a similar motion in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal praying for an order to direct the director of the Civil Aeronautics
Administration (Director) to comply with the decision of the Court
Appeals.4
Aguilar and the Director, for their part, moved to set aside the June 16,
1964 appellate court's decision, the former on June 20, 1964, and the latter
on June 22, 1964. Their common ground is lack of jurisdiction over their
persons as they had no notice of Tan's petition.
On June 27, 1964, the Court of Appeals promulgated the following
resolution:
The petition for the issuance of writ of certiorari,
prohibition and mandatory injunction filed by Ernesto
Tan in the above-captioned case being an offshoot or
concomitant to Civil case No. 2190-P pending in
respondent Court of First Instance, this Court of
Appeals, in aid of its jurisdiction, was in a position to
pass upon the said petition ex parte as it did.
However considering the importance of the case and
to enable the respondents to be heard, upon motion
they are hereby ordered to answer the petition within
ten (10) days from receipt of copy of this order. Upon
petitioners filling a bond of 1,000.00 respondent court
is hereby ordered to suspend further proceedings in
Civil Case No. 2190-P.
In the interim, this Court's decision promulgated June
16, 1964, and is held in abeyance.
Pursuant to the Foregoing resolution, summons were served on Aguilar on
July 1, 1964 and the Director on July 2, 1964.
The Director and Aguilar, instead of filing their respective answers, went to
this Court on an original petition forcertiorari and prohibition with prayer
for preliminary injunction ("Vicente C. Rivera, Jr., in his capacity as
Director of Civil Aviation, Petitioner, versus Ernesto Tan and the Court of
Appeals, Respondents", L-23164; "Castor Aguilar, Petitioner, versus
Ernesto Tan and the Court of Appeals, Respondents", L-23165). Both
petitions sought to annul the June 16, 1964 decision of the Court of
Appeals and also its June 27, 1964 resolution.
This Court in the minute resolution of July 13, 1964 issued in both cases
(L-23165), resolved to dismiss the two petition for being premature since
petitioners "may appeal after the resolution by the Court of Appeals".
Back to the Court of Appeals, Aguilar and the director their filed their
respective answers to Tan's petition.

Issues having been joined and the following oral arguments on the merits,
the Court of Appeals, on September 21, 1964, issued an extended
resolution to be held in abeyance, the same stands with the instant
resolution incorporated therein as part hereof."
Hence, this appeal by certiorari. As prayed for, we issued a cease-anddesist order on November 7, 1964 in L-23600 (Castro Aguilar, Petitioner,
versus Ernesto Tan and the Court of appeals, Respondents).
1. Petitioners assail the June 16, 1964 decision of the Court of Appeals.
Petitioners' claim is that at the time that decision was rendered, the court
had not yet acquired jurisdiction over their persons. They submit that the
decision was void for lack of due process.
Beyond question is the fact that the June 16, 1964 decision was rendered
by the Court of Appeals without giving notice to herein petitioners of Tan's
petition therein and without giving them an opportunity to be heard. Had
the proceedings stopped there, unquestionably, that decision would have
to be stricken down as null and void. But petitioners complained. They
separately moved to set aside the decision. They stress lack of the process.
The Court of Appeals listened to their plea. Thus, on June 27, 1964, the
appellate court resolved to hold in abeyance its June 16, 1964 decision, and
ordered respondents (petitioners herein) to file their answers thereto.
Summonses were served upon the Director and Aguilar. Thereafter, they
filed their respective answers. The case was heard before the appellate
court on the merits. The parties argued orally their respective causes
thereat.
There is then reason to say that the situation here presented comes within
the coverage of the rule that "[w]hat the law prohibits is not the absence
of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof and lack of
opportunity to be heard."5 We have said that where a party was given a
chance to be heard with respect to his motion for reconsideration there is
sufficient compliance with the requirements of due process. 6 Such is the
case here.
Considering then that the decision of June 16, 1964 was suspended, that
meanwhile herein petitioners were given a chance to traverse the
averments of the petition, have had full opportunity to speak and explain
their side of the case, we feel that the fundamental safeguards of due
process were not denied petitioners. Where previously there was error,
subsequently such error was corrected. Originally victims of hasty justice,
petitioners were subsequently given fair treatment. The vice existed; but it
was cured.
2. Now to the core of the case. The judgment of the trial court dissolved the
preliminary injunctive writ which gave respondent Tan the right to operate
the porterage service. The appellate court's directive is that such judgment
should not be enforced. It is the Court of Appeals' view that Tan's appeal
from the adverse decision "suspended all proceedings to oust him until
such appeal shall have been finally disposed of by the appellate court."
The rule that an appeal does not stay execution of the judgment decreeing
the dissolution of a preliminary injunction has a history in this country
which dates back to 1902. That was the ruling of this Court in Watson &
Co., Limited vs. Enriquez (November 13, 1902), 1 Phil. 480, 481-482,
closely followed on November 22 of the same year by Sitia Teco vs.
Ventura, 1 Phil. 497, 499.7
3. Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
Court of Appeals in enjoining the lower court from enforcing its decision
dissolving the injunctive writ is the next problem we are to grapple with.
Deeply ingrained in jurisprudence is the principle that the writs
of certiorari and prohibition are granted "to keep an inferior court within
the bounds of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction." 8 As we have said
in Albert vs. Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch VI), L-26364, May
29, 1968, 23 SCRA 948, 965, "the office of the writ of certiorari has been
reduced to the correction of defects ofjurisdiction solely and cannot legally
be used for any other purpose."9
Let us now look into the reasons of the appellate court for granting the
writs.
The resolution of September 21, 1964, which was issued after hearing both
parties, confirmed the conclusion reached in the June 16, 1964 decision
that the writs prayed for should be granted, thus:

Considering the attendant circumstances, in view of

the appeal filed by the petitioners from the trial court's
decision and in view of the further circumstance that
petitioner has, for the last three years, been the
incumbent server of the arrastre service in said
international airport, it would seem the better part of
judgment to preserve that status in view of the appeal
they have interposed from the trial court's decision.
Obviously, to rule otherwise, that is, by allowing
respondent arrastre group to take over, would be
tantamount to disturbing the present order of status
quo and evidently pre-judge the case. 10
The most that can be inferred from the foregoing resolution is that in
dissolving the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, the trial judge
could have erroneously sized up the situation. Intimation of abuse and
discretion, much less grave abuse of discretion, there is none. Not every
error a court commits in the exercise of its jurisdiction may be correctible
by certiorari. Errors of judgment maybe reviewed only by appeal. 11
That the trial did not abuse his discretion in denying Tan's bid for status
quo pending appeal, may readily be shown from a reading of his order of
April 27, 1964, thus
As to the petition for preliminary injunction, we can not see our way clear
in granting the same in view of our findings that the plaintiff has not
acquired any right under the bidding of November 28, 1960, which has
been set aside by the Executive Secretary by authority of the President. In
our decision, we stated:
We have carefully weighed the reasons of Undersecretary Contreras, the
Auditor General and the Executive Secretary in setting aside the bidding of
November 28, 1960, and we are not prepared to hold, as we find no
sufficient and valid reason therefor, that said officers in setting aside the
bidding, acted arbitrarily or with abuse of discretion. As a matter of fact,
the record fails to show the aforesaid officials had exceeded their authority
in disapproving and/or setting at naught the bidding. It is our sense that in
so doing they were merely guided by their sound judgment and honest
opinion. They acted with fairness and justice to protect public interest.
We are loath to make an order modifying the decision heretofore rendered,
or restoring or granting the injunction prayed for during the pendency of
the appeal. 12
More emphatic is the trial judge's statement in his order of April 29, 1964
denying Tan's second motion aimed at eliminating the dissolution of the
preliminary injunction, as follows:
After a careful consideration of said motion for reconsideration and the
opposition thereto, it is our conviction that the plaintiff has no more legal
right to continue operating the porterage service, nor has he shown any
special reason satisfactory to the court to reconsider its decision dissolving
the writ of preliminary injunction dated August 29, 1961. 13
An order dissolving a writ preliminary injunction issued before decision,
we must say, stands on a footing different from that decreed in the decision
itself. In the former, the possibility of irreparable injury which could be a
potent deterrent against dissolution. The court at that time did not have
yet a full grasp of the situation. But after the facts are known and the
decision is rendered, a strong presumption of the correctness and validity
of the judge's directive arises. 14 So that when the court in its decision
orders dissolution of the preliminary injunction, weighty reasons must be
advanced to overturn such order. Because discretion exercised by the trial
court should normally be upheld. That court is at home, so to speak, with
the record of its proceedings.
We, accordingly, rule that there was no abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court which would call for the exercise of the supervisory powers
of the Court of Appeals.
FOR THE REASONS GIVEN, the judgment of the Court of Appeals of June
16, 1964 and its resolution of September 21, 1964 in CA-G.R. No. 33943-r,
entitled "Ernesto Tan, Petitioner, vs. Hon. Judge Angel Mojica, etc., et al.,
Respondents," are hereby reversed, and the writ of preliminary injunction
heretofore issued in L-23600 is hereby made permanent.
Costs against respondent Ernesto Tan. So ordered.