Barkan

The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of
the near East

Author(s): Omer Lutfi Barkan and Justin McCarthy
Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Jan., 1975), pp. 3-28
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 6 (I975),
3-28
Printed in Great Britain
Omer Lutfi Barkan

THE
PRICE
SIXTEENTH
IN THE
NEAR
REVOLUTION
CENTURY:
ECONOMIC
OF THE
A TURNING
HISTORY
POINT
OF THE
EAST
Translated by Justin McCarthy
The sixteenth century came to an end with the countries of the Ottoman Middle
East falling into a grave economic and social crisis which presaged a decisive
turning point in their history. The most symptomatic sign of what was, in fact, a
structural crisis was a series of popular revolts which appeared most prominently
among the Muslim Turkish population of Anatolia. Known as the Celali revolts,
these uprisings developed into open civil war against the forces of the Ottoman
state, and in their first phase lasted approximately fifteen years, from 1595 to i6io.
The Ottoman chronicles describe these uprisings as mere bandit actions,
organized and led by evil bandit chiefs. More recent studies in Ottoman archival
materials, however, indicate that these events were far more complicated and
significant, both in their origins and in their manifestations. The first indication
of this new view came shortly after the Kemalist revolution in the work of
Hiiseyin Husameddin, Amasya Tarihi,I which indicated that the Celali agitation
was in fact an open revolt of the Turkish population of Anatolia against the
corrupt administration of the Ottoman government, which had fallen totally into
the hands of the devqirmeslaves converted for the service of the Sultan. According to him, the nomadic and Turkoman elements of Anatolia had never been
comfortable under the financial administration of the Empire. Added to this
were new nationalist feelings among the Turkomans, nourished by glorious
historic memories of the Turkish past in Central Asia, as well as by the religious
propaganda spread by the Safavis, which transformed the general discomfort
into a tremendous hatred of the central Ottoman rule. The Husameddin explanation was interesting and attractive, but it ignored the fact that in the major
revolt of the period, led by Kara Yazicl, most of those participating were not
recruited from the Turkoman elements of Anatolia.
The next scholar to examine the problem was the Russian Turkologist A. S.
Tveritinova,2 who found in the Celali uprisings a collaboration between the
III, 348-75.
Istanbul,
'Vosstanie Kara Yazlci-Deli Hasan v Turtsii', Izd. Ak. SSSR, pp. 85-93.
I927,
1-2

Omer Lutfi Barkan
peasantry and the smaller feudal holders revolting against the larger feudal leaders
of the time. Tveritinova, however, presented no documentary evidence to support
her theory, aside from the information found in the Ottoman chronicles regarding
the specific uprisings, and her article accomplished no more than present the
known facts in accordance with Marxist schemas. The general theme regarding
the crisis of the Ottoman feudal elements impoverished by a crisis of capitalism
and the misery of the exploited peasants did provide subsequent scholars with
a useful hypothesis which they could examine by research into the documentary
evidence.
The most prominent and successful of the Turkish historians who have
examined the social and economic background of the Celali revolts is Professor
Mustafa Akdag, of the University of Ankara, who has presented his findings in
a series of studies based on detailed examination of the archival documents.I
According to Akdag the idea of a Turkish nationalist reaction against foreign
slave rule cannot be substantiated, since the prestige of the Ottoman dynasty
remained quite high throughout Anatolia during this period. The insurgents, for
the most part, were not peasants acting in behalf of a definite revolutionary
program, but rather cultivators left without land or employment as a result of
a tremendous inflation combined with the dissolution of the great military fiefs
established previously to support the Ottoman army.
My own archival studies into the movements of prices and demography of the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries attempt to shed new understanding on these
events. Many causes can be examined, but here I propose to investigate the role
of economic factors, as well as that of monetary problems originating outside the
Empire.
I. THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE
AND DOCTRINE
OF THE OTTOMAN
EMPIRE
The economic system in effect in the first centuries of the Ottoman Empire
was in many ways original and to a certain extent was in harmony with the
conditions of its time. While it has been subjected to heavy criticism, one must
remember that, during the first centuries of the Ottoman Empire, it permitted
the rise of considerable economic prosperity in an area that before the Ottoman
conquest had for centuries fallen into decay and impoverishment.
The Ottoman system was basically one of imperial self-sufficiency. In order
systematically to exploit the vast sources of wealth within the empire and to
preserve its political and economic integrity and unity, the Ottomans sought to
establish a tightly closed economic order. They saw the need of bringing to an
end the economic penetration and exploitation by European powers such as
Venice and Genoa. At the same time they attempted to develop means by which
the different economic zones of the Empire would complement one another,
Celali Isyanlar (Ankara, 943).

The price revolution of the sixteenth century 5

instead of developing the dangerous ruptures and disequilibrium that had
brought economic crises and depressions in the past. To a great extent, the
Ottomans were successful in these endeavors. The robust constitution and
political power of the Empire in its first two centuries enabled it to pursue an
economic policy that was highly favorable to it, and as a result to avoid entirely
the kind of economic crises that had weakened its predecessors.
It was only when Europe began to develop its own political and economic
power that the system was breached. The decline of the established Ottoman
social and economic order began as the result of developments entirely outside
the area dominated by the Porte, and in particular as a consequence of the
establishment in Western Europe of an 'Atlantic economy' of tremendous vitality
and force. The economic system of the Empire decayed neither through a flaw
inherent in its constitution, nor through an organic law, but because of immense
historical changes that destroyed its equilibrium, arrested its natural economic
evolution, and condemned its institutions to irreparable damage.
In the second half of the fifteenth century the major European nations began
the intellectual and commercial development that was to eventually bring them
to world domination. At that time, the expansion outside of Europe by the
countries bordering the Atlantic began to reach a peak, extending first into
Africa, and culminating in the discovery of entire new continents. The European
nations were attracted to Africa primarily by the highly lucrative commerce in
gold and slaves. It was not long before they had drained a substantial portion of
the African gold supply. This gold had been the principal source of economic
nourishment for the entire Mediterranean world, and by taking it the Europeans
laid the foundation for the development of a highly profitable colonial system in
the centuries to come. The African experience gave the colonial powers the
experience and means to develop new techniques and a powerful economic and
financial base which made it inevitable that they would proceed to the discovery
of America (I492) and of the Cape of Good Hope (1498). These discoveries led
them inevitably to conquest and exploitation in the heart of Asia.
The effects of these important geographic discoveries on the economic and
social structures of Europe have only begun to be explored; their influence on
non-European lands is even less known. The shift of the old international trade
in silks and spices to the new all-water route was surely a severe blow to the
economies and finances of the lands that controlled those routes. Here I examine
less the overt facts of the trade shift and more the consequent 'price revolution'
that engulfed Europe as well as the Ottoman Empire during the sixteenth
century.
Imperialist organization and colonial commerce produced incredible riches
for certain European countries. After the initial phase of conquest and pillage,
European powers quickly converted their colonial holdings into agrarian
plantations and, perhaps more important, mines. Their rapidly developed

Omer Lutfi Barkan
efficient means of exploitation enabled them to bring into Europe tremendous

quantities of gold and silver; the amount rose to as much as three, five, or seven
times that originally imported in I495. The injection of this tremendous new
supply of capital produced new activity in European commerce and industry and
put at the Europeans' disposal new products whose profits could only be fully
realized if new markets as well as new sources of investment could be found. At
the same time, an inevitable result of this situation was an immense inflation
throughout Europe, with vast repercussions in its social and political order.
While the European economy developed rapidly, with capital accretion, investment, and inflation feeding one another, the Ottoman closed economy, by its
very nature, strongly resisted the temptation to follow a similar path. As a result,
the economies of Western Europe and the Ottoman Empire moved farther and
farther apart. The consequent increase in the prices paid for basic commodities in
Europe gradually began a process by which those commodities were sucked out
of Ottoman markets. Wheat, copper, wool, and the like, which had been the
bases of the Ottoman economic strategy, now came into such short supply in the
major centers of the Empire that here also was developed a rapid inflation of
prices which soon endangered the equilibrium and security of the closed
economic system. While the established system forbade the export of such basic
commodities outside its boundaries, the lure of the profits to be found in the
highly inflated European markets led Ottoman and foreign merchants alike to
adopt all possible measures to smuggle these goods outside Ottoman territory.
This situation made it increasingly difficult for the Porte to fulfill its major
function of arranging for sufficient supplies for the major cities of the Empire;
at the same time the lack of raw materials produced a mounting crisis in Ottoman
industry, which in turn led to ever greater discontent among the artisans, whose
direct and indirect complaints found voice in the Ottoman administrative documents of the time. Of course, for them the situation was the result of the entry
of the 'accursed spirit of speculation and excessive gain' into the empire, the
abandonment of the older trade regulations and the corporate traditions among
artisans and the indifference and corruption of the administrative authorities.
They could not see that the situation was in fact created by economic developments outside the empire, against which the traditional Ottoman administrative
system found itself powerless to act. Traditional methods were naturally employed in an effort to counter the threat; controls on the export of 'strategic'
grains were augmented, violators were threatened with severe punishment, and
goods seized in transit were expropriated by the state, but the profits to be gained
from illicit smuggling of grains into the European market were so enormous that
this traffic continued to attract participants who were able to find accomplices
even among the most highly placed representatives of the state. This contraband
commerce became for many persons in the Empire a normal trade and for some
social classes a source of far more riches than they had ever been able to amass
before. Ottoman agriculture, organized in great tax farms in the areas that were


most conveniently located for participation in this clandestine trade, also began
to feel the pressure of the inflated European prices on its own organic structure,
and it began to orient itself toward an agrarian regime better adapted to massive
commercialization of its products.
Archival materials from the time demonstrate that it was impossible to stem
the flow resulting from the price differences between the hitherto integrated
Ottoman zone and the 'Atlantic economy'. The penetration of the high pressure
'dominant economy' into the Ottoman low tension economy was the inevitable
result of the price difference between the two. It was accomplished in spite of all
the resistance the Ottoman system could provide. Economic penetration produced a grave inflationary current in the Ottoman Empire which together with
other, more internal factors, produced social and political changes that disturbed
the social and economic security of the Empire, and in the end proved to be
irreversible.
The crisis in Ottoman industry
As the Empire's price system gradually fell under the influence of the 'dominant economy', Ottoman industry was also undergoing disastrous changes which
cannot be explained simply as the effects of European absorption of the reserve
stocks of primary materials necessary for industry. In addition to the weapons of the
price mechanism and the absorption of goods, the economy of the Atlantic zone
threatened as well the traditional production and trade structures of the Empire.
In Europe, prodigious commercial expansion had given birth to a new capitalist industry, particularly in textiles and metallurgy, an industry working
always for massive exportation. This new industry was concentrated in the hands
of capitalist entrepreneurs and merchants - men free of all corporate restraint
who worked with a new spirit, inventing new techniques, starting new fashions,
and creating new needs. They inaugurated intensive methods of production and
opened new markets in order to make their merchandise accessible to an increasingly far-flung clientele. In doing so, they completely changed international
trade, giving it a new character - unlimited expansion.
The Ottoman craft industry was thus faced in the second half of the sixteenth
century with a European industry rapidly evolving toward the conquest of the
world's markets. The times had produced a vast change in traditional international
commerce. For example, European commerce, represented by a small number of
merchants, had previously exported a few luxury and speciality items to the
Ottoman Empire. These imports represented no threat to local industry. On the
contrary, they produced customs revenues and added to the pleasures of life for
those classes privileged enough to afford them. Then again, the Europeans were
good clients of the Ottoman luxury industries who bought as much, if not more,
than they sold; their trade was actively sought and encouraged. European commerce was an indispensable part of Ottoman prosperity.
During the second half of the sixteenth century that picture changed. Euro-

Omer Lutfi Barkan
pean commerce, sustained by strong commercial organization and encouraged by

powerful nation-states, began to be a threat to local industry, a prime factor in
economic decline. The new European national commerce intended to sell the
greatest possible quantity of goods abroad, while restricting imports of any
finished products. Thus it provided no market for local Ottoman export industry.
The commerce of the Levant changed to a 'colonial commerce', turning Turkey
into a client for the European industry which was itself to furnish only primary
materials, no longer to export finished goods.
An example of this pattern is the silk industry of Bursa: Until the latter half of
the sixteenth century, this city produced huge quantities of high quality silk
cloth, most of it intended for the export market. Once the European silk industry
was perfected, however, European merchants no longer bought anything from
Bursa but silk thread, eagerly awaiting the day when they would only have to buy
the cocoons.' The same industrial evolution characterized the mohair (sof) industry of Ankara. Ankara had been renowned for its export-quality woven mohair cloth, but by the end of the sixteenth century it had fallen to the level of
a thread center, a simple market for the hair of Ankara goats. Like Bursa, it had
become a supplier of primary material from which others now drew riches.z
One can clearly see that the advent of the new European commerce began the
stagnation of the Ottoman craft industry. Certainly the craft industry continued
in many places to exist, but it never advanced or evolved. Faced with the continuously evolving European industry, Ottoman industry could not find the
dynamism necessary to adapt to the new conditions of the world economy. As
an ever wider gap between it and European industry opened, the Ottoman
system was condemned to degeneration.
The new European commerce must be included as one of the main causes of
the sixteenth-century Ottoman economic stagnation. The shock produced by
this commerce on local industry is one of the principal reasons for the progressive
decline in the balance of trade. This in turn not only caused the loss of gold and
silver, but made it impossible to redress the loss.
It is thus that, well before the use of steam as a source of energy in industry and
transport and long before the Industrial Revolution, other, smaller economic revolutions in world commerce and industrial production had already given European
commerce a crushing superiority in its drive for the conquest of world markets.
II. WAS THERE A SIXTEENTH-CENTURY

PARALLEL
OTTOMAN
PRICE
INCREASE
TO THAT OF EUROPE?
During the last quarter of the sixteenth century, prices in Europe for goods
and services rose to three or four times those at the start of the century. This
I
2
Fahri Dalsar, Bursada Ipekfilik (Istanbul, 1960).

Mustafa Akdag, ' Osmanli Imparatorlugunun Kurulu? ve inki?af devrinde Tiirkiyenin
lktisadi vaziyeti',
Belleten (Istanbul,
I949, x950),
51, 55.


tremendous increase began in Western Europe, then spread to Italy and Central
Europe. Braudel states that, even though the Ottoman Empire had always been
viewed as an entirely separate economic, as well as political and social, system,
this movement reached Turkey soon afterward.'
One of the purposes of my research has been to examine this hypothesis by
systematic study of the Ottoman sources, and I have published the results in
articles on the official Ottoman price lists (narh),2 on the estates of deceased
Ottoman soldiers in Edirne,3 and on the prices paid for labor and materials
during the construction of the Siileymaniye mosque and adjacent buildings,4 as
well as on the operations of several Imarets, hospices maintained for the free
lodging and feeding of travelers and students.5
Table I demonstrates the type of information which can be gained from these
sources, for example, the increases of food prices toward the end of the sixteenth
century. Part i of the table shows the actual prices, amounts purchased, and
total costs of the major food items and other supplies purchased for the Siileymaniye hospice in 1585/6. For comparative purposes, since similar accounts for
the same foundation are lacking for earlier and later times, accounts of similar
foundations have been used, that of the Fatih Imaret for I489-90 in part 2, and
that of the Bayezid II Imaret for 1603-4 in part 3. In parts z and 3, the actual
unit prices as shown in their accounts are presented, together with what would
have been paid at those prices had the same quantities been purchased as at the
Siileymaniye Imaret in 1585-6. These figures demonstrate the changes in total
purchase cost for the same items over approximately one century.
Items that cost 615,I94 akfes in the late fifteenth century, cost I,I22,635
akfes in the late sixteenth century, and 2,908,618 akfes in the early seventeenth
century. Where several prices were given for individual items in an account book,
the average price paid for the bulk of purchases of that item was used. Since all
three imarets purchased the goods at the same markets in Istanbul, valid comparisons can be made to demonstrate the tremendous price increase that occurred.
If the 1489-90 price is assigned the price index of Ioo, it means that the prices of
1585-6 reached 182z49 and those of 1604-5 reached 472-79.
An even more detailed demonstration of the price increase is presented in
I F. Braudel, La Mediterrande et le Monde Mediterraneen a I'Epoque de Philippe II
(Paris, 1966), vol. I, part 2, 'Mtaux precieux: Monnaies et prix', pp. 448, 488.
2
Omer Lutfi Barkan, 'XV. asrln sonunda bazi biiyik ?ehirlerde e?ya ve yiyecek
fiyatlari', Tarih Vesikalari, nos. 5, 7, 9 (I942).
3 Omer Lutfi Barkan, 'Edirne Askeri Kassamina ait Tereke Defterleri', Belgeler, III
(1966), I-479.
4 Omer Lutfi Barkan, 'L'organisation du travail, dans le chantier d'une grande
mosquee a Istanbul au XVIe siecle', Annales (Economie, Societes, Civilisation), no. 6
(1962), 1093- 06; idem, 'Edirne ve givarlndaki bazi Imaret Tesislerinin Yillhk Muhasebe
Bilan;olari',
Belgeler, I (i963),
235-377.
5 Omer Lutfi Barkan, 'Tiirkiye ?ehirlerinin tesekkiil ve inkiSaf tarihi bakimlndan,

Imaret Sitelerinin Kuruluy ve tIleyis tarzma ait Arastirmalar', Iktisat Fakiiltesi Mecmuasz
xxiII (1963), 239-398.

TABLE I
Yearly totals of kitchen expenses,taking as a base the ratio of goods and amoun
of the Siileymaniye Imaret for i585/6 and applying them to the prices listedf
I. Sileymaniye Imaret
(Istanbul, 1585/6)
Lamb
Wheat
Flour
Rice
Clarified butter
Honey
Almonds
Black plums
Starchd
Red grapes
Saffron
Chickpeas
Black pepper
Onions
Cumin
Firewood
Salt
Unit
Okkaa
Kileb
Kile
Kile
Kantarc
Kantar
Kantar
Kantar
Kantar
Kantar
Dirheme
Kile
Okka
Okka
Okka
Cekif
Kile
Price
(akfes)
Amount of
goods used
3-00
23'38
25'54
33'00
525'41
77,61500oo
4,482-50
40I.10
462-20
11,521
II. Fatih Imar

(Istanbul,
Total
expenditure
(akfes)
232,845
104,784
294,246
143,154
109,495
117,330
I0,326
1,978
00
4,338oo00
208-40
292'52
22-34
II73
17'70
173'70
12,420
87-99
71I50
50-20
i 66
7,423-00
12,322
30-00
119'61
0-92
8-9I
12'12
I I00
4,417
5,760
192-00
66-30
7,934
3,762-00
124-50
4,683'00
56,758
390-50
4,295
Totals
Index
3,46I
I,IIO
I,122,635
I82-49
Price
(akfes)
1489/
To
expen
(ak
I 43
110,9
13'50
50,
209,
73,
55,
52,
18-22
16'93
264-00
18o-40
I67-20
79'20
128-28
33'00
0-24
16-25
25'17
0-41
4-00
5-00
12'00
1,
9,0
I,
1,
3,
1,
I,5
23,4
4,
615,
a 1285 grams (figures taken from Viqueinel's Voyage dans la Turqulie d'Europe (P
b The Istanbul wheat kile: 20 okkas or 25-7 kilograms (35 liters); rice kile: 0ook
c 44 okkas or 56-5 kilograms.
d Edible starch, made from wheat, etc.

e 3-212
grams.
f A ceki of firewood: 18o okkas or 231 kilograms.

The price revolution of the sixteenth century 1I

TAB L E 2
Table, by dates, of the foodstuff and kitchen expenses, taking as a base
the ratio of goods and amountsfound in the balance sheet of the Siileymaniye Imaret
for I585/6 and applying these to the prices listed for other dates
(I) In akfes
No.
Date
Year's
Defter
total
number expenditure
(II) In grams-silver
Year's
total
expenditure
Index
Ioo'oo
I42-26
I79-97
472,469
639,759
755,092
Ioo0oo
I35'41
I59-82
Index
I
2
3
1489/90
1555/6
1573
o'9I
7098
6278
615,194
875,184
I,I07,173
1585/6
I954
I,I22,965
I82'48
765,862
I62-I0
5
6
7
8
9
I954
5833
5832
5039
5039
5039
5039
1,649,975
1,959,381
2,248,665
2,716,593
3,273,274
2,572,694
2,83I,I30
268-20
318-50
365-52
441-58
532'07
4I8-20
460-20
633,590
752,402
863,487
1,043,I72
1,256,937
987,914
914,455
I34-10
1I
1586/7
1587/8
1588/9
1595/6
1596/7
1599/I600
I6oo/I
159'25
I82-76
220-80
266-20
209-10
193'55
10
I2
I6o0
5039
2,966,493
482-20
958,I77
202-80
13
14
I5
I6
17
I8
I9
20
I602/3
I605
I6o5/6
I623/5
I628/9
I629
I632/3
I634/5
5039
5039
5039
5039
6019
5813
632
682
2,908,618
3,788,575
3,879,814
3,650,75I
2,635,718
2,603,42I
3,103,609
2,957,876
472'79
6I5'83
630-66
593'43
428-44
423'-9
504-50
480-80
939,483
I,223,709
1,253,I79
1,I79,132
806,529
796,646
949,704
905,I10
I98-85
259-00
265-24
249'57
I70-70
i68-6i
21
i635/6
682
I,986,904
486-52
913,992
193'45
22
I636/7
682
2,96I,130
48I-30
906,106
191-78
23
I648/9
580
2,892,179
470-I2
885,007
I87-3I
24
I655/6
989
2,84I,328
46i-86
869,446
I84-02
20I00oo
I9157
((I) The totals, in akfes, which one would have paid in those years and an index based on
1489/90. (II) Totals and index, calculated by the amount of gram-silver in the akfe at the
time.)
Table 2, which is based on various annual accounts of different imperial imarets

located in Istanbul. Number i represents the same Fatih Imaret account; numbers 4-7 come from the Suileymaniye Imaret; numbers 8-I6 and I8-23 represent
the Bayezid II Imaret; number I7 that of Selim I; and number 24 that of Sultan
Ahmet.' The price indexes continue to be computed using the total of 6I5,194
I The figures in these registers are from the annual account registers of the Imperial
imarets (Sultanin Imaretlerinin YzllzkMuhasebe Bilanfolarz), with the exceptions of nos. 2

and 3, which come from the kitchen accounts of the imperial palaces. Some of the registers
cover the solar year and some the lunar year, so some discrepancies are inevitable due to
seasonal differences. In addition, the accounts in nos. 9, i2, 15, and 19 covered only six
months or even less in the years mentioned, while that of I6 covered an eight-month
period. In all cases, where several prices appeared for individual items, average prices
paid for them have been used.

I2
Omer Lutfi Barkan
akfes for 1489-90 as the base index figure of 0oo. Because of the change in value
of the akfe coin during this time, owing not only to price changes but also to the
debasement of the coin by the state and by counterfeiters, I have reduced the
total values of food purchases given in each budget to a constant silver-gram
value to find the real cost of the items and thus arrive at an accurate comparison.
For this purpose, it was necessary to determine the actual weight and purity of the
silver coins (akfes) in use at the time of each account, and to determine its value
in relation to gold.' During the first half of the sixteenth century, from I491 to
1566, Ioo dirhems of silver were cut into 420 akfes, giving each akfe a weight of
0-73 I grams of silver. Fifty-two of these akfes equaled the value of one Ottoman
Gold Coin (altun) between i49I and I516, 55 equaled one altun from I517 to
I549, and 60 equaled an altun from I550 to I566. According to this count,
I gram of gold equaled io064 grams of silver in I49I, and 1142 grams of silver
in I560.2 The akfe's stability, however, fell rapidly during the next half century.
Following the accession of Selim II in 1566, 450 akfes were cut from Ioo
dirhems of silver instead of 420, and the amount of silver in each akfe fell from
0-73I grams to 0-682. Despite this, the government continued to try to compel
the exchange of 60 akfes for one altun gold piece. The value of silver coinage fell
rapidly as counterfeiters and money cutters reduced the amount of silver
remaining in akfes in circulation. As a result, the actual market price of silver
fell to between 80 and Ioo akfes per gold piece, and inflation followed, causing
multiple economic and financial problems. The government tried at various
times to restore the value of the akfe, but without success.
In an order issued sometime between 1584 and 1586, the Ottoman government
established a new akfe with 800 cut from ioo dirhemsof silver, each akfe weighing
only 0-384 grams. One hundred and twenty of the new akfes were supposed to
equal the Ottoman gold piece of 3-517 grams of gold. Thus, in place of the old
silver coin, where 60 akfes weighing 40-92 grams of silver equaled one gold piece,
a coin was created worth I20 akfes weighing 46-08 grams purchased the same
gold piece. The actual price of gold thus rose from I I-52 grams of silver to I3- I0.
As a result the prices of food and other materials soared, black marketeers
prospered, and those on fixed incomes suffered. In Istanbul, a general popular
uprising occurred against the administration responsible for the new coin, and
the Beylerbey Mehmed Papa and the Treasurer (Defterdar), the officials most
The figures presented here are based on the unpublished doctoral thesis of Docent
Dr Halil Sahillioglu, ' Kurulu?undan XVIIe asrin sonlarina kadar Osmanli Para tarihi
hakkinda bir deneme' (Istanbul, 1958).
2 These figures are based on Sahillioglu's study, which is based on the Tebrizi dirhem
(drachma), weighing 3-072 grams, which he states was used in the Ottoman Empire
used after that time, called Rumi,
toward the end of the seventeenth century. The dirhemn
weighed 3-207 grams. Sahillioglu states that the Ottoman gold goin called sultani contained 3-572 grams of pure gold in 1552, compared with a Venetian ducat of that time of
3'559 grams. The sultani gold piece weighed 3-544 grams between I552 and I56o, and
3-517
grams in I563.
It fell to 3-490 in I64I
and afterward to 3-464 grams. Between 1560
and I641, the Venetian ducat fell to 3-426 grams.


immediately responsible for ordering the new coin, were beheaded.' It was not
until 1589-90 that the government was able to issue new coins to replace the old
and thus restore financial stability. Despite this, the akfe continued to lose value
and prices continued to rise owing to international movements in precious
metals, changes in trade patterns, the tremendous expenditures of the Ottoman
government for various wars undertaken at the time,2 and a great population
increase which took place in most of Europe, as well as in the remainder of the
Mediterranean world, during the sixteenth century.3
It was just as difficult to maintain the akfe during this period as it would be
later. Turkey, in spite of every precaution, vacillating and floundering, found
itself firmly within the cycle of a sweeping international inflation.
According to the preface to a price schedule (Narh Defteri) dated 15 November
i6oo,4 some time after the devaluation and price regulation of 1584-6, the fineness and value of coins again began to drop and the prices of goods and food
began haphazardly to rise. Attempting to restore order in the Empire's economic
life, the state seized the depreciated coinage and brought out new akfes, standardized and fixed in their rate of exchange. It declared that it was about to apply in
the bazaars and markets a new price list, the stipulations of which would cause
a return to the old, normal prices, recently driven out of their traditional bounds.5
In addition to the work of Sahillioglu cited above, see Istanbul Belediye Kitapligi,
Muallem Cevdet MS no. B/9, as cited in Barkan, 'Tereke Defterleri', p. 447.
2
Braudel, op. cit. p. 490, shows that a similar devaluation occurred in Iran at the same
time, and that (p. 480) the money of account in most European countries also underwent
devaluation during the same period.
3 Ibid. pp. 361-83. My own research in two Ottoman censuses taken in 1520-35 and
1570-80 confirms Braudel's hypothesis regarding the Ottoman Empire in this regard.
The provinces of Anatolia increased by 56 per cent, those of Rumelia by 71 per cent, and
the 12 largest cities of the empire, excluding Istanbul, Aleppo, and Damascus, increased by
90oper cent during the sixteenth century (0. L. Barkan, ' Essai sur les donnees statistiques
des registres de recensements dans l'empire Ottoman aux XVe et XVIe siecles', Journal
of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, I (1957); idem, 'Defter-i Khakani', EI.2
At this time, it is not possible to prove a direct connection between the population increase
and that of prices. It seems to me that the former was not a cause of the latter, but that it
did make the resulting crisis more severe and dangerous.
4 Istanbul Belediye Kitapliki, Muallem Cevdet MS no. B/9 and Barkan, 'Tereke
Defterleri', p. 447.
5 As is seen in the records of the Narh Defters, the value of the akfe had fallen so much
that, while it was theoretically 120 to the altun, the official price, it really became necessary
to pay i8o akfes for one altun gold piece. In comparison, prices of goods increased as
much or even more. Now, with the coinage regulation, the akfe was returned to 120 to
one, a one-third drop, and prices of goods were caused to drop in a similar manner. Some
goods went to two-thirds of the old price. Official price lists fixed the new amounts to be
paid: bread which had been sold at I I5 dirhemsto the akfe was now to be sold at possibly
200 for one akfe; one akfe now brought 120 dirhemsof fine bread, not 8o. A kile of flour,
which had been i20 akfes, was now 8o; less acceptable flour went from 75 to 50 a kile,
rice from 56 to 39 a kile, honey from 20 to I3 an okka, an okka of butter from 26 akfes to
19. An even greater comparison is to be seen in the fall in price of imported luxury goods.
For example, a cubit of fine French velvet could fall from i ,200 to 550, a cubit of Genevese
velvet from 88o to 400, a cubit of ' newly produced' (nev-peyda) broadcloth from 300 to
I20. In the records of the Bayezid II Imaret in Istanbul (number I2 in the table), prepared

14 Omer Lutfi Barkan

The newly minted akFes would be the legal tender, accepted at 120 to the gold
altun.
This time, however, the state did not settle the problem by replacing the seized
akfes at the old rate, making good the loss from the Treasury. Instead it decided
to further devalue the akfe and took advantage of the situation to lessen its
financial straits. The old akfe of 0-384 grams, already dropped to that weight in
1586 by cutting 950 akfes instead of the traditional 800 from Ioo dirhems of
silver, now fell further to 0o323grams. Thus one gold altun, which had previously
equaled 46-08 grams of silver (that is, i20 akfes at 0o384 grams each), would now
be expected to equal only 38-76 grams (12o akfes at 0-323 grams). Or, in another
interpretation, previously one gram of gold yielded I 3I0 grams of silver, now it
was I I-o grams, thus increasing the official value of silver.
We know that after this reform, between the years 161i and 61 8, the price of
gold fluctuated between I20 and 130 akfes at the free rate of exchange,' but
toward the end of i618 the gold price began to rise. It rose because the government had once again changed the silver value of the akfe. It now cut ,000o akfes,
not 950, from Ioo dirhemsof silver, while still keeping the official rate of 120 to
the altun. Though the akfe had been debased to 0o306 grams of silver the official
rate was the same as it had been when the akfe's silver content was 0-384 grams.
Ignoring for a while the causes, we have seen that the Ottoman Empire,
caught up in the current of a great international inflation, tried ineffectually to
counter its difficulties with devaluation. Devaluation, however, led to even
greater dislocation of prices, and the empire was dragged from one financial
crisis to another, unable to move against the strong current that held it. Rather
than develop a well-thought-out economic plan, one that would consider the
financial contingencies and possibilities and have a chance of success, the government allowed the devaluation operation to drag on. State policies were ineffectual
and hopeless in the face of crises that every day became more severe. Recognizing
that the devaluation policies were one of the important causes of the increases
that had brought them to poverty, the people rioted and killed the officials who
had initiated them.
An adjustment in the coinage was made in the beginning of I6I9. From 1620
on, however, the price of gold once again began to rise - to 200 and 240 akfes
in the first months of 1623, later to 275 and 3Io akfes, finally, in the first months
of I624, approaching 400. Once again it was necessary for the state to intervene.
The workings of the coinage regulation are demonstrated in a Narh Defteri
from Bursa.2 According to this defter, an order which came from Istanbul on
a year after the officiallyfixed price went into effect, we find the following: the average
price of a kileof wheat,73'14 akfes; a kileof rice, 88 akfes; an okkaof butter,26; an okka
of honey i6; and an okkaof lamb io akfes.
Halil Sahillioglu,'XVII'nci asrinilk yarlsmdaIstanbul'daTedaviildeki Sikkelerin
Rayici', Belgeler Dergisi, vol.
2
2 (I964),
pp. 223-8.
AhmedRefik,Osmanliimparatorlugunda
Meskukat,TurkTarihEnciimeniMecmuasi,
nos. 6, 7, 8, and Io (Istanbul, 1330-40).

The price revolution of the sixteenth century I5

GRAPH I
solid lines in
Price Indexes of foodstuffs from imaret records, I490-I655;

akCes,broken lines in grams-silver
700 .
650 600550 500 r.
631
93
532
4504'400350 300-
424
418
265
267
267
Jloo3
200-
150-
l49
01
..-'
182
\20:18
142J _180
':....."'22
136
50
..... ,
as
>o?
ct ^?
./
0
?
504
473
442
250-
0'I
t:
vr
m 4
l mn
'
v< ? X-
<o?
l rmrmr
ml
169
DE
"r
i?
'
t..
O 800C
vlr In o
..
?-'
?o
r"?/ m
o o\ o
F
i-
'I
'I
"'!t ?t?n
oso
?
Year
21 November I624 ordered the circulation of a new akfe. It was to be circulated

at the rate of 8o to i Spanish real, 120 to i altun, and to be 'pure, accurate, and
true akfes, ten to a dirhem'. A price regulation was to be prepared according to
the correct market price. Similar regulations were taken in Istanbul, and the
new coin values were announced on 24 November i624.1
The exchange rate, maintained with difficulty for one or two years, once again
began to rise. It was at 130 at first, then I8o in A.H. 1036-9 (I626-9), 200 in
I040-I,
220 in 1042-4,
240 in 1045-6,
and finally 250 between 1048 and Io50
(I636-40). Once again, a new coinage adjustment was necessary.

For the coinage reform that was announced on i January I64I (I7 Ramazan
I050), it was decided that I,000 akfes would once again be cut from Ioo dirhems
of silver. One hundred and twenty 0-307 gram akfes would be given in exchange
for one Osmanh altun (at that time, either 3-490 or 3-464 grams in weight).2
Miizesi Ar?ivi, B/44, Kadi Sicilli, yp 90-91. In this official price list
I Bursa Arkeoloji
for food in Bursa, a kile of good wheat is 55 akfe, other wheat 40; barley is 20, Egyptian
rice 50, native rice 40, an okka of butter 20, of olive oil I6, of honey 12, of lamb 8 akfes.
One akfe would buy 2-5 dirhems of black pepper.
2
Concerning the coinage regulation, there exists a Narh Defteri which organizes, in
the new market price of money, the prices of every sort of foodstuff and goods in Istanbul
at this date. The prices in this defter are slightly higher than those in the defter of I6oo,
though they are figured at the same rate of exchange: an akfe will buy 200 dirhems of
bread in the I6oo defter, 150 in this one; an okka of lamb is 8 akfes in one, 9 in the other,
an okka of butter 9 and 24 akCes, an okka of honey i and 13 akces. This demonstrates
that, when needed, the official rate was flexible. (The Istanbul defter is in the Topkapi
Sarayi Museum, Revan Kitaplilg No. 1934. For the I6oo defter, see the source cited in
footnote I, p. 12.)

16
Omer Lutfi Barkan
The graph shows price changes in the Empire. Whether computed in akfes,
the official currency of the Empire, or in reals, so as to obviate the difficulties
caused by fluctuations in the akfe's silver content, the composite index of foodstuff prices in Turkey, rising quickly from 1585, reached its highest level in I606.
Although it fell a little immediately after that, the increase remained until the
middle of the seventeenth century.
If an index value of ioo is given to I490 prices, the price of food, figured in
'nominal' akfes, rose to 182 by 1585, a period of nearly Ioo years. The index in
reals - that is, the index considering the change in silver content of the akfe rose to I62. Between 1585 and I6o6 the akfe index rose to 631, the real index to
265. These increases demonstrate the extent of Turkey's involvement in international inflation.
In spite of the effects of state intervention, which took the form of fixed
official prices and the devaluation of the akfe, we are able fairly accurately to
analyze the price increase by considering prices in terms of the 'essence' of
payment, the pure silver content of the coins. Thus, even though price figures
were recorded in 'nominal' akfes, that is, the often debased akfes used at the
time, by using the real 'silver-gram weight' we can judge the degree of financial
difficulty visited on the masses of the people, on financial life, and on the state,
which made its transactions from the official rate when paying salaries and
collecting tax debts.
It should be added here that studies made in the Estate Registers (Tereke
Defterleri) and imaret records in cities such as Edirne and Bursa corroborate
accounts of price rises drawn from the yearly accounting records (yzllzkMuhasebe
Bilanfolarz) of the Istanbul imarets. In a previous study of the Bayezid II Imaret
in Edirne for the years I489-I6I6I I published exact copies of two accounting
records. According to these, a composite foodstuffs index of Ioo for I489 would
have risen to 434'4 by 16i6. Careful study reveals that the rise occurred in the
Istanbul imarets as well. We find this same tendency in studies drawn from
Tereke Defters.2 In the tereke defter of the Edirne kadzzhk(judicial district) the
price of a bushel (kile) of wheat fluctuated between 6 and 10 akfes between I540
and 1555, from 1566 it began to move from 9 to 20 akfes. We find a mean price
per bushel of 40-65 akfes from I597 to I607. (See the table on page 447 of the
work cited in footnote 2, p. I4.)
Wheat prices registered in the yearly records of the Sultan Orhan imaret in
Bursa also show a large increase. The price of wheat between I539 and I565
moved from 4-5 akfes to 7 akfes, and finally to around 8 akfes per kile. By I6I7
it had risen to 52*5. A kile of rice changed from 8 to II akfes from 1539 to 1565,
then went to 37-5 in I617. One okka (400 dirhems, or 2-8 pounds) of cooking fat
rose from 6-8 akfes to 26.8; an okka of honey from 5-6 to I6.7 akfes.
It is clear that it will be necessary to find similar accounts that will extend the
I
2
See the source quoted in footnote 2, p. 9.

Ibid.


study of prices to include items other than foodstuffs and others of the many and
varied types of charitable institutions. Our future work will hopefully bring out
whether or not these other possibilities for study exist in the Turkish Archives.
Economic conditions of the Empire in the latter part of the sixteenth century
Toward the end of the sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire underwent
a great international inflationary price and trade movement which shook the
foundations of its social and economic life. In order to understand the effects of
this movement on national finance, it is useful to investigate Ottoman 'budgets',
essential reflections of state finances and financial difficulties. It should be understood, however, that these national budgets, both in nature and form, have
a different meaning than modern national budgets. The budgets under discussion
here are summaries (icmal), end-of-the-year balance sheets of the General
Accounting Office, which it was customary to submit to the Sultan for confirmation. Few of them have been preserved and many of those that have survived were compiled according to different methods. Because of this, it is difficult
to compare and study the budgets in series or to give them complete scholarly
investigation.'
From the four budgets we will consider here, the yearly income and expenditures of the state Central Administration Office (Merkezi Devlet Idaresi) can be
summarized as shown in Table 3.
TABLE 3
Budget A,
Budget B,
Budget C,
Budget D,
I527/8
1567/8
158I/2
I669/70
221,582,402
(4,028,771)
229,034,916
(3,817,248)
221,532,423
279,649,967
(4,660,832)
277,578,755
592,528,960
Income
Akfes
Altuns2
Expenditures
150,228,282
(4,937,74i)
637,206,348
(akfes)
Difference
(akfes)
71,354,114
7,502,493
2,071,967
44,677,388
I Three of the four budgets on which these figures are based have been published in
the Istanbul University Iktisat Fakiiltesi Mecmuaszas ' Osmanli tmparatorlugu biiutelerine
ait notlar' ('Notes relating to the budgets of the Ottoman Empire'). The other will be
forthcoming in the same journal. Listed below are the dates and numbers of the volumes
in which they were published, along with the financial years of the budgets: (A) 1527/8,
in volume xv (I955); (B) 1567/8, in volume xix (I960);

(D) 1669/70, in volume xvII (I96I).
(C) 1581/2,
to be published;
2 In order to find the real measure of

value, the yearly income figures, which were
expressed in akfes in the budgets, were converted separately to gold. According to the
exchange lists (resmikur') of the times, one gold coin would convert to 55 akfes in budget
A, 60 in budgets B and C, and 120 in budget D. As was shown in footnote 5, p. I3,
and footnote 2, p. 15 above, in times of inflation the value of the akfe decreased and,
compared to the official exchange lists (resmi kur'), a different free exchange rate for gold
2
MES 6 I

I8
Omer Lutfi Barkan
It must be kept in mind when examining these budgets that numbers registered
in the 'yearly revenues' (senelikgelir) section are not all of the Empire's existing
tax records for those dates. For example, according to the budget for fiscal year
1527/8, the total tax revenue for the year was 537,929,006 akfes. Of this, only
5 percent (276,977,724) is listed as belonging to the Central Administrative Office,
under the name of the 'Sultan's Privy Purse' (Padi?ah Haslan). Thirty-seven
percent is listed by name under the accounts of 37,5I2 timar landlords, large and
small. The remaining I2 percent is found listed in the same manner, under the
names of administrators or emlak and evkaf properties.
Nor was all of the 51 percent that was under the Central Administrative
Office included in the national budget. For example, in the same I527/8
budget, 35,395,322 akfes from the 'privy purse' were never sent from the
provinces of Egypt, Aleppo, Damascus, and Diyarbekir, by order of their
beylerbeyis.The money was spent locally on pay for fortress guards and for the
provinces' soldiery. In the same way, when it became evident that a war would
be prolonged, the military commander at the front might order that the entire
incomes of the eyalets near the embattled border be spent where they were
collected. These sums were not usually included in the national budgets. If we
consider the budget of I669/70, even though the figures here are not as firm as
those above, we find that only one-fourth of the national revenue is listed in the
budget. Of an estimated 2-4 billion akfe revenue, only 592,528,960 appears.
The above reasons prove as unfounded one other notion - that as long as the
country grew through conquests the sources of money that could be used by the
Central Administrative Office would increase and new financial sources pass into
state hands. In reality, in spite of spectacular conquests and the acquisition of
vast territories, the extended wars of the last half of the sixteenth century
exhausted more and more the financial reserves of the Ottoman Empire. The
army was no longer prepared for the great tasks thrust upon it by historical
events. It seemed to show signs of fatigue and sensed the difficulty of following
the advances in armament and tactics which rapid economic evolution had given
to the West. And, what is worse, Ottoman conquests had passed the 'optimum'
territorial limit. They ceased to be of benefit to the finances of the state, while the
defense of the conquered lands created enormous expense.
This was the case, for example, in the conquered Austrian and Hungarian
territories, as well as those annexed from Iran at the end of the sixteenth century.
These provinces, after exhausting their own revenues, demanded from the
central government an annual and substantial subsidy, always composed of gold
or silver 'of good fineness'.
The example of the conquered provinces of Iran in this regard is very significant. The central government was obliged to spend, in excess of the revenues of
would be in effect. Until an adjustment was made, the superintendents of wages and
incomes (dar-gelirli maaf sahipleri) and the Financial Bureau (devlet maliye idaresi)
experienced a great many difficulties.

The price revolution of the sixteenth century I9

these territories, a large part of the income of adjacent provinces such as Aleppo,
Diyarbekir, and Erzerum. Ordinarily, these provinces furnished a large part of
the 'budget' of the central government. Forced to do without this income, the
imperial treasury became exhausted. The state was put in the dangerous position
of having to neglect important and pressing matters, such as the pay of the
soldiers quartered in the capital.
In the expenditure sections of our budgets, the most important parts are those
dealing with military expenditure. It will be seen that, during this period, the
salaries of the sultan's private troops, the Kapu Kulu Ocaks, gradually increased
their share of revenues, becoming an ever greater burden on the treasury. This
can best be understood by comparing the two most important sections of the
military, the Janissaries and the Sipahis. Table 4 lists five sets of measures: (I)
the numbers of each group; (2) each group's total yearly pay; (3) the percentage
each claimed of that year's total expenditure; (4) the average pay of the individual
Janissary or Sipahi, in akfes; (5) the individual's pay, converted into gold.x
During the period 1528-1670, the Janissary numbers increased seven times, the
Sipahi numbers three times. The increases demonstrate their relative importance
in the sultan's Hassa Ordu.
It is evident that the sums paid to the members of the two groups, figured in
gold so as to eliminate the effects of the great losses in the value of the akfe,
became smaller. This was especially true after the great devaluation of 1584-6,
when the difference between the value of the akfe and gold began to increase.
For example, the yearly pay of the Janissaries in budget D registers a 25 percent
increase in akfe over budget C. When compared with the official rate of exchange,
however, the average Janissary payment of 34-38 altun in budget C has fallen to
20o73 in D. Using the estimated 'free market' rate of 225 (or even 250) akfes to
I I o5 altun.
The average yearly salary of the Sipahis, which fell from 99-2I to 4I'I4 altun in
the table, would have gone to 2I'93 or lower, according to the free market rate.
the altun, it appears that the average yearly salary fell even lower, to
As is made clear by the above, in view of the poor economic condition of the
most respected troops of the Empire, the income of the military class had to be
increased, if their livelihood was to be insured. Because of this the soldiers were
allowed to enter fields of commerce. Thus began the destruction of military
discipline.
Continuing the investigation of the structures and facets of the budgets, it is
evident that a large portion of budget expenditures went to costs other than
kapu kulu salaries. Pay of soldiers in fortresses, the expenses of the fleet, weapons
I Also included in these budgets are the acemi oglans, the topfus, and the cephanecis,
who together amounted to I-98-3-07 percent of the national expenditure. The acemi
oglans, youths who were organized into labor battalions to work in construction, transport,
and gardening before they became Janissaries, numbered 8,ooo-Io,ooo. The topfus
(artillerymen) and the cephanecis (munitions workers) numbered I,377, 1,689, 1,645, and
2,445 in the four budgets.
2-2

20
Omer Lutfi Barkan

TABLE 4
Budget A,
Budget B,I
Budget C,
Budget D,
1527/8
1567/8
1582/3
1669/70
Number
Janissaries
Sipahis
7,866
5,o88
12,798
8,739
53,499
14,070
18,905
8,366
Group's total pay

Janissaries
Sipahis
15,423,426
30,957,300
34,264,772
39,008,0I9
29,460,I82
49,799,767
I33,968,556
69,456,552
Budget percentage
10-26
20-60
Janissaries
Sipahis
I5'42
26-84
I55IS
i8-o6
21'02
10-90
Individual's pay (akfe)

Janissaries
Sipahis
Individual's pay (altun)2
Janissaries
Sipahis
1,955
2,677
2,063
2,487
6,084
6,804
5,952
4,936
35'50
II0-62
44,62
113'40
34'38
99-2I
41I14
20-73
and ammunition, material for clothes, and meat and bread rations were important
expenses.
In the D budget, of the 637,206,348 akfe total expense, 62.5 percent (398,393,602
akfes) were spent as follows:
Item
Kapu Kulu salaries

Bread, meat, and cloth expenses
Marine arsenal and dockyard (tersdne) workers
Akfes
226,106,740
45,223,498
41,291,808
and some fleet commanders

Prices of dockyard and arsenal (tophane) materials,
23,766,976
gunpowder, and hard biscuit
Salaries of guards of certain fortresses
62,003,602
Total
398,392,624
The increase in the mean yearly income of the individuals in budget B can be
explained by the addition of 315 akfes a day made to the soldiers' pay on account of the
accession of a new sultan, which occurred during the year. 'Total Salaries' increase is due
to the increase in the number of recipients. These additions were men enrolled in the
ocaks who, together with about 5,000 of the household guards, took part in the Anatolian
wars of accession on the part of the new sultan. Later dissatisfaction among the Istanbul
Kapu Kulus caused a great number of them to be erased from the rolls. They nevertheless
still contribute to the swelling of this budget's figures.
2 These
figures, based on the official rates of exchange, estimate the amount of gold
which would equal the mean yearly salary. In these periods the difference between the
free and official rates of exchange was great. It is clear that this must have resulted in
great problems over methods of payment. On one hand the state would not have wanted
to give out, at the official exchange rate, the foreign silver coins or gold it had taken with
great difficulty from the people at those same official rates. On the other hand, those
affected would not have wanted to accept payment in akfes, because their value in the
market place had drastically fallen. For this reason, those on the imperial payroll tried as
much as possible to be paid in gold. They could then take the pay they received at the
rate of 120 akfes to the altun and change their gold back into akfes at 225 or even 250 to one.


TABLE
Item
Military expenses
Palace expenses
Expenses of bureaus
5
Akfes
398,392,602
189,208,403
5,032,512
Percentage
62-5
29-5
0-7
of the Divan
Other expenses
Total
44,572,831
7'5
637,206,348
Io00o
The general form of the D budget is explained in Table 5. The largest expenditure, more than 62 percent of the income controlled by the Central Administrative Office, went to military expenditures. Of these, the central army took the
greatest share.
In the next largest group, palace expenses, it is the monies expended on the
padi?ahznsahst (sultan's private purse) which should draw our attention.
The income of the 'Egypt Exchequer' (Misir Hazinesi), which amounted to
more than half a million altuns, paid the following directly to the padi4ahznfahsz:
from the A budget, 4'47 million akfes; from the B budget, 4-58 million; from the
C budget, 6-67 million; and from the D budget, 4-5 million. Robes of honor
(hil'at), wedding and circumcision feasts, and travel expenses were also separately
provided through the national budgets, with funds dispersed under the titles
'gifts' (bahsii) or 'alms' (sadaka).
In this section, expenses of the palace kitchens are also of the greatest importance. They were 2'5, 5'5, I3'43, and 52'5 million akfes, respectively,
a twenty-fold increase from the A to the D budget. This same period of time saw
the number of cooks and helpers in the palace kitchens rise to 277, 844, and 1372.
The expenses of the Royal Stables also formed an important part of these
expenditures. The cost of buying fodder, barley, harness implements, and carts
was, in the four budgets, 5-5, 6-73, 5-5I, and 2I million akfes, respectively. The
number of stable workers was registered at 2,830, 4,34I, 4,241, and 3,633, and
their pay at approximately 5, 6, 7, and 8 million akfes a year.
In view of the increases in both the number of palace helpers and in the payment for goods and supplies, it is hard not to gain the impression that the palace
was more and more given to luxury and ceremony. The increase in palace porters
(kapzczs),recorded in the four budgets as 319, 467, 716, and i856, respectively,
is but another sign of this.
The number of craftsmen who worked in the various workshops of the palace
was placed in the records as 886, I,oI6, 1,505, and 949.
The D budget lists I8 treasurers (hazineddrs) and 67 helpers (sakird) working
in the national treasury (di4 hazine). The sultan's privy treasury (if hazine)
employed three scribes and I6 helpers. Divan scribes numbered 37, of whom 15
were doctors.

22
Omer Lutfi Barkan
The remaining expenditures are summed up under 'Other expenses'. They

include payments made to the people of the sultan's retinue, ambassadors, yearly
payments to the Circassian emirs and Tatar khans, sums sent to the Holy Cities
for the ceremonies of the hac, and gifts made to some royal mosques which did
not have vakzf endowments.
III. THE DISORGANIZATION

AND POLITICAL
OF STATE FINANCES
AND ITS SOCIAL
REPERCUSSIONS
The introduction into Europe of a considerable quantity of precious metals,

first from Africa, later from America, caused repercussions in both the political
and military spheres. In the persons of their kings, the European states, caught
up in the feverish rush for gold and silver that characterized the times, gave their
greatest concern to commercial affairs and to enrichment of their lands in
precious metals. This desire for enrichment seemed to be especially justified by
the rise in the cost of living and the multiplication of needs which came with the
onset of modern times. Drawn forward by the powerful force of their new needs,
these states felt required to earn as much as possible, to find extraordinary
resources, and to reorganize their finances.
As their financial strength grew, however, rivalries between states increased
and European states became more and more monarchical and 'national'. The
contemporary passion for riches and the desire for ever increasing military force
dictated the assembling of a modernized national army, the improvement of
recruitment methods, and the perfection of armaments. This race to armaments
and centralized monarchical power, owing in great part to the precipitous
increase of the financial and economic potential of these states, produced both
political tension and the natural desire to use the new weapon of state, the modern
army, to gamble on conquest or ruin.
In the second half of the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire clashed with
these newly enriched states in Central and Eastern Europe and on the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean. Since these countries drew new economic
strength from African gold, American silver, and capitalist commerce, it became
increasingly difficult for the Ottomans to win victories against them and advance
into new lands. The Ottomans could not overlook the political power of their new
enemy in Iran, nor that the new world powers were laboring to harm the Empire.
Because of their pressure, the Ottomans felt the need to make war on the
enemies who were ever increasing on their borders and crush them before the
danger increased. To be able to win these wars, they were constrained to find
new sources of income.


Liquidation of the territorial 'feudal' troops and its consequences
Following the increased perfection of its opponents' armies, the Ottoman
Empire felt obliged to progressively transform the structure and armament of its
army, the greater part of which was composed of a territorial and feudal cavalry
that had proved increasingly incapable of adapting to the exigencies of modern
warfare. This military reformation, encompassing the destruction of the territorial feudal cavalry, was a great debt and direct expense to the state. It demanded
the gradual suppression of the ancient military fiefs known as timars of sipahis,
originally intended to support a large territorial army composed of the feudal
cavalry of the provinces.
Interestingly, this organic transformation of the Turkish army was accomplished without much resistance or revolt on the part of those affected by it. The
evolution of the monetary economy and the long inflation had already produced
a financial crisis in these military 'fiefs'. The revenues of the timariots, composed of medieval rights and privileges, were not able to respond to the necessary
costs of modern armament and the increased cost of living. Thus one of the first
victims of the extended inflation of the second half of the sixteenth century was
the semi-feudal military class of the territorial cavalry. Financial ruin became the
cause of their financial and military degradation.
The timariot class had been the foundation of the agrarian organization and
administration of the Ottoman Empire. Their inability to remain as a landed
aristocracy and their elimination as a class is an important phenomenon of the
history of the Empire. When this military class disappeared its place was left to
other, less organic social classes which enjoyed, because of their origin and
method of recruitment, less social and political prestige. This new class was, in
consequence, less apt to give the Ottoman society a framework that would allow
its social and economic organization to conform to the requirements of the new
times.
In addition, the concentration of an immense army in the environs of the
capital, without the counterbalance of a territorial cavalry, constituted a permanent danger to the security of the state and its maintenance created enormous
financial difficulties. Troops of mercenaries, foolishly recruited in later times,
under the pressure of events and during interminable wars, destroyed the high
quality of discipline and professional conduct that had characterized the imperial army. This army, previously so exemplary, was now a center of troubles
and revolts. Often encouraged by political rivalries, led by usurping leaders, it
exploited the least political or financial difficulty to advance its own demands.
Submitting to the pressure of its transformed army and reactionary political
force, the Ottoman government was not free in its decisions. It was always
obliged to take into account the attitudes of this retrograde and anarchic force.
The imperial army, conscious of its power, became more and more exacting in
its demands for increased salaries and privileges. It increasingly became an

24
Omer Lutfi Barkan
immense corporation whose purpose was the exploitation of the country through
the administrative and fiscal organization of the state. Army men obtained
patents as 'farmers-general' and, transgressing all ordinances and customary
laws, became active in commerce,' gaining lucratively from clandestine commerce. They opened shops and abusively exercised control over trades and commerce. This was all the more easy because of the judicial immunity of the military
and their being unaffected by corporate and state regulations.
The penetration and integration of this immense mass of unscrupulous
soldiers and usurpers, with their grotesque habits and deportment, into the
disciplined work life of the populace constituted a great burden on the social and
economic life of the country. As an agent of disorganization and impoverishment,
the army was, moreover, a cause of degradation of the morality of the people of
the time.
Thus it was that a group of usurpers on yearly military 'annuities', concentrated in the capital or dispersed into all corners of the Empire, profited from
the privileges of their class and pretended to constitute a kind of commercial
middle class. Their commerce, however, was always based on encroachment on
other businesses and their underhanded use of military privileges and allowances
to exploit the revenue sources of the state and the economy of the land. That
which produced the hoarding of the profits of the long inflation had created in
Turkey a financial capitalism, but an economically unequal and unevolved
capitalism which fell into the hands of usurping soldiers and their accomplices in
the Central Administration. Such a capitalism was in fact a hideous instrument of
waste and corruption for the state, an organization for the systematic spoliation
of the people.
Changes in the Ottomanfinancial system
Alterations in the structure of the Turkish army, by concentrating effective
troop strength in the hands of the central government, had greatly augmented
expenditures in the state budget. The thrice-yearly payment of troop salaries,
upkeep of an army and navy capable of waging modern war, extraordinary expenses caused by long and continuous wars, the cost of the more and more
luxurious life style of both royalty and high functionaries, and, finally, the
general pressure of rising prices, put the state in a dangerous financial position.
The ordinary resources of the state were no longer sufficient to fill the financial
chasm created by the expense of a giant army. It became necessary to find new
sources of revenue, to free capital, coin new money, and in fact exploit thoroughly
all fiscal possibilities:
Farmers-general were found to be a convenient and suitable tool for the
collection of the revenues of the imperial domain (which, as stated above, was
being enlarged, to the detriment of the military fiefs), and their use spread.2 In
I
2
Barkan, 'Tereke Defterleri', pp. 59-74.

This spread achieved such intensity that even the 'fiefs' of the smaller timariots and


fact, many factors combined in favor of the system of selling these revenues to
the highest bidder. First, considering the presumed waste of a bureaucratic
administration increasingly suspect of embezzlement and negligence, the new
system could not bring in less than the old state administration (emanet). The
new system was efficient in that, pushed by competition, the farmers bid against
each other and raised the prices of farms. They, of course, had to recoup their
losses from their renters. In fact, once in possession of their farms, they arranged
the extortion of every possible profit. They had found, so to speak, the secret of
unlimited exploitation, and they did not hesitate to resort to practices both
illegal and ingenious to keep it.
On the other hand, the farmers-general, by paying in advance a large part of
their debts to the state, acted as a kind of 'credit agency' in a country where the
lack of a public credit institution was severely felt. The system of giving to
bidders the revenues of the state, however, gave them the opportunity to
represent the state in the distant regions of the country, without effective control
and with all the prerogatives awarded to an agent of the Imperial.Treasury. This
both added to the oppression of the people and was a source of disorder and
financial inadequacy in the imperial administration.
Thus, pressed by the effects of a long inflation and the increase in the necessary
expenses of wars increasingly costly, the imperial government felt the need of
finding means to augment its financial resources, of gaining higher returns on its
land, and of more easily gaining funds. These needs led it toward a system of
farmers-general. This change in the financial administrative system was not only
insufficient but in the long run deficit-causing and destructive. It became necessary to find other means of erasing the budget deficits that had originated in the
mounting increase in state expenses.
In such conditions, the government was obliged to have recourse to well-known
taxation procedures which, as they were used more frequently, began to change
in nature. Like the kings of Western monarchies, the Ottoman sultans had a kind
of droit regalien which in exceptional cases allowed them to require aid from all
the subjects in the imperial domain, as well as from the 'fiefs' of their vassals.
There was, however, a great difference between the right of the sultan and the
droit regalien of European kings. Whereas the latter were restricted in their use
of absolute power to a certain number of exceptional cases, the sultan's powers
were to be used totally at his discretion. A decision of the Grand Imperial
Council (Divan), declared by aferman in the name of the sultan, was able to raise
the 'Extraordinary Taxes of the Divan' (Avdrzz-z Divaniyye) or the 'Common
Law Taxes' (Tekalif-i Orfiye) each time there was a need.'
the revenues of charitable institutions (wakfs) were being sold to contractors who
specialized in such business. This further demonstrates the tremendous need for revenues
and money, a need that gave birth to a class of financial speculators who were interposed,
to the great injury of the public interest, between the administrative cadres of the state
and the people.
See the section "Avarlz' in the Islam Ansiklopedisi, vol. 2, Istanbul.
I

26
Omer Lutfi Barkan
Because of the ease with which it was levied, this method of taxation, truly an
exception at the beginning of the sixteenth century, had become customary by
the century's end; it can be considered the beginning of modern taxation in
Turkey. In actual fact, such a taxing power was a very dangerous instrument in
the hands of a government menaced by bankruptcy. Its use was very tempting to
a central, despotic government, because it was a system of distributive taxation,
very easy to apply.
Inflation and the change in the mentality of the bureaucracy
The long period of inflation in the second half of the sixteenth century grew into
a period of severe financial crisis and social agitation for the Ottoman Empire.
While the inflation had created a class of nouveaux riches, it had no less reduced to
misery and desolation many who had formerly been comfortable. By releasing a great passion for luxury, disturbing the public morality, and producing a
sentiment of discontent and dislocation among many, the inflation constituted
a source of great difficulties for the state.
Inflation, the product of contact with the 'Atlantic Economy', significantly
changed the mentality of Ottoman bureaucrats. Inflation, the century's economic
illness, contaminated all with the sickness of unlimited spending, not least the
bureaucrats, both high and low, who were able to make illicit gains by exploiting
their public charge. The habits of petty bribery (bahsfi), intrigue, and the selling
of public office were widespread and they became the causes of the downfall of
the prestige and integrity of the imperial administration. This degeneration of
governmental morality caused an enormous squandering of government funds,
bringing the state to a financial and political crisis.
Theformation of the agricultural estate (ciftlik)
Owing to historical conditions at the time of its founding, a large part of the
agriculture of the Ottoman Empire had been divided into small peasant holdings.
This was changed through the conquest and colonization by the Ottomans of
vast territories and the destruction of aristocratic classes, among other reasons.
Well-defined historical conditions presented the Ottoman Empire with the
necessity and possibility of administering a great part of the conquered lands as
state property. The judicial and administrative machinery of state property,
however, was not sufficient to save the agrarian structure from the economic and
social crises. The continuous increase in the prices of agricultural commodities,
pushed upward by Western prices, made possible great profits in foodstuffs. In
search of these profits, the farmers-general extracted as much as possible by
means of fraudulent administration and excessive exploitation of the peasants.
Their success gave birth to a class of nouveaux riches, of obscure origin and
aspirations, oriented toward the countryside, who became a factor in the destruction of the agrarian structure which had characterized the first centuries of the
Empire. Those who had profited from the country's economic disorders and


from inflation became more and more interested in the countryside as a place for
safe and profitable investment.' Using classic methods of usury and hoarding,
they increased their agricultural exploitation, playing dual roles as usurers and
country gentlemen.
IV. TOWARD
A GRAVE SOCIAL
AND POLITICAL
UPHEAVAL
The effects of the long inflation, the influx into the villages of capital-city
usurpers, the founding of vast agricultural estates, and the exploitation of the
peasants by the state in time of financial crisis and by the farmers-general
continually and without scruple drove the peasants from the land and became
the cause of general impoverishment and rural depopulation. Inflation had also
robbed the traditional 'feudal' cavalry of its prestige and prosperity. To all
these was added another factor of desolation and misery - rapid population
growth.
At the precise moment of threat to its economic structure the Ottoman Empire
was undergoing population growth too heavy for its means of subsistence. This
exceptional demographic increase, even more than inflation and the agrarian
crisis, increased the army of unemployed, heightening the scope and destruction
of the malcontents.2
How could employment be found for these classless, uprooted people, left
without work and deprived of their means of existence?
i. The military offered extensive opportunities for employment: The interminable and exhausting wars against Persia and Austria necessitated great levies
of men to fill the gaps in the ranks of the army. It was also possible to find a place
in the personal following of a powerful man. The multitude of unemployed
(levend) constituted a reserve army of mercenaries who did not hesitate to form
their own 'companies', with their own customs and codes of honor. The documents of the time often allude to such groups, called sekbdnor sarica, as being in
the service of a governor.3 When their leader died or was removed, however,
these 'companies', who had been his personal following, were obliged to disperse
into small units and find a new master. Until they found new employment they
were forced to live off the land. Under such conditions they were easily, perhaps
necessarily, transformed into bandits.
2. A great number of the peasants driven from the land sought refuge and any
possible employment in large cities. Toward the end of the sixteenth century the
principal cities of the empire were congested with those who had come to 'end
their exploitation as peasants' (fift-bozan). The government expressed its unrest
at the cities becoming the home of crime and misery, fostered by the gathering
Barkan, 'Tereke Defterleri', pp. 30-58; Celali Isyanlarz, pp. 36-43.
See footnote 3, p. 13 above.
3 Akdag, Celali Isyanlari, p. 44; Mustafa Cezar, OsmanlzTarihinde Levendler (Istanbul,
I965), Giuzel Sanatlar Akademisi Yayinlarn, no. 28.
I
2

28
Omer Lutfi Barkan
there of people of no set occupation, living in mean and unhealthy hovels and
inns.
3. In addition to the army, the religious, cultural, and administrative sectors
should have furnished a place for the surplus population. At a time when inflation
and social dislocation cast people from their villages and their traditional classes,
however, the various cultural and administrative services were already filled
with workers of low quality. The charitable hospices open to students preparing
to enter these fields were literally inundated by students who far outstripped their
capacities. These schools became a center for idlers and malefactors of every
sort, centers of social and political agitation. In the guise of students, the unemployed, evicted from the cities, organized themselves into armed bands and
forced the peasants to maintain them.
Sometimes the peasants, already crushed by the exploitations of the imperial
treasury, fought back. Peasants and 'students' fought armed battles and the
intervention of the peace-keeping forces of the governor or, in some cases, the
imperial army, was necessary. We see, in the archive documents of 1560-85, an
endless stream of sensational reports reaching the central government of engagements between the forces of order and detachments of revolting students, and of
the atrocities committed by the students.'
From all sorts of revolts already fomenting under various names in Anatolia,
a chief of a band of obscure origin, under the name Kara Yazicl, gathered together
malcontents and mutineers and made a great army of them. The forces commanded by Kara Yazici were repeatedly able to defeat the forces sent by Istanbul
and, in turn, to have the power to occupy great cities like Kayseri, Tokat, and
Urfa. After his death, Kara Yazlci's command passed to his brother, Deli
Hiiseyin, who, with an army of 20,000, marched on the richest cities of Western
Anatolia and held them for ransom. The central government judged it wise to
compromise with him and offered important posts to Deli Hiiseyin and 400 of his
advisers, which they accepted.
In the end, arrangements such as these, using the prestige of imperial government offices to make the chiefs more easily capitulate, were not sufficient to
extinguish the conflagrations. It was increasingly necessary to send punitive
expeditions which, as much as the revolts themselves, destroyed the prosperity
of the countryside. Despoiled by both the rebellious bandits and the troops sent
to put down the revolts, the Anatolian peasant fled, abandoning his fields and
villages, forced into either nomadism or the great farms.
Medreseli
I Mustafa Akdag, 'Tiurkiye Tarihinde I9timai Buhranlar serisinden:
Isyanlarl', Iktisat Fakiiltesi Mecmuasz,vol. xI (1950).


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The Price Revolution of the Sixteenth Century: A Turning Point in the Economic History of

the near East

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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 6 (I975),

Printed in Great Britain

Omer Lutfi Barkan

Translated by Justin McCarthy

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Omer Lutfi Barkan

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The price revolution of the sixteenth century 5

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Omer Lutfi Barkan

efficient means of exploitation enabled them to bring into Europe tremendous

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The price revolution of the sixteenth century 7

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Omer Lutfi Barkan

pean commerce, sustained by strong commercial organization and encouraged by

II. WAS THERE A SIXTEENTH-CENTURY

Fahri Dalsar, Bursada Ipekfilik (Istanbul, 1960).

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The price revolution of the sixteenth century 9

5 Omer Lutfi Barkan, 'Tiirkiye ?ehirlerinin tesekkiil ve inkiSaf tarihi bakimlndan,

xxiII (1963), 239-398.

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II. Fatih Imar

c 44 okkas or 56-5 kilograms.

d Edible starch, made from wheat, etc.

f A ceki of firewood: 18o okkas or 231 kilograms.

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The price revolution of the sixteenth century 1I

Table, by dates, of the foodstuff and kitchen expenses, taking as a base

Table 2, which is based on various annual accounts of different imperial imarets

imarets (Sultanin Imaretlerinin YzllzkMuhasebe Bilanfolarz), with the exceptions of nos. 2

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Omer Lutfi Barkan

It fell to 3-490 in I64I

and afterward to 3-464 grams. Between 1560

and I641, the Venetian ducat fell to 3-426 grams.

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The price revolution of the sixteenth century 13

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14 Omer Lutfi Barkan

nos. 6, 7, 8, and Io (Istanbul, 1330-40).

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The price revolution of the sixteenth century I5

Price Indexes of foodstuffs from imaret records, I490-I655;

21 November I624 ordered the circulation of a new akfe. It was to be circulated

and finally 250 between 1048 and Io50

(I636-40). Once again, a new coinage adjustment was necessary.

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Omer Lutfi Barkan

See the source quoted in footnote 2, p. 9.

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The price revolution of the sixteenth century 17

in volume xv (I955); (B) 1567/8, in volume xix (I960);

2 In order to find the real measure of

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Omer Lutfi Barkan

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The price revolution of the sixteenth century I9

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Omer Lutfi Barkan