SPS RAET AND SPS MITRA v.

COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 128016. September 17, 1998, (Mendoza, J)
Under 8(11) of E.O. No. 648 dated February 7, 1981, as amended by E.O.
No. 90 dated December 17, 1986, this question is for the HLURB to decide. The
said provision of law gives that agency the power to Hear and decide cases of
unsound real estate business practices; claims involving refund filed against
project owners, developers, dealers, brokers, or salesmen; and cases of specific
performance.
Respondents Phil-Ville and Gatus transacted with complainant Raet for the
sale of the subject housing units despite knowing fully well that they are not
qualified to buy under the GSIS financing scheme. Respondents even allowed
complainants to use the GSIS policies of other persons in order that complainants
can avail of the GSIS loan facility to pay respondent Phil-Ville which is irregular.
Respondent Phil-Ville accepted payments and allowed complainants to
occupy the subject premises despite knowing that they are not qualified to buy
under the GSIS financing scheme and without executing a written instrument
modifying the terms and conditions agreed upon between complainants and
respondent Gatus.
It was only after several years of occupation of the subject premises by
complainants that respondent Phil-Ville informed complainants that they are not
qualified to purchase the subject premises.
Respondent Gatus did not unequivocally inform complainants in her
transactions with them that she was merely selling her interests over the subject
properties to complainants. Respondent Phil-Ville could have made its relation with
respondent Gatus a lot clearer by altogether ignoring the transaction entered into
by respondent Gatus with complainants but it chose to transact with complainants
and accept payments from the latter.
Owing to the failure of petitioners to raise money, private respondent
PVDHC asked them to vacate the units they were occupying. As petitioners
refused to do so, it filed ejectment cases against them before the Municipal Trial
Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan, which eventually ordered them to surrender the
possession of the subject units and to pay the fees, litigation expenses, and costs of
suit. The decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan was
affirmed, first by the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan and then by the
Court of Appeals. Petitioners tried to appeal to this Court but their appeal was
dismissed.
Respectively, the spouses Raet and the spouses Mitra had earlier filed
complaints against private respondent PVDHC with the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan for the recovery of the supplemental costs they had paid to
private respondent PVDHC. However, the complaint of the spouses Raet was
dismissed on the ground that the Regional Trial Court did not have jurisdiction
over cases involving disputes between subdivision buyers and developers which

fall within the exclusive competence of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB). On the other hand, the complaint of the spouses Mitra was
withdrawn by them on April 17, 1990.
The spouses Raet and the spouses Mitra then filed complaint for specific
performance and damages against Amparo Gatus and private respondent PVDHC
with the HLURB which gave judgment in petitioners favor. Y
On appeal, the Board of Commissioners of the HLURB reversed on the
Housing and Land Use Arbiter on the ground that the issues involved in the case
had already been determined by the Municipal Trial Court of Meycauayan, Bulacan
in the ejectment suit between the parties. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration,
but their motion was denied.
Petitioners elevated the case to the Office of the President which sustained
the ruling of the Housing and Land Use Arbiter in a decision. The Office of the
President held that the HLURB has jurisdiction over cases involving disputes
between subdivision buyers and developers to the exclusion of the regular courts.
Therefore, the decision in the ejectment case cannot be conclusive on the question
whether there were perfected contracts of sale between the petitioners and
private respondent PVDHC. Private respondent PVDHC filed a motion for
reconsideration which the Office of the President denied in its resolution.
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals by private respondent
PVDHC. In its decision the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the Office of
the President and dismissed the petitioners action without prejudice to their right
to proceed against Amparo Gatus. Petitioners subsequent motion for
reconsideration was denied by the appellate court..
Issue: W/N there were perfected contracts of sale between petitioners and private
respondent PVDHC involving the units in question.
Ruling:
The decision in the ejectment suit is conclusive only on the question of
possession of the subject premises. It does not settle the principal question
involved in the present case, namely, whether there were perfected contracts of
sale between petitioners and private respondent PVDHC involving the units in
question. Under 8(11) of E.O. No. 648 dated February 7, 1981, as amended by
E.O. No. 90 dated December 17, 1986, this question is for the HLURB to decide.
The said provision of law gives that agency the power to
Hear and decide cases of unsound real estate business practices; claims
involving refund filed against project owners, developers, dealers, brokers, or
salesmen; and cases of specific performance.
This jurisdiction of the HLURB is exclusive. It has been held to extend to the
determination of the question whether there is a perfected contract of sale
between a condominium buyer and developer.[15] As the Office of the President
correctly pointed out in its decision, dated June 29, 1995:

Unquestionably, the instant case stemmed from an action for specific

performance regarding agreements or contracts to purchase houses and lots
located in the subdivision owned, developed and/or marketed by respondent PhilVille Development and Housing Corporation. As such, it is within the exclusive
province of the HLURB to take cognizance of the instant case, involving, as it does,
a demand for specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations by
buyers of subdivision lots against a developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
Petitioners dealt with Gatus. But Gatus was not the agent of private
respondent PVDHC. Indeed, the criminal case for estafa against her was dismissed
because it was found that she never represented herself to be an agent of private
respondent PVDHC. Moreover, Art. 1874 of the Civil Code requires for the validity
of a sale involving land that the agent should have an authorization in writing,
which Gatus did not possess.
Petitioners knew from the beginning that Gatus was negotiating with them
in her own behalf, and not as an agent of private respondent PVDHC. There is,
therefore, no basis in fact for the finding of the Housing and Land Use Arbiter that
Gatus was the agent of private respondent PVDHC with respect to the transactions
in question.
There are no written contracts to evidence the alleged sales. If both spouses
and PVDHC had indeed entered into contracts involving said units, it is rather
strange that contracts of such importance have not been reduced in writing.